Issue No.

22 – September 2008
September 2008 Issue No. 22

From the Editor

E-JETS NEWS is a publication that presents EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft technical

items. This newsletter, compiled by EMBRAER Fleet Technical Center (EFTC),
brings the latest developments and shares in-service knowledge and maintenance
best practices. It also provides troubleshooting tips to optimize aircraft utilization
and efficiency in daily operation.

E-JETS NEWS addresses Operators concerns with maintenance support and

dispatchability of EMBRAER 170/190 aircraft. It has relevant information to be
shared with the technical departments, such as Engineering and Maintenance.
Recipients are encouraged to distribute this newsletter to EMBRAER Customers.

Earlier editions of E-JETS NEWS publication can be found at Flyembraer Portal at

http://www.flyembraer.com

- Login (enter username and password);

- Select “Maintenance” and then “Technical Support”;

- Select “E-Jets NEWS for Operators”;

- Click on desired E-JETS NEWS.

If any additional information regarding the in-service items covered in the E-JETS
NEWS is needed, please contact the local EMBRAER Field Service
Representative. General questions or comments about the E-JETS NEWS
publication can be addressed to:

E-JETS NEWS

Tel: +55 12 3927 7075

Fax: +55 12 3927 5996

E-mail: ejets.news@embraer.com.br

PROPRIETARY NOTICE

The articles published in E-JETS NEWS are for information only and are an EMBRAER S/A
property. This newsletter must not be reproduced or distributed in whole or in part to a third
party without EMBRAER’s written consent. Also, no article published should be considered
authority-approved data, unless specifically stated.

Page 1
September 2008
E-Jets NEWS at Flyembraer –
Subscription
In order to be notified whenever an E-
Jets NEWS is published, Flyembraer
portal has a feature called “Subscription”,
in which it is possible to subscribe and
receive an e-mail notifying that a new
release of the E-Jets NEWS has been
published.
In the Flyembraer “Technical Support”
page, just click on the “Context Menu”
(refer to the red arrow in the figure below)
and then select “Subscription”.
Then, it is necessary to set up the
subscription as shown in the following
figure. After the subscription setup is
completed, just click on “Save
Subscription”.
Therefore, whenever a new E-Jets
NEWS release is published, a notifying e-
mail will be sent.
Issue No. 22
Landing Gear Sampling
Program – Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170
As informed in the E-Jets NEWS release
No. 10, the first phase of the EMBRAER
170 Landing Gear Sampling Program has
been launched following instructions of
SB 170-32-0001 (Nose Landing Gear
Sampling Inspection Program) and SB
170-32-0002 (Main Landing Gear
Sampling Inspection Program).
Three Main Gears and three Nose Gears,
which have achieved around 5,000 FC of
operation were collected from operators
in different climates and regions of the
world and were sent to the manufacturer
for accomplishment of the inspections.
The next phases of the Program will be
performed in components that will reach
10,000 and 15,000 FC. The aim of this
Program is to validate the Maintenance
Review Board restoration interval for the
Landing Gear structural components.
EMBRAER thanks the operators who
participated in the subject Sampling
Program for their cooperation and
support.
As an update, the following are the
actions already taken and also to be
taken regarding the first phase of the
Program:
References:
1. 170LGY203 - E170 Landing
Gear Sampling Program - MLG -
Findings during removal and installation
2. 170LGY207 - E170 Landing
Gear Sampling Program - NLG - Findings
during removal and installation
3. 170LGI006 - NLG Sampling
Program Report - 1st Phase (5000FC) –
First operator
4. 170LGI007 - NLG Sampling
Program Report - 1st Phase (5000FC) –
Second operator
5. 170LGI008 - NLG Sampling
Program Report - 1st Phase (5000FC) –
Third operator
Page 2
September 2008
6. 170LGY205 - E170 MLG
Sampling Inspection Program (5000 FC)
7. 170LGI005 - NLG Sampling
Program Guideline
8. 170DSP180 - MLG Sampling
Program Guideline
Actions:
- EMBRAER, LIEBHERR and ELEB
provided the necessary material,
manpower and technical assistance for
the operators who participated in the
subject Program;
- The first MLG and NLG removal
occurred in Mar/07 and the last one in
Jul/07. Three NLG's and three MLG's
were removed in accordance with MRB
requirements;
- The NLG’s were sent to ELEB –
São José dos Campos – Brazil, while the
MLG’s were sent to LIEBHERR –
Lindenberg – Germany for a complete
overhaul. Guidelines with overhaul
actions to be taken in the NLG and MLG
parts were defined in accordance with
references 7 and 8. The Operators who
participated in the subject Program were
invited to follow the overhaul of removed
parts at the ELEB and LIEBHERR
facilities.
- All 1 to 8 referenced reports were
completed and are now in the process of
approval by ANAC (Brazilian authority);
• References 1 and 2 reports
show the findings detected during the
MLG / NLG removal and the
installation accomplished during the
subject Program
• References 3 to 6 show
inspection results and shop findings
during the overhaul process of the
removed Gears
- After finishing the overhaul process
of all parts and after issuing referenced
reports, EMBRAER, LIEBHERR and
ELEB engineering will discuss the
solutions for eventual discrepancies
found during this first phase of the
Program. The first dedicated meeting is
scheduled for Oct/08;
Issue No. 22
- Proposed solutions will be shared
with the operators who participated in the
subject Program. Their suggestions will
be considered in the issuance of final the
solutions.
- Final solutions will then be
submitted to ANAC;
- The complete description of findings
and final solutions are planned to be
shared with all operators by the first
quarter of 2009 through a dedicated
Service News Letter.
Crossbleed Valve
Contamination – Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
As an update of E-Jets NEWS Releases
No. 15 and 19, EMBRAER informs that
Service Bulletins 170-36-0014 and 190-
36-0011 that install a hose to avoid
crossbleed valve contamination were
released in Jun/08. This modification is
also being incorporated in the production
line on aircraft SN 170.00224 and
190.00180 and on.
EMBRAER recommends the
accomplishment of this SB by the
Operators who have been facing
crossbleed valve failure due to external
contamination.
Wing Anti-Ice Slat
Interconnection Hoses –
Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
As previously informed in E-Jets NEWS
Release No. 17, EMBRAER had some
cases of A-I WING 1(2) LEAK CAS
messages being displayed during
production flights, mostly due to over
temperature.
Troubleshooting led to the wing anti-ice
slat hose, between slats 3 and 4, whose
internal layer was detaching from the
hose body and restraining the airflow
inside the piccolo tube.
Page 3
September 2008
The same anti-ice event can be caused
by the other interconnection hose,
between slats 2 and 3. EMBRAER
engineering worked together with Sonaca
and got new, improved slat
interconnection hoses.
New Part Numbers are already available
and Service Bulletin release scheduled is
being defined. SNL 170-30-0013 (190-
30-0011) provides further information.
CF34-10E Engine -
Commanded In-Flight Shut
Down (IFSD) Event Due to
Engine Hardware Failure –
Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190
The EMBRAER 190 fleet has recently
experienced a commanded engine IFSD
during the takeoff phase, as informed in
E-Jets NEWS Release No. 20.
It was reported that there was a loud
noise just after the landing gears were
commanded to the up position and ITT
from engine number two reached
approximately 1100°C. Flight crew
elected to shut the engine down and
decided to return to departure airport with
no emergency declaration and without
any incident or injuries.
An engine visual inspection was
performed and no signs of FOD were
observed. N1 shaft was locked and metal
debris was found in the engine exhaust
area. The VSV system was inspected
and no damage or any discrepancy was
reported. Borescope inspection was also
performed and internal damage in the
HPT was found. The engine was
removed and sent to an engine shop for
repair and root cause investigation.
Initial Investigation shows the HPT blade
airfoil separation as the primary cause for
IFSD. Current investigation in 2 different
areas: impact of material mechanical
properties on the stress field of the blade
and inclusion detectability by different
inspection methods.
Issue No. 22
AMS Processor Failures –
Update
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
As an update of E-Jets NEWS Release
No. 15 and 16, EMBRAER informs that
Hamilton Sundstrand concluded that the
AMS processor board failure is caused
by a voltage oscillation that affects the
ARINC communication between the AMS
Controller and the SPDA.
As an immediate action, EMBRAER
recommends the replacement of the
affected AMS processor board, if the
RECIRC SMK DET FAIL CAS message
is displayed on the CAS during aircraft
power-up. The development of an
improved AMS processor board is
currently being evaluated by Hamilton
Sundstrand. The applicable FIM Tasks
have already been released in order to
optimize the troubleshooting services.
EMBRAER 170/190 Retread
Tires
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER has received requests to
approve the use of retread tires. Although
there are no concerns regarding MLG or
NLG tire retreading for the E-Jets family,
EMBRAER does not participate in the
certification process. It is obligatory for
the company specialized in this kind of
service to obtain the certification to
retread a specific model of tire. This
certification is issued exclusively by the
local Certification Authority. EMBRAER is
out of the looping and does not issue any
document for this purpose.
It is recommended that the operator
interested in obtaining this service, make
sure that the retreader company follows
every requirement stated by the local
Authority.
Nevertheless, EMBRAER will be
following the performance of new or
retread tires in the fleet. Whenever a
systemic deviation is detected,
EMBRAER will be involved in the
determination of the causes and
corrections.
Page 4
September 2008 Issue No. 22

Aileron Cable Wear and Generator Control Unit (GCU)

Inspection Ground Self-Test
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190

EMBRAER received some field reports SNLs 170-24-0033 and 190-24-0027

from operators concerning the have been issued to inform the Operators
occurrence of wear in the aileron cables about an observed effect when running
during scheduled maintenances, the GCU - Manual Initiated Ground Self
requiring further inspection. Test (MIGST) and the recommended
actions.
Under this scenario, EMBRAER would
like to advise the accomplishment of
AMM II Task 27-11-03-220-801-A
(Aileron Control Cable – Detailed Visual Cargo Smoke Detector and
Inspection), which provides limit levels of Nozzle Cages Permitted
wear, and the maximum wear value
allowed in the cable.
Conditions – SNL
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
Also, in order to address this issue, the
following Service Bulletins are available: EMBRAER has issued SNLs 170-26-
0004 and 190-26-0004 informing the
• SB 170-27-0028 – FLIGHT
permitted conditions for the Cargo
CONTROLS - AILERON - CABLES
Compartment Smoke Detector Cage and
WEAR
Fire Extinguisher Nozzle Cage. Both
plastic and metallic cage models were
• SB 190-27-0017 – FLIGHT
analyzed and are mentioned in the
CONTROLS - AILERON - CABLES
publication. Refer to the SNLs for
WEAR
detailed information.
In addition, as already informed by
EMBRAER through Information to
Technical or Field Support – “EMBRAER
190 MLG Well Aft Rib Support Crack
(Aileron Binding) – Update”, the Aileron
Support crack has an interim solution
with temporary repairs and fly-by-limits
described in IC2008-190/05075 &
IC2008-190/05152 (RH) and IC2008-
190/05104 (LH).

These documents also refer to the

required inspection procedures for cable
aileron wear issue.

Also, Service Bulletin SB190-53-0035 for

the EMB-190 is already available.

LOAD 21.2 – Side Effects

Description
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190

A revision of Service Newsletters 170-00-

0032 and 190-00-0028 has been
released. It describes a new side-effect
for Load 21.2 and provides additional
information for the other ones.
Page 5
September 2008
Interference between hydraulic
compartment lateral door half-
hinge and reservoir
Effectivity: EMBRAER 190
Occurrence of interference between the
hydraulic compartment lateral door half-
hinge and the hydraulic reservoir has
been reported. The half-hinge is installed
on the wing-to-fuselage faring LH/ RH aft
panel.
The interference is caused by
manufacture and/or assembly tolerances.
Deflection of the wing-to-fuselage faring
in flight can also be a source of
interference. This may cause damage to
the half-hinge and to the hydraulic
reservoir.
SB 190-53-0017 was issued in Aug/2008
to provide instructions to replace the
current half-hinge of the hydraulic
compartment lateral door with a new
improved one, to eliminate the
interference between the half-hinge and
the hydraulic reservoir and,
consequently, prevent damage to both
components.
Reservoir CMM will be revised to include
the damage limits and repair procedures
for this case. Currently, when this kind of
damage is detected, the Parker
representative should be contacted in
order to give the technical disposition.
Issue No. 22
Bias Recalculation after Delta-
pressure Sensor Replacement
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER has been informed of
reoccurrences of PACK FAIL messages
correlated to LH/ RH VENTURI DP
SNSR (DRIFT) (PKx) [Cx] CMC message
after the replacement of the Venturi DP
Sensor.
After investigation, it was concluded that
such events may be caused by the delta-
pressure sensor bias. If the bias is above
the specified, this value is stored in the
NVM.
Therefore, after the sensor replacement,
it is necessary to make sure that the new
delta-pressure bias (for the new sensor)
is recalculated in both channels.
It was not correctly verified that the AMS
controller channel transfer would
recalculate the delta-pressure bias. In
fact, only during power-up the AMS
channel in control calculates the delta-
pressure sensor bias.
Therefore, after the Venturi DP Sensor
replacement, in order to guarantee the
delta-pressure sensor bias recalculation
in both AMS controller channels, it is
necessary to:
• Perform a power-down/power-up
for the current channel in control;
• Check the AMS controller channel
in control;
• De-energize the power supply of
the channel in control by pulling its
circuit breakers to be sure that the
delta-pressure bias is calculated to
the other AMS controller channel;
• Perform the power-down/power-up
again.
The related maintenance manuals will be
revised accordingly.
Page 6
September 2008 Issue No. 22

New root cause identified for Further investigation on the FHDB could
BRK CONTROL FAULT on reveal the failure origin.
Power-Up • If CAS message is correlated only
to maintenance messages BCM1
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190 FAULT and BCM2 FAULT, neither
BCM nor PSEM replacement will
FHDB analyzes and aircraft prototype
be effective.
tests have revealed a new root cause for
BRK CONTROL FAULT on power-up on
• If CAS message is correlated to all
aircraft equipped with Brake Control
four maintenance messages BCM1
Module (BCM) PN 142-071142
FAULT, BCM2 FAULT, INBD 28V
(EMBRAER 170) and PN 142-091141
PWR FAULT and OUTBD 28V
(EMBRAER190).
PWR FAULT, EMBRAER
In this case, message is simultaneously recommends PSEM replacement.
correlated to BCM1 FAULT and BCM2
Final Solution
FAULT.
New BCM PN 142-091142.
As a preparation for the future BCM PN
142-091142, that will be common for
EMBRAER 170 and EMBRAER 190,
BCM compares hardware PIN ID DVDR/ QAR Files on
identification with the ASCB parameter
“acFamily” in order to determine aircraft Flyembraer
type.
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
It is confirmed that in some power-ups,
EMBRAER has revised the Service
ac Family parameter does not become
Newsletters that explain how to download
timely available for BCM usage and the
the FDR/ QAR correlation specification
CAS message BRK CONTROL FAULT is
reports and the standard QAR
declared.
configuration files.
It is confirmed that BRK CONTROL
These documents describe step by step
FAULT related only to BCM1 FAULT and
how to locate the subjected files at the
BCM2 FAULT is not caused by Proximity
Flyembraer web page.
Sensor Electronic Module (PSEM).
Refer to the last revision of SNLs 170-31-
In case of the PSEM failure, the CAS
0015 and 190-31-0014 for the required
message will be correlated to all four
explanation about how to download the
following maintenance messages: BCM1
FDR correlation specification reports.
FAULT, BCM2 FAULT, INBD 28V PWR
FAULT and OUTBD 28V PWR FAULT. To download either the QAR correlation
specification reports or the standard
EMBRAER is investigating a possible
configuration files, refer to the last
interim solution and mitigation actions, as
revision of SNLs 170-31-0007 and 190-
well as which modifications can be
31-0003.
introduced on incoming BCM PN 142-
091142 in order to eliminate the issue. Note: Service Newsletters 170-00-0009
and 190-00-0001 refer to addresses at
A Service Newsletter will be issued by
the flyembraer webpage which are no
Sep/2008 containing eventual updates on
longer active. These SNLs are not
this issue.
updated and will be cancelled.
Recommendations

EMBRAER recommends operators to

reset aircraft electrical power as
immediate action after BRK CONTROL
FAULT on power-up.

Page 7
September 2008
APU Oil Consumption
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
With the purpose of improving
maintenance practices, EMBRAER is
investigating the average APU oil
consumption.
EMBRAER kindly ask for inputs from the
field personnel containing APU oil
servicing quantities and interval (APU
hours and APU cycles).
The feedback shall be addressed to:
170propulsion@embraer.com.br
FCM Mod. J Power-Up Test
Results
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER would like to inform that the
new FCM MOD J was extensively tested
during on-wing power-up test campaign
at EMBRAER facilities from July to
August 2008. The main purpose of the
power-up test was to verify “FCM NOT
BOOTING UP” failure mode occurrence
during an airplane power-up procedure.
For the test, the following configuration
was used:
• FCM1: mod H silver label
• FCM2: mod J red label
• FCM3: mod J red label
• FCM4: mod J red label
The test results showed that no “FCM not
booting up” occurrence has been
reported during over 2000 power-ups.
Additional evaluation is being conducted
in order to comply with certification
requirements. Further updates will be
shared as soon as available.
Issue No. 22
Engine Cross Start Procedure
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER is aware of some Engine
Cross Starts that resulted in Hot Start
events (Engine Hot Start happens when
ITT reaches 815°C during start) due to
low start pressure.
Basically it happens because there is a
drop of pressure in the manifold (and
consequently at engine starter) when the
engine is commanded to start and the
Starter Control Valve opens. TLA
adjustment is required to compensate
this drop. This adjustment may lead the
HPSOV to be commanded to close (AMS
logic) resulting in a lower pressure at
engine starter inlet.
Current Engine Cross Start Procedure
requires the following:
• Minimum bleed duct pressure of 33
psi minus 0.5 psi for every 1000ft
above sea level
• Thrust lever adjustment during the
start to prevent the bleed pressure
from dropping below the minimum
required.
A detailed analysis was performed in a
sample of several starts that resulted in a
new value for required pressure and
procedure. This new procedure will now
require the following:
• Before Start: Adjust bleed duct
pressure for 40 psi minus 0.5 psi
for every 1000 ft above sea level
• During Start: No thrust lever
adjustment will be required. A
pressure drop is expected as the
SCV opens.
A Flight Operations Letter was issued on
September 15th, 2008 to advise operators
of such modification.
Aircraft Maintenance Manual is expected
to be revised in November 2008. AOM
revision is expected for December 2008.
Page 8
September 2008
An important remark is that the majority
of Hot Start events are not caused by low
start pressure on cross starts. Typical Hot
Starts seen on CF34-8E fleet are engine-
related and are being followed up
together with GE. Solution will probably
require software modification.
confirmed, that will only happen at the
end of 2009.
Gasper Shutoff Valve
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER would like to inform that the
“GASPER SUPPLY SOV [Cx]/WRG
FAULT” CMC message is spurious on
the EMBRAER 190/195 aircraft as the
gasper valve is only installed on
EMBRAER 170/ 175 aircraft.
During normal system operation, the
gasper shutoff valve is closed. In this
condition, only mixed air from the H-duct
through the gasper check valve is routed
to the gasper outlets. When the air
temperature exceeds 35 °C (95 °F), the
gasper shutoff valve is opened, which
allows conditioned air from the RH
recirculation duct to flow into the gasper
outlets, thus bypassing the H-duct.
On the ground, the RH recirculation fan
operates independently of the RH pack
switch, supplying air to the gasper
system.
Cargo Compartment Aermat
Orders
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
EMBRAER has been inquired about
orders for Aermat (carpet installed over
cargo floor panels) in rolls. This material
may be purchased under PNs
37RS01000-052-00 or AERMAT 37R-
S01000-052-00 and is supplied by LY
(Linear Yard). Each LY has about 3 ft
long and 5 ft wide. The roll material is
already reflected in AIPC 50-31-08.
Contact the nearest C&D Site for further
purchase details.
Issue No. 22
Left Integrated Control Center
(LICC) Hardware Issues
Effectivity: EMBRAER 170 / 190
SNLs 170-24-0034 and 190-24-0028
If were issued to inform the Operators
about two known LICC’s hardware
issues:
1) Thermal Circuit Breaker (TCB)
incorrect indication on MCDU:
It was noticed that there is a possibility of
interference between the large black
harness nearby LICC P1 connector and
its connector. This issue may lead the
solder junction on the circuit board to
present rupture, thus causing some TCB
status not being properly informed on the
MCDU.
Such failure can be identified by the
maintenance message “LICC CB
MATRIX/GCU 1/WRG FAULT” that can
also be related to a fault GCU or
improper GCU installation. In order to
correct this issue, a harness re-routing
was implemented avoiding any possible
damage to the connectors inside the
LICCs.
LICC PN 5914480-2 S/N A292 and on
have this improvement factory
incorporated, LICC PN 5914902-1 is not
affected by this issue and units already in
service can be modified on attrition basis.
2) Aircraft not accepting external AC
power:
It has been identified that the flat cable,
which connects the External Power
Module (EPM) and the LICC, may be
damaged due to tracks capacity being
lower than the interlock circuit pin E/F
over current protection threshold
available on the EPM.
An immediate solution for this issue is
adding a jumper to the interlock trace
increasing current carrying capability and
making it more robust.
Hamilton Sundstrand Service Bulletin
40EPS04LC/LC2-24-6 was issued to
incorporate this solution when a LICC
returns to a shop repair. Modified units
are identified with a mark in the MOD 6
(mod dot) on the identification plate and
Page 9
September 2008 Issue No. 22

units already in service can be modified ITT = Interstage Turbine Temperature

on an attrition basis as per information
contained in the service bulletin LDI = Loadable Diagnostic Information
aforementioned.
LICC = Left Integrated Control Center

LRU = Line Replaceable Unit

Acronyms
MLG = Main Landing Gear
AD = Airworthiness Directive
MMEL = Master Minimum Equipment List
AIPC = Aircraft Illustrated Parts Catalog
NLG = Nose Landing Gear
AMM = Aircraft Maintenance Manual
OB = Operational Bulletins
AMS = Air Management System
PIL = Parts Information Letters
ANAC = Agência Nacional de Aviação
PN = Part Number
Civil (Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority)
PSEM = Proximity Sensor Electronic
AOM = Airplane Operations Manual
Module
APU = Auxiliary Power Unit
QAR = Quick Access Recorder
ASCB = Avionics Standard-
SB = Service Bulletin
Communication Bus
SN = Serial Number
BCM = Brake Control Module
SNL = Service Newsletter
CAS = Crew Alerting System
TLA = Thrust Lever Angle
CMC = Central Maintenance Computer
VSV = Variable Stator Vane
CMM = Component Maintenance Manual
Note: All abbreviations used in
DLS = Data Load System
EMBRAER Maintenance Manuals can be
DVDR = Digital Voice-Data Recorder found in the Introduction to AMM Part II.

EICAS = Engine Indicating and Crew

Alerting System

EMM = Engine Maintenance Manual

FADEC = Full Authority Digital Electronic

Control

FCM = Flight Controls Module

FHDB = Fault History Database

FIM = Fault Isolation Manual

FOD = Foreign Object Damage

FOL = Flight Operations Letter

GCU = Generator Control Unit

HPT = High Pressure Turbine

IFSD = In-Flight Shut Down

Page 10