Take A Closer Look at Process Safety v6

Process Safety eHANDBOOK
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Effectively Manage Large-Scale Process Hazard Assessments 7

Success depends upon properly addressing a number of issues
Use Dynamic Simulation To Improve Process Safety 13

A digital twin can help spot and combat risks during design and operation
Prevent The Illusion Of Protection 21

Address management system failings that undermine process safety
Rethink Your Refuge 28

A zero-vulnerability safe haven helps protect personnel and speed emergency response
Ensure Reliable Fire Protection in Natural Gas Plants 39

Combustible and toxic gas detectors as well as flame detectors can help reduce incidents
Additional Resources 49
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Process Safety eHANDBOOK: Take a Closer Look at Process Safety 3

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Effectively Manage
Large-Scale Process
Hazard Assessments
Success depends upon properly addressing a number of issues
By GC Shah, Wood
N
o official or regulatory definition PHAs for large projects requires emphasis
exists for large-, medium- or small- on numerous issues that may not exist or be
scale process hazard assessments trivial for small projects. This article looks at
(PHA). You can use a variety of factors such strategic considerations in managing large-
as the number of nodes, their complex- scale PHAs.
ity, the amount of people involved, or the
length of time required for a PHA to char- THE BIG PICTURE
acterize its size. Larger projects invariably For any PHA, irrespective of size, key con-
lead to larger PHAs. After all, such projects siderations include:
typically entail considerably higher levels of • identifying as many process hazards as
risk than their smaller counterparts. possible in a reasonable time;
• promptly putting systems in place to
As the size of a PHA increases, the chances address findings from the PHA;
for confusion, delay or omission of critical • reducing risk to an acceptable level and
safety tasks grow exponentially. Inadver- maintaining that reduction for the lifetime
tently omitting crucial tasks leaves the of the project (i.e., the safety lifecycle);
project vulnerable to safety mishaps, liabil- • effectively transmitting vital safety infor-
ity and potential business losses. Although mation to the project sponsors;
techniques for conducting PHAs are essen- • properly allocating the budget and
tially the same for any size effort, managing achieving cost-effectiveness; and

• maintaining confidentiality and security of definition of risks could differ substantially.

data and documents. The lack of a common understanding of proj-
ect scope and PHA expectations increases the
The following strategic issues also chance of dissatisfied or even irate sponsors
merit consideration: — and may render the PHA useless. It’s not
• project sponsors and their safety practices; always easy to get sponsors to agree. Diplo-
• PHA infrastructure; macy is a valuable trait for a PHA manager.
• PHA software;
• document management; and Here are some crucial points to keep in mind:
• safety lifecycle management. • Focus on getting a general agreement on
the PHA’s scope.
PROJECT SPONSORS • Develop consensus on safety philosophy
Very frequently, large projects involve multi- as well as a common safety philosophy
ple sponsors — with these organizations often and PHA assessment procedures for the
based in different geographic regions. Each project. This often is covered in a strategy
sponsor invariably has its own unique safety document called PHA Terms of Reference.
philosophies, safety assessment procedures • Establish common risk assessment criteria
and risk tolerance criteria. Unsurprisingly, their and risk tolerance definitions.
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• Discuss PHA schedules, web access by the PHA. In addition, consider the follow-
remote participants, and the number of ing issues:
participants from specific sponsors. If the • When a PHA occurs during an ongoing
sponsors are in different regions, work out project, keeping track of documents can
a PHA meeting schedule that maximizes be difficult. Isolate and “freeze” all relevant
participation. P&IDs. As the project progresses, record
• Agree upon PHA methodology and soft- appropriate notes as a part of the docu-
ware (e.g., hazard and operability studies ment management task.
(HAZOPs), layers of protection analyses • Ensure the video conferencing system is
(LOPAs), safety integrity level (SIL) assess- compatible with the information technology
ments, or other equivalent techniques). (IT) systems of all sponsors. (This point may
• Maintain confidentiality of spon- seem obvious but it’s easy to miss.)
sors’ documents. • Include different units of measurement in
documents when this would help sponsors.
The above list isn’t exhaustive; others points For example, report flow rates in gal/min
also may be crucial and demand attention. and m3/hr, or other similar units.
• Several days prior to the start of the PHA,
Early stages of PHAs involve intense and conduct a mock run to ensure all video
extended discussions. Some sponsors may conferencing systems are working seam-
feel passionately about their safety systems lessly. Keep IT help on standby to minimize
and PHA methodologies. For a PHA man- painful delays in the PHA.
ager, this is an opportune time to establish • Transmit electronic copies of relevant doc-
effective working relationships among spon- uments to all participants a week or so in
sors. The aim is to enable the diverse group advance of the PHA.
of sponsors to work cohesively. • One key issue that comes up during many
PHAs is: “What is the quantity of a release
PHA INFRASTRUCTURE or spill?” This quantity forms a basis for
This includes documents and data relevant assigning risk level. So, consider develop-
to a PHA as well as video conferencing ing equations in spreadsheets or lookup
systems. Obviously, key documents such tables that enable quickly estimating
as process and instrumentation drawings release quantity or rate with a reasonable
(P&IDs), process flow diagrams, heat and level of confidence.
material balances, cause and effect dia- • PHAs often use a risk matrix. Many such
grams, equipment data sheets, drawings, matrices define risks rather broadly or inade-
and applicable regional regulations are quately, meaning estimates can differ widely.
vital; they should be instantly available for Risk perception by different team members

ideally should match reasonably closely in its nascent stage of development. Such
— and certainly shouldn’t vary by a wide software could cause painful disruptions and
margin. To foster team members coming up costly delays in the conduct of a PHA.
with relatively similar estimates of risk levels,
define consequence and likelihood of events In the long-run, you want to make certain the
to an adequate degree of detail. PHA software remains reliable and efficient.
So, assess the following:
PHA SOFTWARE • Vendor support. Competent technical sup-
Large-scale PHAs involve massive amounts of port from the vendor is vital for ensuring
data. Obviously, you can’t afford to use soft- that relevant changes in data, data struc-
ware that crashes, responds painfully slowly, tures or formats can be made in a timely
or is hard to configure. Consider both near- manner.
term and long-term factors. Near-term factors • Software updates. Ideally, the upgrades
include the suitability of the user interface: should be seamless or near-seamless.
ease of use; entering and editing; and import- • Longevity of company and software. Look
ing/exporting data (e.g., search, sort, save, for a stable company that upgrades PHA
delete, macro functions or special short-cut software in well-organized steps and offers
commands, templates and data transfer). It updates that are easy to install. Unfortu-
should be relatively easy to formulate nodes, nately, determining this is easier said than
navigate between nodes, embed the risk done. Acquisitions and divestitures will
matrix, track recommendations, and generate continue to impact the roster of vendors.
reports and PHA statistics. Some sponsors • Continual improvement. Cloud-based sys-
may not have the proposed software package. tems are gaining increasing acceptance
So, it’s important to ensure they have easy and popularity. Regardless of where it
access to the PHA files. The software should resides, PHA software should be capa-
generate Microsoft Office files without requir- ble of connecting with other programs
ing onerous steps. for health, safety, security and quality
management.
The use of a mature software package lessens • Cybersecurity. Although the number of
the chance of disruption. However, PHA soft- cyber intrusions on industrial control and
ware continually is improving and your system safety systems is on the rise, PHA data
can’t afford to be static. Verify you are using have not yet been affected. However,
the latest version of software. If you plan to appropriate safeguards against cyber
use relatively new software, conduct several intrusions merit attention. Close working
mock runs to ensure the software package will relationships between IT and safety/secu-
function efficiently. Stay away from software rity groups will be vital.

• Effective tracking. It’s essential to know • Collaboration. The system must provide
the current status of corrective actions on provisions for document routing and for
recommendations, risk status and re-vali- team members to collaborate.
dations of PHAs. • Alternative access. Make certain that users
• Data analytics. There’s growing realization still can access critical data if the primary
that PHAs and safety functions could offer means (such as via the cloud) causes any
valuable insights for improving safety if problems.
data are analyzed carefully. • Support. Competent document manage-
• Easy access to data. Keep track of the ment personnel should be available to
compatibility of sponsors’ database man- users quickly.
agement systems with the PHA software, • Streamlined operation. Don’t create doc-
and make provisions so sponsors readily ument bureaucracy. Team members must
and quickly can access relevant documents have fast access to vital information.
in usable form. Remember, the focus is on risk reduction
and safety!
DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT
One major issue for multisponsor PHAs is SAFETY LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT
hassle-free access to data. You must iron Risk reduction isn’t a one-time event; it con-
out access rights and procedures during tinues until the end of a project. Systems
the early stages of a project. Document must be in place to implement relevant
management should provide accurate and changes (management of change), docu-
updated data or files quickly. Generally, PHA ment them and update records. The safety
managers will use the existing document lifecycle is an integral part of IEC 61511/ISA
system unless it’s grossly outdated. Intense 84 and its numerous revisions.
involvement by document management
professionals is crucial. Broad items to con- To sum up, large projects generally entail
sider include: larger risk than that of their smaller coun-
• Document integrity and security. You must terparts. Strategic management requires
define different levels of access. some important traits from a PHA manager
• Data inputs. The document system should including diplomacy, patience and working
accept data in numerous forms, e.g., knowledge or familiarity with the PHA soft-
e-mails, mobile texts, scanned documents, ware, database management and document
manual entry and bulk loads of data. management systems.
• Ease of use. Ensure all users have easy
access to review and receive printouts of GC SHAH, PE, is a senior HSE advisor at Wood, Houston.
data and get update notifications. Email him at ghanshyam.shah@woodplc.com.

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Use Dynamic Simulation

to Improve Process Safety
A digital twin can help spot and combat risks during design and operation
By Timothy Herbig, Bluefield Process Safety
P
rocess upsets at many chemical plants protection analysis (LOPA), simulation can
can quickly turn dangerous. Dynamic help determine how to improve the indi-
simulation can give engineers and vidual risk factors involved in reaching the
operators the power to reduce potential pro- defined tolerance. (For details on how to
cess upsets or non-routine situations. avoid coincident failures in layers of protec-
tion, see “Prevent the Illusion of Protection,”
Long accepted for its strength in training, p. 21.)
dynamic simulation can provide additional
far-reaching value for enhancing safety. By A wide variety of chemical plants can ben-
using a digital twin as a double for the exist- efit from dynamic simulation. Here, we’ll
ing process (Figure 1), dynamic simulation use examples from ammonia production.
offers a protected environment in which Ammonia facilities often choose to per-
to practice safe deployment of process form shutdowns during process upsets
strategies and justify further safety improve- because there’s so little time, minutes at
ments. Unfortunately, myths about such best, to react to potentially hazardous sit-
simulation (see sidebar) frequently thwart uations. While many process plants don’t
its application. require as aggressive a response to con-
ditions, an ammonia facility provides an
As facilities attempt to achieve their safety ideal environment to illustrate the value of
risk tolerance by performing a layers of dynamic simulation.

DIGITAL TWIN
Figure 1. An identical replica in the virtual world allows testing process changes and providing
hands-on training and real-world results without affecting the actual plant.
IMPROVED RESPONSE TO a task can be considered routine rather than

NON-ROUTINE SITUATIONS non-routine; this, in turn, could lower the
Research shows that in stressful environ- risk factor of a process area.
ments, such as during non-routine and
emergency situations, operators make more At an ammonia plant, a loss of feed water
errors than under routine circumstances. can create a low level within the steam
The goals of simulation include improving drum, which may lead to water being
safety by reducing stress and preparing reintroduced to a hot drum, causing cata-
operators to perform non-routine tasks strophic vessel failure. In this case, during
often enough so they feel more routine. simulation, operators might find a low level
Carrying out simulated tasks at an operator inside the steam drum and practice imple-
station, as if in real life, improves response menting a course of action to fix the cause,
time by invoking muscle memory in ways loss of feed water.
that learning via pen and paper or class-
room instruction can’t. After using dynamic simulation during train-
ing, the response of personnel becomes
Operator response time is a factor in a more accurate and faster, thus enhancing
LOPA. If performed often and well enough, the independent layer of protection (IPL).

Because the team acts safely and quickly, networks and systems — operators know
the safety instrumented system (SIS) acti- how to work with the system interfaces. The
vates less. simulation doesn’t affect the live process in
any way.
Actually, a dynamic simulator opens up a
number of opportunities related to opera- Create a solid baseline of performance.
tor performance. Using dynamic simulation, a facility can
establish a minimum acceptable perfor-
Train on a digital twin instead of the real mance for operators in given situations.
plant. Training on a live, working control Ammonia plants, which often are located
system is less than ideal because of risks in remote locations, usually face a short-
to the process and the associated stress in age of experienced operators. Simulation
the learning environment. By training on enables training all operators to the same
a digital replica of the process — includ- baseline level as well as evaluating how
ing devices, control system, and higher quickly they detect a situation, how much
DON’T FALL FOR COMMON MYTHS

Five myths too often impede the wider use of dynamic simulation:
1. Low-fidelity simulation is useless. Low-fidelity simulations aren’t exact replicas of the real
system. However, in creating a LOPA, a near replica could provide enough proof that a
person would know what to do in certain situations.
2. Simulation is just for startup. When kept current, simulations are valuable during skill
re-evaluation. For example, alarms change over time and responding to them is critical, so
keeping those current in the simulation is important.
3. Testing individual sensors and assets is enough. Facilities that don’t test assets together in
the system put themselves at risk. Simulation brings all devices together to verify, for exam-
ple, that voting works as designed.
4. Use experienced operators to train new ones. As operators perform tasks, they inadver-
tently might modify procedures. If included in training, such shortcuts can compromise
approved safe procedures. Training through simulation preserves the approved procedures.
5. Alarm hitting and tripping are the same. High-level alarms don’t necessarily need to stop the
process. With enough practice, personnel can recognize situations and be ready to respond
before a higher alarm trips and stops the process.

time they need to respond, and how themselves can be evaluated to ensure
long it takes for the action to produce they’re effective in emergencies.
results. After baselines are set, trainers
can benchmark operators over time until Save time during refresher training. Sim-
tasks are performed to achieve desired ulation can expedite operator review of
safe outcomes. updated safety situations. Ammonia plant
startups have many hazardous simultaneous
Design structured training. In an emer- activities and can benefit from, for exam-
gency, each person plays a role in ple, compressing tank-fill time so operators
de-escalating the situation. A dynamic learn skills without waiting for the fill.
simulator enables the trainer at the facil-
ity to educate every operator in standard Provide proof to safety evaluators. Under
plant procedures to execute that person’s many circumstances, safety evaluators that
emergency role — and then to evaluate go into a facility must weigh the soundness
the operator’s skills over time. The skillsets of performance reviews provided to them.
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A simulator can document how opera- safe processes, keep in mind a variety of
tors performed during training, giving the opportunities.
evaluators more confidence they have an
accurate report of abilities. Perform alarm evaluation. A team can affect
safety meaningfully by designing an alarm
SAFE DEPLOYMENT OF strategy that reduces, for example, nuisance
PROCESS STRATEGIES alarms so that an operator only sees signif-
Plant staff must be sure of the changes they icant alarms, i.e., ones that demand action.
make to improve process safety. By com- For instance, during an ammonia plant
bining LOPA and simulation, personnel can startup, alarms frequently are set to align
detect weaknesses in design and refine pro- with nameplate as recommended by the
cess areas. manufacturer. However, the nameplate often
eventually gets exceeded as a facility con-
For example, while performing a LOPA on a tinues to improve operations and systems
section of the simulated facility, engineers through debottlenecking. Dynamic simula-
might find conditions that either are unsafe tion enables re-evaluation of potential events
or non-optimized. Digging further into the in the plant environment so they cause fewer
simulation and experimenting with designs, alarms. Without simulation, that re-evalua-
they might identify ways to improve that tion requires a great deal of time and can fall
area of the plant. to the bottom of the to-do list.
An ammonia process can be vulnerable Match the fidelity of the simulation to the
to many deviations, such as low level on need. The area of the plant that most needs
jacket water or turbine over-speeds. While improvements in safety may not require a
these conditions themselves don’t pose a high-fidelity simulation. Indeed, in safety
danger to the work site, if not reacted to analysis, setting the fidelity at a low level
properly, their consequences can injure or sometimes may suffice, thus saving some
kill employees who operate the process. costs and time.
Personnel can safely test, via simulation,
proposed responses to ensure they do what Conduct regression testing. With a valid
they should. Key in all these activities: the simulation of the existing process, an engi-
live process remains unaffected until the neering team can set up tests to compare
updates are polished and safe. proposed and existing conditions to ensure
that changes won’t create unsafe condi-
When considering dynamic simulation to tions. Using simulation, this testing can be
help ensure design and deployment of largely automated and easily documented

for record and compliance safety, quality and produc- situations that could, but
purposes. tion time. Simulation also don’t always, pose dangers.
provides an opportunity Although an SIS respond-
Test the SIS. By simulating to test the effectiveness of ing unnecessarily can result
the SIS together with the safety system IPLs. in a substantial expense,
distributed control system, the SIS must act just in
a site can confirm that, if For instance, the design case. Many facilities would
the SIS were called upon, team might notice that a benefit if their teams could
the systems would act process change can offer realistically evaluate poten-
together as they should. Or a provable four hours of tially hazardous situations
it can see where changes better production or save before programming the
are necessary to improve several hours in a startup. SIS to activate.
response and safety. Further investigation might
show how to improve an To improve safety and
JUSTIFICATION area’s safety integrity level avoid situations where the
OF SAFETY (SIL) rating. SIS must activate, many
IMPROVEMENTS teams perform a LOPA.
Simulation can give the An ammonia plant’s SIS Combined with dynamic
safety team tools to prove often is programmed simulation, a LOPA work-
how process or equip- aggressively to shut down sheet (Figure 2) helps
ment changes can enhance the process for a variety of them determine the most
effective deployment of
layers of protection. After
using simulation to analyze
the potential problems,
teams can add layers
of protection or adjust
the process to avoid the
potential problems. Then
they can re-simulate the
revised process to evalu-
ate the solutions.
Dynamic simulation can

LOPA WORKSHEET
Figure 2. In this project, a non-routine task contributes ten times perform a valuable role in
more than a routine one to the ultimate risk results. several ways.

Avoid over-engineering. A LOPA that respond more quickly and efficiently by

indicates a facility needs double redun- giving them easy navigation and informa-
dant block valves may lead to significant tion at their fingertips, or is it bulky and
over-engineering. In general, over-engi- obstructive to the point of actually reduc-
neered safety systems aren’t necessarily ing their effectiveness? Simulation allows
safer; they’re just over-engineered. Simu- testing new systems well in advance of
lation could check, for example, whether their implementation and reviewing by
loss of lube oil pressure requires a SIS all interested parties rather than just
response at an ammonia plant before a their designer.
facility incurs the added expense of extra
engineering and maintenance. Facilities ACHIEVE A SAFER REALITY
need the least complex systems that As the ammonia applications highlight, use
implement the process safely. Simulation of dynamic simulation in many process sit-
can show where alternative technologies uations can save time and money toward
or people, rather than systems, can handle creating a safer facility. In addition, dynamic
unique and complex tasks. simulation prepares a team to go online
with fewer errors by helping them under-
Set the IPL accurately. Simulation allows stand and reduce the risks and training
a team to test the automation IPL and them for the hazards that could happen.
reduce system errors. In fact, the testing
might indicate the facility has more IPLs As teams design the process and before
than required, enabling elimination of those they implement the physical design,
that aren’t needed — thus maintaining dynamic simulation can tell them if they are
safety while avoiding unnecessary costs. improving the LOPA results. If other design
Of course, the opposite also might occur — options are on the table, the team can try
testing might show the need for more IPLs, those ideas before moving ahead.
thus saving the facility from potentially dan-
gerous conditions. TIMOTHY HERBIG is a safety consultant for Bluefield
Process Safety, St. Louis, Mo. Email him at therbig@
Verify human factors. A well-designed bluefieldsafety.com.
simulator can confirm that human fac-

tors in a process and system are proper ACKNOWLEDGMENT
and need no additional capital expense. The process simulation team at Emerson
For example, does the operators’ human/ Automation Solutions provided support and
machine interface (HMI) enable them to technical information for this article.

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Prevent the Illusion

of Protection
Address management system failings that undermine process safety
By Jerry J. Forest, Celanese
T
he Swiss cheese model familiar to because they fall under the same manage-
many safety professionals clearly ment system. A weak management system
illustrates that when weaknesses in can be a common cause of the multiple
barriers align, hazards can manifest [1]. If failures.
these barriers are selected via a risk-based
methodology, the probability of failure is This article examines the elements of an
calculable. Because many companies use integrated process safety management
some type of semi-quantitative risk matrix system. It describes one system that can
and require mitigation of risks to a cate- be created and used to prevent the illusion
gory level commensurate with a very low of protection.
probability of failure, multiple barriers rarely
should fail at the exact same time. WHAT IS A
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM?
Yet, our experience in industry is that most Since the Center for Chemical Process
large consequence process safety incidents Safety (CCPS) issued its 20-element risk
occur due to coincidental failures of mul- based process safety element model, a clear
tiple layers of protection (LOPs). A likely distinction has existed between process
reason for this is that, while these layers are safety and the process safety management
assumed independent — and, thus, give the (PSM) regulation of the U.S. Occupa-
illusion of protection — they actually aren’t tional Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA). The former term is defined as: “A

disciplined framework for managing the Tribal Operational
Knowledge Excellence
integrity of operating systems and pro-
cesses handling hazardous substances by
applying good design principles, engineer-
ing, and operating practices” and is in place Chaos Prescription
People
to prevent incidents [2]. The later term
refers to the rule that regulates industry.
Systems
The two shouldn’t be used interchangeably.
OPERATIONAL EXCELLENCE MODEL
Similarly, PSM shouldn’t be confused with a Figure 1. People and systems both play key roles
in achieving success.
management system. PSM simply consists
of the 14 elements that OSHA regulates in
covered processes. CCPS’s Vision 20/20 describes the charac-
teristics of a vibrant management system
Common characteristics used to describe as “all employees must clearly understand
management systems include a combina- their role in managing process safety.”
tion of people and systems, as illustrated in Furthermore, the management system: “is
Figure 1. documented, accessible, and easily used;
defines how operations are conducted at
Weak systems executed by weak people the workplace; promotes safety in design,
lead to chaos. Strong people can provide operations, and maintenance; and is agile
a strong management system. However, and continuously improved” [3].
if that system isn’t documented, the orga-
nization will lose knowledge when people With these characteristics in mind, a man-
leave. Similarly, a management system agement system is: “a formally established
only made up of procedures either leads set of activities designed to produce spe-
to people blindly following them without cific results in a consistent manner on a
critical thinking, or ignoring the proce- sustainable basis” [4]. Definition of these
dures. An effective management system activities is the next logical step in creating
requires knowledgeable people executing a management system.
the necessary process safety elements
with discipline to produce repeatable The past 20 years has seen the develop-
results. This type of system leads to ment of several process safety models,
operational excellence and continuous including those published by CCPS, the
improvement. American Chemistry Council, the American

Petroleum Institute, OSHA, the U.S. Envi- (SOLs) illustrates the importance of inter-
ronmental Protection Agency and the connectivity of process safety elements in a
European Union [4]. The comprehensive management system [6].
model developed by CCPS appears in
“Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety” Selecting SOLs requires choosing appro-
[5]; it’s summarized in Table 1 and used for priate process safety information (PSI) to
discussion purposes here. understand the hazards of a process. This
enables identifying high risk scenarios as a
The CCPS model includes 20 elements cat- hazard identification and risk assessment
egorized into four pillars (Table 1). These (HIRA) process proceeds. The team might
pillars — management commitment; under- assign SOLs to those scenarios that opera-
standing hazards and risks; management of tor action — taking into account equipment
risks; and learning from experience — make design and the dynamics of the process —
up the key elements of an effective man- could prevent [7]. Once selected, the SOLs
agement system. become part of the PSI.
INTEGRATING MANAGEMENT The SOLs then must be documented and

SYSTEM ELEMENTS accessible. In addition, operators must
The illusion of protection arises when the receive initial and then refresher training.
various process safety elements aren’t One way to integrate these parts of the
connected in a management system. The management system is to transfer the
selection and use of safe operating limits information gained with PSI and HIRA to
Commit to Process Understand Hazards Manage Learn from

Safety and Risks Risks Experience
Process Safety culture Process knowledge management Operating procedures Incident investigations
Compliance with Hazard identification and Safe work practices Measurements
standards risk analysis and metrics
Process Safety Asset integrity Auditing
competency and reliability
Workforce involvement Contractor management Management review
Training
Management of change
Stakeholder outreach Operational readiness
Conduct of operations
Emergency management
TABLE 1. CCPS PROCESS SAFETY MODEL

Its four pillars include a total of 20 essential elements.

Management Commitment
Process Safety Process Hazard Standard Operator

Information Analysis Operating Training
Procedures
Alarm Mechanical In-

Management tegrity
Incident
Reporting
Auditing
Management
of Change
INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR SAFE

OPERATING LIMITS
Figure 2. Failure to properly integrate elements can lead to the illusion of protection.
standard operating proce- the deviations from nor- commitment and review.
dures (SOPs) and operator mality deserves serious Figure 2 illustrates how
certification/recertification consideration. each of the process safety
materials. Critical alarms management system ele-
often accompany SOLs; Auditing ensures each of ments are interconnected.
therefore, attention to alarm the elements described
management is crucial to above are interconnected The management system
ensure the distributed con- and working as intended. unites the process safety
trol system’s configuration The risk associated with elements. Without inte-
aligns with the HIRA results. changes to anything in this grating these elements, the
This process should be doc- process must be evaluated barriers and LOPs identified
umented. Because failure to through a management of in the HIRA only are an illu-
act on an SOL could lead to change procedure. Finally, sion of protection. If those
significant consequences, any of these elements can LOPs aren’t considered in
preventative maintenance fail without the common building competency, doc-
of instruments that measure tie-in of management umented for ease of access,

taken into account for equipment mainte- With these items in mind, adopt a
nance and other elements of the process three-tiered approach for the manage-
safety management system, it’s easy to ment system.
understand how this common failure mech-
anism can occur. Tier 1. In this tier, documents describe
how a company or a site does business.
BUILDING A MANAGEMENT For process safety, the Tier 1 document
SYSTEM might detail CCPS’s 20 elements of
There are many ways to design a man- process safety, the high requirements
agement system. Companies that have for each, and how every element is
ISO certification may have management addressed. Some elements only might
systems documented following the Inter- have a Tier 1 requirement. This gives
national Organization for Standardization individual sites or units the flexibility to
requirements. “Guidelines for Implement- comply with the higher level requirements
ing Process Safety Management” [4] also commensurate with applicability.
describes how management systems
are built. Tier 2. Here, documents cover aspects
requiring more prescription. They describe
When building a management system, what is required. For example, a Tier 1
adhere to some important best practices: requirement might be that each process
• Document roles and responsibilities for all undergoes a HIRA review once every 5
levels of the organization. years. Because this element is essential to
• Keep written procedures simple and understand the hazards and the risks of
short, and include instructions and a process, the Tier 2 document describes
requirements, not descriptions. specifics of the HIRA, such as team com-
• Group similar requirements together. For position, methodology, minimum PSI used,
example, list all training requirements reporting and approval — to name a few.
in one document rather than dispersing
them through several. Tier 3. In this tier, documents describe
• Include instructions in the system for who is responsible for what, and how
maintaining uniformity in the documents. it gets done. Let’s consider, for exam-
• Establish an approval process ple, incident investigation. The Tier 1
for changes. document might mandate reporting of
• Develop formal auditing protocols to all incidents. Tier 2 might have more
ensure that elements of the management prescriptive requirements, such as an inci-
system are being followed. dent must be reported within 24 hours,

categorized (with instructions provided on JERRY J. FOREST is senior director, process safety,
how to classify), and communicated in a for Celanese, Dallas. Email him at jerry.forest@cel-
certain way. A Tier 3 document describes anese.com.
who reports incidents and how they

report them. This might differ among sites REFERENCES
or even units at a site. (Incident investi- 1. “ANSI/API RP 754 — Process Safety Performance Indi-
gations often reveal deficiencies in Tier 3 cators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries,”
documents that need addressing.) 2nd ed., Amer. Petr. Inst., Washington, D.C. (April 2016).
2. “Process Safety Glossary,” www.aiche.org/ccps/
Success of such a tiered management resources/glossary/process-safety-glossary/pro-
system depends upon strong ongoing cess-safety, Ctr. for Chem. Proc. Safety (CCPS), New
management support. It also requires ade- York City, accessed July 4, 2018.
quate training for all involved, auditing for 3. “Vision 20/20,” www.aiche.org/ccps/resources/
effectiveness, and periodic management vision-2020/five-industry-tenets/vibrant-manage-
review and continuous improvement. ment-systems, CCPS, accessed July 4, 2018.
4. “Guidelines for Implementing Process Safety Manage-
FORESTALL FAILINGS ment,” 2nd ed., CCPS, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken,
The CCPS 20-element process safety NJ (2016).
model, if used properly, provides a basis 5. “Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety,” CCPS,
for effective protection against incidents. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ (2007).
You can’t just pick and choose portions. 6. Forest, Jerry, “Know Your Limits,” pp. 498–501, Proc.
Rather, the various process safety ele- Safety Progr. (Dec. 2018).
ments must share an intimate connection. 7. “Process Safety Glossary,” www.aiche.org/ccps/
This connection is made possible by a resources/glossary/processsafety-glossary/safe-op-
functioning and vibrant management erating-limits, CCPS, accessed January 8, 2018.
system that: “is documented, accessible,

and easily used; defines how operations ADDITIONAL READING
are conducted at the workplace; promotes “Guidelines for Integrating Management Systems and
safety in design, operations, and main- Metrics to Improve Process Safety Performance,” CCPS,
tenance; and is agile and continuously John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ (2016).
improved” [3]. Without this vibrant man-

agement system, we only have the illusion “Process Safety Visions, Vibrant Man-
of protection. agement Systems,” p. 55, Chem. Eng. Progr. (Jan. 2017).

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Rethink Your Refuge

A zero-vulnerability safe haven helps protect personnel and speed
emergency response
By J. A. Rau, MineARC Systems America, LLC; A. Young, MineARC Systems, Pty Ltd;
and M. McDermott, High Performance Building Solutions
W
hile it is not uncommon to of incidents that can occur despite high
find shelter-in-place (SIP) or levels of planning and safety precautions.
safe-haven locations desig-
nated across chemical facilities, what varies Numerous government agencies and other
is the level of protection offered at these organizations recommend SIP as a measure
sites. Functionality can range from merely a to reduce harm in the event of a chemical
muster point — a SIP — to a positively pres- release. Any building may be used as a tem-
surized room — a safe haven. Either way, porary measure to reduce health risk from
when determining the room’s acceptable exposure to the toxic materials by simply
performance criteria, the industry generally closing windows and doors and turning off
applies ERPG-3 or a vulnerability factor. ventilation fans and air conditioning and
An acceptable vulnerability factor often is heating systems.
deemed the probability of a fatality being
less than 1%. Three factors govern the effectiveness of a
SIP location:
Emergency SIP forms an integral part of any • the tightness of the building or leak-
plant’s broader emergency response plan. age rate,
Explosions, fires and the release of smoke • the concentration of the toxic gas, and
or other toxic gases are some of the types • the release duration.

The tightness of the building primarily is vulnerability safe havens. There are con-
based on building construction; however, siderations for effectively sealing existing
temperature differential and wind speed infrastructure and ensuring positive
also play a factor. pressure to ensure contaminants do not
infiltrate safe-haven locations along with
Identification of the maximum toxic con- providing the critical elements of life sup-
centration occurs during a facility siting port, including:
study (FSS). An FSS is a hazard analysis • Positive pressure
that defines maximum credible event (MCE) • Breathable air supply
scenarios using a consequence-based • Supplemental O2
approach to produce a quantitative risk • Removal of accumulated CO2
assessment. Determining potential conse- • Cooling and dehumidifying
quences is a necessary step in the process
of developing a comprehensive safety plan. INFILTRATION
TESTING BACKGROUND
The FSS determines the expected release MineARC contracted Charlotte, North Car-
duration based on stored inventories olina-based High Performance Building
of toxic materials. The higher the toxic Solutions Inc. (HPBS) to perform an air
concentration and longer the release infiltration study for spaces identified as
duration, the less effective sheltering in candidates to be used as SIP in the event
place becomes. of an accidental chemical release. This SIP
strategy uses the existing structure and its
While occupants may feel safe sheltering in indoor atmosphere to separate individu-
place from the external toxic hazard, typical als temporarily from a hazardous outdoor
buildings have high leakage rates. A typical atmosphere.
wood-framed constructed building can have
three to five air changes per hour (ACH50), A series of pre-weatherization air leakage
rendering it ineffective against most chemical tests were conducted to determine the
releases. Additionally, sealing to an accept- baseline air infiltration rate of potential SIP
able airtightness can be time-consuming and spaces. Manual air sealing, a cleanroom
expensive. Even with professional air sealing, suspended ceiling system and low-leakage
it is difficult to air seal existing structures to HVAC dampers were installed to reduce the
an acceptable tightness. overall air infiltration of the SIP spaces and
to close off air leakage pathways from non-
Here, we present a case study for the protected spaces in the building through
conversion of five SIP spaces to 0% the HVAC system.

Post-weatherization air leakage tests were Following ASTM E 779-10, pressurization air
conducted to determine the air infiltration leakage tests were conducted on the spaces
rate of the SIP space after the completion in Table 1, as recommended in the FSS.
of weatherization and HVAC work. The SIP
spaces additionally were air sealed using AIR LEAKAGE TEST RESULTS
the proprietary AeroBarrier system to Positive-pressure air leakage test results are
reduce infiltration rates further. reported in four different ways:
• CFM4 is the quantitative volume of air
SCOPE passing through an enclosure under
Air sealing work was completed, and a pressure difference of 4 Pascals
low-leakage HVAC dampers were installed (equivalent to a 5-mph wind). This is a
to reduce the overall air infiltration of measurable physical quantity and the
the SIP spaces and to isolate the HVAC value recommended in the FSS to elimi-
from nonprotected spaces in the building. nate toxic gas ingress into the SIP spaces.
Post-weatherization air leakage tests were • CFM25 is the quantitative volume of air
conducted to determine the air infiltration passing through an enclosure under a
rate of the SIP space after the comple- pressure difference of 25 Pascals (0.1-
tion of air sealing, suspended ceiling and in w.g.). FEMA 453 requires Class 1 Safe
HVAC work. Havens be pressurized to 25 Pascals. This
is a measurable physical property.
AeroBarrier air sealing was conducted on • CFM50 is the quantitative volume of air
SIP spaces as a pilot project on September passing through an enclosure under a pres-
18 through September 21, 2017, with post air sure difference of 50 Pascals (0.2-in w.g.).
leakage tests conducted on September 21 • ACH50 is the quantitative volume of air
and September 22 to determine the air infil- passing through an enclosure under a
tration rate of the SIP space after sealing pressure difference of 50 Pascals (0.2-in
was completed. w.g.) normalized by the enclosure volume.
SIP Space Occupancy Floor Area (Square Feet) Volume (Cubic Feet)
SIP Space 1 40 990 10,481
SIP Space 2 6 955 8,210
SIP Space 3 5 391 3,917
SIP Space 4 10 1,697 16,968
SIP Space 5 40 293 2,637
SIP SPECIFICATIONS
Table 1. The FSS recommends SIP space testing based on these criteria.

ACH is the abbreviation for air changes Space 4, was abandoned in favor of a smaller
per hour. It is the number of times the air adjacent room due to high leakage post-man-
volume in a building changes per hour at ual weatherization and the computers that
50 Pascals of pressure. could not be shut down, which prevented the
use of AeroBarrier in the space.
Table 2 shows the CFM50 and ACH50 for
each of the SIP spaces pre and post-weath- The AeroBarrier air sealing was prescribed
erization along with the percentage a target. According to the AeroBarrier
reduction in leakage. SIP Spaces 1 and 5 did simultaneous air leakage calculations, all the
not have pre-weatherization results as ini- spaces met and surpassed this airtightness
tially the whole building was tested. target; sealing was halted at this point.
Smaller spaces were selected as the whole Table 3 shows the CFM50 and ACH50
building was too large to feasibly convert to for each of the SIP spaces as tested by
a SIP space (retesting of the new SIP spaces HPBS post-AeroBarrier along with the
was not completed). The control room, SIP percentage reduction. The HPBS results
CFM50 ACH50
Safe
Pre- Post- Pre- Post- % Reduction
Haven Space
Weatherization Weatherization Weatherization Weatherization
SIP Space 1 N/A 1,871 N/A 10.7 N/A
SIP Space 2 3,623 1,560 26 11.4 57%
SIP Space 3 385 135 6 2.1 65%
SIP Space 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
SIP Space 5 N/A 655 N/A 19.4 N/A
POST-WEATHERIZATION LEAKAGE RESULTS

Table 2. This table shows SIP space results according to CFM50 and ACH50 guidelines.
CFM50 ACH50
Safe
Post- Post Post- Post % Reduction
Haven Space
Weatherization AeroBarrier® Weatherization AeroBarrier®
SIP Space 1 1,871 455 10.7 2.6 76%

SIP Space 2 1,560 182 11.4 1.3 88%
SIP Space 3 135 125 2.1 1.9 7%
SIP Space 4 N/A 173 N/A 3.3 N/A
SIP Space 5 655 138 19.4 3.1 79%
POST-AEROBARRIER LEAKAGE RESULTS

Table 3. These are the post-AeroBarrier results along with the percentage reduction according to
CFM50 and ACH50.

AIR LEAKAGE RESULTS

Figure 1. This compares post-AeroBarrier air leakage rates with the FEMA 453 estimates based on
construction types.
were used to calculate the

amount of positive pres-
sure required to convert the
rooms to positive-pressure
safe havens.
The AeroBarrier air seal-

ing methods improved the
air barrier integrity for all
LEAK RATE ESTIMATES
the proposed SIP spaces Figure 2. Estimated leakage rates per square foot of floor space
between 7 and 88% over the to achieve 0.1 iwg (25Pa) overpressure by construction type.
post-manual weatherization
leakage rates. Air leakage Figure 1 displays the take into consideration the
still was observed behind post-AeroBarrier leakage ceiling height and volume of
many electrical penetrations, rate in comparison to the the space.
including HVAC thermostats FEMA 453 estimates for
and fire and smoke alarms. air leakage rates based on Figure 2 is an estimated
These devices were covered construction types. FEMA leakage rate based on con-
with plastic to protect them 453 estimates are reported struction type to estimate
from the sealant but had in square feet of floor area the filtration and posi-
hidden holes behind them. at 25 Pascals and do not tive-pressure system size

ACH50
Safe
Pre- Post- Post % Reduction
Haven Space
Weatherization Weatherization AeroBarrier
SIP Space 1 N/A 10.7 2.6 76%
SIP Space 2 26.5 11.4 1.3 95%
SIP Space 3 5.9 2.1 1.9 68%
SIP Space 4 N/A N/A 3.3 N/A
SIP Space 5 N/A 19.4 3.1 84%
AIR INFILTRATION IMPROVEMENT FOR SIP SPACES

Table 4. AeroBarrier and manual air sealing methods combined resulted in big improvements for
SIP spaces.
Figure 3 compares the

ACH50 pre-weatherization,
post-weatherization and
AeroBarrier air infiltration
results.
LIFE SUPPORT
SYSTEMS
MineARC Systems, a
refuge chamber and safety
technology company, recal-
culated the vulnerability for
each SIP space based on
the post-AeroBarrier leak-
AIR INFILTRATION RESULTS age rates. All SIP spaces still
Figure 3. This figure compares the ACH50 pre-weatherization,
had a vulnerability of 100%
post-weatherization and AeroBarrier air infiltration results.
and therefore required the
installation of independent
under the FEMA 453 stan- Table 4 shows the combined life support systems to be
dard. All the SIP locations AeroBarrier and manual air deemed 0% vulnerability
were between tight and sealing methods improved safe havens.
typical except for SIP Room the airtightness for all
2, which was a small prefab- the proposed SIP spaces Figure 4 shows the toxic
ricated metal-constructed between 68% and 95% over gas concentration, dura-
portable building. the original leakage rates. tion of the release and

SIP SPACE VULNERABILITY

Figure 4. A tank rupture appears as the worst-case scenario but of a short duration.
The air leakage test results provide a

Volume
Safe-Haven Space CFM4 mathematical formula that can be used to
(Cubic Feet)
SIP Space 1 10,481 99 calculate the amount of breathable com-

SIP Space 2 8,210 32 pressed-air cylinders (437 ft3) that must
SIP Space 3 3,917 24 be added to each candidate SIP space to
SIP Space 4 3,110 45
maintain a 4 Pascal positive pressure to
SIP Space 5 2,637 21
overcome a 5-mph design wind coincident
AIR LEAKAGE RESULTS AT CFM4
with a toxic release.
Table 5. SIP space post-weatherization infiltra-
tion rates using AeroBarrier is shown.
MineARC Systems was contracted to

vulnerability for each SIP space. As the larg- install life support systems to convert
est MCE was a full tank rupture, the toxic the SIP spaces to positive-pressure safe
concentrations were extremely high, but the havens. The MineARC AirBANK pos-
duration was short at 1 min. itive-pressure system provides rapid
pressurization, which is activated and
The leakage rate at 4 Pascals of pressure maintained using the AirBANK Control via
difference is slightly more than would a simple human-machine interface (HMI)
occur under a 5-mph wind used in the dis- touch screen.
persion model in the FSS report based on
climatic data for the facility (to maintain MineARC’s integrated Aura-FX Gas Mon-
positive pressure and neutralize air infil- itor ensures breathable air automatically
tration). Post-weatherization infiltration remains within acceptable limits. Addi-
rates in cubic feet per minute at 4 Pascals tionally, the installation of supplementary
of pressure for each of the SIP spaces is oxygen and carbon dioxide scrubbing sys-
shown in Table 5. tems in safe havens are as needed.

QUANTITY OF CYLINDERS REQUIRED FOR 4PA POSITIVE PRESSURE

Figure 5. Based on how much air each person would need to breath, this figure shows how many cyl-
inders would be needed in a chamber.
INTERNAL GAS CONCENTRATIONS IN SAFE HAVENS

Figure 6.Additional supplemental oxygen and carbon dioxide scrubbing may be needed to maintain
the internal gas concentrations within OSHA limits.
Figure 5 shows the number of 437-ft3 In 2018, MineARC completed installa-

cylinders required for each safe-haven tion and training on the five safe-haven
location. The minimum breathable air per spaces. Each safe haven was tested
person is 2.5 cfm (70L/min) per person during the commissioning process to
based on MineARC’s experience and test- ensure it could maintain acceptable posi-
ing within the refuge chamber industry. tive pressure.
The maximum CO2 concentration is at 1% CONCLUSIONS

and O2 between 19.5 and 23.5% based on The conversion of SIP locations to 0%
Occupational Safety and Health Administra- vulnerability safe havens is a three-step
tion (OSHA) limits. Because of the volume process consisting of the following:
and number of people in Safe Haven Space 1. Identification of the correct SIP loca-
5, it required supplemental oxygen and tion based on ease of sealing and
carbon dioxide scrubbing to maintain the small volume based on the required
internal gas concentrations within specified occupancy,
limits (Figure 6). Three sodium chlorate 2. Manual and AeroBarrier air sealing of
oxygen candles and two AirGEN CO2 scrub- SIP spaces,
bers were included in the design. 3. Installation of life support equipment.

Identifying SIP spaces that can seal from are the most difficult to seal because of
the outset is crucial to a successful result. the false floor and myriad cable trays and
In the case study, three of the five original pass-throughs installed for the computer
locations were abandoned in favor of rooms systems. The smaller the room and the
in adjacent locations because of high leak- more robust the construction (i.e., prefab-
age rates or reducing the size to make the ricated metal or concrete buildings), the
project more cost-effective. Control rooms better it seals.
REFERENCES
ASTM E779-10, “Standard Test Method for Deter- 30 CFR Parts 7 and 75 “Refuge Alternatives for
mining Air Leakage Rate by Fan Pressurization,” Underground Coal Mines; Final Rule.”
ASTM International, West Conshohocken, PA,
National Institute for Occupational Safety and
2019, www.astm.org
Health (2007). “Research Report on Refuge
Brake, Fellow, & Bates (1999). “Criteria for the Alternatives for Underground Coal Mines,”
design of emergency refuge stations for an under- www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive/pdfs/
ground metal mine.” Aus. IMM Proceedings, No.2, NIOSH-125/125-ResearchReportonRefugeAlterna-
1999, pp 1–7. tives.pdf.
Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2013, Occupational Safety & Health Administration
“Refuge chambers in underground mines — guide- (2013). “Permit-required confined spaces,” www.
line: Resources Safety,” Department of Mines and osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_docu-
Petroleum, Western Australia, 41 pp. ment?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9797
Epstein, Y., & Moran D. (2006). Thermal Comfort Suming Du. (2014). “On the effectiveness of shel-
and the Heat Stress Indices, Industrial Health, 44, ter-in-place as a measure to reduce harm from
atmospheric releases,” Journal of Emergency Man-
388–398.
agement, Vol. 12, No, 3, May/June 2014.
FEMA 453. (2006). “Design Guidance for Shelters
Venter. J. (1998). “Portable Refuge Chambers:
and Safe Rooms,” Federal Emergency Manage-
Air or Tomb in Underground Escape Strategies,”
ment Agency
School for Mechanical and Materials Engineering,
Health & Safety Executive UK (2008). “Guidance Potchefstoom University, Republic of South Africa.
and Information on the role and design of safe
Worksafe Australia National Standard (2005).
havens in arrangements for escape from mines,”
“Australian Standard AS: NZS 1716:2003 Respira-
www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/mines08.pdf
tory protective devices.”
ITA Working Group 5 (2016). “Provisions for
Yantosik. G. (2006). “Shelter-in-Place Protective
refuge chambers in tunnel projects under con-
Action Guide.” The Chemical Stockpile Emergency
struction,” ITA Report N°014 - V2 / March 2018.
Preparedness Program (CSEPP). U.S. Department
Mines Safety and Health Administration (2008). of Energy

Manual air sealing needs to be overseen by environment must be habitable. Air is to

someone with familiarity in building tight- be free of toxins such as carbon dioxide,
ness. While most of the tasks are general and acceptable levels of oxygen must be
construction, standard contractors are not maintained.
trained to work at the level of precision
needed to ensure proper sealing. Even a Positive-pressure systems reduce the ingress
tiny orifice or ceiling tile not sealed cor- of toxins and provide some or all of the
rectly can ruin a leakage test result. required source of breathable air. Additional
equipment such as compressed air, oxygen
For future construction projects, incorpo- cylinders and air scrubbers are used to meet
rating SIP spaces should occur during the the shortfall. Furthermore, internal conditions
design phase. Air barrier commissioning is must consider the human condition, support-
standard in new construction and should ing workable body temperature and humidity.
include the following tasks at a minimum:
• Design review of the plans with specifi- Reducing the risk of harm to personnel is a
cations for the air barrier and mechanical priority for emergency response planning.
system — specifically as they relate to While the likelihood of an MCE occurring
spaces designated for use as safe havens; may be low, the risk to on-site personnel in
• Quality assurance inspections during the event of an incident is high. Convert-
construction to ensure a continuous air ing SIP locations to zero-vulnerability safe
barrier is in place; and, havens improves emergency response.
• Final air leakage testing of the continuous
air barrier to ensure the leakage rate of J. A. RAU is general manager at MineARC Systems
the safe haven spaces are within accept- America, LLC, and can be reached at James.Rau@min-
able limits. earc.com. ASHLEE YOUNG is marketing coordinator
at MineARC Systems, Pty Ltd and can be reached at
Complementary life support equipment Ashlee.Young@minearc.com MEGHAN MCDERMOTT
is essential to sustain life within an air- is the owner and architectural engineer of High Per-
tight environment. For personnel to formance Building Solutions. Email her at meghan@
remain within the sealed safe haven, the hpb-solutions.com.

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Ensure Reliable
Fire Protection in
Natural Gas Plants
Combustible and toxic gas detectors as well as flame detectors
can help reduce incidents.
By Edward Naranjo, Emerson
N
atural gas processing plants are The dangers of gas plants are underscored
complex facilities designed to by the severity of accidents that can occur.
separate natural gas composed On June 27, 2016, for example, loss of con-
almost entirely of methane from other tainment from a heat exchanger led to the
hydrocarbons, nitrogen, water, metals and release of methane, ethane, propane and
other impurities. These plants are usually other hydrocarbons at the Enterprise Prod-
located in natural gas processing regions ucts Pascagoula gas plant in Pascagoula,
and connected to wellheads through a Miss. (CSB 2019). The leak led to a large-
network of small-diameter, low-pressure scale fire and explosion. A similar incident
gathering pipelines. Natural gas plants’ occurred on September 25, 1998, when a
main hazard are fires and detonations and heat exchanger in the Esso gas plant in
acute exposure to toxic gases from uncon- Longford, Victoria, Australia, ruptured,
trolled releases of flammable and toxic releasing hydrocarbon vapors and liquids
materials. The large inventories of flamma- (Kletz 2009). As with the Enterprise Prod-
ble and toxic gases and liquids managed ucts incident, the escape resulted in a large
by these plants combined with the high fire and explosion.
density of equipment and relatively large
occupancy rates speak to their high Natural gas plants are critical infrastruc-
hazard potential. ture for the modern energy supply and

NATURAL GAS PROCESSING FLOW DIAGRAM

Figure 1. Natural gas processing plants are complex facilities designed to separate natural gas com-
posed from other hydrocarbons, nitrogen, water, metals and other impurities.
their safety is of utmost importance. In the In the following sections, we will review
United States, natural gas plant operators provisions for protection of natural gas
must follow process safety management processing facilities and illustrate their use
regulations for general industry (29 CFR through several examples of common pro-
1910) as well as several of the state plans cess modules. We will then address the
approved by the Occupational Safety and interface between fire and gas detectors
Health Administration. Guidelines like API and the control systems that manage the
Bull 75L and process safety standards like plant. Fire and gas systems are in effect the
IEC 61511 offer the framework for man- independent layer of protection that drive
aging process safety systems through mitigation actions to arrest the escalation
their lifecycle. of accidents. In consequence, it is important

to survey how instruments and logic solvers probability releases may cross the fence line
contribute to improving the performance of and the sources of such releases are outside
the combination. the coverage or at the limits of point detec-
tion. Point and open path hydrogen sulfide
PROVISIONS OF FIRE (H2S) detection are required in acid gas
AND GAS SYSTEMS removal and the sulfur recovery unit, and
Natural gas processing consists of sepa- similarly, at the gas well during production
rating several hydrocarbon molecules and of hydrocarbon fluids and condensates and
contaminants from pure natural gas. The water removal.
process includes condensate and water
removal, acid gas removal, dehydration, In general, it is impractical to provide toxic
mercury removal, nitrogen rejection, and gas detectors to address every toxic release
natural gas recovery, separation, and scenario in most process facilities. As a
treatment. Many associated hydrocarbons result, the use of fixed detectors is limited
known as natural gas liquids are valuable to target receptor monitoring and high-risk
products of the separation of natural gas; applications. Point detectors are placed
when components are separated and frac- on grid spacing and near points of entry
tionated, their feedstocks are sold to oil and along normal travel paths of travel
refineries, petrochemical plants and oil pro- within the units, especially in those loca-
ducers for a variety of uses. A schematic tions where personnel may not be able to
flow diagram of a natural gas processing observe the area as they approach potential
plant is shown in Figure 1 (Riazi et al. 2013). release sources. Open path H2S detectors
are beneficial between equipment in toxic
Process units incorporate some degree of service and mustering points and between
protection in the form of fixed point and potential release sources and uncontrolled
open path gas detection. Because raw nat- areas like service roads and parking lots.
ural gas contains components with higher
and lower molecular density than air, detec- The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
tors in several process units must be placed has alerted about the dangers of oil mist in
at both floor and ceiling level where gas offshore gas turbines (HSE 2008). When
may fractionate. Open path detectors may liquid sprays impinge on hot metal surfaces,
be used to protect module boundaries, they may ignite as the surface temperature
particularly where heavier-than-air combus- exceeds the liquids’ autoignition tem-
tible fluids are managed, and the process is peratures. In the same fashion, lubricating
relatively close to the perimeter and disper- systems in gas compressors in gas plants
sion modeling indicates that small, but high are at risk of fires if not protected. Oil mist

INSTALLATION IN DEHYDRATION PROCESSING UNIT

Figure 2. Two flame detectors are used to monitor the area around an absorption tower and reboiler.
detectors should be installed near compres- corners of an area or module such that the
sors and lubricating and hydraulic systems. detectors’ field of view covers areas where
Likewise, for glycol dehydration and natural fires may occur. Computer aided design
gas liquid extraction using the absorption tools should be used to optimize area
method, best practice calls for installing oil coverage at the design stage. To increase
mist detectors near high pressure sources detection effectiveness, no area should be
of liquid leaks. completely dependent on a single device.
Figure 2 illustrates flame detectors on an
Ultrasonic gas leak detectors are applied in absorption tower and reboiler.
all outdoor locations with pressurized pipe-
work. Locations include compressor areas, Because of their long-range capability and
filter stations, separators, gas metering wide field of view, multispectral infrared
skids and receiver areas. flame detectors offer optimum performance
for these applications. Flame detectors
Flame detectors should view all modules should be used with combustible gas detec-
and all major items of the plant. A common tors to safeguard plants against fires and
arrangement is to locate detectors at the explosions. As the HSE has shown in the UK

FLAME AND GAS DETECTORS AND CONTROL SYSTEM IN SEPARATOR AREA

Figure 3. A distributed I/O block can be placed near the process module to help reduce wiring and
the control system’s footprint.
offshore sector, combustible gas detection open path detectors are placed on oppo-
equipment is not 100% effective in open site sides of the process module to provide
installations (McGillivray and Hare 2008). area monitoring consistent with the prev-
The likelihood of credible gas releases alent wind direction. For fast response to
escalating into incidents that could cause pressurized gas releases, ultrasonic gas leak
large-scale damage is much diminished detectors are positioned to cover potential
when flame and combustible gas detectors leak sources like flanges and valves on the
work in tandem. In the next section, we’ll separator and coolers. To avoid shadow-
examine some common arrangements of ing and reflections, gas leak detectors are
these devices in process modules. placed on either side of the cooler, while
flame detectors are installed at the cor-
SEPARATOR AREA ners and between the separator and heat
Separator process modules include the exchanges to view most of the module.
separator, heat exchanger, and gas cooler.
Figure 3 shows an ideal arrangement. Point A cluster of devices as shown may be
gas detectors are placed between the interfaced with a logic solver installed in
separator and heat exchanger, under the a control room. To reduce wiring and the
coolers, where gas may accumulate. Two control system’s footprint, a distributed

FLAME AND GAS DETECTORS IN NATURAL GAS METERING SKID

Figure 4. An ultrasonic gas leak detector covers the footprint of the metering skid.
I/O block can be placed near the process coverage for the skid. In this example, two
module also shown in Figure 3. detectors are placed on opposite corners.
METERING SKID A distributed system offers an elegant

Measurement of process fluids being approach for managing field devices in a
transferred to other plants takes place in metering skid installation. A distributed I/O
metering skids. The primary variable to block, for example, can interface with flame
be measured is mass flowrate. Main com- and gas detectors for one or several meter-
ponents include the structure frame and ing skids in proximity, an arrangement that
supports, pipework, process equipment offers the benefits described in the previ-
like flowmeters and process gas chro- ous section.
matographs, and local control system. For
illustration, we’ll assume the process fluid is PACKAGED FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM
pipeline quality dry natural gas. As shown Fire and gas systems in gas plants are no
in Figure 4, an ultrasonic gas leak detector ordinary equipment. Because gas plants
covers the footprint of the metering skid. are located near exploration and produc-
Depending on size and degree of obstruc- tion facilities, logic solvers may be exposed
tion, one or several flame detectors may to adverse conditions like high humidity,
be necessary to supply adequate area brine, high vibration, and voltage variations.

Not surprisingly, printed circuit boards are initiating devices to notification appliances
weatherized by application of conformal and other fire outputs is defined and limits
coating and wires and other electronic and exceptions are known. Surprises during
components are designed to allow for few installation commissioning, and operation are
common failures. Compared to other con- kept to a minimum. In addition, packaged
trollers, a fire and gas system logic solver solutions are equipped with configuration
incorporates redundant power and commu- libraries that facilitate the automatic com-
nication paths for input and output devices missioning and documentation of several
and must easily integrate with safety instru- devices at a time. As mentioned above, gas
mented and emergency shutdown systems plants can have several hundred or thousand
to which they may pass certain demands. flame and gas detectors and other peripher-
als associated with fire and gas monitoring,
Certifications also play a critical role for resulting in numerous weeks of installation
fire and gas systems in gas plants, because and commissioning for manual or sequen-
these address minimum requirements for tial set up, an approach that is also prone to
product performance, reliability and sur- error. In one instance, smart commissioning
vivability. In the United States, fire and gas with pre-loaded field device settings resulted
systems are installed according to NFPA 72 in a significant reduction of commissioning
and certified to performance standards like cycle time.
FM 3010 and UL 864. Similarly, the system
level standard for Europe is EN 54-2. The profit to be gained from packaged
systems extends well beyond commis-
One of the most important differences sioning. It is well known that real-time
between personal computers and industrial HART integration into system architecture
logic solvers is the design of the latter as enables users to get access to diagnostics
complete packages. In logic solvers, software, and configuration information. Continu-
hardware, and documentation are designed ous communication between field devices
and tested to work together. Similarly, fire and control system allows problems with
and gas systems are designed to meet per- the device to be detected within seconds,
formance standards that link the size and enabling action to avoid process disruptions
nature of the hazards to the characteristics of and unplanned process shutdowns. Regret-
the system and ensure requirements are met tably, many end users have no access to
for operation and availability. Such packaged such information. Unlike field devices for
solutions offer several benefits to natural process control, flame and gas detectors
gas plants. To begin, the performance of the make use of analog output values below 4
complete system, from a selected group of mA to report faults. Values of 1, 2 and 2.5

SAMPLE FAULT ANALOG CURRENT LEVELS

Fault Condition Product Model(s) Analog Output (mA)
Input voltage less than 8 VDC Gas Transmitter 2.5
Input voltage more than 33 VDC Gas Transmitter 2.5
Critical memory fault Gas Transmitter 2.5
Onboard power supply fault Gas Transmitter 2.5
Sensor zero drift Toxic Gas Sensor 2.5
Memory fault Toxic Gas Sensor 2.5
Calibrate sensor Toxic Gas Sensor 2.5
Span calibration failure Combustible Gas Sensor 2.5
Zero calibration failure Combustible Gas Sensor 2.5
Sensor over-range Combustible Gas Sensor 2.5
Low temperature Combustible Gas Sensor 2.5
High temperature Combustible Gas Sensor 2.5
Replace sensor Combustible Gas Sensor Momentary 2.5 mA
Memory fault Combustible Gas Sensor 2.5
Power supply fault Combustible Gas Sensor 2.5
Sensor nearing end of life Combustible Gas Sensor Momentary 2.5 mA
Sensor weak signal Combustible Gas Sensor Momentary 2.5 mA
Fault Flame Detector 1.0
Dirty window Flame Detector 2.0
Sensor test fault Ultrasonic Gas Leak Detector 2.0
Internal process fault Ultrasonic Gas Leak Detector 1.0
Major fault Ultrasonic Gas Leak Detector 0
Table 1. This list includes several Rosemount flame and gas detectors, as well as their common
diagnostics and corresponding analog output levels.
mA to denote informational or critical faults values below the HART limit. The process
are not uncommon. Table 1 illustrates some is time consuming because every model’s
common diagnostics available in a few specific range of analog output levels and
commercial models and their corresponding configurations must be considered. Even
analog output levels. if some controllers allow access to HART
commands with analog output values
For field devices equipped with HART, the below 3.5 mA, device specific commands
FieldComm Group specifies a minimum may be suppressed. Invariably, ensuring
analog current signal of 3.5 mA. As a result, the device meets the design safety intent
end users wishing to take advantage of requires additional programming and test-
diagnostics, process variable, and con- ing, often after installation. Compare such
figuration information available through an approach to one of a packaged pre-engi-
HART must program logic solvers to read neered system. By design, with a packaged

solution pertinent commands are tested for CONCLUSION

every HART field device within the scope Natural gas plants are critical infrastruc-
of the certification. The need for custom ture for natural gas supply. Although
programming is reduced, which helps keep some separation of water, metals, and
system implementation on schedule. other impurities from raw natural gas
takes place at wells, natural gas process-
Finally, pre-engineered systems enable more ing facilities carry out most of the steps to
efficient alarm management. When an assort- separate natural gas liquids into feedstock
ment of field devices and control systems for oil refineries and chemical plants and
which have not been tested together are first produce pipeline grade natural gas. Due
integrated, the diversity of alarms and alerts to the potential for accidental release of
that must be managed can be overwhelm- hazardous chemicals, natural gas plants
ing. Which action should be undertaken if a face severe risks. Fires and explosions
device reports a low line voltage fault? Can and acute exposure to toxic gases and
it continue to operate under low voltage asphyxiants can disrupt operations and
for several weeks or is it unable to perform cause harm to the workforce and any
its protective function? Although standards surrounding population. Fire and gas sys-
for alarm management like ANSI/ISA-18.2 tems protect these plants by reducing
specify rankings for diagnostics, the termi- the consequences of incidents. Minimum
nology, what constitutes an alarm, and what provisions for fire and gas systems include
is critical for a device’s safe operation varies the installation of combustible and toxic
considerably by vendor. Making sense of the gas detectors and flame detectors. As
diversity falls on the end user, which must shown in the two examples above, the
rationalize alarms through trial and error. At ideal arrangement of these devices varies
one extreme, all diagnostics are suppressed, across process modules based on the
putting an end to improved asset utilization, nature, location and severity of the poten-
while at the other alarm flooding is likely to tial hazard.
occur. With pre-engineered systems, much
of the trial and error related to alarm ratio- Fire and gas systems for natural gas
nalization is minimized. Rank ordering of plants must be reliable. Due in no small
diagnostics and level of criticality is consis- part to the risk of business disruption,
tent across field devices. In consequence, process facilities have instituted tougher
implementations are not only faster but the safety practices including more safety
plant also benefits from fewer abnormal sit- instrumentation and layers of protec-
uations and decrease of capital equipment tion. System hardware and software are
for repairs. designed for adverse environments and

REFERENCES
ANSI/ISA-18.2, Management of Alarm Systems McGillivray A. and Hare, J. 2008. Offshore
for the Process Industries. 2016. Research Trian- Hydrocarbon Releases 2001 – 2008 (RR672).
gle Park, NC: ISA. Buxton, Derbyshire, UK: HSE.
API Bull. 75L, Guidance Document for the IEC 61511, Functional Safety: Safety Instru-
Development of a Safety and Environmental mented Systems for the Process Industry
Management System for Onshore Oil and Nat- Sector (2nd Ed.). 2016. Brussels, Belgium:
ural Gas Production Operations and Associated European Committee for Standardization
Activities. 2007. Washington, DC: API. (CEN).
CSB. 2019. Loss of Containment, Fires, and Kletz, T. 2009. What Went Wrong? Case His-
Explosions at Enterprise Products Midstream tories of Process Plant Disasters and How They
Gas Plant, Pascagoula, Mississippi, No. 2016-02- Could Have Been Avoided (5th Ed.). Amster-
I-MS. Washington, DC: U.S. Chemical Safety and dam, The Netherlands: Elsevier.
Hazard Investigation Board.
NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm and Signaling
EN 54-2, Fire Detection and Fire Alarm Systems, Code. 2019. Quincy, MA: NFPA.
Part 2: Control and Indicating Equipment. 2006.
Riazi, M. R., Eser, S., Peña Díez, J. L., and
Brussels, Belgium: European Committee for
Agrawal, S. S. 2013. Introduction. In Petroleum
Standardization (CEN).
Refining and Natural Gas Processing, eds. M.
FM 3010, Approval Standard for Fire Alarm Sig- R. Riazi, S. Eser, J. L. Peña Díez, S. S. Agrawal.
naling Systems. 2014. Northwood, MA: FM. West Conshohocken, PA: ASTM International.
HSE. 2008. Fire and Explosion Hazards in Off- UL 864, Standard for Control Units and Acces-
shore Gas Turbines: Offshore Information Sheet sories for Fire Alarm Systems (10th Ed.). 2014.
No. 10/2008. Aberdeen, UK: HSE. Chicago, IL: UL.
the systems themselves are certified under to configuration and diagnostic informa-
performance standards for adequate tion through HART and rank ordering of
availability and survivability. Distributed alarms out of the box reduce the need for
I/O configurations contribute to reducing custom programming and testing, which in
the footprint of these systems, enabling turn leads to faster implementations and
operators to integrate devices over long reduced maintenance costs.
distances at reduced costs compared to
conventional peer-to-peer networks. EDWARD NARANJO is director of fire and gas sys-
tems for Emerson’s Automation Solutions business.
For operators seeking to deploy or He is an ISA Fellow and certified functional safety
modify a fire and gas system, packaged engineer with 16 years of experience in flame and
safety solutions offer significant bene- gas detection. Edward may be reached by e-mail at
fits. Smart commissioning, ready access Edward.Naranjo@emerson.com.

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Process Safety eHANDBOOK

I need quick, reliable detection of fires

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Effectively Manage Large-Scale Process Hazard Assessments 7

Use Dynamic Simulation To Improve Process Safety 13

Prevent The Illusion Of Protection 21

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Ensure Reliable Fire Protection in Natural Gas Plants 39

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