LECTURE ON: MILITARY HISTORY IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY

EDUCATION: AN ASSESSMENT
BY: MAJ GEN GA WAHAB (RTD)
TO: PARTICIPANTS OF NIGERIAN AIR FORCE WAR COLLEGE
ON: 16 FEBRUARY 2023

INTRODUCTION

1. History is important in the affairs of humans based on the axiom

that planning for the future will be difficult without knowing the past or
evolution of an individual or system. Even in simple and obscure
communities or villages, history of the people and their lineages is
important as it defines their identity and what the particular community
stands for. In the modern context where nativism and nationalism have
become the norm rather than exception, history has been pushed to the
fore. Events or history of yesteryears, are now being quoted either
rightly or wrongly by those seeking for major decisions and changes
within their communities. You may recall events in the USA since 2017,
reinforced by the killing of George Floyd on 25 May 20, which led to the
pulling down of statutes of renowned military men. This was based on
interpretation of their past actions culminating in renaming of military
installations named after them. Confederate generals who fought the
American Civil War and were also slave owners, like Robert Lee were
viewed as inhuman for their poor treatment of fellow humans. Thus,
actions and inactions of notable military officers would always be of
importance years and centuries after their service period.

2. The military history package of the Nigerian Air Force War

College is apt and timely given the series of security challenges facing
the nation. Instances abound where lessons from past events in the
country could have assisted in the formulation of policies by the
political class and appropriate strategies enunciated by the military to
overcome such developments. For instance, if time and studies have
been devoted to the Maitasine crisis of the 1980’s, the Boko Haram
challenge may have been prevented or its effects minimized through
policy pronouncements by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN).

3. While Nigeria and most nations of Africa are still grappling with
current security challenges confronting them, using platforms acquired

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more than 20 years ago, other nations are thinking far into the future,
using past events, projecting and planning for the future. Sunderland in
the book ‘Modern Warfare, Intelligence and Deterrence’ indicated that
“defence technologies do more than play a big role in determining which
conflicts turn bloody and who wins: they shape the political world”. The
technological developments are partly due to the high casualties in
previous wars particularly WWII, which western countries are weary of
and are making concerted efforts to prevent recurrence. The military of
countries like USA for instance is constantly developing capabilities and
new operational concepts, with experiences from previous operations
as references, to realize the potentials of the new technologies. The
crisis in Ukraine is steeped in military history on and from all sides,
which led to Russia’s invasion on 24 February 2022. Thus, military
history is a major determinant of policy thrust in the developed world.

4. It is rather unfortunate that policy makers in Nigeria usually fail

to give thoughts to history and base their plans on negative aspects of
the discipline, falling to understand its importance in human life. The
Ministry of Education even expunged history from secondary school
education syllabus at a point, which was restored a couple of years back
due to serious clamour by well-meaning Nigerians. The military whose
strategies and plans are based on past events with trainings and
practices for and on uncertain future needs to be versed in the history of
conflicts and effects. This is expected to be a continuous process and as
part of the overall development of officers, which will not only assist
while in Service, but provide a basis for further engagement in
retirement. This paper will therefore discuss ‘Military History in the
Professional Military Education of Service Personnel an Assessment’,
but based essentially on the officer cadre. The paper will clarify some
terms, examine policy provisions for NAF officers and the essence of
Professional Military Education (PME). It will highlight issues with PME
and reasons for studying military history. It will thereafter assess the
study of military history in Nigeria, examine the implications and
requirements for utilizing military history, lessons from 2 campaigns
alongside reasons for some commanders succeeding and others failing
before providing the way forward.

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AIM

5. The aim of this paper is to highlight the need for studying military
history in the professional military education and development of NAF
personnel and by implication Armed Forces of Nigeria officers with a
view to proffering the way forward.

CLARIFICATION OF VARIABLES

6. It is necessary to clarify 3 variables, which are military history,

education and PME, for us to be on the same pedestal. This will assist in
removing any ambiguity or misconceptions.

7. Military History. History is derived from the Greek word

‘Historia’, meaning enquiry or knowledge based on investigation and
documentation. History according to Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary is the study of, or record of past events, considered together,
especially events of a particular period, country or subject, written in a
chronological order. Military history is therefore the historical
recording of armed conflicts or military events and impacts of such
crisis or events on societies, economies, cultures and the resultant
change in local and international relationship.

8. Education. Education is the development of the mind and brain,

which is learning to know. This includes training, which is practical
education or learning to do, or practice under supervision in a
profession. These could be through formal and informal settings or
means.

9. Professional Military Education. PME is the training and

developmental programmes given to a Service personnel at various
points in his or her career in different institutions, coupled with
exposures and experiences over the years. It is meant to prepare the
individual for the next level of leadership responsibility and for the
development of creative, innovative and critical thinking ability.
Generally, PME for officers includes the following:

a. Developing the mind.

b. Understanding the environment.

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 c. Responding to uncertainty.
d. Anticipating and leading transitions through change.
e. Operating with trust.
f. Acquiring skills for future leadership.

POLICY ON PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN NIGERIA

10. The policy on PME differs from one country to another, based on
the affected government’s aim, vision and aspiration for her armed
forces and its personnel. For instance, PME is well entrenched in the
USA Armed Forces conditions of service, with legislative backing
through the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which provides for the Officer
Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) and their reviews,
catering also for veterans or retired Service personnel. Veterans’
subsequent employment or second career options are taken into
consideration in the PME programmes, while in service. There is the
individual Service’s PME applicable to all those serving at the single
service level, which include the services war colleges and their
professional development schools. There is also the Joint Officers PME
(JPME), which is applicable to the Joint Staff, National Defence
University (NDU) and others serving above the single service level as
contained in for example the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction of 20 December 2019 on NDU.

11. The importance of military history to PME was captured by

Halewood and Morgan-Owen in the Nov 20 RUSI Journal, while
commenting on the USA Joint Chiefs guidance on achieving “intellectual
overmatch”. They argued that a narrow approach to the past
underpinned by preconceived notions of ‘relevance’ undermines what
ability history has to serve the aims of military education. They
indicated further that history need not be applied to make it valuable, as
its study can provide a broader understanding of warfare. Only by
treating history more seriously and meaningfully engaging with the
legacies of own military past can the discipline contribute to modern
PME. They believe that in reviewing case studies; the past will provide
an insight into the present or general understanding; and recent
conflicts will assist in future wars.

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11. In Nigeria the Constitution provides for the establishment of the
Armed Forces vide Section 217 with 4 generic responsibilities of;
defence against external aggression, maintenance of the territorial
integrity of the nation, suppression of insurrection and aid to civil
authority and conduct of any assignment prescribed by the National
Assembly. Personnel must therefore be trained for effective and
efficient performance of these roles. The Harmonised Terms and
Condition of Service (HTACOS) officers vide Chapter 13, provides for the
education and training of all Armed Forces officers. The two types of
training enumerated in the document for a military officer vide Chapter
13.02 are; professional training to enhance operational capability and
academic training to broaden an officer’s general knowledge and assist
an officer derive maximum benefit from a professional training.
Unfortunately, nowhere else is PME provided for. The National Defence
Policy fail to address this merely touching on training and education.

ESSENCE OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

12. Professional training on one hand is essentially about getting an

individual conversant and able to perform his or her role within the
system. PME on the other hand goes beyond the training on a core
competence. It is the complete education given to prepare the individual
service personnel to be a leader commensurate to his/ her rank and be
a critical thinker who will be able to operate and appreciate his/her
responsibilities alongside others.

13. A pilot for instance is trained to professionally man his machine

or platform but beyond that, he is educated in other fields such as
simple or minor mechanical and electrical engineering, leadership,
administration and strategy. This gives the individual officer the
opportunity to view issues from more than one perspective or his
comfort zone. He has an idea if something goes wrong with his machine
and can confidently inform those responsible on what the problem
really is in a succinct form, which will also assist them in rectifying the
problem. He will also understand the problem they may encounter if
and when they are unable to get the machine ready for him to be back in
operation.

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14. Furthermore, such education is continuously built upon in
subsequent training or higher courses. The formal education indicated
as the second provision of HTACOS is meant to assist in improving the
all-round performance and knowledge of the individual officer. All these
are expected to be geared towards the career planning and choices for
second career options if and when the individual leaves service. Military
history is an important component of this professional military
education.

ISSUES WITH PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

15. There are few issues with PME even in the developed world
including the USA. Some of these include but not limited to the
following:

a. Unbalanced Training. Officers are trained on

leadership and ability to perform assigned military tasks. There is
a problem of striking a balance between academic rigour and
having a more flexible military training and expertise across a
wider range of areas. This would assist military personnel in
mixing seamlessly in the civil environment while in service and in
blending on disengagement from active duty.

b. Mistaking Military Training for Military Education. The

problem of people mistaking professional military training for
PME is a common occurrence. All military personnel are trained
to be competent or specialist in a particular field, which is their
core competence. This is just a part of the complete PME, as the
latter goes beyond training to perform a function. PME is aimed at
producing an individual with a wide and diverse range of
knowledge to assist him or her in performing assigned tasks and
in choosing a second career when out of Service, for him/her to
continue to be productive in later life.

c. Feedback Procedure. Feedback on or for PME is usually

obscured or not included in major designs of programmes as
superiors who are to confirm the all-round ability or performance
of individual officers are always interested or just happy with the

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 individual for performing his or her core tasks. Thus, other
elements are ignored in the chain of PME.

d. Poor Periodic Upgrading. Due to the feedback shortfall,

necessary periodic upgrade is not conducted until rather late or
only done purely in response to a major incident.

e. Policy Appropriateness and Flexibility. The policy on

PME must be appropriate and be flexible to development within
the larger or even global society. There is a dearth of policy on
PME in Nigeria, which is really affecting the development of
officers.

f. Aping or Complete Copying. Programmes are copied

from related or similar organisations within or outside the
country without critically examining the relevance of some of the
components to the nation’s or service particular environment.
This is also true of application of things learned or ideas picked
for instance in military history or in a campaign which is not the
essence of such studies.

g. Poor or Weak Synergy Amongst Training Institutions.

There is a weak synergy between the different layers of training
establishments for the AFN at the tri and single Service levels,
which is affecting PME and professional performance in the field.

h. Resistance to Change. Military leaders particularly in

Nigeria are averse to change, thus PME will continue to be
resisted not because they do not want it, but for fear of losing
something, as the present system has worked for them.

REASONS FOR STUDYING MILITARY HISTORY

16. Military history is studied for a variety of reasons, which could be

grouped under 4 main headings:

a. Knowledge. Knowledge is sought in military history to

broaden the mind of the individual or group involved on the scope
of activities, events or occurrences.

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 b. Understanding Past Campaigns and Strategies. The
study of military history will and is to assist an individual or
group in understanding past campaigns and the strategies
utilized. As mentioned earlier by Halewood and Owen, the past
provides an insight into the present.

c. Learning Lessons. Lessons are learned from the study

of previous wars and campaigns. Such lessons could be on
leadership, strategy, tactics, platforms and logistics amongst
others. The study of previous conflicts would assist in planning
against reoccurrence of the causes in the future. It was
unfortunate as mentioned earlier that the country and by
inference the military did not learn lessons from the Maitasine
crisis in the 1980’s, which could have assisted in the ongoing
campaign against Boko Haram and ISWAP.

d. Planning and Practicing for Future. Points a-c above

will assist not only individuals but the entire system in planning
and practicing for future engagements.

17. It should be noted that there are 2 practices in the World

depending on the profession, which are direct and indirect training. The
military utilizes the indirect practices, which is reliant on precedents or
history. As Otto Von Bismarck said, “the indirect practice is wider in
scope, variety and dimension than the direct”. Training a military officer
is geared towards producing someone who can undertake more than 2
tasks apart from his immediate responsibility, in comparison to a
banker who is tailored towards a single purpose functionality. Military
history is therefore important in the training of officers to have a clear
view of events in the past, which will influence on their immediate or
current plan being made for the future. However, picking from the past
is not meant to copy the tactics used or ape the strategy employed in
previous campaigns by past commanders, but to learn lessons about
leadership, logistics, workings of minds, why some succeeded and
others failed.

ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY HISTORY STUDY IN NIGERIA

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18. In assessing a situation or issue, a thorough examination or
evaluation or appraisal is conducted to be able to pass appropriate
judgement. Professional training is emphasized in the NAF as in the
other sister Services and tied to career progression, which is a major
part of PME. Academic training is also encouraged with courses linked
to corps, establishments and sponsorship. It is the system that plans for
military education or professional training, while the individual officers
are expected to seek for admission in a relevant higher institution and
sponsorship from the service on academic training as indicated in
Chapter 13.05.

19. Military history is expected to be part of the professional

education from the point of entry, for instance the Nigerian Defence
Academy (NDA) and through the command and staff courses up to the
Defence College. It is taken on a formal basis at NDA and informally at
the Staff College. Some years back, it was treated formally at the Defence
College. The study of military history is expected to continue either
formally or informally in the academic progression of an individual
officer as a way of broadening his/her knowledge.

20. It is unfortunate that military history is not given the importance

it deserves in Nigeria, even at the national level. Nigeria for instance as a
member of the British Empire (Commonwealth) cannot categorically
state the number of her soldiers who died during WWII, despite the
country’s massive contributions to the campaigns, particularly in Burma
(Mynamar) and the India sub-Continent in general. The same is true of
the immense sacrifices to ensure the survival of Liberia and Sierra
Leone today. Yet despite the huge human (over 1000 death) and
material resources of military hardware and more than US$10 billion
sacrifice, which could have raised the standard of living in Nigeria,
nothing has been learned diplomatically, economically and militarily,
with the possibility of the same mistakes of history repeating itself in
the future. The country continues to learn nothing from her past, an
attitude already picked by the military, thereby relegating military
history to the background in the professional education of Service
personnel. For instance, it is difficult to discuss events and commanders
of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-70, which took place not long ago
without raising high brows or issues and allegations of bias from some
quarters, which is not supposed to be, as the essence of learning lessons

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is lost. The spate of agitations in the South East and South South and
even Boko Haram saga in the North East for secession and clamour for
war in certain quarters are instructive. It could be rightly attributed to a
huge failure of the entire nation in learning from the occurences of the
Civil War.

IMPLICATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR UTILISING MILITARY

HISTORY

21. Liddell Hart stated that “history is universal experience- the

existence not of another, but of many others under manifold conditions….
This is the rational justification for military history as the basis of military
education- its preponderant practical training value in the training and
mental development of a soldier. But the benefit depends, as with all
experience, on its breadth: on how closely it approaches the definition and
method of studying it”. There are some basic requirements needed for
individual officers to understand and effectively utilize military history
in formulating strategy and seeking knowledge for their career
progression. It should be noted that the practice of understanding
military history and a campaign is a deliberate effort and not a one-off
thing. Strategies, tactics, platforms and equipment applied in previous
campaigns are studied to assist in formulating ideas, understand
personalities involved, identify role models and equipment for future
use. The following are some of the implications and requirements for a
better understanding of military history for subsequent utilization.

22. Open Minded and Less Bias. If military history is to serve

its purpose, individual officers must be open-minded and be clear about
the aim of the study. Most times biases are allowed to permeate history,
thereby distorting issues involved, thus getting inaccurate account and
picture of events leading to wrong deductions.

23. Knowledge of the Particular Area. Military history will

become mere story if the area is not known or visualized. Maps and
sketches serve great purposes in orienting military officers to the
general area where a particular campaign or battle took place. This will
assist in understanding the environment of the operation and why some

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decisions were taken. Digital equipment permeating the NAF
environment is becoming the norm rather than exception in the modern
crisis situation which has made things easier, although with
implications and challenges. It is easy in the modern context to follow
the situation in Ukraine due to availability of various applications and
sketches on the electronic media.

24. Period. Clear knowledge of the period a particular incident,

operation, battle, campaign or war took place will assist in the
understanding of why a particular strategy or even line of operation
was adopted and utilized. Policy formulation by military commanders
who were also the political leaders during medieval period may not be
applicable in the modern context, but the strategies adopted may be of
immense lessons.

25. Causes. Causes of a crisis or war are usually diverse and

multi-faceted. It is impossible to explain causes of a war on a single
factor. Thus, historians have divided the causes into 4 broad categories;
the remote, immediate, special and general causes.

26. Belligerents. The opposing sides or those involved must be

distinguished to be clear as to those involved in a conflict. The countries,
units or commands, personalities, the strategies or tactics used are
essential in military history. The plans, likely assumptions and
constraints on each side are of essence.

27. Execution or Conduct. Military history is about examining

events irrespective of perception or sympathy and presenting the issues
devoid of sentiments. Events are taken, presented or related the way
they occurred chronologically, without any addition or subtraction. This
is to bring out the aim of the exercise as lessons for future practices.

28. Lessons Learned. Series of lessons could be picked from a

particular campaign depending on the aim. Such lessons could be on
leadership, logistics, understanding the Centre of Gravity (CoG) of a side
in a conflict, manpower and equipment, support by the locals and even
political will to execute the war by the government of a particular force.
It could also be in the form of effect(s) of a campaign on the immediate
environment or region.

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29. Success and Failure. A major interest of military historians in a
campaign is to identify the basis for success or failure of a commander
or party to a conflict. This could be deduced from lessons learned,
political interference, leadership, equipment, strategy or tactics used
amongst others.

EXAMINATION OF PAST CAMPAIGNS

30. It is important to highlight 2 campaigns to buttress reasons for

the study of military history by officers as part of PME. The Normandy
Landing WWII -Operation OVERLORD (3 Jun-30 Aug 1944) and Gulf
War (Iraq invasion) 19 March - 1 May 2003 will be highlighted.

31. World War II. The Normandy Landing will be highlighted to

bring out few lessons. Operation Overlord was conducted in the
Northern France area of Normandy from 3 Jun – 30 August 1944. The
Allied forces was led by the Supreme Allied Commander General
Eisenhower, while his deputy, land, air and sea forces commanders
were all British officers. Gen Montgomery was the Land Forces
commander, Air Chief Marshall Trafford Leigh-Mallory the Air-
Commander-in-Chief who aptly directed the Bomber Command in the
tactical support of ground troops. By 1943, Hitler had become weary of
his commanders with ‘Regime Security’ uppermost in his mind. He was
dabbling into his commanders’ plans and making final decisions over
his commanders with dire consequences. The Germans were aware of
Operation Overlord but planned on a faulty strategy based on the ideas
of the 2 Marshalls; Rommel and Rundstedt in theatre. To Rommel all the
Panzer Corps elements should be concentrated by the Normandy
coastline, to launch and support the Germans engagement of the Allies
far at sea and prevent them from establishing a beachhead. This
strategy was premised on the perceived air superiority of the Allies,
which Rommel believed would cause Germans defeat if the land forces
were allowed to establish a beachhead. Rundstedt on the other hand
wanted the Panzers kept in reserve and launched once the Allied had
beach landed to cause confusion and inflict maximum casualty. Hitler

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divided the Panzers into two and gave half each to the Marshals to do as
they planned. Lessons include the following:
a. Politicians will always interfere in military affairs and plans.
They will not allow the military to be the only arbiter in a crisis
caused by their actions or inactions. The development of the
Comprehensive Approach to Warfare is instructive in this regard.
b. Politicians will also always look out for themselves first and
foremost before the nation.
c. The military must always ensure unity of command in a
crisis situation, to avert disaster.
d. A general or commander must not get carried away with
only his strength but consider the adversary’s capabilities too.
e. Troops must believe in the course and have a higher shared
perception to give their best.

32. Lessons From WWII. A few lessons could be picked from WWII
and other crisis globally, to serve any commander in battle from an
historical perspective. These include but not limited to the following:

a. Efficacy of Alliance. In line with the Realists advocacy

for an alliance particularly in crisis situation or when a nation
cannot achieve its interest independently, WWII threw up 2
alliances the Allied against the Axis. Despite being the major Allied
Force in the European Theatre, Britain deferred to the USA in
appointing the Supreme Allied Commander for Operation
OVERLORD, allowing Eisenhower to lead, while she provided all
the components commanders. Hitler on the other also went into
series of alliances depending on the immediate situation. Thus,
the FGN must always consider utilizing alliances in tackling her
problems where necessary especially with the current security
challenges. The MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin is a good example
of a veritable alliance in tackling security and defence issues.

b. Place of Grand Strategy in War or Crisis. Liddel Hart

opined that grand strategy was absent in WWII, as the Allied put
up a coalition without an overarching policy. Although Kent
Greensfield felt the Allied’s aim was clear as to the complete
defeat of the Axis, which has been criticized as a mere
proclamation. Scholars believe the aim was not a grand strategy

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as the means of achieving it was not proclaimed. It is important
for the FGN to provide policy guideline or the strategic end state
for an enduring peace in war or crisis. This issue is also playing
out in the alliance forged in the in the Lake Chad Basin.

c. Consistency in Aim. The need to consistently pursue an

aim was demonstrated by Hitler. At the onset Hitler clearly
indicated the Third Reich’s aim and went into series of alliances
with Poland and Russia. However, by the mid-1943, the situation
had changed drastically that rather than face the external threat,
Hitler was engrossed with ensuring regime security, suspecting
most of his top Marshalls like Guederian and Rommel. The
collapse of the Reich was therefore a matter of time. A major
problem in Nigeria is policy inconsistencies or summersault in
virtually all spheres of national life. It is important for the FGN to
be consistent in its policy enunciations and statements to ensure a
focused execution of plans and maintaining allies trust.

d. Conformity of Policy and Will. The need for policy and

political will by the government to conform was clearly shown
during WWII. All the major stakeholders realized that their
national interests and survival was involved and as such matched
their policies with political will. Even the Japanese in Burma lived
off ground not for lack of resources, but as a means of making it
faster to achieve military strategic end state. Confronting Boko
Haram has witnessed a mismatch of policy and political will in
Nigeria. It commenced with a state of denial to the postulation
that the crisis was initially a military one and later the security
services against Boko Haram and only got better from July 2015.

e. Knowledge of Adversary and Terrain. A major lesson of

knowing the adversary and ground as per Sun Tzu’s postulation
was the Burma Campaign, whence the Japanese troops utilized the
ground to their advantage due to a better understanding of the
terrain and British fear of the same terrain and weather.

f. Concealment and Deception. There is no better and

simpler example of concealment and deception in WWII than
Rommel activities in North Africa, when he initially got to the

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 scene in Feb 1941. Camouflage, concealment and deception are
constant in all human endeavours as they are part of the indirect
approach.

g. Changing Nature of Warfare and Effect of Technology.

WWII showed that warfare has changed drastically with the
deployment of long-range bombers the B29 that dropped atomic
bombs in Hiroshima on 6 Aug and Nagasaki on 9 Aug 1945.
Technology and particularly advance weaponry have changed the
nature of warfare. Technology is a must for any organisation not
to mention the military to survive now. The death of Gen Qasim
Suleiman the Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on 3
Jan 20 in Baghdad and remote killing of Iranian nuclear expert
Mohsen Fakhrizadeh on 27 Nov 20 near Tehran are instructive

33. Gulf War II 2003. The Invasion of Iraq by Allied Forces led
by the USA from 19 March – 1 May 2003, represents a modern
showcasing of ‘Realism Theory’ in all ramifications. The efficacy of
power measured by military might, issue of national interest being
upper most in national calculations as the international system is
anarchical were all exhibited. The application of the ‘Just War’ Theory in
offensive operation and above all the practicalisation of the Manoeuvrist
Approach to warfare and the issue of exit strategy were clearly
demonstrated during the war. The belligerents as you are all aware
were the Iraqi Armed Forces in an isolated situation in the region and
the Allied Forces of more than 20 countries from different parts of the
World led by the USA and including Senegal from West Africa. The USA
was reeling from the September 2001 terrorist attacks on her home soil,
while Iraq was just coming out of the 8 years’ war with Iran and the not-
well thought out invasion of Kuwait. Technology played a major role in
the war. USA Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wanted about 100,000
land forces as emphasis was on air power and technology for the entire
operation, which was opposed by the Army Staff. The causes are factors
of; regional power, nuclear issue and payment for oil. The general
lessons include the following:
a. No permanent friend in the international system, but
interest.
b. Influence of Israel on USA foreign policy.
c. Influence and effect of technology.

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 d. Western ability for manipulation and collaboration.
e. Air power and superiority.
f. Efficacy of alliance
g. Trade and the international monetary system.
h. Ingenuity and the need to constantly modify equipment
procured externally.
i. Invocation of Just war, humanitarian intervention and
perpetual peace theories by the West for national interest.
j. Interference in military planning and operations by
politicians.
k. UN and its role alongside manipulation by powerful nations.

SUCCESSES AND FAILURES BY COMMANDERS

34. There are many reasons that could be used to explain the
successes or failures of commanders, generals, marshals and admirals in
battles and campaigns. There is no single reason, which could explain
why some succeeded and others failed. Military history is a veritable
tool, which will assist in indicating the result of a commander’s action.
Some of the common reasons for successes and failures include the
following:

a. Failure to understand and learn lessons from history,

knowing where you are coming from and where you are going is
important in life. History is full of instances where the same
mistakes are repeatedly made with particular people and
situation. Afghanistan is an example of what Huntington referred
to as a transitional war, being fought on a major fault line.

b. Commanders failing to understand that politicians will

interfere in their operations. Politicians caused the problem and
would want to be seen as being in charge and not lose authority.

c. Lack or poor understanding of the 5 elements of a force as

enumerated by Sun Tzu; Philosophy, Climate, Ground, Methods
and Leadership.

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d. Failure to understand personal strengths and weaknesses
and knowing oneself. Everyone is unique as there are those who
are good theorists, commanders, practical men and teachers.

e. Poor knowledge of followers. Just like the leader, the

followers are different from one person to the other. It is the
knowledge of individuals that will assist in using them correctly.
Motivation of the followers also comes to play.

f. Inadequate understanding of a commander’s role in the

scheme of things to allay fears of those on the receiving end and
reduce tension. Failing to also understand that military line of
operation is just a line in the national power assets available to
government.

g. Lack of knowledge or understanding of the constraints of

government’s policy, morality in crisis and shortfall in personnel
and equipment.

h. Mirror imaging the adversary and thinking for him rather

than putting oneself in his position.

i. Getting carried away with delivering success, which is just

one part of the equation and failing to lead strategically.

j. Being dogmatic to a particular pattern or strategy as

flexibility is a must in crisis management, failing to think outside
the box and exploiting opportunities.

k. Failure to balance approaches and choices. Situation would

determine strategy and equipment, which are to be balanced as
too much or little are both dangerous.

l. Taking information and intelligence for granted or waiting

for a complete picture before making decisions. It is important to
remember the 20/80 per cent ration in decision making on
intelligence.

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 m. Poor leadership, lack of strategic thinking and inadequate or
faulty decision making process.

n. Poor level of equipment or lack of mastery of those

available.

o. Lack of synergy between policy, political will and populace

support.

WAY FORWARD

35. The need for the NAF to take military history as a major
component of PME for its personnel especially officers cannot be over-
emphasised. Military history as explained will assist in a variety of ways
for the benefit of the system. This is more so as military training is on an
indirect basis and largely based on strategies, which could be gleaned
from past campaigns. The requirements for this include the following:

a. Deliberate Policy. There is a need for a deliberate

policy on PME, which will include the study of military history for
officers to assist in their careers. Such policy will also ensure
continuity so that it is not jettisoned after a change of or in
command.

b. Involvement and Synergy Amongst NAF Schools. There

is the need to involve NAF schools in the teaching of military
history to make the exercise worthwhile. Furthermore, there
should be an upgrade of the synergy in institutions within NAF
and indeed AFN. Presently officers take military history only at
tri-Service institutions, which might not be adequate for the
Service’s requirements.

c. Evolving a Veritable Structure. A veritable structure

would be required for the teaching of military history at NAF
schools for the success of the programme. The structure will
ensure acceptance and survival of the programme.

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 d. Balancing Academics and Military Training. The issue of
balancing the rigours of academics and military training to assist
personnel both in service and retirement is a major problem even
at the NDA. The right balance must be struck to produce a
motivated force and one whose members would be able to take up
any related job after disengagement if they desired without an
hindrance.

e. Arousing Officers Interest and Recognition. Officers

who are the crux of the process must be encouraged to be
interested in military history and not only on courses or for
services exigencies. Historians must also be recognized by the
system, with NAFWC playing a pivotal role in line with what is
obtainable in the USA Services War Colleges.

CONCLUSION

36. Military history is important for learning lessons from past

campaigns, training of senior commanders, development of strategy and
picking role models. It is important for the NAF to deliberately enact
lasting policies for the involvement of the Service’s training schools in
the teaching of military history as part of PME. The Service must arouse
the interests and encourage officers about military history, which could
be spearheaded by NAFWC.

RECOMMENDATIONS

37. It is recommended that:

a. NAF should promulgate a deliberate policy on PME to
include military history within the Service.

b. NAF training schools should be involved in the teaching of

military history as part of PME and forge a better synergy
amongst themselves.

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 c. HQ NAF should establish a veritable structure to ensure
acceptance and success of military history programme, while
encouraging few education officers to specialize.

d. A right balance should be struck between military training

and academic rigours to produce a motivated work force with the
requirements to join any civil organisation without any hindrance
on disengagement.
e. Officers should be encouraged to be versed in military
history.

REFERENCES

1. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

2. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary.

3. Harmonised Terms and Condition of Service Officers 2017

(Revised).
4. B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: Meridian Book.
5. B.H. Liddell Hart, The Tanks Vol II: Cassel and Co Ltd.
6. Hastings M, Overlord: Papermac.
7. Barnett C., Engage the Enemy More Closely: London.
8. Gary Gagliardi, Strategy Against Terror, Ancient Wisdom for
Today’s War: Clearbridge Publishing.
9. JWT Gbor, Military History- Nigeria: Longman.
10. Kent Roberts Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II.

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11. Benjamin Sutherland (ed), Modern Warfare, Intelligence and
Deterrence: The Economist
12. Jeffery R. Barnett, Future War; An Assessment of Aerospace
Campaigns in 2010: Air University Press.
13. www.professionalmilitaryeducation/USA (13 June 19)
14. USA Department of Defence Directive on: Officer Professional
Military Education Policy (OPMEP)- The Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
of 20 December 2019.
15. Jeremy Black, War, Past, Present and Future: Sutton Publishing.
16. Louis Halewood and David Morgan-Owen, ‘Captains of War’,
(RUSI Journal November 2020, pp. 46-54).
17. Kevin P Kelly and Joan Freese, ‘Rethinking Professional Military
Education’: Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Note October 2013, pg2.

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