ISLAMIC EMIRATE OF AFGHANISTAN AND ITS GLOBAL

LEGITIMACY

By
Usama Ahmad

Registration No. AUP-18FL-BS-PS-14032

This Research Thesis Submitted to the Department of Governance, Politics and

Public Policy (GPP), Abasyn University Science Peshawar, in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor in Political

FACULTY OF MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

ABASYN UNIVERSITY- PESHAWAR
RING ROAD (CHARSSADA LINK) - PESHAWAR
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA

December 2022
 i

Abstract

After the collapse of the internationally recognized, elected Afghan government in August 2021, and
with the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, the country is facing a period of great
uncertainty. The Taliban has returned to power in Afghanistan (2021) after twenty years and have
taken control once again; they ruled Afghanistan during 1991-1996. During those five years, which
the Taliban refer to as the “First Emirate” or the “Islamic Emirate,” the Taliban governed
autocratically without ever formally enacting a constitution. They have imposed a harsh interpretation
of Islamic law despite pledges to respect the rights of women and minority communities and provide
amnesty for people who supported US efforts. Meanwhile, as they have transitioned from an
insurgent group to a functional government, the Taliban have struggled to provide Afghans with
security, adequate food, and economic opportunities. The Taliban have expressed a clear desire for a
more “Islamic system” of government and continue to call them an “Islamic emirate.” They have
anticipated the reintroduction of the type of autocratic, Islamist governance that marked the Taliban’s
rule. They are committed to establish a government consistent both with canonical theories from the
medieval Islamic tradition and with the modern Islamist project of creating an Islamic state.
Presently, the Taliban movement itself appears to contain diverse views about the forms that an
Islamic order might take. However, Afghanistan constitutions provide very different models, as well
as insight into possible future evolutions. So far, Taliban leaders have not articulated a clear vision of
how they plan to structure the state. They have softened their traditional rhetoric on Islamic values,
such as girls’ education. Some observers have expressed guarded optimism that the Taliban can be
persuaded by interlocutors from the international community and from Afghan civil society to
establish a government that differs subtly, but significantly, from that which they built during their
first time in power and to retain or refashion at least some elements of the 2004 constitutional order.
Sensitive engagement, coupled with leverage involving foreign aid and international recognition,
might encourage the Taliban to adopt a hybrid order that gives the general electorate more say and to
respect internationally recognized human rights, at least in part. Engaging the Taliban on these issues
will be extremely challenging, but if negotiators understand the paradigm through which the Taliban
see the world, and if they are able to translate their requests into an Islamic paradigm that is informed
by classical texts and the example of other modern Islamic states, then the Taliban might be
convinced to move away from some of the most authoritarian and illiberal aspects of their first
regime.
Keywords: - US withdrawal, Rise of Taliban, Islamic Emirate, Harsh interpretation of Sharia and
liberal values.
 ii

Acknowledgements

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious & the Most Merciful.

All praises to Allah and his blessings for the completion of my thesis. I thank Allah the
Almighty for all the opportunities, trails and strength that have been showered on me to finish
writing the thesis. I experienced so much during this process, not only from the academic
aspect but also from the aspect of personality.

First and foremost, I would like to special thanks to my Supervisor, Ms. Asma Dilawar for
her guidance, cooperation, understanding, patience and most importantly, she has provided
positive encouragement and a warm spirit to finish this thesis.

I would like to sincerely thanks to Prof. Dr. A. Z. Hilali, HOD: Department of Governance,
Politics, International Relations and Public Policy (GPP), Abasyn University- Peshawar, for
his encouragement, understanding, patience and most importantly, He has provided
inspiration, motivation and a warm spirit to finish this thesis.

I would like to thank all my friends who were with me and support me through thick and thin.
Most importantly I would like to thank my colleagues, Muhammad Jamal Khan (BS in
Governance and Public Policy, Mr. Fareed Ahmad (BS in International Relations) and Mr.
Muhammad Ayaz (BS in Political Science), for academic help and assistance, for their
valuable apprehensions, and support in accomplishment or my research work.

Last but not least, nobody has been more important to me in the pursuit of this project than
the member of my family. I would like to thank my parents, especially my Mother, whose
love and guidance is with me in whatever I pursue and who provide unending inspiration.

Usama Ahmad
Date: 01-09-2022
 iii

Author’s Declaration
I, Usama Ahmad s/o Mushtaq Ahmad bearing registration no. AUP-18FL-BS- PS-
14032.

Hereby state that my BS thesis titled entitled “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Its
Global Legitimacy” is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me taking any
degree from Abasyn University or anywhere else in the country/world.

At any time if my statement is found to be incorrect even after my Graduation the Abasyn
University has the right to withdraw my BS degree.

(Student’s Signature)
Name of Student: Usama Ahmad
Date: 01-09-2022
 iv

Declaration Regarding Plagiarism

I solemnly declare that research work presented in the thesis titled “Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan and Its Global Legitimacy” is solely my research work with no significant
contribution from other person. Small contribution help whether taken has been duly
acknowledged and that complete has been written by me.

I understand the zero tolerance policy of the HEC and Abasyn University Peshawar toward
plagiarism. Therefor I as an Author of the above titled thesis declared that no portion of my
thesis has been plagiarized and any material used as reference is properly referred/cited.

I undertake that if I am found guilty of any formal plagiarism in the above titled thesis even
after award of the BS degree, the Abasyn University Peshawar reserve the rights to
withdraw/revoke BS degree and that HEC and the Abasyn University Peshawar has the right
to publish my name on the HEC/University Website on which names of students are placed
who submitted plagiarism thesis.

Student Signature: ___________

Name: Usama Ahmad
 v

Dedication
This Thesis Is Dedicated To the People of Globe
 vi

Certificate of Approval

This is to certify that the Research Work persisted in this thesis entitled “Islamic Emirate
Afghanistan and Its Global Legitimacy” was conducted by Mr. Usama Ahmad S/o Mushtaq
Ahmad under the supervision of Ms. Asma Dilawar (Department of Governance Politics and
Public Policy (GPP)).

No part of this thesis has been submitted anywhere else for any other degree this thesis has to
the department of Governance, Politics, IR and Public Policies (GPP), in partial fulfillment of
the requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Sciences in Political Science.

Faculty of Management and Social Sciences

Abasyn University- Peshawar

Student Name: Usama Ahmad Signature:____________

Examination Committee

a) External Examiner: Signature: ___________

Dr. Muhammad Zubair
Assistant Prof.
Department of Political Science
University of Peshawar- Peshawar

b) Internal Examiner: Signature: ___________

Dr.Muhammad Naveed ul Hasan Shah
Assistant Prof.
Department of Governance, Politics/IR and Public Policy (GPP)
Abasyn University- Peshawar

Supervisor Name: Ms. Asma Dilawar Signature: ___________

Department of Governance, Politics/IR and Public Policy (GPP)
Abasyn University- Peshawar

Name of HOD: Prof. Dr. A. Z. Hilali Signature: ___________

Department of Governance, Politics/IR and Public Policy (GPP)
Abasyn University- Peshawa
 vii

List of Abbreviations

AK-47 Automat Kalashnikov

AKDN Aga Khan Development Network

ANDSF Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

AUMF Authorization for the Use of Military Force

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CNN Cable News Network

DC Deputy Commissioner

ETIM Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas

GDP Gross Domestic Product

IEDs Improvised Explosive Devices

IMF International Monetary Fund

IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence

ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

IS-K Islamic State of Khorasan

JeM Jaish-e Muhammad

LeJ Lashkar-e Jhanvi

LeT Lashkar-e Taiba

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDS National Directorate of Security

NGO Non-governmental Organizations

 viii

NRF National Resistance Front

SDR Special Drawing Rights

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIV Special Immigrant Visa

TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

UN United Nation

UNGA United Nation General Assembly

WHO World Health Organization

 ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....................................................................................................................................i
Acknowledgements...................................................................................................................ii
Author’s Declaration...............................................................................................................iii
Declaration Regarding Plagiarism...........................................................................................iv
Dedication.................................................................................................................................v
Certificate of Approval............................................................................................................vi
List of Abbreviations..............................................................................................................vii
Chapter- 1................................................................................................................................1
1.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................1
1.2 Theoretical Framework.................................................................................................4
1.3 Literature Review..........................................................................................................4
1.4 Statement of the Problem..............................................................................................7
1.5 Aims and Objectives of the Study.................................................................................5
1.6 Research Quetions........................................................................................................7
1.7 Significance of the Study............................................................................................6
1.8 Research Methodology.................................................................................................3
1.9 Organizational Structure of the Thesis..........................................................................7
References................................................................................................................................9
Chapter- 2..............................................................................................................................10
Prerequisite of the Legitimacy of the Taliban Government...............................................10
2.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................10
2.2 Authority and Legitimacy in Conflict-Torn Spaces....................................................11
2.3 The Taliban’s Claim of Legitimacy.............................................................................12
2.4 The Taliban’s Public Legitimacy...............................................................................12
2.5 Local Perceptions of the Taliban................................................................................13
2.6 Problem Legitimize the Taliban.................................................................................15
2.7 The United Nations Role for Rehabilitation of Afghanistan .......................................17
References...............................................................................................................................18
Chapter- 3..............................................................................................................................19
Reservations of the Great Power about Taliban’s Government........................................19
3.1 Introduction..............................................................................................................19
3.2 Rise of Taliban in Afghanistan...................................................................................19
3.4 Taliban Regain Power.................................................................................................19
3.5 Taliban Second Regime..............................................................................................20
3.6 Armed and Unarmed Opposition.................................................................................21
3.6.1 Taliban’s Power and Rule From: 1994-2001...............................................................22
3.6.2 Fall and Beginnings of Insurgency: 2001-2014...........................................................23
3.6.3 Summer 2021, Taliban Takeover................................................................................24
 x

3.6.4 The Taliban Action....................................................................................................25

3.6.5 Islamic State of Afghanistan......................................................................................26
3.6.6 Taliban the ‘Operational Art’ Military Victory..........................................................26
3.6.7 Isolating the Afghan Military......................................................................................27
3.6.8 Targeting Cohesion through Threats and Texts...........................................................28
3.7 Practicing a New Form of Terror: Kill and Compel....................................................28
3.8 Negotiating to Buy Time and Constrain Military Power.............................................29
3.9 Taliban Next Phase.....................................................................................................29
References...............................................................................................................................31
Chapter- 4..............................................................................................................................32
Western Reservations and the Taliban’s Legitimacy.........................................................32
4.1 Introduction..............................................................................................................32
4.2 Education Concerns....................................................................................................32
4.3 Media Freedoms..........................................................................................................33
4.4 Foreign Relations and Internal Security......................................................................33
4.5 Taliban People Acceptance........................................................................................34
4.6 Stretched Forces.........................................................................................................34
4.6.1 Governance in Afghanistan under Taliban Regime...................................................35
4.6.2 Taliban Control over Forces......................................................................................35
4.6.3 Economy and Reliance on Foreign Aid.....................................................................36
4.6.3 The Taliban Takeover and Challenges for Pakistan..................................................37
4.6.4 Pakistan’s Stakes......................................................................................................37
4.6.7 Opportunities and Challenges....................................................................................38
4.6.8 Afghanistan’s Economy under the Taliban...............................................................39
4.6.9 Four Key Challenges for the Taliban.........................................................................40
4.6.10 Legitimacy Challenges................................................................................................41
4.7 Security Challenges.....................................................................................................42
4.8 Governance Challenges...............................................................................................45
4.9 Humanitarian Challenges...........................................................................................46
References...............................................................................................................................48
Chapter- 5..............................................................................................................................49
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................49
5.2 Democratic Recognition..............................................................................................51
5.3 Representation at the UN General Assembly..............................................................52
Bibliography..........................................................................................................................53
 1

Chapter- 1
1.1 Introduction

Legitimacy is an old concept in international relations, the origin of which has been explored
by numerous scholars from Jean-Jacque Rousseau to Robber Dahl (Rousseau, 2018). Nation
state navigates their existence by probing popular and external legitimacy, both of which are
required to take in the affairs of the state. The denial of legitimacy, evidence in Taiwan, by
mainland china, has been an active part of Beijing’s strategy at the United Nations (Winkler,
2012). Which has had adverse effects on the island; measured in part by diminished
international stature and a nagging security dilemma that has narrowed windows for
diplomacy Legitimacy in Afghanistan has been a concerned for decades and has not
necessary grounded in the Webern sense of the term. The west has had to come to terms with
the traditions that legitimize rule in the country, especially when it has based on patriarchy,
political kinship, family, and age. (Kraemer, 2010).

The inner working of western-backed governments had been sources of anxiety for many
Afghans, particularly the ability of such mechanisms to generate legitimacy out of essential
state functions, such as social service delivery or the conduction of elections. No more corrupt
and bereft of both legitimacy and public faith were the august 2009 presidential elections,
which resulted in a victory for the incumbent, Hamid Karzai, over his rival, Abdullah
Abdullah. Security lapses, low enthusiasm, and poor voter education-as well as alleged ballot
stuffing-marred the end result (Zeleny, 2009). The 2014 election did not augur well for a free
and fairer process, although a negotiated compromise after a lengthy recount created the
national unity government of President Ashraf Ghani and chief executive officer Abdullah
Abdullah (Larson, 2016).

The work of the United Nations (UN) agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO),
and civil society groups assumed that both security and government legitimacy would be
guaranteed or that the arduous process of development would continue unabated. Aside from
the tens of thousands of international troops that were deployed to maintain peace and security
and reconstruct the country, billions were invested in the afghan national defense and security
forces. Focusing on a range of objectives, from education, good governance, infrastructure, to
agriculture.

While developmental assistance to Afghanistan had slowly declined after 2011, as donors
fatigued or became weary with the prospect of continued Afghan dependence on external
 2

resource, there were some signs of progress, particularly in terms of the education of girls,
greater participation for women in government, media development and broader economic
diversification and development. All this changed when the Taliban quickly seized control of
Afghanistan in August 2021. International development now operates in fog, with line
ministries, under the control of what many deem to be an illegitimate government. While
more than $1.2 billion has been allocated for immediate humanitarian needs, the longer-term
problem of engagement with the Taliban back in power in Afghanistan remains a lingering
concern of the international community. (Keaten, 2021).

In the aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan from the collapsed Ashraf Ghani
government, western countries and institutions have made some attempts to delegitimize and
marginalize the new Taliban regime. The United States, upon leaving Afghanistan
immediately frozen $9.5 billion in Afghan central bank assets-funds that will now be
unavailable to the Taliban, which remains on the US Treasury Department’s designated
sanctions list (Mohsin, 2021). The deprivation of the fund also means that the Taliban will not
have access to international financial institutions, an essential component of governance. In
mid-August, the International Monetary fund blocked access to more than $460 million in
reserve funds,(Rappaport, 2021), finally, the World Bank halted funding for several
Afghanistan projects, directly citing the illegitimacy of Taliban rule, a departure from its
history of funding more than $5 billion in the country since 2002 (Zumbrun, 2021). These
developments are significant as they complicate efforts by the Taliban to get gain popular and
external forms of legitimacy.

Legitimacy and recognition serve as important factors for any government to operate
independently within the confines of the state and participate in the international system. The
recognition of a government allows for several important benefits such as providing a basis
for the acceptance of representatives as diplomats, the ability to enter into treaties, the
reception of aid and development packages, and the access to state assets abroad.

The Taliban is aware that without proper external legitimacy and recognition, it will not be
able to maneuver effectively to win over the support of the Afghans or to craft or join
cooperative arrangement with other states to address a wide array of issues in the defense,
economic, and sociocultural real’s, in keeping with these aims, the Taliban recently asked UN
Secretary General Antonio Guterres to speak at the General Assembly, as well as expel
Afghanistan’s UN Ambassador Ghulam Isaczai in favor of the Taliban’s choice, Mohammad
 3

Suhail Shaheen (Wajahat, 2021). A seat at the UN would have significantly improved the
Taliban’s recognition deficit, also coupled with the Taliban would potentially moderate its
behavior, from claims of establishing an inclusive government, respecting human rights-
particularly for women, and preventing the country from becoming a heaven for terrorism.

The regime shown signs that it has begun to revert to its much more restrictive ideological
approach, preventing women and girls from attending schools or participating in the labor
force (Harrison, 2021). While the Taliban claims to have full control of Afghanistan and the
support of Afghans, the reality is much more complex. Many Afghan have gone into hiding,
the Taliban continues to search and monitor individuals who supported American and
international forces. In urban areas, Afghan fear of losing development gains achieved over
the past two decades. These factors also demonstrate the obstacles the Taliban will face in
gaining a significant degree of international support and recognition. For example, it was
assumed that Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan would be overt in their recognition of the
Taliban, but Moscow has expressed concern about the Taliban’s promise to deliver a tolerant
and sustainable government.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

This project is looking to examine Afghanistan’s Civil war through core concepts of Realism.
Realism holds that civil wars occur when the dichotomy between the domestic order and
international chaos breaks down. In such a situation, the central government loses its
legitimacy and thus people start to own back the liberty that was already given to the central
government for the sake of security. In Afghanistan, the same dynamics happened. Since the
1990s, people lost trust in the governments and thus mobilized around ethical lines to
accumulate power and seek security for them. This paper concludes that partition is the
fundamental solution for civil wars like that of Afghanistan.

In order to have a good grasp of the political events that occur every day around us, it is
crucial to know the theories around which the international relations discipline revolves.
These theories are like a pair of glasses with different colored lenses, every colours lens shows
the same thing in different colours. In the past, to have a comprehensive and clear
understanding of the political events, Thinkers devised some simplifying means or theories.
Realism, Liberalism, Marxism, Social-Constructivism, Post-Structuralism and Post-
Colonialism are the main theoretical perspectives they left behind as their immortal legacies
 4

for next generations. Among these theories, Realism has been the dominant school of
thought, for it provides the most comprehensive and best-developed answer for the most
recurring feature of human life, war (Smith, Owens and Baylis, 2011) Therefore, in this study
as a student of International relations, it would like to apply an exclusive account of realist
perspective on causes of civil war in Afghanistan and offer a realistic solution for it. The first
part of the paper reviews the core concepts of realist thought on international relations.

Now it would like to apply the above theoretical concepts of realism on the issue of civil war
in Afghanistan since the 1990s. Realism holds that when the sovereign authority of a state
collapses, intra state wars, civil wars happen for many of the same reasons that wars between
states happen. According to realism, wars between states happen because the international
system is anarchic and thus every state seeks more power and security. When there is not a
sovereign authority, to which the people already gave up their liberty in exchange of security,
people refrain more form giving up their liberty.

1.3 Literature Review

Analyzing the impact of post-colonial statehood on Third World cultures, while also
liberating this history from the straitjacket of state boundaries, Nunan’s offers an honest and
deeply illuminating global history of Afghanistan. The fact that most of these external actors
and their ideas were somehow rationalized and even encouraged by Afghans highlights the
interactive nature of this history. For instance, the appeal of ‘Pashtunistan’ among the Kabul
elite meant that most developmental projects came to be viewed as a way to support a
nationalist vision that challenged existing territorial realities. It also showed that the political
elite in Kabul, like western powers, had limited understanding of and cared little for the
requirements of the people.

In this respect, Nunan’s book (Humanitarian Invasion: Global Development in Cold War
Afghanistan) could break the heart of anyone who is interested in Afghanistan on its own
merit. It shows how failure has become a trend in the country, even when there are no good
reasons for it. Like Bayly, Nunan confirms the thesis that despite decolonization,
Afghanistan continued to remain a place where ‘knowledge entrepreneurs’ or ‘humanitarian
entrepreneurs’ let their imaginations and aspirations run wild. If such is the history of toxic
interventionism in this region, then why and how have the Afghanistan Pakistan borderlands
evaded governance and state control and still ended up becoming a fulcrum of global power
 5

play. Elisabeth Leak answers this question in the defiant border. It is often argued that
Pakistan’s continuation of the system of political agents in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) has been a sign of unquestioned acceptance of the political legacies of the
British Raj.

The ‘unruly Pashtuns’ in the mountains of the border regions, so goes the logic, are too
remote and violent to control and therefore it is to best leave them be and focus on the rest of
Pakistan. Leak demonstrates that this is far from the truth. If anything, both imperial Britain
and Pakistan tried hard to assert control over these areas, only to fail in their endeavors. The
recent military operations in north-west Pakistan, codenamed Zarb-e-Azb, then, mark the
continuation of the political process that Pakistan embarked on soon after independence.

In the first chapter, covering the 1936- 45 period, Leak details how tribal unrest and she uses
the term ‘tribal’ with the utmost caution informed British military and political planning
before and during the Second World War. Due to the 1936-1937 revolts by the ‘Faqir of Ipi’
and Axis ‘intrigues’ in the region, a large garrison had to be stationed in the tribal area,
despite gargantuan war efforts elsewhere. As the eastern bastion of the Middle East theatre,
maintaining peace in the borderlands remained critical even after the Japanese invasion of
Burma and eastern India.

Leaked shows how the region fit in US Cold War policies, as Peshawar became a base for
CIA flights over the Soviet Union; and the fifth chapter discusses developments in the region
during the presidency of Ayub Khan and the 1965 India–Pakistan war. Both these chapters
underline the fact that despite the sociopolitical marginalization of the communities of this
region, the frontier areas remained keys to the strategic interests of independent Pakistan.
They also throw light on the fact that despite Kabul’s best efforts in galvanizing support for
an independent Pashtunistan, most tribal leaders remained unsure of such political objectives.

Given the history and terrain of the region, it is hardly surprising that the US-led NATO
forces were most frustrated when operating in these border areas. Whether it was the escape
of Osama bin Laden into the mountains of Tora Bora, or the guerrilla warfare launched by
the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban against Kabul and Islamabad respectively, the borderlands
remained impenetrable. American drone operations in these areas are almost a farcical
repetition of imperial British air bombing campaigns to ‘pacify’ tribal revolts. The latter were
 6

carried out to ensure stability in the rest of India, the former to support state-building in post-
9/11 Afghanistan.

Together, Bayly’s, Nunan’s and Leake’s books form a seminal corpus of literature that
challenges arguably every floating myth about Afghanistan and its adjacent region. These
books lay bare the lazy analytical frames which most contemporary analyses apply to
Afghanistan and the Afghans. Instead of asking foundational questions about poverty, the
impact of war on society and the economy and why the country is stuck in a conflict trap
without any possible egress, most efforts are invested into crafting temporary policy
measures that ensure that the ‘gains’ of recent years are not lost. Even a brief look into this
literature will be sufficient to show that this perennial need to secure temporary gains is a
trap and will only prolong the conflict.

Maybe ‘focused engagement’ and an ‘insurgent-based approach’ to reconciliation help

stabilize the battlefield but they will surely not end the war. The urge to make Afghanistan
into something that underlying structural, social and political realities do not permit is
dangerous and doomed to failure. After all, recent western attempts to rebuild the country
into a western style democracy are little different from former efforts to reshape a Third
World state. The core issue that emerges from this important literature, therefore, is the need
both for outsiders and insiders to reimagine Afghanistan.

1.4 Statement of the Problem

The legitimacy, the support the Taliban seeks from the international community, it depends
on their conduct including centrally and centrally their respect for the rights of women when
it comes to the public and private commitments that the Taliban have made. They have made
a number of them, including their counter terrorism commitment, including the freedom of
access, freedom of travel for those who wish to leave Afghanistan, and when it comes to
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaida. Of course, the Taliban has not been
living up to the commitment it has made in the realm of human rights, “said the US state
Department Spokesperson Ned Price. Price added that Washington’s acknowledgment of the
legitimacy of the new government depends on its ensuring the rights of women and girls,
fighting terrorism, and other issues in Afghanistan.
 7

1.5 Aims and Objectives of the Study

Following are the main objectives of the study.

 To analyze the prerequisites of the legitimacy of a government;

 To evaluate the views of major powers about Taliban government; and
 To explore the challenges which are faced by Taliban in perspectives of its
Legitimacy by global community.

1.6 Research Questions

The basic questions of the research are as following?

 What are the prerequisites of legitimacy for a government?

 What are the socio-political difficulties for the recognition of Taliban government
by the global community?

1.7 Significance of the Study

As the Taliban continue to consolidate power in Afghanistan, it is inevitable that states and
institutions will have to engage with it to provide Afghans access to humanitarian assistance.
However, it must be noted that engagement merely reflects on understanding of power, but
not legitimacy. Accordingly, engaging with Taliban should be limited to area-specific
objectives, while incorporating a series of well-defined conditions- including the closing of
development workers, religious minority groups, marginalized communities, and human
rights defenders. The advantages of this leverage could push the Taliban toward moderation,
which could include greater political participation, from regular citizen input to a distant goal
of holding free and fair national elections.

1.8 Research Methodology

This research is both qualitative and analytical and will apply empirical methods. It will be
qualitative in the sense that it will narrate facts in the light of the existing sources. So,
qualitative research has involved collecting and analyzing non-numerical data to understand
concepts, opinions, or experiences. It used to gather in-depth insights into a problem or
generate new ideas for research. The material obtained from primary and secondary sources.
 8

Furthermore, qualitative research methods are designed in a manner that helps reveal the
behavior and perception of a target audience with reference to governance matter. Empirical
method will be applied in the form of structured and semi-structured interviews conducted
with scholars, experts, bureaucrats, academicians, and journalists. Analytical methods will be
used for comparison, authentication, interpretation and reinterpretation of the facts related to
the fluctuating trends in their relationship. Nonetheless, qualitative research methods based
on in-depth interview, focus groups, ethnographic research, content analysis, case study
research that are usually used. The results of qualitative methods are more descriptive and the
inferences can be drawn quite easily from the data that is obtained.

1.9 Organizational Structure of the Thesis

This research work has been divided into the following five chapters.

Chapter- 1 Introduction

This chapter includes Introduction, Literature Review, Aims and Objectives of the
Study, Research Questions, and Statement of the Problem, Significance of the Study,
Research Methodology and Theoretical Framework, References.

Chapter- 2 Prerequisite of the Legitimacy of the Taliban Government

This chapter discussed the Taliban movement rise to power and their
current government and global legitimacy, References.

Chapter-3 Reservations of the Great Power about Taliban’s Government

This chapter explained the government of Taliban since the Takeover of Kabul
on 15 August, 2021, the policy of Taliban government and imposed sharia
law, References.

Chapter- 4 Western Reservations and the Taliban’s Legitimacy

This chapter explained the role of western in Afghanistan after the US

withdrawal, Taliban violets the Human Rights and Western has been imposed
the Sanctions on Taliban government, References.

Chapter- 5 Conclusion
 9

This chapter includes the Conclusion.

Bibliography

References

Anna, Land. (2016). Resources over Reform in Afghanistan: How Changes in the Political
Economy Are Reshaping Local Politics. New York: US Institute of Peace Studies.
Barnett, R. (2006). Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate. New York: United
States Institute of Peace and Conflicts Studies.

Castellum, F. (2021). Which Taliban Leaders Are Sanctioned. California: US Institute of

Peace Studies.

David, Zucchino. (2021). Afghan Civilian Casualties Soared After Peace Talks Start.
United States: New York Times, April13, 2021.

Elisabeth, Leake. (2017). The Defiant Border: The Afghan-Pakistan Borderlands in the Era
of Decolonization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grant, Thomas. (2000). “Current Development: Afghanistan Recognizes Chechnya,”

American University International Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, PP. 869-894.

Harrison, Emma. (2022). Taliban ban Girls from Secondary Education in Afghanistan.
New York: Longfellow.

Helene, C. (2009). Obama Warns Karzai to Focus on Tackling Corruption. New York: City
University Press.

Josh, Zumbrun. (2022). World Bank Freezes Aid to Afghanistan. New York: Wall Street
Publications.

Jamey, Keaten. (2022). Donor’s Pledge $1.2 billion in Emergency Funds for Afghans. US
News, July23 (2022).
 10

Chapter- 2
Prerequisite of the Legitimacy of the Taliban Government
2.1 Introduction

The Taliban are usually depicted as ideological fighter’s religious extremists who want to
introduce harsh rules in Afghanistan, including the prohibition of music and the suppression
of women. Their mode of governance stands in stark contrast to Western ideals, with the fall
of the Taliban government in 2001 being portrayed as a victory against terrorism and human
rights abuses. However, the influence of the Taliban and other armed opposition groups is
steadily growing again throughout Afghanistan. They describe themselves as ‘jihadists’ that
fight against the government and its foreign supporters. According to a report for the US
Congress, not even 60% of the country's districts were under Afghan government control or
influence in 2017 (SIGAR, 2017). At the same time the US is welcoming direct peace talks
with the Taliban.

This framework is applied to an empirical analysis of the local perceptions of authority in

Afghanistan. Insights into these perceptions were gained through an extensive number of
interviews, conducted in different parts of Afghanistan in 2014 and 2015. This paper draws
on those interviews that were collected in the eastern province Nangarhar. It uses selected
interviews to illustrate the findings of the wider analysis of perceptions in the province. At
the time of these interviews, some districts of Nangarhar were under government rule and
others were opposition-controlled. In the government- controlled areas, the behavior of the
Taliban is perceived to be threatening and illegitimate by many, if not most.

The main concern of people in these areas is not religious extremism but the attacks the
Taliban launch and the instability they cause. But in territories under Taliban control – as
well as in some territories that are government-controlled which the Taliban can access –
some people consider the Taliban to be legitimate. The findings suggest that this legitimacy
is often not underpinned by ‘big’ ideological concerns, whether traditional or religious, but
by the perception of being treated better by the Taliban than by the government.
 11

For instance, the Taliban successfully construct legitimacy by providing conflict resolution in
a way that is perceived to be accessible, fast and fair. In the massively corrupt and volatile
political order of Afghanistan, people appear to be longing mainly to be treated with respect
and as equals, caring less about which code of law is actually applied. In some cases, the
Taliban seem to be responding to these local demands better than the government.

2.2 Authority and Legitimacy in Conflict-Torn Spaces

The literature on legitimacy usually deals with political orders that are characterized
by a high degree of monopolization of force. In such static settings, researchers can
conceptually distinguish the institutionalized ‘state’ from the ‘people’ who bestow
legitimacy. In this way, one can drill into the rational–legal source of legitimacy and
investigate, for instance, how different policies affect a state’s legitimacy. However, in a
conflict-torn space there is, by definition, a contestation of at least two authorities, if not
more. This conflict does not take place within the institutionalized structures of the state but
outside of them. Usually the state is part of the conflict, fighting with armed opposition
groups, whether they are called rebels, militias, insurgents or terrorists.

In such a dynamic setting, the analysis of legitimacy becomes more complex due to the
multiple referent objects, multiple audiences and multiple potential sources of legitimacy
(Weigand, 2015) and (Gippert, 2017).The empirical analysis of a complex concept like
legitimacy in such a dynamic setting requires a well-defined framework. It is suggested that
in order to conceptualize the political order of conflict-torn spaces the context in which
legitimacy ‘happens’ the static understanding of the Weberian ideal- typical state should be
left behind. Adopting such blinkers narrows the focus down to the degree of monopolization
of force in a defined territory.

As a consequence, conflict-torn spaces are easily dismissed as ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states, a

category based more on the absence rather than the existence of characteristics, and hence
devoid of much analytical leverage. In order to focus on what is rather than what is not,
herein the political order is considered to be dynamic and in a constant process of
transformation. In line with scholars such as Migdal and Schlichte (2005), political order is
 12

viewed in the present study as a constantly changing arena of competition involving multiple
authorities. As Agnew points out, ‘political authority is not restricted to states and is thereby
not necessarily exclusively territorial.

2.3 The Taliban’s Claim of Legitimacy

The armed opposition or ‘insurgency’ groups in Afghanistan today are commonly associated
with the label ‘Taliban’. Indeed, after successfully turning an insurgency into a government
in 1996 and being toppled again in 2001, the Taliban have returned to insurgency strategies
to subvert the current government and its foreign allies. However, armed opposition today is
a complex phenomenon, consisting of various groups and factions that change alliances fairly
readily. The history of the Taliban is closely linked to the ‘jihad’ against the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan and the subsequent civil war. In response to the occupation,
multiple Mujaheddin groups in the country took up arms to fight the Soviets, often with the
support of Western countries that were channeling money and weapons through the Pakistani
intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (Coll, 2004).

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the fall of the pro-Soviet
Najibullah government that held Kabul until 1992, the Mujahidin groups turned against each
other. Afghanistan quickly disintegrated into multiple regions controlled by different
strongmen, fighting each other with changing alliances. At that time, the southern province of
Kandahar was also divided. As foreign funding dried out in the province, competing
commanders began to mistreat the population and extract money; the highways were littered
with checkpoints of various groups who put chains across the road and demanded tolls
(Rashid, 2001) and (Kuehn, 2012).

2.4 The Taliban’s Public Legitimacy

While the Taliban portray themselves and claim legitimacy on the basis of being ‘jihadists’
and wanting to “re-establish an Islamic system” it remains unclear how their legitimacy is
perceived by Afghans. The importance of gaining a better understanding of what underpins
legitimacy in the Afghan context has been widely acknowledged. Scholars working on
peace-building, state building, development and the international intervention in Afghanistan
have emphasized that a major reason for failure is one of legitimacy (Roy, 2004). While the
international approach in Afghanistan focused on gaining legitimacy in the intervener’s
countries, local perceptions of what is legitimate or not were often ignored or misconstrued
 13

Coleman, 2017). Peace-building on this realization, most of the literature on legitimacy in

Afghanistan looks at the state and the government. More quantitative, survey-based studies
focus almost exclusively on service delivery, indicating an instrumental understanding of
legitimacy. For instance, (Sabarre, 2013) conclude that ‘perceptions of security are key
indicators of legitimacy scores’. Scholars with a more substantive understanding of
legitimacy often claim that local customs are crucial pointing at what Weber would call
traditional legitimacy. Libel emphasizes the importance of the Pashtunwali over religion for
the Pashtuns in the south and east of Afghanistan.

The Taliban’s legitimacy post 2001 on the other hand has not been investigated much.
Perception data indicates that public support for armed opposition groups in Afghanistan has
been decreasing since 2009. But this does not explain why people support the Taliban or
consider them to be legitimate. Some of the sources of legitimacy that are discussed in the
context of the Afghan state may also matter for the Taliban in particular ‘tradition’ in the
form of the Pashtunwali could still play a key role. (Liebl, 2007) suggests that the people’s
expectation in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan regarding governance rests on the
Pashtunwali.

At the same time, the Pashtunwali influences how the Taliban govern, matching local
expectations. But service delivery may also provide the Taliban with some legitimacy. (Gius,
2012) offers some helpful additional insights. On the basis of interviews with members of the
Taliban, he concludes that the provision of justice is central. When the Taliban manage to
establish a local monopoly of force, Gius Tozzi argues, they can construct legitimacy by
providing justice: ‘by and large, the Taliban seem to have greatly benefited from their ability
to mediate disputes among communities. In 2012, it could be argued that such ability is a
major source of legitimacy for the Taliban. Building on these ideas, this paper further
contextualizes the perception data and compares the Taliban’s claims to legitimacy with the
reasons why people perceive them to be legitimate or not.

2.5 Local Perceptions of the Taliban

To gain a better understanding of the Taliban’s authority and sources of legitimacy, the ways
in which they are perceived by members of the public are examined. To do justice to the
‘fluid’ nature of the Taliban, with characteristics varying spatially and changing over time, the
analysis focuses on Afghanistan’s Eastern province Nangarhar in 2014. This geographical
 14

focus complements the existing literature on the Taliban that concentrates mainly on the south
of Afghanistan.

Travelling from Kabul, it is only a three hour ride by car to the city of Jalalabad, the capital
of Nangarhar Province. The road follows Kabul River and twists down 1300 meters through
the mountains. In the mountains one can see patches of new asphalt on the road frequently,
serving as reminders of the fuel trucks that have caught fire after being shot at from the
mountains. Surabi District, which is one of the eastern districts of Kabul Province, is well
known for frequent attacks on the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Leaving the
mountains of Kabul Province behind, the road reaches the plains of eastern Afghanistan, first
Laghman Province where many people take a break for a photo with an old Soviet tank lying
next to the road and finally in Jalalabad.

The recognition of a government allows for several important benefits such as providing a
basis for the acceptance of representatives as diplomats, the ability to enter into treaties, the
reception of aid and development packages, and the access to state assets abroad. The
Taliban is aware that without proper external legitimacy and recognition, it will not be able to
maneuver effectively to win over the support of the Afghans or to craft or join cooperative
arrangements with other states to address a wide array of issues in the defense, economic,
and sociocultural realms.

In keeping with these aims, the Taliban recently asked UN Secretary-General António
Guterres to speak at the General Assembly, as well as expel Afghanistan’s UN Ambassador
Ghulam Isaczai in favor of the Taliban’s choice, Mohammad Suhail Shaheen. A seat at the
UN would have significantly improved the Taliban’s recognition deficit, also coupled with a
series of recent promises that the Taliban would potentially moderate its behavior, from
claims of establishing an inclusive government, respecting human rights particularly for
women and preventing the country from becoming a haven for terrorism.

Today, with about 200,000 inhabitants, Jalalabad is one of the biggest cities in Afghanistan.
From here it is barely 80 km to the Pakistani border. Indeed, the main currency used in this
part of Afghanistan is the Pakistani rupee. Like most other parts of Afghanistan, the
predominantly Pashtun province of Nangarhar was controlled by the Taliban from 1996 to
2001. Today governance in Nangarhar is dominated by a number of strongmen, who compete
for influence (Jackson, 2014). In the period during which the interviews were conducted, the
 15

Taliban had gained full control of many parts of the province again. However, the provincial
capital Jalalabad remained under government control, with some districts close to the city
being ‘grey’ areas, technically controlled by the government but also influenced by the
Taliban. But even though the visible presence of the Taliban in Jalalabad was low, there was
an atmosphere of fear, driven by suicide attacks, kidnappings and robberies.

2.6 Problem Legitimize the Taliban

In the aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan from the collapsed Ashraf Ghani
government, Western countries and institutions have made some attempts to delegitimize and
marginalize the new Taliban regime. The United States, upon leaving Afghanistan,
immediately froze $9.5 billion in Afghan central bank assets funds that will now be
unavailable to the Taliban, which remains on the US Treasury Department’s designated
sanctions list. The deprivation of funds also means that the Taliban will not have access to
international financial institutions, an essential component of governance. In mid- August,
the International Monetary Fund blocked access to more than $460 million in reserve funds.
Finally, the World Bank halted funding for several Afghanistan projects, directly citing the
illegitimacy of Taliban rule, a departure from its history of funding more than $5 billion in
the country since 2002.

These developments are significant as they complicate efforts by the Taliban to gain popular
and external forms of legitimacy. Legitimacy and recognition serve as important factors for
any government to operate independently within the confines of the state and participate in
the international system. The recognition of a government allows for several important
benefits such as providing a basis for the acceptance of representatives as diplomats, the
ability to enter into treaties, the reception of aid and development packages, and the access to
state assets abroad. The Taliban is aware that without proper external legitimacy and
recognition, it will not be able to maneuver effectively to win over the support of the
Afghans or to craft or join cooperative arrangements with other states to address a wide array
of issues in the defense, economic, and sociocultural realms.

In keeping with these aims, the Taliban recently asked UN Secretary-General António
Guterres to speak at the General Assembly, as well as expel Afghanistan’s UN Ambassador
Ghulam Isaczai in favor of the Taliban’s choice, Mohammad Suhail Shaheen. A seat at the
UN would have significantly improved the Taliban’s recognition deficit, also coupled with a
 16

series of recent promises that the Taliban would potentially moderate its behavior, from
claims of establishing an inclusive government, respecting human rights particularly for
women and preventing the country from becoming a haven for terrorism. In its pursuit of the
UN seat, the Taliban demonstrated a modicum of restraint by maintaining security during
their initial weeks in power.

Yet the regime showed signs that it has begun to revert to its much more restrictive
ideological approach, preventing women and girls from attending school or participating in
the labor force. While the Taliban claims to have full control of Afghanistan and the support
of Afghans, the reality is much more complex. Many Afghans have gone into hiding, as the
Taliban continues to search and monitor individuals who supported American and
international forces. In urban areas, Afghans fear losing development gains achieved over the
past two decades. These factors also demonstrate the obstacles the Taliban will face in
gaining a significant degree of international support and recognition. For example, it was
assumed that Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan would be overt in their recognition of the
Taliban, but Moscow has expressed concern about the Taliban’s promise to deliver a tolerant
and sustainable government.

In September 2021, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov highlighted that the interim
government of the Taliban failed to reflect the “whole gamut of Afghan society.”
Furthermore, Lavrov added that international recognition of the Taliban was not yet on the
table. Iran despite its willingness to enhance its economic engagements with Afghanistan,
also expressed its displeasure due to the marginalization of the Shia Hazara community in the
Taliban’s power structure. This has also resulted in Tehran’s wariness about how Taliban-led
Afghanistan will turn out vis-à-vis the Shia community.

China initially extended support and accommodation for the Taliban. Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi hosted the Taliban in July 2021, while they were still gaining ground in
the country. Yi called the Taliban a “pivotal force,” and later Beijing offered $31 million in
humanitarian aid. However, China is also keenly aware of the strategic limitations in
Afghanistan. While Beijing has expressed a long-term desire to incorporate Afghanistan into
China’s Belt and Road Initiative and monetize Afghanistan’s untapped mineral wealth,
Chinese leaders understand the security risk an unpredictable partner can pose on the
Wakhan Border, in broader Central Asia, and in Xinjiang.
While Pakistan was among the first to recognize Taliban rule in 1996, the current situation is
 17

quite different as Islamabad copes with a faltering economy and record inflation. Moreover,
Pakistan is highly dependent on the aid provided by states and international financial
institutions. Will be counterproductive for Islamabad to recognize the Taliban knowing the
negative implication in which it can result. Within the domestic political realm, Pakistan’s
parties are also divided. While Islamic hardliners have shown their great support for the
Taliban, secular parties have expressed discontent toward the Taliban’s treatment of women
and minorities worries brought by the possible proliferation of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s
terror activities are also a cause of critical concern. These factors serve as immediate
obstacles for Pakistan openly recognizing the Taliban.

2.7 The United Nation

Prior to Taliban control, Afghanistan faced a myriad of development crises, from the onset of
drought to the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Under the Ghani government,
approximately 40 percent of Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) came from
foreign aid. In addition, 90 percent of Afghans were living on less than $2 per day, and,
going into 2021, more than 18 million people were dependent on humanitarian assistance
nearly half the country’s population. As billions in national assets were frozen by the West,
the question of legitimacy has a direct impact on humanitarian and development plans by
international organizations like the UN working on the ground in Afghanistan. While the
Taliban made attempts to reassure the international community of its intentions to create a
more inclusive government, inaction has forced Guterres into appealing to partner countries
to act on a “make or break moment” for Afghanistan.

After the events of August 2021, the work of UN agencies in Afghanistan was upended, as
diplomats and practitioners worked against the pressures of security and a loss of operational
control. In the weeks after the Taliban takeover, national staff exchanged correspondence
with senior UN officials worried about the prospect of Taliban rule and their immediate
security. Some national staff reported being beaten and abused, in stark contrast to written
assurances by the Taliban that development and humanitarian workers would have safe
passage and freedom of movement.
 18

References

Agnew, John. (2005). Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in

Contemporary World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Alam, Payind. (1989). “Soviet-Afghan Relations from Cooperation to Occupation,”

International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1. PP. 111-113.

Amiry, Sharif. (2000) “Details of Taliban, Republic Demands for Talks Agenda. California”
Los Angles Times, June 7, 2000.

Barnett R. (1995). Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the

International System. London: Yale University Press.

Basit, Abdul. (2021). “Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Fence, a Step in the Right Direction”
Saudi: Al Jazeera News, August18, 2021.

Barfield, Thomas. (2012). Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.

Hanif ur Rahman. (2012). “Pak-Afghan Relations During Z.A. Bhutto Era: The Dynamics of
Cold War,” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol. 2, No. 3, PP. 12-16.

Mustafa, Zubeida. (1978). Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations and Central Asian Politics.

Lahore: Jinnah Group of Publications.

Nawaz, Shuja. (2008). Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within. London:
Oxford University Press.

Sudarshan, V. (2019). “How India Secretly Armed Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance”

Delhi: The Times of India. July 9, 2019.
 19

Chapter- 3
Reservations of the Great Power about Taliban’s Government
3.1 Introduction

The Taliban retook control of Afghanistan in 2021, two decades after being removed from
power by a US-led military coalition. The hardline Islamist group advanced rapidly across the
country, seizing province after province before taking the capital Kabul on 15 August last
year, as the Afghan military collapsed. Foreign forces, who had agreed to leave, were stunned
by the speed of the advance and had to accelerate their exit. Many Western- backed Afghan
government leaders fled, while thousands of their compatriots and foreigners fearing Taliban
rule scrambled to find room on flights out of the country.

Within weeks, the Taliban were in control of all of Afghanistan something they had not
managed to do in their first stint in power between 1996 and 2001. The group had struck a
deal with the Americans in 2020 for US troops to withdraw, following a bloody but
ultimately successful guerrilla campaign lasting many years. Under the deal, the Taliban
committed to national peace talks, which never took place, and to preventing al-Qaeda and
other militants from operating in areas that the Taliban controlled.

Following the group's return to power, Afghanistan's economy imploded, leaving a huge
portion of the population struggling to find enough money to eat and to access other
essentials. Billions of dollars in Afghan assets held abroad are frozen as the international
community waits for the Taliban to honor promises still to be met on security, governance
and human rights.

3.2 Rise of Taliban in Afghanistan

The Taliban, or "students" in the Pashto language, emerged in the early 1990s in northern
Pakistan following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. It is believed that the
predominantly Pashtun movement first appeared in religious seminaries- mostly paid for by
money from Saudi Arabia - which preached a hardline form of Sunni Islam.
3.4 Taliban Regain Power
 20

In the year following the US-Taliban peace deal of February 2020 - which was the
culmination of a long spell of direct talks - the Taliban appeared to shift their tactics from
complex attacks in cities and on military outposts to a wave of targeted assassinations that
terrorized Afghan civilians. The targets journalists, judges, peace activists, women in
positions of power - suggested that the Taliban had not changed their extremist ideology, only
their strategy. Despite grave concerns from Afghan officials over the government's
vulnerability to the Taliban without international support, new US President Joe Biden
announced in April 2021 that all American forces would leave the country by 11 September -
two decades to the day since the felling of the World Trade Center.

Having outlasted a superpower through two decades of war, the Taliban began seizing vast
swathes of territory, before once again toppling a government in Kabul in the wake of a
foreign power withdrawing. Hey swept across Afghanistan in just 10 days, taking their first
provincial capital on 6 August. By 15 August 2021, they were at the gates of Kabul their
lightning advance prompted tens of thousands of people to flee their homes, many arriving in
the Afghan capital, others heading for neighboring countries. The future for Afghans living
under the Taliban's rule remains highly uncertain. While most are relieved the war is over,
millions are struggling to survive. No country has recognized the Taliban government in the
year since they returned to power. The August 2022 killing in a US drone attack of al-Qaeda's
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul will do nothing to persuade Taliban critics that the group
has turned over a new leaf.

3.5 Taliban Second Regime

One year after toppling the internationally recognized Afghan government and seizing power,
the Taliban has consolidated its tight grip over the war-torn country. The extremist group has
monopolized power, sidelining many ethnic and political groups. It has also jailed and beaten
journalists and rights defenders who have protested the Taliban’s severe restrictions on
women’s rights and press freedom. The small, albeit sustained, resistance to Taliban rule has
failed to make significant inroads. Meanwhile, the militants have waged a bloody war against
the rival Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K) extremist group. The Taliban’s campaign has
blunted, but not defeated IS-K, which has continued to stage deadly bombings in major cities.
Experts said the biggest threat to the Taliban is growing disunity. Rifts have widened as rival
factions tussle for political power and economic resources. No country has recognized the
Taliban. But Western powers keen to soften its harsh policies and avert a humanitarian
 21

catastrophe in Afghanistan have maintained dialogue with the extremist group.

Allegations that the Taliban harbored Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahir, who was killed in
US drone strike in Kabul, has jeopardized the group’s aim to gain international legitimacy
and aid, observers said.

3.6 Armed and Unarmed Opposition

For the Taliban, it is a very big deal that their current government is the only regime in
Afghanistan's past four-decade history that controls the entire country," said Sami Yousafzai,
a veteran Afghan journalist and commentator who has tracked the Taliban since its
emergence in the 1990s.The Taliban’s territorial dominance, he said, will likely prevent a
civil war like in the 1990s when neighboring countries armed rival Afghan factions that each
held ground in different parts of the country. Even after the Taliban prevailed in the civil war
in 1996, it was unable to conquer all of Afghanistan before it was toppled from power after
the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.Afghanistan’s neighbors have been surprised at the military
strength of the Taliban, despite their economic vulnerability," said Yousafzai. “They all know
that another civil war in Afghanistan will not resolve anything but will open up a new
Pandora’s Box.

A handful of small armed groups have opposed Taliban rule in different regions of the
country. But they remain weak, divided, and have no sanctuary or outside help, experts said.
“They pose mostly an annoyance, not a threat to the Taliban regime,” said Marvin
Weinbaum, the director of Afghanistan and Pakistan studies at the Middle East Institute think
tank in Washington. The most potent anti-Taliban group is the National Resistance Front
(NRF), led by Ahmad Masud, son of former mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah Masud,
who used his native Panjshir Valley in northern Afghanistan as a base to fight Soviet forces in
the 1980s and the Taliban in the 1990s The NRF has staged deadly, sporadic attacks against
the Taliban but has been unable to wrest control of the valley.

The militant group has used brute force to quell the resistance, including the alleged killing
and torture of resistance fighters and the detention and beating of civilians. Weinbaum said
Afghanistan’s neighbors and foreign powers are uninterested in igniting a broader civil war
by arming resistance groups. “They would prefer there to be a government in Kabul stable
 22

enough to facilitate international efforts to deal with a humanitarian crisis that could unleash a
flood of refugees,” he said, adding that the international community also wants to contain the
threat posed by transnational militant groups like IS-K in Afghanistan. The Taliban has also
violently suppressed peaceful opposition to its rule. Human rights campaigners have accused
the Taliban of carrying out extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, enforced
disappearances, torture, and forced confessions as part of its effort to crush dissent. The
militants have targeted human rights defenders, women activists, journalists.

3.6.1 Taliban’s Power and Rule From: 1994-2001

In 1993-1994, Afghan Sunni Muslim clerics and students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin,
formed the Taliban movement. Many were former anti-Soviet fighters known as mujahideen.
After the 1989 Soviet withdrawal and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet-supported Afghan
government in 1992, a civil war among mujahideen parties broke out. Those former fighters
who had become disillusioned with the civil war formed the backbone of the Taliban. Many
members of the movement had studied in seminaries in neighboring Pakistan and chose the
name Taliban (plural of talib, a student, in this case, of Islam) to distance themselves from the
mujahideen.

According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Pakistan supported the Taliban because of the
group’s potential to “bring order in chaotic Afghanistan and make it a cooperative ally,” thus
giving Pakistan “greater security on one of the several borders where Pakistani military
officers hoped for what they called ‘strategic depth. Taliban beliefs and practices were
consonant with, and derived in part from, the conservative tribal traditions of Pashtuns, who
represent a plurality (though not a majority) of Afghanistan’s complex ethnic makeup and
who have traditionally ruled Afghanistan.

The Taliban viewed the post-Soviet occupation government of President Burhanuddin

Rabbani as weak, corrupt, and anti-Pashtun. The four years of civil war between the
mujahideen groups (1992-1996) resulted in popular support for the Taliban as they were seen
as less corrupt and more able to deliver stability; as Zalmay Khalilzad, later US Ambassador
to Afghanistan and Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, wrote in his 2016
memoir, like many, was optimistic about the Taliban” at the outset. The Taliban took control
of the southern city of Kandahar in November 1994 and launched a series of armed campaigns
throughout the country that culminated in the capture of Kabul on September 27, 1996. The
Taliban reportedly received significant direct military support from Pakistan in their
 23

offensives.

The Taliban quickly lost international and domestic support as the group imposed strict
adherence to its interpretation of Islam in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments,
including public executions, to enforce its decrees including bans on television, western
music, and dancing culture etc.

3.6.2 Fall and Beginnings of Insurgency: 2001-2014

On September 11, 2001, operatives conducted a series of terrorist attacks in the United States
that killed nearly 3,000 people. In a nationwide address before a joint session of Congress on
September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over AQ
leaders, permanently close terrorist training camps, and give the United States access to such
camps, adding that the Taliban “must hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.
Taliban leaders refused, citing Bin Laden’s status as their guest and what they characterized as
a lack of evidence of his involvement in the attacks.

Pursuant to an authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) against the perpetrators of
the attack as well as those who aided or harbored them (P.L. 107-40), US military action in
Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, with airstrikes on Taliban targets throughout the
country and close air support to anti-Taliban Afghan forces (known as the Northern Alliance).
Limited numbers of US Army Special Forces, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary
forces, Germany, to form a transitional government, even as Taliban forces were still fighting
in their final redoubt, Kandahar. The Taliban were not included in those talks, at which
Afghan opposition leaders selected Hamid Karzai as the interim leader of the country. Taliban
leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and others reportedly offered to recognize Karzai and
surrender their arms and Kandahar to Afghan opposition forces in December 2001, in
exchange for being allowed to return to their homes.

At a December 6, 2001, press conference, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said an

arrangement where Omar could live “in dignity” would not be acceptable, and he cast doubt
on the prospects for a negotiated settlement. Some Taliban leaders were arrested and detained;
others, like Omar, escaped to Pakistan, where many AQ leaders also fled. Some observers
assert that US. Forces, lacking AQ targets to combat, focused on low-level Taliban fighters
 24

“because they were there,” sometimes becoming involved in local disputes that were unrelated
to terrorism and contributing to the growth of the insurgency.

US officials declared an end to major combat operations in Afghanistan on May 1, 2003,

though Rumsfeld said that “pockets of resistance in certain parts of the country remain.”By
2005, scattered Taliban forces had begun to regroup in southern and eastern Afghanistan, as
well as in Pakistan, where many observers suspected they were being tolerated by, if not
receiving active support from, Pakistan’s security and intelligence services. By 2006, Taliban
forces were reported to be clashing “daily” with US and coalition forces and administering
areas of southern Afghanistan under their control. To combat the growing insurgency, US
troop levels in Afghanistan were increased after 2006, supplemented by a comprehensive
nation building effort.

By 2009, the Taliban had expanded their presence in the north, reaching areas far from the
south and east. While US observers judged that the Taliban did not have significant popular
support, a combination of factors, including widespread Afghan government corruption and
the Taliban’s provision of some basic services (including justice) allowed it to make inroads
in local communities; it also extended its influence through intimidation. The group also
adjusted its tactics, focusing on coordinated assaults against remote outposts of US and
coalition forces, as well as use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

3.6.3 Summer 2021, Taliban Takeover

Throughout 2021, Afghan officials sought to downplay the potential detrimental impact of the
US troop withdrawal while emphasizing the need for continued US financial assistance to
Afghan forces. In a May 2021 press conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Mark Milley said “bad outcomes” were not “inevitable,” given what he characterized as the
strengths of the Afghan government and military. In its 2021 annual threat assessment, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that “the Afghan Government will
struggle to hold the Taliban at bay if the Coalition withdraws support.”

An external assessment published in January 2021 concluded that the Taliban enjoyed a
strong advantage over the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in
cohesion and a slight advantage in force employment and that the two forces essentially split
on material resources and external support. The one ANDSF and National Directorate of
Security (NDS) advantage force size was assessed as much narrower than often assumed. The
 25

author concluded in his net assessment that the Taliban enjoyed a narrow advantage over the
government. The Taliban had also come to control significant territory: in October 2018, the
last time the US government made such data publicly available, the group controlled or
contested as much as 40% of Afghanistan and the group continued to make gradual gains in
subsequent years.

In early May 2021, the Taliban began a sweeping advance that captured wide swaths of the
country’s rural areas, solidifying the group’s hold on some areas in which it already had a
significant presence. The Taliban’s seizure of other districts was more surprising: some
northern areas had militarily resisted the Taliban when the group was in power in the 1990s,
making their 2021 fall to the Taliban particularly significant. One source estimated that the
Taliban took control of over 100 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts in May and June 2021. The
speed of the Taliban’s advance reportedly surprised some within the group, with one
commander saying that his forces were intentionally avoiding capturing provincial capitals
before the departure of US forces. In July, the Taliban began seizing border crossings with
Tajikistan, Iran, and Pakistan.

3.6.4 The Taliban Action

The Taliban controls more territory than at any time since the US-led invasion in 2001 toppled
the fundamentalist group from power. The fundamentalist militant group's leadership fled to
neighboring Pakistan, where it allegedly received sanctuary, training, and arms, an accusation
Islamabad has denied. From its safe havens in Pakistan, the Taliban has waged a deadly
insurgency against Afghan and international troops. The Taliban has been following what
security experts call an "outside- in" strategy that was effectively employed by other
insurgencies in Afghanistan, including the mujahedin who fought Soviet and Afghan
government forces in the 1989 in recent years, the Taliban has encroached on more populated
areas with the aim of isolating and then seizing them.

The militants have twice briefly seized control of the northern city of Kunduz, the country's
fifth-most populous the Taliban has so far been successful in seizing and contesting ever
larger swaths of rural territory, to the point where they have now almost encircled six to eight
of the country's major cities and are able to routinely sever connections via major roads,"
Schrode says. The major thing holding the Taliban back at this point is the government's
supremacy of their leadership and its superior strike forces in the form of the commandos and
 26

special police units. But those units are being worn down and the Afghan Army has been
slowly failing as an institution for the past five years.

The Taliban insurgency has been a unifying cause for some smaller foreign militant groups.
Around 20 foreign militant groups are active in Afghanistan, including Pakistani extremist
groups like the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e Jhanvi (LeJ), Lashkar-e Taiba, (leT) Jaish-e
Muhammad (JeM), and Central Asian militant groups including the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union, and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a
militant group fighting for Uyghur independence in China. Ali says the Taliban has ties to
some of these foreign militant groups. "Some of these groups operate under the Taliban
umbrella," he says. "They can't operate in Afghanistan without the Taliban's permission. Each
of these groups has a unique relationship with the Taliban operationally, ideologically, or
economically.

3.6.5 Islamic State of Afghanistan

Afghan security forces said on May 11 that they had captured the IS group's regional
leader for South Asia, Abu Omar Khorasani, in an operation in Kabul. This was the latest in a
string of recent setbacks for the group. In April, Afghan security forces in the southern city of
Kandahar captured the leader of the IS branch in Afghanistan, Abdullah Orakzai, along
several other militants. According to the United Nations, since October 2019, over 1,400 IS
fighters and affiliates have surrendered to Afghan or US forces. The US military said the IS
group's stronghold in the eastern province of Nangarhar was "dismantled" in November 2019
due to US airstrikes, operations by Afghan forces, and fighting between the Taliban and IS
militants.

The US military said around 300 IS fighters and 1,000 of their family members surrendered.
The fighters and family members who did not surrender have relocated to Pakistan or the
neighboring province of Kunar, a remote, mountainous region along the border with Pakistan,
it added. The US military estimates that there are between 2,000 and 2,500 IS fighters active
in Afghanistan.

3.6.6 Taliban the ‘Operational Art’ Military Victory

How exactly did the militant group do it? Understanding how the Taliban accomplished its
lightning-fast encirclement of the capital, as well as the next phase of the conflict, requires
 27

understanding the group’s strategy in terms of “operational art.” The Taliban of 2021 is not
the same as the Taliban of the 1990s. This Taliban is now adept at integrating military and
non-military instruments of power in pursuit of its political objectives. The Afghan
government didn’t lose the fight because most US military forces withdrew from the country.
Instead, the government’s troops were outmaneuvered by a more adaptive military
organization. The Taliban delineated specific objectives and lines of effort to hollow out the
Afghan security forces and conduct a strategic encirclement of Kabul designed to force the
government to capitulate.

The concept of operational art forms the blueprint for military campaigns, translating political
objectives and strategy into tactical actions on the battlefield. A group need not study
Clausewitz and Western military history, or attend a modern military staff college, to develop
such an art. As the Taliban has demonstrated, it need only rely on an overarching to guide its
actions. Over time, the Taliban has evolved into a military group capable of advancing along
multiple lines of effort. The shadowy insurgent network deft at executing rural ambushes and
planting IEDs has been replaced by a complex organization managing as many as 80,000
fighters who are even more skilled at using social media than AK-47s.

Their operational art combines information operations, including appeals from tribal elders
alongside text messages and Twitter, with decentralized orders that allow local commanders
who know the terrain and politics in their areas to identify opportunities for taking the
initiative. When Taliban forces achieve military success, they reinforce those advances with
hordes of commandos on motorcycles allowing the group to maintain tempo on the battlefield.

3.6.7 Isolating the Afghan Military

The collapse of the Afghan security forces was a result of operational-level isolation. In US
Army doctrine, isolation involves sealing off an enemy both physically and psychologically
from its base of support denying them freedom of movement and preventing reinforcement.
The Taliban took a deliberate approach to isolating its foe at the operational level for more
than eighteen months by taking advantage of fundamental weaknesses in the posture of
Afghan security forces. Initially, the Afghan government focused on holding terrain through
checkpoints and small outposts scattered across the country. From a political standpoint, this
posture allowed Ghani, who struggled to win broad-based political support, to appeal to
different political groups and say he was denying the Taliban terrain. But the military reality
 28

was the opposite: The approach dispersed units across the country and rendered them unable
to mutually reinforce one another. The Taliban exploited this vulnerability, disrupting ground
lines of communication in an effort to further isolate the checkpoints and set the conditions for
the defeat of Afghan forces. As the checkpoints became dependent on getting new supplies by
air, resupply missions strained an already overstretched Afghan Air Force. As a result,
maintenance issues grounded more aircraft than anti-aircraft fire did.

3.6.8 Targeting Cohesion through Threats and Texts

With Afghan security forces which likely outnumbered the Taliban by three to one isolated,
the Taliban increased activities along a second line of effort: the use of tailored propaganda
and information operations to undermine morale and cohesion. Morale and the will to fight
are critical intangibles in war as practitioners ranging from Sun Tzu to Napoleon have
observed. The Taliban further sealed off physically isolated Afghan security forces through a
sophisticated psychological-warfare campaign.

The insurgents flooded social media with images that offered surrounded Afghan security
forces a Hobson’s choice: Surrender and live or die and wonder if the Taliban will kill your
family next. More than 70 percent of the Afghan population has access to cell phones, and the
Taliban has adapted accordingly using modern, Russian-style information warfare that
deploys fake accounts and bots to spread its messages and undermine the Afghan government.

The group combined the new with the old as well, using appeals from tribal elders alongside
text messages to compel Afghan security forces to surrender. As outposts crumbled, the
Taliban sustained its momentum on the battlefield using captured military equipment not only
to resupply its forces but also to exploit images of the surrender for additional propaganda.
Put yourself in the shoes of an Afghan soldier: You are in a combat outpost, running out of
food and ammunition, fighting for an unpopular government, and forced to pay bribes due to
endemic corruption. As you look at your cell phone, all you see are images of fellow soldiers
surrendering. Even if you opt to fight, your morale and will to fight have been undermined.

3.7 Practicing a New Form of Terror: Kill and Compel

The Taliban used terror to further undermine confidence in the government and degrade
Kabul’s ability to fight. Whereas the insurgents once relied on high-value attacks using
vehicle-borne IEDs to terrorize the population and strike at the government, in the lead-up to
 29

this latest campaign they shifted their tactics to a war in the shadows that proved more
effective in undermining the legitimacy of the Afghan government.

Over the last two years, the Taliban has employed a covert assassination campaign to target
civil-society leaders and key military personnel such as pilots. The intermediate military
objective was twofold. First, it amplified the Taliban’s strategic messaging that Ghani’s
regime could not secure Afghanistan. Everyone knew the Taliban was behind most of the
assassinations, but the fact that it didn’t take credit for them made the killings seem more
Insidious. Second, the best way to destroy an air force is on the ground. Lacking sophisticated
air-defense weapons, the Taliban opted to undermine the Afghan Air Force by killing pilots in
their homes crude but effective variant of the practice of high-value individual targeting.
These attacks were designed to compel other Afghan pilots to abandon their posts.

3.8 Negotiating to Buy Time and Constrain Military Power

The Taliban integrated diplomacy with its military campaign in a way that both Afghan
security forces and the United States struggled to replicate. War is a continuation of politics.
Any battlefield activity in which the operational logic isn’t connected to clearly define
political objectives will prove self-defeating. The Taliban took advantage of the peace deal
negotiated largely bilaterally between its representatives and the United States under former
President Donald Trump. In excluding the Afghan government, the agreement undermined the
Ghani administration politically and made it difficult to maintain unity of effort between
partners in the counterinsurgency campaign.

The Taliban used the cover of the peace deal to move into position across the country,
surrounding key districts and provincial centers, while also using the negotiation process to
limit US military power. Each round of diplomatic talks constrained America’s ability to
attack Taliban targets. If there was a critical turning point in the conflict, it was the peace deal
signed under Trump: Without it, the Taliban would have struggled to isolate the Afghan
military and set the conditions for its rapid advance on Kabul. Likewise, the deal signaled to
regional actors that they needed to hedge their bets and start making provisions for the end of
the Ghani regime in Afghanistan.

3.9 Taliban Next Phase

All wars must end. But how they end matters and can determine the character of future
conflicts and their ability to spread beyond borders. The complete collapse of the Afghan
 30

security forces increases the likelihood that regional actors will engage the Taliban, shifting
from proxy support to open political relations with the group. These interactions will be
transactional exchanges, as states like Iran and Pakistan secure their borders and security
interests while countries such as Russia, China, and Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors
advance their economic interests and try to limit refugee flows and what could prove to be a
complex humanitarian emergency.

In the transition period, regional states and great powers will determine whether or not to fund
rival centers of power in Afghanistan to balance the Taliban an unlikely prospect in the short-
term given the success of the Taliban campaign. More immediately, regional actors will
increasingly view Afghanistan through a counterterrorism lens and shift their attention to
groups such as ISIS and IS-K, a mutual enemy of states in the region and the Taliban.
 31

References

Buddenburg, Doris. (2006). Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006. Kabul: United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime.

Dorronsoro, Gilles. (2005). Revolution Unending. Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present. New
York: Columbia University Press.

Foxley, Tim. (2007). The Taliban’s Propaganda Activities. Stockholm: SIPRI Project
Paper.

Gannon, Kathy. (2002). Secret ‘Night Letters’ Condemn Afghan Government as Traitors of
Islam: Urge War on US. New York: International Institute of Peace Studies.

Rashid, Ahmed. (2000). Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.
New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rashid, Ahmad. (2007). Letter from Afghanistan: Are the Taliban Winning. The New York
Times, September 2, 2007.

Olivier, Roy. (2010). Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

Maley, William, (2002) The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave: Macmillan Publisher.

Mustafa, Zubeida. (1978). Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations and Central Asian Politics.

Lahore: Jinnah Group of Publications.

Nawaz, Shuja. (2008). Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within. London:
Oxford University Press.
 32

Chapter- 4
Western Reservations and the Taliban’s Legitimacy

4.1 Introduction

One year after the Taliban's return to power, the Islamist group's efforts to manage an
economy already beset by drought, the COVID-19 pandemic, and waning confidence in the
government it toppled, have largely proven fruitless. In Afghanistan's final fiscal year before
Ashraf Ghani's Western-backed coalition government collapsed 2020-2175% of public
expenditures from the country's $5.5 billion annual budget were drawn from foreign aid. But as
the United States exited, international civilian and security aid was abruptly cut off and the new
rulers were sanctioned. The US commandeered the majority of the country's foreign currency
reserves, freezing about $7 billion held in the United States by Kabul's central bank, linking its
release to improvement of women’s rights and the formation of an inclusive government.

4.2 Education Concerns

Although US and Taliban officials have exchanged proposals for the release of the
billions of dollars frozen abroad into a trust fund, significant differences between the sides
remain. One sticking point is the Taliban's commitment to secure Afghans' rights to education
and free speech within parameters of Islamic law. Immediately after taking over, the Taliban
sought to assuage international concerns about the rights of Afghan women, insisting the Islamic
Emirate is committed to the rights of women within the framework of sharia law.

The group’s Ministry of Education promised that girls’ secondary schools from grades 7-12 would
reopen at the start of the spring semester in March 2022. However, the Taliban abruptly shifted course
on March 23, citing a need for additional planning time to designate gender- separated facilities.
To date, secondary schoolgirls in most parts of the country are waiting for a decision, while boys’
schools reopened almost immediately after the fall of President Ghani’s administration.
 33

4.3 Media Freedoms

In their first press conference after seizing power in August 2021, the Taliban said it
would welcome a “free and independent press. But over the following month, it issued a series of
media directives that critics said, in some cases, amounted to prior censorship. Female journalists
are banned from working at state-run media and those in privately run media outlets can appear
only with their faces covered; journalists in some provinces must seek permission from local
officials before reporting; and with media companies banned from broadcasting music or popular
soap operas and entertainment programs, and sources of advertising revenue cut off, many
outlets closed. Afghanistan dropped to 156 out of 180 countries on the, with Reporters without
Borders saying the return to power of the Taliban “has had serious repercussions for the respect
of press freedom and the safety of journalists, especially women.”

Apart from media restrictions, a three-day conference of Taliban leadership decided in March
that men who work at government jobs must wear beards and Islamic dress to work, that city
parks must be gender segregated, and that women may not travel by air without an
accompanying male relative, or mahram. The Taliban also ordered shopkeepers to remove the
heads of all mannequins, calling them un-Islamic. The provincial branch of the Taliban’s
Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice also banned women from
bathhouses in Balkh and Herat provinces. For many of the women in these provinces, their only
access to a bath was these hammams.

4.4 Foreign Relations and Internal Security

Internally, the Taliban’s greatest threat comes from the Islamic State-Khorasan Province
ISIS, IS-K and al-Qaeda. While the number of bombings has dropped across the country since
the Taliban seized power, a school bomb blast killed at least six people in April. There also was a
string of bomb attacks in May 2022, some of which the Islamic State claimed responsibility. A
Sikh temple was targeted in Kabul in June, killing two and injuring seven, and a bomb blast at a
cricket match in Kabul in July left two dead. On the international front, the Taliban has not been
recognized by any country as yet, but the Taliban leadership was invited to an international
conference in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, that included delegates from 30 other countries, including
the EU, the US and representatives of the United Nations. Western governments, however, insist
 34

on seeing the Taliban improve its record on women’s and human rights. China has maintained
direct communication with the Taliban administration, and both sides have met on several
occasions, bilaterally and internationally, to discuss plans for Afghanistan’s reconstruction.
Beijing also has been active in various international, multilateral and bilateral talks on Afghan
issues with regional governments and international powers. International organizations like the
Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) continue their work on improving historical
structures, parks and structural facilities.

4.5 Taliban People Acceptance

The government of President Ashraf Ghani failed to meet the aspirations of the people, as
their standard of living barely improved with poor basic services such as health and education.
The government was mired in corruption, while the security situation remained precarious,
forcing thousands of Afghans to leave the country. Many notorious militia leaders and their
henchmen were rehabilitated despite their atrocious human rights records and corruption.

People were frustrated and ready for change, but that does not mean they welcome the return of
the Taliban. "In many parts of Afghanistan, people are subjected to Sophie's choice of a
repressive Taliban regime or a government that extracts far more than it provides,” said Jonathan
Schrode, the research program me director at the Center for Naval Analyses based in the US
state of Virginia. “While some Afghans certainly have strong preferences and support one side
versus the other, a great number are caught in the middle of not being particularly enthusiastic
about either side,” said Schrode, who heads the Countering Threats and Challenges Program.

4.6 Stretched Forces

In a span of weeks, the armed group captured most of the provincial capitals, including
the capital Kabul, in a virtually unopposed, lightning military sweep that brought back memories
of US-trained Iraqi troops fleeing battlefields in face of marauding Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) fighters in 2014.The Taliban launched its military offensive in May as US-led
foreign forces started to withdraw from Afghanistan as part of an agreement the group signed
with the US on February 29, 2020, in the Qatari capital Doha. Afghan security forces either
surrendered (after mediation from local tribal elders) or withdrew, giving the Taliban fighters a
walkover in some northern and western provinces. Advisers to the previous government headed
 35

by President Ghani, who has since fled the country, say the former government’s decision to
withdraw government troops from remote areas backfired, as it allowed the Taliban to build
momentum and strike fear among the remaining troops.

4.6.1 Governance in Afghanistan under Taliban Regime

The Taliban have yet to demonstrate their ability to effectively govern. They did not do
so when they ruled Afghanistan, and they have not shown such ability in the areas they currently
control in the country,” said Schrode from Cable News Network (CNN). The Taliban have at
times been credited with being good at maintaining security albeit through very heavy-handed
means and providing efficient forms of traditional justice, but they have little to no technocratic
understanding of how to perform the other functions of government.

The group will likely struggle to provide effective governance to the people of the country as the
government does not have much revenue to spend on public services – this is the essence of its
problems today. “There are the issues of retaining enough manpower, bureaucracy and civil
servants to run the affairs of the government. With an exodus of people, one vulnerability could
be an insufficient number of professionals and people in the technocratic cadres to run state
institutions,” said Omar Samad, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council (SIGAR, 2020).

4.6.2 Taliban Control over Forces

The war against a foreign occupation united the Taliban’s rank. Now, when these fighters
become governors and mayors and have access to incoming revenues and authority will they go
down the same route previous governments followed, and end up accused of corruption and
abuse of power this will be an interesting dynamic to watch. The Mujahedeen struggled with this
in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal when they no longer had the unifying cry of defeating the
godless communists and turned their weapons on each other,” Schrode said referring to the war
against Soviet occupation in the 1980s.The Taliban are aware of this risk and have spent the past
seven years or more improving the vertical and horizontal linkages within their organization to
strengthen its cohesion. To what extent those efforts will prevent Taliban fighters from deciding
to cease the fight when the rallying cry of foreign invaders is gone remains to be seen,” he said.
 36

4.6.3 Economy and Reliance on Foreign Aid

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world and more than 20 percent of its
gross income comes from foreign aid. The US froze $9.5bn of Afghan central bank’s assets in
the wake of the Taliban takeover, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended
access to its funds. Many other Western donors might follow suit, making it extremely difficult
for the new government to run the economy in a country where 75 percent of public spending
comes from grants. Significant mineral wealth remains underground as instability has prevented
major exploration and international investment. Although the Taliban have been talking to
Russia and China about possible economic cooperation projects, it remains to be seen how that
will materialize.

It would also need humanitarian agencies to provide urgent aid to Afghans displaced by the war.
More than 5 million Afghans are estimated to be internally displaced. The UN says nearly
400,000 people have been displaced this year alone as a result of ongoing violence. But with aid
agencies, including the UN, pulling their staff out of the country, things will be difficult for
people dependent on foreign aid. In order to unlock international funding, the international
community’s recognition of a Taliban government will be key, as the group is still blacklisted by
the UN. The Taliban has shrugged off the idea of reliance on foreign aid, saying its fighters
survived on bread and water while fighting the war. The question remains: Can it convince
millions of Afghan civilians to live without the foreign help they have relied on for years.

In order to unlock international funding, the international community’s recognition of a Taliban

government will be key, as the group is still blacklisted by the UN. The Taliban has shrugged off
the idea of reliance on foreign aid, saying its fighters survived on bread and water while fighting
the war. The question remains: Can it convince millions afghan civilians to live without the
foreign help they have relied on for years? It is also an opportunity for foreign donors and aid
agencies to persuade the Taliban to accept their terms in return for aid. But Jonah Blank, a
lecturer at the National University of Singapore said: “Money is not really as powerful a tool as
some outsiders might think.
 37

4.6.3 The Taliban Takeover and Challenges for Pakistan

In more than 40 years of civil strife, war and instability in Afghanistan, it would not be
wrong to say that its neighbors have often pursued their own strategic interests by manipulating
the Afghan political field, even at the expense of peace in the country. Since the interests of
Afghanistan’s Neighbors have varied, they could hardly agree on any one formula. Instead, the
country became an intersection of proxy conflicts not only between superpowers, but also
between neighboring states jockeying to empower their favored political factions.

These political machinations were most visible in the 1990s, when different Mujahedeen groups
were bankrolled by external supporters on the basis of their ethnicities and sects. Pakistan mostly
backed Pashtun groupings and eventually threw its weight behind the Taliban, while the Central
Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as well as Iran extended their support to
the forces of the Northern Alliance. However, current developments suggest that for the first
time, Afghanistan’s Neighbors have decided not to intervene in the country, and the Taliban
takeover has occurred with their tacit approval although they have emphasized that the Taliban
should form an all-inclusive government.

4.6.4 Pakistan’s Stakes

Afghanistan’s eastern Neighbors, Pakistan, remains the most critical player in this new
mix. Pakistan shares Afghanistan’s longest border, which runs from the Wakhan Corridor in the
northeast to the junction of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan near the Iranian city of Zahedan in the
southwest. Both countries and their populations have remained connected by religious, tribal and
cultural bonds. On the political front, however, they have a rather cheered history, and apart from
a brief period in the late 1990s when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan during which their regime
was recognized by only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates bilateral relations
have remained uneasy. The militant movement’s return to power presents Pakistan with
geopolitical opportunities, but also challenges. Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban dates to
the mid-1990s, and continued even after the previous Taliban regime was overthrown by the US-
led intervention in 2001. Owing to the alleged presence of the Taliban’s top leadership in
Pakistan, this association has been viewed as extremely close. However, the linkage has seen its
fair share of ups and downs, and both sides have gone against each other on multiple occasions.
 38

In a clear violation of international law, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, and handed him over to the
US. Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies also arrested the group’s cofounder, Mullah Abdul
Ghani Baradar, in 2010 and kept him in prison for eight years, only releasing him in 2018 at the
request of the US. Additionally, Pakistan has for some years attempted to develop a working
relationship with the Tajik and Hazara political factions in Afghanistan in a bid to diversify its
engagement with local actors. The Taliban for their part have actively tried to engage with other
regional stakeholders, particularly Iran, to develop strategic autonomy in their operations in
Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban has also remained silent on the attacks of the Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) against Pakistani security forces and civilians. The Taliban even issued a
veiled threat to Pakistan’s security services when they were approached by the US for the
possible provision of air and military bases.

4.6.7 Opportunities and Challenges

Against this backdrop, the emergence of the Taliban as the ultimate power-holders in
Kabul does serve some of Pakistan’s strategic interests. From a Pakistani perspective, for the last
20 years, Afghanistan has been ruled by governments that have allowed India to strategically
embed itself in the country. This Indian presence has allegedly translated into support for Baloch
insurgents and the TTP, which have been involved in terrorist activities within Pakistan. The
departure of an Afghan government that had become increasingly hostile towards Pakistan will
likely diminish India’s structural presence and its use of Afghan soil against Pakistan. This will
invariably relieve Pakistan’s security establishment from a two- front engagement against India
and Afghanistan. Pakistan can also act as a bridge between the Taliban regime and an
international community reluctant to recognize it as a legitimate government.

There has been concern in Pakistan as the Taliban offensive across Afghanistan has resulted in a
mass release of prisoners, including senior leaders of the TTP. Pakistan has fenced off most of its
border with Afghanistan, but these TTP elements could still pose a significant challenge to the
Pakistani state, particularly in the districts of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
The Afghan Taliban have more than once affirmed that Afghan soil will not be used for activities
against any other country by foreign militants, but they have shown a reluctance to take a clear
position on the TTP issue, while also airing concerns on the fencing of the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border.
 39

This situation is far from ideal from a Pakistani perspective, but as the new Taliban regime faces
political and economic isolation from much of the world, its dependence upon Pakistan will
increase even further, giving Pakistan even greater leverage on the TTP issues .The Taliban’s
dominance in Afghanistan has given Pakistan a geopolitical edge over India in the broader
Central Asian region. A stable Afghanistan could become a strategic conduit between Pakistan
and the Central Asian republics and help Pakistan realize its geo-economics ambitions in the
region. Yet, for this to happen, the Taliban must reach a political consensus with other Afghan
stakeholders. Barring a political agreement, peace and stability will remain elusive, and the
country’s potential to develop into an economic and energy corridor linking South Asia with
Central Asia will never be realized.

4.6.8 Afghanistan’s Economy under the Taliban

In August 2021, Afghanistan succumbed to the Taliban at lightning speed. However, the
new regime will soon be overrun by another foe: an economic crisis. In response to the Taliban
takeover, the United States froze $9.5 billion in foreign reserves, Germany suspended $300
million in aid, and the IMF suspended $440 million in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation.
The sum of this foreign aid made up 40% of Afghanistan’s GDP. To make matters worse, the
new government must also swim through a sea of pre-existing sanctions tied to the Taliban since
2001. The Taliban’s takeover was a challenge that pales in comparison to their next mission:
governing during an economic crisis.

It is unclear whether the Taliban are up for the task. Afghanistan’s economy has transformed in
the twenty years since the previous Taliban regime. According to the World Bank (WB),
Afghanistan’s GDP has almost quintupled between 2002 and 2020, jumping from $4 billion to
$19.8 billion. This growth was driven by the influx of foreign aid into a highly centralized
government. The international community flooded the weak, corrupt system with funds both
keeping the Afghan government afloat and preventing it from being held accountable to Afghan
citizens.
 40

4.6.9 Four Key Challenges for the Taliban

Amid the growing security concerns of the last two years, many expected the fall of
Afghan districts and provinces to have a domino effect; however, no one expected that it would
lead to a spectacular collapse of the Afghan government, including former Afghan President
Ashraf Ghani fleeing the country on August 15, 2021. The Taliban rapidly overtaking Kabul was
beyond the expectations of almost all experts; Afghans, including senior government officials;
the US government and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies; regional
legitimacy, security, governance and how to deal with the humanitarian needs of ordinary
Afghans. The Ghani government’s collapse brought everyone into uncharted territory.

The Taliban taking control of Kabul spawned many urgent crises, including: the evacuation of
US personnel, international forces and allies from Afghanistan; efforts to prioritize the
evacuation of US citizens and eligible Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders and their families;
the rush of thousands of Afghans to the airport in Kabul; the need to protect the diplomatic
community and immediate security needs on the streets of Kabul given the sudden presence of
Taliban fighters and no clarity on who was in charge. The Taliban and their facilitators also did
not know how to handle the growing crisis. As the Taliban overtook Kabul, the world watched to
see how they would portray themselves in the near term, how they would govern and whether
they have become more moderate since the 1990s or will pose new challenges. Absence of
government is a big void to fill.

In the aftermath of the Taliban takeover, it became evident that no national or international actors
were prepared to handle this crisis, nor did they have a plan ‘B’ for the worst-case scenarios. It
took three weeks for the Taliban to coalesce their internal factions and announce some interim
appointees for national-level cabinet positions. This paper does not address how and why the
Ghani government collapsed, what mistakes were made by national leaders and the international
community or how the enormous effort of the last 20 years, at a cost of $1 trillion and thousands
of lives, was lost in 10 days in August. Failures in Afghanistan have called into question
international diplomacy and policies of all national and international actors in that country.

It is a question that political scientists, historians and military experts will analyze and debate for
years to come. in this paper, what address some of the Taliban’s internal rivalries and the long-
term governance challenges Afghanistan’s new leaders will face in part because they do not
 41

understand the dynamics of the new Afghanistan. What attempt to explain what we can expect
next. Each of the four areas where the Taliban face challenges demands a comprehensive and
robust preach by the group as well as the international community?

4.6.10 Legitimacy Challenges

It will not be easy for the Taliban to overcome several legitimacy issues both
domestically and internationally. Their decisions thus far are out of step with Afghan and
international values. Without a broad consensus, the Taliban renamed the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan the Amarit-e-Islami (Islamic emirate) of Afghanistan. Despite calls from
Afghan civil society not to remove the tri colored Afghan flag discarded Afghanistan’s 2004
constitution. The Taliban have appointed a caretaker government, composed of 33 ministers
and several deputies, to manage day-to-day business. But there is no clarity on the law by
which this administration is run. The caretaker appointments represent the Taliban’s old
guard with very few new faces. A clear majority are graduates of Pakistani madrassas
(religious seminaries), including the Haqqani madrassa in Akora Khattak.

The list of caretaker government officials includes some who have done a substantial amount
of time It. Military prisons in Guantanamo Bay and Bagram and who remain on US and UN
sanctions lists this will constrain the caretaker government’s ability to engage with the
international community. Further, on the few broad decisions that Taliban leadership has
made since taking Kabul, there is a lack of consensus among the leaders, revealing cracks
within what has until now been a highly cohesive movement. The Taliban’s caretaker
government is modeled on the same system that they had in the 1990s: it has both a spiritual
leader and a prime minister or head of government.

The caretaker government is neither ethnically balanced, nor does it include women or
governance professionals. In a video that was widely circulated on social, national and
international media, the new caretaker minister of higher education, Molvi Abdul Baqi
Haqqani, questioned the relevance of higher education. In his first speech, he said, “[N]o
Ph.D. degree or master’s degree is valuable.” Some followers of the Haqqani network, a
Taliban partner, have introduced the black abaya for women (a full-length outer garment) in
educational institutions dress which is contrary to Afghan tradition and customs.
 42

in both Kabul and the provinces, the Taliban have beaten local journalists and killed former
government officials, including those who spoke out against the group. Such brutality and
retributive killings are ominous signs of things to come. Nooruddin Turabi, the former
Taliban justice minister who is now running the prisons in Afghanistan, recently said the
government will bring back amputations and executions as punishments.

Another key legitimacy issue centers on Pakistan’s support for Because the Taliban took
power by force and have ignored international and domestic calls for an inclusive
government and the protection of human rights and the freedom of press, speech and
assembly, it will be difficult for the international community to recognize the Taliban
government anytime soon. As Ghulam Isaza, who was appointed by the Ghani government
to serve as Afghanistan’s permanent representative to the United Nations, wrote on Twitter,
17 of the 33 Taliban cabinet members are on the UN sanctions list. At the time of writing, no
country, not even Pakistan, Qatar or China, all of which have close ties with the Taliban, has
recognized the Taliban government. For the foreseeable future, most countries are unlikely to
have normal state-to-state relations with this caretaker government.

4.7 Security Challenges

The Taliban are currently comprised of three factions: the Haqqani network, a trusted
ally of Pakistan 'Sisi; the political wing, represented by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar; and
the military wing, represented by Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir, Mullah Mohammad Yaqoub
(the son of Taliban founder Mullah Mohammad Omar), Mullah Mohammad Fazel Mazloom
and Mullah Ibrahim Sader. A Row erupted between the Taliban’s political and military
wings days after the caretaker government was set up. According to Al Jazeera press reports,
Baradar, who serves as first deputy prime minister in the caretaker government, and Minister
for Refugees Khalil Haqqani argued in the presidential palace in Kabul while their followers
came to blows nearby. Baradar was unhappy about the structure of the caretaker government.

The dispute reportedly was over who deserved more credit for the Taliban’s victory, with
leaders of the military wing claiming that victory was only possible because they had
defeated the international forces, while Baradar wanted greater emphasis on the role of peace
negotiations conducted by the political wing. Leaders of the military wing did not want an
 43

inclusive government. They argued for the revival of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan of
the 1990s, saying that if this was not done, they could not hold together their rank-and-file
fighters.

Further, the military wing was unhappy with the leaders of the Haqqani network, Conducted
some public engagements and engaged former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, former
Afghan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah and Senate Chairman Abdul Hadi Muslim Yar
in talks about forming an inclusive government. However, in the first week of Taliban rule,
the military wing immediately appointed people it trusted Sader as acting interior minister
and Zakir as acting defense minister. The former Guantanamo Bay prisoner, Abdul Haq
Wasiq, who was deputy of Taliban Intelligence during the previous regime of the 1990s, was
appointed acting director of intelligence. Wasiq was responsible for establishing contacts
with other international terrorist networks and was one of five Taliban prisoners released
from Guantanamo Bay in exchange for US Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl in 2014.

The military and political wings of the Taliban are mostly members of southern clans of
thePashtun ethnic group. They do not accept the hegemony of other Pashtun groups in the
east and south of Afghanistan, including the Haqqani network, whose members are mainly
from region of Loya Paktika that abuts Pakistan. The Haqqani network, meanwhile, has
argued that its suicide squads played a critical role in defeating Afghan and international
forces. They will likely lobby to have a more dominant role in the Taliban government. It is
important to note that the Haqqani network joined with the Taliban in the later stages of the
insurgency but kept separate command and control centers.

The Haqqani's have better relations with Pakistan and some of their leaders have reportedly
resided in Islamabad. in contrast, the Taliban’s political wing is more pragmatic and better
understands the reality of Afghanistan and the international community due to its
engagement with different national and international diplomats during the peace talks in
Doha. However, they lack the military strength to control all groups of the Taliban. Most
members of the political wing were arrested, tortured or kept under close surveillance in
Pakistan. Baradar was arrested in Pakistan, Omar died mysteriously, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor
was killed in Pakistan, and Taliban leader Sheikh Habibullah Akhundzada’s whereabouts are
a mystery. Pakistan has less control of or influence over the Taliban’s political wing,
 44

compared to its he second security challenge for the Taliban will be how to deal with the IS-
k. There is the risk that disaffected rank-and-file Taliban fighters might join IS-K. As a
former governor of Nangarhar province, I have seen firsthand how IS-K poses a threat to the
Taliban; IS-K quickly took over most of the Taliban’s territory in a few southern districts of
Nangarhar in 2019. It was only after Afghan government forces, backed by air and ground
support from the NATO-led Resolute Support mission, pounded IS-K bases and defeated
them in their last stronghold in Achin district of Nangarhar did the Taliban reappear in some
mountainous areas. Taliban former governor was recently informed by a contact in
Nangarhar that the Taliban are carefully checking all traffic entering the provincial capital,
Jalalabad, in search of IS-K fighters. Taliban former governor believes that the Taliban will
face serious security challenges from IS-K. The third security challenge for the Taliban will
be how to deal with political opponents and potential scattered, armed resistance in different
parts of Afghanistan.

Even though such resistance may not prevail because of a lack of credible national resistance
figures, pockets of resistance could be destabilizing in the short or long run. The Taliban will
also face challenges in the north and the northeast of Afghanistan from some extremist
groups such as the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU).

The fourth security challenge is how to integrate former militias, ANDSF soldiers and the
Taliban’s own rank and file. Even during normal processes of reintegration, this is a
significant challenge. If the Taliban cannot help these various former combatants to
reintegrate into society, many may join terrorist and criminal networks. As many reports
have suggested, the Taliban receive major funding from illicit drug trafficking, mining and
the timber trade; they also levy local taxes on people and organizations. If the Taliban stop
paying their own fighting forces due to a lack of funds, those Taliban involved in criminal
networks will continue to get money.
 45

4.8 Governance Challenges

The Taliban face multiple governance challenges. Public legitimacy is the necessary
foundation for governance, but as discussed above, the Taliban will have difficulty gaining
legitimacy given the fact that they have already contradicted national values and ignored public
opinion. The people of Afghanistan expect that their lives under the Taliban should be better than
under the previous government. But delivery of basic services will be difficult because the
Taliban lack the human resources and international support which the previous government had.
The flight of human capital from Afghanistan over the last month has been a huge setback for the
Taliban. It will be difficult to fill the void in order to run the government machinery in the near
future.
More than one million government workers, including security sector personnel and teachers,
had not received their salaries for up to three months at the time of writing. (Non- Payment of
salaries was also a problem in the last couple of months of the Ghani administration.) The US
Federal Reserve has frozen all of Afghanistan’s foreign exchange reserves, the IMF has frozen
Afghanistan’s access to all IMF resources and the World Bank has stopped payments to the
Taliban government. A major challenge for the Taliban will be running the fiscal and financial
management system of Afghanistan. They do not have the human resources to run the system,
collect revenues and distribute the resources to different levels of ministries, provinces and
districts because the officials who had these responsibilities under the previous government have
either left the country or are simply not showing up to work. Previously, the United States and
other international donors funded roughly 80 percent of the Afghan government’s budget. Now,
with donors having stopped that assistance, the Taliban faces a massive budget shortfall.

The Taliban called back some former government employees and security personnel to restart
the engine of bureaucracy, but too few have returned to work for the government to reach its
previous level of operations. Imports and exports are down, and revenue generation has declined.
The prices of basic commodities have already gone up in local markets. Given this dire fiscal
situation, poverty and unemployment have increased. Based on information from friends,
relatives, government officials and the business community, the economy has stalled because the
financial sector is not operating as it used to. In the very few bank branches that have reopened.
 46

4.9 Humanitarian Challenges

The Afghan people are in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. The population’s limited
ability to obtain cash, together with job losses and months of nonpayment of salaries to hundreds
of thousands of public servants and members of the security forces, is exacerbating an already
dire situation caused by a prolonged drought, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the
large-scale displacement of people due to violence. Most borders and crossing points are closed
for travel and trade. The prices of daily commodities have gone up 30 to 75 percent. The United
Nations has warned that 95 percent of families do not have enough food, and that food insecurity
is affecting people in cities at a rate similar to that in rural areas.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has warned that the health system is on the brink of
collapse and less than one-fifth of Afghanistan’s largest networks of health clinics remain open.
The United Nations has released $45 million to address the immediate needs of the health sector.
Basic needs is putting pressure not only on the Taliban government, but also the international
community, to respond and fast. Recommendations for the International Community are
imperative for the international community to engage with the Taliban. Yet diplomatic
recognition of the new government, and engagement with it, should be conditions-based.

First, the international community should push for access for humanitarian aid delivery, for an
end to extrajudicial killings and punishments and the harassment of former government officials,
for girls’ access to education and for allowing Afghans’ freedom of movement to and from
Afghanistan. Second, the international community should establish a third-party mechanism to
monitor the Taliban’s actions with respect to human rights, freedom of assembly and free speech.
Such a monitoring body should be charged with reporting on the abuse and punishment of
former government officials, security personnel and human rights defenders. Third, Afghans and
the international community should demand that the Taliban establish greater legitimacy for their
government. The Taliban can do this through different mechanisms: by holding a representative
loya jirga which could approve an interim government, which could then pave the way for
elections and a future representative system of government.
 47

At the time of writing, it is not known what constitution or legal system will apply in
Afghanistan. In the 2002 emergency loya jirga, it was decided that Afghanistan would be run
under the 1964 constitution until a new constitution could be drafted and approved by the
constitutional loya jirga. To maintain national legitimacy, the Taliban should keep the previous
tri colored flag which represents Afghanistan, rather than a flag that represents one political
faction. Many Afghans will refuse to work under the white factional flag of the Taliban.

Fourth, the Taliban should establish a good mechanism with international organizations for the
distribution of humanitarian assistance to immediately address food shortages in remote areas of
Afghanistan as well as in the big cities before food insecurity becomes a national catastrophe.
The above four recommendations are the bare minimum confidence-building measures that the
international community should pursue vis-à-vis the new Taliban government. If the Taliban fail
to address the lack of legitimacy of their government, it will be extremely difficult for them to
overcome the security, governance and humanitarian challenges that they face.
 48

References
Edelman, Howard. (2006). Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home.
London: Ashgate Publisher.

Filkins, Dexter. (2002). A Tribe in Prey to Vengeance after Taliban’s Fall in the North.
The New York Times, February 17, 2002.

Fein, Helen. (1993). Discriminating Genocide from War Crimes: Vietnam and
Afghanistan Reexamined,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 22: PP. 29-
62.

Giustozzi, Antonio. (2001). Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics,
and the Rise of the Taliban. Washington: University of Washington Press.

Pierre-Arnaud , Chouvy. (1999). Taliban’s Drug Dilemma: Opium Production vs.

International Recognition. Paris Publishing Company.

Rasooli, Shirshah. (2021). Govt Emplyees Face Closed Offices, Unpaid Wages, Afghanistan.
Washington: Washington University Press.

Stobodan, P. (1999). The Afghan Conflict and Regional Security. New York: Institute of
Strategic Analysis.

Tomsen, Peter. (2000). Response: A Chance for Peace in Afghanistan the Taliban’s Days
are Numbered. London: Pall-Mall.

Wintour, Patrick. (2021). “Taliban Reassure UN over Safety of Humanitarian Workers in

Afghanistan,” Strategic Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2021), PP. 222-230.

Yusufzai, Rahimullah. (2001). “A Question of Tolerance,” The News (International), April

17, 2001.
 49

Chapter- 5
Conclusion

In the immediate future, the Afghan National Government as well as the international
community needs to make national and local governance in Afghanistan their priority and
allocate adequate resources for improving this sector. Out of the three pillars of Afghanistan
reconstruction and stabilization efforts (security / development / governance), the governance
pillar still receives far too little attention, despite some progress in recent years. The Rapporteur
pleas for a more balanced approach, elevating governance to the same level of importance as the
other two pillars. So far, there is a tendency to think that security is the key precondition for good
governance. In fact, vice versa is also true.

On August 10, the US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad went to Doha to tell the Taliban that if they come
to power through force they will not be internationally recognized. A statement by a number of
states, namely China, the United States, UK, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Germany, India, Norway,
Qatar, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Turkey as well as representatives of the United Nations and
the European Union, have “reaffirmed that they will not recognize any government in
Afghanistan that is imposed through the use of force,” effectively conditioning recognition on
gaining power through a “future political settlement.”

The UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has even gone so far as to state that recognition is
“the only leverage that exists” over the Taliban whilst pushing for a united front among UN
member states. The British Prime Minister has said that nobody should bilaterally recognize the
Taliban as the government of Afghanistan as there would be a new administration in the country
and that like-minded countries should do “whatever we can to prevent Afghanistan lapsing back
into being a breeding ground for terror.” The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that
“A future Afghan government that upholds the basic rights of its people and that doesn’t harbor
terrorists is a government we can work with and recognize.” Though he then later went on to
acknowledge that the Taliban were the de facto government of Afghanistan. French President
Macron stated that France has initiated a dialogue with the Taliban whilst confirming that this
did not amount to recognition of the group as the country’s legitimate leaders. He stated that
“Let’s be clear: it is the Taliban who are in control of Kabul. In an operational, practical way, we
 50

must have these discussions. Warmer relations between Russia and the Taliban mark a difference
from those which existed when the Taliban were in power previously. In 2000 the Taliban had
recognized the secessionist government of Chechnya and also recognized Chechnya as an
independent State following which the Chechen government then opened an embassy in Kabul.
This thawing is probably due to the fact that the Afghan Taliban has given specific assurances to
both Russia and China that it will not support Chechen and other rebels against Russia, Uighur
rebels against China and they have also promised Iran that they will not provide bases for Saudi-
supported anti-Iranian Sunni rebels.

Pakistan has stated that recognition will be a regional decision and it will not be taking any
unilateral steps in this regard. However, its Foreign Minister has also said that the international
community should develop a roadmap which leads to diplomatic recognition of the Taliban in
which they are not isolated and expectations regarding human rights are fulfilled. Pakistan is
proposing that the international community develop a road map that leads to diplomatic
recognition of the Afghan Taliban with incentives if they fulfill its requirements and then sit
down face to face and talk it out with the group's leaders. Most States are adopting a wait and see
approach where they are hesitant to be the first country seen to legitimize the Taliban’s taking of
power. If their doubts are sufficiently overcome, and the regime is able to consolidate power
over time, it is likely that an implicit recognition of their de jure status as a government will
follow.

Some experts suggest abandoning the idea to implement a Western model of constitutional and
secular governance, transferring political power to the jirga system, security responsibilities to
warlords and judiciary to local elders and shores. However, while on the tactical level one should
be prudent and flexible, the constitutional/secular model must remain as the ultimate objective.
The “Arab Spring” shows that no nation should a priori be considered as not being ready for
democracy. So far, all success stories of governance in Afghanistan (e.g. governor of Helmand
Gulab Manga, or Minister of Agriculture (Asif Rahimi) depend largely on the integrity and
efficiency of concrete individuals.
 51

To ensure sustainability of good governance, however, the international community and the
government of Afghanistan must embrace a more comprehensive approach and to build a system
which includes the presence of vibrant civil society, unlocks bottom-up initiative, encourages
inclusiveness and transparency, promotes widespread literacy and education, ensures the right
balance between various branches of government as well as provides adequate funding. In terms
of more specific policy areas.

The recognition of governments is a highly uncertain area of international law with little clarity
owing to the fact that it is largely left to States as to which governments they recognize and
which they do not and the reasons underlying that decision. It is too early to tell whether the
Taliban’s de facto control over Afghanistan will ripen into the jure control. However, one of the
key requirements, that of effective control, does appear to have largely been satisfied, in that they
are independent, arguably enjoy the habitual obedience of the population, and control the capital
city. They are able to stay in power in a sustainable manner which is not temporary is as of yet
unclear.

However, the speed with which they have defeated the Afghan government and the fact that any
opposition has not yet led to a formidable adversary to the Taliban or been given international
support suggests that this consolidation may be tenable. If so, it is likely that more States will
implicitly recognize the Taliban without making any express declarations to that effect, this
could be by way of diplomatic relations or through bilateral treaties.

5.2 Democratic Recognition

In the past 25 years since the Cold War, there has been an increase in interest in the role
of democratic legitimacy in recognizing governments. The question, however, as to whether it is
a distinct criterion for recognition is debatable. States have at times refused to recognize
governments that have come to power through revolution or through violence. In Haiti in 1994
and Sierra Leone in 1998, the international community sided with an ousted yet democratically
elected government which lacked effective control in order to restore democracy against an
insurgent government.61 States may refuse to recognize a non-democratic regime which usurps a
democratically elected government in an effort to persuade the government to transition back to
democracy. For instance, the US broke off diplomatic relations with Iran following the Islamic
 52

Revolution in 1979 and imposed sanctions against. However, the US has acted inconsistently in
this regard having had no issue with recognizing Musharraf’s government in Pakistan despite the
fact that it came into power through a military coup. Significantly though, international law does
not prohibit revolutions as a means of governmental change and therefore, not complying with a
country’s constitutional processes should not preclude recognition. Moreover, there are dozens
of nondemocratic States in Africa and the Middle East that are recognized by the international
community. Most scholars also agree that a customary law norm on the non-recognition of
governments established anti-democratically has not yet emerged with effective control
remaining the primary criterion for legitimacy.

5.3 Representation at the UN General Assembly

In the UN General Assembly, a credentials committee gives recommendations on who

should be allowed to represent each member state. These recommendations are based on a
review of the credentials submitted by state representatives to ensure that they comply with the
Assembly’s procedural rules. The Committee’s recommendations are then voted on by the entire
Assembly. The Assembly may agree to the recommendation or defer its decision. Regimes are
often represented and agreed to by the Assembly that some other member states choose not to
recognize. In the past, the Assembly has deferred making a decision on submissions from
Afghanistan from 1997 to 2000 both the Rabbani Government and the Taliban submitted
credentials. The Assembly deferred its decision allowing Rabbani’s representative to participate
until the Interim Authority took office in December 2001. The credentials of this authority were
then accepted by the Assembly.

The currently accredited Afghan Ambassador submitted a list of Afghanistan’s delegation for the
General Assembly’s 76th annual session on September 15 The Taliban submitted a
communication to the Secretary-General on September 20 nominating a UN new permanent
representative for Afghanistan. They also stated that the former representative no longer
represents the country as that administration has now been ousted. It is likely that the Assembly
may go on deferring its decision as per its previous practice.
 53

Bibliography

Agnew, John. (2005). Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary
World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Alam, Payind. (1989). “Soviet-Afghan Relations from Cooperation to Occupation,”

International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1. PP. 111-113.

Amiry, Sharif. (2000). Details of Taliban, Republic Demands for Talks Agenda. Kabul:
Institute of Research and Analysis.

Al Jazeera. (2021). “Taliban Announces Normal Government in Afghanistan.” July12, 2021.

Anne, Schuit. (2021). Recognition of Governments in International Law and the Recent
Conflict in Afghanistan. London: Royal Institute of War Studies.

Bernard, Lewis. (1993). Islam in History, Illinois: Open Court. New York: Columbia
University Press.

Edelman, Howard. (2006). Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home.

London: Ashgate Publisher.

Eric, Newby. (1981). A Short Walk in the Hindu Kush. London: Frank Leroy Cross
Publisher.

Filkins, Dexter. (2002). A Tribe in Prey to Vengeance after Taliban’s Fall in the North. New
York Times. March 7, 2002.

Fein, Helen.(1993). “Discriminating Genocide from War Crimes: Vietnam and Afghanistan
Reexamined,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 3, No. 22, PP. 29-
62.

Malise, Ruthven. (2001). Signposts on the Road: the Nature of al-Qaida and the Parochialism
of Western Intelligence. London: Times Literary Supplement.
 54

Malik, Hafeez. (2000). Pakistan, Islam and the Taliban Phenomenon. New York: Noble &
Noble Press.

Maley, William, (2002). The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave: Macmillan Publisher.

Nawaz, Shuja. (2008). Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within. London:
Oxford University Press.

Nagesh, Ashitha. (2021). “Afghanistan’s Economy in Crisis After Taliban Take-over”, BBC

News, April, 2021.

Nebehay, Stephanie. (2021). Drought Leaves Afghans Hungry as Economic Collapse Looms.

New York: UN Reuters.

Olivier, Roy. (2010). Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

Paul, Kennedy. (2002). Bernard Lewis asks what went wrong. New York: Columbia
University Press.

Paul, M. Lubeck. (2000). The Islamic Revival: Antinomies of Islamic Movements Under
Globalization. London: Oxford University Press.

Ruth, Rene. (2010). Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People. San Francisco: Asia
Foundation.

Rubin, R. (1997). Arab Islamists in Afghanistan and Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or
Reform. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Robert, D. (2001). The Lawless Frontier: Atlantic Monthly. New York: City University Press.

Rashid, Ahmad. (2007). Letter from Afghanistan: Are the Taliban Winning. New York:
Longfellow.

Shane, Scott. (2010). Pakistan’s Plan on Afghan Peace Leaves US Wary. New York:
Oxford University Press.
 55

Young, Harris. (2022). Road to War: US Struggled to Convince Allies: Risk of Invasion.
New York: City University Press.