.

ALANLI. BRUNACINI

 FI co AD
Second Edition

by

Alan v. Brunacini

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Fire Command
Second Edition

Written by Alan V. Brunacini

Printed by
Von Hoffmann Corporation
Jefferson Ci ty Plan t
32] Wilson Drive
Jefferson City, MO 65109
(573) 635-9161

ISBN 0-9747534-2-4 (Previously, ISBN 0-87765-500-6

Copyright 2002 Alan V. Brunacini

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or trans­

mitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including
photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval sys­
tem, without permission in writing from the author.

The author disclaims liability for any personal injury, property or other dam­
ages of any nature whatsoever, whether special, indirect, consequential, or
compensatory, directly or indirectly resulting from the publication, lise of, or
reliance on this product. The author also makes no guaranty or warranty as to
the accuracy or completeness of any information published herein .

In making this product available, author is not undertaking to render profes­

sional or other services for or on behalf of any person or entity. Nor is the
author undertaking to petiorm any duty owed by any person or entity to some­
one else. Anyone using these materials should rely on his or her own
independent judgment or, as appropriate, seek the advice of a competent pro­
fessional in determining the exercise of reasonable care in any given
circumstances.
 Acknowledgements
Just like typical incident operations, this book is the result of the incident
commander (i.e., author) receiving a lot of help from a team of very capable
people. The first group I extend thanks to are the members of the Phoenix
Fire Department. They apply our local incident management system every
day in an extraordinary way to effectively deliver service to our customers.
They are willing to continually explore and engage in projects that improve
our command and operational system. The changes between the original Fire
Command book and this revised edition a.re mostly a reflection of what we
have learned "in the street," in Phoenix, over almost the past 20 years.

A special group of Phoenix Fire Department members have helped in the pro­
duction of this book. Kathi Hilmes and Kevin Roche have converted what I
have written (literally) into an understandable form. They are (thankfully) as
electronically literate, as I am illi terate. l' m constantly fascinated that they
can convert a bundle of yellow-pad paper covered with #2 pencil hallucina­
tions into a little "disk" that can store and send text to other electronicites.
They are also as good natured as they are electronically literate. Assistant
Chief Steve Stormet, Assistant Chief Steve Kreis, Deputy Chief Terry
Garrison, Training Chief Don Abbot, and Dr. Ron Perry served as the initial
reviewers and always effectively "adjusted" my written stuff.

Phoenix Firefighter-Paramedic Harold "Pooney" Pickering made his usual

artistic contribution to all the material. His efforts always improve the quality
of the presentation. He is clearly the most talented and experienced fire serv­
ice graphic artist on the planet. His drawings always reflect his incredible
humor and experience. He is a pleasure to deal with and is universally
admired in the Phoenix Fire Department.

My three Phoenix firefighter children have also been a huge help to me dllling
this project. My son, Nick, is a Shift Commander (Deputy Chief) and applies
the command system as a major part of his job. He has also taught tactics and
strategy for a number of years in the Phoenix College Fire Science Program.
He has managed the production of this revision, has done much of the actual
writing, and has coordinated getting all tte pieces and parts assembled. My
son, Fire Captain John, is an experienced ladder company officer (20+ years)
who also uses our command system every day. I always appreciate his practi­
cal approach to tactical operations and his ideas on how to effectively connect
the command system to operational action. My daughter, Candi, is also a Fire
Captain, who continually provides me a realistic sounding board about fire
company operations in the "real world." She has an excellent perspective on

--- - - - -
 the human condition and approaches her job with humor and concern.
In addition to their regular jobs as Phoenix Firefighters, Nick and John also
operate a video production company (Across the Street Productions) that
makes fire service training material. They have produced the video series that
is part of the Fire Command training package. Having them convert the
words into a video form makes the written material "talk" to the reader, and I
appreciate their talent and efforts to make this conversion. Getting to spend
time in a video studio with two wacky "B" Shifters is about as much fun as
their crazy, old father can have.

The central figure, and great joy, in my life continues to be my wife, Rita (43
years). She keeps me going and most days pretty well oriented. She is a
beautiful, patient, and very special person. She has taught me through the
years that life involves more than just putting water on stuff that is burning,
and that Mrs. Smith will remember how nice we were, a lot longer than how
smart we were. I am constantly directed by her personal intuition and emo­
tional literacy.

MyoId friend, Doug Forsman, has also been a gigantic assistance with the
Fire Command project. He has an incredible knowledge and extensive experi­
ence in the production and management of fire service training material. His
efforts and advice have improved the quality of the material and the fairly
complicated production routine required to connect a lot of upside down "air­
plane writing" into an actual book. He is currently Chief of the Greeley,
Colorado, Fire Department and I look forward to a mutual future that will be
as fun and interesting as our exciting past has been together.

A group of "national" friends have reviewed the material and their comments
and suggestions have greatly improved the content. They are all experienced
and very capable incident management sy~tem players and I appreciate their
efforts very much. They are listed in alphabetical order:

Bob Andrews, Jr. Darryl Fugerud Bill Neville

Corpus Christi, TX Toronto, Ontario Penn Valley, CA
Kevin Arbuthnot Bobby Halton Greg Noll
West Yorkshire, UK Albuquerque, NM Lancaster, PA
Dennis Compton Cliff Jones William Perrin
Mesa, AZ Tempe,AZ Victor, MT
Brian Crandall Rick Mahaney Dennis Rubin
Bozeman, MT Jackson, MI Norfolk, VA
David Fischler Garry Morris Gordon Sweetnam
Suffolk County, NY Seattle, WA Calgary, Alberta
Steve Foley
Quincy, MA

l­
 CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ...... .. ...... ............ .... ..... ..... .... .i

Introduction ..... .. .... ...... .... .. ........ ...... . .. .... .. ..... .1

Up-Front Stuff ...... ...... .... ....... ..... ....... .. ... .... ... .13

~~~1 ............. .. ...... ... ... .. ... ... .... ... ... ... .... ~

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

Chapter 2 . .... .... .. .. .. .. ..... . . .. . . ........ . . ... . .... . .... . ..95

The Situation Evaluation

Chapter 3 ... . .. .. .. . .... .... .. .. . . ... . ... ........... . .. .. . . . .137

Communications

Chapter 4 ......... .... ..... .. . .. .. .. ... ... . .... . .... . ... .. .. .171

Deployment Management

Chapter 5 .......... ......... .. ... ... .. .... .. ... ..... ..... . .. .217

Strategy and Incident Action Planning

Chapter 6 .. . . . . . ... . . . .. . .. . .. .. . .... . . ... .. ... .. . .. . ... . ... .263

Organization

Chapter 7 ...... . .......... . .. . .. .. .. .. ... . .... . . ... . . . .... .. .325

Review, Evaluation and Revision

Chapter 8 . .... ... .. ... .. . .... . .. . . .... ...... .. .. . ... . ..... .. .363

Continue Transfer and Terminate Command

Appendix .... ... . ... .. .... ... .. .. ............ ... .. .. .. . ...... .393

INTRODUCTION

- - --- - -
 Introduction

INTRODUCTION

AVB AND IMS (INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

SYSTEM)
As a little kid, I was
afflicted with a serious
case of interest and
attraction to firefighters
and fire-fighting opera­
tions . This psychosis has
persisted now for over
fifty years. During that half century, I have
been continually fascinated with the ability
of firefighters to almost instantly develop a
plan to control a difficult fire situation, and
then have the "stuff' to actually pull off that
plan in the street. This fascination warped
my young brain. My fourth-grade teacher
would have been happy (actually elated) if I
had quit screwing up her class and gone off
(as I wanted to) to become, at that time, a very short firefighter. My stodgy
parents felt I should learn basic math skills so that I could at least recognize
the numbers I would probably stamp on license plates later in life. Somehow,
my parents (nice people) and my grade school, high school, and college teach­
ers, along with some very understanding bosses (more nice people), kept me
out of the license-plate stamping place. In 1958, the nanosecond that I happi­
ly turned twenty-one-minimum age to become a firefighter-they delivered
me to the Phoenix Fire Department, and I actually became a very short fire­
fighter (I didn ' t get much taller beyond the fourth grade). In fact, given my
height, I came in closer to the ground floor than any of my firefighter col­
leagues. Becoming involved in the manual-labor end of fire operations, as a
firefighter gave me the chance to be a part of and learn basic fire-company
operations at the task level. My early fascination with fire fighting was (and
still is) directly confronted and challenged by trying to understand the dynam­
ics and details of what makes basic fire operations effective. I have been
incredibly fortunate to be able to pursue that same fascination and challenge
for my entire adult life in a very positive and progressive place (Phoenix Fire
Department). That personal process will most probably continue until I final­
ly doze off in the third rocker from the end on the front porch of the old
firefighter's home.

- ---'-- - - -- -- ­
Introduction

One day after I had been on the job for abcut a year, my curiosity got the best
of me and I asked a savvy old officer, "Where would a guy go, if he wanted to
learn more about fire fighting?" He answered, "Oklahoma State University
has a fire school-now finish mopping the apparatus floor, kid." I finished
mopping the floor, wrote for an application, mailed it back to Stillwater. OSU
sent word "pack up-get out here." PFD gives me an educational leave of
absence (thanks again, Chief Dean) ; I head out to be an Okie for a couple of
years. The fire-school cUlTiculum at that time involved a full range of munici­
pal fire-department subjects. The school and I were a perfect match-they
had a lot to teach, and I had (and still have) a lot to learn . In those days, the
OSU Fire Program included two classes in fire-fighting tactics and strategy.
Both classes were taught by a Stillwater Fire Department Fire Captain named
W. C. Buck. He was an exceptional character with a young face, prematurely
white hair, and a twinkle in his eye. He was smart, experienced, and had an
attitude that was the result of having the brain power to make the class inter­
esting and the fire-fighting experience to make the class realistic and
challenging. I continually pestered him during all my time at OSU, and he
patiently answered about 1,000 mostly dumb "what happens if?" rookie fire­
fighting questions. Buck's energetic teaching and Loyd Layman's Fire
Fighting Tactics and Strategy (class textbook) became a two-semester signifi­
cant emotional event (actually, a religious experience) for me and became the
early launching pad for the book you are now reading .

I completed the program and graduated in 1960 and returned to the PFD,
where I have occupationally lived, happily ever after.

After graduating from OSU, I got back to mopping the apparatus floor at
Station One. About that same time, a Fire-Science Program was being devel­
oped at Phoenix College (local community college). Given my fourth-grade
number recognition skill and OSU teaching me the Hazen-Williams formulae!),
I got to develop and teach a fire-service hydraulics class. After a couple of
years of teaching hydraulics, the old deputy chief who instructed tactics and
strategy keeled over. I was walking by the dean's office, and she asked me if I
 Introduction

could fill in. I did two back flips, dug out my OSU class notes, and for almost
the next twenty years, did a W. C. Buck impersonation (not even close) as a
community college fire science instructor.

During that same period, I was going through the PFD promotional process. I
trudged through engineer, captain, battalion chief, and assistant chief. In
1978, I became the fire chief. I continued to teach tactics and strategy during
that "promotional period," so I continued to struggle with somehow attempt­
ing to apply, in the street, what I had taught (and learned along with my
firefighter students) the night before in the classroom. The practical connec­
tion between the classroom blab and the actual management of fire-fighting
action provided a healthy dose of ongoing reality therapy that forced a practi­
cal connection between teaching and doing. Simply, it didn ' t take long to
realize that Wednesday-morning fires burn right past Tuesday-night, pie-in­
the-sky, classroom academic claptrap, unless that teaching could produce
enough water in the right place, at the right time.

A major teaching-doing breakthrough experience

involved the early use of fire simulation. While the
original simulation systems were fairly primitive,
they provided the most dramatic improvement in
the Tuesday-classroom teaching to Wednesday
actually doing it in the street. Simulation was a big
01' light bulb coming on for me-us. We abruptly
woke up student firefighters (firefighter students,
you know, can sleep sitting up with their eyes open)
by putting them in a little room with a tactical
drawing and a simple sound system connected back
into the classroom. We had them use a radio mic to
" put the fire out" and in the process produced a lot
of huge armpit sweat rings and a discernable
improvement in their Wednesday-morning, on-duty
command ability (wow!).

The opportunity to be actually involved with teaching/learning tactics, strate­

gy, and fire operations, along with moving through the ranks of our
organization, created an interesting balance of experiences. As the teaching
and doing went on, the more our system got to develop a balance of both tac­
tical and command material-the tactics package and presentation descri bed
effective tactical action. The command stuff was directed toward how to man­
age and control our organizational resources (hardware, software, and
liveware) to execute the tactical stuff. To thi s day, we continue to see how
closely connected the two parts are and how necessary it is on the local level
for the tactics part to drive the command process-not the reverse.

In the early seventies, an important (actually historic) fire-service project

occurred that blasted us into the future. A group of California fire-service
guys developed the Incident Command System (ICS). They became (and still
Introduction

are) the FIRES COPE organization. While the

focus of thelr original work was directed
toward commanding large-scale, wild-land
fires, the original ICS authors had the early
(and very accurate) vision to see the eventual
application of a system used to manage all
risks. They developed the basic ICS structure
and approach. Their efforts formed the basic
foundation for essentially all of the subsequent
ICS development that has occurred in the past
twenty-five years. The American fire service ..,
has been well served by the original and ongo­
ing efforts of the FIRES COPE organization.
The California response-and-assistance net­
work uses ICS as the basis for an incredible,
statewide automatic-aid system. California's
unique mutual response system serves as the
large-scale, multi-agency organizational gold
standard for our entire business. Phoenix Fire Department members attended
early ICS training programs offered in California ... in fact, we are still atten­
dees at those same training functions. I remain a grateful neighbor and
humble student of the California command system.

The initial California ICS development could not have come at a more ideal
time for us in Phoenix. We had spent almost twenty years (before
FIRES COPE) between community-college. fire-science course development
and PFD operational planning, putting together a tactical operations SOP
package, along with an early focus on how to perform the tactical command
required to actually implement and manage those procedures in the street.
Looking back on it, our approach to pre-ICS command was then really more
like what was required to create and manage an effective level of operational
supervision on the tactical level. The ICS package showed us how to add
strategic command to tactical management to form a more complete, overall
command system and to more effectively manage the manual labor that is
done on the task level. The early FIRES COPE model was originally devel­
oped in response to dealing with the many command challenges that occur at
major large-scale, wild-land fires. Necessarily, the system had to create a
wild-land management structure, capable cf dealing with a lot of resources,
from a lot of different agencies. Those operations required doing a bunch of
really exciting things for periods of time that, in some cases, were so long,
they were called "campaign situations." To do this, the big-time command
chart necessarily has a lot of boxes, simply because to do all that is needed at
those big-time jobs, a lot of folks are at work. Over a couple of years, we
learned and imported that system into the Phoenix Fire Department by writing
our own local incident-command procedures and training everyone within the
department on them. We were then ready to grab a freshly printed tactical
work sheet, mount up, and ride out into the brave new world of big-time inci­
dent command.
 Introduction

Then we waited and waited (and waited some more) for the "big one" to
occur so that we could go out and apply our XXL command system. In those
days, I was the assistant chief in charge of the Fire Fighting Division. Being
anxious to lead the ICS charge, I kept looking out my office window to spot
the next huge thermal column. I continually asked my merry band of ICS­
trained-and-ready fire lads:

"Do you see any big wild-land fires?"

"Chief, we live in a desert-all we see out there is noncombustible sand."

"Do you see any big mud slides?"

"It hasn't rained here for two and a half years (desert, remember?)."

"How about an earthquake?"

"The ground is packed too hard to shake."

"How about a big riot?"

"It's too hot to go outside-anyway, now they call 'em civil disturbances."

"What is going on out there?"

"Mrs. Smith keeps having kitchen fires ; Mr. Smith is still hosting back
room/attic fires at his hardware store down at the strip mall; and the
Smith family is still producing an intersection full of beat up men,
women, and children by bashing their Nash Rambler into the Jones' Olds
, 88."

"What do you want to do with this big-time ICS (a dangerous question to

ask "B" shift)?"
"Make the big-time ICS into small-time ICS."

"What will we apply it to?"

"All of the above."

For the next twenty-five years, we have followed this direction . Basically, that
"B" shifter's response has guided incident command development within the
Phoenix Fire Department. That response also has served as the local com­
mand and operational part of the national incident management system
development process, known as the Fire Ground Commander (FGC) system.

- - -- - - - - - - -
Introduction

The FGC adventure has become the "other end" (i.e., small, up to about twen­
ty-five companies, local, every day) of the national Incident Management
System (lMS) process by providing a tactically-oriented focus on command­
ing hometown events attended by homeys and their fairly close neighbors.
Simply, the FGC ("hometown command") system covers small and medium­
sized events; ICS easily connects to the FOC front end and expands to match
XL and XXL big deals.

Another special concentration of the FGC system has been (and continues to
be) an extensive discussion and description of the role and functions of the Ie.
This strong focus on the incident commander emerged out of our having to
actually retrain, reprogram, and restructure all of our real, live, in-place, nine­
teen-seventies, Phoenix Fire Department fire officers who had performed
traditional command behaviors since 1886 (PFD founded). These guys (all
guys in those days) were great fire officers and capable firefighters. They had
the knowledge, experience, and inclination required to blast a fire out (mostly
fires in those days)-but they had never received much (or any) formal IC
training, and they never had the opportunity to work within a structured com­
mand system (simply, because in those days, there was no such IC/ICS thing).
Their old-time, fire-ground boss role models practiced free enterprise, aerobic
(running) command. They typically did high-volume, face-to-face communi­
cations (yelling). When they arrived on the scene, they generally blasted out
of their sedans (sometimes before the car actually stopped*) and quickly
moved (physically) right to where the problem was occurring. Based on that
very active, intrepid approach, they got scuffed up a lot, just like the nozzle­
man (whom they visited frequently). A major challenge for our early
FGC-system development involved changing the human (personal) behaviors
of these officers. They were the ones who actually showed up at the incident
and were expected to become the IC and perform the newly developed stan­
dard functions of command. The challenge for a young assistant chief (me)
was to gently redirect the personal incident-management behaviors of a bunch
of old, tough, smart battalion chiefs (along with my own behavior). This was
a very practical organizational, guerilla-warfare-like, nonacademic change
process we worked our way through, over a long period of time ... mostly
because the old guys helped the young guys. This experience taught us that
no other piece or part of the incident command system has, does, or will ever
have any more effect or inf1uence on our ultimate command effectiveness,
than if the IC shows up and how he/she performs. Nothing we have seen in
the ensuing period of time has changed that reality. We continue to realize
that the most effective way to increase the overall success of incident manage­
ment is to invest (and then reinvest) in the understanding and behavioral-skill
level of our incident commanders and IMS team players.

*1 can recall many old-time incidents that were littered with chief officers'
response cars, abandoned in the middle of the street, with the driver's side­
door open, and the warning lights still rotating and blinking ... those vehicles
told the story of how command was managed in those days.
 Introduction

Another major influence on the development of the Phoenix command system

emerged from the diversification of service delivery that started in the early
1970s. The American fire service was then beginning to use our in-place fire­
control resources to deliver Emergency Medical Services (EMS).
Decentralized fire stations, well-trained (and highly trainable) firefighters,
strong command communications, and well-established, positive community
relations made us the ideal agency to deliver unscheduled, out-of­
hospital urgent medical care. Simply, when Mrs. Smith went
haywire medically, we could get to her faster than any other agency,
ask her, "Where does it hurt?" and then begin to stabilize and fix
whatever hurt. She had easy access to us because we answered her
phone calIon the first ring, and we had easy access to her because
she was happy to see us an"ive, and let us in on the first ring of the
doorbell. We made her feel secure because she liked us and trusted
us. When we started our original 1970's EMS adventure, we had no
idea that 70-80% of our service-delivery activity would eventually
involve cross-trained (fire-EMS), dual-role firefighters delivering
basic and advanced EMS on BRTs (big red trucks). We quickly
learned that EMS events, like fires, come in small, medium, and
large, and produce conditions that have about the same incident-command
needs as the structural fires that we originally developed the system to manage.
Adapting and applying the command system to medical incidents was a natural
process in Phoenix because the same workers, bosses, and BRTs show up and
operate on whatever the incident problem is. It was pretty easy to just add the
special system pieces and PaJts to the regular IMS required to manage a non­
fire incident.

We have used that same adaptation approach, through the years, to make the
regular command system "fit" the other service-delivery areas we have devel­
oped. Customizing the system to fit lots of different service-delivery areas
has (for us) created a flexible approach and mentality. It's really pretty sim­
ple: We just add the special sectors that are required to manage each type of
sector activity to the regular command system that we set up on every inci­
dent. There is only one basic overall "umbrella" command system to
remember. Services like hazmat, high-angle rescue, confined space, swift
water (in Phoenix ?), and now delivering service in violent settings ranging
from just spending Saturday night with the knife-and-gun club to planning for
widespread weapons-of-mass-destruction terrorism, have produced their own
special SOPs and sectors. This special adaptation involves developing sector
procedures that match the needs of that particular activity. At a structural fire,
the IC may set up interior, rear, and roof sectors; at a hazmat incident, a hot
zone, warm zone, and decon sectors; at an EMS event, a triage, extrication,
treatment, and transportation sectors. The family-day picnic gets a hot dog,
cotton candy, and horseshoe sectors. Who knows what's next? .. we're ready!

Also packed into the seventies (a busy time) was a growing curiosity by fire
service folks across the country about command-system development. Based
on this early interest, a team from Phoenix (Kime, Varner, Brunacini) hit the
Introduction

road and let the airlines destroy about twenty-five suitcases to tell the FGC
story. This road show is still playing and if-. certainly among the longest run­
ning on-going, fire-service seminars around. The author continues to sacrifice
his scuffed up suitcases to the Giant Baggage Crusher (Kime is our retired
Executive Assistant Chief, has a PhD, and is managing the Fire Administration
Program at Arizona State University; Varner is currently Fire Chief in
Carrollton, Texas-both are doing great). Being able to go out on the national
seminar circuit, almost every weekend since the mid-seventies, to blab about
IMS has afforded me the incredible opportunity to interact with literally thou­
sands of firefighter colleagues in every part of North America. This contact
has produced a chance to hang out, discuss. brag, exchange war stories, and
mostly listen to responders from about every big and little burg imaginable. I
thank all of those nice people for the ideas and lessons they taught (and contin­
ue to teach) an old mutt, who is always trying to learn new tricks. Much of the
material in this book is the result of those national conversations .

Throughout my career, from W. C. Buck's tactics class to this afternoon's air­

plane ride to the next command seminar, I have developed the habit of jotting
down notes about various operational and command thoughts and observations.
These notes have landed in a lot of places. Some have become seminar outlines
and materials, some have ended up in SOPs in our operations manual. Another
place these notes have congregated has been a growing package of material we
use in the national FGC seminars that, in 1983, became the Fire Command
book. The book you are now reading is the 2nd edition of Fire Comnumd and
includes the addition of my notes, observations, experiences, lessons and reflec­
tions for the past 19 years. The vast majority of the original Fire Command
content is still included. It is basic, simple, straightforward stuff that has held
up pretty well while being applied in the street for the past fifteen years.

I have attempted not only to add the material that has emerged out of our col­
lective command experience during the last fifteen years, but also to tune up
and expand the basic approach and original material of the book. In this
updated book, the FGC has become the Ie. we now use "IMS" to describe the
overall command system. The IMS term emerged out of the work of the
National Fire Service Incident Managemert System Consortium (NFSIMSC).
They have developed a model procedures guide that valiantly connects FGC
as the front-end part of IMS and uses ICS {basically FIRESCOPE) to escalate
command operations at larger incidents. This revised version of the Fire
Command book fits the NFSIMSC format by making a longer and more
detailed presentation of the eight functions of command that are typically used
in everyday, local command operations. We have also included a presentation
of the expanded IMS organization (to match the consortium's approach).

Another subtle, but critical change in our service-delivery command approach

has been the shift from regarding those who receive our service as being cus­
tomers, instead of victims. Along with this shift, we have started to think of,
and treat, our own department members as internal customers. This change
has produced an improved regard for our human resources.
 Introduction

Adding the customer-service routine has become a very complementary and

progressive part of our local IMS response. Being able to make serving Mrs.
Smith the ultimate objective of IMS has added a practical and effective set of
performance targets for why (and how) we do IMS. The customer-service
adventure produced another set of three-by-five's that, in 1997, became the
book Essentials of Fire Department Customer Service (published by
Oklahoma State University). Customer references throughout this book will,
hopefully, strengthen our ability to make IMS fit the customer's needs and to
more effectively support Ollr department members.

The command system pre­

sented in this book belongs
to the customers. We just
deliver and manage it when
they need it. They depend
on us to always make our
response system match
their emergency. This
requires that our command
system continues to change
to somehow match the cus­
tomer's constantly
changing needs. This revi­
sion is directed toward that responsibility. We respectfully thank the past for
providing an ongoing launching pad for improvement and look forward posi­
tively to learning all the lessons the future will teach us.

Being involved in the material in this book has been a lifelong labor of love
for me ... most of all it has given me the opportunity to be with the smartest,
most capable, dedicated, funniest group of people on the planet. . . the members
of the North American Fire Service. Thank you for that incredible opportuni­
l ty. I hope we get to see each other down the line.

Alan V. Brunacini

2002

------ - ---------
Up Front Stuff

------
 Up Front Stuff

UP-FRONT STUFF
The major focus of this book will revolve around the eight basic functions of
command. Each function has its own chapter with a complete description of
how the IC performs that function and how that individual function plays its
part in the overall Incident Management System (lMS). The Incident
Commander (IC) is called upon to orchestrate and support the manual labor
required to produce an effective and standard incident outcome, so the com­
mand functions must (if they are to be effective) be closely connected to all of
the moving parts that make up the incident response. Given the intimate rela­
tionship between command performance and our tactical/operational effort, a
presentation of the Ie's job, expressed in command functions, also does dou­
ble duty by producing a fairly complete description of what happens on the
tactical and task level of operations. As we trudge through the eight command
functions, we must continually connect the IC doing his/her job with the actu­
al physical labor that quickly solves the customer's problem. The plain and
simple objective of the IC (and this book) is to always perform whatever
amount of command (no more, no less) it takes to produce safe, effective
action and to continually adjust command to match the changing needs of a
dynamic incident. This very practical focus serves as the reality therapy that
continually reminds us that "Mrs. Smith" (our customer) calls us because her
kitchen is on fire, not because she wants to marvel at the weather station
whirligigs spinning around on the roof of the command post. Also included in
that on-going reality therapy is the modern realization (developed within the
last fifteen years of IMS application) that the connection between command
and action had better go both ways. While our
focus must always be directed toward tacti­
cally solving the customer's very practical
problem, we live in a dream world if we
believe that we can consistently pro­
duce effective, safe action simply by
shooting aggressive responders out of
the free-enterprise cannon into Mrs.
Smith's burning kitchen . Successful
operations require a lucid, competent
IC, actively in attendance, who can pull
the trigger at the right time and aim the
command cannon in the right direction.

Before we jump into the eight command functions, there is some important
introductory information that sets the stage for us looking at how the function­
al pieces and parts of the command routine actually work. It's always smart
 Up Front Stuff

to warm up a bit before the game and to get our bearings before we start play­
ing. Looking at this intro stuff might serve to get some of the kinks out and
get us headed in the right direction. Generally, taking the time to create a
good beginning produces a lot better middle and end (this will be a recurring
theme). The up-front stuff is arranged in three basic "clumps:"

1. What changes-what doesn't

2. The Incident Commander
3. The IMS package

1. What changes-what doesn't

Just when we begin 10 understand all the stuff in the
evening edition of the SOPs, some rabble-rouser from
500 miles down the TOad comes up with a "better mouse
trap." The new trap rudely violates the familiar and
comfortable routine we have been doing for a long time,
and the change scares us. We generally regard and react
to such changes as a special event, rather than a regular,
ongoing process. These change events cause us to worry that
our basic knowledge and capability will become obsolete and
wrecked by the change. This "sky-is-falling" reaction creates a
huge barrier to putting the new change in a sensible perspec­
tive. This loss of perspective becomes the basis for the classic
resistance-to-change reaction and will then cause us to invest a
lot of time defending our present practices, and waste a lot of
energy acting goofy about stuff that never happens. Producing goofiness
requires a lot of energy (also wasted), and that use of energy distracts us from
using everything we already know (knowledge) and everything we can do
(experience) to get on with the details of the new change. An example of this
process was present during the initial development of ICS. Many firefighters
feared that the new system would cause our previous background and experi­
ence to be unusable. At the time, those of us who were the command system
change agents didn't have enough experience to help the troops through this
predictable, worry/fear change reaction . Once we put the system in perspec­
tive, we quickly recognized that the effective operation of the system
absolutely requires experienced players who knew the wall was going to fall,
ten minutes before it fell over (as an example). Then we discovered that IMS
was the best tool that a cagey IC could use to quickly move troops out from
under and away from the wall, once some old guy realized it was about to fall.

Based on this somewhat natural reaction (goofy), one of the early challenges
in effectively making a change involves the players developing an understand­
ing of what has actually changed and whm has stayed the same. Most
changes come with their own special combinations of the two. Performing
this "sorting" process is a major sanity-retention technique that keeps us from
going nuts when the change bombs are dropping all around us. Actively

.- -.- - - .. - - - - ­
 Up Front Stuff

coaching the troops through the change process is a major role of good boss­
es. Sensibly sorting out what has, from what hasn ' t, changed helps workers
use cun'ent capabilities as the launching pad for developing new skills that
match what has indeed changed.

Since we started the IMS development adventure, we have learned a lot about
what the command system looks like, what it does that is new, and the time­
less stuff that has been here a long time before the IMS brainstorm ever
occurred. Looking at the two lists eliminates a lot of wasted effort and goofi­
ness. Perhaps by doing this we can make the ongoing process of refining IMS
a joyride, rather than a funeral march.

First, let's look at what IMS has changed.

IMS Changes: We develop an "ahead-oj-time" plan.

IMS development has created the capability to proactively-ahead of the
event-build a set of standard operating procedures that creates a consistent
organizational command plan. The eight standard command functions form a
simple, doable plan that outlines the moves and formations of the Ie and the
command team. Being able to decide, develop, and train on those command
functions, before the incident, has produced a gigantic improvement in both
command and operational effectiveness. This proactive approach replaces the
old-time mentality where we muttered that, "All fires (or bank robberies, or
hazmat events, or car wrecks, or whatever) are different out here," whenever
anyone suggested that we develop a command system (or whatever we called
it then). The old approach required we take on (approach and manage) each
separate incident, almost like it was the first time we ever saw any kind of
incident. In effect, we had to develop the plays on game day. This required
that we produce a special command plan at the beginning of each incident
while the event was under way (always a tough time to develop a plan) to
match the conditions and needs of that particular situation. This approach is
like trying to design an airplane, and fly it at the same time. Without a stan­
dard organizational plan, it was almost impossible to round everyone up into a
common work plan and eliminate the on-scene chaos. This lack of preinci­
dent planning was really a problem in the beginning of the event:

• We had no standard starting point for command and operations .

• Front-end confusion typically produced an out-of-control beginning .
• We spent the rest of the incident trying to catch up to being under
control.

With no front-end foundation, it was difficult to learn from mistakes and rein­
force good work because there was nothing standard to "critique against" after
the incident. Thi s " nonsystem" produced a lot of breakdowns that occurred
over and over-one old sage called it "practicing mistakes" (others have used
Up Front Stuff

a two-word phrase, the first of which is cluster). The majority of the condi­
tions and problems we encounter recur, and the inventory of the type and
capability of response options and resources we deploy are pretty much identi­
cal from incident to incident. These standard elements (conditions/resources)
become the basis for our command and tactical-operations system. Decisions
about the recuning parts of our operations go into the collective (organization­
al) "experience bank," so our reactions (moves and formations) occur almost
automatically when the team encounters these recurring, standard conditions.
This allows a department to take advantage of the collective experience of its
members, rather than having each IC needing to live through every possible
experience to develop his or her own "bank." This automatic organizational
approach, developed ahead of time (and refined over
time), produces a standard starting point for both com­
mand and operations , that becomes the basis for
producing, not only routine, regular responses, but also
for creating special responses to what are the special
conditions, that seem to come with every event. If an incident
has ten critical factors, and eight of them are "standard" and
recurring (been there, done that), and two are sort of special
(wow-look at that!), it's a lot easier to do the eight routinely and automati­
cally, and spend the time we used to devote equally to all ten to whatever
extent we need to customize a response to the two special ones.

The ahead-of-time management process becomes more complicated within our

organizations because operational challenges and command problems are not
created equally and we typically don't react to them the same-operational
problems are physical and tactical; command problems are
organizational-based leadership problems. When we
encounter and deal with difficult tactical conditions, we say
it was a tough job. When command is out of balance, we
roll our eyes and say, "Crazy Chief Polkadot did it again."
Based on this reality, producing and practicing a plan to
support and improve the human part of command becomes
an even higher priority in building responder confidence.
Simply, the major operational and command problem ought
to be that the incident problem is out of control, not the Ie.

- - -- - - -- -
 Up Front Stuff

IMS Change: Ie shows up ... acts like the Ie.

As we proceed along through this section, we will see that IMS has not changed
a lot of critical incident conditions-things like the natural laws of physics
and chemistry (a U.S. gallon of water still weighs about eight and a half
pounds). IMS has not changed things like the standard inventory of
firefighter/customer body parts that get scuffed up. What IMS has changed is
how the IC and the command/ops team will manage themselves when they
respond to the timeless stuff that all comes together to cause an incident to be
an incident.

A practical and accurate way for us to observe what

IMS has changed is to compare a series of old
(BIMS-before IMS) snapshots with those of a new
(AIMS-after IMS) response. When we look at the
old pictures, we see that the old-time bosses did not
all come from the factory the same, so they all did (or
didn't) command from a little to a lot differently from
one another. Based on these individual differences,
everyone (else) responding to the incident had to invest any­
where from a little to a lot of time at the beginning of the
incident to somehow figure out if Chief A, B, or C was going to show up so
they could all get ready to engage in a type A, B, or C operation.
When the whole alphabet shows up ...stand by for a cluster!

The differences between plans A, B, and C were not

the fault of the individual chiefs; they were typically
capable officers just trying to do a good job. The
problem was that the organization had not (yet) creat­
ed a standard, IC-job description that would cause us
all to command in the same way. At that time, most
chiefs had not received ten minutes of command train­
ing. In fact, the role, title, and job we now call the IC
was a product of the 1970's ICS development. Before
ICS there was no such phrase as "Incident
Commander" (BIMS we used the term "Fireground
Commander-FGC").

The AIMS snapshot would show an early-arriving responder (hopefully, the

first) assuming and confirming that he/she was in command. That person
would then assume a standard command position based on conditions. This
command assumption would occur in a standard manner (described in com­
mand function SOPs) that would provide visual (watch the IC take command),
and radio (hear the IC take command) confirmation that command had shown
up. This is the standard on-going way that the IC would show up and act like
an Ie. The AIMS response is the result of our developing an IC job descrip­
tion, training our responders, and practicing and refining that standard
command routine (imagine if we had taken the same approach for pump oper­
Up Front Stuff

ations-"Pump whatever pressure seems right for you.") The command rou­
tine calls upon the IC to play the lead role. and while the system has a lot of
necessary pieces and parts, the IMS will never arrive out at Mrs. Smith's until
one of us shows up and acts like an Ie.

IMS Change: We have an Incident Action Plan to

follow.
An important IMS change involves the IC developing an Incident Action Plan
(lAP), as a regular part of the command routine. Command Function #S
describes in detail how the lAP is created and managed . Let's use a musical
comparison to describe how IA Planning has helped us. It is a good compari­
son, because we
often use the
expression that we
were (or were not)
playing from the
same "sheet of
music." Before IA
Planning, it was dif­
ficult to identify any
one major song we were
playing, because many
times we (typically in small independent
groups) were all playing something different
(free enterprise). We could play simple tunes
okay, or even complicated ones, if the same musicians who showed up had all
played together a lot in the past, and everyone was in the mood to play nicely
with the others. After we started practicing and using lAPs, those lAPs
became a musical plan (i.e., "sheet" of music) that we all followed-the IC
became the conductor, the troops the musicians, and the audience the cus­
tomers. We now sound a lot better because the conductor starts us all playing
at the same time, with the same tone from the very beginning, everyone plays
the same song, and every player (and team) can contribute his/her own part
(instrument) to the overall performance of the band ... the music is a lot better
for everyone.

The lAP basically describes the tactical activities that will solve the incident
problem(s). Developing the lAP involves evaluating and prioritizing the criti­
cal factors present, and using the plan as the basic framework for the IC
making the operational assignments (with objectives) to the responders who
will solve the incident problems. This operational action typically involves
the manual labor done by teams of responders assigned to tasks and functions
within the lAP. A major lAP benefit is to increase the effectiveness of our
individual and collective efforts. The lAP lays out the strategic and tactical
plan that becomes the framework for the IC making specific operational
assignments. The point of those assignments is to solve the incident problem
and to require the IC to connect the right resources with the right time, place,

- -- - - - - - -
 Up Front Stuff

and action, so that each part of the operation supports the goal to control the
incident. Fire fighting without an lAP can lead to counterproductive and even
dangerous actions ... opposing hose lines, masterstreams blasting inside
crews, etc. The lAP provides the plan for how our action will make contact
with the incident problem(s)-this engagement becomes the essence of why
we are in business.

Based on the compressed time and gritty incident conditions we generally

encounter, the plan must be simple, basic, and clear. The plan must be quick­
ly developed and expressed in understandable and doable (i.e., assignable)
terms, using the standard offensive/marginal/defensive strategies as the foun­
dation of the plan. lA Planning becomes a critical way we standardize our
response. The process creates a predictable, dependable, and very practical
connection between the lC and the operational team. This standard connec­
tion involves using the plan as the overall incident-performance target that the
ops team "works against" by receiving and acting out the tactical assignments
that they receive from the lC that complete the plan. This is why it's called an
action plan.

Using the lAP as the basic game plan for incident action is an important part
of how we are able to consistently create standard outcomes . Making IA
Planning routine builds confidence that incident action will be structured
around a standard performance plan that will mobilize and integrate every­
one's efforts (same "sheet of music"). This approach gives us a fighting
chance to replace the old-time differences between Chiefs A, B , and C with a
regular planning system, including SOPs and training that is used during the
incident and reviewed and reinforced after the event. The new routine inte­
grates the invaluable operational experience of Chiefs A, B, and C to develop
a plan that matches incident conditions.

Over time, the content and approach of IA Planning becomes more and more
standard and predictable, as the organization reinforces what works effectively,
and collectively learns from individual experience, and adjusts what doesn't
work well . The content of lAPs becomes the regular language we use to
describe tactical operations. As an example, when our bosses arrive (after we
start operations), they generally ask a fairly standard set of briefing questions:

1. Waddaya got?
2. Waddaya doin'?
3. Whatsit doin'?
4. Waddaya need?
5. Is everybody okay?

The lAP provides a quick answer to #2; the ongoing answers to #1 and #4
will describe how waddaya doin' will answer #3. The answer to #5 will indi­
cate if we should keep fightin' or lUn.
Up Front Stuff

IMS Change: All increased emphasis on worker safety

From a safety standpoint, the workers were pretty much on
their own in the old, fast-and-dirty free-enterprise days.
The system delivered teams of responders (who might or
might not stay in teams), who spontaneously and aggres­
sively blasted off on a search-and-destroy mission to solve
the incident problem. In most cases, no one person really
even knew what troops were actually on the scene, where
they were, what they were doing, and if they were okay.
The system worked if we could find the problem and over­
power it before it could find and overpower us. Life as a
freelancer was exciting. but not very safe. IMS has
changed a lot of that wild and wooly approach. In fact, a
major focus of every part of IMS involves the safety of the
workers-particularly those working in the hazard area
(you will probably get tired of me blabbing about it as you
go through the book).

A major safety objective of IMS is to control and account for the position and
function of all responders throughout incident operations. This control is a
very practical welfare and survival factor, because a lot happens to us (both
getting beaten up and not beaten up) based simply on where we are and what
we are doing. We really can't do much for Mrs. Smith when she is getting
scuffed up by the incident problem, while we freelanced ourselves into an
unsafe operating position and now must save ourselves before we can save
her. A major part of this control process involves matching our operating
position and action to the current and forecasted incident conditions. A lot of
worker safety relates to the Ie maintaining a knowledge of current conditions,
and always having an effective organization, and two-way communications
connection to units and sectors operating in the hazard area. These capabili­
ties give the Ie the ability to both know what is going on and to be able to do
something about it. This on-line command effect is the major way that we
start under control, maintain control, and never lose control. Everyone operat­
ing at the incident knows that the Ie will give standard orders, based on
standard conditions.

Major IMS components that do double operational and safety duty, include
standard procedures for assigning all resources within an incident-organization
plan. The plan maintains an effective span of control (number of organiza­
tional and operational pieces and parts the Ie can effectively communicate
with), developing an lAP based on standard risk-management considerations,
and continuous tracking of responders within a standard on-scene deployment
and accountability system. The Ie keeps all of this going by maintaining
ongoing communications availability. This integrated approach prevents safe­
ty from being an "add-on." Geographic sectors account for local (area)
conditions in that sector and hazards throughout the incident site. Some func­
tional sectors manage an array of specific activities directed toward worker
 Up Front Stuff

welfare like safety, accountability, rapid intervention, and rehabilitation. All

eight standard command functions have a built-in safety routine (the safety
routine will be presented at the end of each chapter on that function). The
safety part of the function is integral to that command activity, and the IC
does that safety routine just naturally and automatically along with the func­
tiol1 ... there is nothing else to remember (or to forget). IMS has created an
entirely new level of safety responsibility on the strategic level that is man­
aged by the Ie. This has created a huge improvement, and a better balance, in
the overall structure we now use to manage the safety function.

While IMS has greatly improved our collective safety performance, it has not
eliminated the hazard to our responders . Our workers continue to get injured
and killed on the tactical/task level in alarming numbers. This sad reality is a
function of how timeless the hazards to our responders remain, and the (also
timeless) fact that our members continue to effectively do their jobs by putting
their bodies in between Mrs. Smith and her problem. This reality reinforces
how important it is for us to continue to refine everything we do, to protect
our human resources (our internal customers). This refinement is particularly
critical on the strategic level (IC) because so much of what the IC does affects
the safety and welfare of the troops.

IMS Change: IMS has created a strategic level of

command
Another major AIMS change involves creating a plan to conduct
operations and command on the task, tactical, and strategic lev­
els . These three levels create a complete organizational
approach that connects direct supervision of work activi­
ties (task level), mid-management direction (tactical
level), and overall command (strategic level). Creating
and connecting the three levels provides the major
functions required to consistently conduct effective
operations. The task level is where the manual labor is per­
formed to directly solve the incident problem. The tactical level
involves geographic and functional sector bosses who supervise task-level
work by being physically located right where the work is being performed.
Sector bosses serve as the eyes-and-ears partners of the Ie. The IC provides
overall strategic command direction from a central point (command post), and
the sectors are off site from that command post. The plan is simple, straight­
forward and, as we use it over time, it enables us to improve how we establish
and coordinate the three standard levels into an integrated system. The new
(after IMS) part of the three-level approach involves adding the strategic level
of command to the system.

Looking back at the BIMS period, we mostly conducted command on the tac­
fI tical level where the IC supervised the task level of workers directly (in

I person lots of times). Officers who served as the IC (even though we didn't
call them ICs in those days) had a strong connection to the work that was

I
~

l
Up Front Swff

being performed. They typically supervised by going directly to the specific

site of the work. The troops were accustomed to their command boss being
with them, up close and personal, right at the point of action . Having the
overall boss in a tactical position worked best when when the incident area
was fairly small, the action was routine, ar:d the initial assignment (first wave)
solved the problem. The boss was generally in a good position to directly
supervise that initial activity, but what came naturally to that active position
was at the disadvantage of also being directly (and personally) assaulted by
the same incident conditions as the workers (hot, dark, smoke, noise, confu­
sion, excitement).

The value of that direct supervision is as important today as it was then. The
difference today is that same level of on-site direction is provided by sector
officers who are operating with the added value (and protection) of having a
strategic-level boss (IC) in a strategic posi~ion "above them" (organizational­
ly). Thus the IC can support the sector boss's efforts with resource allocation,
coordination with other sectors, and overa!! direction within the overall strate­
gy. This support is particularly important as conditions (and the lAP) change
and tactical and task efforts must be moved, redirected, and expanded. It was
difficult for the old system to change the plan midstream (and bring everyone
along).

An important part of IMS development involves creat­

ing what is (in actual effect) a new position, role, and
set of functions for a strategic level of command . The
new (third) level revolves around the job description of
the IC Creating the new strategic job emerged out of
the overall IMS development and would have been dif­
ficult (or impossible) before that overall system
development occurred. In the old days, there was a
strong cultural value to having the commander in chief
directly with the troops, turned out in full-battle gear
(General Patton). Even today, a disagreement exists
with regard to basic positioning of the IC There are
still those rugged souls who call themselves the IC, but
operate on what is (in actual effect) the tactical level,
simply because they continue to position themselves in
an active, aerobic (mobile), open-air tactical position.
~!a=~R;;~L~~- These operations are under the command of what is, in
effect, a sector officer who is (inaccuratley) called
"command." It is impossible for this tactical supervisor
to outperform the complete, integrated system provided
by having all three supervisory levels (strategic-tactical­
task) staffed and operating together, each playing their
role in the IMS. Serious, mature (clear-eyed , hand­
some, beautiful) IMS students should not be distracted
by those (good 01' boys) who still advocate open-air
tactical command-they are simply on the tail end of
 Up Front Stuff

change. A major characteristic of IMS is the flexibility (and expandability) of

being able to make the command system match the severity, speed, area, and
nature of the incident. We use this flexible-responsive capability routinely to
conduct effective operations. This includes the option for the Ie to operate
exclusively at the strategic level in demanding situations. In these significant
(big/bad) events, the rest of the team understands , expects, and depends on
that strategic level of command support. Any system that cannot quickly and
naturally expand into the standard strategic (third) level is routinely short­
changing themselves by operating what is, in actual effect, only two-thirds of
a command system. While the three levels are closely connected, they all
operate in different places, talk to different people, say and do different things.
No matter how fast we run (around) or how big an eagle we affix to our ani­
mal skin helmet, there is no way we can get a tactical position officer to do
strategic command. In 1983, I wrote (in Fire Command) that the correct posi­
tion for a strategic-level Ie is remote, stationary, and inside a
vehicle-nothing I have seen in the ensuing 1,482,889 alarms, that have
occurred in the past eighteen years in Phoenix, has changed my mind. In fact ,
in the (literally) thousands of cases where I have observed the performance of a
lucid, in-control Ie inside a vehicle, it has consistantly reinforced that 1983
belief and comment.

IMS Change : We declared war on freelancing

One major IMS development issue involved us looking at an old-time respon­
der behavior known as freelancing. This behavior involves self-supervised,
independent responders directly engaging the incident problem without any
central command or control, or any coordination
with other responders. This uncommanded action
typically is performed by highly motivated workers
arriving at the incident-scene where an obvious and
accessible problem is present. Our fast-attacking free spir­
its go to work directly on the problem without any standard
IMS "check-in" (staging, assignment tracking, accountability,
etc.). While most of the freelancers arrive in teams, many times they
peel off from their original team members (= confusion 2). They typical­
ly meet up and "flock together" with other roving aggressors seeking
up-close action, right where the most intense problem and the most physically
challenging tasks are OCCUlTing. Freelancing was (and still is) done mostly on
offensive, interior-attack situations (where we all still do a lot of business).
The approach (and the attackers) survives, continues and is reinforced when the
incident problem is solved by the first (and fast) wave of attackers.

Freelancers don't file a "flight plan," so they are detached and independent
from any overall command-direction coordination (and protection). When the
first attack "shot" doesn't get the job done and requires backup/reinforcement
(i.e., problem expands-something goes wrong-somebody gets lost, etc.),
it's pretty tough to get Plan "B" going .. .simply because there was never a
Plan "A." Operational revisions are difficult to achieve even with a plan, and
Up Front Stuff

they are almost impossible to pull off without one-it's difficult for the Ie to
protect the troops if they are not pal1 of the command system (which is the
point of free enterprise/freelancing).

Freelancers are typically non- (or even anti-) bureaucratic and become very
skillful in avoiding, working around, or disregarding anything or anybody that
slows them down (like slow inept IMS). Freelancers are generally task com­
petent; they have enjoyed success in their aggressive actions in the past and do
not anticipate the unexpected. Freelancing, independent action flourishes
when strong, in-place, active command is not present. The reverse also is
true: free enterprise cannot exist in the same incident "space" with well-man­
aged, under-controIIMS. Freelancing was a fairly standard ElMS response.
Freelancing has always been a "closet problem" for our service. We all knew
it occurred (a lot), and we talked about it, but we really didn't do anything
about it. Simply, we had not yet developed an effective command system that
could compete with, capture, and control aggressive, highly-motivated, fast­
attacking freelancers . Our members do not have a lot of patience with any
"bureaucratic stuff' that delays action when a solvable problem (to them) is
present, and they can get to it. They are not going to wait around for ten min­
utes while some Ie character gets in touch with those feelings and gives the
order to go to work and extend an attack on Mrs . Smith's burning kitchen.

The basic objective of 10calIMS is exactl) the same as local free enterprise.
The under-control system (AIMS) attempts also to quickly and safely move
the workers into the best fast-attacking positions to pick a fight with whatever
is causing the incident problem-just like the out-of-control (free enterprise)
system does.

Standard IMS components (SOPs) like fast. initial-command assumption by the

first arriver, staging of subsequent alTiving units, quick, direct assignment (to
staged units) by the Ie, standard incident action planning, on-going
command/sector task-level supervision, and accountability-system application
have pretty well made freelancing not so free.
Responders engage in free enterplise because they
are good guys/gals who have strong feelings about
the work they are doing. Any examination of freelanc­
ing reflects that the spirit and dedication of our responders
is what drives the process. These feelings (and what they
produce) are now, and al\\ ays will be, the highest and finest
tradition of our service. Any industry or occupation would kill to have human
assets like our responders (skill, determination, brains)-not many work groups
drive through the bottom section(s) of the overhead door (before it actually
becomes completely overhead) because they are that anxious to deliver service!

The problem with the free-enterprise system is that, beyond a certain point
(that we reach pretty quickly), it isn ' t effective and it is always unsafe for the
workers. Absolutely nothing in IMS is de signed, directed, or intended to
diminish or discourage the spirit of our human resources-in fact, just the
 Up Front Stuff

opposite. Workers with the feelings and dedication of our troops deserve to
participate in well-managed incidents , within a well-managed organization.
They also deserve to always leave the scene sitting up in the same rig they
arrived on, by virtue of being protected by a professional, effective incident­
management system.

Stuj! that did not change

We have just presented a short (but important) list of some of the big changes
that have resulted from IMS development. The list mostly reflects changes in
how we organizationally and personally program and manage our response to
incident conditions. Basically, IMS has changed how we control ourselves so
that we can evaluate, decide and act in a way to control the incident problem.
Creating a system that helps us manage the incident converts our ongoing, col­
lective experience into system improvements that become a huge IMS advantage.

The rest of this section will outline the major stuff that has not changed since
IMS came along. Some of the details of the timeless items may shift around a
little (but not much), mostly because the customer's life and the problems
connected to that life are always changing and in a state of flux. A critical
ongoing lMS challenge is to always adjust our response in whatever way is
required to match the current state of the customer's flux. IMS has pretty well
not changed the following major incident factors.

No Change: FirelGravitylWater
These are timeless incident elements that are influenced by the standard laws
of nature and science. It is impossible to repeal these natural laws (that's why
they don't call them suggestions). These elements are major tactical consider­
ations of the lAP process. Our ability to understand and effectively react to
them will determine our operational success and, many times, our collective
and individual survival.

While modern material (plastic stuff) bums hotter and quicker (than old natural
stuff), fire behavior involves a standard process that radiates, conducts, and con­
vects itself onto anything and anybody that it possibly can. The ultimate,
un-extinguished result of an old-time fire is exactly the same as a blaze that
might occur this afternoon-with death, damage, and destruction. Burned-up
new stuff looks about the same as burned-up old stuff... the ultimate difference is
only academic. Fire is the basic enemy of every firefighter and will instantly
produce the deadly (combustion) products of heat, flame, smoke, and lethal
gasses. It will burn and strangle humans in a violent and unforgiving way. Fire
is absolutely democratic-it attacks the rich, the poor, the smart, the dumb, the
young, and the old in exactly the same way. Death by fire is the most consistent­
ly feared human end. Fire always shows up when fuel, oxygen, and ignition
temperature get together. Hostile fire always acts like a jerk and is not impressed
with IMS, big fancy-fire machines, or complicated organizational charts. It will
naturally bum until it exhausts the fuel, and only responds to water.
Up Front Stuff

Gravity is another big-deal, natural element that is always

present in our operational lives. The home office of gravity
resides somewhere inside the earth (around San Francisco).
It is basically a lonely natural phenomenon and is always try­
ing to pull everything down to the earth to somehow kiss the
ground. Gravity is always peeking out of the structures we
visit, particularly the ones hosting a fire . The fire is very typi­
cally beating up the building by burning through structural
members and by disconnecting the connections that hold the
building together. While this fire damage is occurring, gravity is
conducting an invisible tug-of-war with the structure trying to pull
it down. The trick for us is to anticipate when gravity is going to
win, and arrange for our troops to be in rehab, drinking bottled water and eat­
ing Snicker bars, when the structure and the ground start smoochin'. The
old-time, structural-collapse time frame is the same as we blabbed about in
the previous fire section-new-time, lightweight construction collapses just
like the old-time, heavyweight stuff did-only sooner (and it's not lightweight
when it falls on you). After the incident, when it's in_a big, ugly burned-up
pile, it all looks the same. We must assume (and expect) that everything at the
incident site is ready, willing, and able to collapse, if gravity gets its way.
Gravity is the reason the IC must carefully and continually manage the overall
offensive or defensive strategy that positions the troops away from overhead
stuff when it falls down and goes boom.

Water is the primary weapon we use for fire con­

trol. It has a set of characteristics that have been
the same since it was invented (also near San
Franciso). It weighs eight and a half
pounds per gallon; there
are 7.48 gallons per
cubic foot; one gallon
expands 1,700 times and
absorbs 970.3 BTUs per
pound when it turns from
liquid to steam. It is color­
less and tasteless (without bourbon) . For the purposes of fire control, we are
effective to the extent that we can produce an adequate rate of water flow
delivered directly to the materials that are on fire. The basic process is pretty
simple: The only thing that the fire reacts to (or respects) is water. Very little
bums when it is submerged. The fire-fighting industry is forever tempted to
fool Mother Nature and add stuff to water to make it scarier to fire. We have
worked our way through making plain old water rapid, wet (?), foamy, bubbly,
sticky, slippery, and light. In fire areas much bigger than Mrs. Smith's
kitchen, we still typically run out of the high-octane version of water (with
additives) and revert back to regular-which still continues to work okay.* A

*Compressed air foam has been the most effective additive used by those who
have perfected the details of its application. It is extremely effective when
used properly.
 Up Front Stuff

dramatic change will occur when we can make water heat seeking. This
invention will be a big deal and will change our delivery system dramatically.
So far, we are not even close. Water (like fire and gravity) is timeless and
could care less if we invented IMS (or anything else), and could care even less
that we have a big-time command post with polished aluminum wheels (both
sides). From all reports, the modern version of water that the yuppies are
drinking in the fern bars (with a lemon slice) is exactly the same as the H 20
that the cave man washed down his roasted yak chop with. Water, like fire, is
schizophrenic-friendly water is good (fire fighting, showers, hot tea, water­
skiing, etc.), unfriendly water is a bad actor (floods, typhoons, drownings,
mud slides, B-shift water fights, etc.).

No Change: Anatomy and Physiology

The most important part of what we do involves protecting and helping peo­
ple. In spite of all of the other modern service-delivery distractions, we are
basically in the people business. We also look after the things that come with
people-homes, personal stuff, business buildings and industrial hardware,
hula-hoops, vehicles, pets, and the landscape. The reason that we protect
these physical resources is because they are a natural and important part of the
human condition. While human accessories change a lot with style, fashion,
taste, and time ('58 Chevy vs. '02 Chevy), the basic inventory of human body
parts (anatomy and physiology) has stayed the same for a long, long time. We
typically respond to customers who are having a bad day because they were,
in some way, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. Many times their current
problem brings them right down to the survival (biological) level, on the hier­
archy of needs. It is pretty tough to self-actualize when you are holding your
breath while you crawl low in smoke, or to imagine you are at the beach while
you wait for a rescue company to cut the top off of your car and hydraulically
move the steering wheel out of your lap (ouch) because it is holding you pris­
oner. While responders continue to be surprised (actually amazed) at the new
and creative things the customers do to each other and themselves, there con­
tinue to be only so many body parts that can be insulted. Based on this
timeless reality, service delivery to humans should always be the stalting point
l for every part of IMS.

f
I. No Change: Firefighters
Very little service-delivery automation exists in our business, so essentially,
every service we deliver is performed by a real, live responder. Our standard
service-delivery routine involves department members responding as quickly
and safely as possible, and then personally and physically pbcing their bodies
between the customer and the problem. Nothing happens until our humans
show up. There are no middlemen in the process. This response approach
forms a very special, personal relationship between the workers and the cus­
tomer, and a very high-risk relationship between the workers and the work.
There are not many service-delivery situations in our world where the workers
put their welfare on the line for the customers, like we do. This is a process
Up Front Stuff

that is typically highly respected by the customers, and forms the basis of how
we (as a service) will secure our long-term future. IMS must always enhance
both the welfare of our troops and the way they treat Mrs . Smith. We deliver
service based on a combination of what we know and how we feel. What we
know is the basis of what we are able to do technically (the rational part).
How we feel becomes the basis of how we deliver that service and add value
in human terms (the emotional part).

Another absolutely historic reality is that bosses (more humans) become a

huge part of how the workers personally and professionally react-particular­

and feelings about leader­

ship. They are not much
inclined to follow a com­
,
ly when we are delivering urgent, dangerous services. The troops have very
straightforward expectations

mittee into battle. Two

hundred years ago, when
Mrs. Smith called us for
help, a firefighter showed
up-today the very same routine
applies. Firefighters (and their
bosses) always have been, and
always will be, the basic delivery
mechanism for our service.
Today, the "cavalry" might show
up a bit more mechanized and on
snazzier rolling stock, but the
war is still won on the ground, by the "foot soldiers."
Under his/her new work clothes, the current Firefighter Smith looks just like
Grandfather Firefighter Smith looked under his old-time work clothes. While
IMS improves the coordination and safety of the workers, it does not, in any
way, replace the fact that basic, service delivery still involves our workers
directly engaging the incident problem with hand-to-hand combat. Muscle,
brains, and guts continue to be what it takes to do effective hand-to-hand com­
bat. It doesn't appear that anything in the near future will change that reality.

No Change: BRTs (Big Red Truck)

In the previous section we discussed the fact that even though the customers
and responders may come dressed in modern, new costumes, both the players
and their fundamental situation have not been changed much by IMS. The
same applies to our hardware. Let's use engines and ladders to make the
point. These two pieces of fire-service equipment were developed and have
been refined over the last 250 years to do the basic fire-fighting functions
required to get the job done. In the very early days we pulled (literally) the
two basic pieces of equipment to Mrs. Smi th's. Engines were used to pump
water and ladders were used to provide access . The units are now so much a
part of our culture that even though our troops are highly versatile and do a lot
 Up Front Stuff

of different jobs while they are

assigned to those trucks, they develop
a mentality, approach, and identity
that matches the function of those
E
units. Firefighters serving as engine
guys are foot soldiers, who use water
as their basic weapon; ladder charac­
ters (truckies) are highly active
commandos who typically use big,
ugly tools (also timeless) to manipu­
late the building so that they can play
hide-and-seek with the fire. Ladder
companies open stuff up so that the
engine can hold the red devil's head
under water. While our rolling stock has
changed technically a lot through the years, today we still use those two basic
types of rigs, and the modern version does exactly what the old ones did. To
start with, we had human pullers and pumpers; we graduated to horses, steam,
gas, and now diesel. We worked our way through direct-drive, square-tooth,
syncromesh, and now automatic transmissions. We had single-stage, multi­
stage, high-pressure, and now compressed-air (CAFS) pumps. We have seen a
steady stream of changes revolving around electronics, computers, space-age
materials, and design improvements, but today the fire service is still using
engines to pump water and ladders to gain access. We used these units BIMS
and AIMS still shows the same picture-simply, we didn't invent all new
equipment when we invented IMS. While IMS has not changed the role or
function of our basic rolling stock, the command system has improved the
way we utilize, manage, and integrate the use of these units. Regular IMS
elements like staging, specific assignments within the lAP, accountability for
tasks (placement and function), and on-line command have given us the abili­
ty to better use our traditional assets and put them in the right place at the
right time, doing the correct action to solve the incident problem.

No Change: Operational experience

IMS in no way reduces the absolute importance of opera­

tional experience. No command system can serve as an

effective substitute for a responder living through lots of

incident beginnings, middles, and ends. That actual inci­

dent experience develops an understanding of how all of

the parts of an emerging and ongoing event (people,

places, things) fit together and affect one another.

IMS is not a substitute for experience; it makes an excel­

lent companion. IMS is a huge help to new responders who are trying to

learn the system because it is written down, can be used as the basis for train­

ing, and the IMS recruit can understand what they are involved in.
The
 Up Front Stuff

command system creates a standard organizational order and control plan, so

that experienced players can not only use their experiences to decide what
they should do but the system also creates the capability to effectively control,
manage, and use organizational resources (along with experience) to pull off
the plan. The IMS becomes a "bank" where we can store (and then retrieve)
teaching, education, study, reading, reflection, war stories, and organizational
development. All of these activities also provide positive input into our per­
sonal experience "files" that get acted out at service-delivery time. Our basic
performance-management plan must provide an effective balance of develop­
ment activities for the players. While IMS and operational experience are
activities in and of themselves, they are most effective when they are mixed
together, and less effective when separated.

2. THE INCIDENT COMMANDER

The need for central command

Successful incident operations require the application of an effective overall

management system, and the skills of a strong incident commander (IC) start­
ing at the very beginning of the event. The lack of understanding of this
central command role still adversely affects more CUlTent emergency-opera­
tional outcomes than any other single incident-management challenge. The
five major responsibilities of the Ie are to :

1. provide for responder safety and s:lfvival

2. protect, remove, and provide care :0 endangered customers
3. stabilize the incident problem
4. conserve property and the environ:nent during and after incident
operations
5. provide short-term services that stabilize and begin to normalize the
customers lives

Simple, effective, hard-hitting emergency operations are conducted at the task

level and require a strategic plan, supporting tactical coordination, application
of SOPs, continual evaluation and management. Without strong central com­
mand, the typical emergency-incident scene quickly deteriorates into an
unsafe, out-of-control situation. It is highly unlikely that responders operating
in such an unmanaged atmosphere will have the capability to simultaneously
coordinate company and team activities and achieve their planned tactical
objectives. The larger the team gets and the longer the game goes on, the
more impossible it becomes for the participants, directly involved in every
phase and stage of action operating all over the incident site, to somehow sup­
port one another, and to coordinate everyone's collective efforts in controlling
the incident. To effectively control a significant incident, there must be a for­
mal leader.

r-- ­
 Up Front Stuff

Operating at the incident without central command usually produces:

NO COMMAND AT ALL-Everyone operates in the "free-enter­

prise/freelance system," where responders commit themselves

independently with no central coordination. The free-enterprise

(yahoo) system really gets rolling when it exists on every

level-including command. This produces independent,

uncoordinated, disconnected outcomes, generally at

the expense of safety and effectiveness.

MULTIPLE, COMPETITIVE COMMANDS-The

incident site quickly becomes occupied by highly­

mobile officers, each with a different plan, and each wanting

a piece of the action. They generally circle the scene in opposite NO C OMMAND
directions, each giving conflicting orders to everyone they encounter. Portable
radios give each rapidly orbiting commander the ability to communicate con­
fusion to everyone, without losing a step.

In both cases (no command/multiple com­

mand), responders
~ (including
command) are
typically capable, dedi­
cated people who are
highly motivated to do a
good job. They general­
ly come from the factory
programmed to solve prob­
lems with direct action and will typically attack
with or without command-or in spite of ineffec­
tive command, if necessary. The incident
management system does not in any way attempt to eliminate or discourage the
spirit or motivation of responders that can get them in a free-enterprise mode, if
command is out of balance (or nonexistent). Emergency operations are impor­
tant to them, and they deserve a fighting chance to be successful. They need a
basic, effective management system-one that creates and attempts to apply just
the right amount of command. This "correct" command package supports,
coordinates, and takes advantage of responders' aggressive feelings and
approach. The command system focllses on standard roles and the performance
requirements for each role-rather than the personal approach of whoever is on
duty and shows up when the incident occurs .

The only really effective starting point to eliminate freelancing is to fix it at

the top (Ie). It's really tough for the troops to overcome a lack of operational­
command effectiveness from the spot where they operate (bottom/middle of
the hierarchy) in the system. Achieving an effective balance of command and
control, in relation to operational action, is a major system objective (and
challenge). Too little command can create uncontrollable chaos, while too
much command (i.e., micromanagement) can produce conflicting, over con­
trolled, constricted action that frustrates and underutilizes the skills of the
Up Front Shiff

players and the coaches. Consistently creating an effective command balance

requires a practical command system; strong game planning (SOPs); partici­
pants with skill, determination, discipline, and experience; and a critical,
ongoing critique process . The longer the team refines, practices, and applies
the command system, the easier and more natural the process becomes. The
corrunand system also eliminates freelancing through a standard plan that out­
lines everyone's accountability and responsibility:

• Command is directly responsible for sections, branches, and sectors.

• Sectors are responsible for the units assigned to them.
• Company officers are responsible frail crew members.
• Crew members always work in teams of two and are responsible for
one another.
• Each individual member is responsi Ie for his/her personal safety and
operating within the system.

The command procedure mobilizes and in tegrates everyone's efforts to:

1. Fix responsibility on a particular individual to become the IC

through a standard identification system. Who becomes the IC
depends upon the arrival sequence of responders, units/
companies, and officers.
2. Ensure that strong, direct, and visible command is established as
early as possible.
3. Establish a management framework that clearly outlines the
regular functions and objectives assigned by the IC to the standard
positions and roles outlined in local IMS SOPs.
4. Provide a coordinated effort of all resources at the scene to gain
control of the situation.

Command function SOPs define the fundamental job of the IC, establishing
that person as the overall incident-site manager with the basic role to manage
and coordinate all SOPs that collectively form the incident action plan and the
organizational structure.

Every organization must devise, develop, and refine the SOPs that describe
how these four basic IMS functions will be performed in their own system.
While IMS SOPs look a lot alike (from system to system), each local place
must develop operating guidelines that match their resources, area, level, and
type of activity, organization, operating philosophy, and history (culture).
This hometown approach is what makes IMS local (and effective).

The command system creates the agreement that the incident commander will
be the overall incident-site manager and that everyone else operating at the
 Up Front Stuff

incident will follow and support the Ie's plan. In return everyone can expect
the IC to perform the standard, agreed-upon, practiced eight (8) command
functions that effectively achieve the tactical service delivery targets-rescue,
incident stabilization, property conservation, and customer stabilization. The
IC must always make the safety and survival of the troops an ongoing and
high priority. This basic management-worker game plan and agreement is
determined prior to the event, and is particularly crucial in view of typical
incident conditions (quick, dangerous, confusing), and the urgent need for
effective, coordinated action among all the participants at the incident.

Command procedures give the IC the responsibility for overall incident

results, along with the organizational authority to achieve those outcomes.
Thi s game plan balances the classic conflict between responsibility and
authority, and puts everyone to work on common objectives (same "sheet of
music") within a strong, agreed-upon operational/command plan.

Command procedures also establish a standard critique framework for review­

ing incident outcomes. The critique should include a customer-safety oriented
review of the procedures, training, application, physical resources, and results,
as they are applied to the given situation. The knowledge gained from these
critiques should be packaged to continually improve performance-a regular
total quality management (TQM) principle.

Command functions
The command functions list provides a si mple, practical job description for the
IC and helps define what "being in command" really means. It serves as an out­
line for everyone on the team to understand exactly (before, during, and after
the incident), where the IC will be, what the IC will be doing, and how the IC
will interact with the rest of the team. A clear statement of, and agreement on,
B

the command functions serves as the common basis of the incident management
system. The functions provide the basic management structure to customize an
effective organizational response to the needs of each particular incident situa­
tion, and as the practical command plan and framework for incident escalation.

The eight (8) basic command functions develop an organizational structure

and game plan that drive the basic IMS and include the following:

1. Assume, confirm, position command

2. Situation evaluation (size up)
3. Incident communications
4. Deployment management
5. Strategy development/incident action planning
6. Incident organization
7. Review and revision
8. Continuation, transfer, and termination of command

 Up Front Stuff

The eight functions provide a beginning/middle/end for command operations

and form a standard IC job description (definition) that is:

• short
• simple
• street smart
• standard
• sensible
• safe
• nice

The standard functions connect an organizational command plan with regular

IC performance targets. The performance targets will be described and dis­
cussed in detail, in each separate command-function chapter later in thi s book.

An important command system objective is to create a game plan where all

team members know where they and their team fit into the overall plan.
Starting this process with the IC (by laying out the command functions)
makes sense because it defines the who, where, when, and how of the inci­
dent-management structure and operations function s, starting with the IC at
the very top of the organization. It's pretty tough to tell someone on the bot­
tom to act sane, when the top is acting nuts.

Developing and refining the operational and command plan, ahead of the
event, gives the team a chance to decide how it will use its individual and
collective resources to achieve standard performance objectives at game
time. This agreement eliminates the traditional process we lived through
in the old days (BIMS), where the incident boss had to become a
)) Jack-the-Ripper autocratic lunatic to somehow gain control of the
((C
uncommanded, uncoordinated, and many times unsafe action and
actors. Modern command procedures absolutely prohibit goofy IC
behavior, including having to yell the loudest to let everyone know
that the 600-pound command gcrilla has landed. In fact, in a well
designed IMS , the IC should (al:nost) never raise his/her voice; in
fact (#2), screaming ICs call out for more training, coaching, and love.

The command plan creates a set of standard, integrated plays as the IC per­
forms the command functions that are applied to the particular needs of each
situation. The command plays produce the tactical direction and task-level
action (work) that solves the incident problem(s). Our operational and com­
mand reaction becomes more predictable as we practice and play over time.
This basic ahead-of-time planning moves the role of the IC from the dictator,
who could yell the loudest, to a quarterback whose performance requirements
are well known to all of the team, based on the standard functions of com­
mand.

- ---- - -- -- - - ---
 Up Front Stuff

Profile of the effective Incident Commander

Very few leaders must perform in settings anywhere close to being
as quick, chaotic, intense, initially information poor and dangerous,
as the situations an IC must routinely handle. How the IC reacts,
behaves, and performs sets the stage for the entire incident­
response effort. The charactelistics the IC models create a
personal and professional profile, that will influence the effec­
tiveness of the command process more than any other single
thing. No amount of organizational planning and develop­
ment, training, and refinement can outperform an
out-of-control, screaming, ego-mad, deranged, manic IC (that
was fun to write). Based on that reality, let's look at some of
the major characteristics that make up the profile of an effective IC

The Effective IC-System smart/street smart/people

smart
The incident-command process revolves around the IC being
really smart about how the command system must work, how
to set it up, and how to keep it going so that the system can
outlast the incident problem(s). The IC must effectively apply
standard organizational directives like the regular command
functions, local SOPs, and universal tactical guidelines to cre­
ate effective operational responses. The IC must be able to
actually apply the system in the street where "asphalt" -level
realities generally include lousy initial information, com­
pressed time, difficult communications, dangerous conditions,
and lots of excitement/stress. The IC must be continually aware
that IMS is mostly about miling emergency-response humans effec­
tive, as he/she goes about managing and supporting responders who are
delivering service to our customers. Peiforming as an IC is a challenging job
that requires a high level of command-system intelligence, situation aware­
ness, and understanding of human behavior under difficult, dangerous, and
dirty incident conditions.

The Effective Ie-Creates standard action

The basic objective of the whole incident-response process is to cre­
ate the operational action (work effort) that will solve the customer's
problem. This requires the IC to be able to first identify the present
conditions that make up the incident problem. The IC can then trans­
late those conditions into standard terms. Converting dynamic, many
times very confusing, out-of-control conditions into standard terms makes it
lots easier (and more possible) for the IC to then create and connect standard
action that matches those conditions. The IC must know what the result of
tr.at standard action is supposed to look like when it is applied to those condi­
tior~s . The result of the standard action (hopefully) produces a standard

r ~- - --
Up Front Stuff

outcome. This "standardizing" approach creates (over time) a predictable pat­

tern of what happens when standard problems and standard solutions come
together. These connections become a template for the entire response team.

This standard becomes the expectation-and-verification

basis for incident operations. Simply, we test standard
conditions (standard by our evaluation) by applying a
standard response (expectation) to those conditions-if
the standard action works, the condition was indeed stan­
dard (verification). If it doesn't work, we then must
move, change, expand, modify, and in some cases
retreat. Lots of responders are alive today because they
bailed out of a situation where a standard attack did not
achieve a standard reaction (outcome)-after they got
outside, they watched their former tactical-operating
position collapse into the burning basement.

The Ie must have the experience and skill to connect

standard problems/action/outcome and to use that
approach for planning, decision making, assignments, and revision. (Please
forgive all the "standards." There is really no other word that works as well.)
There are times, when for a lot of reasons (rapid changes, miscalculations, bad
info, mistakes, etc.), responders do not take correct action by doing things that
do not follow standard operational roles and principles. When this occurs, the
Ie must redirect and restructure incon-ect actions back into a standard mode.
Students should refer to the "Backbone" section of the A&P outline further
along in this section. Many times this is the major body part the Ie must
employ to achieve such corrections.

The Effective Ie-Cool head

The folks who make emergency inci­
dent response their business have a
high regard and respect for those who
are able to handle tough situations, and
remain calm, rational, and in control.
They describe such characters as "cool
heads." This capability is particularly
importan t for the Ie. It's very difficult for
the response team to pull off the complicat­
ed plays required to coordinate (right place,
right time) a lot of players who are attempt­
ing to do their work (and survive), if the
quarterback is searching for the head (his/her
own) he/she lost fifteen minutes ago. It's
pretty easy to sit around the kitchen table and talk a good (cool) game, but the
only place that such a reputation can be developed is right on the line. This i~.
where all of the incident monsters are waiting for the cool guy/gal to arrive.

-- --- -- - -
 Up Front Stuff

He/she must develop and then pull off an lAP that makes all the bad stuff bet­
ter*. The incident command process is enormously unforgiving-it is done
effectively on-line by a real live, street-smart person (IC) who is in actual
attendance (you can run, but you can't hide). Providing that person with a
radio, a clear channel, and a tough situation gives everyone within twenty-five
miles the opportunity to listen (and decide) where that IC is on the in-control/
out-of-control scale. Show time can be a real bear: "Some days you get the
bear and, some days, the bear gets you."

The Effective Ie-Sensible risk manager

A major IMS component involves the entire team (fire chief to recruit) conduct­
ing an ongoing, never-ending discussion that describes in plain, understandable
language, how risks to our department humans will be handled. This critical­
organizational ritual requires us to apply that review to all of our planning,
training, application, and review activities. This risk plan must be known and
understood by every team member. This requires us to create little tiny drops of
highly persuasive Chinese-water-torture risk-management water that must con­
tinually bounce off of the foreheads of every department member, from his/her
first day on the job to his/her last. It is absolutely impossible for the IC to effec­
tively manage risks if he/she is the only one who is aware of what the plan
means (where we go/what we do) and then try to teach the plan to a mob of
aggressive, fast attackers, who never heard of the plan before, and are now
bouncing around in front of a dynamic, dangerous situation that is in progress.
The objective of the plan is to evaluate the risk that we take compared to the
likely benefits of our action. Such a plan might look like the following:

• We will risk our lives a lot, in a highly calculated and controlled

manner, to protect a savable human life.
• We will risk our lives a little, in a highly calculated and controlled
manner, to protect savable property.
• We will not risk our lives at all to protect lives or property that are
already lost.

Note-"Highly calculated" does not mean that the IC must be a mathemati­

cian with gypsy blood-it does mean that we have an in-place, strong,
practiced, SOP-based safety plan. The plan must describe in detail how we
will protect the troops, as they act out the risk-management plan because of
the consequences. The highly-calculated safety stuff is packaged up in rules
(not guidelines) that we always follow and enforce.
*For many years my wife was a Veterans' Administration nurse. She said that
she could tell the old soldiers who had actually been in battle from those who
hadn't-the guys who never got any closer to battle than the pictures on the
wall of the officer's club loved to talk about how "war is hell," the guys who
hung out where real bullets were flying never talked much about battle ...
I
mostly, they just stared off into space.
!

_ --
. . - -- - - ----­
Up Front Stuff

The Ie should continually ask a simple and standard risk management ques­
tion throughout the incident: "Is the risk that I am taking with my people
worth what we are trying to accomplish?" If the answer is yes, keep going; if
the answer is no, stop or change the plan.

The Ie becomes the very practical on-line custodian of the plan (and the ques­
tion) as he/she calls the shots at an actual incident. This is where our troops
do hand-to-hand combat with the incident problem within the hazard zone and
is the point of managing the risk. How the Ie manages that plan will deter­
mine if our humans will walk away or be carried away from the scene.

The Effective Ie-Strong delegation

A major IMS component is the ability the Ie has to create a standard com­
mand organization (Function #6) to match the needs of the incident. This
command function creates the framework for the standard delegation of both
geographic and functional responsibility to sector bosses. These sector com­
manders become the IC's partners who are operating on the
scene, away from the command post, who directly manage the
details of their assignment right where that work will occur.
This is how the Ie backs away from the direct action, looks at
the big picture, and maintains an effective span of control. The
command system describes in detail the functions of the stan­
dard incident-management sectors, and as officers are trained
and become experienced in those functions, the team members
become highly interchangeable. This interchangeability is a
huge advantage for the Ie because he/she can make sector
assignments to whoever shows up and be confident that they can
do the job. Developing and using the incident organization effectively

requires the Ie to quickly assign the sectors required to manage the entire area

and the various functions that must be covered. The Ie uses this standard del­

egation approach, along with effective two-way communications, to capture,

maintain, and never lose control. Any Ie inclination for micromanagement

becomes a big barrier to the high degree of sector empowerment that is

required to execute effective operations, and will inevitably lead to the Ie get­

ting bogged down in detail and losing track of the big picture.

Overall incident planning and effective follow up provide the standard front

and back ends of the delegation process. The Ie must combine preincident

planning, reconnaissance, and information processing to develop and update

the plan. Standard task and benchmark progress and completion reports com­

bined with visual information provide the Ie with on-line information on how

well the delegated activities are being completed. Planning and follow-up

establish a firm context for delegation. Responders must have confidence that

the assignments that are delegated to them fit into the same overall plan. They

must understand and expect that the Ie will manage the entire incident opera­

tion through completion of their assigned task or activity.

 Up Front Stuff

The Effective IC-Plays well with others

Emergency incidents (like everything else in life) seem to have become more
and more confusing in recent times and become a place where lots of respon­
ders from different agencies, jurisdictions, and disciplines come together.
These various responders all bring different sets of skills, experiences, and
approaches. They are typically highly motivated, tough folks who respond to
do what they do best. Most incidents move quickly and are not very clear cut
(to say the least). Everything and everybody gets mushed up together so that
the workers must get very close to the work, and to one another. Emergency
responders just naturally fight (blessing/curse), and without effective com­
mand and control, it's pretty easy for the troops who came to fight (fire,
crime, hazmat, medical stuff, etc.) to end up fighting one another. An exciting
challenge for the Ie is to get all these go-getters to somehow get up and
go in the same direction (together). Based upon the possible
inside/outside confusion that can occur, the Ie must continually
manage tactical and relationship activities to maximize and inte­
grate the efforts of everyone at the incident. This human
coordination requires the Ie to be the positive-relationship
playground poster child. How he/she speaks, makes assign­
ments, critically listens, solves problems, demonstrates
patience, assists those who are stuck, and effectively connects
everyone becomes contagious and will determine if the inci­
dent is a model or a mess. Many other agencies have
legitimate roles within their mission that require them to respond
to our incidents. A unified command relationship is critical to the success of
these agency interactions. When things go wrong with interagency relation­
ships at an incident and that fact makes the papers (which it always will),
everyone looks like a jerk and our customers lose confidence in our abilities.
Loss of confidence often evolves into lack of support the next time we need
something (bond issue, increased staffing, new station, etc.).

The Effective IC-Strong ego control

The command system attempts to create an effective balance between respon­
sibility and authority throughout the organization. This balanced approach
recognizes that whenever the system assigns responsibility it also must give
the corresponding authority required to complete that assignment. The system
creates a standard organization that operates on the taskltacticaVstrategic lev­
els. Each of these levels is responsible to learn, understand, manage, and
control the details within their assignment. Gaining control of the conditions
(i.e., details) that are beating up our customer and their stuff involves creating
fast, bold, energetic, and many times violent action. Effective incident out­
comes require that our commanders and troops are given a lot of authority to
take such strong action: move, manipulate, and restrain people; put them in
jail; stick needles into their bodies; insert tubes down their throats; force entry
into their property, etc. The person who is given the most personal and sys­
tem authority is the Ie. This much power can be very seductive and
·
.~
 Up Front Stuff

distracting, unless that person has a healthy, under-control ego. The Ie must
continually react in a functional, supportive, mature, and self-confident way
that is centered on the needs of the customers and the troops. He/she must
avoid playing personal or political games and must avoid constantly self mar­
keting when it comes to taking credit. The Ie also must realize that
compressed, noisy, exciting incident condltions create a lousy communications
setting. He/she must guard against taking such difficult order-giving condi­
tions personally and getting angry when workers don't get the message the
first time.

The "grand-command potentate" (IC) must work the hardest to effectively get
the word to the workers. This is difficult when the Ie's ego gets beat up
because he/she feels that the workers are not basking in the command aura
when (in fact) they are trying to communicate around a howling chain saw (as
an example). Workers quickly become experts on the ego of their boss, and
this knowledge becomes the basis of the confidence (or lack of confidence)
they have in the command system.

The Effective Ie-Respect for the task

Generally, customers call us for help because they are having
some difficulty that they cannot solve by themselves. Their
problems mostly involve a physical-type thing that is disrupt­
ing their life. We solve their problem when the Ie and the
response team develop and execute an lAP that matches and
overpowers the incident problem. To consistently solve these
physical problems, the command system calls upon the Ie to main­
tain a somewhat separated (from the action) strategic position and the
troops to be in an operational position thaT is very close to the action. Ies
support the very active, task level of operations by locking themselves in a
command post and performing the standard functions of command. It
becomes critical that the Ie understand and maintain an awareness that he/she
is in a safe, tidy, peachy position while the workers are, many times, operating
in dangerous, dirty, nasty positions. The Ie has all the command-post crea­
ture and command comforts we will describe as we go through the command
functions-things like lights, air-conditioning, comfortable seats, friendly
helpers, big windows, etc. The troops are enjoying such things as fire
conditions, including possible structural collapse, badly injured cus­
tomers; emotional family members: violent, deranged, out-of-control
lunatics; stressful crime scenes; hazardous-materials situations complete
with leaky, fuming, exploding death; and other exciting, fast-moving,
confusing conditions and situations. The Ie must always realize that
the system packages up and places him/her in a comfy spot, to support
the troops doing their jobs in yucky positions, and to get them out alive.

Big problems occur when the Ies' egos seduce them into believing that they
are in that blessed command spot because they are golden-souled philoso­
phers-simply, egos eat brains . In our business, pretty much everybody starts

1 - -­
 Up Front Stuff

out on the bottom doing the down-and-dirty manual labor. We work

our way up through the system to become an officer, who some­
times serves as the Ie. It is absolutely essential for the Ie to be
in the standard command position doing the standard command
functions. It's absolutely essential that the Ie remember what it
was like for the incident to poke you in the nose, while you
fought it hand to hand, up close, and personal. When this com­
mand amnesia occurs, the Ie stops providing the practical
support and assistance required for task-level outcomes and sur­
vival. Someone asked Napoleon (the most powerful person on
earth at that time) why he stepped aside and let his weary soldiers
pass by. He stated simply, "Respect the task." That says it all.

The Effective Ie-Logical thinker/decider

The Ie leads the incident operation by evaluating conditions, using that evalu­
ation to make the decisions that produce an lAP, and then communicating the
assignments to the workers who carry out that plan. This evaluate-assign-act
approach requires the Ie to have the intelligence to mentally produce a set of
logical decisions and directions that produce effective action. The Ie must
understand tactical and operational logic that is based on standard, accepted,
good practice. For the Ie, much of this good practice is spelled out in the
incident management system, local SOPs, and standard tactical guidelines.
While this material provides the basis for a lot of command intelligence, the
real, live person serving as the Ie must provide the actual, on-line decision­
making mental mechanism, that creates the action, that drives the actual
street-service delivery. A big part of the IC's mental "stuff' involves how past
experiences (personal and collective) get stored in the IC's brain-inventory
file, and how well he/she can recall those past experiences. Lots of incident
decision-making involves quickly taking a mental snap shot of conditions and
then running that picture past the experience files . Being able to remember
the reaction-and-result pattern of past experiences becomes a major source of
decision-making information that is applied to the current situation. Like any
other tool, how well the IC's brain works depends on how sharp it is.

The Effective Ie- Good communicator

Virtually every part of the command process and every effort of the Ie is sent

out and received using some part of the information-management and commu­

nications system. The Ie listens and talks face to face inside of the command

post, and electronically (mostly by radio) to those on the outside. He/she is

effective (like every other boss) to the extent that he/she can receive,

process, understand, and send out information. Simply, if Ies can con­

nect effectively with others, they are open for business-if they can't,

they are essentially out of business . The system sets up and maintains

the Ie in the best communications position (command post) and contin­

ually calls upon that person to always be the "one-part talking, two-parts

- - --- - -- .

Up Front Stuff

listening" focal point of incident communications (you may only get one
chance to hear a "mayday"). This requires starting the information-exchange
process at the very beginning of the operation, keeping it going, and control­
ling it throughout the incident. It was easier to maintain ongoing
communications control than it was to somehow regain that control once it
had been lost. Everyone connected to the incident gets to know the IC based
on how he/she communicates. Timing, tone, and technique reflect how ICs
feel about the work that is being done and how happy or unhappy (respect­
ful/disrespectful) they are with the workers. The IC must continually decide
how much and what level of communication is needed throughout the incident
organization to keep everyone effectively connected. Communications SOPs
provide the science, the IC provides the art-they are both necessary.

The Effective Ie-The right stuff

Any exercise involving the profile of an effec tive IC must recognize that those
performance capabilities are delivered and "glued together" by a real, live
human. Lots of the command system occurs effectively on the lines because
the IC understands and operates in between those lines. The IC fills in the
lines with initial and ongoing judgements and decisions, completing the com­
mand functions, local SOPs, and tactical g:Jidelines to match the tactical needs
of the situation. Making those organizational directives effective requires all
of the positive IC-profile stuff that we have covered in this section, plus some­
thing else that is uniquely human and can only be delivered in person by the
Ie. Many tactical situations are almost impossible to manage-they are very
dangerous with a lot of activity. That activity is simultaneous (a lot going on
at once), sequential (activity must be done in an ordered and integrated way),
and time compressed (no time to "manage"). The situation is highly dynamic,
everything keeps changing. Incident operations are sort of like playing bas­
ketball (finesse), hockey (violent), and chess (brainy), all
at once. If the incident problem is winning,
it's gettin' worse; if the IC is winning, it's
gettin' better. We live in a dream world if
we think that organizational directives
will just deliver themselves onto
the incident scene, set themselves
up, and go to work in such a situa­
tion.

There is no square-sbooter's bible,

laundry list, electronic machine, or fancy theory that can out peliorm an on­
line IC who is composed, qualified, and highly willing to use his/her
operational experience, personal skill, and individual style to support the
aggressive effOlts and dedicated spirit of our responders. I have spent my
entire career (over forty years) being intensely involved with street-responder
ICs who operate in a busy metro system (PFD) that has taken the application of
IMS very seriously for the past twenty-five years. I continually watch and
marvel at the skill, style, capability, and pizazz these characters bring to the

- -_._ - -- --- -­
 Up Front Stuff

command process. I have seen, over and over, that the personal approach of
the IC is the most clitical component of the command process. The fighter­
pilot motion picture title The Right Stuff pretty well describes that very special
personality component. The "stuff" is special and unique for each individual.
The differences (i.e., diversity) between responders strengthens the team by fit­
ting everyone into the incident operation based on the special profile of each .
This becomes a beautiful process when we can effectively match our cast of
characters to all the different needs of the incident. Like a lot of other really
important things, this right stuff is difficult (at least for me) to describe in
words, but I know it when I see it. The "stuff" makes up the Ie's personality
and, like most personality components, becomes the function and sum of a lot
of contrasts. These contrasts might include the following pieces and parts that
make up what the IC looks like, acts like, and is:

The Ie must be but /lot

Confident Arrogant
Mature Senile (ouch!)
Youthful Childish
Smart Egghead
Cautious Scared fi I ;- D~_' '"
Flexible Wishy washy ,
Tough Thug tf.uft.J- ' t: ,,0
Funny Silly . 1.:'
Serious
Grim .!( {/<. / / ;. J cE';'" -'c .
Bold
Reckless /:.. (.~, ..,,:. j,(.
Composed Numb
Aggressive Berserk
Basic Crude
Simple Simplistic
MUST BE Nice NOT Sobbing
Organized Robot
Clinical Calloused
Street smart Burned out
Kind Patsy
Stand up Zealot
Creative Goofy
Thorough Micromanager
Responsive Frantic

The Effective Ie-Personal skills

A somewhat different way to describe and understand how the IC personally
performs the command functions is to look at how the person directly and
intensely uses his/her anatomy and physiology (A&P) in the command
process. This personal IC performance approach involves developing (and
then using) a set of simple, doable rules of engagement for each separate body
part. At first, the A&P approach probably seems a bit awkward (because it is
Up Front Stuff

so basic), but looking at the rules of engagement for the IC's body parts is a
useful drill (actually primitive) , simply because it is directed at the personal
equipment the Ie actually brings to the incident. Using this personal equip­
ment is how the Ie makes the decisions th at "pull off the plan." All personal
performance is in some way a function of body-part operation. We pretty
much learn how to manage our human capabilities by actually using our A&P
as we trudge through life (what else would we do-or use?). While this is a
very practical way to learn and practice, in lots of cases we may start out
using a body part in a less-than-effective way. If noth­
ing interrupts thi s process, we may then practice that
bad habit forever. One of the many reasons that we act
nutty (dy sfunction al) is that we are never taught " how
to act." This reality is particularly true for an Ie who
is desperately trying to get all of his/her personal
"stuff' to act smart, while attempting to command a
difficult, fast-moving, dangerous incident. The A&P
rules-of-engagement approach requires we pause and
perhaps relearn a more effective way to put a particu­
lar body part to werk.

While the command system provides an enormous amount of help and support
for the Ie and the command team, it is impossible for that system to outper­
form how the IC's body parts actually operate. How the IC's personal
capabilities work is particularly important because so much of the on-line
command system is driven directly and personally by the individual serving as
the Ie. The IC's human components have the following bas ic capabilities:

Brain ............................ Think, remember

Eyes ... ..... .................... ..... ............ .. ....See

Ears ....... ...................... ..... .... .. ..... .... .Hear

Nose ................. ...... ..... ... .. .......... ....Smell

Mouth ............... ..................... .. ......... Talk

Face ............ ... .. .... ........ ..... ......E xpression

Hand .... .............. ... ... .. ... ............. ...Action

FOOL ........ ......... ..... ...... .... ........... Mobility

Heart .......................... .......... ...... ... .... Feel

Body ......................... ...... ..... ... ..Language

Gut .................... ......... ................. .Instinct

Backbone ............... ...... ...... ..... ..Fortitude

Funny bone ...... .... ... ....... .... .. .........Humor

 Up Front Stuff

IC Rules of Engagement-Brain
• Keep brain running (engaged)

... Stay awake

... Pay attention

... Stay connected

... Anticipate

• Use command and operational system intelligence

... IMS-eight basic command functions

... SOPs-local organizational directives

... Tactical guidelines-operational game plan

• Use relevant experiences/memory ("files") as the decision-making

reference point

... Understand incident status

... Create/correct standard action

• Continually receive, process, and balance input and information

from all other body parts
THE BRAIN
... Eyes/nose/ears/mouth/heart/gu tlbackbone

... Do not let any other body part overpower the brain

... Stay on the coolheaded end of the brain temperature scale

IC Rules of Engagement-Eyes
• Establish and maintain a standard and effective "looking"
position

• Be careful of getting too close to the action-pick a "wide­

angle" spot

• Maintain and sharpen the ability to focus on critical tactical

conditions

• Look deep-be aware of what you cannot see-the IC must

use someone else's eyes to go look, evaluate, report
THE EYES
• Sometimes enlist "new eyes"-command team should use
standard formation/function/role to support effective "seeing"

• Don't let visual demons distract you-stay visually agile-be care­

fulof:
... Candlemoth syndrome
... Tunnel vision
... "Blinking"
... "Look at that baby burn!" flame fronts (mesmerized)
... Other demon dirty tricks

• Sometimes face away from visual demons (i.e., turn your back)
 Up Front Stuff

IC Rules of Engagement-Ears
• Assume an effective, standard listening position (command post =
listening post)

• Control your own hearing distractions and emotions

• Continually sort out static

• Listen before you speak

• Always utilize communications SOPs

• Hear the whole message-listen past the sound for:

THE EAR
... Emotion/feeling/meaning/urgency

... Listen for what is not said

• Continually improve communications position

... command post = listening post

• It's hard to listen when you are talking

• Be careful of becoming "tone deaf"

• Time your listening to match the pace of the talker

• Listen your way out of tough spots (instead of talking)

IC Rules of Engagement-Nose
• Smart ICs develop a sense of (okay/not okay) "smell"

• Utilize and trust nose capabilities

... Quick

... Go/no go

... Refined and subtle

... Useful memory = "nose files" (remember "old smells")

• Continually run "smell test"-"smell" generally involves listening

to and using our nose to "add up" all the messages that all of our
senses are sending to us, and not the literal act of smelling

THE NOSE
• Pay attention to changes in "smells"

• Quickly react to danger/survival "smells"

r - - -- - -- - - - - ---- -- - - -­
 Up Front Stuff

Ie Rules of Engagement-Mouth
• Think twice, speak once

• Use simple, understandable, standard language (no coded messages)

• Regulate voice tone, timing, and level to match the situation­

always sound calm, deliberate

• Make your message short, to the point, and tactical (commo ABC's
=accurate, brief, clear)
• Pick your words ...use your talk to encourage-avoid negativity, or
angry, sarcastic stuff (even though you want to)
THE MOUTH

• Use your talk to set the pace of the incident

• Be continuously available to receive, process, and respond to inci­

dent communications

• IMS geography reality:

... IC is in good communications position

... Troops are in lousy communications position

• Always use communications SOPs

Ie Rules of Engagement-Face
• Choose facial messages carefully and consciously

• Put on your game face-know when to show/mask emotions

• Realize huge impact of nonverbal communication

• Use your face to reinforce/compliment your words/speech

• Realize that the face becomes the IC's "mug shot"

... Cool
THE FACE

... Calm

... Under control

... Handler

... Pizazz (give' em a wink)

 Up Front Stuff

IC Rules of Engagement-Hand
• Always engage brain before hand

• Consciously use hand to physically do the correct management activity

• Use hand to directly manage IC command stuff

... Radios

... Tactical work sheets

... Preincident plans

... Reference material

... Status boards

THE HAND,

• Three standard incident positions, each requiring different hand

function:
... Company/Task-mobile, manual labor
... SectorfTactical-mobile, area/functional supervisi on
... IC/Strategic- stationary, remote, command post

• Be careful of hand demons

IC Rules of Engagement-Foot
• Engage brain, before foot

• Command position =big deal/lC cannot outperform position

• Consider the message that your location sends

• Know where to be and where not to be

• Consciously select a standard command position based on conditions:

... Nothing showing-very mobilelinvesti gating } Company
... Fast attack-mobile/work-command combo Officer IC
... Command-standard command post position

• Standard command post (strategic) position

... Stationary

... Remote

... Inside vehicle

... Supported

• Continually upgrade and strengthen command formation, moves,

and position
... Create quick action
... Tiered reinforced response
... Standard command functions/position
... Team effort
THE FOOT

... Driven by SOPs

• Be careful of foot demons, who continually lure you into dumb positions

. - -- - - -- .. - -- - - - - - -- - - - - -- ­
 Up Front Stuff

IC Rules of Engagement-Heart
• Understand incident impact on humans-buildings don't have feelings
(but humans have feelings for buildings)

• Understand your own emotional capabilitiesllimitations-know

your own emotional "buttons"

• Balance and connect your emotions with your other A&P parts

• Maintain effective cardiac hard/soft consistency

• Quickly utilize the standard ICS components that provide direct

emotional human support:

... Occupant support sector

... Social/family service support

... Loss control SOPs

... Disaster and crisis aid

... Pet management procedures

... Welfare and shelter services

• Quickly provide worker support:

... Safety, survival, risk-management SOPs

... Rotation

... Rehab

... Critical incident support

... EAP services

... Nice management (nice = patience, kindness, respect, and compassion)

• Smart management
... Smart = sensible, positive, humane, inclusive, progressive, everyday

management (this is what we "get back to")

• Be nice

IC Rules of Engagement-Body
• Consciously pick the body-language message you want to send

... Keep body in sync with other A&P messages ... look connected

• Watch/evaluate/process incident site body language messages in

others (big deal)

• Use standard command positioning to effectively support body per­

formance:

-I THINK HE"8 SERIOUS"

... Inside-somewhat sequestered

... Comfortable (?)

... Air-conditioned/heated

THE BODY
.. Quiet

... Standard vantage point

- - .- - - - ­
 Up Front Stuff

.& Long term (if necessary)

.& Quick communications availability

• Use a body language style that matches personal profile

IC Rules of Engagement-Gut
• Trust your gut instincts-don't disregard-if it's there, it's there. If
it feels bad, it's probably bad.

• Realize that the gut is direct and has a short feedback loop

• Use gut check for risk management-if it looks, feels, smells too
dangerous, it's probably too dangerous

• Use gut check during ongoing situation management (mix with

THE GUT
other body parts)

• Refine the accuracy, memory, and recall of gut capability

IC Rules of Engagement-Backbone
• Basic leadership message = what you will stand for and what you
won't stand for

• Flexible enough to change when necessary

• Balance equal parts: smart/nice/tough

• Must "patrol the perimeter" around the system (for safety and
effectiveness) :
.& SOPs

.& Command functions

.& Risk management (big deal)

.& Incident action plan (emphasis on action-more action than planning)

THE BACKBONE

.& Conect, effective execution-actual outcome

.& Safety stuff

• Smart "patrol-the-perimeter" approach

.& Ahead-of-time planning (simple, ;e>asic, practical-no mumbo-jumbo)

.& Standard approach (SOPs)

.& Clear, sensible direction

.& Empowered workers-no micromanagement

.& Immediate adjustment (where required)--don ' t live with a bad situation

.& Positive reinforcement

• Must take the heat-walk the talk

.& Know business

.& Mean business

.& Do business

• Don't be afraid to acknowledge and correct a mistake

 Up Front Stuff

IC Rules of Engagement-Funnybone
• Use appropriate humor to strengthen:

.... Situations

.... Problem solving

.... Relationships

• Avoid humor that hurts

• Use humor to reduce tension/stress

• Leaders should tease themselves (appear human)

• Humor causes responders to survive:

.... Be careful where/when (timing, timing, timing)

.... Outsiders may not understand us (sick humor)

THE
.... Remember customers are having a bad day
FUNNYBONE
• Humorous story telling creates and supports organizational culture

3. THE IMS PACKAGE

It is pretty difficult for anyone to make sense out of IMS if there is no pack­
age that "walks" the system through the organization. The package mobilizes
and connects a regular set of organizational activities (management stuff) into
a standard service-delivery response (action stuff). The package must include
information on how the system is recorded, organized, presented, applied, and
stored. The foundation of the package is a complete, current, understandable
manual of command system SOPs closely connected to an integrated set of
organizational activities that support the procedures. A major message gets
continually extended to everyone in the system based upon how (and if) the
department provides and manages the resources required to create, maintain,
and refine the basic performance-management elements described in the
action-management model (described in this section). If a department mem­
ber can quickly find (in a standard place) a well-written (in plain English)
description of how the local IMS works, if the organization prepares that per­
son to be an effective system pa!1icipant, and if that member sees that
SOP-based system actually applied in the field, then that system is beef-if
those things don't occur, then the system is baloney. It is impossible for any
amount of management pep-rally mumbo jumbo or phoney chin boogie to
fool the inside players. Leaders produce a real live "in-the-street" system by
creating and managing the whole package. The package speaks (and performs)
for itself. The IMS package must provide an organizational cycle that is local,
simple, practical, and complete. The system outlines and describes what will
occur before, during, and after the incident, and works best when it is:
Up Front Stuff

• supported by leaders
• taught by teachers (who are experienced responders)
• actually performed by responders
• reinforced by coaches

• owned by customers

The Action-Management Model

The basic action-management model form s the framework for how the organi­
zation will package and conduct IMS, and includes the on-going interaction of
the following basic activities:

• standard operating procedures

• training
• application
• critique
• revision

The model identifies, defines, and connects the five standard organizational
activities that make up the model and the relationship between those system
parts. We use the model to set up the system in the beginning and to keep the
system ongoing. Developing and implementing the model forces the organi­
zation to decide on its overall incident-management philosophy and then to
continually and intensely deal with how that philosophy actually works in the
street. It requires the actual definition and description of each stage in the
process and, although all levels of the organization are involved, it must be
supported and directed from the top. While the model is very "quiet" and
simple (why it works so well), the effect of its ongoing implementation has a
very powerful organizational and operational effect.

Each of the five steps accomplishes a separate and different set of things that
integrate to support the entire IMS effort:

• The SOPs require us to decide, defin e, and write down the details of
how we will operate (creates a play book).
• The training prepares everyone to ap ply the current and revised SOPs
(we will always play the way we practice).
• The SOPs become our game plan (operations manual) when we

actually deliver service.

• The Clitique forces us to critically review our service-delivery performance.

• The revision stage requires we con nually load ongoing lessons

learned back into the SOP package.

 Up Front Stuff

Application of the model over time requires the organization to manage itself
so that actual local experiences are SOP based, actually applied, and automati­
cally reviewed. The lessons those experiences teach us (which they always
do) automatically get cranked back into the standard procedures we will use in
the future. The good news is that this approach continually creates the capa­
bility and causes the system to "fix itself' (i.e., continual improvement). The
bad news is that the ongoing application of the model requires a humongous
amount of work that occurs within a continuous loop that just keeps on going,
so once we start (if we are serious), we can never stop.

The objective of the model is to create effective action-that's why it's called
> an action-management model. The whole routine is short and sweet-it is not
I
I some high-falutin' academic exercise. It is a plain and simple organizational
road map where effective action is sandwiched in between an SOP/training
r front end and a critique/revision back end. The model is so basic that there is
t
no place to hide-insiders can see, feel, hear, touch, and smell all five parts of
l
f
the model as they occur so, either you are, or you are not, doing the standard
steps-simple stuff is hard to subvert.

Let's look at the five stages of the model.

Standard Operating Procedures*

SOPs are a set of organizational directives that establish a standard course of
incident action stated and described in written form. It is difficult for any
organization to operate consistently and effectively without such procedures,
particularly during large, complex, or unusual situations. Successful incident
operations require the integrated efforts of the entire team, which is organized
and mobilized under a strong, central SOP-based plan. While the actions of
individuals are important, incident operations are necessarily done collective­
ly. A consistent management goal is to simplify, remove the mystery, and
standardize operations. Each department must develop its own procedures
that match local conditions, capabilities, and limitations. IMS SOPs should be
developed to outline and describe an organizational approach to the major
activities of incident operations and generally include such areas as:

• basic command functions

• a method to divide and assign area and functional command responsibility
• all aspects of communications and dispatching
• guidelines that establish and describe tactical priorities and related
support functions
• an outline of responsibilities and functions of the various elements of
the organization and units

*Today, some folks use the term SaGs (guidelines) instead of SOPs. We will use
SOPs in this book only because SOPs is what we have always called those ani­
mals in the PFD. The reader should substitute any term that works for him/her.
Up Front Stuff

SOPs are characterized by being:

• Written
• Official
• Local
• Applied to all situations (including training)
• Positively enforced and reinforced

Training
Virtually every piece and part of IMS is driven and directed by real, live
human responders, so the system is basically about human performance.
Simply, no fire fighting happens at Mrs. Smith's on the day she has her
kitchen fire, until Responder Jones shows up and goes to work (i.e., per­
forms). The outcome out at Mrs. Smith's is directly connected to the quality
of the work Firefighter Jones performs. Good work is a function of human
skill; human skill emerges from training-so, if we want our responders to do
good work, we should give them good training (pretty simple, hUh?). Good
training (along with safety) is the most important organizational investment
we can make, because when our humans are well prepared, they do a good
job. When they do a good job, they feel good. When they feel good, they are
happy. When they are happy, it's lots easier to get them to do a better and bet­
ter job-life is good. The five-step action model creates an effective
framework for training because the action-oriented approach of the model
directly connects preparation (training) with service delivery (application).
SOPs describe how we will operate, and our IMS SOPs become the com­
mand-system drill manual for the teaching/learning part of the process.
Training creates understanding and agreement, as it develops individual and
collective capability. Effective training must create a safe place to make mis­
takes without embarrassment or lidicule-you don't have to be perfect when
you practice. IMS students should be assigned a coach who will take them
through an IMS workout routine with the sets and reps that are required to
create a standard level of command fitness. Training cycles over time create
the progressive capability to go through the beginninglintermediate/advanced
levels of development that eventually produce mastery of the system. It's
tough to truly join a system you don't really understand or haven't been able
to practice. Effective training is a major place where we both recruit and sign
up new (and old) command-team players. It also is a place where we retrain
old members by adding new lessons to their experience and capability.

Application
The application stage of the model is where the green flag drops and it is show
time for the entire system. Field operations structure and solidify the paper plan
and give us the chance to play the way we practice (if not, why practice?). The
procedures and training (front-end) should create a framework that will clearly
d~scribe and pinpoint the incident rescue/stabilization/conservation activities.
SOPs give us the capability to shift operations from minor to major, and eventu­

- -.- - - - - - - - ­
 Up Front Stuff

ally back to minor. SOPs create an operational response that can become the
size and peliorm the stuff required to work on and overpower the problems that
come with each particular situation. The application stage is where the reality
therapy kicks in. Our response generally involves the local conditions that are
waitin' for us down the street. There is no "baloney" in going out and deliver­
ing River City service in River City using River City resources. The basic River
City routine:

• River City incident

• River City personnel
• River City hardware
= Local
• River City SOPs
• River City outcome
• River City politics (big-time danger)

We are in the service-delivery business, so the application stage is what we

had better live for. The reason that the system is consistently effective at show
time is because we always work hard to get ready and we are obsessed with
going out into the real world and kickin' the problem's ass. The eight stan­
dard command function chapters that follow after this section describe the
game plan that the IC will use to command and control actual service delivery.

Review and Critique

Incident operations test the system under actual conditions; the critique evalu­
ates that field test. The word "critique" is the traditional word that we have
used to describe the post-incident review. While the word can have a sort of
negative feel to it, it is meant to be a positive event, directed toward improve­
ment, not placing blame. Please forgive an old guy (me) for using an old
word (critique)-the reader should substitute any more modern word that
works for him/her.

Note: Some organizations are so prone to placing blame that workers

run for cover just at the sound of the word "critique." Changing the
behavior of bosses will improve the process-changing the word (and
not the bosses) will only irritate the workers more.

The SOP package becomes the "launching pad" for the post-incident review.
Conducting the critique is a major way (and place) where we reinforce SOPs.
Responders must operate with an awareness that the organization is serious
enough about developing and maintaining SOPs, that after an event, a standard
critique will always be conducted that asks two basic questions: How well did the
responders peliorm, and, how well did the SOPs perform? The critique officer
will react (+ or -) to how we answer (+ or -) those two basic questions. A big­
time problem occurs when we have created SOPs and then don't follow them.
The existence of such unfollowed (but established) procedures can actually be
dangerous to the organization (and to its members). It's pretty easy for some
lawyer to ask any of us the two timeless legal-review questions (under oath):

- - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - ----
Up Front Stuff

• What were your SOPs?

• Did you follow them'?

When we answer "duh" to number two, we not only look stupid but there is a
good chance that the SOPs are about to get shoved into some very uncomfort­
able place-going to court sucks anyway, but going to court stupid really
sucks. A few years ago, some folks in our business changed SOPs to SOGs to
reduce the legal review that could occur to operations covered by those direc­
tives. Lawyers have indicated to me that the written form of how we are
going to operate ends up in the record no matter what we call them. That
record will be a part of the legal review that occurs after an event. Call the
damn things cosmic twinkies if it makes you feel better-but then follow
them. Life will be good.

The basic objective of the critique is to improve future performance. There

isn't really very much we can do about the last fire (or whatever). This do/cri­
tique/learn approach becomes the basis for what we can do about the next one.
The standard critique should be built around five basic areas that together pro­
duce answers to the questions-"What are our SOPs, and did we follow them?:"

Conditions - What was present at the scene when we arrived?

Action - What action did we take?

Outcome - What was the result of our action?

Lessons - Lessons reinforced-What part of our existing

game plan worked okay? .. and
Lessons learned-What lessons did the event
teach us?

Action - A detailed organizational plan to use the

plan for reviewed incident as the basis for operational and
improvement command improvement. It is specific as to who,
what, and when assignments make up the plan.

Obviously, all incidents are not created equal, so all critiques also should not
be created equal; small, medium, large, and XL incidents should have cri­
tiques that match. Small critiques should be conducted within the work group
that attended the event, many times, right at the scene right after the event.
Medium-sized critiques could be handled by the responder boss who was the
Ie. Large and XL incidents require organizational-critique events where the
review is many times conducted by a critique team assigned to do all of the
staff work of investigating, analysis, recording, and distributing the results.
No matter how big or small, the critique s'lould be positive, honest, education­
al, humane, and naturally, standard.
 Up Front Stuff

Revision
The revision stage completes the fifth and final part of the action-man­
agement process. This is where we do the stuff that keeps the system
current. As a regular management process, it requires us to automat­
ically expose ollr command and operational performance to a
continuous-improvement process. Actual local service delivery pro­
duces the most relevant and important lessons to us. Our day-to-day
hometown activity gives us the opportunity to evaluate how well our response
activity actually works when Mrs. Smith calls us to solve her hometown prob­
lem. Mrs. Smith is our River City customer, and the revision stage should
focus on the lessons produced by the critique that involve'ciur River City
I
department's liveware (folks), hardware (equipment, ap~tus, gadgets), and
software (systems, SOPs, tactical guidelines, etc.).

We have described the action-management model, so far, as a way for us to

use our local ongoing experiences to manage and improve the service-delivery
and organizational activity that goes on within our system. We have said that
our hometown activity is local, River-City show time for our IMS. Another
really smart major way we expand the review stage involves looking for
improvement examples in places outside of our local system. This approach
is called "benchmarking" and involves our importing the best IMS industry
examples, practices, and experiences from all over to improve the perform­
ance of our own system. This benchmarking requires that we get out into the
IMS world, look, ask questions, listen, go to class, network with others, and
then go home and plug in the improved practices we have picked up into the
SOP (development) and training front end of the model.

It is impossible for our system (or any system) to think up every good IMS
idea or to go through every possible IMS educational event. If we don't go
out and "browse" in the real (outside) world, as students, and pick up those
lessons, we simply miss the benefits of those improvements. In fact, many of
the lessons we are able to gather on the road and take back to our local system
are a real bonus. Such lessons generally come with their own blood, sweat,
and tears, and when we can "bolTow" (and implement) them, we save a lot of
the anguish that it takes to typically produce all of those educational body flu­
ids-it all balances out when we are able to send out some of our painful (and
successful) experiences to others.

There is a lot of material written about how to manage the change process that
is required to keep an organization effectively tuned up and CUlTent. Some of
the material makes sense and is helpful, but a lot of it is disconnected, aca­
demic claptrap that is almost impossible to apply to any real service-delivery
system. Consistently performing the revision stage, as a part of the five-step
model, provides a highly doable management plan that is so simple you don't
need to write it down to remember it. That plan gives us a fighting chance to
stay connected, be agile, invest in the existing system, and import new, differ­
ent, and better stuff. The " business end" of the revision process occurs when
Up Front Stuff

the improvements have been integrated in~o the SOPs, appropriate training has
been conducted, and the improved routine is actually being performed in the
street. This is what continuous (no bull) improvement actually means.

Local Stllff
A major approach of the author (and this book) involves the basic belief that
local responders are the owners and custodians of their own IMS and that the
vast (plus) majority of IMS activity is conducted on a local basis by home­
town responde~ergency service in North America is typically a function
of the level of gO.3Jl1ment that is closest to the people. Without going into a
lot of political-science blab, the original purpose of government was (and still
is) a function of providing local, first-response safety services-sim­
ply, citizens got together in communities (that's what made them
citizens) so that they could help one another when they were in dan­
ger (attacking wolves, falling meteors, burning log cabins, so on).
Being in danger is very much an immediate, personal, and local
process-so if the response to that danger is going to be effec­
tive, it must be local and mu st quickly snuggle up close to the
event, if it is going to effectively intervene in the problem. It
doesn't help much when you are being attacked by saber-toothed
tigers for the tiger-control guy to come out from the home office
two days after you were the last tiger's burp. Another part of our
local identity emerged from the fact that we (U.S.A.) became a
country, in the very beginning, as a result of a revolution-we revolt­
ed against authority (from central government). For the past 225-plus
years, we have continued with that revolution . Even though life (and govern­
ment) has gotten a lot more complicated, we pretty much always send the guy
home who shows up in a color-coordinated suit and starts out the conversation
with, "I'm from the government, and I'm here to help you!"

For the past forty-plus years, I have been a local government worker/respon­
der/manager. During that time, our department has conducted 100 percent of
the Phoenix (sixth-largest American city) responses with only PPD IMS and
PPD resources, always supported by the kind, able, and automatic response of
our many metro neighbors (thank you, thank you, thank you). Based on that
very local and personal experience, this book centers around the part of IMS
that is conducted on a day-to-day basis by hometown responders.

What makes the local IMS system local involves the very practical process of
fitting the regular "national" IMS components into the special (local) condi­
tions that exist in the particular place where the system will be used
(i.e., "River City"). This local application and adaptation does not involve
reinventing the national stuff-it does involve making the regular IMS proce­
dures, organization, and approach match local conditions, capabilities, and
limitations. How every local organization (or group of organizations) decides
to use their resources causes the local macagement of resources, and the typi­
cal outcome those resources are able to achieve, to be standard (in that place).
 Up Front Stuff

Simply, the home girls/boys get to decide what will be standard for their
hometown organization. While accepted good practice is pretty similar, there
are enough local differences that each place must decide how to handle home­
town service delivery. The local system development is what makes the River
City system "fit" in River City.

We cannot escape the reality that what is standard for our local place will
emerge out of us actually using our resources in a day-to-day way. What
we've got is what we've got, and that becomes our regular response profile.
How we manage tho~~assets and the result of that management will occur
either by decision 01: by d~fault-but it will occur. When we make a con­
scious, planned set of org~nizational decisions, we have a fighting chance for
maximum resource utilization and a standard outcome. Further, we have a
better chance to determine what went wrong, so then we can fix it. When we
do it by default, we are (in effect) letting the incident decide for us, and most
of the time, it (the incident) will take advantage of us. Having the locals take
control of the decision is a lot better than always trying to recover from
default, and that is what this little volume is all about.

We all use the basic ICS approach as the standard launching pad to local com­
mand-systems development. The basic objective of all national command
systems is to describe regular command and organizational system compo­
nents and to establish standard terminology. The material has served us very
well for the past twenty years and will for the next 200. This approach has
created the national capability for us to not only develop an effective local
system, but also to hit the road for an "away game" (i.e., lots of players from
other teams playing on someone else's field) and to be able to understand one
another and play nicely together. This is a major capability the national ICS
system has given us. No national system is designed or capable of jumping
up and marching into River City to provide all of the details and direction
required to somehow deal with and handle anything/everything that could pos­
sibly occur in River City. That's what we locals are in business to do.

Another reality is that the performance of our IMS will be reviewed locally.
That review could (and will) occur in a boss's office, on the front page of the
morning paper, or in the courthouse right down the street (sometimes it occurs
in all of those places). While that review can involve a lot of high-dollar, out­
of-town "expe11s" coming in to second guess the homeys, the process will
ultimately revolve around the usual two basic local questions: What were
your procedures, and did you follow them? Hometown-system managers are
in a lot stronger position when the local system is based upon regular national
IMS concepts and components that are effectively adapted to local characteris­
tics/capabilities. The application of IMS also has found its way into the
various codes and standards that are applied to our business. Response-sys­
tem managers must understand and follow those regulations to effectively
manage liability lisk and managerial survival. Those codes basically require
that an in-place local command system is used to manage responder safety
and survival. NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire Department Incident
Up Front Stuff

Management System, is the foundation safety-command standard. The 1561

Standard is stated in general-performance terms and requires local command
systems to structure and manage their operations in an under-command and
control manner that always protects the workers. The operations described in
this book are designed to meet (and exceed) NFPA 1561.

IMS development, over the past twenty years, has created an interesting
process that involves the original authors of the major systems vigorously rep­
resenting the details of their own systems. Having a meeting where all those
(us) characters show up creates a certain amount of predictable interpersonal
energy. A major compliment for everyone involved in IMS development (start­
ing with FIRES COPE) has been how similar the systems are. Differences
involve such things (minor) as the ICS-management subcomponent designa­
tions of "divisions and groups" (division=area, group=function). Most of the
structural fire community (and this book) calls both geographic and functional
subdivisions "sectors." ICS calls fire trucks that haul water "tenders" and air­
planes that drop water on wildland fires "tankers." Most of the structural fire
community still calls water haulers "tankers" and anything that flies (with
wings and motors) "airplanes." Once in a while, an old-time command system
"purist" will emerge and denounce anyone who has bastardized the pure (origi­
nal) system. Recently, there have been fewer and fewer sightings of these
guys. Most of us have learned during the very active IMS-implementation
period of the past decade that the critical element in effectively interfacing
responders together is whether those responders routinely operate at home
within the framework of an IMS. This reality moves the focus to AN IMS, not
THE IMS. A big-time problem does occur when we try to mix and match
responders into an IMS-managed incident who have never heard of incident
command and still think ICS is an agency that regulates the trucking industry
in Illinois. The problem with these non-Il'vIS guys is not that they call a part of
the system something a bit different from the homeys, it's that they don't call it
anything at all. Responders are smart, flexible people who if they have been
trained and operate in their own local IMS can quickly figure out that a ventila­
tion group is the same as a ventilation sector-as they grab a saw and start up
the ladder. Smart unified-command-system managers will have a "welcoming
officer" provide a simple briefing to "tourist" responders on the general status
of the incident, an overview of the lAP, and the basic details of the local IMS
routine when lots of players from different jurisdictions, agencies, and disci­
plines get together at the "big one." How we play at the occasional "big one"
will be determined mostly by how we play at the frequent little ones that occur
every day in our local place. Like any other system, getting good at IMS
emerges out of using it all of the time so that it becomes a habit. When the
chips are down, the IC will default to his/her command habits. We must con­
stantly build and support effective, safe IC routines. The stuff we have
presented about packaging attempts to create a local routine that is habit form­
mg.

Speaking of habits, let's jump on the functions of command so that that is

what they become.
... -~,

FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND

CHAPTERl

BY THE AlJTHOmTY OF THE

QDEEN Of 00, I ASSIlME
(OMMAND OF THIS INODENT.

ASSUMPTION, CONFIRMATION, AND

POSITIONING OF COMMAND

 Functions of Command Chapter 1

'\
)
FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND
CHAPTER 1:

ASSUMPTION, CONFIRMATION, AND

POSITIONING OF COMMAND

MAJOR GOAL

TO QUICKLY ESTABLISH AND CONFIRM A SINGLE IC AND PLACE

THAT INDIVIDUAL IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE INITIAL-COMMAND
POSITION

CENTRAL COMMAND
We are the agency that typically is called upon to quickly respond to situa­
tions that are already under way and many times out of control upon our
arrival. Our role in the community is to establish command and to take con­
trol of the conditions that are causing problems and generally disturbing or
disrupting the lives of our customers. We do this to protect the customers, to
solve their problem(s), and to return control to their lives. The IMS can only
react to what we inherit when we get there. We can't unburn property, undie
the dead, shove the explosion back into the tank, or make the crazy sane.
Responders didn't make the world, they just continually try to patch it up and
somehow make it better. They are typically terrific, action-oriented people
who don't have a lot of maybes in their lives. Bad stuff happens. They call
us, we ask 'urn, "Where are you/what's the matter?" We respond and go to
work. No committees, consultants, reports or research-just smart, quick,
problem-solving manual labor. When we have done everything that we can
do, we thank the people who called us and go home. Then we get ready for
the next call. Life is simple.

Active incidents can and do create confusing, dangerous, and compli­

cated conditions that can make setting up and operating the command
system very difficult. How the incident command system "shows up"
and gets stmted initially will always have a major impact on the
ongoing and ultimate success of the entire incident-management
operation-simply, good beginnings produce good endings, good
starts create good stops (and, unfortunately, bad starts create bad
stops).

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

Chapter 1 Functions of Command

Command assumption must be a natural, automatic, and regular organizational

event. Command Function #1 is designed to create a standard way for that
assumption to occur. The basic objective for this function is for command to
always start in a standard way upon our arrival at the incident. Creating a
simple, practical system where command assumption occurs at the very begin­
ning of our arrival will be a persistent and reoccurring theme throughout this
chapter. Actually, the author will harp on it only because the failure to assume
command at the very beginning of operaticms consistently and predictably cre­
ates confusing, unsafe, and ineffective free-enterprise beginnings. Many
times, it is impossible to recover from such bad beginnings. These ragged
starts are prevented, simply by having our first responder always capture com­
mand at the very start of operations.

Application of the command system (starting with Command Function #1)

insures that the customer receives a service-delivery response that is under
effective command and control, from the very beginning of our arrival. A reg­
ular SOP that describes, teaches, and regu larizes command functions smooths
out the command process, particularly in the critical front-end period of oper­
ations-in the same way that a training/operational SOP describes how to
place, raise, and operate on and around a thirty-five foot ground ladder (as an
example) . Consistently using a command SOP, that clearly describes the basic
functions of command, eliminates a bunch of on-scene responders from stum­
bling around bumping into one another until some "boss" finally shows up
and musters the stuff to act like a real-live incident commander. Standard
command and coordination outcomes don't happen until, and unless, we actu­
ally have an IC established and operating on the scene (obviously a big
problem occurs in the system when such a boss never shows up) . The front
end of the standard command routine is packaged up in Command Function
#1. Always performing this initial command assumption function is how we
eliminate the never possibility from occurring-this is a big deal, simply
because we don't have a command system if never occurs.

The consistent application of the procedure described in Command Function

#1 creates a strong, initial-command beginning at every incident. Outlining
the standard initial-command process creates a procedure and an agreement
with everyone in the organization, that is developed way ahead of the incident.
This agreement describes and supports the initial IC performing in a regular
manner (outlined and described in the eig~t [8] conunand functions) from the
very beginning of operations. Everyone en the team understands, expects,
supports, and fits into the standard routine for how the command system (and
the IC) will initially start up and continue.

Command Function #1 describes in very ~imple, straightforward terms the

standard organizational and personal routine that the command system
requires the initial IC to perform, in order to establish command. Having the
IC call the shots from the point of our initial arrival creates the effective capa­
bility for all of our individual and collective efforts to occur inside the overall
operational strategy and the incident action plan. This approach eliminates

Assumption, Confinnation, and Positioning of Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 1

the unsafe, uncoordinated, and wasted (sometimes opposing) action that typi­
cally emerges out of an uncommanded, free-enterprise incident beginning.

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

FIRST-ARRIVING IC
Normally, the first-arriving responder (humanoid) is responsible for initially
assuming command. This first incident commander retains command respon­
sibility until command is transfened (within SOPs) to a higher-ranking
officer; to the person with "the duty;" to a specially qualified responder; or
until the incident is terminated. The assumption of command by the first
responder should be mandatory; however, the \hiti~l IC may choose to quickly
pass command to another responder who is corning in behind the passer under
~
certain fast-action circumstances. Passing command is actually command
transfer that is initiated by a person who is on the scene and has conunand­
assumption responsibility but wants to quickly go to work on the incident
problem. Using "who gets there first" to determine who will be IC#l is a
very democratic and practical process. For the system to be effective, every­
one in the organization must be basically familiar with how command is
established and what must be done to keep it going until the "cavalry" arrives.
When they anive, more experienced, higher-ranking team managers can con­
tinue, reinforce, and support what IC#l has started. Obviously, younger,
lower-ranking members will not have the experience to conduct big-deal,
long-term IMS operations. This is one reason that we typically dispatch a
team that has a diverse set of capabilities among the members. While young
folks may not be seasoned ICs (yet), their body parts all work really
well and they are able to do the manLlal labor that is required on
the task level. They also are very smart, highly trainable, and
completely capable of learning IMS. The old geezers are continu­
ally thrilled when they (young folks) effectively perform as IC#l
because they showed up ahead of everyone else. Having a young fire­
fighter in a delivery vehicle (as an example) be the first aniver at an
incident and give a good initial radio report, adjust the assignment, and direct
initial aniving companies is a beautiful thing. Such performance creates a
smart beginning for the incident, and a positive experience for the young per­
son and his/her boss, who can commend him/her for putting an under-control
beginning on the incident.

The standard assumption of command establishes and balances the personal

responsibility and the organizational authority (for the initial IC) to perform
the command functions starting at the very beginning of an operation. The
system strengthens initial command by requiring, empowering, and supporting
the first aniver to serve as the beginning IC and to perfonn the standard func­
tions of command. Many times, the initial IC is a company-level officer (not
a command officer) or a non-officer responder who is first on the scene. That
first aniver is really the only person who can directly evaluate conditions and

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

Chapter 1 Functions of Command

use the observable information to develop the on-scene decisions that can pro­
duce fast, effective action (simply because he/she is the only department
member who is physically present at that critical time). No individual or rank
is exalted enough to perform remote-control command functions during
hislher response, regardless of clairvoyance or cosmic capability.

Creating an effective responsibility/authority balance for first arrivers is a critical

organizational process that is simple (actually transparent) when it works and
complicated (very obvious) when it gets screwed up. Achieving this consistent
initial command assumption capability means front-end loading SOPs that are
canied out by smart, capable initial responders doing what they have been
trained to do.
,/-­
{

The current Iqis always responsible for performing the standard command
functions. Tran'sfeFFing command really means transferring the responsibility
to do these functions. Anyone who is in command had better be prepared and
willing to do these standard functions within their personal and professional
capability, if the system is going to work. The IC is responsible for all com­
mand functions, all of the time-simply, command functions define the IC's
job. The term Command now refers jointly to the person, the functions, and
the location of command, and provides a standard identification tag for the Ie.
The focus of the command system is to create and support a single IC from
the very beginning to the end of the incident. The standard command­
assumption procedure (along with command-transfer procedures), within the
overall system, makes it difficult for more than one incident commander to
exist "in the same space" at anyone incident scene.

The initial objective of the command system is for the first arriver to establish
standard management control at the very beginning of the event. This person is
generally a member of the lead agency/discipline/jurisdiction and could be a
fire-company officer, a police officer, an EMS person, an industrial-response
unit or person, or a command officer leading a response mob. If we miss the
initial command window, we will never get that initial effectiveness opportuni­
ty back again-in fact, in some incidents, if we lose the front end, we lose the
whole event (I hate when that happens); being an IC is never easy, patticularly
in the very beginning of incident operations. The command system empowers
and directs the first arriver, regardless of identity, rank, personal magnetism, or
charisma, to begin performing the regular command functions. IMS provides
the individual (IC) with the organizational power and capability to bring struc­
ture and discipline to a fast-moving, active situation. The system creates and
reinforces the empowerment of the initial Ie by explicitly having that person
(who establishes "command") outrank everyone else in the system dUling the
time they are serving as the Ie. This is a practical and powerful way for the
organization to put their empowerment money where their mouth is. It's real­
ly pretty simple: When a first arriver says, "I'll be Main Street Command,"
the organization (through IMS) makes that person a 600-pound command
gorilla, until command is formally transferred to an SOO-pound (higher-ranking,
more experienced, etc.) gorilla or the incidenUcommand is terminated.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

..._ ------ - ­
 Functions of Command Chapter 1

The IC continues to maintain this authority until command is transferred or

the incident is terminated. Function replaces rank and, hopefully, displaces
ego(s)-egos eat brains.

The basic agreement among the response team that gets IMS going, and keeps
it going, is the following standard routine:

• first arriver automatically becomes IC# 1

• responders who arrive after command is established by IC# 1:
• follow staging SOPs (park/announce position/listen/look/wait for

orders)

• staged units receive and acknowledge orders from the IC

• go to work on the IC's order/work under the IC's command

While this is a Vyry simple and nonmysterious procedure, it becomes the cen­
terpiece of IMS. \(his operational agreement triggers how IMS actually works
(or doesn't work) inthe street. Creating a system where all operational action
is managed, coordinated, and integrated by the IC requires everyone on the
team to understand and play his/her assigned position . Task-level responders
who show up at the incident, who do not receive any command directions
because the IC is out to lunch, will not sit on their hands and worry about an
uncontrolled and uncommanded incident beginning. They hopped on Big Red
and blasted off to the Smith fire to do some problem-solving work. When
such arrivers see that another responder has arrived ahead of them, they
assume that character is supposed to be the IC If that person (for whatever
reason) does not assign them a work location and task, they will pretty natu­
rally find their own location/task.

Sometimes when there is such an uncommanded beginning, the responders

quickly freelance their way to effective positions and solve the incident prob­
lem. While this is a good thing for that event, it can be fatal for the next one.
Other times (like maybe the next incident), uncommanded responders cannot
coordinate and integrate their efforts, and the problem wins. We call these
clusters. Occasionally, some boss shows up and does a set of things that gets
the incident organized and packaged up in an Incident Action Plan (IAP)-it
generally takes a command-level street fight to convert a cluster to an under­
control incident.

The system requires the IC to be an order giver, and the workers to be order
followers. If everyone follows this simple plan, we have the basis of IMS-if
we don't, we simply have freelancing.

When the incident is concluded, everyone goes back to their regular organiza­
tional rank/role and life goes on . Bosses who create and support SOPs that
give organizational authority to workers so that they can operate effectively
during incidents strengthen our command-operational capability and (most of
all) our internal relationships. There is no more authentic way for the system

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

r- ­
 Chapter 1 Functions of Command

to send a message to the workers that they are trusted, than to prepare and
empower them to take command when they arrive first. This approach may
be somewhat nerve wracking to old-time control-oriented bosses, but the actu­
al application of the system reflects how consistently effective, both the
people and the process are, when good bosses support initial arrivers who take
command. IMS creates a simple, doable framework to always have command
start with the first arriver.

IMS is mostly about the Ie effectively comecting with humans, not using
"stuff." Stuff, like hardware and software, is absolutely critical to our success
but should be used to make humans more safe and effective-not the reverse.
Mrs . Smith will probably not notice much or remember our bells, whistles
(literally), and brightly colored, gold-leafed hardware. She will connect with
how our humans treated her, and this will be the basis of the lasting memory
she will have of our time together ("+" or "-"). This same relationship
between people and stuff applies to both 1\lrs. Smith (as an external customer)

c and to the team of responders (as internal customers). Firefighter Smith will
remember how Ie Smith takes command, does his/her Ie job, takes care of
the workers (and customers), and follows up with reinforcement for "+" per­
formance and "+" coaching for "-" less than "+" performance. The name of
the IMS game is helping internal and external humans be safe, successful, and
connected with their own empowered control.

O,.ganizational Ranks/Incident Roles

How the Ie and the command team get set up during the beginning incident
stages necessarily will set the stage for how effectively the event is resolved.
This part of the command game plan requires us to somehow connect and inte­
grate the local day-to-day organizational chain of command with the
incident-command organization that is quickly established for managing the
incident. The challenge occurs because we are essentially building a command
and operational structure out (in the "street") of regular department members of
all ranks who work at their regular day-to-day department jobs throughout the
organization (in the "office") based on who shows up and when they get there.
This requires (for the purpose of incident management) that ranks are replaced
with roles. This system can become complicated as more ranking officers
arrive, if strong planning, training, discipline, and reinforcement do not occur as
a matter of department policy, or protocol. Each system must decide how they
will connect the regular chain of (day-to-day) organizational command with the
incident organization for themselves and then constantly do it that way-the
local details of how it is done are less important than if it is consistently done in
the agreed-upon manner (as long as it works), and it effectively connects with
the local responders from other agencies who routinely hang out together.

To a major extent, the command system peIforms or doesn't perform based on

the support and behavior of the ranking ofticer bosses who operate within that
system before, during, and after the incident. Ranking organizational leaders
are responsible for establishing the system ahead of the event, fitting (them-

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

... - - - - - --_ ..._... - ._- -- - -- - ­

 Functions of Command Chapter 1

selves) into the plan, based on how they are needed during the incident, and
then reinforcing positive command and operational performance while effec­
tively troubleshooting problems that may have occurred.

If such leaders act good (smart, calm, nice) and follow the plan, the rest of the
system acts good. If they act goofy, everyone (below them) runs for cover,
hides out, or freelances their way into the most fun action-oriented spots. In
these systems, the troops can be heard to say, "Put it out before they (the boss­
es) get here!" or "Let's get it out before the second white helmet gets here."
Ranking officers don't stop being ranking officers just because Mrs. Smith has
a fire in her kitchen. It's pretty tough for an operations-level responder to tell
a command boss to either transfer and take command or shut up and stop act­
ing like an idiot(!).

It's pretty easy for bosses to send a "HOORAY IMS!!!!" note to the troops,
attend the kickoff pep rally, and sign the inspirational cover sheet of the com­
mand SOPs. How they behave at show time, when a lower-ranking
responder is in command, sends the most powerful and authentic message
about their actual commitment to the system. Consistently having everyone
in the orgcriz-ation use the command system gives us a fighting chance to
move syst~m people and system parts from out of control to under control.
The basic 'w"ay we do this is to patiently and persistently apply a standard
SOP/training/application/critique/revision approach. Bosses require love (and
training), too. The highest-ranking person in the system deserves and should
receive as much attention and access to this positive, educational approach as
the lowest-ranking.

Responding ranking officers or supervisors not on the scene should stay off the
radio, unless they have critical supporting information that could help the cur­
rent Ie. Driving through traffic, five miles from the scene, with one hand
somehow trying to dodge Bertha (or Bubba) in the big Buick, and manipulat­
ing a radio microphone, digital pager, mobile data terminal (now a computer),
and a cellular telephone with the other hand is exciting, but not even close to
any kind of effective command position . The command system is simple.
Ranking officers who want to serve as the IC must respond to the scene, find
the current IC, and go through the regular command transfer process (Chapter
8). Everyone in the system supports and strengthens the IC by not distracting
and nagging during their response. The objective of fast initial-command
assumption is for the first arriver who shows up on the scene (emphasis on
arriver) to evaluate conditions, develop an incident action plan, and then
assign, place, and support arriving resources within that plan and decide if
the dispatched resources will be adequate. Assuming command at the very
beginning of operations eliminates the zero-impact command period (ZIP)
caused by initial uncommanded confusion, roving, multiple commanders, or
free enterprise-or all of the above. Many times how we manage (or misman­
age) command at the very beginning of the incident sets the stage for how
command and operations will occur for the rest of the incident. The more
responders (potential ICs) who arrive, aimlessly mill around, and don't take

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

Chapter 1 Functions of Command

command or receive an assignment from the IC, the more potentially confusing
and difficult it is for whoever finally attempts to establish or maintain command.
This is particularly true during the initial stages of the incident. The system is
designed for the initial IC to capture control at the very beginning of our arrival.
If we don't effectively jump into the initial window of command opportunity,
we play the dreaded command, control, and operational catch-up game for the
rest of the event. Such an uncommanded beginning causes us to start, and many
times, stay behind the command power curve for the entire event.

It is standard incident-management procedure for command to be assumed at the

very beginning of every event. To be conshtently effective, this regular assump­
tion must become habitual with the entire team. This approach eliminates the
need for a judgement of whether the event somehow qualifies for conunand to be
established. Simply, command is automatically initiated, every time. If a cus­
tomer is concemed enough to call us, and we respond, the event deserves to have
a standard command beginning and a standard incident resolution.

In very minor or "no problem" situations, command is quickly established and

accurately described in a standard initial radio report by the Ie. Simply, the
IC says, "Nothing showing," to quickly describe conditions. Conditions are
investigated and evaluated, and many times our incident response is reduced
to a nonemergency response status, or terminated, and we all go home. These
minor situations provide the opportunity to practice the beginning command
routine and to become comfortable setting up the front end of the command
system with very little risk or pressure. We use the term "minor" only in the
context of these incidents being simple, small, and not severe-not in any
sense that what is going on is minor to the customer. While such events don't
require a lot of the pieces and parts of IMS, they will always require a com­
plete customer service and support routine. Another "nothing showing"
reality is that we should always set up and start all of our command and oper­
ational systems every time-even with nothing showing. Most of us have
started out with dull , half-asleep " nothing showing ;" four and a half short
minutes later, we are screaming for attack lines and ventilation; and in thirty
minutes, we are trying to confine Ollr dulL nothing-showing beginning to the
census track of origin. Be careful of "nothing-showing" sucker punches!

This approach uses the little everyday situations to get ready for the big ones.
A routine, familiar, and effective application of command procedures emerges
out of our using the system as an everyday way of doing business. This "take
command every time" approach builds the very natural habit of the first-arriv­
er taking command. In fact, developing this habit causes the system to be out
of balance in a very uncomfortable and unnatural way when the first arriver
does not act like a regular IC and take command. Any organization that saves
standard command stuff for the "big one" is setting itself up for a cluster situ­
ation. Simply, responders must develop and depend on the organization (and
its responders) having a natural, instinctive set of taking-command habits and
routines when they land in the initial-arriving IC hot seat when a large amount
of ugly, smelly stuff is blowing through the fan.

Assumption, Conjinnation, and Positioning of Command

 Chapter 1 Functions of Coml1'zand

command or receive an assignment from the IC, the more potentially confusing
and difficult it is for whoever finally attempts to establish or maintain command.
This is particularly true dming the initial stages of the incident. The system is
designed for the initial IC to capture contwl at the very beginning of our arrival.
If we don't effectively jump into the initial window of command 0ppOltunity,
we play the dreaded command, control, and operational catch-up game for the
rest of the event. Such an uncommanded beginning causes us to start, and many
times, stay behind the command power curve for the entire event.

It is standard incident-management procedure for command to be assumed at the

very beginning of every event. To be consistently effective, this regular assump­
tion must become habitual with the entire team. This approach eliminates the
need for a judgement of whether the event somehow qualifies for command to be
established. Simply, command is automati.::ally initiated, every time. If a cus­
tomer is concerned enough to call us, and we respond, the event deserves to have
a standard command beginning and a sta ndard incident resolution.

In very minor or "no problem" situations, command is quickly established and

accurately described in a standard initial radio report by the IC Simply, the
IC says, "Nothing showing," to quickly describe conditions. Conditions are
investigated and evaluated, and many times our incident response is reduced
to a nonemergency response status, or terrninated, and we all go home. These
minor situations provide the opportunity to practice the beginning command
routine and to become comfortable settin up the front end of the command
system with very little risk or pressure. We use the term "minor" only in the
context of these incidents being simple, small, and not severe-not in any
sense that what is going on is minor to the customer. While such events don't
require a lot of the pieces and parts of IMS, they will always require a com­
plete customer service and SUppOlt routine. Another "nothing showing"
reality is that we should alway s set up and start all of our command and oper­
ational systems every time-even with nothing showing. Most of us have
started out with dull, half-asleep "nothing showing;" four and a half short
minutes later, we are screa ming for attack lines and ventilation; and in thirty
minutes, we are trying to confll1e our dull. nothing-showing beginning to the
census track of origin. Be careful of "nothing-showing" sucker punches!

This approach uses the little everyday sit uations to get ready for the big ones .
A routine, familiar, and effective applicatio n of command procedures emerges
out of our using the system as an everyday way of doing business. This "take
command every time" approach builds the very natural habit of the first-arriv­
er taking command . In fact, developing this habit causes the system to be out
of balance in a very uncomfortable and unnatural way when the first arriver
does not act like a regular IC and take command . Any organization that saves
standard command stuff for the " big one" is setting itself up for a cluster situ­
ation. Simply, responders must develop and depend on the organization (and
its responders) having a natural, instinctive set of taking-command habits and
routines when they land in the initial-arriv ing IC hot seat when a large amount
of ugly, smelly stuff is blowing through th ~ fan.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of COinnwnd

r ~-----
 Functions of Command Chapter 1

Not setting up command at the very beginning of operations creates a tough

start for IC#l, who basically has the task of trying to herd cats. Be careful of
having some predetermined level of response or the an-ivaI of some regal
(level) person to trigger when to set up and start the command system. Most
of the time, this predetermined (mysterious) point is reached at a really busy
point when units are an-iving and going to work, so it's pretty easy to miss this
magic moment. Also, we can have a lot of units and workers present doing a
lot of work in lots of places when this moment occurs-so the IC#l has a big
job figuring out the who, what, when, and where of the early arrivers. It
makes sense to consistently make arriver # I the IC# I and for that person to
call the shots from the very beginning.

When one of us arrives on the scene and command is not assumed, dispatch or
a responding supervisor should realize the operation is out of initial-command
balance. They must communicate directly with the first aniving on-scene per­
son who has not taken command to check on their welfare and to inspire
standard command assumption ("Engine 1, please establish Main Street com­
mand."). Monitoring situation status, maintaining an awareness of initial
arrival and command assumption, and coordinating and closing any initial
command "gaps or lapses" are a very good thing, and one of the very legiti­
mate reasons for a supervisor who is off site (and awake) to become vocally
il1vol~diQ, briefly coaching the initial alTiver to become the Ie. Once com­
mand is set ~up, supervisors should quietly and safely respond, and then play
the standard role of helping the IC and the operational team when they arrive.

Initial command assumption is an absolutely critical and unforgiving period

and part of effective IMS; it is continually reinforced by bosses doing some
standard review follow up (like during the critique):

1. If command was assumed in a standard way, the boss says, "Good

job, keep it up."

2. If command was not assumed, the boss does some standard, helpful,

corrective stuff:

• "What happened?" Then listens.

• "Do you understand the SOP?"
• "Can I help (coach) you to learn/unlearn/relearn?"
• "Don't get discouraged-I will help you get into the SOPs."

3. The boss continually looks, listens, and reacts to use organizational

experience as the ongoing launching pad to improve initial

command-performance objectives.

Smart, nice, involved bosses send the powerful ongoing message that the
organization is serious about the consistent application of SOPs in doing the
follow-up part of the action-management (change) process, palticularly during
periods of initial change, when players are trying to learn and fit into new

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

Chapter 1 Functions of Command

IMS plays. Simply, if it says take command in the SOPs and nothing happens
when you don ' t (take command) , pretty soon everybody will skip taking the
time to set up command and quickly jump into action that feels good.

Our warriors write our history about the agony and ecstasy of fighting battles
while we sit around our "cultural camp fires." The old warriors get to sit up
front, close to the fire, and tell war stories. The younger ones stand in the
shadows, listen, and learn. These organizational rituals are an important place
where we create, reinforce, and pass on our attack-oriented, service-delivery
values. Based on the status this storytellir,g process gives to fast, aggressive
action, requiring the first-arriving "warrior" to take command can be a diffi­
cult, and somewhat unnatural act, during the initial phases of command
development for the individual and/or the entire system . These characters
have been rewarded when they chew up the incident problem and spit it out.
This chew-and-spit inclination and capability has, and always will have, a
high value and status in the emergency-response business. We are basically a
fighting unit, not a commanding one, so our command approach must be
quick and streamlined so that it supports our fast, manual-l abor mission.
Making the IMS work, particularly in the very beginning of an incident,
requires that we redirect the initial responder to take command. This requires
that he/she resist the natural inclination to personally take action. Bosses
must cause everyone to understand that we dedicate a single person to be the
Ie so that we can organize and manage the action-oriented operational activi­
ty. We quickly take command so that chewing up and spitting out the incident
problem can be faster, safer, and better placed.

Command Modes
The three standard command modes give ftrst-arriving company officers, who
assume initial command, the capability to combine or separate command and
action in a standard , predictable way based on applying SOPs to actual inci­
dent conditions. The standard modes create a regular beginning to command
operations, consider the range of conditions the Ie can initially encounter
from least severe up to most severe, and provide standard command options
(modes) to match those conditions. Having the Ie select (and announce) one
of the standard command modes becomes a quick way to easily communicate
incident conditions, the location of the Ie, and the IC's actions to responding
team members. This is possible, simply, because the team has planned and
practiced their collective response to each mode ahead of time and then
refined mode-management details as they use the system. Each mode has its
own standard command position and its own moves. Because of this
approach, the Ie effectively "calls the play" by selecting (and declaring) the
mode, and, based on that call, everyone understands the basic conditions that
are present and the approach the team will take. The three modes create a
standard front-end way to quickly get command up and running during the
fast and dirty beginning stage of an incident.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 1

Initial-arriving ICs should select one of the following basic command-com­

mitment categories:

1. NOTHING-SHOWING (INVESTIGATING) MODE-Situations

where no problem is visible (nothing showing) from the IC's position­
mostly side one-generally requires investigation by the fust-arriving
response unit while other companies remain in Level I staging (all other
units stage in their direction of travel, approximately one block from the
scene) or as conditions dictate, and simply announce their staged loca­
tion (Engine I-East). Level I staged units are assigned and placed by
the IC (we will describe staging in Chapter 4). Usually, the officer
(IC #1) will go with the investigating company using a portable radio to
continue the command function. In effect, the company officer IC cre­
ates a "mobile" or "portable" command who is directly searching for
information on current and forecasted conditions to form the basic inci­
dent action plan (strategy/tactics).

2. FAST-ACTION MODE-An active, dynamic problem is present

upon the arrival of the first responder and requires immediate action to
stabilize (e.g., a working, interior fire in a residence, apartment, or
small commercial occupancy; assisting with extrication/quick treat­
ment; fast hazmat stabilization, etc.). For critical, offensive fast-fire
attack (as an example), the company officer may make a conscious
decision (choice) to lead the operation while utilizing a portable radio
to continue command, or the IC may transfer command to the
second-arriving company/command officer (who is on or close to
being on the scene) before entering the structure/fire area.

This fast-action mode should be concluded rapidly with one of the fol­
lowing outcomes:

a. The situation is quickly stabilized (i.e., incident problem is

solved) by fast offensive action.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

------
Chapter 1 Functions of Command

b. Command is transferred from the fast-action company officer IC

to a later-arriving company/command officer.

c. For whatever reason the situation is not stabilized; the fast-action

company officer IC moves to exterior (stationary) command
position and is now in the command mode.

Fast-action situations typically involve the beginning stages of scenar­

ios where a first arriver decides that putting his/her body directly in
the action can quickly solve or stabilize the problem. The fast-action
option creates the regular capability to front -end load the operational
response with a combination of both quick command control at the
beginning of operations and strong initial action in the earliest window
of opportunity. The tiered response of multiple units, including higher
ranking officers and supervisors, is designed to provide additional par­
ticipants who can come in behind a fast-attacking mobile IC and
"bump up" the position of the IC into a standard, stationary remote­
command spot that provides support (and safety) for fast-action
operations. Many times, our local IMS strength is a fast-action IC,
who directly supervises quick force in the beginning of the event, rein­
forced and upgraded by responders, who come in behind the initial
mobile IC to quickly establish stationary, exterior command that both
supports and expands initial action. The fast-action command mode
provides the basis (actually the front end) for that capability.

3. COMMAND MODE-Because of the size/severity of the situation,

the complexity of the occupancy, the hazards present, or the possibility
of the basic incident problem expar:ding (bigger fire/more patients/haz­
ardous substance releases), some scenarios will demand early, strong,
stationary command from the very outset. In these cases, the first­
arriving IC will assume command and, from the very beginning, stay
out of the hazard area in a stationary exterior-command position. The
IC must remain there until the incident is terminated or command is
transferred. In these situations, the initial-an-iving IC has made the
decision that his/her personal action in the initial stage of the incident
will have little effect on the overall outcome. Effective resolution of
these major events requires big-deal command from the very beginning.
In these cases, strong initial command is the best investment the organi­
zation can make and will payoff (b ig time) throughoLlt the event.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 1

Most of the time, in significant incidents, if the Ie doesn't pay now (by
taking command), the customer will pay later in the form of unneces­
sary property loss or personal injury-because we shortchanged the
beginning of command and, as a result, we "burned up" the initial stage
of both the building(!) and the initial opportunity to capture and control
command. These types of major incidents will generally require the
response and commitment of lots of resources because they typically
involve significant, widespread, expanding situations with conditions
potentially hazardous to our task-level workers. They require strong
command control and coordination from the very beginning of opera­
tions. If we don 't establish a command-mode level and the incident
outpelforms command, the incident wins. Too little and too late in the
,,------biginning stages of the event sets the stage for thi s eventual outcome.

These three basic front-end management modes were originally developed for
structural fire fighting. We now apply the same approach to the other services
that we deliver. The three modes provide good direction for where the bosses
should be and what they should be doing in a variety of standard management
situations (both emergency/nonemergency).

CREW OPTIONS
When a company officer Ie (who responded with a crew) assumes initial
command in the command mode and takes a standard command position (sta­
tionary, remote, inside vehicle), he/she has several options in regard to crew
assignments. The initial company officer Ie may:

1. "Move up" an acting officer within the company. This is determined

by the individual and collective capability of the crew. This capability
also would include the number of crew members (big deal ), training,
portable radio availability, experience, etc.

2. Assign company personnel to staff (aide) function s to assist the Ie.

Staff functions could include reconireporting, communications assis­
tance, help with tactical work sheet tracking, radio assistance, etc.

3. Assign company personnel to another company. This creates a larger

work group with an officer and is generally a good move. This must
be acknowledged by both the original and the receiving officer and by
their inclusion in the acco untability sys tem.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

Chapter 1 Functions of Command

COMMAND-MODE MANAGEMENT
Even though the person (I C) who assumes command has a choice of com­
mand modes and degrees of personal involvement in the attack, the IC always
remains responsible for performing all of :he command functions .

While the command system gives the initial-arriving company officer IC the
option of mobile command, he/she must realize that the downside of moving
around and utilizing a portable radio in a nonstationary, action-oriented, not­
inside-the-command-post-vehicle position places that IC at a personal and
positional disadvantage when performing command responsibilities.
Effectively pulling off the effective combination of initial action and com­
mand (i.e., " fast action mode") is a real test of initiative, attention span,
experience, and judgment under pressure.

The experienced first-arriving company officer IC realizes that he/she gives up

the advantage of a stationary command pest only when hislher direct, personal
participation will make a critical difference in the short-term operational out­
come or the safety of the crew. At this point, everyone at the incident should
recognize that the operation is in the fast-action mode and be prepared to sup­
port and reinforce that initial effort.

Many times the beginning windows-of-opportunity provide the best chance of

quickly solving local incident problems that are under way. In these fast­
action situations, if we can act quickly and effectively, the incident problem
simply goes away. Conversely, the longer many incidents go uncontrolled, the
less chance of success we have. It's a lot easier to put a little fire out now,
than a big fire later. Based on the perishability of these rapidly changing
early windows, local first-arriving operating units must have the option of
combining command with fast, aggressive action. It would be nice if we
could all travel around as an intact attack mob (task force) and arrive with a
big-deal, staffed command post that had the radios warmed up and the coffee
made. It just doesn't work that way out in the real world where, many times,
a local-responder (homeboy/homegirl), fast-acting initial IC saves the home­
town day by having (and using) the option to combine action and command.
The response team must understand that a smurfed-up, fast-attacking initial IC
simply can't recite the Gettysburg Address over a portable radio, through a
mask, while doing it.

In these exciting "window-of-opportunity" action situations, the initial IC

gives a standard initial radio report that includes the announcement and
assumption of the fast-attack mode and then directly participates in a
fast-action operation. There is no one in a better position to know what is
going on and what is needed than the initial-arriving company currently on the
scene. They must initiate and continue command until the next company/boss
arrives on the scene before transferring command. The entire team respond­
ing in behind the fast attackers must realize that the IC is in an attack (not
command) position and the operation is now in a somewhat compromised,

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

 Functions of Conllnand Chapter 1

nonstandard command status. Nonstandard simply means that the IC is in the

hazard zone attempting to quickly solve the incident problem, and is not oper­
ating in a command post. This requires the responding team that arrives in the
#2 spot to provide backup support to that fast-acting IC and crew. This sup­
port involves such activities as assuming a standard IC position (outside),
critical radio listening (because the initial IC is generally in a working posi­
tion where it is tough to communicate), updating, reviewing and reinforcing
the initial size up (is offensive really or still offensive), backing up the basic
attack, and verifying the safety, welfare, and accountability of the fast attack­
ers (getting a personnel accountability report-PAR, Chapter #4).

The mobile command decision is fUlther influenced by the arrival time and
sequence of responding units. The staffing levels of those units also becomes a
major factor in the command process. As an example, when the next respon­
I der/unitlcompany is ten minutes away and the situation is offensive, the
'~as{-action command (and operational) mode is indicated. Simply, there is no
one on the scene yet to command, and there won't be anyone for a significant
period of beginning-incident time. On the other hand, when the company offi­
cer arrives seconds ahead of the next five units, using stationary command to get
everyone in the best operating positions and then coordinating the activities of
those resources by staying in a standard (stationary/exterior) command position,
inside the vehicle, selecting the command mode will probably be much more
effective to the overall outcome than having the IC leave the standard command
position and jump into the interior sector (no matter how good it feels).

Because of the differences from place to place, the local deployment and man­
agement of personnel is sufficiently different within the fire and emergency
services that each organization must determine their own local game plan to
use their people to the best advantage. The following guidelines are generally
accepted protocols:

In cases when the first-arriving officer is a command officer arriving in

a non-fire-fighting vehicle, he/she should automatically assume a stan­
dard stationary, exterior, somewhat remote (from the direct action)
command position and immediately begin the IC functions. Command
officers generally establish and continue command inside their regular
response vehicles as a standard practice. Fixing up these command
vehicles to be initial command posts (radios, headsets, cell phones,
inside overhead lights, stuff to write/record with, status boards, refer­
ence materials, etc.) makes sense and sends a logical and very practical
message to the team that the system expects whoever is assigned to that
piece of equipment to have the vehicular (and, we hope, personal) capa­
bility to be an Ie.

Command officers responding within the organizational chain of command,

such as command officers in nonoperational (no pump, water, aerial, etc.)
command vehicles (Suburbans, vans, sedans, as opposed to engines and lad­
ders), and serving as the IC normally do not have the option of investigative

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

Chapter 1 Functions of Conunand

or fast-action mobile command and must initially assume and stay put in a
regular stationary command position inside the vehicle. (As an old chief said,
"I ain't got no booster tank in that Crown Victoria.")

The three distinct/different command modes create both standard options and
standard status categories for how the IC will start command . The game plan
is practical, simple, and attempts to create a regular, predictable beginning for
the event. A difficult reduction in initial-command effectiveness occurs when
the IC is not clearly in any of the three regular modes, but somewhere in
between several of them (e.g., standing arcund or running around, not in pro­
tective gear, etc.), not in the command mode or command position, not in the
fast-action mode with their crew. In these cases, as the incident escalates or
something goes sour, the IC is found in the free-enterprise cluster command
mode, and things typically go downhill from there. Company officer ICs
should either get fully dressed and get out and help the crew on the inside-or
get comfortable in a standard command position and help the insiders from
the outside.

COMMAND ASSUMPTION
Basic command assumption procedures shift from the traditional narrow organi­
zational focus on who (the particular individual) is in command (the rank and
authority that person has) to a redirected importance on how (standard response)
command is conducted (role/function). This shift (from rank to role) creates a
standard response to how command is conducted. Regardless of who it is-sim­
ply, command authOlity goes with whoever lands in that role, not the person.
Training and supporting everyone in IMS creates a widespread capability
throughout the organization to do any IMS job. This approach moves us from an
approach that depends on a particular individual to a system-dependent organiza­
tion. This approach disperses system capability throughout the organization.
When this happens our human resources become highly interchangeable. The
effect of this standardization is that regardless of who becomes the IC, a regular
command routine is followed. This eliminates the personalized approach of each
individual and the need for the rest of the responders to somehow figure out what
person has landed in the Ie's spot and what his/hers particular (and possibly
peculiar) approach to command is. While this seems like a pretty simple change,
it can make life a lot (a lot) easier on the team because they no longer have to
somehow remember (or determine) who is actually responding and then adjust
their response to the idiosyncracies of each possible actor/actress who is on duty
and might somehow show up and become the Ie.

Formal organizational authority is generally distributed in a limited way where

higher-ranking officers become compressed at the top (of the organization)
and is necessarily restricted by the limited number of boxes (positions) at the
top of the organizational chart. Functional command potential and capability
is widely distlibuted among personnel throughout the organization and is only
limited by the system's capability to develcp effective command procedures
and then train, trust, and support the players.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

._- - -- - - -- ­
 Functions of Command Chapter 1

Describing the basic command functions ahead of time in simple, understand­

able SOP terms, before we have to operate at an actual event, eliminates the
mystery and mumbo jumbo of a mysterious (actually unmanaged) system that
could take literally years to somehow understand and fit into. The system
involves an approach where ranking (and generally senior) officers become
the role models and teachers/coaches. They provide organizational support by
not only be.ing directly involved as part of the on-scene command team but
also by pre~g/empowering, and trusting first arrivers to assume initial and
on-going command and then reinforcing that system with continual positive­
performance feedback.

This approach in no way diminishes the importance of rank. Emergency serv­

ices have always used rank to structure and identify responsibility and
function, and probably always will. This overall, day-to-day command system
is based on experience, capability, and organizational structure. These charac­
teristics are absolutely essential to maintain good order and for effective
system performance. Our systems must recognize and respond to some fairly
basic realities:

• Typically we dispatch multiple officers and units to an event. This

tiered response causes us to arrive on scene at different times-typically

one after the other-and becomes the basis for the command and opera­

tional capability to escalate our collective effort to get the job done.

• Whoever shows up first is the only person who can really assume com­

mand. We depend on this initial arriver to effectively trigger the

beginning of the command system in a standard way. Forget about call­

ing Chief Bubba/Bubbette from home and then waiting for him/her to

arrive and start command-he/she can help the command cause only

when he/she actually arrives. It is impossible for the system to immedi­

ately beam aboard the oldest, most experienced, highest-ranking, biggest.

baddest role-model person to the scene to majestically assume command.

The IC roll call mostly involves regular responders, in all sizes and

shapes, who must and do (very well, thank you) make the system work

from the very beginning.

• Developing a command system, where the capability to effectively serve

as an IC is widely distributed among all the responders, creates an enor­

mously powerful impact on initial (and ongoing) operations, simply,

because whoever shows up can (and does) set up the command system

and start operations by serving as the initial IC within their capability.

• The event itself could care less about the rank of the Ie. In fact, a par­

ticularly fast-moving fire (as an example) actually loves it when we

stumble all over ourselves and fail to initiate the command functions

from the very beginning because a group of ego-driven, insecure dum­

mies are trying to figure out who will get the IC photo opportunity and

sound bite. The major status of command had better involve effective

action (command functions)-not the decorations on our uniforms.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of COI11.l1wnd

Chapter 1 Functions of Command

• The subsequent arrival and involvement of ranking officers (hopefully,

more experience/capability) greatly strengthens the system and creates
the capability to support, reinforce, integrate, and expand fast initial­
command assumption. Simply, the command system should become
stronger as more officers arrive-not the opposite.

• Each local system creates a strong, effective capability when it can rou­
tinely and effectively expand itself from quick, hard-hitting, front-end
loaded responses to long-term, widespread campaign big deals. This
system versatility requires that we design and practice the system and
then continually be prepared to implement it, in a quick, bold, aggres­
sive and backed-up way that solves the incident problem .

CONFIRMATION OF COMNIAND
The first-arriving responder who will assume the role of incident commander
should advise dispatch of this fact by broadcasting a standard initial radio
report including the unit designation, arrival, assumption of command, condi­
tions, and the name and location of that command post. For example,
"Engine 1 on the scene, north side of a medium-size commercial building,
with a working fire-Engine 1 will assume Ajax Command."

An important standard part of command!communications operations involves

the IC using the location of the incident (e.g., "Main Street Command") or the
name of the occupancy (e.g., "Ajax Command") to designate that particular
command operation. This system of naming command is a really simple way
to help keep communications concise and understandable, particularly during
complex incidents, or when multiple incidents are in progress. In industry, the
emergency-response team might use the technical name of a plant area before
the anival of the fire department. If the industrial-plant event expands, the
fire department may rename the incident (after their arrival and in consult with
the ERT IC) with a more general name and retain the technical designation as
a management subdivision (sectorlbranch). Any changes in the
"location-command" designation should be coordinated between the IC and
dispatch.

If the first IC arrives on an operational unit (engine, ladder, EMS/police unit,

etc.) and the IC names the incident (as a standard procedure), that unit in
effect goes out of service and loses its regu lar designation, until its crew is
moved up, or until command is transferred from the original officer and
he/she returns and places that operational u nit back in service.

In some cases, the initial-an1ving company officer may become command

("Ajax Command") at the outset and the rest of the crew stays in service as
the regular unit (Engine 1, etc.). The capability to designate the regular offi­
cer as IC #1 and also to keep the unit in service with a "moved up" officer
depends upon the staffing level and capability of the responders assigned to
that unit.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 1

The standard radio designation for the IC is the name of the event followed by
the word "command" (e.g., "Ajax" Command), and that name automatically
transfers to whoever is the current IC throughout the incident. Anyone wish­
ing to talk to the incident commander can simply contact "_ _ _ _ __
command." While the procedure of naming the incident and then using that
name along with "command" to designate the IC is a simple procedure, it typ­
ically produces a big-time communications/operational improvement. The
simple act of naming command also provides another way to move the system
from a rank-based system (ego) to a functional-based system Uob descrip­
tion)-simply, most folks who want to communicate with the IC really don't
care much who that person is. They just want a quick, easy, accurate way to
contact whoever that person (the current IC) is so that they can do their busi­
ness with command, and then get along with their incident-operational role.
If they do care who, by name, is command , they can simply ask. Using the
incident location or designation to name command is a simple, effective way
to create this capability. Officers who love to hear their regular department
designation ("Battalion 1," "Engine 1," "Car 1," etc.) transmitted over the tac­
tical channel must be coached and nurtured during the identity-crisis
adjustment period of (in effect) making command pretty much anonymous,
but very functional. Naming command also separates multiple incidents that
occur simultaneously.

The initial announcement of command by the first-arriving responder signifies

the regular beginning of an operation by a definite act. This announcement
ensures quick, up-front command and also requires the IC to commit a con­
scious act (personally) and a standard act (organizationally) by formally
advising that he/she is now the Ie. After the initial command declaration,
everyone else en route, arriving, or operating at the scene (or monitoring the
tactical channel) knows that an IC is in place. If no one has announced the
assumption of command, the entire system knows that no one has officially,
directly, visibly, or vocally begun the functions of command.

The standard assumption (and declaration/announcement) of command

front-end loads the system with effective management direction and control so
that the regular functions of command are automatically started at the very
beginning of every incident---every time. Front-end loading the incident with
standard command also insures that initial command and incident action occur
in a coordinated and integrated way. The system eliminates a bunch of action
occurring before command is established and then having the IC struggle to ENGINE 1
first understand ("get a handle on") the action and then get it (the action) WILL BE
COMMAND.
under his/her command and control-a lot like trying to catch a tiger by the
tail. Standard initial-command assumption also supports the IC in a very sim­
ple, practical way, starting at the beginning and working through the regular
numerical order of the eight standard command functions. Completing the
functions in order gets each function up and operating. It also gives the IC the
capability to overlap and mix and match the functions as the event goes on
based on the framework for command and operational escalation. The com­
mand routine is very simple, when we are responding, arriving, and setting up

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

Chapter 1 Functions of Command

command at an incident out on Main Stree t. The initial arriver either does
establish Main Street Command or does not establish Main Street Command.
If the IC does establish command in a standard way, the command system
quietly smiles and gets on with the next logical order of business (the next
function). If, for whatever reason, comm and does not get established, the sys­
tem (i.e., ranking responders or dispatch supervisors) must do whatever is
required to get command set up before the team can proceed. Standard com­
mand assumption eliminate s any guesswork at the very beginning of the event
and saves a lot of management and operational confusion throughout the
event. Regular operating units/officers arriving at an incident with an in-place
IC must fall under one of the following four standard status categories:

1. Use regul ar alTiving procedures (staging) , receive an assignment from

the IC , and then work under the Ie 's command.

2. Transfer and take command, if you outrank the cUlTent IC, or

3. If requested, take command from the IC by virtue of having higher

rank/qu alification, following standard procedures, or
agreement/request ("Boss, please take command.").

4. Join the IC and become part of the command team.

Note-Some specialist responders will arrive and automatically set

up and perform their special function. They then advise the IC that
they are on scene and operating. Functions like safety, rehab, PIO,
and resource would be examples of such functional activities.
Wherever the command system can create system reinforcement
th at occurs automatically, it becomes a big system-performance
bonu s and lets the IC concentrate on the operational assignments
that cause the lAP to match the needs of that particular situ ation.
The automatic establishment of such specialty sectors must be clear­
ly outlined in SOPs, practiced, and revised regul arly.

The four standard status categories eliminate confusion and create an integrat­
ed and simple definition, approach, and understanding of wh at everyone is
doing in relation to command . They al so create a structure where everyone,
everything, and all the action occurs inside the plan. Free-enterprise
resources, wandering around out of control and not assigned to any part of the
command system, are simply fu gitives from regular command and control,
who are out of balance until they get into one of the standard statu s categories.
These free-enterprise loose ends should be tied up in the critique where the
organizational chart should be compared to the actual incident response. This
is a logical place where the organization reinforces that everyone who is
working on the incident problem is ass igned to and part of the incident organi­
zation. The ongoing application of the post-incident review process (see
chapter 8) becomes an effective way that the organization reinforces and con­
tinually connects how SOPs are written and how they are carried out.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 1

The standard radio designation for the IC is the name of the event followed by
the word "command" (e.g., "Ajax" Command), and that name automatically
transfers to whoever is the current IC throughout the incident. Anyone wish­
ing to talk to the incident commander can simply contact "_ _ _ _ __
command." While the procedure of naming the incident and then using that
name along with "command" to designate the IC is a simple procedure, it typ­
ically produces a big-time communications/operational improvement. The
simple act of naming command also provides another way to move the system
from a rank-based system (ego) to a functional-based system (job descrip­
tion)-simply, most folks who want to communicate with the IC really don't
care much who that person is. They just want a quick, easy, accurate way to
contact whoever that person (the current IC) is so that they can do their busi­
ness with command, and then get along with their incident-operational role.
If they do care who, by name, is command, they can simply ask. Using the
incident location or designation to name command is a simple, effective way
to create thi s capability. Officers who love to hear their regular department
designation ("Battalion 1," "Engine 1," "Car 1," etc.) transmitted over the tac­
tical channel mu st be coached and nurtured during the identity-crisis
adjustment period of (in effect) making command pretty much anonymous,
but very functional. Naming command also separates multiple incidents that
occur simultaneously.

The initial announcement of command by the first-arriving responder signifies

the regular beginning of an operation by a definite act. This announcement
ensures quick, up-front command and also requires the IC to commit a con­
scious act (personally) and a standard act (organizationally) by formally
advising that he/she is now the IC. After the initial command declaration,
everyone else en route, arriving, or operating at the scene (or monitoring the
tactical channel) knows that an IC is in place. If no one has announced the
assumption of command, the entire system knows that no one has officially,
directly, visibly, or vocally begun the functions of command.

The standard assumption (and declaration/announcement) of command

front-end loads the system with effective management direction and control so
that the regular function s of command are automatically started at the very
beginning of every incident-every time. Front-end loading the incident with
standard command also insures that initial command and incident action occur
in a coordinated and integrated way. The system eliminates a bunch of action
occurring before command is established and then having the IC struggle to ENGINE 1
first understand ("get a handle on") the action and then get it (the action) WILL BE
COMMAND.
under his/her command and control-a lot like trying to catch a tiger by the
tail. Standard initial-command assumption also supports the IC in a very sim­
ple, practical way, starting at the beginning and working through the regular
numerical order of the eight standard command functions. Completing the
functions in order gets each function up and operating. It also gives the IC the
capability to overlap and mix and match the functions as the event goes on
based on the framework for command and operational escalation. The com­
mand routine is very simple, when we are responding, arriving, and setting up

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

I
 Functions of Command Chapter 1

COMMAND POSITIONING

THE COMMAND POST

Each organization must create and use command-post (CP) resources within
their own local conditions/capabilities. More and more within the emergency­
response business, the standard-command position for the incident
commander is a stationary one, located outside the hazard zone, inside a com­
mand vehicle or a piece of response apparatus, which is then called the
"command post." It should be situated in a standard and predictable location
that affords the IC a good view of the scene and sun-ounding area. When pos­
sible, it should be somewhat remote from the action in front of the scene (side
one) and should NOT interfere with apparatus movement. Ideally, it also
would offer a vantage (view) point of two sides of the situation (generally the
front and most critical side).

To a major extent, command effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) is directly con­

nected to regular-command positioning, and the entire command system
revolves around the rapid establishment of a stationary, remote IC operating in
a standard command post. Utilizing long-term, mobile command or multiple
corrunand locations defeats the objective of having a strong, single command
person in the best command position. Simply, the faster we establish regular­
command positioning (within the correct mode), the faster we get standard
command. In the cases where a company-level officer or member establishes
an investigative/fast-action mobile command, that IC must realize he/she is
operating in a disadvantaged command position. The IC should ensure
upgrading to a stationary command position as soon as possible, using stan­
dard procedures. Many times in these situations, a subsequent an-iver who
comes in behind the cun-ent IC should assume a standard, upgraded-command
position, and thereby transfer command from the initial IC who is in a mobile
position. If the incident escalates and the command post capability does not,
the IC (and the entire incident operation) may never catch up.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of C0111.mand

r - - _. -- ----- - - ­
 Chapter 1 Functions of Command

There is a temptation for the IC to assum e an open-air command position out­

side the CP and to directly and personally deal face to face with responders,
who all want to communicate up close and personal (with the IC). While this
"friendly" approach is natural and probably feels good, it sets up an ongoing
mob, which can quickly surround the IC with (typically) excited, high-energy
characters who all want to receive orders, tell their story ("I need, I need , I
need"), borrow money, etc. This direct group contact murders any semblance
of command awareness or control by overloading the IC with up close and
personal face-to-face people, talk, and confusion. Not to mention the effects
of the weather on an open-air Ie. For ex ample, in Phoenix in August-if an
IC puts a clipboard on the hood of his/her red Suburban, it will ignite; or in
Seattle in February, it will wash away; or in Buffalo in winter, it will freeze to
the hood.

Physically separating, while organizationally connecting, the IC from the

direct action to inside a command post becomes a major (and modern) mecha­
nism the command system uses to maintain both managerial and operational
control over the incident. Having the IC sit quietly (and in the quiet) in the
command-post vehicle effectively talking on, and critically listening to, the
tactical radio channel being used by officers or various operational and organi­
zational IMS elements to keep the IC informed of the situation and keeping
track of the entire situation on a work sheet really looks pretty underwhelming
and uninspirational, compared to the traditional command posture and posi­
tioning. The old system set the commander up on a white horse (or was it a
helmet?) close to and directly immersed in the action, sweat running down his
regal face. Many such commanders were heard to continually mutter, "I
would never send my men anywhere 1 wouldn't go myself."* Let's use an
analogy to make the point why we need a stationary, remote IC inside a vehi­
cle. You are on an airplane that is about to land in heavy fog on a dark and
windy night at a busy urban airport. It is "rush hour," and there is a lot of air
traffic backed up anxiously circling the area. The cockpit crew is competent,
capable, and conscious, and they are acti,ely positioning and manipulating the
plane to attempt a standard wheels-down landing. Now comes the question
(remember-you are a passenger). Where do you physically want the air-traf­
fic controller assigned to your flight? Should that person (critical to your
survival) be located in the air conditioned, well-lighted tower, seated, with
access to radar and standard communications equipment, or do you want that
person wandering around the runway in an old leather aviator's cap and gog­
gles waving his/her arms and yelling (on a low-wattage portable radio) that a
real controller has to feel the actual jet blast to effectively land these alu­
minum babies? Get the point?

The command system in no way disregards (or disrespects) the critical need
for command leadership close to the action. This is performed within the
command system in a standard way by sector officers (sectors explained in
Chapter 6). Such sector officers are assigned to directly manage geographic

*pretty much all men in the old days, who probably never imagined saying, "I
would never send my women anywhere I wouldn't go myself."

Assumption, Conjinnation, and Positioning of Coml1wnd

1- ­ - --- . - - - -.- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - ­
 Functions of Command Chapter 1

COMMAND POSITIONING

THE COMMAND POST

Each organization must create and use command-post (CP) resources within
their own local conditions/capabilities. More and more within the emergency­
response business, the standard-command position for the incident
commander is a stationary one, located outside the hazard zone, inside a com­
mand vehicle or a piece of response apparatus, which is then called the
"command post." It should be situated in a standard and predictable location
that affords the IC a good view of the scene and surrounding area. When pos­
sible, it should be somewhat remote from the action in front of the scene (side
one) and should NOT interfere with apparatus movement. Ideally, it also
would offer a vantage (view) point of two sides of the situation (generally the
front and most critical side).

To a major extent, command effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) is directly con­

nected to regular-command positioning, and the entire command system
revolves around the rapid establishment of a stationary, remote IC operating in
a standard command post. Utilizing long-term, mobile command or multiple
command locations defeats the objective of having a strong, single command
person in the best command position. Simply, the faster we establish regular­
conunand positioning (within the correct mode), the faster we get standard
command. In the cases where a company-level officer or member establishes
an investigative/fast-action mobile command, that IC must reahze he/she is
operating in a djsadvantaged command position. The IC should ensure
upgrading to a stationary command position as soon as possible, using stan­
dard procedures. Many times in these situations, a subsequent arriver who
comes in behind the current IC should assume a standard, upgraded-command
position, and thereby transfer command from the initial IC who is in a mobile
position. If the incident escalates and the command post capability does not,
the IC (and the entire incident operation) may never catch up.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

Chapter 1 Functions of Conunand

There is a temptation for the IC to assume an open-air command position out­

side the CP and to directly and personall y deal face to face with responders,
who all want to communicate up close and personal (with the IC). While this
"friendly" approach is natural and probably feels good, it sets up an ongoing
mob, which can quickly surround the IC with (typically) excited, high-energy
characters who all want to receive orders, tell their story ("I need, I need, I
need"), bon-ow money, etc. This direct group contact murders any semblance
of command awareness or control by overloading the IC with up close and
personal face-to-face people, talk, and confusion. Not to mention the effects
of the weather on an open-air Ie. For example, in Phoenix in August-if an
IC puts a clipboard on the hood of his/her red Suburban, it will ignite; or in
Seattle in February, it will wash away; or in Buffalo in winter, it will freeze to
the hood.

Physically separating, while organizationally connecting, the IC from the

direct action to inside a command post becomes a major (and modern) mecha­
nism the command system uses to maintain both managerial and operational
control over the incident. Having the IC sit quietly (and in the quiet) in the
command-post vehicle effectively talking on, and critically listening to, the
tactical radio channel being used by officers or various operational and organi­
zational IMS elements to keep the IC informed of the situation and keeping
track of the entire situation on a work sheet really looks pretty underwhelming
and uninspirational, compared to the traditional command posture and posi­
tioning. The old system set the commander up on a white horse (or was it a
helmet?) close to and directly immersed in the action, sweat running down his
regal face. Many such commanders were heard to continually mutter, "I
would never send my men anywhere I wouldn't go myself."* Let's use an
analogy to make the point why we need a stationary, remote IC inside a vehi­
cle. You are on an airplane that is about to land in heavy fog on a dark and
windy night at a busy urban airport. It i ~ "rush hour," and there is a lot of air
traffic backed up anxiously circling the area. The cockpit crew is competent,
capable, and conscious, and they are actively positioning and manipulating the
plane to attempt a standard wheels-down landing. Now comes the question
(remember-you are a passenger). Where do you physically want the air-traf­
fic controller assigned to your flight? Should that person (critical to your
survival) be located in the air conditioned, well-lighted tower, seated, with
access to radar and standard communica[ions equipment, or do you want that
person wandering around the runway in an old leather aviator's cap and gog­
gles waving his/her arms and yelling (on a low-wattage portable radio) that a
real controller has to feel the actual jet blast to effectively land these alu­
minum babies? Get the point?

The command system in no way disregards (or disrespects) the critical need
for command leadership close to the action. This is performed within the
command system in a standard way by sector officers (sectors explained in
Chapter 6). Such sector officers are assigned to directly manage geographic

*pretty much all men in the old days, who probably never imagined saying, "I
would never send my women anywhere T wouldn't go myself."

Assumption, Confinnation, and Positioning of Comnwnd

- _. . - - - - - - - --- - - -­
 Functions of Command Chapter 1

operational areas and functional support activities. They are close to where
the work is being done and directly support and supervise the work. The
command system dedicates one strategic-level person in a "clean" position
(the IC) to coordinate, connect, and support the sector managers operating on
the tactical level (in "dirty" positions) for that incident; just like the aviation
industry dedicates a controller to coordinate the safety and effective move­
ment of each flight. Effectively covering the two critical spots (IC/sectors;
ATC/pilot) creates a safe landing for both systems (only our chow is a lot bet­
ter than airplane food).

The following fairly simple organizational game plan describes a set of stan­
dard command and operational moves that create an effective team formation:

• As quickly as possible, the system gets an IC up and working in a

vehicle

• The IC stays in vehicle-uses tactical work sheet, mobile radio, and

helpers (if available)

• Task- and tactical-level responders radio their arrival in staged

positions (close to scene) to the IC

• IC assigns responders to initial operational positions within the

incident action plan and logs them on a work sheet

• IC creates a geographic and functional incident organization (sectors)

to fit the situation

• Responders communicate directly (usually face-to-face) with and

work for their organizational (sector) boss and not directly with the IC

Shifting from outside to inside command positioning invol ves more than the
IC hopping into the command car, rolling up the windows, locking the doors,
and doing the command functions. Such a change (stationary, remote IC,
inside vehicle) requires the creation of a complete organizational package that
produces a shift in how the whole team approaches the scene and how they
become integrated into the action plan. This shift in team response gives the
IC the capability to effectively perform the command functions required to
establish and maintain effective command and control from inside the com­
mand post. Such changes require an overall organizational plan, training,
practice, application, and review. Everyone on the team must understand that
as quickly and smoothly as possible, the responder team will reform/upgrade
itself (from an investigative/fast-action mode) to a command-mode IC who
will assume a stationary position inside a vehicle. This creates a system
where the IC can develop an effective incident action plan and then continual­
ly upgrade, reinforce, and manage that plan from a stationary standard
position. It sets the IC up in a position where he/she can be continuously
f
I,
I Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of COinmand
l1.--- ­
Chapter 1 Functions of Command

available to support and protect sectors/companies by coordinating incident

communications (IC = communications focal point), coordinating activities,
providing resources, effectively monitorin g changing conditions, and moving
resources as required. The IC also is in a position where others can provide
positive support in order to improve the overall effectiveness of the entire
operation. The ownership shifts from "my incident" to "our incident." As
usual, leaders must coach everyone through unlearning old aerobic all-over­
the-incident command ways and learning the new stay-put-inside-the-CP ones.

In some situations, like an industrial setting, the initial IC may not be working
out of a vehicle. In these cases, the IC should find and announce a safe loca­
tion with a good view that is easy to find by responding team members, and
then upgrade to a command post as quickly as possible.

Most of us started on the bottom end of the business and then worked our way
up through the organization. This initial socialization on the task level is very
durable (remember how we learned sitting around the "camp fire") . Entry
into the service on the working level causes us to understand and expect that
to get the job done we must operate up close (and many times real personal)
to the incident problem, and we generally get pretty gritty doing it. This sets
up a feeling that it is a pretty unnatural act to separate yourself from the direct
action to take command in a safe and "clean" position-especially in situa­
tions where the troops are doing the fast-and-dirty task-level stuff. The early,
strong socialization as a worker bee can create a difficult level of command
anxiety (actually guilt) when the IC is operating in a pretty cleaned-up and
comfortable command-post position, while the troops are all cold/hot, sweaty,
and grimy. A major way that the system creates an effective level of com­
mand that can outlast the incident problem is by quickly placing the IC in as
safe and effective (maybe even comfortable) position as possible that is some­
what removed from the action, and then requiring that he/she stay in that
position so that the IC can effectively perform the standard command func­
tions . Simply, the IC protects and supports the troops by acting like a
commander and not by looking directly over the workers' shoulders as they do
their task-level jobs. The somewhat remote command position, inside-the­
command-post approach also requires the IC to trust the troops to personally
encounter, evaluate, and describe what is currently going on in their area in an
accurate, regular, and truthful way. The troops also must have the confidence
that the IC will use the continuous availab ility advantage within the command
post to critically listen and react to their reports. Those serving. as ICs must
do whatever is required to make the adjustment in their own psyche and act
like ICs. Command system leaders must apply whatever reality therapy,
coaching, and support is required to fit offICers into the role (and position) of
the IC This is particularly true with new officers.

The IC must be disciplined (or restrained enough) to remain at (or ideally,

inside) the command post and manage the incident from that one basic posi­
tion. The system is designed to support and assist the centrally located IC
Consistently establishing a command post also eliminates the too-common

AssUlnption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

 Functions of Comnwnd Chapter 1

question, "Where's the chief?" Now, everyone on the fire ground can predict
and have confidence in where the IC (command post) will be, how to contact
the IC by radio ("Interior Sector to Ajax Command"), and generally what the
IC is doing (command functions). Standard command-post visual identifica­
tion should be developed for each jurisdiction or system. This approach could
use lettering, signs, a command-post flag, or special (color) revolving light.

Advantages of the Command Post

When a standard position inside a particular vehicle is assumed by the IC, it
(the command post) becomes the IC'sfield office and, based on the size and
design of the command vehicle, gives some or all of the following advantages
to the IC:

• a stationary spot
• comfortable, seated position(s)
• a quiet place to listen, think, decide, and maintain sanity
• a vantage point to see from (command-post vehicles should ideally have

windows on both sides)

• inside overhead and high-intensity lighting for night operations or when

the smoke blocks out the sun(!)

• a place to write and record

• radios with headsets and boom microphones
• a place to store, read, and manage reference and preplanning material-

maps, structural layouts, floor plans, access diagrams, etc.

• protection from the weather (rain, heat, cold, wind, etc.)

• a place to somewhat sequester the IC from direct distractions
• space for staff support
• computers (in some systems)
• magnetic, marker, and status/accountability/inventory board(s)
• mobile-data (computer) terminals
• cellular telephone(s)
• weather-station systems
• copy machine (for maps/preplans/action plans)
• FAX machines
• mast-mounted video cameras
• a regular TV set up, watch news reporting, helicopter shots, etc .
• VCR player for video reconnaissance and playback (very handy)
• a standard place to stash and eat Snickers bars
• a place for quiet prayer, reflection, contemplation, and meditation

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Comnwnd

Chapter 1 Functions of Command

Many times, command-post profiles become a reflection of organizational size

and resources. Big-time vehicles and staff are nice but not absolutely neces­
sary. A lucid Ie communicating on a working portable radio, permanently
placed inside the vantage point of a '37 Ford, two door, with an up-to-date
tactical work sheet and an integrated command helper, can outperform an
array of people stumbling around bashing badges inside a million-dollar com­
mand tank. We must not build IMS to meet the capability of the "toys,"
instead of looking at how the "toys" can support the Ie and increase our com­
mand efficiency and effectiveness.

Very mobile commanders who primarily use visual informa­

tion by going far and wide to look directly at the incident
problem(s) will probably require a period of adjustment to the
new experience of being "tethered" to the command post, par­
ticularly after their rough-and-ready aerobic days of moving
all over the incident to directly (with their own eyes) look,
check, order, and verify in person. Perhaps, when a track-star
,-- Ie establishes command and gives the initial communications report,
a modern electronic system should automatically lock the Ie's seat belt.
Thi s might be a mechanical way to restrain (and retrain) the characters who
are just naturally more acti ve, and insure command stays inside the vehicle.
Everyone in the "new-and-improved" system must support and assist the Ie's
efforts to "unlearn" the old habit of orbiting the incident. An improved com­
mand-and-control performance always feels good, and also will reinforce the
stationary Ie approach.

Note: Standard command (IC) positioning is still a controversial issue. Some

officers maintain that the Ie should be inside a command-post vehicle for the
reasons just listed and discussed. Others say command should be open-air
where the Ie can use all of the senses and face-to-face communications to
connect with responders and incident conditions . The author is obviously an
advocate of inside-the-vehicle command. His department has required the Ie
to be inside of a command post for the past twenty years. Using this approach
on literally thousands of incidents has shown that it is absolutely impossible to
establish and conduct effective strategic-level command operations from an
outside tactical-level command position . Serious command students should
reflect on the reality that a strategic level of command absolutely requires
strategic command positioning. Such students must not be distracted by
rough-and-ready, old timers who confuse tactical supervision with strategic
command. Simply, no mature, refined, and reflective command system can be
conducted in the open air that is crowded. noisy, smokey, and typically very
confusing.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 1

Command Safety
The Ie always assumes command in a standard, structured manner at the
beginning of every incident so that responders can depend on a continuous
and effective level of protection from the command system from the beginning
to the end of operations. This up-front command approach fixes responsibility
on a single individual (Ie) to manage in a way that the overall operation starts
under control, stays under control, and never loses control. Effective control
by the Ie = worker safety. That involves the Ie being able to assign, track,
account for, monitor, and move the troops based on initial and changing con­
ditions. The Ie also deliberately confirms and names command in the initial
radio report. This regular up-front confirmation provides the important capa­
bility for everyone involved in the event to hear with their own ears that a
single Ie has set up and started command operations. The on-scene Ie is now
in business directly on the incident site and will develop and manage an inci­
dent action plan that will always consider the safety of the troops as the
highest priority. Naming command eliminates guessing who is in command
and makes it easy for the troops who might be in a tough spot to quickly
connect with the Ie by simply calling "command." The strong,
standard beginning of operations strengthens the operational
impact and eliminates freelancing or unnecessary risks to
workers. The Ie must realize it is impossible to perform the
essential command functions when he/she is out of position, so
the Ie assumes a stationary, remote command-post position as
quickly as the command mode can be assumed to effectively
see, hear, evaluate, decide, order, and react. The Ie remains in
that standard position throughout the incident to maintain an
effective level of command and control. By setting up and
staying in the command post, the Ie uses strong stationary
positioning to maintain on-line operational control, to be con­
tinuously available to communicate, and to monitor and
evaluate the changing welfare and survival needs of responders
who are typically in tough operating positions within the haz­
ard zone.

Assumption, Confirmation, and Positioning of Command

10-- - -- - -­
 Chapter 1 Functions of Command

CHAPTER 1

ASSUMPTION, CONFIRMATION, AND

POSITIONING OF COMMA _VD

INCIDENT COMMANDER CHECKLIST

• First arriver must quickly assume initial command in a standard manner
(per SOPs) .

• Use strong, quick, automatic, command assumption to eliminate any

zero-impact period (ZIP).

• Confirm command assumption with a standard initial radio report.

• Use location/occupancy to name command.

• Select the proper command mode (i nvestigative/fast-action!command).

• Correctly position command to match and support the current command

mode.

• Set up a standard command post (stationary, remote, outside hazard

area, inside the vehicle) as quickly as possible.

• Begin to "package" command for on-going operation and escalation:

... strong standard command
... sectors
... SOPs
... clear communications
... standard strategy/action planning

• Correctly accept/continue/transfer command.

Assumption, Confinnation, and Positioning of Command

1- ­
 Functions of Command Chapter 1

COACHING VERSION:
Confirm command assumption as soon as you arrive, and then act and sound
like command on the radio. Stay put in your rig unless the direct engagement
of your body can make a difference in rescuing the kid, quickly solving the
incident problem, or protecting your crew. The early windows of opportunity
offer the best chance for us to achieve effective (offensive) outcomes-endan­
gered customers with a lot of interior seniority are generally dead; older,
well-established, expanding fire situations are (or will soon be) bigger defen­
sive festivals; EMS customers become bad risks when they lie around a long
time untreated; hazardous materials that are out of control for historic periods
are really ugly, etc.

Bold and smart can produce okay outcomes, but bold and dumb can produce
dead outcomes. Know your limitations-don't fight out of your weight class.
Eliminate any ZIP or initial freelancing by loading the front end of the event
with strong, empowered, quickly established command-it's our best chance
of capturing and maintaining command and control from the very beginning.
Good beginnings produce good endings. The first five minutes can be worth
the next five hours.

Assumption, Confinnation, and Positioning of Command

 FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND

CHAPTER 2

THE SITUATION EVALUATION

,
.- - ---­
 Functions of Com.I1'land Chapter 2

FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND
CHAPTER 2:

SITUATION EVALUATION

MAJOR GOAL

TO DEVELOP A REGULAR APPROACH TO SITUATION EVALUATION

USING THE STANDARD FORMS OF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
AND CRITICAL INCIDENT FACTORS

THE SIZE UP
The second basic command function is the situation evaluation. This initial
information, management phase, known as "size up," begins to occur for that
incident episode at the start of operations. Size up is a systematic process
consisting of the rapid, yet deliberate, consideration of all critical incident fac­
tors, which leads to the development of a rational action plan based on these
critical factors. Given the compression of time in the beginning stage of inci­
dent operations, the initial size up cannot be delayed, nor can it be a
time-consuming process.

This beginning evaluation produces information that the IC and the operations
team must have to make decisions and to initiate action. Unfortunately, the
process usually begins at the earliest and toughest time of the incident, when
all the needed facts are difficult, if not almost impossible, to immediately
gather. The process of situation evaluation remains difficult throughout the
early stages of the operation as the IC attempts to gather facts and verify their
completeness and accuracy within a very compressed and typically dangerous
time frame.

It is not uncommon for highly motivated, aggressive responders to begin oper­

ations before adequately reviewing all critical incident factors. Initial action
can be an instinctive and action-oriented process that involves taking the
shortest and quickest route directly to the problem. Sometimes it becomes
very expensive (and painful) to learn the other critical factors later on in inci­
dent operational time-in fact, sometimes we learn about them when they fall
on us and bash us on the head (figuratively, but sometimes literally). Another
common challenge in the initial evaluation process is the fairly understandable

The Situation Evaluation

 Functions of Conunand Chapter 2

STANDARD ON-LINE INCIDENT INFORMATION

FORMS

Dealing with incident information becomes a complex problem in most inci­

dent-management operations. Information must be quickly received,
processed, interpreted, and acted upon. Factors can, in some cases, be
observed directly from the command post, while others can only be deter­
mined from different locations inside and outside of the structurelincident
area. Obtaining critical/necessary information requires the Ie to develop,
refine, and practice a standard system of incident-intelligence network man­
agement that is applied to actual on-line incident operations . The Ie uses a
combination of the following four basic information forms:

1. Previous Experiences
Previous experiences and lessons learned become a major incident-man­
agement source. Having seen actual conditions, developing an action
plan to meet and match those conditions, and then living through the
outcome of how that action worked is a very practical way we use to
evaluate where the incident is now, and to anticipate where it is heading.

2. Visual
Visual observation and inspection is an important way that informa­
tion is gained. It is acquired by looking at the situation from the
outside, inside, and around the incident site. This "look-at-it"
information form involves the critical, perceptive capabilities of
the Ie and the team. This is the most common factor used for
initial and ongoing incident evaluation by the Ie and the most
natural factor for action-oriented responders.

3. Reported/Reconnaissance
Information not directly available visually to the Ie from the fast­
action or command-post position many times is acquired by the Ie
assigning personnel to standard geographic and functional organiza­
tional assignments all over the incident site. It comes from operating
elements and sectors dealing with specific incident problems and loca­
tions and then transmitting their information-oriented repOits back to
the Ie. It also can come from other sources, such as owners/occu­
pants, technical representatives, other agencies, law enforcement, or
press helicopters circling (noisily) above.

4. Pre-Incident Planning and Familiarity

Information gained from formal pre-incident planning and informal
familiariz ation activities is an important information source. This pre­
determined and prepackaged intelligence increases information
beyond what is quickly available visually or what requires reconnais­
sance assignments to obtain. Pre-incident planning materials include
reference information that comes from books, data bases, information
services, technical sources, and advisors.

The Situation Evaluation

 Functions of Command Chapter 2

becomes a huge part of managing and improving personal effectiveness.

Actual performance at an event will produce an effect on both the player and
the team. That personal performance can be reviewed, and lessons (both
learned and reinforced) can be loaded into "the files." Our brains become
hard drives to access these files as needed. We then access and apply these
files to each situation we encounter. The application of this personal, and
hopefully collective, experience over time becomes a major part of how per­
sonal stature is developed and organizational respect is given to an individual.
Our service highly regards those who have actually performed right where the
action happens. There is no shortcut around this validation-any short-time
"expert" who attempts to explain "what happens in the street" to a veteran
with hash marks from the wrist to the elbow will probably live (hopefully)
through a "memorable" interpersonal reaction (that can then go in their file).

VISUAL OBSERVATION: THE INITIAL

EVALUATION
The Ie must assume the strongest possible position for a fast, initial evalua­
tion. This requires a certain amount of training, experience, and ability. The
Ie must be able to consistently obtain good initial and ongoing incident infor­
mation, and then translate that information into a usable form. The
information is used to develop a plan structured around the basic tactical
activities involved in life safety, incident stabilization, property conservation,
responder/worker safety, and customer service.

The initial (real time) evaluation for each incident event begins at the time the
alarm is received. The dispatch can be an important (reported) information
source, including the type of call, conditions, nature of the incident problem,
occupancy, general area, and the units responding. While en route, the Ie can
observe weather conditions, note the time of day, and receive additional infor­
mation, such as reports of persons trapped, fire extension, hazmat details,
violence, injured customers, etc. The Ie considers all of this information as
the beginning of the situation evaluation before arriving at the initial on-scene
command location.

As the Ie approaches the scene, he/she can add any signs that they observe to the
incident-information data base, along with a visible initial impression of overall
conditions. Therefore, how the Ie approaches the scene can be very impOliant.
When possible, the Ie should take a route that partially or completely circles the
incident. This 360-degree drive-by system may delay the IC's official arrival by
a few seconds in some cases, but it may well provide the Ie with significant
information that is not visible from the command post, when the command post
is established-generally on the front side "Side A." These facts may often
apply directly to the layout of the incident area, access/obstructions, extent and
severity of the incident problem(s), potential structural failure, or rescue problems.

This drive-by evaluation approach is particularly effective when a responding

officer is coming in behind a responder who has adequately assumed and

The Situation Evaluation

 Chapter 2 Functions of Command

established initial command. In these cases, command has already been set
up and is operating so that the ranking officer has the luxury of using a little
extra time to see more of the entire scene and become oriented to that environ­
ment, before locating in a stationary command position. The ranking officer
also is afforded the opportunity to take a li:tle extra time to evaluate the
impact of any action that ha s occurred prior to hi s or her arrival.
Strengthening the situation-evaluation process in this way is another reason
that team management, along with our typical tiered-response sys tem, is able
to manage and reinforce how response resources are utilized.

TYPE OF RISK
A critical initial and ongoing situation-evaluation component involves the
detelmination of what kind of risk is present, so that the IC can decide what
type of response (and re sponders) is required and how initial and ongoing
deployment will be managed (Command Function #4). The situation could
involve fire, EMS, hazmat, law enforcement, public works, technical rescue,
or (probably) some combination of them all. Dispatch mu st select and send
initial resources based on repOlted conditicns. Command mu st then order
whatever additional appropriate response i~ required, use the regular U\1S ele­
ments to customize an incident action plan to deal with the problem(s), and
then develop an adequate incident organization (Command Function #5) to
effectively manage that incident action plan.

Every response area is served by a different combination of agencies, each

with its own profile. Some agencies do only one function . Others do multiple
functions. Very few do everything. The local profile requires the IC to order
and then coordinate and support the activit:es of whatever agencies/specialties
are required to deal with the type of risks present. Today, life is pretty com­
plicated. Very few events involve a single agency response. It seems that
what once was an incident with a fairly simple, straightforward problem that
the agency that specialized in that problem could solve, now requires three or
four agencies that mu st hang out together-and unify their efforts (and com­
mand). The command system must now regularly initiate the response of
multiple agencies and manages those multiple agencies within an
agreed-upon unified command configuration to get the job done.

INITIAL AND ONGOING VISUAL OBSERVATION

Proper evaluation is greatly influenced by the location of the command post
(and vice versa!) . When selecting a locatio n for the command post, the IC
must keep in mind the ongoing view it will provide as operations continue and
expand. From the command post, the IC must be able to observe incident
conditions, general operational action, and the effect of that action. The best
command placement often involves a view of two sides (front and most criti­
cal side) of the incident, such as placement near the corner of a building. The
IC must place the command vehicle close enough to see the operation yet far

The Situation Evaluation

r - ­
 Functions of Command Chapter 2

enough back to afford a wide-angle view of the incident area (out of the way
and out of the hazard zones).

Visual observation is an intense, direct, rapid, on-line (on-scene) method that

is done in person to size up conditions. The Ie should continue to attempt to
maintain visual contact with the event throughout the operation. The Ie has
to realize that certain conditions are often visible outside of a structure/area
before they are noticeable inside (and vice versa).

The IC's visual observations may be the quickest and most direct source for
information on conditions that can be seen from the outside (from the com­
mand-post position) . Some of the exterior conditions that typically are easily
identifiable visually include:

Area arrangement-streets, alleys, buildings, potential exposures, access

obstacles

Hazard evaluation-fire, EMS, hazmat, special rescue, etc.

Hazard size-what is the scale of the actual and forecasted problem

Incident building(s) detail-building type, size, height, layout detail,

occupancy, name, type of construction, age and general condition, and
structural stability

Fire conditions-what's burning, size, location, products of combus­

tion, amount and color of fuel smoke, run-off

ty, crime scenes

Resource status-placement, use, and effectiveness of apparatus and activities

of personnel

Effects of operational action-what impact are incident operations having on

solving the incident problem(s)

Looking out from the command post is an essential data-gathering method,

but it is necessarily limited to the field of vision that is available from that one
spot. This visual advantage/handicap can be balanced by the use of pre-inci­
dent plan data and from reconnaissance and operational reports from
geographic and functional units and sectors that are assigned and operating all
over the incident. The type of incident will necessarily regulate how the Ie
must manage information. As an example, in structural fire-control opera­
tions , the Ie will have to rely more heavily on progress reports from interior
sectors during offensive interior attacks, than from other sectors operating on
the exterior during defensive "sUlTound-and-drown" operations. Another

The Situation Evaluation

 Chapter 2 Functions of Command

example of information management differences would be the need to gather,

process, and manage technical information at a complicated hazmat event,
compared to a fire in a big pile of burning stuff with no exposures. Simply,
the combination of visual/pre-plan/recon will be different for every event.
The IC must develop an information management profile and approach to
match the conditions and needs of each particular situation.

Based on the critical need to continually access information, the IC should try
to select the best "looking-post" position for the command vehicle. How we
spot that unit is a big deal because if it is not in a good vantage-point position,
the IC will get out and go see what is going on (conditions/action/effect).
When this happens, our formerly stationary IC is now roaming around on a
mission to become more visually intimate with the situation. If we want the
IC to stay put, we must practice backing the Suburban into a driveway directly
opposite from side one, sneaking the Crown Vic around the BRTs into a
vacant lot across the street from the address side or spotting the larger com­
mand post tank with the windows facing the event. Sometimes conditions
change, the area in front of the command post becomes congested or a better
spot opens up-in those cases the command post should move to that better
place. In other cases, the CUlTent IC's bo~s will anive in a better, bigger com­
mand vehicle and can pick a better command post spot. This gives us another
opportunity to upgrade the visual position of the Ie. Obviously, it's not a
good idea to move the command vehicle so much that the IC gets carsick, but
we should not live with a bad spot, if a better one is available.

While we should always go for the best command post spot, we must also
understand that in most situations, the IC must combine what can be seen
from the command post with reports from those in remote, unseen positions
(from the command post). In these situatwns, the IC must use the off-site
(from the command post) subordinate officer's eyes. Sometimes I hear it said
that a good IC does not even need to be physically on the scene to command
an incident. This may be okay for Houston Control, but for us locals, it still
makes sense for the IC to be both in command and in attendance. Remote
control command doesn't create much confidence in the troops or the cus­
tomers. If the incident keeps going long enough or gets big enough (or both),
we will eventually round up the mayor, city manager, a bunch of department
heads and staffers, and lock them up in a remote Emergency Operations
Center (EOC). This group of senior managers will try to figure out how to
save the city while they eat stale doughnuts and cold pizza. We will discuss
EOCs in Chapter 6. These EOCs are generally located in the third basement
of the Armory in the middle of the fairgrounds-safe from thermonuclear
destruction. I always have wondered who the safely ensconced EOC'ers will
command, after the big bang. The workers will be vaporized, or at least fraz­
zlized.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 2

REPORTED/RECONNAISSANCE INFORMATION
There is no way (particularly while the event is actually occurring) that we
can learn as much about the occupancy/area as those who live there, work
there, or manage the place know about it. The critical information factor
management challenge for the IC is to create a system that effectively gathers
reported information from the owners/occupants, workers, and managers,
while the incident is underway, and then quickly connect and integrate those
facts with the IC's decision-making process. Many times, assigning a depart­
ment member (as a technicalliaisonlinformation sector) to such informed
individuals streamlines, packages, and delivers relevant factors to the Ie.
This assignment/function very naturally evolves into an owner/occupant sup­
port sector, in an early and effective way.

This "assign someone to connect with the owner/occupant and gather informa­
tion" approach is a huge help to the IC when he/she looks out the window of
the command post and sees a mob of people who somehow appear to be offi­
cially connected to the incident occupancy. The information gatherer can
directly deal with the mob, seek out the manager, resident technical expert, or
building engineer, and start to coordinate an effective information flow into
the command post. This assignment should be made as early as possible, so
that the information gathered can be used in a timely way. This approach is
particularly useful in high-hazard occupancies with a lot of technical and
potentially dangerous stuff to deal with.

Most responders (including the IC) are intrepid, action-oriented people who
very naturally solve problems with quick, strong action. It is generally diffi­
cult for intrepid people to sit still, and solve problems from an
"administrative" position . This natural inclination toward action causes them
to take a "Marco-Polo" approach of going out and exploring. Typically and
naturally, they evaluate the effect of that action right at the action site, by
looking directly at what is going on. This up close, personal visualization is
quick with very little bureaucracy or translation in between. This natural
inclination can create a strong temptation for the IC to depend too greatly on
visual factors and to try to view conditions by physically wandering all over
the incident site. This aerobic survey usually produces a serious breakdown,
first in effective command positioning, and then in the basic command capa­
bility to effectively maintain continuous communications availability and to
manage the incident. No one can command rationally on a dead run, while
they try to look at what amounts to a series of snapshots that become quickly
compressed, crossed up, and outdated. While staying put in a command post
doesn't magically cause ICs to suddenly become rational, it at least creates a
fighting chance to capture control of the information management (and overall
command) process by using a balance of the standard information sources. It
also gives the troops a fighting chance at communicating with the IC when
they have information they are trying to tell him/her. It is hard to talk on the
run, but it is almost impossible to listen on the run. This approach gives the
IC the situation evaluation capability to integrate the ongoing, changing (some

The Situation Evaluation

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 Chapter 2 Functions of Command

get better/some get worse) snapshots of incident conditions into a moving pic­
ture, and then to be in a position to effectively "watch" the movie that shows
both overall and detailed incident considerations. This standard stationary
command position gives the IC the capability to create effective incident
action responses to match those (many times changing) conditions.

Complex (and some not so complex) incidents quickly create widespread and
dynamic (always changing) settings, which absolutely defy the capacity for
complete, direct, on-site visual appraisal by one person (the IC). No amount
of roadwork will prepare anyone to run fast enough or far enough to keep
informed of rapidly changing (and many times widespread) incident condi­
tions. Decentralized uuits and sectors mu st be used as reconlinformation
centers. Reporting mu st be combined into regular assignments over the entire
incident and is a regular (and natural) continuous responsibility of every unit.
Important information can be directed upward to the IC, through the sectors,
which form the IC's management network.

If there have been confusing or conflicting repOlts, the IC

can also specifically as sign recon officers to visit, view,
evaluate, sketch, and video conditions not visible from the
command post, and bring this information back to the
command gods and goddesses. This recon approach , par­
ticularly during large, ac tive incidents, can be a big
advantage and assistance to the IC, and creates the capabil­
ity to develop a more balanced, CUlTent, and complete
overall view of the entire scene, that may be fragmented by
sectors reporting (accurately ... but separately) only what
they can connect with from their operating/functional posi­
tions . This recon system is in no way meant to second
SECTOR 2 TO
COMMAND -WE guess, diminish, or micromanage the work and repo~ting of
HAVE RUN ACROSS sectors. The objective is to evaluate and describe how the
ADRUG LAB.
operating sectors connect and integrate with each other,
and for the IC to determine uncovered areas and opportuni­
ties for increased safety and effectiveness . This "information-assembly"
process requires the IC to quickly create the capability to "see" the entire inci­
dent site. The IC must customize an information-input system that produces a
complete view of the entire incident, and recon reporting becomes an impor­
tant part of that approach. The longer the team practices and refines ad hoc
incident information management, and the plays and formations that relate to
information, the more effective, natural, and routine their efforts become. The
IC receives input and then processes, repackages, and distributes this flow of
upward information back down to the operating and support organization to
keep everyone effectively connected.

The IC must use the command post advantage to create and continually main­
tain a two-way information. flow. The ongoing refinement of connecting a
standard response to a standard piece of information builds predictability and
trust between senders and receivers. This requires the entire team to under-

The Situation Evaluation

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 Functions of Comm.and Chapter 2

stand the basic process and then to get into the "flow." The IC must orches­
trate the "flow" and serve as the focal point to help everyone stay connected
with quick, adequate, accurate, cUlTent, relevant(!) information. A major func­
tion/capability of command post operations involves becoming such an
information center.

This effective information-management capability emerges out of continual

practice and refinement of the IC using all the information management
forms. Like the other command functions, the IC and the operating team must
use small incidents to develop a functional set of size-up habits and routines
that naturally expand into larger incidents. Big deals can become a gigantic
information-management sucker punch if the IC has become comfortable with
only a limited set of fast-and-dirty habits that barely provide the minimum
amount of information needed to manage the small, routine, highly forgiving,
generally residential incidents that we deal with most of the time.

THE PRE-INCIDENT PLAN

A major information-management support item during the initial and ongoing
evaluation phase is the pre-incident plan. Most fire departments perform these
planning activities as part of a structured program that includes touring signif­
icant occupancies and hazards ("target hazards"). These tours identify and
record any important characteristics that would affect an incident in that occu­
pancy. The information is gathered, recorded, and usually stored in
notebooks, which are typically carried in apparatus, command vehicles, with
team leaders, and/or in some cases, at dispatch.

Pre-incident planning arms the IC and the response team with facts and details
that are often almost impossible to acquire during an actual event. This is
because pre-incident planning is conducted with the advantage of ideal condi­
tions. These pre-incident planning surveys are cauied out in daylight, under
non-emergency conditions. There is no sense of urgency during the prepara­
tion of such plans. Responders have time to visit, interact with the occupants,
decide, contemplate, draw, revisit, and even redraw until they get it right.
Preplanning also creates the opportunity for very positive customer contact.
Responders get to meet and know the people they might later deliver service
to, and send the very practical message that our agency cares enough about
them to take the time to learn (and record) the details of where they live,
work, and hang out.

Conversely, conditions during the emergency incident are almost exactly

opposite of the cool, calm, collected time when the preplan was produced.
These actual incident conditions bring about an entirely different (almost
opposite) set of disadvantages, challenges, and reactions. The IC and respon­
ders must function close to and inside a burning building, around a hazmat
situation, or an EMS event, often at night, with little time to gather and man­
age detailed (but critical) information. The IC usually has only one chance, in
a very short period of time, to make the right initial evaluation and related

The Situation Evaluation

 Functions of Command Chapter 2

Heavy weight-Large buildings that present significant fire and

rescue problems requiring a long-term, greater-alarm, campaign­
length period of operation for control. Examples include large
open warehouses, high rises, mills, and commercial occupancies.

Middle weight-Medium-sized buildings that present a low level

fire/phy sical problem requiring routine first-alarm tactics with
predictable occupancy load outcomes, such as smaller stores,
commercial, industrials, older strip malls, and garden apartments
with connected multiple units.

Light weight-Single family and small commercial risks typical­

ly controlled by a small standard group (three to four units) of
responders. They present a relatively low fire problem but must
always be approached in a manner that includes standard safety
practices-these light weights all contain the same deadly haz­
ards as the big guys, and have seriously injured and killed
(sucker punched) more responders than any other occupancy
type. The majority of our repeat working-incident business
occurs in these buildings. In most cases, it is unlikely that these
occupancies will be individually preplanned-particularly single
family dwellings. We should be aware of the common factors
present that might affect safe, effective operations (basements,
lightweight construction, oil tanks, etc.).

The IC must use the same superlheavy/middle/light weight approach in

evaluating size and hazard into general categories of scale for the events
that do not involve buildings and structures-hazmat situations, indus­
trial process complexes; highway, waterway, and aviation emergencies;
wildland, or any other possible setting that requires the IC to decide if
situation potential is a pipsqueak or a monster.

ACCESS AND ARRANGEMENT-The basic layout of the occupan­

cy/area becomes a major operational factor and will determine the
difficulty responders will have getting into and out of the place.
Current concerns about security create big-time barriers for responders
and require long and difficult forcible entry festivals. Obviously, such
delays create expanded incident problems. Complicated interior
arrangements become accountability nightmares, particularly in larger
occupancies. Complex mazes can quickly outperform our routine
accountability systems-when this occurs, such places can become fatal
when they confuse and trap inside workers longer than their air supply
can last. Many times, these complicated interior arrangements are not
obvious from the outside, so showing them on a preplan becomes even
more critical to responder safety.

HAZARD-The number, location, condition/capability, and activity of

occupants in relation to the hazard will determine the basic rescue pro­
file. The amount, nature, and location of the hazard will determine how

The Situation Evaluation

Chapter 2 Functions of Command

incident stabilization will be conducted. Water supply problems, possi­

ble delayed, inadequate or extended response, and any special hazards
associated with the structure or the area should be listed on the preplan.

BUILT-IN PROTECTION-We must evaluate the benefits provided

by automatic extingui shment systems, early-warning devices, automatic
alarms, adequate separation, fire-re sistive construction, and smoke­
control systems. Fire fighting support equipment, industrial fire
brigade, EMS and Hazmat resources must also be considered. Don't
bet the farm on any of these systems; fire walls need attention to remain
intact to be effective; sprinkler systems need routine maintenance and
incident support and can sometimes be overpowered and fail. Smoke
control systems are many times mysteries to all but those who design
them (from 500 miles away) .

Size arrangement, and hazard factors add to the risk, while built-in protection
subtracts from it. The final evaluation combines all of these factors to pro­
duce an overall building-risk rating. The building-risk rating can be expressed
in terms of "weight" classes.

PRE-INCIDENT PLAN COl\SIDERATIONS

Since the purpose of a pre-incident plan is to provide the Ie with information
on the critical factors that cannot be seen from the command post, a pre­
incident plan should answer the following questions:

1. What factors are present?

2. What does the Ie need to know to be effective?
3. What factors can be seen from the command post?
4. What serious problems can be caused by the unseen factors (hazards)?

Answering these questions at the beginning of the pre-incident plan process

may change the selection of the buildings/areas that deserve a plan. For exam­
ple, if a building's only significant feature is its size (easy to determine from
the outside), it may be preempted for a smaller building with major internal
hazards or features that are not identifiable from the exterior. Having a preplan
to know these details will help the Ie operate more safely and effectively.

Another consideration is how typical the physical layout or use of that build­
ing is to its occupancy type. Experienced responders get to know the
inventory and nature of the regular criticall factors that come with a type of
occupancy. The knowledge of the standard inventory of factors becomes a big
deal in the management of incident information. Effectively using the inven­
tory causes the Ie to keep track of what cri tical factors are known and what
factors are still unknown. The unknown factors become information targets
that the Ie must find out about. The Ie must also have knowledge of the tac­
tical consequence of a piece of information. In cases where the consequences
The Situation Evaluation

- - - _ .. _. _ - -
 Functions of Command Chapter 2

of a factor are highly severe and the current information is not adequate, the
IC may hold off on assigning the troops to work on that factor (people, places,
things) until more information is available. Having experienced bosses know
what they don't know has caused a lot of us to be on "command leashes" in
the street, just as the building collapses into the basement (it's amazing how
much smarter your boss becomes when this happens). Connecting visual cues
to an accurate checklist of information items is a critical factor management
function . Doing lots of pre-incident plans is a major way we develop this
checklist capability.

If a place is just typical (even though significant), it probably doesn't need a

plan. A plan would be useful for a place that is not typical and could present
a dangerous surprise to responders. A good exercise for pre-incident planners
is to first assemble outside in front of the occupancy (initial view/normal
approach), and from what is visible, imagine the interior layout, construction,
contents, life hazard and other significant tactical features that may be present.
Then go inside, on the roof, and anywhere else possible. Were the projections
made outside correct? If not, a detailed pre-incident plan and orientation
would be critical for the safety and effectiveness of those responding to an
incident in the occupancy.

Most of us do not have the capability or need (thankfully) to do a pre-incident

plan on every structure/area in our jurisdiction. We need to develop a system
of guidelines based on size, hazard, arrangement, and built-in protection that
qualifies a place or area for a pre-incident survey, and then manage our plan­
ning and operational program around those guidelines.

PRE-INCIDENT PLAN MANAGEMENT

Filing, storing, and finding plans can present many practical and functional

problems/opportunities. Command must be able to quickly access the

correct plan. If the IC can't find it at the proper time, the IC can't use it

(brilliant conclusion).

The incident planning forms are usually best stored in notebooks (regular 8
112" x 11") that are kept in apparatus cabs or car trunks. For quick access,
specially constructed, convenient, easy to get to storage space should be pro­
vided. Given the reality of physically storing and manipulating binders while
inside a vehicle, it is best to carry the pre-incident plans for the
first-aJarmlfirst-due response area only. The fewer books carried, the easier
they are to find , and the better their usage.

For responding fire companies, it makes sense to assign a "jumpseat" fire­

fighter to locate the plan in the plan book while en route. This frees up the

company officer to assist the driver with watching traffic, operating warning

devices, and handling the radio. Jumpseaters should get dressed before they

board, so they generally don't have much to do but look into the windows of

cars, as they pass, and sing the company fight song.

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Chapter 2 Functions of Command

When used correctly, pre-incident plans are typically employed at the begin­
ning of the operational effort, when time is critical, and then throughout the
event to provide the information basis for effective on-going decision making.
A simple filing system, using occupancy/address, will help the IC find the
correct plan in the book. Some departments operate with microfiche (old
technology) or computer-aided graphic systems using mobile data terminals
and video terminals to access and display the data. These modern (dandy)
electronic systems have big capacity and very rapid display capability.
Mobile data terminals (MOTs) are now being replaced with mobile computer
terminals (MCTs), and these computers have the ability to store huge amounts
of data that can quickly be received. Small, fast printers can produce data that
can be distributed throughout the command organization.

THE PRE·INCIDENT PLAN FORMAT

The pre-incident plan format is important if the plan is to be a regular compo­
nent, particularly during the critical, quick, confusing initial stages of
operations. If the plan is too complicated or too difficult to deal with under
emergency conditions, it simply will not be used. The plan layout should pres­
ent primary information using a graphic- and symbol-oriented approach, along
with notations (very brief/simple documentation) on critical factors. Every
department should decide on and use standard symbols. The primary data
should include physical layout, features to be used for fire fighting, hazmat,
EMS, and hazards to responders. Particular emphasis should be placed on
serious, potential life-safety hazards, problems that are hidden, obstructions to
access, and safety.

The pre-incident plan format should avoid excessive detail. This distraction of
excessive detail affects the most critical factor, the limitation of time and
attention span on where and when they wilJ be used. Some of the more
important features may be too small, and buried in among non-essential detail,
to be readily identified using a pure-scale drawing. The graphic presentation
should provide for these critical factors to be shown in oversize form so they
stand out, and don't get lost in routine details.

The pre-incident plan should direct attention to the features, which will affect
tactical decisions and help to develop safe and effective action. Drawings
generally assume that the IC will be positicned in front of the building (Side
A) or in a prearranged alternate, standard (predictable) location and the plan
should coincide with the view and orientation the IC would normally have
from the command post. The ability of the IC to quickly connect the incident
environment to the pre-incident plan beconoes a big deal in how effectively
he/she can use that plan to help understand the critical details of the incident
site. Simply being able to grab a plan, look out the window and have what
you see basically "line up" with the plan is a strong, practical, information­
management beginning for the use of that plan. Plans that fold up like a road
map of South Dakota, take the IC ten minutes to unfold, and another five to
figure out which way is North (or is it South?) so he/she can find the front

The Situation Evaluation

 Functions of Command Chapter 2

door, will probably not get much actual use. Also, use large enough fonts so
that ICs over 40 can read them. Standard fire protection symbols on build­
ing/area diagrams present an easy way to locate major factors that will affect
operations. Unfortunately, some of the typical (old time) symbols devised for
fire-engineeringlinsurance-industry risk evaluation are highly technical and
tend to use very small detailed symbols to describe critical features that
become cluttered and difficult to interpret. Such symbols simply were not
designed to be used at 3:00 a.m. in the poorly lit cab of a fire truck. The use
of currently available computer pre-incident software programs, designed spe­
cially for the fire service, creates more effective, user-friendly graphics
designed for a variety of uses including pre-incident plans, incident critiques,
and other tactical-training desktop-publishing projects.

The standard pre-incident format used for recording and managing informa­
tion for fire fighting is equally useful and applicable for other
operations-haz-mat, EMS, special-rescue, law-enforcement, etc.

THE TACTICAL WORK SHEET

The IC must stay aware of and keep track of the various task assignments and
the incident organization developed on the incident scene. Having a stan­
dard action checklist and then recording on-going incident
deployment can prove to be a significant command capa­
bility as operations expand, become more
complex, or change rapidly. The IC needs a
standard system that allows the writing and
recording of all important incident-deployment
activities. The tactical work sheet, designed to be
used in the command post, provides a standard sys­
tem that is easily understood by all the players.

The tactical work sheet is designed to record incident

deployment and action during the incident in the same
way that pre-incident plans record information before the
event. These forms go together in a very practical and
usable way to integrate information management, standard­
incident evaluation, decision-making, and operational
direction. The ongoing use of both preplans and work sheets,
often together, creates a routine management approach that can
be consistently applied to every incident, based on the profile of
that event. While single-unit responses do not require lots of tac­
tical work sheet support, having the officer use a work sheet to
write down the address, radio channel, and any other pertinent
response details develops a very positive habit of using the work
sheet as a regular part of managing every incident. Sometimes, such
single-unit beginnings require additional units, and if the work sheet
has already been started, it's lots easier for the IC to now just record the
added-on units. Tactical work sheets should be printed and bound in pads.

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 Chapter 2 Functions of Command

They are a "cheap" IMS tool that produces huge management benefits. In
fact, some departments draw pre-incident plans directly on tactical work
sheets . This approach integrates tactical work sheets with prefire plans, and
effectively connects the two forms. This is a very practical and effective
approach, as it gives the Ie an information-management head start, by having
critical tactical information on the standard work sheet at the beginning of the
event. This approach also sends a clear message that the purpose of preplans
is to provide the Ie with on-line information that is to be used to facilitate and
support the initial and ongoing command of actual tactical operations.

The tactical work sheet must be easy to understand and complete if it is to be

used on the scene. The well-designed work sheet will systematically lead the Ie
through considerations and decisions, acting as both a standard place to record
(standard) information, and a "memory jogger." To be easy to use and effective,
the form should combine a check-the-box-on-the-checklist, fill-in-the-blank(s),
and complete-the-drawing approach. It should record the following data:

• Resource status-dispatched, responding, staged, assigned

• Resource assignment-sector/arealt2:sk

• Resource-tracking accountability-\\here, doing what, assigned to

whom

• Personnel inventory-tracking and accountability of crews by their

designation arrival, assignment, location, and activity

• A brief description of the incident action plan

• Benchmark of completion and times of standard and special functions

• Simple, basic, line-drawing diagram of the incident area or occupancy

(including high-rise floors)

• A standard method to mark down, draw, and track the location of

response resources as they arrive, stage, are assigned by the Ie, and
while they operate

• Activity check list-companies/sectors assigned to standard functions as

life safety, incident stabilization, property conservation, special opera­
tions, personnel safety, and customer care

• A time scale to mark elapsed times and incident status

• Organizational structure----closely connected to unit tracking

Using the tactical work sheet should be a normal part of the IC's beginning
routine upon arrival. Recording the details of assignments, actions, and loca­
tions, as they occur, becomes a critical method the Ie uses to record and
manage critical-incident factors and maintain control. The consistent disci­
pline to complete a work sheet, from the start of operations, eliminates having

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 Functions of Command Chapter 2

to play information management catch-up. It is much easier to record incident

details as they happen, than it is to somehow reconstruct them after the fact.
It can be extremely difficult to attempt to locate and fill in the blanks on a tac­
tical work sheet/command-status board in the middle of a fast and dirty event.
The process of recording orders and actions, as they occur, will strengthen the
IC's conscious, deliberate, decision making. By routinely using this work
sheet, the IC will build a set of well-organized, functional management habits
(remember-staying up is always better than catching up).

A tactical work sheet should be used during training classes, drills, tactical
exercises (particularly simulations), and at incidents so that its use becomes a
completely natural act. If not used regularly so that it becomes a habit, it will
be difficult for the IC to (simply) remember to use it, or to be comfortable
with completing it, under the pressure of a real-life significant incident.

TACTICAL WORK SHEET ADVANTAGES

The tactical work sheet offers many advantages to the IC Tactical work sheets:

• Record information in a standard place

• Furnish reminders of key points

• Provide the same (standard) information format for everyone

• Standardize communications and information management

• Improve and distribute understanding at the command post, particularly

of the lAP

• Provide a standard format to record and track

responding/staged/assigned resources

• Support the command-transfer process

• Compile useful information for the command-post staff

• Support on-going, situation-status evaluation throughout the incident

• Provide a standard, fill-in matrix to identify the incident organization

and assignments within that organization

• Furnish an ongoing tactical-status, accounting, and inventory system

• Provide standard recording for unit/sector accountability

• Connect time with standard benchmarks and personnel safety

• Provide a basic diary of the event

• Act as a training tool

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Chapter 2 Functions of Command

The Ie should start the work sheet as early as possible, to help establish con­
trol at the beginning of the event, when command and control is the most
possible to capture. It also will increase the Ie's ability to continue and main­
tain control as the operation expands, and additional responders have arrived
on the incident scene, and are operating ill! more places, doing more tasks. If
the tactical work sheet wasn't started when there were two or three companies
on the scene, it will be very difficult to do so accurately after a mob of
responders arrive, are assigned, and go to work within a bigger organization to
different places doing different tasks. This detailed awareness of operations is
well worth the time invested in completing the work sheet. The best way to
avoid confusion is to maintain control, never letting confusion surface.
Tactical work sheet use produces proactive habits, instead of reactive respons­
es, in the Ie. This basic change creates the capability for the Ie to control
tactical circumstances, instead of the opposite. While helpers and command
partners can assist the Ie in many supportive ways, the responsibility to con­
trol operations always rests with the grand poobah (Ie). No one else will (or
really can) maintain control for the Ie.

A critical part of maintaining overall control of the incident is the Ie's ongo­
ing capability to effectively run an on-line inventory and status-keeping
system of the resources assigned to the incident. Using the tactical work sheet
is the quickest and consistently most effective way to do this. The sheet has a
standard place to record the units assigned to the incident, a column to check
off those units as they stage, and a column to briefly list the details of their
assignment. The Ie can mark down their location on the incident diagram and
note their sector assignment. The Ie is always responsible for maintaining a
real-time awareness of the location and function of all incident resources, and
using the tactical work sheet becomes a major deployment-management tool
in completing that responsibility.

Be careful of overlooking or underrating the importance of tactical work sheets

because the form (and approach) is so simple. In fact, that is the reason they
work so well. The Ie needs straightforward, basic, non-algebraic management
tools that are instantly usable and effective. During the quick, and many times
confusing initial stages of operations, a lucid Ie with an engaged brain, a tacti­
cal work sheet, and a #2 pencil can assign and control a rapidly arriving first
alarm before the most sophisticated electronic system gets the password
entered and checked. Big-deal, long-term. management-support systems are
absolutely required for big-deal, long-term operations, but for fast and dirty,
routine, local operations, simple stuff like tactical work sheets really works
well. The use of work sheets consistently helps create effectively managed
organizational beginnings that provide an effective launching pad for expanded
and more sophisticated information-management systems during longer-term
operations. The sheet can be a tremendous crutch and mind jogger for the Ie.
Preprinted tactical work sheets allow the Ie to log information in the same
place on the form at each incident. Standardizing the location of data on the
work sheet facilitates rapid transfer of both information and command because
the receiver can expect to find information without the need to search for it.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 2

Tactical work sheets should be a regular, official form habitually used by

everyone in the organization. The form should include the areas and activities
that are critical for that particular agency. While a lot of stuff on the work
sheet is standard and pretty timeless, work sheet content and form should shift
over time to lead us through peJiormance, technique, and operational changes
we implement for continual improvement. It's pretty easy to put a little, new
section on the work sheet to help remind everyone of some current IMS
improvement or tactical/operations project. Don't engrave tactical work
sheets on tablets of granite-changing them in a slow, steady way over time
as the organization continues to refine the command and operational system,
creates the capability to connect new, progressive stuff directly to the Ie at
show time, in a dynamic and very practical way.

THE EVALUATION SYSTEM

A functional incident-evaluation system evaluates and considers current condi­
tions to develop quick initial action. The system also forecasts conditions and
outcomes to prevent surprises and provides the information necessary to stay
ahead of the incident power curve. A fast, initial size up gives the Ie a "snap­
shot" of the existing conditions at the beginning of operations. The Ie must:

• Evaluate the critical factors

• Select the correct strategy

• Develop an incident action plan (tactical)

• Translate the plan into tasks

• Assign responders (by giving orders) to go to work on and complete

those assigned tasks

While the initial "snapshot" is critical to starting operations effectively, the Ie

is at a serious disadvantage when he/she considers conditions only within the
single dimension of the current time of the initial "snapshot." Without an
effective method to realistically forecast the future, the Ie will constantly be
responding to surprises generated by changing conditions. In order to stay
ahead of the event, the Ie must use an evaluation system that considers,
accounts for, and forecasts future changes and needs. If the Ie does not do
this, the action plan can get behind changes that occur along the incident time
line and the event will simply outrun the outdated information, and the action
plan based on that obsolete information. When this occurs (oops!), we are out

l
of position, doing the wrong thing, in the wrong place.

I The Ie must consider time as a standard (and critical) incident factor. This
I orientation of how many ticktocks it takes for the present to become the future
[
~
I creates the capability to combine and connect that time line with the progres-
~

The Situation Evaluation

Chapter 2 Functions of Command

sion of standard conditions, as the incident evolves. Where will an incident be

in the five minutes it takes a fire company to get on that side, as assigned?
How long will it take to get on that side with a hose line?
These are basic examples of how the Ie must consider
time as a standard incident factor. Time moves for­
ward in a predictable way. Standard conditions
keep changing-also in predictable ways that are
connected to that changing time line. The matching of
times and conditions produces a scale that represents what is
really occurring and what 'vV ill occur at the incident. The basic
objective of the Ie is to intenupt the natural evolution of the
incident problem, and to make that problem go away. The fore­
cast along a standard scale allows the Ie to visualize and operate through the
incident cycle, from beginning to end-\\ herever the incident eventually ends
(and yes, Virginia, they all eventually will end). This evaluation-and-forecast­
ing approach allows the Ie to first pinpoint exactly where current conditions
are on the scale, and then to connect a standard operational response to that
condition. It allows the Ie to project an evaluation along the scale, essentially
predict the future (expressed in time) , and then effectively create the action
that matches the anticipated stage. The Ie uses the forecast to intervene and
solve that specific incident problem(s) by getting and staying ahead of chang­
ing conditions.

An ongoing evaluation challenge to the Ie involves setting up the incident­

action plan to match CUlTent conditions, and then to evaluate how well that
action is working. It's really a pretty simple process-either the plan works
and conditions get better, or the plan doesn't work, and conditions get more
severe (as the pilots say, "Push the stick forward, the houses get bigger; pull
the stick back the houses get smaller"). Where/when the plan doesn't work,
the Ie must use the standard scale to connect correct action with curre'nt con­
ditions. The scale becomes the fast and cirty frame of reference the Ie uses to
make this critical connection (actions with conditions). In effect, the Ie is
playing a game with the major, dynamic incident factors by continually trying
to convert conditions that are out of control, to being under control. Very little
stays the same during active incident stages, so like most games this contest
occurs within the limited time frame of keeping the incident problem from
wrecking the viability of what is left to save. There is only so much time for
the Ie to win; simply, because out-of-control conditions damage and destroy
people and property. The Ie uses the standard forecast scale as the basic eval­
uation-and-prediction structure to be quick, agile, and responsive. The Ie
must develop the ability to accurately estimate the time it takes to get opera­
tions going. This becomes particularly critical as conditions evolve along the
scale. It takes time to get resources in place and operating and, if the Ie miss­
es estimating and placing these times on the scale, the efforts show up behind ,
instead of ahead of, incident conditions . When this occurs, the Ie must adjust
the response to prevent "chasing" the incident problem.

The Situation Evaluation

 Functions of Command Chapter

Using the standard scale of both where we are now and what will happen in the
future becomes the basis for moving from reactive to proactive (reactive=sur­
prise, proactive=plan). The Ie should ask : If I were the fire trying to get away
from this plan-where would I go? If the Ie can predict the answer, he/she
mLlst get ahead of the problem, cut it off, and control conditions (the world­ 1.
class hockey guy said, "I figure out where the puck is going to be, and I skate
there"). The ongoing use of this situation-evaluation-and-reac tion approach
continually convelis actual incident outcomes into the big deal "experience
bank ." Expanding and refining this base of intelligence makes understanding
2.
how incidents actually evolve less mysterious. The "experience bank" collects
the pieces and parts of incidents that are similar and recurring, and connects
them to standard organizational responses that effectively handle those condi­
tions. Those standard organizational responses become almost automatic
wherever those conditions are encountered. This automatic local response to 3.
stuff we know about gives the Ie and the team the capability to quickly deal
with the "knowns" and then concentrate on the special, unusual stuff we do not
know about (yet). This information evolution and capability accumulation
causes us to get individually and collectively smarter over time, and eliminates
the need for us to evaluate, decide, and manage conditions we have seen lots of 4.
times, as if we were seeing them for the first time.

MATCHING ACTIONS TO CONDITIONS

5.
Structure fires (as an example of this forecasting-and-action-plan approach)
progress through fairly standard stages. Actions can be matched to fire condi­
tions on a one-to-one scale. Figure A shows this correlation. Thi s scale gives
the Ie a picture of the full range of fire stages both inside and outside the
original fire structure, and begins to link the proper fire-fighting action s and 6.
resource utilization to conditions (expressed in standard stages) with time pro­
gressions. The scale provides an operations curve that outlines the beginning,
middle, and end of the fire and the link between them-simply, there are only
so many stages. As we said , "Virginia-all fires go out eventually."
7.
Most (other than fire) types of events also move along a fairly standard time
line. This standard progression creates the capability for the Ie to understand
and forecast how the incident will occur, and improves the IC's ability to con­
nect effective action to current and predicted conditions. This forecasting 8.
approach gives the Ie the capability to control
circumstances by getting ahead of them, rather
than reacting to them by chasing them.

The ongoing LIse of the evaluation-predic­ 9.

tion scale (as a frame of reference) also
creates the capability to refine our under­
standing of how connecting standard action
to standard conditions produces standard 10.
outcomes. The three standard parts of "stan­
dard" : Figure A

The Situation Evaluation

I-"~ --
hapter 2 Functions of Command

• conditions = critical factors

• action = SOPs/training/appiication/critique/revision

• outcome = result action has on conditions

This understanding produces a hefty dose of reality for the IMS players that
over time begins to eliminate any unrealistic expectations that the IC and the
response team might have about their abili:y to always save the world (at least
the real one). Simply, the actual conditions we inherit at the incident must
drive the action we create, and the relationship of the two (conditions/actions)
becomes the outcome. The more we standardize that food chain, the more
consistent, predictable, and realistic the whole process becomes. Emergency
responders must be optimistic souls who get up in the morning (or the middle
of the night) motivated by the feeling that they can do some good. The reality
of the three standard parts of "standard" should not be discouraging, because
it describes as much what we can save by creating standard action, as it
describes what is lost based on what happened before we arrived.

TIME MANAGEMENT
As stated in the previous section, typical incident conditions are very dynamic
and will seldom stay static. Simply, things will get more or less severe as the
incident evolves. These changes will occur with us, or without us; the point
of our response is to cause conditions to get better, as quickly as possible.
These changes (however they occur) necessarily occur within a time frame.

The element of time at the incident is standard, uniform, and absolutely unfor­
giving. This reality makes time management a critical command requirement.
The command system must develop standa.rd procedures and techniques to
maintain an awareness of incident and operational times, and then manage
within a realistic and accurate time framework. Incident danger, urgency, and
pressure can all create a major time distraction and distortion . A fairly com­
mon reaction when a busy Incident Commander gets the (very accurate)
twenty-minute elapsed-time-on-scene notification from dispatch is, "We just
got here." This time compression reflects how easy it is to lose track of time
during active, intense operations.

Virtually everything at the incident occurs along a time line. Both the event­
evolution profile and our response-and-intervention profile are a function of
combining time and a combination of regular and special elements. We con­
tinually refer to burn times on the fireground: ignition time, flashover time,
collapse time, SCBA time, etc. EMS has "golden" times: 10 minutes, 30 min­
utes, 1 hour, etc. Hazmat has release times, BLEVE time, vapor time,
containment time, etc. Our response is measured, start to finish, in notifica­
tion time, alarm time, response-and-navigation time, reflex (set up) time,
operational-tactical-priority benchmark times, release time, in-quarters time.
Our standard operations are marked in times. Fire-fighting routines have all-

The Situation Evaluation

- ..... -.-- - - - - - - ­
 Functions of Command Chapter 2

clear, under-control, loss-stopped times. EMS times mark extrication, tri age,
treatment, and transportation/tracking times.

The incident-management team must serve as the focal point to manage and
mark time for everyone else operating at the incident. The regular command­
post operational routine should include a time-management support system.
Elapsed-time notifications from dispatch to the IC, at lO-minute intervals
throughout the incident, provide the basis for acknowledging, mark­
ing, and managing event time. The IC mu st specifically
(consciously) acknowledge these interval notifications. A time line
on a tactical work sheet should serve as an ongoing tim e-oriented
reminder and checklist to assist the Ie. Tactical work sheets also can
provide regular compartments that track progress through standard tac­
tical benchmarks and connect time to these regular operations.

The ongoing use of time-management procedures creates regular habits,

techniques, and approaches. If time marches on past the IC, we find our­
selves playing from the catch-up disadvantage.

Understanding the timeframe of incident conditions becomes a critical IC

capability. Knowing how long customers can survive certain physical haz­
ards, how long structures can stand up to fire assault, or how long it takes bad
stuff to go boom is a big deal. Also knowing how long it takes to set up and
get tactical operations going and to have an effect becomes reality therapy for
an impatient IC tapping hi s/her finger on the tactical work sheet, looking out
the command post window, and muttering, "C'mon, c'mon ." In highly haz­
ardous and marginal situations, the command team may decide, allocate, and
mark a certain amount of time for specific tasks or tactical targets. If such
timed objectives are not reached, the IC must "call time" and change the basic
strategy and plan. Connecting time to safety and worker welfare always
makes sense and many times involves the IC moving hot-zone workers where
conditions have not improved and the "called time" has been reached. This is
as simple as the IC telling attackers, "If the fire ain't out in five minutes, you
are!!" The IC must always evaluate conditions, ask the right questions, and
make decisions based 011 all the available information. Consider that condi­
tion s change as the incident problem/hazard goes on, and these changing
conditions make safe operating positions perishable. A lot of negative stuff
happens to us if we are in an operational position that was safe ten minutes
ago, but has gotten more and more unsafe because the problem we are trying
to solve has gotten ten-minutes older, and a lot worse.

TEAM EVALUATION AND REACTION

An important organizational objective is for the entire team to develop an
agreement that connects what the critical incident factors are and what they
mean (tactically), in terms of a standard organi zational reaction to those fac­
tors. This action-oriented agreement emerges from a continual focus on how
important the development of standard incident information is to sound

The Situation Evaluation

Chapter 2 Functions of COTnm,and

decision-making that produces effective operational action and outcomes,

This common team agreement has a powe':"ful unifying and cohesive effect
among the players,

While pre-incident planning gives us critical information about a particular

(single), tactically-significant occupancy or area, it is virtually impossible for
us locals to create a specific plan for the huge number and variety of people,
places, and things we may encounter. We manage the conditions that we have
not specifically preplanned, by developing a standard operational approach to
them, This approach emerges out of the experience of dealing with them in
the past This organizational agreement creates, in effect, a preplan for how
our organization will react to that condition, The preplan agreement becomes
the information-management basis for the operational plays and command
moves that go with that specific condition, This approach provides a common
starting point for the entire team and strengthens their collective capa­
bility to then customize the plan and plays to meet the particular
needs of each situation, Many times, we must invent as we go, and
this team approach connects standard information to the standard
plays that (hopefully) create a standard outcome (there we go
again with all that "standard" stuff), This common starting point
also simplifies the critical beginning stages of action planning and
streamlines ongoing operations because it creates a practical com­
munication and understanding among the players, They know
the stage of the game based on time/conditions, the overall
objective, along with the operational approach, and they
expect the quarterb ack (IC) to call the standard plays
,...."" ...."'LI"'.... THE required to trigger a standard response, This is how we win
BUILDING.
WE'RE GOING or lose, Simply, first and ten (offensive) is a lot different
DEFENSIVE. from fourth and twenty-five (punt), and requires a lot different reaction
(moves and formation) from the leader and the team, That different reaction
had better not be a mystery to any of the participants. After the incident oper­
ations game begins, you can't call a time-out or ask for an instant replay. It's
also too late for the quarterback to settle disputes and disagreements about
what important stuff means, or how the team will basically play, based on that
stuff being present. The huddle is a lousy place to teach the team the basic
plays. Without pre-incident planning and agreement on common factors and
related plays, our game gets confusing and dangerous very early,

When thi s team approach works, it can look like voodoo from the outside
looking in-a lot of effective, quiet, integrated activity that seems to occur
almost automatically with very little command direction. What is really going
on is the synergistic effect of a whole integrated string of internal agreements
and intense practice and application over a period of time, pelformed by a
team, all operating on the same wave length (literally)-when this occurs, it is
beautiful, simply beautiful.

Another important piece of this beautiful outcome is the ability of this

approach to continually standardize the regular incident elements that are pre-

The Situation Evaluation

 Functions of Command Chapter

sented and the things that regularly occur. Over time, the team standardizes
their understanding and approach, and these "go in the bank." In effect, they
have decided how to handle these conditions and when they recognize those
conditions, their response becomes automatic. This frees up the IC and the
team to pick out the conditions which are special to the incident situation they
are working on and that becomes the focus of the decision-making and related
action plan. This approach makes life a lot easier than having to start out at
information zero for every new incident and go completely through the begin­
ning numbers (all old time, recurring stuff) to get to the special stuff at the
end. Be careful of responders with "tactical Alzheimer's"-this happens
when we summarily forget what OCCUlTed in the past, so we must relearn
every lesson, procedure, and reaction at the beginning (and throughout) every
event, because we forget everything we ever knew. While the world to these
dazed folks is always a wondrous and surprising place, it can be a highly dan­
gerous and confusing one. The continued application of IMS and all the many
pieces and parts of the support process by both the individual and the organi­
zation is how we prevent this organizational and personal psycho chlorosis
(hardening of the head).

Continuous improvement is another benefit of the common team approach.

Simply, the more we play, the more we learn-the more we learn, the better
we play. The agreed-upon information/reaction system provides the founda­
tion and gives us the capability to add to our organizational
mentality/capability. Operational experience always produces the new lessons
that continually refine the critical realities and specific details of what we can
and what we can't (and shOUldn' t) do. This on-going process creates a system
and structure to internalize lessons/knowledge and becomes the essence of
individual and collective "experience." A team is not a team until they can col­
lectively visualize, execute, and consistently recreate being in the right place,
at the right time, doing the correct set of integrated actions. A common infor­
mation-management approach creates the critical basis and beginning for this
outcome.

INCIDENT FACTORS

DEFINING INCIDENT FACTORS

The IC needs a simple system to deal with all the basic incident information.
Without such a system, it will be impossible to perform the situation evalua­
tion and all other command functions efficiently. Incident factors offer such a
structure.

Incident factors are a list of the basic items that the IC must consider when
evaluating tactical situations. They provide a checklist of the major topics
involved in size up, decision making, initiating operations, and review and
revision.

The Situation Evaluation

Chapter 2 Functions of Command

Command deals with these incident factors through a systematic management

process that creates a rapid, overall evaluation, and then sorts out the critical
factors in priority order, and then seeks more information about each of them
(critical factors), and then focuses on them. These factors are:

• Customer profile

• Life hazard

• Fire
• Exposures

• Time
• Building
• Occupancy
• ArrangemenUaccess
• Non-fire hazards/problems

• Resources

• Action
• Personnel safety
• Special circumstances

These factors are not listed here in any order. A major situation-evaluation
function of the IC is to line up these factors in priority order based on the pro­
file and needs of the incident. While this sounds simple, it requires training,
experience, skill, and practice to get it right.

CRITICAL INCIDENT FACTORS

Virtually every incident factor comes with a related set of consequences that
can range from minor to fatal. This is what makes critical factors critical. A
major IC information-management function is to identify the factors with the
most severe consequences, and then concentrate on reducing, stabilizing,
eliminating or in some cases avoiding the possible outcomes of those critical
factors . This requires the IC to develop a standard approach to sorting out and
prioritizing (triaging/ranking) critical factors. The IC must train and prepare
(practice) to continually engage in conscious information management.
Incident factors and their possible consequences offer the basis for a standard,
information-management approach. Decisions and the action they produce
can be no better than the information on which they are based (unless you are
awfully lucky). A standard information-management approach is the launch­
ing pad for effective incident decision making and successful operational
performance. The IC must develop the habit of using the critical factors in
their order of importance, as the basis for making the specific assignments
that make up the lAP. This standard approach becomes a huge help when it is
hard to decide where to start.

The Situation Evaluation

 Functions of Command Chapter 2

The IC must create a standard information-management system and utilize

effective techniques to keep informed at the incident. Information is continu­
ally received and processed, so that new decisions can be made and old
decisions revised, based upon increased data and improved information . The
IC can never assume that the action-oriented respo nders, engaged in opera­
tional activities, will just naturally stop what they are doing so that they can
feed the IC a continuous supply of top-grade objective information. It is the
IC's responsibility to do whatever is required to stay effectively informed.

During most critical incident situations, Command many times must develop
an initial-action plan, based only on the critical factor evaluation information,
that is available at the beginning stage of operations. Many times, that infor­
mation is incomplete. Even though the IC will continue to improve its
quality, the IC will seldom function during the fast, active periods of the
event with complete, or totally accurate, information on all the factors.
This is most evident during confused, compressed-time initial opera­
tions. This continual improvement in the accuracy and timeliness of
incident information becomes a major IC function. The ability of
the IC and the response team to quickly be informed, and perform
an analysis of the critical factors that can cause major physical and
emotional setbacks to them (responders) and the customers, will
have a great impact on the health and longevity of responders and cus­
tomers (not to mention their property).

Critical factors are critical because of their physical and tactical consequences.
Therefore, a basic command job is for the IC to first figure out what is critical
and what is not. The IC must then quickly learn what is required to first keep
that clitical factor from hurting (or worse) the troops/customer, and then con­
vert an out-of-control situation (related to the critical factor) to under control.
The IC must realize that not knowing about a severe factor, does not change
its "criticalness." In fact, sometimes the obvious factors can disguise or dis­
tract the IC from knowing about some other more critical nonobvious ones.
Generally, the longer a critical factor goes without attention, the more danger­
ous and difficult it becomes. Experienced ICs must grow brain cells out of
the road rash created in the past, when what they should have known about in
the beginning of an event, reaches out and grabs them later in the event, and
throws them (literally sometimes) to the ground. Such hard-earned brain cells
create an effective (before, during, after) IC size-up capability-such painful
experiences cause the IC in the future to be as concerned about what is not
known and to use the " not knowns" as critical factor information targets. The
ability to sort out the known from the not known emerges from the IC devel­
oping the information inventory we discussed earlier in this section. Refining
this inventory is the natural result of living through lots of incident begin­
nings, middles and ends.

Certain types of information have a much greater bearing and effect on inci­
dent outcomes, especially as they pertain to firefighter safety and survival.
These significant pieces of information are best described as "Red Flags."

The Situation Evaluation

Chapter 2 Functions of Command

Red flags can describe building conditions (structural stability) , fire conditions
(or conditions that are about to change), or any other critical factor/situation
that can quickly turn lethal. Some red flags can rapidly be dealt with and neu­
tralized without making wholesale changes to the overall incident action plan.
Other red flags are indicators that the tactical situation is about to become
very ugly. Red flags must be identified and plugged into the size up.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Any manager can only deal with a limited number of factors at anyone time.
The IC cannot make an effective decision from 150 pieces of information;
however, the IC should be able to deal with five or six pieces. The inclination
to deal with too many factors will soon overload the IC, resulting in chaos and
confusion. Considering this natural limitation, the identification of the critical
factors now becomes crucial. Fortunately, all factors are not created equal and
are not critical (at the same time) in any given tactical situation. Once the
critical factors have been identified, Command must focus on timing and
invest operational energies in them. The major incident factors are listed in
Figure B. If all of the factors that could possibly be present were critical for
all times , during all incidents, the IC's information-management task would
be impossible. The ability to effectively deal with incident information is a
highly learnable, trainable, and reproducible skill that requires planning and
practice ahead of time, then refinement by actually using the critical-factor
approach, and putting prior information-management experiences in the "bank."

CRITCAL FIREGROUND FACTORS

BUILDING FIRE
o Size-area and height o Size
o Interior anangementlaccess (stairs, halls, elevators) o Extent (perce nt of structure involved)
o Construction type-ability to resist fire effect o Location
o Age o Stage (inception .. flashover)
o Condition-faults/weaknesses o Direction of travel (most dangerous)
o Value o Avenue of travel
o Compartmentationlseparation o Time of involvement
o Vertical-horizontal openings, shafts, channels o Type and amount of material involved­
o Outside openings-doors and windows/degree of structurelinterior/finish/contents/everything
security o Type and amount of material left to burn
o Utility characteristics (hazards/controls) o Product of combustion liberation (smoke, heat,
o Concealed spaces/attack characteristics flame, gas, etc.)
o Exterior access o What is perimeter of fire?
o Effect the fire has had on the structure (at this o How widespread is the fire area?
point) o Fire access-ability to operate directly on fire
o Time projection on continuing fire effect on
building
o How much of the building is left to burn?

The Situation Evaluation


OCCUPANCY
o Specific occupancy
o Type-group (business, mercantile, public assem­
bly, institutional, hazardous, industJial, storage,
school)
o Value characteristics associated with occupancy
o Fire load (size, nature)
o Status (open, closed, occupied, vacant, abandoned,
under construction)
o Occupancy-associated characteristics/hazards
o Type of contents (based on occupancy)
o Time-as it affects occupancy use
o Property conservation profile/susceptibility of
contents to damage/need for salvage
o Morale hazard
LIFE HAZARD
o Location of occupants (in relation to the fire)
o Number of occupants
o Condition of occupants (by virtue of fire exposure)
o Incapacities of occupants
o Commitment required for search and rescue
(firefighters, equipment, and command)
o Fire control required for search and rescue
o EMS needs
o Time estimate of fire effect on victims
o Exposure/control of spectators
o Hazards to fire personnel
o Access rescue forces have to victims
o Characteristics of escape routes/avenues of
escape (type, safety, fire conditions, etc.)
ARRANGEMENT
o Access, arrangement, and distance of external
exposures
o Combustibility of exposures
o Access, arrangement and nature of internal
exposures
o Severity and urgency of exposures (fire effect)
o Value of exposures
o Most dangerous direction-avenue of spread
o Time estimate of fire effect on exposures
(internal and external)
o Barriers or obstruction to operations
o Capability/limitations on apparatus movement
and use
o Multiple buildings
RESOURCES
o Staffing and equipment on scene
o Staffing and equipment responding
The Situation Evaluation
Functions of Command Chapter 2
o Staffing and equipment available in reserve
o Estimate of response ti me for personnel and
equipment
o Condition of responders and equipment
o Capability and willingness of personnel
o Capability of commanders
o Nature of command systems available to command
o Number and location of hydrants
o Supplemental water sources
o Adequacy of water supply
o Built-in private fire protection (sprinkler, stand­
pipe, alarms, protected spaces, smoke removal, etc.)
ACTION
o Effect current action is having
o Things that need to be done
o Stage of operation (rescue, fire control, property
conservation, customer stabilization)
o Effect of the command function-is command
established and working?
o Is there an effective organization?
o Has the IC forecasted effectively?
o Is there an effective plan?
o Tactical priority questions: Are victims okay? Is
fire out? Is loss stopped?
o What is the worst thing that can happen?
o Are operating positions effective?
o Are operating function~ effective?
o Are there enough resources? (Personnel, appara­
tu s/equipment, logi stic~/support, command,
water, SCBA air)
o Are troops operating safely ? Do you fear for
their lives?
o Is there a safety plan/organization (RIC, safety
sector, etc) in place that can react in case some­
one gets in to trouble?
o Situation status: from under control to out of
control
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
o Time of day/night
o Day of week
o Season
o Special hazards by virtue of holidays and special
events
o Weather (wind, rain , he at, cold, humidity, visibil­
ity)
o Social unrest (riots, terrorism, etc.)
 Chapter 2 Functions of Command

DETAIL MANAGEltfENT-DETAIL DELEGATION

Incident conditions can present a ton of separate details. Many times, these
details can change very quickly. The need of the command-and-operations
team to effectively deal with details can present an almost impossible informa­
tion-management challenge. No single person (like the IC) can maintain an
effective, long-term awareness of this amount of detail. The longer the event
goes on, the more overloaded any single person will become if he/she
attempts to centralize (and internalize) that
detail management. The way the command
system meets this challenge is to create a
simple plan where the regular incident
organization divides up the incident
detail into manageable pieces . Every
IMS level automatically becomes
empowered for learning, understand­
ing, and managing the details that are
required for effective operation in their
position/on their level-in effect, they
"own" the details that go with their job.
This approach takes advantage of and rein­
forces the standard strategic/tactical/task levels
of tiered command and operational structures.
The IC is responsible for maintaining a level of understanding of the overall
situation, resource, organizational and operational status. Sector officers con­
centrate on information that supports tactical operations, integration, and
coordination in and for their geographic or functional responsibility. Sector
14 is not concerned where standpipe water is coming from-the water sector
is not much concerned about the quality of the hose lays in Sector 14.
Companies must deal with the details required for direct task-level effective­
ness. Simply, the level of required information (details) gets cut smaller, as it
moves toward the task level. When the system needs to be tweaked, the IC
must direct and facilitate connecting that PaIiicular piece of infonnation to the
COlTect spot-the "correct spot" relates to both the actual location on the inci­
dent site and the actual location on the incident organizational chart.

The longer the team practices this decentralized detail-management approach,

the more independent and self sufficient each level becomes. The practice
also refines our understanding of what information needs to stay on each level
and what intelligence stuff needs to be passed along (up/down/across). The
more we practice, the less we have to communicate routine details, and the
more we can concentrate on exchanging high-impact information that facili­
tates the strategic/tactical/task levels helping one another. This makes us
individually, and COllectively, more effective.

The Situation Evaluation

r- '- ­
 Functions of Command Chapter 2

Note: The Ie must be careful of situations (and people) where other levels
(tactical/task) try to delegate the responsibility for managing details
up the command chain that more appropliately belong to that level of
the operation . An example of thi s would be the roof sector officer
asking the Ie where the hole should be cut. Unless the Ie has specific
information or some special need that will make the difference in this
situation, this decision is left to the company officer or roof sector
officer-they should have all of the resources, authority, and informa­
tion needed to make this deci sion, before they get on the truck
(training and SOPs). The companies and sectors should be empow­
ered to work within their areas and to coordinate their work with
related places and processes, without a lot of outside-command input
or involvement.

The effect of this process can quickly overload and then sink the Ie if
he/she doesn ' t redirect and inspire the other (lower) level to deal with
their own details and information. This reaction is one important way
the Ie maintains strategic control and reinforces effective empower­
ment-particularly, when the Ie will coach those that become lonely
or insecure dming incident operations. Such coaching involves the Ie
gently helping and directing everyone to take whatever action is
required to deal with and report on the critical factors in their
area/function. This Ie help also includes coordinating and integrating
activities between units and sectors and providing whatever resources
are required to get the job done. The system is designed for the Ie to
help everyone, and then for everyone to do their assigned job, and to
understand and manage, not dump, their details on other levels.
Organizational detail distortion also can go the other way-from the
top down. This is called micromanagement and is caused by an anal­
retentive, control-oriented boss becoming directly involved in so much
task-level labor detail, that all work progress stops. Workers univer­
sally hate micromanagement because it is a huge barrier to operational
effectiveness. Such overcontrol is created by the people (bosses) who
should be doing (and creating) just the opposite effect. Bosses need to
continually pay attention to achieving an effective (and sensible) bal­
ance between supervision and empowerment, to avoid this
demoralizing (and dumb) practice.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND

COMMUNICATIONS

The inseparable partner of effective information management is simple, clear,

balanced communications. The command post becomes the place where

~
information flow, through the communications system, gets managed and bal­
anced. We can quickly choke on too much communications/information;
.
I conversely, we also can fail when we become information poor because some­
one kept a critical secret. The Ie mu st altistically sort out information
coming in and going out on radio airtime that is controlled on every level to

The Situation Evaluation

Chapter 2 Functions of Command

redistribute the information where it needs to be to get the job done.

Achieving this effective balance takes a lot of experience, skill, and effort and
is a lot easier to write about (and talk about) than to actually create and
accomplish.

Chapter 6 will describe how the incident-organization chart serves as the com­
munications-flow matrix.

This approach requires a simple, standard communications game plan (SOP)

for the entire organization. During difficult incident operations, everything
works against communications (just like information-management chal­
lenges); therefore, responders mu st be trained and disciplined to communicate
effectively within a strong communications plan (SOPs).

INCIDENT-FACTOR MANAGEMENT
Effective factor management is an ongoing part of operations that must be
integrated into all activities. The absence of one or more critical factors can­
not become a distraction. The IC must deal with, or compensate for, the lack
of a specific piece of information, in relation to what incident intelligence the
IC does have. Often, what information is received becomes a clue to what
additional information needs to be pursued . The critical unknowns must
become information targets for the IC, and many times, obtaining that piece of
unknown information becomes a specific assignment to an operational/recon
company or sector.

Effectively managing information targets requires a

practical know ledge (by the IC) of the standard fac­
tors that relate to incident type, size, and stage.
Virtually every incident will reveal some factors
and conceal others. Sorting through this
combination of knowns and unknowns
creates an interesting challenge for the Ie.
Learning, practicing, doing, and then con­
ducting critiques of actual
factor-management experiences refines and adds to the
IC's knowledge inventory of the pieces of regular and
special events. This standard information inventory
creates a very practical understanding of the "anatomy
and physiology" of an incident. The IC must not let
his/her focus on the critical factors that can be seen
create a tunnel-vision distraction from the critical fac­
tors that cannot be seen. Those unseen factors must
become information targets that emerge out of the standard critical-factors
inventory. Effective ICs use that informa tion inventory to develop a standard
critical facts-management routine. This routine provides the information-man­
agement basis for decision making and might include such standard incident
factors (some known, some unknown) as :

The Situation Evaluation

 Functions of Command Chapter 2

• What is the incident hazard? Type, size, location.

• What is my current customer situation? What do I have to do to

stabilize it?

• Do I have cUITent, accurate information on all seven sides? Top,

bottom, inside, and four sides.

• Do I know what is going on behind the layers on all seven sides?

• Where is the incident problem going-how is it changing, and how

fast is it changing?

• What is my access profile (both in and out)?

• Can I control the troops (position and function)?

• What are we saving-does the benefit match the risk?

• What is my current capability to effectively distribute critical safety­

related factor information throughout the organization? Particularly
to the workers in the hazard zone.

Information concerning incident factors will arrive at different times. The IC

learns some things before the event, some during, and some after (some
never). The challenge is to quickly acquire useful critical information, as
early as possible, apply it effectively, and to convert that information into
effective action.

Incident factors represent an array of items that are dynamic throughout the
entire process. Accordingly, the relative importance of each factor changes
over time. Command must deal continuously with these changes and base
decisions on current information relating to the most important factor. The
effective IC does not stick with the initial plan of action after conditions have
changed. Successful operations require continual reconsideration of the major
factors based on data feedback to make action-plan revisions.

The IC must concentrate not only on the right factors but also on the most
effective information form for those factors, and the proper time to ask for
information to decide on actions-packaged in the overall incident-action
plan. The action plan is based on the basic overall strategic mode (offen­
sive/marginal/defensive). The tactical priorities dictate the order of
operations; first life safety, then incident stabilization, then property conserva­
tion, then customer attention-worker safety must occur throughout the entire
event. Command must identify the best source of information for a particular
problem at any given time. The IC must keep in mind that the source for
some information will probably change with time.

The Situation Evaluation

 Chapter 2 Functions of Command

The volume and speed at which informatIOn is received by the IC, has a great
deal to do with the ability to process it effectively. It is possible to put the IC
in "information overload" (too much/too fast). Command support and plan­
ning assistance are critical in such infon1'.ation-rich situations. What is
thought to be a communications problem is many times really an information­
management problem-and sometimes the opposite_

Information-management support looks like a command team working inside

of a command post. The team provides a focus on the operation by maintain­
ing a two-way link to the geographic and functional organization. The team
also continually receives, evaluates, and translates incoming data into deci­
sions that create effective action.

Some factors are fixed and rigid; some are variable and flexible. All of the
factors influence the event and must be considered, but the IC's ability to
change any of them is limited. For example, the IC cannot change the
weather, the occupancy, the type of construction, or the size of the building
(although it will get smaller if it is burning, as the fire gets older).

The entire team mu st then concentrate on the factors they can alter, manipu­
late, remove, and create. Worry about the things you can change; respect and
work around those you cannot. The question at this point becomes, "What
factors can I change?" The answer is integral to the plan of action. Fixed fac­
tors lend themselves to pre-incident planning activities, while the variable
factors are best managed by using on-line visual and reconnaissance methods
while the incident is in progress.

Variable factors the IC could affect would include things like extricating and
treating patients, stabilizing a haz-mat problem, controlling a fire, rescuing,
moving and protecting endangered occupants, manipulating the structure (e.g.,
forcible entry, ventilation) to make the building behave in a certain way, etc.

Virtually all factors exist on a scale or spectrum ; they are not absolute. Size
up involves first selecting the critical fact~rs and then evaluating their severity.
Thi s severity can range from "no problem" to "absolutely critical."

Since factors, particularly critical ones, are not static, they generally get
worse, if left alone (although eventually they all will go away). Usually, the
IC develops decisions and initiates actions in response to the critical factors.
Once the critical factors are identified, reducing the severity of these factors
becomes the major activity at the incident These problem-solving efforts
always require current, accurate, relevant information.

The Situation Evaluation

.-- - - - - - - - -- - - - -­
 Functions of Command Chapter 2

COMMAND SAFETY
The Ie requires good information to make effective safety decisions. Good
information emerges out of consistently starting operations with a standard
evaluation system to determine the critical-incident factors that are present.
The basis for determining critical factors is the consequences they can have on
responders, safety, and welfare. Sorting out and selecting these critical ele­
ments from a standard inventory of incident factors is a regular method the Ie
uses to prevent information overload. The critical-factor selection approach
gives the Ie the capability to concentrate on reaching the standard tactical
objectives and to do whatever is required to protect the troops .

The Ie must develop an information-management plan using a combination of

visual, preplanned, and reported-recon information to stay cun-ent throughout
the incident. To stay safely ahead of the incident, the Ie must forecast where
the critical factors are going and change the lAP accordingly. The use of each
information type will shift as the event evolves, so the Ie must maintain an
awareness of what is going on in relation to elapsed-incident time. Regular,
practiced incident evaluation provides the intelligence basis for the decisions
required both to protect the customers, and for developing and maintaining a
standard risk-management plan for worker welfare and survival.
The Ie must continually compare and balance responder
safety and survival, against the possible benefit of current
operations. The equation must always favor protecting humans
against saving stuff. The Ie must develop and control opera­
tions on a scale that connects big risks with protecting savable
humans on one end, and no risks for what is already lost (both people and
property) on the other end, and the on-going risk management of everything
that occurs in between both ends of the scale.

Effective risk management requires accurate, CUlTent information about pres­

ent conditions and pessimistic forecasting about future conditions. During
incident operations, the future can (and does) arrive very quickly-and some­
times unexpectedly-so the Ie must maintain control of the position, and
function of the troops. Incident control within this context means the Ie can
place workers in operating positions, maintain and reinforce those positions,
and then quickly move those workers to safe positions, if conditions change.
Simply, if the Ie can ' t quickly move the troops out of the hazard zone, he/she
should not put them in the hazard zone. The risk-benefit system is necessarily
driven by a steady stream of current, accurate information that keeps the Ie
ahead of the changing incident power curve. On-line incident management
also provides the input basis for a common team plan. The Ie must continual­
ly operate in a manner that connects a standard response to a standard
condition, that attempts to create a standard outcome. An absolutely critical
part of virtually every standard outcome is that the workers survive and are
okay-simply, we do not trade tactical outcomes for our human assets. This
unified/standard approach and agreement creates the capability for everyone
on the team to predict basically where they will be and what they will be

The Situation Evaluation

 Chapter 2 Functions of Command

doing based on current and forecasted conditions, and how long that process
will take. The approach also structures an understanding of where team mem­
bers should not be, and what they should not be doing, based on regular safety
practices combined with standard information.

A regular part of every standard outcome is that the workers survive, intact
and okay. Simply, we don't have any place in our regular or special routine,
or any part of a standard outcome, that ruins a worker's today, or eliminates
their tomorrow. Well-packaged information that protects the troops doesn't
just fall out of the sky and land in the IC's lap. Such intelligence is the result
of a strong plan, quick information management, and an Ie with an engaged
brain. Those on the business end of the action must have the confidence that
such a system is in place, if they are to consistently survive and be effective.

The Situation Evaluation

.---­
 Functions of Conunand Chapter 2

CHAPTER 2

THE SITUATION EVALUATION

INCIDENT COMMANDER CHECKLIST

• Pay attention to dispatch information.

• Conduct rapid, systematic, accurate size-up.

• Use command positioning for visual information

management.

• Use maps, preplans, and reference material.

• Record information on a standard, tactical work sheet.

• Use companies and sectors as information, reporting, and recon agents.

• Use a standard information inventory to identify critical known/not

known incident factors.

• Quickly identify and react to safety "red flags."

• Structure and time information management around tactical priorities .

• Evaluate current conditions and forecast future conditions along a

standard scale.

• Continually reconsider conditions-stay current and stay connected to

resources .

• Integratelinteract with owner, occupant, building engineers, technicians.

• Maintain a realistic awareness of elapsed incident time.

• Consider fixed factors and manage variable factors.

The Situation Evaluation

Chapter 2 Functions of Command

COACHING VERSION:

Avoid fancy evaluation systems during fast and dirty initial-incident stages.
Look at what's going on from where you are, pick out the critical stuff, fore­
cast where the problem is going, get an information-management partner
(company/sector) on the opposite side from you , and on the inside who can
report on conditions to eliminate unknown/unforeseen information sucker
punches from the back, unseen side, and the inside. Trust your pessimistic
instincts and then try to convert assumptions to facts-don ' t be distracted by
minor stuff-don't let the problem become a monster that hypnotizes
you-avoid tunnel vision-pay attention to time/stay awake/stay ahead of sur­
prises. Don't let a lot going on in the beginning overload you. Sort out and
line up information around tactical priority targets and focus on going to work
on those targets. You must retain your command sanity, particularly in the
beginning of the event. The incident monster will do everything it can to rush
you, overload you, distract you, and scare you. These distractions can make
effective information-management decision making and operational control
impossible. Plenty of people are working directly on solving the incident
problems, so if looking at the monster mas es you nuts, turn your back on it,
and keep the information processing and command functions going.

The Situation Evaluation

FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND

CHAPTER 3

COMMUNICATIONS

 Functions of Comm.and Chapter 3

FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND
CHAPTER 3:

COMMUNICATIONS

MAJOR GOAL

TO INITIATE, MAINTAIN, AND CONTROL EFFICIENT INCIDENT

COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS
The third basic fire ground command function involves initiating, maintaining,
and controlling the communications process. Effective incident communica­
tions provides the very practical connection between and among the
strategic-command level of the IC, the tactical level of sector officers, and the
task-operational level of the workers. Communications also becomes the Ie's
link to the tactical and support command team and to the outside world
through Dispatch. Incident communications is the information "carrier" the
team uses to connect and commit resources, and to create effective action.
Communications becomes a reflection of almost every part of incident activi­
ty. Jumping on communications as the major problem when things go wrong
is fairly predictable, and happens a lot. It should be a strong indicator of how
critical effective communication is to virtually everything that occurs (particu­
larly on and around the command level) during incident operations. Simply, if
almost any incident activity is out of balance, a problem quickly emerges in
some part of the incident communications process. Therefore, communica­
tions becomes one of the major pieces of command and operational
effectiveness, particularly among the perceptions (and feelings) of the players .
The fact that communications is our favorite incident problem, and the fact
that it is so easy and familiar to blame confusing stuff on communications,
shows the importance of having a strong, well-practiced "commo" package
that is closely connected to and integrated into the entire incident management
and operational plan.

Standard Commo System Elements

The organization must create a fairly standard set of system elements to con­
sistently pull off good incident communications. This will help to eliminate

Communications
Chapter 3 Functions of Command

the talking/listening snags that can occur during difficult incident conditions,
if we don't make the correct cOITUnunications investments. These elements
include:

Standard Operating Procedures

A written, communications game plan is an essential part of the overall
incident-management SOP package. These procedures describe the
communications roles, functions, and approach of every operational
level. SOPs become the basis for the standard planning/training/doing/
critiquing package that consistently creates both operational effective­
ness and continuous improvement. SOPs are particularly critical to
incident communications because they give us a fighting chance to plan
and develop the best commo plan, an outline for training, and the basis
to reinforce and commend good commo performance. SOPs also serve
to pinpoint problems when they occur. Effective commo procedures
provide us with a practical set of "how-to" communication guidelines.
These guidelines provide a framework for a standard organizational
approach and provide the foundation to stop repeating (sometimes it
seems like we are practicing) the mistakes that will eventually reduce
and hopefully eliminate the eternal "communications is the biggest
problem we have" cycle.

In addition to SOPs that focus on incident commo (in and of itself),

standard, written procedures should be developed, practiced, applied,
and refined that relate to the commo part of every other standard tactical
activity (rescue, fire control, property conservation, etc.) and every other
organizational component (command, staging, ops, accountability,
rehab, etc.). This sends the very practical message that all commo pro­
cedures are applied and integrated in to everything we do in IMS to get
the job done.

Communications Training
Most of us learn to communicate early in our career by watching, listen­
ing, and hanging out with those ahead of us, while those ranking/more
senior players actually participate in the commo process. While imitat­
ing our elders will always be an important way we learn, in some cases
it only perpetuates dysfunctional communications characteristics.
Continued, uninterrupted over a period of time, these bad habits can
become organizationally "genetic." It's difficult to improve substandard
performance that has been practiced (on purpose). The most logical
organizational response is to provide initial training and on-going per­
formance support based on communications SOPs. Effective examples
and experiences of both ends of the "push-to-talk" radio process
become the organizational models fo r training and operations. Using
the review of actual incident commo to commend good performance
and to coach through commo problems, along with continual review and

Communications
 Functions of Command Chapter 3

improvement of commo procedures, becomes a very practical method to

continually improve the organizational commo capability.

Tactical simulation is an extremely effective training approach we use to

develop effective commo skills. Actually having to "talk" your way
through simulated tactical situations reproduces the setting, pressure,
and personal dynamics that occur during actual field situations. The
speed, size, and complexity of incident operations can be increased as
the student develops command and commo skills within a coached and
safe setting.

Organizational Management
Communications often becomes the "fall guy" for organizational prob­
lems. An excessive number of responders attempting to talk with the IC
(generally all at once), multiple ICs, no IC, lack of an incident action
plan (lAP), compressed time, getting behind and chasing the incident
problem, playing "catch up," and general operational confusion can
quickly beat up and overwhelm any incident commo plan/system. It's
always tough to solve a problem by attacking only the symptoms. This
occurs when we attempt to correct either system or individual perform­
ance difficulties only in the "back end" of the process-something goes
wrong and we gather the participants and scream and shout. We then
congratulate ourselves and think we have fixed the screwup. This
process really applies to commo snafus because so much overall system
confusion shows up disguised as commo problems. Many times the
longer we yell about the commo part of where the problem keeps pop­
ping out, the heavier the camouflage becomes over where the problem
really exists. As an example, continually beating up a sector officer
because he/she can't effectively communicate with the eighteen compa­
nies assigned to that sector is really stupid and will not fix the problem .
Any part of the system operating beyond their effec­
tive span of control (five to six) will almost
instantly develop commo problems. The way to
fix the commo problem is to fix the span-of­
control problem, and (bingo!) the commo
settles down and becomes normal.

Many times the most effective way to trou­

bleshoot and solve commo problems is to take
the long way around. This sys tematic
approach requires the problem be tracked back
to where and when it occurred, how
command/organization/action was connected to
commo when it occurred, and then solve the
problem where it actually occurred within the
organization.

Communications
-------- ----- ---
Chapter 3 Functions of Command

Equipment Support

Hardware problems can and do affect the entire commo operation. Poor
reception, caused by equipment malfunctions, generally cannot be cor­
rected on the scene (like changing a fan belt with the engine running).
Effective incident commo results from a match of good system design ,
effective ongoing maintenance, and well-trained/organized/disciplined
players, not from fancy commo equ ipment. Old-time, simple two-knob
(volume/squelch) commo equipment is pretty much a thing of the past.
The old stuff has been replaced by a lot of gee-whiz miniaturi zed mar­
vels that are child's play for the younger joy-stick generation. The
Nintendo kids understand what LEDs (???) are blinking about and that
to turn the darned thing on you must simultaneously hold down the vol­
ume button and button number seven, and quietly hum yankee doodle
dandy-old guys (author) must be retooled (very painful).

Communications Channels
Incident commo quickly breaks down when on-line traffic overloads the
existing number of radio channels. Multiple radio frequencies give the
IC the critical capability to build a radio net to fit a larger and more
complex organization in big-deal, fast-moving, expanding situations.
Multiple frequencies give the command team channels to assign to sec­
tors, branches, and sections to cover geographic, functional, and
organizational areas. This gives the IC the capability to maintain an
effective span of control and to stay ahead of a changing incident. The
"repeat test" is a good indication of the IC's commo-control level: if the
IC starts asking for radio traffic to be repeated-they are probably over­
loaded . However, the commo-system capability that is in place is what
you 've got, and the IC must work within actual local radio-frequency
realities. Having every number of channels (from one to a lot) has its
own set of challenges: It's pretty easy to go berserk and lose control of
lots of channels-conversely, a single channel can get overloaded pretty
quickly. Effective SOPs, on-going practice, strong command organiza­
tion , and on-scene commo discipline are required for every system
(regardless of size) and must be designed and operated to fit the local
system profile. A recurring theme throughout this text will involve
using the incident organizational chart as the commo flow plan. The
use of multiple channels will give the IC an expanded capability to
effectively connect commo management to a larger, expanding incident
organizational chart. Consolidating departments that each bring their
own radio frequency(ies) into a collective di spatch and operating system
(hopefully, automatic) are a modern, smart way to expand channel capa­
bility and to increase overall local effectiveness. With the potential of a
multi-agency response, all local departments must have the channel
capability to communicate with each other.

Communications
 Functions of Command Chapter 3

Standard Language Text

Mixing common language and numbered
(ten code) signals can be very confusing and "COMMAND, WHAT'S YOUR 20?
mysteIious if all (all) of the participants are WE NEED A 10-5 FOR A 918.
ARE WE 10-2?.... 10-4.
not familiar with the meaning and the details. -ZULU KOA-519.
Each group of organizations, who routinely
respond and operate together, must decide on
the commo text format that is the most practi­
cal and effective for their purposes. The use
of plain text (common English) cUl1'ently
seems to be more popular, as opposed to
ten-signals and more esoteric code-number
systems. Where multiple agencies/disciplines
operate together, the participants must decide
and practice the best way to cross-pollinate
incident information and somehow understand
each other's operational and command commo
text. Huge commo problems occur when multi­
ple agencies get together that use different ten
codes--conversely, getting such agencies to decide, practice, and use
common terminology is an excellent opportunity to practice a commu­
nity-wide response plan.

Communications Techniques
While the commo system involves lots of hardware and software, the
most critical element continues to be the "liveware"-the humans who
actually make the system operate. The personal techniques used by
those participants will regulate commo effectiveness and outcome more
than any other part of the system. Personal techniques such as voice
levels, word choice, timing, tone, level of excitement, and degree of
patience have a very direct effect on the quality of commo. Verbal cues,
particularly from ranking officers that indicate sarcasm, impatience, or
disapproval, may put receivers at a big-time (and sometimes dangerous)
disadvantage. Being a good communicator involves planning and prac­
tice to build good habits and managing techniques. This skill requires
straightforward diagnosis and cOl1'ective coaching, beginning by listen­
ing to actual radio transmissions, reviewing commo procedures, and
instituting the appropriate training loop.

Communications

Chapter 3 Functions of Command

Basic Communications Activities

The incident communications process is designed (very simply) to exchange
information among the participants and involves the following set of essential
activities:

• dispatchers answering the phone and getting accurate information

• dispatching responders to the correct place that is experiencing a rep0l1ed

problem (the actual initial dispatch establishes this event as an incident)

• acknowledging the receipt of information and describing the respon se

being taken to that information

• reporting unit status and changing that status (in standard categories) as
units move tlu·ough the regular status stages of operations (responding,
on scene, available, in quarters)

• transmitting and acknowledging the receipt of information, assignments,

instructions, and orders

• the general exchange of information, including condition reports

• giving progress, exception, and completion reports for information and

documentation

• requesting resources from some resource allocator (dispatch, command,

staging, resource sector, etc.)

• transmitting high-priority emergency traffic on hazardous conditions

• use plain-text (non-coded) messages

• returning resources to available status for redeployment in the system

Those separate activities become the ingredients of the overall incident-com­

munications process. We become familiar with the pieces by mixing and
matching them into a natural communications "flow" that is very familiar to
us (because we use pieces all the time). While we don't generally think of the
activities separately, taking them apart gives us a chance to review and
improve our communications performance , refine our incident-information
discipline, and more effectively connect communications and command. This
approach creates standard commo categories that begin to structure what's in
and what's out of the regular system. The above list of regular communica­
tions activities provides a very simple structure of what is acceptable use of
the radio at the incident scene. Thinking, beforehand, to plan what you are
going to say can reduce the content and duration of transmission, as well as
reduce the "ahhhhs." Conversely (for example), there is no acceptable catego­
ry for excessive chatter that exchanges zero information among players who
are underutilized and lonely, those who transmit only to hear the incredible
clarity of their own voice (radio self-satisfaction), or ranking officers who

Comm.unications
 Functions of Command Chapter 3

dominate airtime only to verify and then advertise their exalted existence.
Simply, if you can't move important information, or create effective action,
don't push the button.

Communications Participants
To be effective, the IC must somehow orchestrate an ongoing combination of
these standard communications activities among the set of participants who
are all actively involved with the incident and operate at their own (i.e., differ­
ent) levels. Each level operates with its own special set of needs, capabilities,
and challenges. These differences create a complex set of comm%perational
realities for the entire team. They require a strong, well-practiced, proce­
dures-based communications plan and positive functional relationships among
the participants. While communication, in and of itself, does not put water on
the fire or patch up the wounded, in most cases, the overall outcome of the
incident is directly connected to the quality of the communications among the
participants-good communications = good outcome; bad communications =
lousy outcome (pretty simple but critical). The major commo players include:

• Dispatch
• IC
• command support staff

• operating units

• other agencies

Dispatch
The department communications center serves as the initial call intake and
processing place for the team. Dispatchers are in an office-like environment
that is the very best ("cleanest") communications position among all the par­
ticipants. They have direct access to the most powerful and sophisticated
communications hardware and control of the deployment software that drives SOUNDED LIKE HE SAID,

the overall response system. It is critical that dispatch personnel understand "EEND VUN LAKE

SHUN COW."

the incident management system before the event occurs, and then become ,-------'

quickly integrated into the incident operation, as it progresses. They must use
their positioning, hardware, and software advantage to support ongoing inci­
dent communications.

Dispatch can help the team in conducting effective commo by listening criti­
cally, repeating (parroting) transmissions that don't come through clearly, and
assisting players that are having trouble connecting with each other during dif­
ficult commo times.
ENGINE ONE SAID,
"THEY NEED
VENTILATION
While dispatch can provide indispensable incident support based on being in NOW."
the best listening and talking position, they simply cannot manage the incident
from inside a room that is separated from the actual site, nor should they be

Communications
Chapter 3 Functions of Command

expected to. There is no substitute for the up-close and personal attendance of
the IC who commands and controls direcTly from the scene-"directly" means
the IC is physically on scene and can personally connect with what is going
on, while it is going on (this is what "on- line" means). Any attempt at
remote-control command at normal-sized local events will generally be dis­
connected, deranged, and probably doomed. Large-scale disasters, that
become long-term events require both an on-scene IC, and remote EOC sup­
port. Most day-to-day hometown events continue to be managed at the scene
by an in-attendance Ie. Any system that has a responder whose ignition
switch automatically activates his/her rad~ o mic and blab button should rewire
that vehicle (and occupant).

Incident Commander
The IC operates on the strategic level and deals with incident evaluation, deci­
sion-making, assignments, operational CQ;1trol, and revision to manage the
overall strategy and the incident action plan.

Every command function depends upon effective communications and requires

the organization to develop a local plan that connects their own chain of com­
mand of responders to standard command positioning and operation. This plan
involves, deciding in adequate detail, how the initial command-commo system
will operate based simply on who arrives first, what the system expects the first
arriver to plug into (say), and how those who come in behind the first alTiver
integrate into the plan. Enormous commo problems occur when this basic
front-end command process gets screwed up, and we end up with lots of
responders on the scene with no command (and no commo), or multiple ICs (?)
who produce way too much conflicting command, and way too much simulta­
neous/smushed together commo. It is not so critical how the sys tem decides to
designate who will be in command and where they will position themselves
based on conditions (as long as it works okay), as it is that the commander
develops a plan, that everyone on the team understands, and that they all con­
sistently follow, review and refine the basic plan.

The incident management system generally gives the first-arriving company

officer IC the option, based on incident conditions, of operating outside the
command post in an investigation or fast-action mode, or selecting a com­
mand-mode position and staying inside the command post from the beginning
of operations. These two different positions (inside or outside the CP)
become a big (actually huge) deal, particu larly as they affect the IC's commu­
nication cupability. Both basic command positions have an upside and
downside (like most command decisions). This is particularly true in the very
critical initial stages of the incident. Many times the fast-action mode gives
the capability to quickly capture control of a typically offensive incident prob­
lem while it is the youngest and most controllable. The fast-action mode
gives the IC the capability to combine bot action and command by usi ng
his/her portable radio to move around the incident site and still stay connected
and in command. Portable radios unleash us from the rig radio and provide a

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huge advantage, simply because we can quickly and easily take our communi­
cations with us as we move around the incident site.

The fast-action disadvantage is that many times the Ie is mummified in pro­

tective gear and close to the noisy action in a position where anyone and
everyone has direct face-to-face access to the Ie. All this can become a major
distraction. Effective fast-action operations require strong planning/practice,
effective, simple initial communications, and lots of help from other respon­
ders and dispatch. Fast-action command operations should not last long and
are generally limited to the Ie coordinating only two to three units. In the
most simple terms, the Ie cannot effectively run a rapidly expanding second
alarm from a fast-action command position.

When the Ie selects the command mode and either moves into the command
post from a fast-action command position or starts and stays in the command
post from the beginning, he/she necessarily is separated from direct (or even
indirect) action. The Ie cannot both sit in a command post and at the same
time manipulate a hose line, place a cervical collar, or directly do all of the
complicated, technical plays that are involved in making a hazmat geegaw
work. The communications process itself, along with equipment, helpers, and
the command organization, become the Ie's communications tool package.
Locating and staying in the command-post absolutely connects the Ie to the
communications process and creates a dependence on electronic stuff, com­
munications SOPs, an operational/functional organization, and helpers to
complete the functions of command. A picture of an effective command-post
Ie would show a responder seated inside a rig (command post), listening to
radio traffic (preferably on head phones), talking into a microphone, maintain­
ing an incident status snapshot on a tactical work sheet, and interacting face to
face with command helpers inside that command post. The basis (and huge
advantage) of maintaining an inside, command-post position is the establish­
ment and maintenance of a strong command ability for the Ie to effectively
communicate with his/her resources-this communications capability is really
the only tool the Ie has to get the tasks accomplished that are required to
solve the customer's problem. In a very active sense (for the IC), being in
control really means being able to effectively communicate. Based on this
tough reality, the Ie uses communications more than anyone else on the team
to do the job, and if he/she loses the capability to effectively communicate,
he/she might as well go back to the station and watch the event on TV.

The local day-to-day response system must effectively integrate the inside/out­
side commo positions to make them complementary and not competitive. This
is accomplished by dispatching multiple operating units (such as engines/lad­
ders) and at least one supervisor (chief officer) on the initial response. The
initial-arriving operating unit officer can (in offensive situations) initiate stan­
dard fast-attack communications from a mobile (outside the rig) position, and
when the supervisor arrives he/she can back up that fast-initial attack from an
improved communications position inside their command vehicle. This
approach is simple and combines the best of both inside/outside worlds.

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 Chapter 3 Functions of Command

Command Support Staff

Establishing geographic and functional sectors is the typical
method the Ie uses to cover the entire incident and to organize,
LADDER 1 YOU manage, and maintain an effective span of control as the inci­
WILL BE ROOF
dent progresses and escalates. Effective communications
SECTOR.
I NEED A REPORT becomes the basis for how the Ie connects the evaluation and
AS SOON AS decision-making process to the team to quickly create and posi­
POSSIBLE. tion the sectors that can gang up on, get ahead of, and
overpower the incident problem(s). Basic sector capability
revolves around having a team of assigned sector officers along
with these TV-OPS remote end decentralized from the Ie who
can directly supervise the tasks and action required to complete
each sector's integrated part of the overall action plan. The
number and type of geographic and functional sectors the Ie
sets up become the basic organization that is created and cus­
tomized to fit the profile (and needs) of the incident. Standard
communications between the Ie and the sector officer are used ini­
tially to establish the sector and genera Hy include a location, function ,
objective, and the resources assigned to that sector. Ongoing communica­
tions between the Ie and sector is used to maintain and exchange an
awareness and status of the position , progress on completing tasks and activi­
ties, and needs of the sector. The sector officer also uses standard
communications techniques to initiaJly contact, assign, and continually stay
connected to sector resources. Typically, communications SOPs create a plan
where the stationary Ie uses a rig radio in the command post and the mobile
sector officer uses a portable radio and lot~ of face-to-face talk with sector
workers and supervisors assigned on the task level under that sector officer.

Sector communications capability ranges from okay to almost impossible.

Simply, the closer we get to direct action (generally in the hazard area), the
more difficult communications becomes-for anyone and everyone. The inci­
dent-communications system must automatically (and naturally) accommodate
and integrate both ends, and everything in the middle, of the communications­
difficulty scale. The following are exampl es of what routinely happens on the
difficulty scale at the same time at the same incident: A PIO sector officer in a
fatigue uniform dealing with the news media a half block from the incident in
the cold zone is in a pretty good communications position; an interior sector
officer bundled up (and wheezing) in full protective gear, operating directly
with sector resources inside the hazard ZOEe is probably in a pretty lousy com­
munications spot. The hazard-zone sector officer is insulted by and up close
to the same hazardous and distracting elements as are his/her workers­
smoke, hazmat, dark, noise, danger, rushed, excited, threatened, beat-up
customers, primitive communications equi ment, and other bad stuff (wow!) .
In cases where sectors are operating in such spots, the Ie must use the com­
mand-post advantage to help those sector officers and workers stay connected,
get the job done, and survive the thrill of hazard-zone conditions. The inci­
dent management system is designed to place the Ie in a good command-post

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 Functions of Comnwnd Chapter 3

communications position to help the sectors operating in active, exposed, and

many times dangerous positions, communicate effectively and operate safely.

The IC uses a fairly routine set of sectors in the vast majority of local inci­
dents. This limited (and regular) set provides the elements needed to expand
the organization to match the profile (time/size/arrangementlseverity/nature)
of the event. The IC implements branches and sections to assist in coordinat­
ing and supporting operations in those less-frequent larger events where
incident size or complexity requires a larger number of operational and sup­
port sectors that exceed the Ie's span of control. The command game plan
must structure the radio support that will allow the IC to connect to the
branches, sections, and sectors outside of the CP, while effectively connecting
with the face-to-face communications contact inside the command post, with­
out overloading him/her with too much detail. The detail-management
process we discussed in the previous chapter supports limiting details to a
manageable level.

Operating Units
Responders organized into operating and support units are the critical
tactical/task part of the response system. They are the action part of the action
plan and do the business of our business on the manual-labor level. The reason
that the IC sets up the whole communications drill is not to hear his/her majes­
tic voice, but to safely and effectively get teams of workers into effective
operating positions, and then to support and coordinate the who, where, what,
and when that is required to get the job done. They (troops) necessarily oper­
ate closest to the problem/action in the most difficultldangerous operating
position and in the toughest communications spot. Very active, face-to-face
communications inside the team is used for the dynamic, quickly changing, ad­
hoc information exchange that typically occurs during battle on the task level.

Teams must find their way to their assigned position, and many times they
must "invent as they go" to execute their part of the action plan and get the
job done. Working teams are generally not in any sort of ideal talkingllisten­
ing spots, so they stay connected and communicate physically inside the team
and among teams (close to them) many times by yelling, shouting, hand sig­
nals, pointing, pushing, pulling, grabbing, shoving, grunting, following,
hanging on to one another (being dragged along), and performing standard
roles and procedures that are well known and practiced inside the manual­
labor team.

Another task-level communications characteristic is that operating teams are

many times in position and working on fast-and-dirty problems that are highly
urgent. They are simply very busy (to say the least) in an attempt to directly
solve their part of the incident problem. They are not much inclined to do a
lot of fancy communications during the heat of battle, unless it has to do with
task support, coordination, assistance, or safety (survival). Based on these
roller-derby communications conditions, the IC deals directly with company

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Chapter 3 Functions of Command

commanders during initial stages by giving them an assignment stated in posi­

tion/function/objective. The IC then assigns sector officers that are able to
provide direct supervision and safety support closer to where the work is actu­
ally being done. Portable radios are typically used to communicate out of and
into the action area between (and among) the IC, the team leader, or the sector
officer. Face-to-face communications usually occur among workers, team
leaders, and sector officers within the worksite.

As a standard safety-survival approach, it is absolutely essential that the team

go in together, come out together, and always stay together within the hazard
zorie (basic accountability stuff that we will discuss in Chapter 4). The assign­
ment of members to pelform tasks in spots remote from the team must be done
within practiced, well-known accountability SOPs or with pOltable radio con­
tact between the team leader and the detached member(s). Simply, when team
members working in the hazard area cannot directly connect and communicate
with one another (vision, voice, touch), they must be considered disconnected
from the team, and dealt with as being lost, until they are accounted for (i.e.,
"no-PAR-mode" mode).

Current command and accountability procedures are increasingly using both

the incident-organization plan, radio, and verbal communications as the major
methods to keep everyone connected. State-of-the-art responder safety recog­
nizes how absolutely critical it is to have everyone in the hazard zone
effectively and continuously connected with one another and with the com­
mand team. "Effectively connected" simply means being able to effectively
communicate with one another. This is moving us toward having every
responder operating in the hazard zone equipped with a portable radio.
"Portable radios for the masses" absolutely requires smart SOPs, strong
training, personal discipline, and effective on-going review. Hanging a
portable radio on all responders is so that they can connect with the out­
side world (IC/Sectors) when their P31t of the world is about to do them
in or when they have critical tactical-commo needs. It's not so that they
can call their buddies on the next company over to set up the next ski trip.

We typically operate inside a very narrow window of effectiveness, so

the incident-communications system must be very realistic and practi­
cal to fit the rough-and-ready working conditions of going into Mrs.
Smith's back bedroom to remove a flashed-over fire that is blowing fifteen
feet out of every opening (as an example) . The NASA ground-control folks
take a day and a half to get astronauts into a space suit and in touch with their
feelings before they blast them off to visit the man on the moon. We take a
minute and a quarter to get into full protective gear, kangaroo a portable radio
into a pouch, and then blast off into the hot zone. Mrs. Smith didn't call us to
write a report or form a committee-she wants her fire out, the house left
behind, and she will really remember if we are nice to her. The incident-com­
munications system has to be designed to understand that it's the water that
puts out the fire and it's the words that hellp get the wet stuff in the right place
at the right time.

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Outside Agencies

Incident support and assistance is routinely provided by different agencies

based on the nature and needs of the event. Agreements that outline standard
procedures between agencies and positive relationships become the foundation
for the practice, application, and review required for effective response and
operations among agencies. Outside agencies should be specially called,
based on requests from the IC, or dispatched automatically based on pre­
arranged dispatch procedures that call for agency participation in particular
situations, or when those particular agency-specific conditions exist.

Dispatch is generally in the best position to trigger the initial agency response,
based on reported conditions or requests from the IC, and then to assist the IC
in integrating the supporting agency into the operational plan. Most incidents
require a lead agency that is in business to operate on the main problem (fire,
bad guys, injured customers, methyl-ethyl-death leaks, hurdling meteors, etc.).
Typically, the lead agency takes command of the incident, and the other agen­
cies help them (pretty simple, pretty powerful). Different types of events
require a different agency IC and a different formation and mixture of assist­
ing agencies. Eventually, as the regular occurrence of events just naturally
goes on within a local area, every agency gets to be lead dog and everyone,
over time, gets to help pull the command and operational sled.

It is essential that all area resources get together (way ahead of the incident)
and decide how they will operate together at show time. Communications pro­
cedures among agencies necessarily become a critical part of this inter­
agency plan. Such procedures must outline how separate agencies will connect
with each other's radio frequencies and the definition of a language interface
that causes each agency to understand and connect with every other agency.

Many times the IC assigns a liaison officer or sector to meet with, coordinate,
and assist the supporting agency. If there is room, it makes sense to actually
position an agency representative inside the command post (or at least pull
vehicles together and form a "command village"). In these cases, the support­
ing agency officer can communicate directly with his/her own agency
resources and can interact face to face inside the command post to evaluate

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 Chapter 3 Functions of Command

needs, discuss operational details, and stay current. The basic communica­
tions spirit and approach is moving from the stupid outdated, "I'm in charge
here," to the currently sensible and productive, "What can I do to help?"

This change requires smart, noncompetitive leaders with engaged brains and
under-control egos who model effective, helpful communications, and focus
on customer needs, and not the glow from their full-length, back-lit portrait in
the command post (a stirring, but somewhat distracting, tribute during battle).

FORMS OF INCIDENT COMMUNICATIONS

There are four basic forms of incide nt communications. The IC and incident
response team must use a combination of these approaches to maintain com­
mand effectiveness. They are:

FACE TO FACE-This is the best communications form because the

participants can combine a variety of verbal and nonverbal interpersonal
methods. As they talk, they can look at one another to see how the
other reacts, evaluating facial expressions, gestures, and body language.
Simply, if the receiver nods his/her head and says, "I got it," the sender
can be fairly confident that the message got through. Conversely, if the
receiver's eyes look like the windows of a vacant house, the sender
knows he/she must keep on communicating until the lights come on.
This form of communication is necessarily limited to the range of
direct, up-close, personal contact.

RADIO-Radios provide a remote verbal communications capability

when face-to-face communications are not possible. The advantages are
speed and the ability to communicate with many different people locat­
ed over a large area. The main disadvantage is its one-dimensional
characteristics-only voice. A great deal gets communicated by the
tone of a person's voice/sense of urgency-especially if they are nor­
mally as cool as a cucumber, but now they sound like Pee Wee Herman.
The sound of a person's voice over the radio is as much a signal as any
facial gesture. Incident operations require both a strong radio proce­
dure, a plan, and a positive functional relationship among all of the
communications participants. The IC may become remote from the
action but must not be remote from the coordination and control of this
action .

Radio commo, given its instant-remote capability, becomes the principal

tool that the IC uses to connect with the incident organization/resources.
A lot of IC practice involves becoming radio adept and articulate. In
the beginning stages of IMS development, it seems as though we are
trying to "talk the fire out" (as an example). This is a natural stage of
development, and as the learning curve continues, communications bal­
ances out and becomes a regular, natural, and necessary part of incident
operations.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 3

ELECTRONIC SUPPORT-Incident computer systems are starting to

show up in more and more places. If you are in a department that does
not use computers, or you believe that your department is too small or
too remote to use these devices, keep in mind the rapid advances made
by the computer and telecommunications industries in just the last ten
years. It is predictable that an incident-support computer system will
soon be a part of our regular routine.

These systems now typically have main computers located at dispatch

and mobile terminals in the field units. They can provide on-line dis­
patching and tactical information in hard copy or on a video display.
This advanced approach gives the IC the ultimate in information access
and instant technical assistance. It also represents the maximum in elec­
tronic impersonalization-the computer never expresses anxiety or offers
(or needs) love and reassurance. Now PCs (mobile computer terminals­
MCTs) are replacing the "dumb" mobile data terminals (that have served
us very well) and will offer more versatility, capacity, and support capa­
bility. Also small, hand-held computers will be the field data-entry
machine in the very near future (actually right now).

FAX MACHINES-Fax machines provide another electronic

connection to the outside world and have become a standard
business tool that easily integrates into modern CP commo man­
agement.

MICROFICHE-Microfiche machines also create the capabili­

ty to store an enormous amount of information in a small space.
Maps, preplans, and detailed information can all be transcribed
to microfiche form and quickly called up and read.

IMAGING SYSTEMS-Imaging systems the modern-day big

brother of microfiche, stores electronic images of anything on a
computer to be called up when needed.

PORTABLE PHONES-Portable telephones, such as cellular

and digital phones, can provide a major advantage for day-to­
day, emergency incident commo operations. Their use can
relieve crowded radio channels for some types of messages­
particularly those involving other agencies, responsible parties,
and others in the outside world. Phones are more private for
sensitive/confidential messages than public radio channels,
which are currently widely monitored. They are only more pri­
vate in the sense that anyone who wants to monitor must work a
bit to do so. All it takes to listen in on radio frequencies is to hit
the 01' scan button on the Bearcat. Cell phones are a major cus­
tomer-service support tool. They create the capability to connect
the customer with relatives, friends, and other support folks who
can provide affection, recovery assistance, and other efforts to
reconnect the customer's typically disrupted life.

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 Chapter 3 Functions of Command

Note: In real big deals that receive a lot of long-term media

attention, cells fail and phones die because the system becomes
overloaded. Typically, lots of national media and others descend
upon the event and promptly capture and hold a cellular or digi­
tal connection. This ties up the whole system. Dan Rather is
really not interested in Mrs. Smith's kitchen fire, so the portable
phone system works fine on our local level to allow her to call
her daughter and her insurance agent. Everyone using portable
phones should understand their lack of security (like radio fre­
quencies)-don't repeat the launch codes on a portable phone
unless you want it to be a feature on the evening news.

REAL-TIME VIDEO-Video support from both ground level

and from helicopters is becoming a reality in some places. More
and more high-tech, comms.nd-post rigs are showing up with
high resolution video cameras attached to elevated towers.
These units give the command team the capability to watch the
action on-line. Having a command helper "take a walk" with a
video camera, or a recon unit circlelfly over the incident with a
video camera, and then pop it into a VCR playback unit back in
the command post is a pretty slick (and really pretty cheap) way
for the IC to get a 360-degr~e, God's-eye view of the incident
without leaving the comfort of his/her command-post home.
The increasing use of hand-held thermal imaging cameras and
Forward Looking InfraRed (FUR) systems by law-enforcement
helicopters adds heat detection to the video menu, and can be an
excellent tool to judge fire progress, find hot spots, or to help
find the fire in a large structure.

Video cameras and players are very common, low tech, and
highly familiar to us. Using them is a comfortable and very nat­
ural act. This makes their use easier. Some thermal-imaging
equipment now has the capability to send video signals back to
command. This gee-whiz concept will become a more common
recon factor in the future.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES-SOPs may not general­

ly be regarded as a communications form, but they provide the
organization with the ongoing capacity to evaluate, and then
solve communications problems. SOPs create the structure
for the organization to decide how they will describe standard
conditions and actions and the words they will use in particu­
lar situations. This approach greatly reduces the difficulties in
communicating routine condi tions/actions. A critical analysis of
incident operations during the critique process will produce many
opportunities to standardize and streamline the commo system.
This approach creates a high level of predictability and confi­
dence, eliminates a lot of rou tine traffic, and frees communication

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space and time for more critical traffic. SOPs can be a powerful and
effective communications tool. SOPs become somewhat of a "glossary"
that describes standard commo form and language among the partici­
pants.

COMMUNICATIONS-ORDER MODEL
To ensure that the message is completely and properly received by the receiv­
er, the commo-order model should be used. Before the message is sent, the
receivers must indicate that they are ready. After a message is sent, the
receivers must briefly restate the message to verify understanding. By using
the commo-order model, you can reduce the likelihood that a "handlight" will
show up in the place where you need a "handline" (personal experience).

INITIATING COMMUNICATIONS
From the very beginning of incident operations, the
Ie must use communications to exchange the
information required to initiate and evaluate
incident actions. Upon arrival, the Ie needs to
advise all operating companies of the basic
details of incident conditions, along with the
strategy, and the action plan. Throughout the
operation, the Ie must receive steady feedback
on the plan's effectiveness by way of reports
from operating units and sector officers; there­
fore, it is essential that operating companies and all
sector officers enter the communications loop in a standard
and regular way once the Ie takes command.

THE INITIAL REPORT

The larger the event becomes, and the more resources that become involved,
the farther the Ie is removed from the direct action, and the more he/she must
depend on communications from decentralized areas/functions to complete the
command functions and provide leadership. The original Ie begins the com­
mand, control, and commo process with a brief initial report that explains the
conditions that can be seen from the command post. This report is directed to
everyone responding to the scene, in addition to advising dispatch of the size
up, upon the initial IC's arrival. The initial report also connects those "listen­
ing in," e.g., non-responding companies and bosses still in quarters, staff
officers, and (yes, Virginia) the media, to the initial situation status.

The initial report is not an affidavit of absolute accuracy. The Ie takes a

quick snapshot of the incident (at that initial-arriving moment) to quickly
develop and extend a word picture of what the Ie can see. The report is
updated as conditions change or additional information is received.

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Chapter 3 Functions of Command

This initial report provides a description of the following fairly standard items :

• Arrival on the scene-confirm the address/location

• Building/area size-small, medium, large
• Buildjng height-number of floors
• Exposures
• Occupancy (type)

**** Sidebar H** Sometimes just giving the occupancy name

of well-known local places. adequately describes all four (size,
height, exposures, occupancy) to homey responders, e.g., Ajax
Theater, North High, City Hall (!).

• Event description (may be one or a combination of the following):

... Fire/Smoke conditions-nothing showing, smoke showing, fire show­
ing, working fire , fully involved

... Hazmat conditions

... EMS customer si tuation/scene status

... Law-enforcement situation status

• Confirmation and designation of command

• Action being taken (basic incident action plan)
• Declared strategy (offensive/marginal/defensive)
• Resource determination (return/hold/add)

An agency can add any relevant special item to their standard initial
radio report to fill a special local need.

Since an organized beginning usually leads to a well-managed operation, the

standard initial transmission becomes an indication of things to come. Using
a fire for example, if Engine 1 is the first-arriving unit at North High School,
the officer's radio report could be, "Engine 1 on the scene with a
medium-sized, two-story school, with smoke showing from the rear. Engine 1
is laying a line in, making an attack on the north side. This is an offensive
fire; I will hold the assignment. Engine 1 will be N0I1h High Command."

In this case, everyone responding knows that command has been established, a
basic description of the event, what Engine Company 1 's crew is currently
doing, what type of building is involved. and the basic operational strategy.
Responding firefighters can anticipate going into action on a working offen­
sive fire. At the same time, dispatch can begin to gear up the system to
support a working fire incident and provide coverage to the affected area.
Other types of events would be described in much the same way (as a fire).

This short transmission provides a description of conditions and announces

the establishment of command. It starts the command-and-control process at
the very beginning of the operation. The initial fire ground report helps the
entire team start operations in a standard, orderly, well-managed way, greatly
increasing the chances for success.

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The initial report serves to initiate the communications process. The report sets
the stage for ongoing communications as the incident evolves. A significant
advantage of giving such a standard initial report is that it requires the original
IC to take the time to perform a conscious, deliberate, standard size up before
an appropriate, standard report can be communicated.

The initial-situation evaluation and report serve as command activities that

require the IC to slow down (a bit) to capture control of the fast action that is
about to happen. Taking a few extra seconds to evaluate what is going on and
then having to plug (articulate) those conditions into an initial radio report
necessarily requires ICs to control themselves enough to focus and concen­
trate on up-front incident conditions. The initial radio report emerges from
this focus and concentration. Requiring a standard, on-scene report in a con­
sistent manner, in accordance with SOPs, also forces the IC to do a size up of
certain factors . This can be an incredibly helpful routine to get the IC started
in an effective manner. The initial radio report is pretty unforgiving-simply
because everyone can and does hear it. If the IC sounds lucid and in control
(of themselves), the operation gets a good start. If the IC sounds like a blub­
bering, suffocating hyena, everyone listening says, "Here we go again." The
initial radio report should be brief, complete, and clear. Clear-headed system
bosses should not be distracted by young, aggressive respond er officers who
say that the initial radio report takes too long-they say (to me, a lot), "Pretty
soon we will be reporting the color of the flowers blooming along side two."
The young turks (terrific characters) are frustrated by anything and everything
in the system that slows down their catapult into the action. Taking time to
effectively set up some of the sta ndard beginning parts saves a lot of opera­
tional time (and road rash) in the middle, by connecting the right
people/place/action.

MAINTAINING COMMUNICATIONS

THE Ie'S ROLE

The IC gets the operation started by communicating important information to
the other players. The IC decides on an overall strategy and action plan, gives
specific orders to operating units to go to work, and then establishes sectors to
directly support, supervise, and report on that work. The emphasis in initial
communications is on the IC vocali zing what he/she wants accomplished.
The IC is effective to the extent he/she can transmit clear, simple, understand­
able directions and objectives. Initial (and ongoing) communications should
be centered around the tactical benchmarks-getting an "all clear," "fire con­
trol ," and "loss stopped." Once the operation is set up (responders arrive and
are assigned), the IC begins to receive feedback in the form of reports of con­
ditions that are present, on the problems that are being encountered, progress
being made, and the need for more resources or coordination. Incident opera­
tional success is dependent on this commo feedback.

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 Chapter 3 Functions of Command

As the operation goes on, the Ie must balance talking and listening
(that's why two-way radios are called "two-way") and use the
increased communications capability of the command post

~
o assist working crews. During ongoing operations, criti­
~ cal listening should ideally occur at least 50 percent of
4'i the time (we all ha\e two ears and one mouth = big hint
from Mother Nature) and is often the key element in
rdJ? effective incident communications. (The system should
t;o)) be aware of, and concerned about, those whose hearing is
reduced by promotion.)

During the most active stages of operations, the Ie must use the physical
and electronic advantages of the command post, making command the
ongoing focal point to support and coordinate incident communications. This
position allows the Ie to initiate communications at the beginning of opera­
tions, and maintain it during the active incident stages.

The Ie must control communications not so much so that he/she can talk, as
to use the position capability to help those in difficult operational positions.
The Ie can generally defend himself/herself in the commo process-the Ie
outranks everyone else so he/she can tell blabmasters to "stand by" (shut up).

The Ie must understand that sectors and companies are on the most active,
operational level of the incident organization, and realize how this impacts
their ability to communicate. The Ie must use the communications advantage
of the command post to balance (hopefully help overcome) the environmental
and operational disadvantages that go with the typically active and disadvan­
taged position and functions of the hazard-zone workers. As an example, if an
operating unit has only 30 percent commo capability, the Ie and the rest of
the system must make up the other 70 percent. The Ie does this by taking
advantage of the command post (position and environment), being continuous­
ly available to respond (receive and transmit), and using the command-post
staff (as the incident escalates) as communications helpers to maintain control.
Effective communications control creates the capability for the Ie to clear and
maintain the way for everyone to exchange critical information.

Providing strong, ongoing, communications support and assistance to operat­

ing units and sectors assigned to tough w:xk positions becomes a major way
the command system legitimizes standard, remote, stationary command posi­
tioning inside the command post. This approach also strengthens the
boss-worker relationship over time. Having the calm, collected , helpful voice
of your cagey, old (or young) boss outside looking out for you, getting you the
stuff that you and your folks need to do your job, and sending the rapid inter­
vention cavalry after you when the alligators are about to eat you is a pretty
nice security blanket.

The ongoing availability of the Ie becomes an important factor in maintaining

the communications process throughout the entire operation. From a practical

Communications

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 Functions of Command Chapter 3

standpoint, if an operating unit tries to contact the Ie and there is no answer,

they will generally make one more attempt. If this second try fails, they will
go back to work, choosing action, and skipping communications when such a
communications miss occurs. Their actions may unknowingly end up outside
the framework (and safety) of the overall incident action plan. This is the
beginning of the Ie losing some degree of control over the operation. If
action without communication goes on long enough, the free-enterprise
process takes over, and the Ie eventually (and inevitably) loses overall control.
The best method to maintain overall control is, simply, to never lose it.
Regaining control (of just about everything) is always a struggle given typical
incident conditions-particularly with regard to communications-it's lots
better to grab control early and never lose it. The Ie can control the pace of
an incident to a significant extent by maintaining control of the communica­
tions process and using it to best advantage. Effective communications
becomes a major method the Ie uses to maintain such control. The very criti­
cal bottom line of Ie communications availability is for the Ie to (ideally)
answer incoming communications on the first radio call.

A big part of ongoing, incident control is somehow keeping the three

basic management-system levels (strategic/tactical/task in the form of
Ie/sectors/companies) effectively connected. In this case, what "effec­
tively connected" means is that the task level has an awareness and
confidence that both the Ie is open for business, and operating on
the strategic level, and that their tactical-level sector boss is effec­
tively in place. Operational control also means that the Ie and
sector bosses maintain, and never lose, a connected, on-line
awareness of the position, function, and safety of the task-level
operating units that are working in the hot zone. The incident­
communications process is how this primitive, practical
command/operational connection occurs.

The Ie loses the ability to answer on the first radio call when:

• Excessive radio traffic is directed to the Ie from resources who all

attempt to communicate directly with the IC This process creates so
much radio traffic that it quickly overloads the communications capabil­
ity of the command structure that is in place. This is typically caused
by the Ie not building the organizational structure fast enough or large
enough to keep ahead of incident escalation-simply, more responders
attempt to talk with the Ie on the radio than he/she can answer and keep
track of. They get backed up on the air, and the Ie's communications
span-of-control meter goes "tilt" (i.e., major overload).

• Too many people have up-close, personal, face-to-face access to the IC

They engage in active, intense, many times competitive conversation
inside and around the command post, and quickly make it impossible
for the Ie to effectively listen and respond to incoming radio traffic
from field units/sectors. Refining command-post team routines and
communications procedures is the solution to this dilemma. The Ie

COl1ununications
 Chapter 3 Functions of Command

should quickly develop a support staff that facilitates, not distracts from,
effective communications. Responders generally have a legitimate rea­
son to communicate and should fit into and communicate inside their
particular compartment of the incident organization. The team must
realize something is out of balance when fifteen people are in a line
(take a number) anxiously waiting outside the CP to look directly into
the eyes of the IC (always a stirring experience), while they all attempt
to get up close and communicate personally.

• Radio discipline goes away, and everyone is trying to blab in a uncon­

trolled way, and there is no airtime for any reason. The incident commo
profile is designed to match and overlay over the organization chart.
Combining organization and commo structures how and to whom every­
one communicates, and the whole plan (both organization and commo)
is built on span-of-control management.

• Many times when someone jumps ~hip and gets outside of the regular
communications plan, others go nuts and join him/her, and they collec­
tively produce a big blab fest. The IC must continually patrol the
perimeter of radio discipline. This generally involves the IC directing
that free spirit to repOli to his/her boss in the regular organization, either
DO face to face, or on the appropriate frequency .

• The IC stops acting like an IC and leaves the command post. Beyond
DOD the fairly brief initial fast-action mode (period), the command system is
designed to have a stationary, somewhat remote IC inside a command
post, who can take advantage of the most office-like environment possi­

•••••••
00
ble in the field. When the IC, for whatever reason, becomes distracted
and gets aerobic (outside the command post), he/she becomes essentially
just another field unit with all the communications disadvantages that
naturally occur outside the command post. The command post ain't per­
fect, but it's the best shot the Ie has to stay connected with operating
resources.

• If the IC loses the mental concentration needed for effective perform­

ance, it quickly shows up in the communications process. The IC must
maintain a concentration and focus on both cun'ent and changing inci­
dent dynamics. It is an ongoing challenge for the IC to maintain an
absolutely CUlTent awareness of incident conditions, resource
position/function status, and the ability to quickly respond to their
needs. Working units generally communicate within a fairly small win­
dow, and they can quickly perceive an IC who is mentally/emotionally
out of balance, and behind the incident power curve.

SECTOR REPORTING
During the initial stages of operations, the IC will assign and directly super­
vise responders, as quickly as they arrive. As the incident goes on and more

Communications
 Functions of Command Chapter 3

companies arrive, the IC will begin to assign sector offi­

cers to various positions and functions. These officers
become command partners, and help the IC to build an
effective organization, and to maintain a manageable span
of control.

As already discussed in this section (but worth repeating),

becoming overloaded with too many responders who all
want to talk to the IC becomes a big-time problem that can
submarine the IC's control. Creating an effective incident
organization early in the event becomes a major method
the IC uses to prevent this command!commo overload.
The IC can quickly assign a dozen units to four sectors and
bingo-the span of control goes from twelve to four. This
is the simple, routine method the IC uses to keep the old
head above the tactical-confusion quicksand.

Sector officers receive tactical assignments and resources

from the IC and directly manage companies assigned to
their specific sectors. Sector officers generally use
portable radios to communicate with the IC and other operating and support
sectors. Although face-to-face contact has limited range, it is still the best
communications form and, wherever possible, sectors should use such
face-to-face communications with their operating units inside their sector.
This direct person-to-person communications unloads a lot of radio traffic
from the tactical channel(s) and greatly simplifies incident communications.

Sector officers are usually near action and noise. They are generally not in a
position to provide long dissertations. They need to be with their companies
and dressed just like the workers. Their radio reports to command should
include:

• position (where are you?)

• progress (how are you doin' ?)
• needs (resources and support) (whaddaya need?)
• *PAR (are you okay?)

These four basic reporting items provide an adequate and simple information
structure for the IC to manage the attack plan and support sectors.

EMERGENCY TRAFFIC
The majority of incident scene communications are conducted with "normal"
radio etiquette-if you have something to say over the radio you wait for clear
radio air space and then transmit your message. This is the same communica­
tions model that our Kindergarten Teacher taught us-wait your turn . For
routine communications, this works well. For occasions when someone has

*PAR = Personnel accountability report. .. means we are together and okay

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Chapter 3 Functions of Command

something urgent to report, thi s routine communications model doesn't work

as well (especially if a lot of people are communicating over the tactical chan­
nel). Any situation that deals with urgent safety information (power lines
down, deteriorating incident/structural conditions, etc.), changes in the strate­
gy (i .e., going from offensive to defensive), or other urgent information takes
priority in the communications process. This is accomplished (in many local
systems) with "Emergency Traffic."

When the sender has an urgent piece of information that they need transmit to
the IC (or anyone else), they wait for a clear space in the radio traffic and
request "Emergency Traffic." Example-'"North Sector to Dispatch, give me
Emergency Traffic." The dispatch center activates (in many systems) a special
and distinctive emergency traffic tone and repeats back who made the request
and that they have emergency traffic. Example- emergency traffic tone ...
"Dispatch to all units, be advised that North Sector has emergency traffic, go
ahead with your emergency traffic North Sector." At this point in the commu­
nications process, North Sector "owns" the radio frequency. No one is allowed
to use the ai rwaves, until the NOith Sector clears their emergency traffic.

Using a tone for emergency traffic alerts everyone listening to the radio that
emergency traffic has been requested. Emergency traffic should only be used
to transmit urgent information. If individuals start to abuse the use of emer­
gency traffic, (example-"Overreaction Sector to Dispatch, give me
emergency traffic ... be advised that the building is on fire"), the workers will
stop paying attention.

When the IC changes the strategy from offensive to defen sive, he/she should
do so with emergency traffic. Example-IC - "Van Buren Command to
Dispatch, give me emergency traffic." The dispatch center activates the emer­
gency traffic tones and states, "Dispatch to all units operating on Van Buren
be advised that Command has emergency traffic ... go ahead with your emer­
gency traffic Van Buren Command." "Command to all units, be advised we
are going defensive. I want all units to abandon the building to safe locations .
We will begin defensive operations once I get PARs from all sectors.
Dispatch parrots back the message-HAll units on Van Buren be advised,
Command is going defensive. All units to abandon the structure to safe loca­
tions. Sectors Officer to get PARs on all units."

COMMUNICATIONS WITH OPERATING UNITS

Operating units perform task-level work en the most action-oriented level.
Communications, to them, are even more basic than those of sectors and will
usually involve sending and receiving messages that relate to the following
operational items:

• assignment to a task with a location and objective (where, what, and

desired outcome)

Communications
 Functions of Coml1wnd Chapter 3

• resources, support, and reinforcement requiredJprovided

• supervision required/provided

• safety issues noticed/encountered

• progress, exception, and completion reports

• reassignment when the current task is completed

Once responders have received their initial assignment, e.g., "open the roof,"
there is little need for them to initiate additional transmissions unless they are
faced with unexpected operational or safety problems, or barriers, or until the
assignment is completed. When the assignment is particularly time consum­
ing, they should extend progress reports back to their boss (sector/IC)
periodically, as directed in SOPs. Training plays a key role in this process
because it establishes normal-time frames for task-level operations. Under
active incident conditions, when working units do communicate, they general­
ly have a critical need to do so.

Radio messages sent to operating units must be task-oriented, location-based,

and indicate the operational objective. They should involve a function that fits
the profile and capability of the receiver and can be reasonably handled by the
company or groups of companies. Effective operating unit orders should tell
the receiver where to go, to whom to report, what to do with an objective, and
what resources have been assigned to them . If the SOP and training system
works, they already know how to do it.

CommandJSectors must realize that the ab ility of working units to communi­

cate is directly proportional to their operating position. Working teams, in full
protective gear, will find it difficult to talk. The command system attempts to
compensate for the task-level operating position of companies/sectors working
in the hazard area by positioning sector bosses so that they can quickly and
directly monitor their progress and welfare, and by the IC maintaining effec­
tive command positioning, listening critically, and being continuously
available to respond to radio reports and updates.

There are some current hardware improvements that make commo out of pro­
tective gear better, but the urgency of donning such gear and the limits of
fire-fighter patience with delicate things that need to be "plugged in," limits
how sophisticated and complicated the equipment can be. Simply, responders
will not take a lot of time to get into, hook up, and adju st complicated commo
stuff, particularly during compressed, initial operations. The answer that
matches the real world probably involves integrating the commo equipment a
responder will use in the future, into the regular, personal-protective equip­
ment ensemble-when you put on your coat, you "put on" the radio .

While the IC should maintain commo control and stay effectively connected
to the workers, he/she should not pester those workers. The IC should allow
them to complete their tasks. Operating units should use regular progress

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Chapter 3 Functions of Command

reports as the method to send the re, or their sector officer, standard messages
regarding how the work is going. The cun-ent PAR (personnel accountability
rep0l1) radio signal used in the accountability system (covered in the next chap­
ter) is a quick and standard way to indicate that the crew is intact and okay, and
makes a nice addition to standard progress rep0l1s. Well-placed PARs always
increase the Ie's confidence in those operating positions/functions.

Everyone who has access to incident radio communications develops a very

personal impression of the re, as they listen to that person talk on the radio.
The impression involves both what they say and the techniques that they use
to say it. This impression also includes how much they say. Developing the
skill to produce just the right amount of radio communication is a function of
experience and conditions. Ies who have been around for a while develop the
ability to say what it takes to get the job done, and then not say any more.
New res many times talk on the radio more than they should; res who are a
bit (very) insecure, also tend to pester the workers. res with radio dian-hea
drive the troops nuts. They also give the command system a bad rap because
they create the vocal-micromanagement impression that they use words to put
out the fire, instead of water. A major command technique involves using the
right amount of radio words to create an effective and sensible quantity of
incident communications. We routinely use a rate of water flow (gpm) to
effectively control a fire, perhaps we shou ld develop a rate of word flow
(wpm) to effectively exchange command and operational information. Too lit­
tle and too much communications, both create big problems. The Ie should
talk enough to support the cun-ent command function, trust the troops to do
their jobs, and then be quiet.

As the overall operation grows in complexity, the Ie needs to delegate some

of the responsibility for radio communications to support personnel, aides,
techs, and through the regular command staff, as the incident organization is
expanded. Sharing commo functions does not free the Ie from the command
responsibility to maintain a constant awareness of what is going on, but it
does give the Ie the capability to better listen, and think about overall incident
status. The Ie who attempts "Lone-Ranger" management during significant,
expanding incidents may become quickly overwhelmed.

The capabilities of the entire team are improved by the use of the staff as
communications technicians. A communications plan defining the use of mul­
tiple frequencies, radio procedures, and a team approach to command-post
operations is a major asset. Once the organization is in place, aides/techni­
cians can communicate with support (functional) sectors (staging, resource,
PIO, etc.) on separate frequencies, freeing up the Ie to concentrate on operat­
ing sectors. The whole command-post staff should be directed toward equal
parts of receiving (listening), thinking, planning, decision-making, and trans­
mitting.

Communications
 Functions of Command Chapter 3

CONTROLLING COMMUNICATIONS

THE Ie'S ROLE

The incident communications process is a mixture of equipment and standard
procedures linked by human participants. Once the equipment and procedures
are in place, the human element becomes the deciding factor. The IC must
serve as the conductor who coordinates the human part of the communications
process. In a very practical sense, the IC's ability to effectively maintain and
control the communications process regulates the IC's ability to command the
operation. This really shows how critical effective communications is to the
IC, and to the entire system. Whether or not the IC can maintain effective
two-way communications with the various pieces and parts of the incident
organization will define, in a very practical way, if the IC is actually under
control or out of control, with regard to that resource. Effective two-way
communications also will determine if the IC is controlling the incident, or if
the incident is controlling the Ie. Starting under control, and never losing
control, is a really smart way for the IC to lock up the communications
demons.

Since the IC is located as quickly as possible in a relatively stable atmosphere

inside the command post, he/she is expected to be the communications star of
the incident operation. Virtually everyone on the scene will hear the IC, so
the IC's communications presence and demeanor should set the tone for the
whole show.

Communication (i.e., radio) time and space become a valuable capability.

Competition for airtime can become a major problem. Only one person can
talk at a time, so poor timing can create a system overload that can prevent
everyone from understanding anything. The IC must facilitate and coordinate
who talks, and when they talk. The IC must serve as air-traffic control (pun)
to keep this control and must NEVER allow himself/herself to be knocked off
the air.

By controlling communications, the IC can (to a degree) set the pace of the
incident. This capability, in and of itself, can provide critical time for the IC
to think and plan. The IC controls the communications process, not to prevent
participants from communicating but to facilitate, coordinate, and integrate
effective communications. In effect, the IC is the maestro, the sectors/units
are the musicians, and the SOPs are the sheet music. It's tough for the band
to all start playing together at the same time, and then keep playing, without
the control of the conductor.

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Com/nunications Guidelines
The following basic techniques will improve fireground communications:

BE SHORT, SPECIFIC AND CLEAR-Know what you are going to

say before you key the mic. Choose precise, short terms, and avoid
unusual or little-used words. Common language and standard opera­
tional terms are best understood. Be prepared to over explain non­
routine instructions. Operational orders should be tactical and specific
(position, task, objective).

LISTEN CRITICALLY-Use continuous and intense listening to

focus on current action status. Manage and delegate confusion and dis­
tractions that reduce listening capability. Listen particularly for
situationslconditions that create safety and welfare challenges. A sector!
company officer's tone of voice can say a lot about what is happening.

MAINTAIN SELF CONTROL-Stay under control emotionally.

Continually send a message that the boss is okay (cool head)-maintain
a regular pace with a calm voice tone-both ends of the excitement
scale (out of control/under control) are contagious. Avoid sarcasm,
impatience, and negative stuff. Don't beat up the troops over the radio
(or anywhere else).

AVOID DISTRACTING MANNERISMS-Use a natural tone, strict­

ly avoid whispering or shouting. Speak in a clear, supportive tone, at a
normal rate. Don ' t mumble, blubber, or sob.

PRIORITIZE MESSAGES-Send critical messages first. Maintain

radio discipline, and do not intelTupt unless you have emergency traffic.
(Listen before you transmit).

KEEP MESSAGES TASK ORIENTED-Indicate a specific assign­

ment or task--don't micromanage. Outline what to do, not how to do
it, unless there are special/unusual conditions that require a nonstandard
approach. Those receiving the message need to know where to go, to
whom to report, what to do, what resources they will have, and the
desired results/objective.

BE SUPPORTIVE-Always attempt to commo in a way that supports

and assists the team to connect the right time/place/action. Use positive
phrases, encouraging tone, functional concepts, and courteous language.
Communicate to assist anyone who is having problems or is out of bal­
ance.

FOLLOW THE ORDER MODEL-Be certain that the receiver is

ready to receive before transmitting the assignment, and make sure the
message is acknowledged. A brief restatement of the message is far
more effective and insures complete understanding of the message.
Avoid " ten-four," "okey dokey, good buddy," or other homey phrases.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 3

CO~NICATIONSCOMMANDSAFETY

Effective incident-safety procedures are increasingly dependent on maintain­

ing a continuous commo connection to everyone operating within the hazard
zone. The IC uses this ongoing commo link to evaluate if the troops in the
hot zone are okay, or not okay. Use "PARs" as the routine radio shortcut for
"we are together, and okay." The IC uses the same commo link that indicates
the troops are not okay, and to do whatever is required to quickly move
them to an okay spot. The IC establishes this capability from the very
beginning of operations by creating an effective incident organiza­
tion and then overlapping the incident-communications plan
over that organizational profile. Typically crews/sectors within
the hazard zone use portable radios to connect with the IC and
others beyond face-to-face range. In cases where the IC loses
or cannot communicate with hazard zone crews/sectors through
the chain of command, he/she must redefine the operation as
defensive, and use standard personnel-accountability proce­
dures and rapid intervention to locate and move the troops to a
safe location.

The IC must use the command-post advantage as the base to serve as the inci­
dent-communications team leader, to exchange the information that
continuously evaluates and compares the effectiveness of the incident action
plan, against current conditions. The troops who are operating, many times,
in high-hazard positions must depend on the IC to be effectively positioned,
always available, and concentrating to quickly communicate whatever changes
are required, as conditions change to insure the safety of operational positions.
Incident operations are structured around a fundamental and critical relation­
ship between the IC and the troops. The troops go into the hot zone and do
the manual labor that is required to solve the customer's problem, while the
IC stays outside the hazard area and manages the overall strategy and the inci­
dent action plan that always has the safety of the troops as the highest priority.
The commo system is a major tool the IC uses to complete his/her part of that
relationship.

The Ie's basic commo game plan must include:

• commo SOPs
• con tin uous availability
• use of the CP advantage
• use of the order model
• staff help
• good commo techniques

• ongoing discipline

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Chapter 3 Functions of Conunand

CHAPTER 3

COMMUNICATIONS

INCIDENT COMMANDER CHECKUST:

• Use communications SOPs.

• Start/control communications upon arrival with initial radio report that

describes conditions and actions .

• Use effective communications techniques to keep everyone connected.

• Use organization chart as communications flow plan.

• Use companies and sectors as communications partners .

• Maintain a clear, controlled, well-timed radio voice.

• Listen critically-understand communications difficulties from tough

operating positions.

• Mix and match forms of communications (face-to-face/radio/comput­

ers/SOPs).

• Coordinate timely progress reports .

• Always maintain your communications availability-answer on the first

call .

• Utilize the standard-order model to structure communications.

• Keep communications simple: task/location/objective (use plain text).

• Utilize CP position and staff to help communications.

• Center communications around the tactical benchmarks-"all clear,"

"under control," "loss stopped," and "customer stable."

• Project a good radio image.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 3

COACHING VERSION
Capture control of the communications process from the very beginning. Pay
attention, listen critically, and quickly position yourself to always be available
for incoming radio messages-try to answer on the first call. Continually
direct and connect incident communications in a positive way to help folks
trying to communicate from tough spots. Effective communications is the
IC's most powerful (and sometimes only) tool. Remember, the IC pretty
much is out of business if he/she loses control of the overall communications
process. Always use the command post as your communications field office.
Take your time, don't talk too loudly or too fast. Create a positive command
image by being the incident radio superstar-clon ' t ever let 'em see (or
"hear") you sweat-sound cool-be cool.

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 FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND

CHAPTER 4

DEPLOYMENT~NAGEMENT

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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

FUNCTIONSOFCOM~ND
CHAPTER 4:

DEPLOYMENT MANAGEMENT

MAJOR GOAL

TO PROVIDE AND MANAGE A STEADY, ADEQUATE, TIMELY

STREAM OF APPROPRIATE RESOURCES

INCIDEN~DEPLOYMENTMANAGEMENT

Deployment is the "most functional" function of command. When someone

rings the response bell (Mrs. Smith calls Mabel down in dispatch about her
kitchen fire), we get to go out and mush all of our training, SOPs, equipment,
along with the other functions of command together, and actually get out and
perform (deliver service). Deployment becomes show time for all the incident
players. It serves as the point in our professional lives where we stop talking,
practicing, writing, arguing, and contemplating about it (service delivery), and
actually go out and do it (deliver service). In auto racing this as known as
"dropping the green flag." The green flag is waved by a person who stands at
the top of a large pole over the starting line to begin the race. Old, salty rac­
ing veterans refer to this point, in the time-space continuum, as when the
green flag drops the b.s. stops (Mabel hangs out with these guys).

While all of the functions of command are connected in some way to various
parts of the deployment of resources, the process is sufficiently important and
special to deserve its own separate command function. The IC is responsible
for the initial and ongoing deployment of the resources required to support the
incident operation. The basic objective of effective incident deployment is to
provide a steady, adequate stream of appropriate resources-people, equip­
ment, and systems-at the right time, in the right place, performing correct,
standard action. Well-designed, practical-resource management procedures
and quick, effective, command deployment provide the organizational struc­
ture and command plan that drives the on-line, incident resource-acquisition
and utilization process. Simply, this involves the IC first acquiring and then
effectively and safely using the right stuff to pick a fight with the incident
problem and win.

Deployment Managelnent
Chapter 4 Functions of Command

After the event begins and gets rolling is really a bad time for the response
system to somehow decide who does what, how many and what kind of
resources to send, where the resources come from , how to dispatch them, etc.
It is a lot better to decide this important stuff earlier, and then develop a stan­
dard, organizational-deployment system ahead of the incident. Any emergency
event can then be plugged into that agreed-upon, incident-management
system, when and as the event occurs. As the team plays, over time, they
learn what resources are required to make particular operations work and the
best ways to trigger the respon se of those required resources. These experi­
ences become the very practical basis of the local deployment system that
utilizes the in-place resources we use every day-personnel, fixed facilities,
apparatus, equipment, and organizational Jnd operational systems. We dis­
patch and use these same local resources every day for virtually all of our
at-home service delivery (what else would we use ?). Sometimes we hit the
road with those same resources and play an "away game" to help a neighbor.

These local resources are typically multifunctional, and we dispatch and

assign them to work on and solve a full range of incident problems. We have
the very positive (and very possible) opportunity to standardize and streamline
how we deploy these response capabilities. This creates a very stable and
smooth-beginning routine for each incident response. Having and using such
a standard and natural incident beginning for every event creates the capability
for the IC to have confidence in initial deployment occurring almost "automat­
ically" so that he/she can concentrate on assigning and managing response
resources to solve the incident problem. The overall command system
becomes stronger and more effective whenever it can develop such an auto­
matic, standard response to a standard condition . The deployment part of the
incident-management process has many such opportunities (within the recur­
ring theme of standardize the routine acti,· ity so we can concentrate on the
special stuff). Handling big deals should be a natural escalation of how we
handle daily, little deals.

The basic operational deployment framew ork for IMS has two major parts that
involve the dispatch personnel in the communications center and the incident­
management team, who directly deliver service to the customer at the incident ·
scene. Effective operations necessarily require the two pieces to continually
coordinate, connect, and integrate their activities throughout the entire inci­
dent, from the initial 9-1-1 request for service, to the last response unit going
back in service at the end of the event. The two basic parts of the deploy­
1ilII1fA...t4I ment process are really pretty simple (but absolutely critical to our
~ success) and involve what happens m dispatch and what the IC does at
the incident si te. Dispatch receives calls for help from customers and
must take their best shot at translating the customer's description of the
problem into an accurate dispatch of the appropriate responders. The
di spatched responders then make like the cavalry and head out to the
customer's place. The first responder to arrive becomes the initial on-
scene IC, and he/she takes over the on-scene deployment function from
dispatch. The IC must quickly develop an incident action plan and deploy

Deployment Management
 Functions of Command Chapter 4

incoming resources to go to work on and solve the customer's incident prob­

lem(s). Dispatch and the Ie must effectively coordinate their deployment
activities throughout the event to provide the resources necessary to get the
job done.

This chapter will describe the various components of both the di spatch and Ie
parts of the deployment system. We will project a snapshot of each compo­
nent separately that attempts to describe that particular IMS function. As an
incident evolves, the command system must mix and match the various com­
ponents of the system to trigger the deployment support required to keep the
operational plan going. The Ie must continually match the plan to both the
current needs of the incident and maintaining a tactical-resource surplus to
meet normal incident progression or unforeseen changes. The Ie must always
deploy in a proactive way that orders resource levels, bigger than the present
needs, to prepare for what's next. This "order-more-than-you-need and order­
it-before-you-need-it" approach requires the Ie to combine the snapshots into
a continuous, moving deployment picture.

Incident-deployment activity becomes a major command function that

attempts to provide the deployment support required to achieve the following
basic operational objectives:

• Being bigger-overpower the incident problem

• Going longer-outlast the incident

problem

• Always being able to create

con"ect action to meet the

CU1Tent needs of the situ­

ation

• Being quicker-get

ahead of the incident

problem and cut it off

• Being agile-outmaneuver the incident

problem by always being in the correct spot

• Avoid catch up-anticipate and manage to control circumstances

• Having an ongoing deployment bookkeeping system that supports

accountability and resource-inventory management

• Being customer centered-looking at and solving the incident problem

in the customer's terms-and best interests

• Protect the troops-we all go home okay when it's over

Deployment Management
Chapter 4 Functions of Command

Over a period of time, the deployment system in a local area begins to adjust
to the routine activity that naturally occurs in that particular place. This is a
predictable and logical process and an understandable reality. Our routine,
regular business generally involves small- and medium-sized activity (simply,
we have a lot more little deals than big ones-thankfully). This regular activi­
ty matches the major characteristics of both our customers and the conditions
that exist in our local response areas. While it is a very positive thing to get
good at what we do the most, it can be an unnatural act for our deployment
system to effectively respond when non-rcutine events occur and require our
response system to quickly adjust. Just like the other major parts of our com­
mand system, we maintain the versatility and effectiveness of our deployment
system through ongoing planning, practice, and refinement.

While the pieces of the deployment process are straightforward, non-mysteri­

ous, and highly familiar to us (because we use them every day), it is helpful to
break the separate parts out and refine how we connect them (the deployment
elements) with the overall incident-management process. We should continu­
ally review our local system before (planning), during (application), and after
(critique/refinement) a deployment experience to evaluate effectiveness, and to
develop needed improvements. Such an o21going review can improve both our
regular, everyday deployment practices and assist in streamlining our resource
management approach when the system has to respond to bigger, faster, dif­
ferent, more complex (non-routine) kinds of activity. Making a steady stream
of small, "quiet" deployment adjustments over time, based on our local expe­
rience, can produce a huge difference on our overall operational effectiveness.

REQUESTS FOR SERVICE

The front end of the on-line deployment process involves a customer having
an urgent problem (at least to them), and calling us for emergency-response
service. While the original request for service seems somewhat separated
from what we generally think of as actual incident-command activity, the
request for assistance becomes the critical initial local event that kicks our
emergency response (deployment) system into action. This initial customer
contact provides the very practical beginni:lg of the incident management sys­
tem. How we start out necessarily becomes an important part of creating the
"good beginnings" we refer to (continually) as a critical part of the local inci­
dent-management process. It is always difficult and sometimes it is
impossible to make a good middle (or end) out of a bad beginning.

Folks having a bad day call us because we consistently and quickly respond.
Our workers are very typically highly motivated, capable of solving their
problem, and being nice to the customers. This relationship between us and
the customer becomes the very practical definition and foundation of the busi­
ness we are in. Simply, we are in the bad-day business. The customer's
urgent needs are why we are in this business.

Deployment Management
 Functions of Command Chapter 4

Our customers need easy access to a fast and familiar system when they are
having problems and need emergency service. They typically do not have
time to screw around with multiple operators who each ask the same twenty
questions. Capable, experienced dispatch personnel supported by strong dis­
patch/deployment SOPs, and in some cases computers, provide the critical
initial connection to these customers who need help right now. The 9-1-1
System has provided a standard, national reporting method to quickly connect
with the place and the people who can di spatch the red lights and siren work­
ers to solve tactical problems in need of immediate attention. Dispatch
"owns" the front end of the event and the activities that get the response
going. The command and operational parts of the IMS package cannot oper­
ate until call taking and dispatching occurs. Simply put, responders can't
begin to play until dispatch hikes them the ball. In fact, the event is generally
a big-time secret until dispatch lets someone else in on it (hopefully respon­
ders) by dispatching the call. In a very practical way, dispatch is the
organizational IC until the responders are dispatched. Responders can request
more/different resources, and dispatch can continue to receive, process, and
transmit incident information to responders. They basically share the IC role
while the responders are on the road to the incident. When a responder
arrives on the scene and gives an initial radio report, command is automatical­
ly transferred from dispatch to that first arriver.

The entire dispatch process becomes the dynamic front end of the deployment
system by creating a plan to quickly process and translate requests for serv ice
into response outcomes. The call-intake system must do several
customer-centered things very quickly:

• Understand the event is almost always an emergency to the caller.

• Treat the caller with a calm, professional, considerate, firm, and effi­
cient approach. The event had better not be an emergency to us (if it is,
whom would you call ?).

• Effectively question the caller to get required dispatch information and

do this in a way that shows we understand their problem, that we are
concerned and moving quickly toward dispatching a response.

• Once we have the required information, we process and dispatch the

call in a regular/routine (snappy/accurate) manner using standard dis­
patch SOPs.

• In some cases, we advise and instruct the caller in what to do to protect

themselves or reduce harm until we arrive-this might be as simple as
telling the caller to "get out" (fire situation), or as detailed as instruc­
tions on how to perform CPR (medical situation).

This call-intake process requires two fairly standard pieces of dispatch infor­
mation. The starting point for dispatch is to somehow determine the location
of the incident in terms of an accurate address. This requires a local geogra­
phy-based information system that contains the names of local roads, streets,

Depioym,ent Management

Chapter 4 Functions of Command

and highways, how addresses are marked and managed, natural and construct­
ed-on-purpose barriers and the familiar names people routinely use to identify
major buildings, places and things (like landmarks). This system provides the
geographic inventory of the local dispatch area and must match, speak, and
understand the ways (customs and habits) the natives and visitors will use to
describe where they are, what's around them (and what's going on around
them), and who they are with. This local geo-based information system pro­
vides the basic structure required to connect caller information into a viable
incident location (address).

The capability of the system to develop a tindable address gives responders

the simple and necessary response information to mount up( !), whip and ride
out (cavalry stuff) in the correct direction, and to show up at the right place.
This (obviously) is always a big deal to the customer (who is waiting for us).
Many times it is a challenge to determine the exact event location, given how
mushed up and confusing local geography can be and the typical urgency and
excitement going on many times in the customer's life when they call us for
service. Enhanced 9-1-1 systems automatically give the location of the
caller's telephone address, and have become the state-of-the-art standard (elec­
tronic voodoo to the author).

The second and closely connected piece of basic dispatch information relates to
the type, size, and general nature of the customer's problem . The dispatch sys­
tem must develop, maintain, and manage standard categories of emergency
problems, and these categories become the basis for the type, and combination
of resources that are required-fire, EMS, law enforcement, hazmat, special
ops, etc. Quick, accurate interviewing of the caller using a standard questioning
format gives call takers the capability to place reported conditions into a regu­
lar incident-classification category. Accurate determination of the nature of the
event provides the capability to dispatch, a::, closely as possible, the correct
resource from the beginning. A somewhat pessimistic deployment approach
sends slightly more rather than slightly less resource and eliminates, or at least
minimizes, the delay required to adjust the response to match reality later on
when the problem is older and many times bigger. As the system continues to
operate, dispatchers and responders review specific local-deployment experi­
ences, and this approach continually refines and expands the ability to
accurately predict from the initial call what resource will be ultimately
required .

While standard response categories cover the majority of activity, it would be

virtually impossible to create a system that could identify and then effectively
cubbyhole every special, unusual, and zan) problem a customer could possi­
bly imagine and then create. Skillful, cool. creative call takers and dispatchers
always have and always will use standard system resources, experience, and
judgement to make the process work on, and in between, system lines.

Deployment Management

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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

The Dispatch Process

Dispatch systems range from MabellWaldo down at the local gas station/gen­
eral store answering the fire phone and manually dispatching the community
fire truck on the wrecker-dispatch frequency, to humongous urban public safe­
ty communications systems staffed by a small army of call takers, dispatchers,
and tactical radio operators using computer-driven electronics to dispatch and
support basic deployment activities and elements. While systems may look a
lot different, they basically do the same thing at show time; they quickly con­
nect Mrs. Smith on kjtchen-fire day with local firefighters who can remove the
fire and leave most of the original house behind (as an example) .

The business end of the dispatch process actually dispatches resources , and
this function involves the in-place and on-line system elements, including:

• Response Zones:
The system must divide up the entire, geographic dispatch area into
zones, and assign particular resources to each zone, based on the loca­
tion of the local responder resource (fire, police, EMS, special ops,
etc.), and actual response times into that zone. These in-place,
assigned-response zones become that unit's "first-due" area. The sys­
tem must program the subsequent response order (next closest, next
closest, etc.) of neighboring responders when the first due unit is
unavailable, or on a multiple-unit response. These response zones
drawn over a map of our local area of responsibility (village, town, city,
county, state, galaxy) create a very practical, local-deployment picture
(quilt) by connecting Engine 1 to Mrs. Smith.

Many times, the size and shape of these zones are as much defined by
jurisdictional boundaries, as response times. The development of auto­
matic mutual-aid agreements between neighboring jurisdictions
minimizes delays for Mrs. Smith and recognizes the relationship
between jurisdictional boundaries, the location of local resources
regardless of jurisdiction, and the actual location of the customer and
his/her problem-this recognition serves as the basis for areawide
resource (deployment) planning and utilization.

Note: Makjng old-time mutual aid into new-time automatic aid

involves a modem deployment arrangement where neighbors agree
to drop emergency-response jurisdictional boundaries and to
automatically dispatch whatever resource is closest to the
incident, regardless of where the emergency is or where
the responders come from. When the customer is crawl­
ing low in smoke, trying to dodge ttIe OK Corral crowd,
or holding their breath (not on purpose), they could care
less if the hometowners or across-the-liners show up first
and solve their problem. This is a smart way for us to oper­
ate that recognizes that old-time, get-perrnission-before-you­
go-each-and-every-time dispatch systems consistently produce

Deployment Management

...----- - - ­
Chapter 4 Functions of Command

responders who are too little and too late to effectively intervene in
the customer's rapidly deteriorating bad day. Simply, local events
currently under way, and moving quickly will not wait for the dis­
patch center to somehow get the mayor of Smithville out of the
bathtub to say it is okay for the Smithville boys and girls in blue to
go help Jonesburg because they are closer to where the problem is
occuning. Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) systems have
become the current state-of-the-aIt deployment/dispatch tool.
These systems involve the in~tallation of a radio unit in every
emergency response unit. This radio communicates with orbiting
satellites(!) and makes its actual location known to the dispatch
system. When a customer calls us for service, the dispatcher enters
the location of the emergency, and bingo, the system sends Mrs.
Smith the responders closest ~o her kitchen.

• Basic Response Unit Capability:

The dispatch system must standardize and know the location, number,
type, and basic and special capability of personnel, equipment and
apparatus within the response system. These response assets can be
packaged as individuals, units, companies, and/or combinations.
Standardizing the names and designations of our resources within a
local area simplifies what we call particular parts of the response system
and creates a common understanding of what resources look like and
what those resources can do within our local system. This makes
ordering, referring to, and managing the regular dispatch of those
assets quick and easy. Developing an area-wide numbering sys­
tem is a smart way to create standard unit designations and to
eliminate three "Engine] s" showing up when three separate juris­
dictions all come together at the automatic-aid event and need to
communicate with one another in a hurry ("Engine 1 to Engine 1"
sounds more than a little schizophrenic).

• Resources Status:
The dispatch system must be able to maintain a continuous knowledge
of the current and changing availability of response resources.
Dispatchers must have the capability to mentally, mechanically, or elec­
tronically track response-unit activity as those units move through a
standard on-line status category cye Ie. These categories include:

... In quarters/available
... Alerted/dispatched
... Responding .
... On the scene
... Staged
... Assigned/working
... Available on scene
... Available/returning to quarters
... Back homelin quarters

Deployment Management
 Functions of Command Chapter 4

The amount and timing of response activity (how busy and when that activity
occurs-actually, when it "bunches up") within the overall system determines
how easy or challenging maintaining system status will be. The local level of
activity will necessarily drive whatever on-line support (people, equipment,
systems) is required to effectively maintain system status.

As the system gets bigger and busier, the status keeping and dispatch process
must move from mental to mechanical, and then from mechanical to electron­
ic. This is in no way meant to minimize or trivialize how absolutely critical
the human dimension created by an alert, experienced, nice dispatcher is to
system (customer) effectiveness. The mechanical and electronic system
"stuff' is in place to help real-live dispatch people keep track of activity and
not, in any way, to act as a substitute for these essential humans.

Maintaining an awareness of the status of the resources assigned, dispatched,

and working at the incident site becomes the responsibility of the on-scene IC
(along with the command team), and he/she must somehow keep a more
detailed (than dispatch) inventory and accounting of location and function for
both personnel and task accountability while those assets are dynamically(!)
assigned and working at the incident scene. The details relating to on-scene
resource inventory and tracking "bookkeeping" systems will be presented later
in this chapter.

• Actual Dispatch:
/-The basic initial objective of the dispatch system is to receive and
process caller information through the regular in-place request-for-serv­
ice system that considers incident location, incident type, and system
status (available units), and then triggers the response of appropriate
resources. The actual dispatch of those responders requires a way to
connect dispatch personnel with responders:-simply, dispatchers trans­
mit by, talking and/or typing the information into the "system." This
dispatch information should produce the essential incident "wheres" and
"whats" required to produce a quick, effective response. Responders
listen and quickly jot down basic response details or "rip off" the dis­
patch printout,as they run by the computer on the way to the BRT.

Communications connections between dispatch and responders can

include telegraph, alerting and dispatching systems using bells and
gongs(!), telephones, radio frequency paging, and computer connec­
tions. The form of dispatch can be audible (voice/tone/bell), hard copy
(telegraph tape/printout), a screen display (in-station computer/mobile
data terminal), or any combination thereof. While systems can range
from a "yellin' -down-the-hall" system to space-age electronics, the rou­
tine is the same and basically amounts to: "Get out Engine 1, hit the
road for Fifth and don't walk, assist Mrs. Smith with an unfriendly
kitchen fire. Engine 2, Ladder 1, and Battalion 1 are goin' with you"
(as a somewhat crudely stated example).

Deploynlent Management
Chapter 4 Functions of Command

Complete standard-response information should be given to responders

in the original dispatch and should include:

... type of call

... address/routing/map/preplan page number
... incident description
... premise histories
... responding units
... tactical radio frequency assigned
... any additional pertinent information

ALARM LEVELS AND TYPES

The dispatch part of the deployment process must decide specifically how
much and what kind of resources to send on the initial response to each spe­
cific (type/size/location) incident. These standard-response assignments give
the system the capability to make important resource planning and allocation
decisions ahead of the event. These basic deployment decisions expressed in
actual dispatch-system terms become the organizational software that drives
the who/whatlwhen/where of how resources will be actually dispatched to a
particular event. These prearranged respo:1se assignments save time in both
the initial dispatch and throughout the event. Standardizing this approach cre­
ates an effective level of understanding among the participants based on basic,
resource-management procedures.

The regular dispatch-and-response system creates a very practical way within

the organization to translate the conditions reported to dispatch and those
found by the IC into a standard level of response. Both ends of the deploy­
ment system (dispatch/responders) use the same resource-level terms. The
standard terms that describe these response levels (like single-unit response,
1st alarm, 2 nd alarm, medical response, hazmat response, etc.) become a quick,
effective, standard organizational language. Simply, responders know basi cal"
ly how big and what type of reported event they are responding to based Ol~
what level and what type of resources have been dispatched .. This dispatch
approach also indicates the relative urgency of the event-a report of a dog
barking gets a "cooler" response than a bank robbery in progress (very hot); a
patient transfer between convalescent facil ities gets a different status than a
person with a spear in the center of his/her chest. Dispatch quickly learns
what responders found at the incident site, based on how those responders
adjust the assignment (cancellreduce/holdlincrease the response) when they
arrive on the scene. Everyone uses the common local-deployment language
that connects standard initial and ongoing conditions and resources. The reg­
ular, day-to-day, in-place system also simplifies the escalation of resources by
the IC to meet the needs of expanding, different-than-reported, and/or more
complex situations.

Levels of response range from single unit:, to predetermined response pack­

ages, with combinations of types and number of units. An example of a fairly

Deployment Management
 Functions of Command Chapter 4

standard, tiered fire-department structural fire-response system might look like

the following:

Still Alarm-Special Duty (single) 1 engine

Residential 2 engines 1 ladder 1 chief
1st alarm 4 engines 2 ladders 2 chiefs
2nd alarm 4 engines 2 ladders 2 chiefs
3rd alarm 4 engines 2 ladders 2 chiefs
4th alarm 4 engines 2 ladders 2 chiefs
5th alarm 4 engines 2 ladders 2 chiefs
Above 5th Alarm-Special Calls

The same alarm/response approach also must be developed and applied to

other types of incidents like medical, rescue/special operations, rehabilita­
tion/personnel rotation, brush/wild land, hazmat, law enforcement, public
works, industrial, etc. Every jurisdiction I!!Ust .nt?cessarily _fIlatch the dj~llli-tcb
~~!em to its Q\VIJ lQC::,,!I-~es.2urce and service-d~liv~ry profile.

INCIDENT TYPE
Both dispatch and the IC must determine the type of incident problems that
are present and what resources and agencies will be required to solve these
problems. Typically, the hazardous and urgent nature of the incidents we are
called upon to manage and resolve generally involve a major type of problem
that will be handled by a lead agency that delivers that type of service (e.g.,
smell of smoke = fire department; stick 'em up= police; people scuffeq up=
EMS; funny smell = hazmat). Many times these events al?o will require some
additional combination and involvement of fire, EMS, hazmat, law enforce­
ment, special rescue, public works, or industrial mutual-aid agency.

We also routinely order and use people and stuff, resources from various non­
emergency logistical and technical support services, such as utility control
(electrical, water, gas, etc.), special equipment, tools and supplies, private con­
tractors, rehab stuff, technical (smart) experts, etc. Those support services
may involve the special response of some internal public-sector lead depart­
ment or resources that come from public and private agencies within the
community. Most events are currently complex enough to require the coordi­
nated deployment of multiple agencies who must operate and integrate their
efforts within a unified command structure (Chapter 6). In the beginning of
the incident, dispatch must sort out and separate the pieces of the incident
puzzle and then connect (dispatch) the correct response agency with each
piece. After the IC has alTived at the scene and evaluated conditions, he/she
will refine the initial decisions that dispatch has made. This may involve
"holding the assignment," the request of additional resources, the cancellation
of resources that have been requested, or any other modification that is neces­
sary. This
-- --_._-
" --
is what-. on-line, coordinate<;\.
- .---- .- -
incident dep]9ym.ent
. .
is aILcthout..

Deployment Management

r-­
 hapter 4 Functions of Command

Multi-agency, unified-command operations become the best shot we have at

effectively connecting, integrating, and commanding the separate response
organizations who must operate together at the same incident. This
deployment-management approach requires both operational planning,
training and practice, and relationship management among the different
agencies that operate together ahead of the event. Multi-agency coordi­
nation and statesmanship can be an interesting challenge when we think
of how challenging it is to get everyone from the same agency/shift to
play together nicely. Combined operations among agencies at incidents
will be more effective if we know one another ahead of time and discuss
how we will integrate with one another prior to the incident occurring.
The unified-command breakthrough occurs when "I'm in charge here"
is replaced by "what can I do to help?" This positive relationship
begins with dispatchers for all agencies effectively communicating at
the very beginning of deployment operations and reflecting the "what can
we do to help" attitude.

Dispatch completes their initial deployment responsibility by receiving, pro­

cessing, and dispatching an appropriate response based on the information
they received from the customer. After the initial dispatch, units respond and
begin to arrive at the scene. At that point, the major deployment function (and
responsibility) shifts from dispatch to the first-arriving (initial) IC Nowdis­
patch moves into an ongoing, deployment-support role. This handoff from
• dispatch to the first -arriving IC necessarily occurs at the beginning of the
event, where time is compressed and critical. We put a ragged and disadvan­
taged front end on our response if the initial arriver must struggle to get
command from dispatch or if dispatch has to hassle the first arriver to some­
how take command. Simply, it's hard for us to play nicely after we yellat
each other during a "who's in charge" tug-of-war (among participants from
the same agency!) that occurs during the first ten minutes of the incident. A
consistently smooth transfer of command from dispatch to the initial IC is the
result of developing, applying, and refining basic deployment SOPs.
. '.

When the first arriver sets up as the "resident IC," the command system gains
the capability to begin on-scene incident management. The actual arrival of
an on-scene IC (as opposed to on the phone, over the radio, etc.) is obviousl~
a big deal for the overall deployment proces~ (and the customer) because, up
until now, virtually everything we know about the incident has been the result
of a phone conversation between dispatch and the calling customer(s). Some
cases, such as electronic fire alarm notificstions systems, are even more
impersonal and don't allow dispatch to ask questions. When the IC arrives,
he/she now has his/her own "eyes" (and all the other body parts) on the scene,
and the IC can now personally continue to refine the electronic, remote-control
deployment process that dispatch has conducted over the phone. The major
initial IC on-scene deployment functions are directed toward getting the right
type and amount of resources safely in the right place, at the right time, doing
the right thing. These heroic functions (actually on-site, generally looking
right at the incident problem) include the following deployment activities:

Deployment Management

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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

• Quickly develop an evenUresponse profile.

• Determine how much and what kind of resources are needed .

• Call for additional resources as required, or return unneeded resources.

• Assign resources to complete the incident action plan.

Event/Response Profile
A major initial and ongoing evaluation function of the IC is to determine the
current and forecasted profile of the event. This evaluation and determination
provides the basis for ordering, receiving, assigning, and managing the
resources required to solve the incident problem(s) and reach the standard tac­
tical objectives. This basic event profile forms the foundation for making the
critical initial-deployment decisions that will set the stage for the effectiveness
of the entire operation. The regular situation evaluation (size up) (Command
Function #2) creates the foundation and framework for the IC to make this
profile determination and involves the consideration of two standard profile
elements. They make up a simple and useful three-sided triangular model
where time is represented on the bottom, incident size/severity is shown on
the vertical scale, and the sloping side shows the overall event profile.

The event has a life cycle with standard stages, and everything that happens in
these standard incident stages will always occur within the framework of the
size/severity dimensions. Connecting the two sides creates a triangle where
the angle of the sloping third side shows a simple slow-fasUlittle-big profile of
how the event will occur.

For the IC, this simple event profile becomes the infamous and unforgiving
"power curve." Many times we use this "power curve" to create a reference to
being ahead or behind the progress of the incident. Translated into street
terms: ahead=winning, behind=playing catch-up (losing your butt). The shape
of this event-profile geometry (triangle) describes how the incident will occur
(how big-at what speed). The same general triangular shape also can be
used to describe the overall pattern of how our response is structured. The
typical decentralization of our resources throughout the community (neighbor­
hood fire stations, patrolling police officers, etc.) produces a tiered and
incremental response pattern where responders arrive at different times, based
on their location when dispatched to a multiple unit response. Unit arrival
time can be plotted on the bottom, and the level of response resources on the
scene can be shown on the vertical side of the triangle. The sloping side also
will describe our response profile-or our response "power curve." The event
has a sloping side that describes its severity; we have a sloping side that

Deployment Management
 Chapter 4 Functions of Command

shows our response profile. In real simple terms , whichever "slope" is the
steepest wins. The event profile forms an unfriendly (ugly) picture of how the
incident problem is occurring; the respon se profile forms a friendly (nice) pic­
ture of the response and arrival of the resources that will solve the incident
problem.

The incident-life cycle has a natural beginning/middle/end (out of fuel/we

intervene), and once the event starts, it will evolve with or without the Ie
and all of our responders. The point of our response and all of the
work done by our troops is to intervene in this natural cycle while
the event is under way. This makes it doubly important for the Ie
to make an accurate (as possible) estimate of what the event pro­
file will look like and then effectively deploy around, against, and
ahead of that profile. All fires go out eventually; all injured cus­
tomers either die or get bored and go home by themselves; all
hazmat stuff runs off, vaporizes, soaks in, or blows up and then
becomes a legal event, not a tactical one. We are in business to
quickly respond and create an emergency-services-induced interven­
tion that attempts to interrupt (and stop) the natural evolution of the
"""'::.. event (hopefully, in the beginning and sooner rather than later) .
~~

The basic profile model (time/size) describes in very practical terms the devel­
opment of both the incident situation and our response (deployment) to that
situation. Using the same geometry (for both the event and our response)
gives the Ie the capability to use the same triangle-shaped model to superim­
pose the solution (our response) over the problem (fire, EMS, hazmat, etc.).
Whoever, the Ie or the event, has the biggest, fastest power curve
(profile) wins. This "whoever is biggest" reality forms a powerful,
Ii'ESOUR,,~
LEVEL on-gomg. d ep Ioyment re IatlOns
· h·Ip b etween mCI
··dent d ynanucs
. an d
\ tactical capability, and action. This connection forms the essence
of the most primitive deployment target of the command system:
find the problem, get ahead of it, overpower it, make it go away.
Generally, the incident-problem curve is assaulting our deploy­
ment curve and is aggressively attempting to find us, get ahead of
us, and generally wreck everyone and everything. The Ie pro­
tects the customers and the troops by continually deploying so that
our response profile will stay ahead of, and overpower, the basic
incident-hazard profile.

This model does not attempt to create a scientific or absolute precise picture
of the incident. It does offer a fast-and-dirty way for the Ie to evaluate and
forecast the size and speed of the problem. It also is an equally fast-and-dirty
way to forecast and structure a deploymen t response to overpower that event
profile. The model is used in the rough-and-ready beginning stages of the
event when the Ie must evaluate and decide quickJy to get resources respond­
ing and working on the problem when the problem is the youngest and usually
the smallest-best chance for the good guys/girls to win. In the starting
stages of the process, the Ie is generally in a tough management position and

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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

must do some fast, fairly primitive, non-brain-surgery-type evaluation/deploy­

ment stuff to start the operation (no pun intended).

The model provides a simple, profile-based approach that becomes an evalua­

tion/decision-making/deployment security blanket for the Ie. Strong early
local deployment is critical because it expands the front-end capability to win,
as close to the beginning of the event when the problem windows are the
smallest, and the opportunity windows are the largest they will ever be.
Simply, the best chance for us locals to win is as close as possible to the
beginning. The longer an active, escalating incident goes on, the more chal­
lenging it becomes for the Ie to overpower expanding problems. An adequate
(plus a little extra) amount of force in the beginning eliminates the need for
lots more force (sometimes impossibly large) later on. This reality creates the
need for us to continually "front-end load" our local response and operational
command systems. This involves our always trying to create the "steepest
deployment slope." This approach requires our deployment system to always
send adequate resources (plus some). We must quickly react to the conditions
we encounter to overcontrol the problems that those conditions are creating.
An important part of the front-end loading process involves always pessimisti­
cally backing up our initial operations.

To create these two basic profiles of the event and our response, the Ie does a
quick situation evaluation directed toward answering a standard set of ques­
tions, that produce an event profile (it = the incident problem, you = Ie):

• What type of problem is it?

• How big is it now/how big do you think it will get?

• How severe is it now/how severe do you think it will get?

• How long has it been going onlhow long do you think it will go on?

The answers to these questions will add up to how much and what type of
work (and workers) it will take to intervene, stabilize, and contain the incident
problem expressed in the terms of the standard (time/severity) event profile.
The Ie connects this profile of the incident to the deployment process by
quickly answering another set of closely connected questions that create a
basic response profile:

• What resources are on the scene?

• When will the responding resources alTive on the scene?

• How much work can the responders on the initial assignment do and for
how long?

• How much work is there beyond the capability of the initial assign­
ment?

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Chapter 4 Functions of Coml1wnd

• How many geographic/functional points need resources assigned to

them to cover the incident and get ahead of the power curve?

• What additional resources are required?

• What is the profile of the additional resources that will be required

(who/what/where/when) ?

The IC must automatically, instinctively, and quickly (sometimes very quick­

ly) develop and compare these two profiles (event/response) to call for the
specific additional resources required to bring the response model up to effec­
tively engage and (hopefully) overpower the problem the event is creating.
The longer the overall command system practices developing and connecting
the two basic elements (how much work-how many workers), the quicker,
more acc urate, and "smoother" the dispatch, command, and operational team
can play the deployment game.

Determine Resource Needs

During initial command operations, the IC simply engages the incident situa­
tion by looking, listening, smelling, sensing (gut) to develop a quick, basic
evaluation of what is going on and what will go on in the future. As the oper­
ation progresses, the Ie will develop a larger evaluation-feedback organization
(off-site managers, strong communications, standard-attack planning) that
builds and continues on the previous quick, up-front evaluation. A major
command function involves the IC continuously translating incident condi­
tions into tactical needs and objectives and then connecting those needs and
objectives into the standard assignment of resources. Experienced ICs devei­
op a "deployment math" that cycles aroul1d the dynamic factors related to
evaluating conditions, and automatically translating those conditions into the
following command routine:

Conditions-+ Achievable goals-+ Tactical needs/Obj ectives-+

Operational tasks-+ Orders-+ Action-+ Outcome evaluation and
adjustment

The IC then continues to recycle and apply that same bas ic routine as the
work progresses until the end of the incident. Obviously, response resources
(workers) actually do the task part of the routine. Once we get started, how
well that work is solving the incident problem will determine the effectiveness
of the IC's action plan. Simply, the basic and primitive objective of local
deployment is to perform actual manual labor (work) out at Mrs. Smith's
hou se to make her bad day better. This capability is pretty much regulated by
quickly having enough manual laborers \\ ho can first get in between Mrs.
Smith and whatever is causing her a bad clay, and then stay there until they
solve the problem.

Most of the time, the customer is lucid enough to give dispatch an adequate
amount of basic information to dispatch the appropriate response. They say
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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

that their kitchen is on fire, and when we get there, the kitchen is indeed host­
ing a fire; or they say that Grandpa is having a bad coronary day, and when
we get there the old guy points to his chest when we ask, "Where does it
hurt?" In those places and cases, dispatch sent the units that effectively match
the customer's description (accurate enough) of the problem. In these situa­
tions, the IC generally holds the amount and type of resources (responders and
equipment) required to solve the customer's problem. Then, when the work is
all done, the IC and the troops go back to whatever they were doing before the
call.

Some other times, the IC anives, does a quick evaluation (that again creates
our standard profile triangle), and discovers that the kitchen fire is the result
of being on side three of a working warehouse fire-or that Grandpa's chest
pain was the result of being involved in a gunfight down at the OK
Corral(!) and that all of the other party goers are laid out on the pave­
ment or running from the police. When the IC shows up in
situations like these and says, "Whoops, I need more workers for
the job," he/she must quickly call for additional resources. Such a
call should alert the system that the situation is somehow different than
it had been reported (to dispatch), is producing more work than the units
responding on the initial assignment can handle, and the IC is bumping the
incident response up a notch. For this response upgrade to occur in a standard
and natural way, the system must develop quick, easy SOPs that don't require
the IC to recite the Gettysburg Address or require an act of Congress to get
more workers on the road.

Once the IC has made the "initial" resource-level evaluation and determina­
tion to be certain that the initial response is adequate, he/she must then
continue to decide throughout the event if enough units are present to control
the incident problems. Making resource-level decisions is a critical ongoing
function of the Ie. When calling for additional resources works okay (accord­
ing to SOPs), it is streamlined and simple (almost transparent), and we really
don't think much about it. When something or someone gums it up, it neces­
sarily occurs at a critical period when the IC needs more workers ("help!")
and becomes a gigantic organizational headache that wrecks a lot of people,
places, and things. Simply, the delay that emerges from having to wade
through a blivet of slow, bureaucratic dispatching confusion consistently clogs
up the airways when we need them most, and produces a too-little, too-late
response that is absolutely impossible for almost any amount of overmatched
hard work to outperform.

When additional resources are required, the IC must not be timid about order­
ing those resources according to the event evaluation/forecast. The
organization must give the IC the authority (and encouragement) to call for and
then manage whatever resource he/she feels is needed. Calling for additional
resources could be the result of added information, visible evaluation, or the
IC's "gut" feelings. The deployment system should provide for predetermined
response packages, ranging from single units to groups of units (alarms).

Deployment Management
Chapter 4 Functions of Comnwnd

These standard packages make calling for more resources simple, quick, and
streamlined.

The standard package of response resources works best for situations that
require additional workers and tools to do a regular menu of work at an esca­
lating situation. These packages can include a "bundle" of fire, EMS, law
enforcement, hazmat, and other resources. When the Ie needs more of the
same people and stuff that responded on the initial alarm, it's lots easier to say
"give me a second alarm" than "give me two of those, one of those, and three
medium-sized of these." While the "bundles" are quick and easy to order and
get- the Ie can always special call any special amount and type of needed
resource.

If the Ie can't rapidly acquire and assign the required resources within an
effective working time frame, those late-arriving units will merely witness
what has happened and not have the capability to actually intervene.
Delivering an abundance of resources that arrive on the scene past the point of
effective intervention is futile and frustrating. Being able to pump an ocean of
water on what used to be a burning structure only produces Mississippi-sized
runoff-just like a dozen ALS units staring down on DRT (dead right there)
customers who went on to the happy hunting ground ten minutes ago (when
they were salvageable) is an exercise in being firmly behind the rapidly mov­
ing power curve as it pulls ahead of the IC and the troops. The Ie stays ahead
of that power curve by doing a quick forecast, being somewhat pessimistic,
and calling for help early. The deployment system must develop a concentra­
tion of resource mentality and approach. The Ie must call for and assemble
enough resources at once to overpower the basic incident problem(s).
Dribbling in resources in onesies and twosies simply does not create enough
force to get ahead of a serious problem, cut it off, and bite its head off. When
additional help is needed, make the big call and get enough players together at
once to pull off the major plays required to gain control.

If the Ie makes a determination, for whatever reason, that additional resources

are needed and orders those units and then later decides that they are not
needed, he/she should simply send them home. It's lots better to be too big
than to be too small- particularly in the beginning. This is why the system
should encourage front-end loading of the local deployment system. Bosses
send a strong message when they say "good call" to ICs that sensibly overde­
ploy (i.e., front-end load) in high-potential situations. As an old chief said, "If
I can hire ' em (call additional resources), I can fire 'em (send them home)."

Assign Resources
After determining that adequate resources have been dispatched, the command
system must then begin to place arriving responders in correct operational and
organizational positions. Task assignment is the closely connected next step
of the IC evaluating, calling for more (if required), and managing adequate
resources. The task-assignment process is where the action begins and trig-

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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

gers the "business end" of the deployment function. This is where we physi­
cally go to work on the problem that the customer called us about. The
situation evaluation (Command Function #2) and the basic-event profile are
what the IC uses to quickly evaluate the physical and social conditions that
are making the event an emergency incident and not just another nice day out
at Mrs. Smith's. The IC must determine the details of the major incident
problem(s) and then convert each critical factor into a related tactical need .
Simply, something is going on (problem), and a related something (generally
manual labor) needs to be done about it.

This tactical translation must occur quickly and automatically and is what sep­
arates spectators saying, "Oh my God, look at that awful stuff that is
happening" from the pros saying, "Let's go to work." While the IC must
evaluate the conditions that caused the initial problem, he/she must avoid the
inclination to be preoccupied with what happened before they arrived, and
rather focus on the difference they can make now that they are on scene. The
IC starts the process of assigning resources by converting the needs that
emerged out of evaluating conditions (critical factors) into tactical tasks.
Developing tactical tasks in a regular, predictable way, produces the basis to
articulate the standard operational language that the team can use in a pre­
dictable, understandable, exchangeable, action-producing way. The IC and
the entire team must use plain, simple words and phrases to describe the situa­
tion and lead the team through the beginning, middle, and end of incident
operations. Common, day-to-day language should be used as much as possi­
ble-even when ordering and managing responses to special and unusual
situations.

Incident conditions are hectic, time compressed, and many times dangerous.
Responders do not have the time and are typically in no position to figure out
a lot of never-heard-before esoteric words and phrases from an IC who is
attempting to put a poetic touch on incident orders. Communicating in terms
of tasks, answers the basic (timeless) worker question, "What do you (boss)
want me (worker) to do?" and becomes the point of the IC giving orders to the
troops.

How responders are put to work when they arrive on the scene becomes an
important part of the IMS. If this front-end management occurs in a regular,
orderly manner, the hazard-zone workers become part of the IC's overall plan.
This creates a safe and standard operational beginning. If those workers assign
themselves to a place and function unknown to the IC, they make themselves
unaccounted freelancers and eventually (sooner or later) will become out of
balance with the IC's overall incident action plan. The essence of incident con­
trol is the ability of every boss to create, manage, and-if necessary-move the
position and function of the resources he/she is responsible for.

IMS requires an interesting combination and balance of both control and

empowerment. Everyone operating on the incident must always be "enrolled"
as a pa11icipant in the IC's accountability roll call. It is a major command

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 Chapter 4 Functions of Command

responsibility for the IC to maintain that roll call in a current and accurate
manner. The IC must know who is on the scene, where they are, their basic
assignment, the identity of their boss, and if they are okay. These details are a
big part of what the IC records on a tactical work sheet. The command team
must be really grumpy about maintaining this position/function information.
The reason for thjs micromanagement (yes, Virginia, the M word) is that any­
where and everywhere the safety and sun·ival consequences to our workers
are severe, the system must automatically overmanage the position and func­
tion of those workers. Simply, the reason that we call the hazard zone the
hazard zone is because it is hazardous( !). A major part of going into the haz­
ard zone is to do whatever is required to either eliminate what is creating the
hazard (so it's no longer a hazard zone) or to safely get out of it, if it appears
that the hazard is going to win. Both of these outcomes require strong com­
mand and control that begins with initial accountability.

The empowerment part of the process kicks in once responders arrive, stage
(if they don't get there first), get assigned and logged in, and get to work. The
entire command system creates standard accountability roles and functions for
the strategic, tactical, and task levels. The system presupposes that once the
participants are safely ensconced inside the accountability system, they can
effectively do their work in a highly-empowered manner. The IC and sector
officers provide resources, coordination, and support, and then let them do
their job. The system carefully creates everyone's initial safety and accounta­
bility and uses that approach as the launching pad for effectively using the
skill, experience, and djscipline of the workers to get the job done. This
"tightlloose" combination requires well-trained, mature players who under­
stand and use the system to pelform and survive doing their hazard-zone jobs.

This control/empowerment flexibility shows the on-going need for IMS to

always create whatever organizational response is required to match the actual
needs of the different parts of incjdent operations. What works in one part of
the event may not work in another. As an example, we call an empowered
incident beginning freelancing. This creates a bad situation that is unsafe and
uncontrolled. It makes sense to overman age responder accountability (to
eliminate freelancing). If we continue to manage those workers with that
same amount of overcontrol when they were trying to get their work done,
they would say that they had an extremely insecure IC with diarrhea of the
radio. Once accountability is established. we empower teams of workers and
don't pester them so that they can accomplish their assigned tasks. The entire
command system must form itself to reflect the needs of the current phase of
the operation. Creating an effective balance of control and empowerment is
an artistic challenge throughout incident operations-as it is in most other
management situations.

IMS uses three standard methods to put arriving units to work:

• Conscious officer decision

• SOP
• IC order
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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

These three work-entry methods describe how our resources go from a

response mode to a working mode. Using the three standard ways becomes a
big deal because they set the initial stage for us to start and stay under control
(and vice versa). Once we use one of the three options to get into a working
position, we then use a combination of all three to continue and complete our
work. Officers are expected and empowered to make a series of conscious
decisions as they direct the ongoing work in their area, and use their resources
to achieve the objective of their assignment. The system creates the structure
and support for everyone to do their job on their own level. The entry system
(i.e., assignment) gets them on the field . Once on the field, everyone must be
prepared to play their position. The system works because the IC plays strate­
gy, the sectors tactics, and the companies tasks. SOPs are used throughout the
incident to describe how basic operations, evolutions, and execution will
occur. They also describe (in some cases) the actual, detailed techniques that
we will use to pull off those activities. While we may structure SOPs to pro­
vide initial unit placement, as one standard way we put responders to work
initially, SOPs are used to outline efforts for most other parts of incident oper­
ations. Direct IC orders are used in the beginning and throughout the incident
to connect the right workers, place, time, and function.

The following descriptions outline how arriving resources get entered into the
IC's inventory and accounting system and then initially go to work:

1. Conscious officer decision

Arriving company officers can make a conscious, deliberate decision
to go to work on a critical tactical need they see while driving their
response vehicle or while staged. Such needs may include things like
an urgent physical rescue, a critical tactical condition, or the safety of
other responders. These situations typically involve conditions that
the IC cannot see from the command post. Many times, particularly
in the beginning stages of an incident, the IC is trying to get accurate
information about cun·ent conditions on all seven sides-top, bottom,
four sides, and inside. The IC depends on responders on every side to
report incident conditions that they can see from their positions. In
urgent situations, they would not only report the situation to the IC,
but based on the critical nature of the need, the unit would go to work
on the problem. When such a unit remote from the IC identifies and
assigns themselves, they must advise the IC of their location and func­
tion. The IC must then enter that unit into the accountability system,
include that activity/function in the incident action plan, and provide
any resources, supervision, and support that the activity requires.

2. Standard Operating Procedures

SOPs can be used to create initial deployment actions automatically
without specific orders. In effect, the order is in the SOP. Such initial
placement SOPs describe how initial action will occur and include
instruction on where units are assigned, what basic action they will
take, and how they will deal with specific conditions. This local
approach generally emerges out of the experience of dealing with

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Chapter 4 Functions oj Command

recurring conditions in a place that does a lot of " repeat" business. An

organization learns, over time, what works in certain situations and
what resources are required, and develops an SOP response to those
experiences. For example, the SOP may describe in a certain (stan­
dard) tactical situation that E-1 has the fire, E-2 will locate and
establish a water source, and L-1 will ventilate, force entry, and per­
form other truck work. When units assign themselves based on SOPs,
they should briefly report their actions so that the Ie can verify that
they are in position and enter them into the accountability and inven­
tory system. The initial Ie can issue specific orders that alter or
change placement SOPs, wherever conditions require different actions.

3. Orders from the Ie

The basic point of the previously presented condition, evaluation,
translation into needs, and tasks stuff (in this chapter) is to form the
basis for the Ie doing the standard mental gymnastics that produce a
simple, doable order and then verbalizing (actually saying) that order
to a working unit. We can get into big trouble when we don't under­
stand, practice, and apply the conditions-+ needs-+ tasks-+ orders
front end to develop and vocalize effective orders. "Think before you
transmit" has been drummed into us virtually forever. The
conditions-+ needs-+ tasks-+ orders routine becomes the very practi­
cal lesson plan for that instruction. When we skip the front end of the
order-development process and engage mouth before brain, we may
sound like an idiot, transmit idiotic orders, or both. While this little
front-end routine may seem like a sort of awkward and cumbersome
thought process, after we learn it (pretty simple), and practice it
(sometimes not so simple), it becomes an instinctive, transparent, and
automatic process we naturally apply when we encounter tactical con­
ditions that require manual labor to resolve. The more we do it
individually and collectively, the more common the organizational
reaction (and expectation) becomes for us to sound like we are lucid
and well organized when we (the IC) mash down a mic button and say
something to a worker.

Using a common order-development approach among the participants has a

strong unifying effect within the team. We begin to connect standard organi­
zational responses (action-oriented) to standard local conditions and develop
an understanding and expectation of how those actions always attempt to pro­
duce standard outcomes. Having the Ie use standard common "inside"
language to produce effective orders is an important part of the very practical
basis of this unifying organizational capability. Everyone on the team expects
the first arriver to become the Ie who win evaluate conditions and give the
task-oriented orders that will address (go to work on) the critical-incident
problems. Along with this approach comes the organizational understanding
of what this process "sounds like." This simple "Ie calls the shots from the
very beginning" agreement mobilizes the work of all responders within a uni­
fied incident action plan and, in and of itself, establishes a standard level of
initial incident control that becomes powerful, anti-freelancing medicine.
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The IC's timing when making specific assignments (giving orders) to specific
units is an important factor in effectively getting each unit into the action plan.
Ideally, the IC should give orders to responding units as they arrive in their
staged (level I) positions and report that they are staged, i.e., close to the
scene, uncommitted (has not passed water supply, has not passed access point
to multiple sides of the incident), crew intact, ready to go to work, and their
staged direction ("Engine 1 north"). Staging procedures (described
later in this chapter) are designed to provide a standard system to
put responders to work in a regular, organized manner.
Waiting until the unit stages assists both the IC
and the responders in getting the right assignment
(order) at the right time. The primary deployment
objective of staging procedures is to prevent
responders from rolling into the middle of the inci­
dent and becoming totally entangled in confusion and
congestion before the IC can give them an assign­
ment. Once we are in an operational spot, we don't
do "reverse" very well. Using the staging report to
trigger the assignment from the IC eliminates an anxious IC
giving the responder an order when they are five miles from the scene, strug­
gling to maneuver around the maniacs with their windows rolled up, cold air
blasting out of the AC, listening to some cowboy twanging about his love
affair with 01' Paint on the stereo. Lots of times a unit that receives such a
premature, long-distance order from the IC while they are in this five-miles
away, "let's try to not have Bubba in the Peterbilt smush us" response position
will quickly transmit "okay" back to the IC just to satisfy (and shut up) the
Ie. By the time the unit arrives on the scene, they have become distracted and
separated from the earlier transmitted order-sometimes they actually forget
what the IC told them to do or there is a different need for them. At that
point, they don't want to call the IC for a reorder because they are afraid that
they will appear memory deficient (after all, they said "okay"), so they look
for the best, most fun position (most action), and jump into that spot. This is
where the confusion begins . The IC expects them to be in position A where
they were assigned (they said "okay"), and now they have freelanced them­
selves into position B. The IC must now somehow try to sort out which
kittens are in the basket (within the plan) and which kittens are playing with
the ball of yam under the sofa (free enterprise)-herding cats is always a big
job.

Standard staging, order giving, and order receiving are the closely connected
partners that form the business end of effective incident deployment and con­
trol. The IC must match task assignments to the basic capabilities of each
unit. The capabilities of various units range from very specific and narrow, to
very broad. The IC must analyze and assign tasks based upon the general pro­
file of needs and capabilities. This mix-and-match approach mobilizes
everyone within the action plan and takes advantage of the different capabili­
ties of the various types of units.

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THE ORDER MODEL

The IC can exercise an appropriate level of command effectiveness only to the
extent that he/she can develop and deliver clear, understandable orders . These
orders are the "let's go to work" deployment link between the evaluation/deci­
sion process and effective action . The IC assigns responders by giving them
specific, task-oriented orders, and in return the assigned responder describes
the situation he/she encounters so that the IC gets an "up close and personal"
picture of conditions. A major factor in managing incident orders is the ongo­
ing routine that is followed by the participants. Communications SOPs should
provide a practical description of that romine. There must be an effective plan
to standardize the actions required of both sender and receiver. There must be
a standard information exchange and a mutual understanding of how the
exchange will occur. The order model provides the basic plan and set method
for processing orders on the incident scene. To be of any use, it must be
understood and followed by all the participants. The order model requires the
IC to begin by identifying the standard condition~ needs ~tasks to produce
an effective order that connects the task that must be performed. A major
characteristic of an effective order is that it is "task oriented." This means that
the order includes a work location, a basic task description, the task objective,
the resources allotted, and any related details required to complete the task.

The knowledge of available resources is critical to the order model. Simply,

the process of giving orders works a lot better if the IC knows:

1. There is someone available to give the order to

2. Who that person/company is
3. Their basic capability
4. When they will arrive on the scene
5. Their general direction of approach/travel

The ongoing management of the resource inventory in standard status cate­

gories (dispatched, responding, staged, on-scene) gives the IC the capability to
match a responding unit to the task. Before giving an order, the IC secures
the available status of the unit. Once the unit reports its readiness, the IC can
then give the order-and not until then. Having the IC mash the mic button,
take a deep breath, and assign four engines, two ladders, one squad, and a
small child with a red plastic fire helmet basically amounts to rapid-fire com­
munications that may, or may not, have gotten through to the receiver. This
order-model shortcut occurs a lot because the IC has aITived on scene, evaluat­
ed conditions, determined achievable goals, packaged up needs into tasks, and
decided what he/she wants all the responder(s) to do. The IC is looking right
at the incident problem (generally urgent) and is typically in a hurry to get the
work started. If the IC does not slow do\\n Gust a little) and get standard
acknowledgements at the beginning and end of the order, there will be big­
time confusion. The IC starts out the assignment process by first calling the

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receiver to alert them that he/she (lC) has incoming communications for them
("Command to Enginel"). At the beginning of the event, the receiver (gener­
ally a working unit) can pretty much expect that this incoming communication
from the IC will be an order. For operational purposes, until and unless the IC
receives a standard readiness acknowledgment back from the receiver after
he/she has alerted them of "incoming," that unit (simply) does not exist and
there is no point in transmitting the order. In fact, the worst thing that IC can
do when the unit does not acknowledge is to continue with the order, assume
the receiver got it, and build that incorrect assumption into the incident action
plan. A responder becomes a candidate to become a working operational unit
upon their arrival on the scene by acknowledging their readiness to receive an
order ("go ahead command"). Until then, they are just the unit number of a
responder (and a hope) on the IC's tactical work sheet.

Once the company acknowledges its readiness, the IC can then give the
order to that unit. After getting the order, the receiving unit must COpy THAT COMMAND.
then acknowledge the receipt of that order. A brief restatement E-5 TO WAREHOUSE
INTERIOR TO HELP
of the order (summarizing the task details) quickly sent back to PULL CEILING.
the IC is the standard way the receiver acknowledges they got
the order. This brief restatement of the order locks up the back
end of the order process a lot better than "ten-four," "gotcha,
good buddy," "okey-dokey, chief baby," etc. This back-end
restatement increases the IC's confidence that the order effectively
"stuck" with the receiver. If the IC does not receive a receipt
(acknowledgement) after giving the order (based on getting the front­
end readiness signal from the receiving unit), the IC must assume that
the order was not received. Nobody knows what they "copied" or "got"
unless you listen to the received repeat the order. The critique is not a
good time (or place) for the IC and the receiver to find out that they mis­
understood an assignment. In such cases, with no acknowledgement, the
IC must continue to retransmit the order back to the receiver until the receiver
acknowledges they received and understood the order. The IC must assume
that the order did not get through until the receiver says they got it. The IC
must persistently recycle the order until the beginning, middle, and end parts
are all complete. The order model is also a check for the IC that he/she cor­
rectly verbalized his/her desire. The time and effort invested in the order
model produces a big payoff for the whole team, as they work through the
task assignment and accomplishment process. It is tough to effectively do
your part of the incident action plan when you missed the play and are going
out for a pass while the rest of the team is running up the middle. When this
happens, the coach is always grumpy and has some really swell stuff to share
with you during the next timeout-lots better to get the signal on the first call.

Orders will not always be clearly understood every time. If the order is not
fully understood, then the receiver must request additional information or clar­
ification . The IC will have to translate, describe, or explain the order. The IC
must establish a positive team relationship so that responders feel it is okay to
request more information, if they did not get it the first time. The need to

Deployment Management
 Chapter 4
COMMAND TO E1 ... LAY A
LINE TO THE REAR.
ADVANCE AN ATTACK LINE
TO THE INTERIOR FOR
SEARCH, RESCUE AND FIRE
CONTROl. YOU Will BE
NORTH SECTOR.
E1 COPY, LAY A LINE TO THE
REAR. ADVANCE A ATTACK
LINE TO THE INTERIOR FOR
SEARCH, RESCUE AND FIRE
CONTROL. E1 WILL BE
NORTH SEr:-CT....:;O-,-R._--,
Functions of Command
clarify orders many times occurs because the Ie did not communicate clearly
or the receiver was distracted in some way. These situations require the order
model to be used in a very straightforward way to insure that the order was
effectively understood.
Once the order is acknowledged, the unit goes to work on the task. They
(boss, workers) must continue to use the order-model format to issue brief,
incremental progress reports. Such report s should include:
• a basic description of how the work is going (progressing)
• requests for support activities or additional resources
• requests for more command/sector coordination
• other actions needed to accomplish their assigned task
If the assigned task cannot be completed, the unit must inform the Ie by trans­
mitting an exception report. This exception report should state reasons why the
task could not be completed, and include a description of what resources it will
take to complete the task, if possible. The Ie will then have to evaluate the
report and react. This may involve clarification or amendment of the original
assigned task or the re-evaluation of the action plan and task-identification
process by the Ie. The working unit may then be reassigned to another task or
continue to work on the same task with more/differentlbetter SUppOlt provided
by the Ie. When the task is completed, the Ie must be informed . This
requires a completion report. At this point, the unit is available for reassign­
ment. The standard assignment cycle allows the Ie to keep track of what work
has been accomplished, identify the tasks that are still pending, and to recycle
units that have completed assigned tasks, back into the incident action plan to
do additional work, or send them to rehab , or back home. The order-model
cycle becomes a big part of effective resource utilization .
Workers get into the assignment cycle by receiving a direct, task-oriented order
and stay in that cycle throughout their time at the incident by reporting
progress/exception/completion. The back end of the process (exception/comple­
tion) gives the Ie the capability to reassign them as they complete their assigned
tasks, to work on the next part of the incident action plan. In the absence of the
complete assignment cycle, the Ie may get an initial shot at capturing a working
unit (if he/she is fast and alelt enough), but when they finish their assigned task,
they go off (freelance), and scout out whatever they find the most interesting.
Losing working units in this manner creates (in effect) midpoint free enterprise.
While the standard assignment cycle is a slper-simple procedure that involves a
standard beginning, middle, and end to assigning and completing a task and
then repeatedly (recycling) that process until the work is done. It becomes a big
deal in the way the Ie maintains a continuous awareness of the status of the sit­
uation and of the accountability of the workers. Freelancing can occur within
any level of the organizational structure, sometimes without the knowledge of
the Ie. All officers must be sensitive to the need to prevent freelancing.
Deployment Management
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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

Resource Inventory and Tracking

The Ie has a continual deployment-management challenge to somehow keep
track of what is happening, as a rapidly changing and expanding incident goes
on. As more responders show up, go to work, and the incident starts to "move
fast and spread out," these dynamic conditions can quickly exceed the Ie's
mental capability to maintain a current awareness of "who's where, doing
what." The same fast-moving, tough incident conditions that make recording
incident status a difficult task also create the absolutely compelling reason to
maintain such on-line recording from the beginning of the event. When the
Ie starts to lose track of incident and responder status, it sometimes becomes
almost impossible to recapture overall information control-it's lots easier to
start early and never stop. Based on these attention-span realities (limita­
tions), a major deployment-management function involves the Ie performing
the on-scene "bookkeeping" activities required to keep track of all the respon­
ders assigned to the incident and their ongoing operational status. The system
also must account for the work in progress, the work still to be completed, and
everyone's safety. Response cards, tactical work sheets, and status boards are
the basic forms that the Ie typically uses to record (wlitten on tactical work
sheet, use of magnetic tags, etc.) resource details and work activities.

The basis of this recording system revolves around responders developing the
habit of writing down dispatch details before they hit the road, including such
basic (really important) things as "where we are going (address), who is going
with us (responders), and what radio channel are we going to use (so that we
can all talk together). Recording these simple, important initial details on a
standard organizational form (tactical work sheet) kept in the same place
(hopefully convenient) on the rig, along with a sharpened #2 pencil (losing the
pencil sucks), reinforces this recording habit. Writing down these important
response details requires officers to slow down just a little so that they can
consciously focus for a second on the "who/where/doing what" command
details for the incident. Whoever arrives first and becomes the Ie uses the
basic details recorded on the form, as the starting point for developing the
incident action plan, and then assigning responding units to that plan, as they
arrive. Some dispatch systems include printers located near or on the apparatus FRON

that can print out a hard copy of these details and other relevant information. 51! N t\\AI/J sz:
Ct2 ~

E-I NORTH
Under "battlefield conditions," the physical act of writing is somewhat of an 1:2 T
E E.I
unnatural act. If there is not a simple, standard, well-practiced organizational II 00'
11.5 5100
inventory-and-tracking system in place and the ongoing discipline to use this 8(. COMMAND

system every time, using the recording system will never become habitual.
All such "bookkeeping" necessarily should start at the beginning of the hur­
ried initial-response period and then continue in a tough, on-scene
management setting-work conditions are dangerous, time is compressed,
everyone is excited, and initial information a lot of times is pretty lousy. The

*Today the PPD uniform tee shirt has a pocket-this was originally provided
for response cards (before computers ... but they still work very well and do
not require the use of a password).

Deployment Managen7ent

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Chapter 4 Functions of Command

initial "bookkeeping-office" (command post) environment is generally

plopped down in the middle of this action-oriented incident mess, particularly
when early arriving Ies are working out of their regular response vehicles.
Many times, these rigs are doing double duty as both an operating unit and a
fast-and-dirty command post. These rigs are typically cramped, noisy, and
close to the action, with a zillion up-close and sometimes very personal dis­
tractions . The Ie is not in a position and does not have the time to write
a novel about the event. In fact, tough, action-oriented incident condi­
tions make writing much more than brief notes, check boxes, or rough
sketches pretty much impossible. Developing standard symbols and
abbreviations that mean the same thing every time can create a form
of "shorthand" that can help the Ie overcome this problem. Only a
practical and practiced rough-and-ready-field-oriented recording
system and approach will stand up to real-world incident condi­
tions.

The system must set up fast, and it must be easy to maintain

and expand. It must be standard, well-known, and inter­
changeable among the team as command is escalated and
sometimes transferred . This on-line recording by the Ie
assumes the format of quick note taking on a standard
tactical work sheet. The work sheet facilitates "jotting
down" (quickly, my dear IC) the critical details of con­
ditions, assignments, and work progress in regular
places on the form. The recording process is
designed to start at the very beginning of our
response and continues while the work is going on. The
approach of recording details from the very beginning elimi­
nates somehow trying to recreate and capture the details of
twenty-minute old action that did not get written down. Such catch up can
be almost impossible. The system involves the Ie physically writing down
the assignment, location, and progress of units working through the standard
deployment cycle. This recording should include the following basic informa­
tion:

• What units are assigned (dispatched) to the incident

• A check off as the units arrive, stage, and are ready to go to work

• As units are assigned, the Ie must record:

... work location

... tasks/functions/objectives

... supervision (who's their boss)

• A checklist of progress and times completing tactical priorities

• A rough sketch of the incident area and the location of responders

• A basic (fill-in) organizational chart-who is assigned where, and to

whom (accountability)

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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

The point of our response is to do the work that solves the incident problem,
not to write about it. This requires us to achieve an effective balance and
combination of a lot of physical work being done by responders supported by
a much smaller amount of administrative-support activities performed by the
IC Major problems occur when we get this work/administration balance
screwed up. A major way the Ie does his/her part (in achieving this balance,
particularly in the beginning of the event) is by assuming a standard command
position that facilitates performing some quick/basic paper-and-pencil work to
quickly record and support the effectiveness and safety of the workers who are
in non-writing working positions. What it takes to actually write stuff down
creates a very basic relationship (and requirement) with standard command
positioning. The difference between the action-oriented position of workers
and the command position of the Ie is not space-shuttle science. It is pretty
much impossible to write well (or at all) when you are standing up, jumping
around, trying to manipulate tools, moving quickly, smurfed up in protective
gear, and trying to avoid having heavy objects fall on your noggin: It is lots
better if you want to effectively write stuff down to sit down(!), stay sort of
still, get a clipboard and a standard form to write on, have an overhead light if
it's dark out, and be inside if it's raining/snowing/sleeting/hailing outside.
The basic welfare of our troops and our overall operational effectiveness sim­
ply requires a lucid Ie always being up (ready) to answer the following
questions at all times :

• Who is on the scene?

• Where are they?

• What are they doing?

• Are they okay?

• Is the risk that we are taking worth what we are trying to accomplish?

We must develop the attitude and approach that an operation is not completely
under control until, and unless, all basic incident details are briefly and cur­
rently recorded by the Ie on an up-to-date tactical work sheet.

Staging
Staging provides a basic framework for the orderly arrival, assignment, and
placement of responders. It serves as the front end of the on-scene deploy­
ment cycle. Staging adds some standard organizational predictability to the
critical actions of initial-arriving responders and allows the Ie to more easily
and effectively manage up-front resource allocation. In fact, without a prac­
ticed staging procedure, it is almost impossible for the Ie (or anyone else) to
manage initial resource deployment. Staging procedures create a standard
"gate" between the response and working modes, and increase the efficiency
and safety of operations, by preventing the disorganized "swarming" of
responders. Staging allows the Ie to assign resources within the incident

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-- - - - -- - - .. -- - - -­
 Chapter 4 Functions of Command

action plan to the place/function where they can have the most impact on the
incident problem .

In the absence of a staging procedure, action-oriented responders will "self­

assign" themselves when they get to the incident scene by "tunnelizing" on the
major incident problem, and typically driving up as close to the action as they
can get. When this occurs, the IC serves more as a frustrated spectator than
anything else. Spontaneous self-assignment "unstaging" typically produces a
situation where the IC must concentrate more on trying to somehow figure out
the who, what, where, and are they okay pout of the event, than the lAP.

Staging brings order and accountability to initial incident command by keep­

ing companies in one of four active modes:

1. .Responding (on the way)

2. Staged (alTived on the scene, ready to go to work)
3. Assigned to the standard work cycle by the IC
4. Completed work, going available

Staging procedures are always in effect for all companies or members

responding to an incident. There are two levels of staging: level I and level II.

LEVEL I STAGING (Using a Standard Fire Response

As an Example)
Level I staging is always in effect for all multiple-unit responses. The first
unit to the scene (usually an engine) assumes command while performing
standard company functions (described in local SOPs). The first ladder
responds directly to the scene and provides standard ladder support. All other
companies stop short of the scene, approximately one block in their direction
of travel, and announce their alTival and position over the tactical channel. A
typical staging report would be:

"Engine 16 staged west on a hydrant."

Level I staging provides a response unit on the scene as soon as possible (does
not delay the first unit of each type), allows the first an-iver to take command,
size up the incident problem, begin formulating an incident-action plan, and
allows the crew of this first-in (fast-attack mode) unit to begin work. It also
ENGINE 3
COPY-TAKE A provides the IC with the most options in assigning the rest of the response.
LINE TO THE
ROOF. Staged companies remain uncommitted so that they can be assigned to operat­
ing positions according to the IC's plan.

When staging, engine companies should not pass their last water source, and
enginelladder companies should not pass treir best access-option point to the
structure.

Deployment Management

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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

Staging procedures also streamline the corrununications process by creating a

quick, standard, staging radio report that both minimizes airtime use and tells
the IC the unit is on the scene, their direction, and that they are ready for
assignment/action. Reporting their staged position gives the IC the capability
to make assignments that take advantage of the access responders have based
on those positions. The IC must pay attention to staged positions as they are
repolted, because responders may not be coming from their normal direction.
Staging procedures facilitate accountability by allowing for the orderly, sys­
tematic, and deliberate initial deployment of personnel.

LEVEL II STAGING
When an incident escalates past the capability of the initial response, the IC
may use level II staging to manage the initial arrival of responding resources.
When the IC requests more resources, he/she can announce level II staging
and identify a location of the staging area. "Ajax Command to alarm-give
me a second alarm assignment with level II staging two blocks north on
Seventh Street." Unless told otherwise, after level II staging has been
announced, additional responding units, members, and other resources should
quietly respond to the level II staging area.

By establishing a level II staging area, the IC creates a centralized location

and resource pool (parking lot). The staging area should be close enough to
the scene to provide quick access for any needed units, while remaining far
enough out of the way to avoid congesting access to the scene.

Level II staging is managed by the staging-sector officer who is assigned by

the IC The initial-staging officer is generally the officer of the first unit to
arrive at the staging area. The staging-sector officer then logs all incoming
resources into the staging area.
LEVEL 2
STAGING
During large, complex incidents, the IC should avoid becoming the middle­
man in communications process between sectors requesting resources and the
resources that will be assigned to them. Typically, what happens is a sector
officer contacts command and advises that they need more companies and
then proceeds to tell command the specific task they need them for, along
with the location of the task, and what type of resource is needed. The IC
then regurgitates this information to the staging-sector officer, who does the
same ventriloquist routine back to the companies. This is very repetitive and
can unnecessarily tie up the IC The IC needs to operate on the strategic level.
While this is generally not a problem during smaller incidents, one of the
things the IC can do organizationally to facilitate this at "big deals" is to sim­
ply delegate staging to the logistics section. This accomplishes two things.
First, it gets staging off the IC's plate and allows him/her more time and space
to focus on the operational, tactical sectors. The second thing it does is it puts
staging off the tactical radio channel (provided logistics operates on its own
channel). Sectors still request resources through the IC, and the IC uses a tac­
tical work sheet to maintain a current, accurate, ongoing accounting and

Deployment Management
 Chapter 4 Functions of Command

inventory of where resources are assigned and who they are working for as the
incident evolves. The only real change comes in the command post. Someone
other than the IC contacts staging and requests the desired resources.

Once the sector officer knows who has been assigned to the sector, he/she can
directly contact those companies to give them specific orders. The sector offi­
cer requests resources with a brief tactical reason. This is good radio work.

DECENTRAliZED RESOURCE AREAS

Occasionally, it may be beneficial for command to assemble resources
in areas other than level II staging. Examples of level II staging inci­
dents would include multiple-alarm fires, highrise operations, major
medical incidents, hazmat orgies, bi~ technical operations, etc. It is
advantageous for command to establish a resource sector somewhere
below the fire floor(s). This makes crews available for assignment
much quicker than bringing them into the attack/operational area from a
staging area somewhere outside the ;;tructure.

Another place that lends itself as a staging area is adjacent to the rehab sector.
Eventually all working companies cycled through operational sectors end up
in rehab. At large incidents, the rehab sector can end up looking like the Civil
War (only with less facial hair). Some companies have been known to get lost
in rehab and never return. To avoid this, after crews are sufficiently rehabbed,
move them into an "on-deck" resource area adjacent to the rehab sector. This
separates the already rehabbed from the yet to be rehabbed, brings more order
to rehab, and provides the IC with another resource pool while enhancing
incident-scene accountability. For this to be effective, units must remain
intact. This requires company and sector-officer control.

While staging is normally associated with structure fires, it also should be

used for any (and all) incidents requiring multiple company response. There
also are incidents where it is appropriate for companies to stage prior to
arrival to the scene. These incidents include any calls that involve criminal
activity or violence. Many times we are th~ first responder to arrive at the
scene of a shooting or other violent incident. While the victims are ecstatic
about seeing us, occasionally the perpetrators will take exception to our pres­
ence and attack us. If the bad guys are still on the scene, the police should
secure the scene, prior to fire units' deployment on the scene. When dispatch
believes that the incident scene is still hostile, they need to notify
dispatched/responding units so they will kr:ow to stage until the police can
make the scene safe for non-armored, non-gun-totin' responders.

Personnel Accountability
An important part of the process of knowing what troops are on the scene,
where they are, and being able to control their position, function , and welfare
is known as accountability. The accountab:Jity process, like a lot of other

Deployment Management

..
--­
 Functions of COI11.mand Chapter 4

things we do on a regular basis, is pretty transparent to Mrs. Smith. When she

has a need for the services we provide (like when her kitchen catches fire) ,
she simply pushes three buttons on her phone, gets a hold of Mabel in dis­
patch, who in turn triggers the local deployment system. Incident
management and firefighter safety are two gigantic ingredients in the service­
delivery cycle. Mrs. Smith doesn't stay up late at night pondering the
complexities of the fast-action mode or how the Ie tracks the assignment and
location of assigned resources. All she is really concerned about is that we
show up quickly, effectively mitigate her problem, and be nice. Mrs. Smith
does care that we don 't get hurt while helping her, because she is a decent
person who bakes us delicious chocolate-chip cookies after her kitchen gets
fixed. While a lot of the elements that we load into a fire attack are a mystery
to Mrs. Smith, they are absolutely essential to successful incident-scene opera­
tions. The Ie is out of business if he/she can't manage accountability on the
command (strategic) leveL The primary reason we create an Ie out at Mrs.
Smith's is to coordinate the activities of all of the other folks we send. If the
accountability process is out of whack on the strategic level, it's a pretty safe
bet that it is also screwed up on the tactical and task leveL This is a very bad
thing-bad for the Ie, bad for the troops working under the Ie (although if
the Ie doesn' t know who's there, they probably are working independently),
and bad for Mrs. Smith. A lack of accountability on the strategic level paves
the way for less than safe and effective incident out­
comes. A lack of accountability on the task level can
be, and sadly sometimes is, fatal for firefighters who
must operate in the toxic environment found within the
hazard zone. Nothing will interrupt the fire attack being
conducted in Mrs. Smith 's kitchen quite so abruptly as a
report of a firefighter in trouble. Ail three levels of the inci­
dent-scene organization (strategic, tactical, and task) are responsible for the
accountability and tracking of ail their assigned personneL Each individual is
personally responsible to operate within the accountability system.

Strategic
The Ie and the command staff are responsible for the strategic end of the
accountability system. Generally, most of the Ie's strategic-accountability
benchmarks are met through the use of the incident management system. The
Ie starts the front end of the accountability process by first recording and then
tracking the assignment status and location of incident-scene resources on a
tactical work sheet. As the resources required to bring the incident under con­
trol escalate, so must the incident organization (and the accountability
system). As the event/response expands, the Ie starts to sectorize and chop
the incident up into more, smaller, and manageable units to maintain an effec­
tive span of control. The accountability system should have some built in
"prompts" that cause the Ie to periodically check on everyone's status. These
accountability benchmarks are called PARs-Personnel Accountability
Reports. What a PAR report means to the crew is that they are in their
assigned location, that the crew is intact, that they are okay, and that they are

Deployment Managem.ent
Chapter 4 Functions of Command

in contact with the IC/sector. PARs should be given automatically in certain

situations. These situations are:

• All clear
The structure has been searched, and crews report back to the IC that the
life-hazard (rescue) phase of the incident is over for any possible cus­
tomers. From this point on, the only life hazard in the structure is our
firefighters, so now we should start including ourselves in the all clear.

• Under control
After companies/sectors report they have the fire knocked down, they
should take an inventory to make sure that everyone is still together
and all right.

• The 30-minute mark

If the fire-ground organization extends to the thirty-minute mark, the
IC should take roll and get a PAR from all companies operating in the
hazard zone (accountability management is a major reason for elapsed
time notifications). At thirty minutes, the first-in companies are run­
ning low on air (or have already nm out) and exiting the structure,
while later-arriving units are taking their place. This time slot can
create a lot of overlapping and confusion about who is where. It is
very easy for firefighters to get lost during this period in the fire fight.
The IC can help keep companies together by getting a PAR from
them at this point in the incident.

Note: The thirty-minute PAR might be adjusted based on the

typical operational duration of a department's SCBA air bottles .

• Switch from offensive to defensive strategies

Before the incident organization switches from an offensive to a
defensive strategy, the IC must account for all of the companies that
were assigned to tactical positions on the fire ground. In these cases,
the IC must move inside crews to safe external positions. After
receiving PARs indicating that all companies are out, the big lines can
be opened and the fire can be floated away.

• Sudden hazardous event occurs somewhere on the incident scene

When something especially hazardous occurs on the fire ground, the
IC needs to get PARs. This would include any report of a trapped,
lost, or missing firefighter. These PARs will then become the starting
point to start whatever type of operation that is necessary to ensure
that everyone is okay or to send help to companies that may need to
be rescued.

• Transmission of a "mayday"
"Mayday" is the standard distress signal used to indicate that the
sender is in some trouble-they are lost, stuck, trapped, out of air, etc.
The IC must quickly develop and extend a rescue plan with the objec­
tive of getting a PAR on that person(s).

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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

Tactical
When the IC assigns sector officers to the different geographical/functional
areas around the incident scene, they (sector officers) operate with the authori­
ty and responsibility for all activities in their assigned sector. This includes
the accountability of all of the personnel assigned to their sector. Most often
this is accomplished by the sector officer keeping track of each company that
is assigned to his/her sector, and not necessarily the individual members that
make up the company. Imagine if every time some sector officer requested a
company and the IC came back with "command to east sector-you'll be get­
ting Engine 14, which is Captain Smithenhickel, Engineer Poffihaatcher,
along with Firefighters Willysmits and Argentina." We don't operate that way,
although if you do, we would like to purchase some of your incident audio.
The key to effective tactical-level accountability is for the sector offIcer, or
anyone else, to be able to quickly identify any individual who is assigned to
any sector at the incident scene. This can often times be a challenge for sector
officers. It is unrealistic to expect sector officers to encapsulate themselves in
layers of protective equipment, insert themselves into the hazard zone, direct
the tactical activities in their sector, communicate with the IC and other sec­
tors, and write down all of their assigned resources on a piece of paper.
Water, smoke, and fire make it pretty difficult to take and maintain good
notes. The sector officer needs to be able to keep track of his/her assigned
companies. This becomes more challenging as more companies are assigned
to the sector, conditions worsen within the sector, or more and more compa­
nies are rotated in and out of the sector. This is an instance where a formal
accountability system will increase incident-scene safety.

Task Level
Accountability is a management tool on the strategic and tactical level. Task­
level accountability is a survival-assurance program. When firefighters enter
toxic environments, the only things directly keeping them alive are their per­
sonal protective gear, the finite amount of air carried in their SCBAs, and the
support of their team members. It really doesn't take a rocket scientist to fig­
ure it out from here. If you become missing (get lost) inside a place with
bad/no air, you will only last as long as your SCBA's air supply does. When
the IC assigns twelve firefighters to the interior of a burning structure, there
must be some type of system to ensure that all twelve firefighters come out­
alive and okay. To consistently create this firefighter-survival outcome, the
IC/sector officer must know where crews are operating within a given, prefer­
ably small, area. This is the bottom line for any type of accountability system.

The other side of this equation belongs to the firefighters who routinely oper­
ate in the hazard zone. We put a heavy investment in fire attack. Training,
equipment, SOPs, and IMS are all things that have been developed and
improved upon in the past. The target is improved c'ustomer service and fire­
fighter safety. FirefIghters must operate within the safety-survival system and
not do stupid things when operating in the potentially lethal working environ-

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 Chapter 4 Functions of Command

ments (fires, hazmat, etc.) they must operate within. Wandering off hose lines
in large structures charged with smoke, freelancing (operating outside the sys­
tem), operating within the hazard zone solo, and entering the hazard zone
without the means to communicate (a portable radio) are but a few things that
can kill you. Task-level accountability revolves around going in together,
staying together, and coming out together. Together means that the team
members are always within vision, voice, or touch of one another-if not,
they are not together. There are standard :,afety rules of engagement we must
follow if we are to survive. Fire fighting is for grown-ups who realize that
accountability is more than a bunch of tags stuck on a board. It begins when
we an-ive and ends when we go home. It involves the strategic, tactical, and
task levels. All are respon sible for them selves and their team members, offi­
cers are respon sible for their crew, sectors are responsible for their companies,
and the IC is responsible for them all.

Accountability and Incident Evolution

The accountability system should fit into and improve the way we operate.
We are just kidding ourselves if we think firefighters are going to show up to
the scene of a structure fire and go through a five-minute accountability fertili­
ty dance before they start the fire attack. When Mrs. Smith's kitchen is
burning, we show up to make sure she, and everyone else inside, gets out
okay, put her fire out, and take care of all her stuff during the event. We don't
go out to Mrs. Smith's and waste the front end of our window of opportunity
by doing a slow, complicated accountability ritual.

The initial-attack wave pretty much solves most of our tactical problems by
putting the fire out. The first-five minutes are worth the next two and a half
hours . The accountability system must allow us the flexibility to live in the
world of fa st-and-dirty, offensive front-end operations, while still keeping
track of the firefighters who are trying to solve Mrs. Smith's most pressing
problems.

Fast-and-dirty offensive fire fighting that goes quickly and directly from
where the rig stops to the hot zone is very effective, but if accountability is
continually neglected, it can set us up for a nasty sucker punch. This tends to
happen in larger structures. The problem begins when the first wave doesn't
put the fire out and we start to throw more resources at it. Couple this with
using the same level of command we use for Mrs. Smith 's kitchen fire, and
the fire fight gets out of balance before the IC realizes it. If these rapidly
escalating operations aren't tightly managed within regular personnel account­
ability SOPs, they can quickly become a runaway train. The IC becomes
overwhelmed assigning and keeping track of companies, while getting to
watch the fire increase in size. These are very dangerous times-large struc­
tures, large fire, and lots of firefighters coming together for a offensive
hoedown. These tactical situations end one of two ways : We overpower the
fire with water and put it out-or the fire takes possession of enough of the
structure that we must abandon the structure and set up outside to keep it from

Deployment Management

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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

./

burning down the next-door neighbor's building. A critical, firefighter safety

benchmark, in these ongoing operations, is firefighter accountability. Crews
must always go in together, stay together, and come out together. Sector offi­
cers must know exactly which crews they have working for them, and the IC
must know what crews are assigned to which sectors. The following is an
illustration of an accountability system and its components.

Helmet IDs - Each member of the company

wears the unit 10 on their helmet.

Name Tags - Each member puts a name

tag on the passport at the start of their shift.

apparatus. They are used by AO's or

sector officers to collect and keep the on each piece of apparatus.
passports together for the units assigned unit that operates in the
to their sector/area. zone must have a passport.

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Chapter 4 Functions of Command

The majority of our local fire attacks are quickly resolved by the initial-arriv­
ing assignment in a very short time frame. Generally it takes more time to set
up a full-fledged, strategic-level command. post than it does to extinguish most
of the regular, offensive fires we respond to. Once the officers on the
responding companies verify that their paSspOlt is correct, they have pretty
much covered the task-level front end of the accountability process. The first
due company arrives to the scene (usually an engine), gives a report, takes
command, announces "accountability north-east, etc. as part of the initial
radio report and commences fire attack. The first-due ladder responds directly
to the scene, announces their arrival , and starts providing whatever support is
necessary-if command wants something different, he/she simply calls them
over the tactical channel and tells them. Everyone else stages. An integral
part of the accountability system is to make sure that all of the folks who are
assigned to the hazard zone are initially accounted for on a passport, and then
periodically checked throughout the incident. This is accomplished through
the use ~f PARs. If the IC (or anyone else)
wants to check to see if Engine 1 is intact
and okay, be/she would simply ask them for
a PAR. The officer of Engine 1 would
check to see that everyone on Engine I is
accounted for and okay, and would report
back that "Engine 1 has a PAR ." The same
thing applies to a sector. The IC calls the
sector officer over the assigned tactical
channel and asks if they have a PAR. The
sector officer checks with all the officers of
the companies that are assigned to him/her
and asks if they have a PAR. This would
normall y be done face to face within the
sector, but could be done over the radio, if
the sector is spread out over a large area.
As the incident grows in size or complexity,
it may be necessary to raise accountability
up a notch . This is when your accountabili­
ty system must be able to keep pace with
incident-scene activities.

Accountability becomes a major deployment factor when firefighters are oper­

ating in particularly hazardous situations. Hazmat teams have been doing
heightened accountability operations far ahead of the rest of the fire service.
Basically, this entails everyone who enters or exits the hazard zone doing so
through some type of entry-control sector. The use of entry-control sector
creates an important safety mentality that attaches a safety component (area)
of each entry point into the hazard area. This is where workers get checked in
right before they go into the hot zone and where they get checked out as they
leave the hot zone.

Deployment Management
 Functions of Command Chapter 4

Fire-ground accountability systems pretty much mirror this type of operation.

Each sector's operation can be expanded to include a central accountability
point (i.e., entry-control point). When the IC expands the accountability system
to this point, accountability officers are assigned to the affected sectors to man­
age the comings and goings of the companies assigned to that area. This level
of accountability starts with the accountability officer (AO) collecting all the
passports of the companies that are in his/her sector. The accountability officer
then serves as a hall monitor. AOs stay outside of the hazard zone and work in
concert with the sector officer in that area. As companies leave the sector, they
pass through its entry point. The AO verifies that the passport reflects all of the
company members who are leaving the sector. If the passport has four names
on it and only tlu'ee members are leaving together, the AO would find out where
member number four was. If the crew elected to leave member number four in
the hazard zone (maybe they don't like number four), the AO would, should,
and must cause the company to go retrieve the solo member of the company.
We all go in together-we all come out together. The same holds true for com­
panies that are assigned to the sector. As they report in to the sector, the AO
collects their passport and puts it on the status board. The AO verifies that the
passport reflects the "inventory" of the crew. Any discrepancies in the passport
must be eliminated prior to the crew enteling the hazard zone. If the passport
has one name too many (tlu'ee show up and there are four names on the pass­
port), the AO must find out where number four is prior to the crew entering the
hazard zone. This same routine is repeated in each tactical sector and rehab.

The accountability structure must mirror the IMS structure. Once the IC stalts
assigning AOs, he/she needs to somehow coordinate all of them. This can be
done by assigning the entire "accountability network" to an accountability sec­
tor officer. This person will be assigned to the command post and will
communicate with the IC face to face. If it is at all possible, the accountability
players should operate on their own radio channel. This way they can commu­
nicate freely with one another without tying up tactical channels. As a
company leaves one sector for another, the AOs pre-alert one another, "East
accountability to rehab, Engine 1 is on their way over and they have a PAR."
Once this system is up and running, it should not take very long to identify and
actually verify each individual who is operating in the hazard zone.

The entire accountability system is set up and in place to make sure that firefight­
ers do not become lost or missing in the hazard zone. There must be some sort of
organizational response, that is preloaded and in place, to deal with a "no PAR"
or a report of trapped firefighters. Nothing else can cause an incident to spiral out
of control like a lost, down, or trapped firefighter. The IC must maintain a rapid­
intervention tactical reserve that is ready to go at a moment's notice. The Rapid
Intervention Crew (RIC) stages themselves just outside the hazard zone, fully
turned out and listening to the tactical channel. Once in place, the RIC serves as
the calvary by providing the IC with a team whose sole focus is to constantly evalu­
ate incident conditions, monitor the tactical channel, and stand by in the event that
someone needs to be quickly extricated from the hazard zone. At larger, complex
situations, multiple RIC teams can be assigned to place them closer to the hot­
zone workers.
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 Chapter 4 Functions of Command

Command Safety: Deployment

The operational-deployment process starts with dispatch, first determining the
basic nature and type of the incident prob2em, and then dispatching the initial
and on-going response that matches the basic incident situation. The evalua­
tion/dispatch process triggers a command function that continually provides
the deployment of enough appropriate resources so that our troops are not
overmatched. Dispatch also reinforces responder safety by:

• Determining as accurate an incident address as possible

• Dispatching the closest appropriate resources

• Gathering as correct incident information as possible

(particularly about hazards)

• Clearly relaying all of that intelligence to responding units

This approach gives our responders the safest possible send off to the incident.

The initial-arriving IC evaluates incident conditions and verifies if the initial

dispatch is adequate-if it is, the IC goes ' 0 work on the incident problem; if
it is not, the IC immediately calls for more resources and carefully assigns the
on-scene resources. The IC then continuously balances the incident work that
is required with on-scene resources based on a quickly developed current and
forecasted incident, time-severity profile. The IC maintains and refines this
incident profile throughout operations and manages and moves the troops as
required, based on progress and changing conditions. The IC uses a standard
command/control routine to assign resources that connects a very deliberate,
situation-needs assessment, as the basis of developing and extending specific
orders to specific units to work on and achieve specific objectives.

The assignment and control of operating units occurs within a standard, order­
model communications approach. The model requires an acknowledgment at
the beginning and at the end of the order to ensure complete, verified, safe
communications. This requires the IC to put a standard under-control front
end on the deployment of units operating in the hazard zone. The IC contin­
ues this "staying-under-control" approach by maintaining an early and
ongoing inventory and tracking system that logs responders into their tactical
assignments, and then always tracks where they are, what they are doing, who
their boss is, and if they are okay.

Incident-staging SOPs require responding units to pause in a regular way as

they approach the scene so that the IC can assign and "log them into" their
position/function. This procedure also is a major safety mechanism/technique
because it gives the IC a fighting chance to capture and control the position
and function of operating units from the very beginning of their on-scene
arrival.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

The incident accountability system requires everyone operating in the hazard

zone to use a unit passport, to be logged onto an inventory list maintained in a
standard way at their hazard-zone entry point, and to be continuously account­
ed for throughout operations. The procedures require teams to go in together,
stay together, and come out together. Exceptions to ongoing crew integrity,
such as accountability exceptions, are always immediately reacted to and
managed (quickly and pessimistically) by the Ie as hazard-zone workers are
lost, trapped, or missing. Basic deployment procedures dispatch enough
workers to get the job done, then provide the Ie with a practical command­
and-control system to effectively protect those workers as they do their jobs.
Deployment safety is pretty simple-the Ie must order enough of a resource,
and specifically assign and account for that resource-if the Ie sends workers
into the hazard zone, the Ie must always be able to get those workers safely
out of that hazard area.

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Chapter 4 Functions of COTnTnand

CHAPTER 4

DEPLOYMENT MANAGEMENT

INCIDENT COMMANDER CHECKLIST

• Call for resources based on the most rapid, accurate, current, and fore­
casted event profile you can develop, based on the tactical priorities.

• Maintain an awareness of local-resource response, amount, and

capability:
... Personnel
... Apparatus/equipment
... Systems

• Quickly assess and use the local dispatch and status-keeping system.

• Monitor and manage within on-line response times.

• Use staging, assignment by the IC and accountability SOPs to get fire­

fighters into the standard work cycle.

• Maintain cUlTent, accurate, recorded resource inventory and tracking on

a tactical work sheet.

• Balance resources with tasks (don't overmatch).

• Always maintain an appropriate tactical reserve.

• Use command SOPs to manage and escalate operations.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 4

COACHING VERSION
Figure out and order the resources you will need based on what is going on
now and your best shot at where the problem is going. Don't screw around­
be pessimistic, order big, order early (send them home if you don't need
them). Don't write a tactical check that you don't have the resources to cash .
Virtually every incident operation requires real, live responders to execute.
Most of the time, the limiting factor in effective resource management is how
many smart, under-control, organized, manual laborers the system can deliver
while the incident problem is still present. Our best shot is at the beginning,
so delivering an army of workers after the window of opportunity closes is
just interesting. Always use resource tracking and staging to log units into the
scene, and accountability as the ticket the workers use to get into and out of
the hazard zone (no ticket, no entry). Hazard zones that workers can enter but
may not be able to exit must be defined and managed as defensive positions.
You pick the time and the place where you're going to fight and take enough
people and stuff with you to get the job done.

Deploym.ent Management

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FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND

CHAPTERS

IDENTIFY STRATEGY/DEVELOP

INCIDENT ACTION PLAN (lAP)

- - - - -- - - - -- -- ---
 Functions of Command Chapter 5

FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND
CHAPTERS:

IDENTIFY STRATEGY/DEVELOP
INCIDENT ACTION PLAN (LAP)

MAJOR GOAL

TO USE A SYSTEMATIC METHOD TO MAKE BASIC STRATEGY

DECISIONS, AND TO DEVELOP AND INITIATE A TACTICAL lAP

IDENTIFYING STRATEGY
Showing up at a fast-moving working situation, where the incident problem is
putting on a big show, is a difficult time and place for the IC to make initial
and ongoing decisions. To create effective, quick, correct action, the Incident
Commander must "cut through" a lot of confusion, uncertainty, and dan­
ger. Incident operations that consistently get the job done are created by
a calm, lucid IC who simplifies a lot of complex stuff that is going on
all at once, to develop the decisions that consistently get the right action
in the right place at the right time. What we do in the very beginning
generally sets the stage for what happens for the rest of the
incident...lots of times the first-five minutes are worth the next-five ~
hours. Command Function #5 describes how the IC develops and f:J(;5' ~­
uses the incident strategy and lAP as the initial and ongoing evalu­
ation, decision making, and management framework. The IC uses
the incident strategy to determine the right place(s) to operate and then
develops the lAP to desctibe the correct action that matches and takes
control of the incident conditions, within the basic overall strategy. Having
such a basic overall strategy and a matching tactical action plan, that can be
connected to actual incident conditions loaded into the system ahead of the
event, provides a huge head start when show time is fast and dirty (as usual).
Dedicating one of the regular functions of command to how the organization
will connect standard action to standard conditions, to hopefully create a stan­
dard outcome, becomes a major way of consistently making the basic strategic
decisions that are required to create effective (standard) performance under
difficult incident conditions. The IC will be at a continual disadvantage until
he/she is able to figure out what actually happens at an incident. While this
sounds pretty simple, a reflection of this disorientation is frequently contained

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

 Chapter 5 Functions of Command

in the traditional comment that we used to hear from the rugged old soldiers
who gasped, "Every fire (or whatever) is different!" Looking at every event
as "being different" was the reason (they said) that a documented (written
down) command system could not be created. The challenge this sets up, is
that it's pretty difficult to design any sort of standard action-oriented, prob­
lem-solving system when the conditions that the action is designed to apply
to, and the problems that we are trying to solve are always regarded as being
"different." If this is the case, we must rely only on our experience gained at
the situations, where the individual or the team previously encountered the
exact same conditions in a past incident, or the hit-and-miss process of
depending on plain old luck to provide us with any direction on what action
we should connect to incident conditions. Both experience and luck are good
things (even in a well-developed system), but they are not enough, in and of
themselves, to consistently run an effective, every-day IMS decision-making
and operational process. Imagine (particularly if you were the patient) if a
heart surgeon said, "Every heart is different," before the operation-and also
imagine, if you overheard him say to his operating room buddies, just as he
was about to make the initial incision (in you-"I wonder where that little
baby is?" To a major extent, we are saying the same thing as Doctor Mallard
(quack) is saying when we blubber, "Every fire is different!"

The folks who say every incident is different are basically (and personally)
telling the truth. These poor souls react to what they encounter episodically,
at every successive routine incident, as if it was the first time whatever is
going on ever happened, or at least the first time that they ever saw it occur.
It's nice to be surprised on your birthday, but it's tough to use up a lot of
front-end incident time because the IC is a horrified spectator looking right
down the barrel of whatever assortment of ugly things that are creating what
is, in effect, an ugly incident. A critical capability for the IC is to be trained
and prepared to know the things that are the same in the same types of inci­
dents and to have the ability to figure out and react to those special (i.e.,
different) conditions that are present. All of this evaluation/information must
then be merged into the ongoing strategic, and tactical decision-making
process. Most of the pieces and parts of an incident are pretty standard, but
how people, places, and things are "packaged" will create a combination that
is different, from incident to incident. This produces a mixture of regular and
special stuff. We can standardize how we will react to the recurring condi­
tions that we encounter by identifying that factor (or set of factors), assigning
a response value to it, deciding what action is required, and what the standard
outcome of that action should look like. Then whenever we encounter that
standard factor, we have (in effect) preplanned our standard reaction to that
factor. The approach of creating an automatic operational response to recur­
ring conditions creates the capability to react to those parts of the incident
"quietly" (i.e., short, sweet, predictable orders to team members that create
standard actions). While these conditions can be handled by such "ShOlt
orders" (mostly coordination), they are critical and involve the recurring con­
ditions that make up the majority of what our business deals with. Every
incident also has some parts that are special to that event. This is the part of

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

incident management where we consider those special factors and customize a

response to meet their needs. Over time, we "log" these special experiences
and expand our memory files. Living through special experiences con­
verts them from special (non-standard) to standard ... smart, old
soldiers (rCs) who pay attention and continue to learn and remember
( .. . been there, done that), probably don't get surprised much (or at
least less and less), as time goes by.

The road to having a standard, strategic management system is straight

forward-we walk it by creating a scale of standard incident condi­
tions, ranging from light to severe, and then deciding how operational
action that effectively deals with those conditions will be conducted
along that scale. While there are lots of dynamic factors present at a typi­
cal incident, the event starts, evolves, and eventually ends in a fairly standard
way, that creates a standard incident profile. This standard scale becomes the
basis for incident evaluation, decision making, planning, and revision .

This chapter will describe how the organization develops a strategic and tacti­
cal management system and then "preloads" a standard decision-making
approach (philosophy) ahead of time to assist the IC and the operational/com­
mand team. Chapter four (one back) on deployment describes how requests
for service produce a standard dispatch and how the arrival, assignment, and
inventory tracking/accountability of responders is managed. The local deploy­
ment approach creates a simple system, that routinely gets hometown
workers/neighbors and their hardware into safe, effective operating positions.
This chapter will describe the basic details of how the responders (delivered to
the incident scene by the organizational response created by what we blabbed
about in the deployment system) will take strategic and tactical action.
Deployment gets the players to the stadium and on the field. Organization
(next chapter) describes the standard roles they will play, and the formations
they will use. Strategy and rAP create the operational game plan they will use
when they actually play. The rAP keeps track of how the plays are working
during the game and provides a structure for the IC to keep the game plan cur­
rent. Deployment and strategylIAP, like all of the command functions, are
closely connected and cross over each other when (and where) they actually
occur. The two are separated into different chapters (four and five) for this
text, and focus on the details of how the re manages each as an individual
command function . The reader should mentally integrate the two as they pro­
ceed and remember how they bounce onto and complement each other. Like
any good cook, the IC must first understand the characteristics of each sepa­
rate ingredient (function) and then skillfully mix and match them together to
make the "command stew" come out right every time.

The basis of operational incident strategy management emerged mostly out of

traditional military procedures that we adopted and applied to structural fire
fighting a long time ago. We still use a lot of battle-oriented terms and
concepts when we plan, teach, discuss and organize how we connect
(engage) our resources (the soldiers) to the incident problem (the enemy).

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

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Chapter 5 Functions of Command

The same basic strategic approach we use to control structural fires applies to
the other kinds of incidents we currently respond to and manage. In fact, the
strategy stuff we use at structural fires (presented in this chapter) pretty much
applies to most day-to-day management situations. Most of us scuffed-up old
fire department managers find the clarity of a structural tire fight a welcome
relief from the currently confused, emotional, non-precise typical day that we
spend in the office ... a lot more public safety managers "check out" from
political collapse than structural collapse (but that's another book). We will
use a lot of structural fire fighting references as we go through this chapter
because they are the familiar foundation of the strategy and tactics that we
apply to fire control in burning buildings and the other all-risk (multi hazard)
incident services that we now deliver and manage with standard IMS proce­
dures.

A major command function involves the Ie using the situation evaluation , the
event profile, the standard risk-management plan, and the forecast of incident
conditions as the evaluation and decision-making platform to produce the
overall incident strategy. This strategy decision serves the critical purpose of
determining and mobilizing the basic operating position of the hazard zone
workers and the overall inside/outside operational objective of the entire inci­
dent response. The development and management of the overall strategy also
becomes the basis for the Incident Action Plan (lAP). The overall strategy
determines whether inside or outside operations will be conducted. The lAP
describes the tactical details and work plan that address and (hopefully) solve
the incident problem(s). Those lAP details become the very practical (and
standard) performance targets for the Ie and the operations team.

The basic strategic decision (offensive/defensive) always drives the planning

process-initially, and throughout the incident. The basic order of develop­
ment is: Strategy #1 -+ lAP #2. The lAP must be a reflection of the
operational strategy ... not the other way around. Using the strategy as the basis
of the lAP requires the Ie to take the front-end time that is required to con­
sciously evaluate initial incident conditions and then use that evaluation to

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

develop the overall operational strategy, before starting operations. As opera­

tions continue, the Ie must always compare what is occurring (right then)
against the current strategy, to be certain that the workers are in safe operating
positions. When conditions change (for better or worse), the Ie must consider
changing the overall strategy, and the lAP, to match those changing condi­
tions. Those changes can be relatively minor and are almost automatically
adjusted to by the operating units and sectors that are in the area of those
changes. Other times, the changes can be significant and require a coordinat­
ed effort by the whole team. This approach produces an initial and ongoing
action plan that is based on a rational, conscious, and strategic evaluation of
incident conditions, and then deciding on the overall incident strategy. This
"strategy-first" approach is the rational opposite of the emotional reaction of
jumping into the closest, hottest, most exciting position that quickly (and
painfully) shows the jumpers how potentially dangerous it is to put the lAP
ahead of the strategy. Strategy first creates a very simple, "think-before-you­
jump" approach.

Overall operational strategy is divided into two basic modes: The offensive
and defensive modes. Offensive operations are conducted inside the hazard
area. Defensive operations stay outside of the hazard area. The two separate
modes create a simple, understandable (position-based) game plan that
describes in very practical (and primitive) terms how close the emergency
responders will get to the hazard area. Simply, understandable means that we
only have to know, remember, and apply a two-position option ... we either
operate on the inside or from the outside and never do both at once, in the
same place. To do offensive and defensive at the same time, in the same
place, is like ordering an artillery strike on yourself.

Students of command should not underestimate how important the IC's initial
and ongoing strategic call is because it is so simple-that's why it works so
well. The Ie must quickly decide a lot of critical stuff many times with limit­
ed information, under tough conditions, and using a basic offensive/defensive
approach, as the basis of starting effective, safe operations, which is a big help
to the whole team.

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 Chapter 5 Functions of COl1'unand

Being able to call (at the very beginning of operations) a big strategic play
quickly (short orders: little talk, lots of action) is like looking at a traffic
signal while we approach the signal. While the colors are simple
(only three), they create a well known, predictable, and safe outcome
if we (and our road neighbors) pay attention to the color, and follow the
standard action that goes with each color. The traffic signal is simple
and understandable. Simple and understandable means, in traffic signal
terms, that we either stop or go ... an'i pretty much can't do both at once
(except for the crazy drivers in Phoenix). The basic traffic signal risk­
management plan is really simple-if everyone responds to their
color. .. there should be no intersection accidents. Developing and maintain­
ing the overall strategy and lAP becomes the command function, along with
deployment, that effectively translates command evaluation and decisions into
tactical manual labor. Having the initial :C make a strategic decision, and
then develop an lAP, is what "puts water on the fire"-because this is the part
of the command process where the IC decides on the strategy, which describes
the basic water application location (inside or outside), and the lAP that out­
lines how that water will be applied. Establishing and maintaining the correct
offensive/defensive mode is a major IC function. While the entire team uses
reconnaissance, evaluation, and reporting from their position/function to help
the IC keep the plan current, the IC is the only person whose organizational
role (i.e., overall incident boss) and oper2tional position (i.e., command post)
creates the consistent capability to receive and process such information from
all over the incident site, "add it up," and maintain control of the overall strate­
gic mode for everyone operating at the incident. This is why we say (over and
over) throughout this text that the IC must operate on the strategic level.

IDENTIFYING THE STRATEGIC MODE

The IC identifies the strategic mode as offensive or defensive through the
analysis of an array of standard critical iccident factors and their related char­
acteristics. The major factors and questions to consider in determining the
correct mode include:

• Fire extent and location-How much and what part of the building is
involved? This will determine where we can and cannot operate.

• Savable occupants-Is there anyone alive to save? We will not risk our
lives for those who are already lost (we must distinguish between a res­
cue and a body recovery).

• Fire effect-What are the structural conditions? Don't get under stuff
that will fall down and go boom.

• Savable property-Is there any property left to save? We will not risk
our lives for property (stuff) that is already lost.

• Entry and tenability-Can forces get in the building and stay in? Get
in/stay in = offensive; can't get in/can't stay in = defensive.

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

• Ventilation profile-Roof operations become big strategic indicator­

particularly where roof, attic, and fire area are directly connected: Can't
go on the roof = can't go inside.

• Special hazards-Hazmat, confined space, highllow angle, swift water,

meteor showers? We must develop strategylIAP to match the hazard.

• Local violence--Social disorder, shooting/bullets/weapons, violent

people and situations are present-do we need law enforce­
ment to stabilize before we can safely operate? We are
basically a highly vulnerable, non-bulletproof "friendly
force."

• Terrorism-Chemical, biological, nuclear, explosives, etc.

• Resources-Are sufficient resources available for the

attack? We require adequate manual laborers to do
incident work ...either offensive or defensive. Do our troops have the
hardware necessary to support their efforts?

While it is a major responsibility of the IC to decide on and manage the strate­

gic mode, the entire response team must be able to define, identify, and
understand (and hopefully agree on) the basic characteristics of the incident
conditions that produce the overall strategic decision. They must know the
basic approach and objective of each mode,
and what offensive and defensive opera­
tions look like when they occur. This is
an absolute necessity if all the players are
to react conectly, efficiently, and safely
to the IC's strategic decision and plan .
The process must be simple and cannot
be a mystery, if everyone is going to do
an effective job and survive the "strate­
gic" experience. Standardizing how the
organization will conduct strategic opera­
tions requires a major agreement among the
entire response team. Connecting the strategic, tactical, and task levels so
that they all operate within the same basic strategy (once it is determined) is a
major IMS goal. While the IC is many times an officer who has developed
some road rash (experience) by living through and surviving past strategic
decisions and their outcomes (probably some good ...some bad), he/she has no
inherent superior, genetic, strategic psychic ability. Like every other part of
the IMS, the more you do it, see it, and live it, the more you know about it.
Every member of the team must be aware of the basic strategic and tactical
game plan and must be offensive/defensive "literate" and "cooperative." This
becomes particularly critical because the IC generally uses the evaluation of
up-front incident conditions to determine initial strategy. Then tactical and
task assignments are made (and acted out), within the lAP, all over the inci­
dent site (within the context of that strategy). Once operations begin, the

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Chapter 5 Functions of Command

sectors and task teams become the eyes and ears of the Ie.
To a major extent the Ie will adjust, fine tune, or complete­
ly change the strategy based upon reported information
that comes into the command post. The Ie must con­
tinually evaluate how well the reports, that describe
conditions and progress that the emergency
responders extend from their positions all over the
incident site, line up with what the Ie can see
from the command post. The Ie must create the
I- most effective information management system
possible to keep the operational plan connected to
current conditions. This involves the on-line manage­
ment of a combination of visual infOlmation, recon reporting,
and operating-position feedback. In determining the strategy, the
Ie also establishes the standard tactical objectives that go with that
decision (described in the lAP). The Ie decides where and when the
troops will engage the incident problem, and the best forecast of where
they will attempt to stop it, and what the final outcome will be.

Under fast-and-dirty incident conditions, it's a big deal for incident conditions
to basically mean the same thing to everyone and create the same reaction
within the whole team. This approach (common definition/evaluation/reac­
tion) is what "standard" really means (throughout the IMS)-particularly
when the chips are down and the troops are trying to stay out of the way of
flying bricks, bullets, or blood. This corr:mon, agreed upon reaction (based on
a standard strategic approach) is a major way we mobilize the local team and
exchange standard strategic information from every level, so that we can move
quick, hit hard in the right place, and then go to plan "B" when plan "A" gets
(sometimes very quickly) obsolete. Strategic clarity produces standard out­
comes that match standard conditions. Strategic confusion produces
cluster-based, fragmented situations that devolve (i .e., evolution going back­
ward) into mess management, rather than incident management.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
A long time ago, our service made a promise to our customers that we will
quickly respond without a lot of bureaucratic mumbo jumbo, and then directly
(and personally) do everything we can to save them and their stuff from what­
ever problem is causing their bad day. While their lousy-day problems range
from minor to fatal, we establish the most profound part of our reputation in
the community, and our relationship with the customers, in situations where
there is an active problem present and we put our bodies in between the cus­
tomer and that incident problem. Offensive, go-inside-and-save-Mrs. Smith
operations become the most authentic way we act out our original promise to
protect those we serve.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

Offensive operations are conducted where inci­

dent conditions will allow responders to make a
fast, active attack inside the hazard zone. In
structural fire situations, handlines are
extended into the fire area to support the
primary search and to control the fire,
while related offensive support (forcible
entry, ventilation, and provision of
access) is provided to clear the way for
the attack. This offensive attack mode
is aggressive and quickly moves in to
directly overpower and extinguish the
fire from the inside. Aggressive means
forceful, active and deliberate ... it also means
conscious, thoughtful and standard.

Offensive operations are our strategic mode of choice. Wherever and whenev­
er our basic safety system will adequately protect our firefighters from the
interior conditions that are present, the Ie should order a strong, well­
supported, inside attack that controls interior conditions and directly protects
our threatened customer(s). Full-service public safety agencies should have
the aptitude, training, equipment, and, most of all, strong motivation to go into
effectively evaluated, offensive-hazard areas. Simply, if a hazard exists and
incident conditions are indeed offensive, the only really effective way the cus­
tomer and their stuff can be effectively protected (physically) is to conduct
standard attack operations from the inside. Being able (and willing) to do
tough inside hot-zone work is what makes emergency workers emergency
workers. The beginning point of our action-attack planning process should be
based on the mentality and basic approach of being offensive oriented. We
should also quickly and intelligently develop defensive reactions when condi­
tions (based on their hazards) prevent us from going inside. It's lots easier for
the Ie to decide on and do both offensive and defensive work with smart,
aggressive responders who get up in the morning looking forward to doing
high impact, up-close and personal, hand-to-hand battle with ugly incident
problems. Trying to plead with and somehow convince highly reflective "nor­
mal" workers to take the exciting trip to Hazardville is an extra burden no Ie
needs. This basic offensive instinct, combined with sensible, experienced,
strategic judgement, provides the best staIting point for a full range of effec­
tive incident operations. This active, inside-attack approach creates the need
for a strong safety system that allows our troops to do and survive working in
offensive hot zone positions. This approach creates the capability for the Ie
to always determine the COlTect strategy to control the incident problem-not
the opposite. When there is an urgent, solvable offensive or defensive incident
problem present, the efforts of teams of tough , combat-oriented workers led
by a smart, calm Ie are a thing of beauty and a joy forever.

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Chapter 5 Functions of Command

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
The Ie must always evaluate conditions and connect the operational strategy
to the level of hazard created by those conditions. Sometimes the situation
upon our arrival is "fully involved"-which means we got there at the peak of
the hazard. "Fully-involved" conditions require the Ie to produce a big
response in the beginning. While this is generally challenging, such expanded
initial conditions have a lot of clarity because what you see is what you get.
Many times, the Ie must quickly call for additional resources to somehow
cover all the operating positions required to manage these big initial condi­
tions. Such situations require a major deployment response that will test how
quickly we can assemble, assign, and manage a response that is big/quick
enough to effectively respond to the situation.

Other incidents move through a set of fully standard stages that begin small,
and become larger and more severe, as these events go on. In these situations,
conditions will reach a point (if the incident problem is not solved) where it is
unsafe for emergency workers to go/stay in the hazard area. These evolving
situations require the Ie to forecast the dynamics (location, amount, arrange­
ment) of the people and stuff that are not yet involved, and how, where, and
when the incident is moving toward what (and who) is left to burn.

In these cases, when conditions go beyond the interior operational capability

(regardless of their initial profile), the Ie must conduct defensive operations
from outside of the hazard area. During cefensive fire operations, large exte­
rior fire streams will be placed between the fire and the exposures to prevent
fire extension.

This defensive mode is a heavy-duty, cutoff oriented

approach. It may inclt;de operating exterior streams around
a large or inaccessible fire area, that is essentially burning
itself out. During active defensive operations, perimeter
control becomes critical since firefighters should not enter
the fire area. The IC concedes property to the fire (write­
off) and decides where the cutoff will take place. In these
cases, the IC must conduct defensive operations outside the
collapse/hazard area. Defensive operations represent a standard
organizational response to situations that cannot be managed
offensively, because conditions are simply too dangerous to get
close to (and escape from, in some situations); there are no sav­
able lives or property present. It doesn't mean that when we
encounter such defensive conditions we wave a white flag, pick up, and go
home. Our role in the community is to deliver standard service to a wide
range of incidents that are in every incident stage. When advanced incidents
occur and create defensive situations, we respond, set up yellow tape, and stay
out of the collapse-hazard area, limit spread, pump and apply a lot of water,
stay ' til the end, and all go home okay. There is no place in the service deliv­
ery SOPs where we commit suicide by strategic positional stupidity.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

MARGINAL OPERATIONS
Life would be pretty simple, if all incidents were either clearly offensive or
clearly defensive ... no such luck.

A difficult and dangerous situation occms when rescue (i.e., plimary search)
operations are not complete and conditions are near the end of offensive and are
starting to look and act like the beginning of defensive. This is show time for
the Ie-he/she must carefully control operations, remain in continuous radio
contact with interior sectors/crews, provide protection for the interior workers
from whatever the hazard is (fire, hazmat, violence, etc.) and, if necessary, pull
the troops out, if conditions continue to go bad. Marginal situations are where
our standard risk-management plan (presented later in this section) says that it
is okay to take a big lisk, in a highly calculated manner, to protect a savable
life. Highly calculated means we carefully evaluate conditions, use all of our
safety equipment, SOPs, and command system support to protect ourselves. We
must operate with an ongoing awareness that marginal is a situation (that occurs
at the end of the offensive stage) and not another strategic mode .. .in fact, be
very careful of Ies (or really anyone) who make marginal operations both a
standard mode and a regular habit. Keep strategy management real simple­
it's either heads or tails ...the only two standard strategic modes are offensive
and defensive. Quickly completing search and rescue is the only reason that
our troops should be operating inside of a marginal situation.

Tactical situations are very dynamic. They either get better or they get
worse. Under active fire conditions, we can only protect interior crews
with hose lines and support, as they search for a very limited time.
Forget about "holding" a fire-it goes out or bums on until the fuel
is gone, or it goes out when water application exceeds BTU's pro­
duced. Big piles of closely packed combustible material (tires,
sawdust, compost, etc.) will bum a long time once they get goin',
but the author (like a lot of old guys) has stood in front of a lot of
burning structures and very few of them ever burned for a week.
We said that strategy is like flipping a coin-even if it lands on
edge, it will fall to one side or the other in just a second. Marginal
is the edge.

Sometimes the offensive fire-fighting efforts we llse to protect search

and rescue operations, and to cover our workers, will actually make progress
on controlling a marginal incident problem, and conditions will become more
offensive. The Ie can then continue to reinforce those interior operations and
manage the incident as an offensive event. Other times, just the opposite
occurs. The problem (that makes the situation marginal) continues to get
worse, our troops become more severely threatened, and the Ie must quickly
get them out of the hazard zone. The Ie must always include our workers as
a part of the life-safety profile and realize that emergency responders are all
ready to risk their lives (in a highly calculated manner, if necessary), but there
is no plan or place where we just sacrifice ourselves.

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Chapter 5 Functions of Command

It's always a difficult decision to order the inside searchers out of an area
before the search is completed, because conditions are deteriorating-this is a
tough, but very important, part of the IC'~ job.

Note to Reader-While offensive operaticns are our strategy of choice, the IC

must, based on conditions, clinically select whatever strategy is appropriate. It
would be peachy if we could always control the incident problem (whatever it
is) in the compartment of origin. A strictly offensive world would feel good to
the responders because they always want to quickly make the problem go away
and save everything they can. The real world simply does not work like that.
The IC and the team must be ready to respond to a variety of tactical situations
that are actually underway and in virtually every stage of development. .. one
through ten on the standard scale. Once the incident problem stmts, it means
that the engineering, enforcement, and educational parts of the fire protection
system did not work (for whatever reason). Now, the manual response/sup­
pression prut of the process must kick in. There is no strategic value
judgement, no good or bad, no nice or not nice, no right or wrong, in offen­
sive/defensive/marginal operations-the IC must match the strategy to the
cunent and forecasted stage of the incident, based on the "cards" that the inci­
dent dealt-this means creating and applying standard actions to standard
conditions to achieve a standard outcome. Regular strategy management
directs us to respond and set up standard operations that continue until we
resolve the incident problem. The result cf this standard response process is
mostly driven by the conditions the IC encounters at the incident. It is a good
thing that our responders are highly motivated to save everything they can, but
we must not regard defensive operations (and outcomes) as a failure-they are
simply a standard outcome that goes with a standard stage.

STRATEGIC "SEPARATION"
Effective fire operations (safe, sane, predictable, reproducible ... standard) are
conducted either on the inside or from the outside of the hazard area. Any
mixture of the two basic modes, in the same area at the same time, begins to
set the painful stage for injury, loss of life, and expanded property loss. The
basic safety objective of strategic management is to keep firefighters out of
offensive positions at defensive situations.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

The crews operating on the interior of the hazard area (like conducting pri­
mary, offensive fire-fighting operations inside of a building) must
depend on the Ie to control the strategy, knowing the operation will
be managed in the offensive or the defensive mode, and not a mix­
ture of both. If the inside guys/gals are pulling a two-inch attack
line into the building while the outside guys/gals are simulta­
neously operating multiple ladder and monster-sized deck
guns (masterstreams) into the same interior space, effective
and safe fire fighting has ended. The troops operating on the inside
will soon learn that cannons outshoot peashooters and the outside
blasters always win (even if the streams are of equal size).
Simultaneous inside/outside operations into the same place are always a
big-time reflection that the Ie is not in complete (or in many times even
pmtial) control of the incident. Marginal means that the inside operators
(searchers) are quickly trying to complete rescue functions and, as soon as the
"all clem"" is given, the Ie will decide if the troops stay and fight offensively,
or get out and go defensive. Marginal does not mean both modes are ever in
operation simultaneously in the same place. Sometimes the Ie will conduct
offensive and defensive operations in separate areas where there are mUltiple
compartments that are close to each other. The basic objective of strategic
separation is to prevent inside and outside operations in the same area at the
same time. Incident areas can be large, complex and separated enough that
the Ie can establish and control defensive operations in one place and offen­
sive operations in an adjacent area. This is okay if there is some standard
separation like distance or standard construction (i.e., firewalls, etc.) present
between the areas. An example might be a fully-involved building that gets a
defensive, outside attack while offensive exposure protection operations are
conducted inside the separate buildings detached/separated on each side. The
defensive objective is to knock down the fire and to cut off fire extension to
the exposures on each side. The offensive objective is directed toward con­
finement, where we attempt to protect the exposures from the inside. The
closer that simultaneous offensive/defensive operations are conducted, the more
evaluation, coordination, and control must be provided by the Ie.

OPERATIONAL BENEFITS
Effective management of the overall strategy by the Ie provides the following
benefits:

• Structures decision making and evaluation

• Standardizes understanding and communications

• Provides operational control

• Improves overall effectiveness

• Supports incident safety

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Chapter 5 Functions of Command

Structuring Decision Making and Evaluation

The Ie performs a critical function as he/she performs all the activities
required to manage the strategic process. The Ie begins to manage ("set up")
the strategic function at the beginning of operations by making the initial deci­
sion to conduct an offensive or defensive attack. The Ie must then continue
to maintain and manage the strategic function by keeping the lAP cUlTent, in
relationship to the inside/outside strategic process. As conditions change, the
Ie must be prepared to adjust the strategy and the related incident action plan
-particularly, if conditions worsen. When active incident conditions become
more intense and widespread, and the incident problem(s) keeps winning, the
attack plan must shift from offensive to marginal (if rescue has not been com­
pleted) and if conditions continue to worsen, eventually to defensive.

The offensive/defensive index provides a standard way that information can be

quickly exchanged in a standard way inside the command and operational
team to evaluate critical incident conditions and the effect of operational
action. This index allows for an effective adjustment in the overall operational
plan as the incident continues. The system depends on the Ie to evaluate ini­
tial and ongoing conditions, and the effect of operational action, and decide if
incident workers will operate inside or ou~side the hazard area. Responsibility
is fixed on the Ie to continually re-evaluate that strategic decision. As quickly
as possible, the Ie should assemble an effective staff to assist with strategic
decisions, develop a hard-hitting plan within the declared strategy, and create
an adequate incident organization to support the plan.

Standardizing Understanding and Communications

Developing and maintaining ( ...continually) the overall strategy is a major,
ongoing Ie function . This inside/outside decision sets the stage for the entire
operation, and influences how (and where) incident operations will be con­
ducted . The Ie must always be able to define operations within the
offensive/defensive framework. The strategy decision (and statement) is the
quickest and most descriptive proclamation of incident conditions and the
operational actions needed to match those conditions. .

This basic strategy definition serves the purpose of providing a simple and
straightforward framework for everyone on the operational and command
team to develop a common understanding. "Offensive" means a quick, vigor­
ous, interior attack. "Defensive" means get in between what's burning and
what's not, to keep it that way. In these defensive cases, the Ie must go for
the big guns and watch out for falling waCs. "Marginal" means organize and
operate to protect inside rescuers while they try to find, grab, and remove Mrs.
Smith. Marginal operations require the Ie to control the troop's positions,
continually evaluate conditions, and move them (out) quickly, if conditions
don't get better.

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 Functions of Coml11and Chapter 5

The typical incident environment is fast and dirty... particularly in the begin­
ning of operations. Developing a common understanding and agreement of
how incident operations will be conducted (and how that process will be artic­
ulated) ahead of the incident, and packaged up in SOPs, facilitates quick
communications and effective action and reaction. When the IC says, "Get
out, we're going defensive," the action must be swift. The IC must not act as
if there is time to send long, detailed, and very specific directions to the interi­
or sector by way of registered letter. If everyone knows what mode they are
in, and what it means to be in that particular mode, a simply stated command
must be able to quickly achieve a standard response to either stay or go (i.e.,
change) into a standard offensive/defensive strategy/position.

Redeclaring Strategy
Elapsed incident times are given throughout the incident (for structure fires and
any other incident, where workers are operating in the hazard zone). These
times usually are generated by the communications center and begin when they
receive the initial call for help. Elapsed times are usually given every five min­
utes. This can be adjusted, according to the operational needs of each locale,
or the safety needs at a particular incident. When dispatch notifies the IC of
the elapsed incident time, the IC should acknowledge the message and re­
declare the incident strategy. Example: "Dispatch to Command, be advised
that this is your lO-minute, elapsed-time notification. "Command copies, 10­
minute elapsed time, we are still operating in the offensive strategy."

These periodic elapsed-time updates keep the IC current on how long people
have been operating in or around the hazard zone. This is pru1icularly important
during offensive operations, where crews are operating in the interior of a burn­
ing structure. This gives the IC a time-based measuring standard to judge the
effect that the incident operation has had on the incident problem. They also
provide the IC with an idea of how much time is left to operate in offensive
positions.

One of the traditional, widely accepted rules, used for structural firefighting is
the 20-minute rule. This rule basically states that, if you don't have fire con­
trol within 20 minutes at a working fire in an ordinary constructed building,
abandon interior positions, because the building will not be standing up much
longer. The old 20-minute rule of thumb was made in the days before high­
temperature fuels were used to build, decorate, furnish and equip buildings.
Construction techniques have also changed since the birth of the 20-minute
rule. Construction materials and building systems are much more highly engi­
neered in today 's world. New buildings have significantly less mass than their
40-year old cousins . Less mass equates to shorter burn times before collapse
occurs. When the IC receives a IS-minute elapsed time notification, he/she
has got to quickly decide if the gain is worth the risk (refer to the risk­
management plan). Maintaining an ongoing awareness of how burn time can
effect structural collapse is an example of why we do elapsed time notifica­
tions and attach the overall operations strategy to them.

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Chapter 5 Functions of Command

Providing Operational Control

In order to establish an overall strategy that will work for the entire operation,
the IC must approach initial evaluation and attack planning, in a rational and
systematic manner. This starts the operation in a well-organized fashion and
sets the stage for safe and effective operations. Establishing the overall strate­
gy provides a basic and standard organizational structure that assists everyone
in understanding the overall plan and thei:- relative position and function with­
in that plan.

The basic offensive/defensive approach provides a major starting point for

understanding the incident command and operational planning and control
process. The essence of fireground control by the IC simply involves the
ongoing ability to direct where the hazard-zone workers are located and what
they are doing (position/function). In a very practical sense, if the IC can ini­
tially place the troops, then move them, and change what they are doing,
based on changing incident conditions, the IC has captured and maintained the
most important level of position/function control. If the IC is not able to
change the location and function of his/her resources, the operation is essen­
tially (and bluntly) out of control.

Typical incident conditions involve compressed time, lots of confusion, and

high danger. Those conditions do not create a very good place (to say the
least) for the IC to assemble all of the responders and conduct an on-scene
strategy class in front of a burning building. Incident operations are at a real
disadvantage if the team that shows up has not attended and graduated from
"strategy" school. Diversity is a good thing in most organizational areas, but
it can fragment (and kill) us when it comes too quickly, creating standard, eas­
ily controllable strategic reactions. Huge :;>roblems can occur when there is
widespread, unresolved (and then acted out) personal disagreement among the
team, as to what basic action should be taken at the incident. Some folks are
naturally bold and others are naturally cautious. Having half of the team eval­
uate and react offensively (go inside), and the other half evaluate and react
defensively (blast inside troops) results in a gigantic, unsafe outcome ... strate­
gic mode confusion is consistently a majo:- cluster cause. Developing,
announcing, and managing a common (i.e., organizationally "standard")
strategic action plan is a major way we unify the team ... unify = a consistent
reaction where everyone assumes standard positions/everyone works to
achieve the same strategic (offensive/marginal/defensive) objective. Creating
such strategic clarity emerges out of strong SOPs, training, and agreement that
is developed way before the incident occurs.

This strategic agreement is much like the plays a team develops to, first of all,
decide what game they are going to play, what type of ball to bring, and
decide how they will play, when they show up on the field at game time. This
strategic game plan is a very practical description of where responders will go
and what they will do, based on making a standard strategic decision at the
beginning of the event, based on actual and forecasted conditions. Given the

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

incident hazards that we routinely encounter, the plays also outline where our
responders will not go, and what they will not do, based on that same standard
evaluation, decision, and reaction. Very simply, if the strategy is offensive, we
don't operate from the outside in, and if the strategy is defensive, we do not
operate from the inside out. What standard strategy management prohibits is
as critical as what it permits, and becomes a big-deal, incident-control disci­
pline element that directly, and consistently, affects the survival of our workers.

It would be virtually impossible for the Ie to consistently develop a survivable

strategic response from incident to incident, based only on the force of their
own individual, on-scene command personality, and their ability to "round up"
and directly control the position and function of a mob of aggressive, simulta­
neously and sequentially arriving responders, who are highly motivated
(thankfully) to play in the tough spots. Sometimes these gritty operational
spots are the conect place to be, and other times, they are potentially fatal
(always avoid fatal spots). The Ie is generally greatly outnumbered by the
responders (again thankfully), so if position/function control becomes a con­
test between the Ie and the troops, the smart money will always bet on the
troops. How the team strategically places themselves (based on the "strategic
argument") becomes a practical way we control where we go, and don't go,
and what we do, and what we do not do. Over time, the team gets to practice
the strategic system, by applying it to actual incidents and (hopefully) living
through the result of using the system. The cumulative intelligence that
emerges from this ongoing organizational experience must be used to refine
the system into a smart, habitual, strategic approach.

Improving Overall Effectiveness

Mobilizing the entire operation, under the control of a strong, strategic plan,
produces an efficiency of collective effort that is able to concentrate on a stan­
dard, well known, central operational objective. The objective of each mode
is simple and easy to understand:

• OFFENSIVE TARGET-do battle on the inside to control the incident

problem (on the inside)

• DEFENSIVE TARGET-exterior attack from outside the hazard area

to limit loss and stop the spread of the incident problem

Deciding on and then managing (and controlling) the overall strategy has
more practical, achievable opportunity for determining overall operational and
safety success, or failure, than does any other function. In fact, the other com­
mand functions assist and support our ability to effectively decide
on the conect strategy, and then develop, and pull off an effective
lAP. The strategy function becomes the "moment of truth" for ,
the whole IMS. Simply, offensive operations and defensive oper­
ations are different. Nothing else produces effective, standard,
and predictable outcomes any better than a fast determination of

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Chapter 5 Functions of Command

the con-ect strategy, and strong control of the operation within that strategy.
Effective strategy management and operational control require maximum
effort by everyone to achieve standard, strategic objectives (nothing produces
poor outcomes any quicker than the screwed up opposite). Strategic confu­
sion unnecessarily beats up and kills more incident workers and causes more
incident loss than any other command mistake. In fact, when we critique
most dysfunctional (cluster) incident outcomes, slow (i.e., behind the "power
curve"), incorrect, indecisive, strategic mode confusion is generally one of the
critical elements in what caused the mess. Based on that reality, getting and
keeping the strategy straight is a major, mess-prevention technique.

Tactical situations in which interior workers, who are about to complete an

offensive attack, are bombarded by the outside big guns, eventually will pro­
duce the need to mobilize lots of donuts (or granola bars) in the canteen/
rehab sector. This simple "blast-the-inside-workers" mode confusion will
many times quickly (almost instantly) reverse interior offensive conditions,
destroy the tenability of the correct direction and position of offensive attack
and support (particularly ventilation), and will drive the inside crews out. One
good thing comes from all of this mode confusion. It gives the insiders a
chance (when and if they get out) to spend some high-quality time interacting
with the outside blasters, and discussi ng whether their parents were even
acquainted.

Strategy confusion is ALWAYS a mistake. Sometimes this mistake is ordered

by an impatient Ie, who (as an example) can no longer stand to watch the fire
push smoke and pass gas out of the fire oven (inteIior). When this occurs, and
the Ie loses strategic (offensive/defensive) focus, he/she may order a prema­
ture exterior deluge attack that will cause (actually reverse) the nasty stuff
coming out of the fire area, that is making the Ie nuts, to go right back into
that inside area, and onto the offensively positioned troops. Sometimes the
precontrol period can seem to take longer (to the IC) than it should. It is a
frustrating time for everyone. However, the management and control of the
two separate strategic modes by the Ie is designed to keep everyone under
control, and always within the strategic agreement-particularly the Ie.

The concept of incident control becomes an active and very practical reality
when it effectively connects to the overall strategy. There isn't any "blue sky"
involved in an Ie sitting in the command post, looking at what can be seen
from that standard command position, listening to reports from all over the inci­
dent scene, and continually processing all cf that information ("adding it up")
to decide if the attack is going to be from the inside or the outside, and then
controlling the operation in that strategic mode. The Ie must have the patience
and discipline to carry out and manage the current (and correct) mode to a stan­
dard end, or revise the mode, if the operational action the Ie has applied to that
mode is not effective. The Ie cannot give away the ongoing responsibility for
making, revising, and controlling the overall incident strategic decision. Keep it
simple ... the point of the strategy management routine is to prevent firefighters
from being in offensive positions under defensive conditions .

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

Incident managers must be realistic (and tough minded) about incident opera­
tions that are essentially not under effective strategic control, but somehow
solve the incident problem. Lots of times, task-level freelancing and lousy Ie
strategy management go together, but sometimes aggressive responders will
freelance their way (in spite of an ineffective level of command) to the incident
problem, operate directly on that problem, and Batta Boom!! !-the problem
goes away. While this is why we responded (to solve the incident problem),
this freelance success can produce a painful pay day (i.e., sucker punch) the
longer it goes on and the more comfortable the Ie becomes with just turning
the troops loose on the incident problem, closing his/her eyes, counting to
twenty, and hoping the problem is gone when the Ie opens his/her eyes.

As we continue to conduct operations that work on the task level, but are not
really being managed on the tactical/strategic level, the more we are cruisin' for
a bruisin.' We can be out of command and control a hundred times and pull off
putting out the fire (as an example), and then on a dark and windy night, a
deceptive, innocent looking situation sucks us in, gets us hooked (because it
. worked the last hundred times), and then kicks our ass. This happens because
we produced a freelance win (a lot) before on the task level, but have not really
been awake and in effective control on the tactical/strategic level. When our
freelancing "habit" connects us to a well-disguised set of these sucker-punch
conditions, that in the beginning, look just like the last 99 events that our free­
lancing, attack-inclined commandos chewed up and spit out. We have now
seduced those attackers to habitually go around the Ie (and the command sys­
tem) and independently blast themselves into the hot zone. Sooner or later,
those well-disguised, bad-ass conditions will get our troops in their clutches
and conclusively show they will not cooperate and go away. Now the Ie must
somehow wake up, take control, and move the troops. This is a lousy time to
learn that the luck of the semi-conscious Ie has just run out, and the troops are
disconnected from the command support that will help get them out alive. We
must continually plan, apply, review, and reinforce that effective, safe, incident
operations absolutely always require the conscious attendance of lucid bosses
operating on the strategic, tactical, and task levels. The Ie must be performing
the standard eight functions of command wherever and whenever there are ·
responders operating in the hazard zone-no timeouts, no lapses, no blank
spaces. This critical, ongoing command presence should prevent the "anaes­
thetic" created by successful, task-level outcomes, OCCUlTing at essentially
(strategically) uncommanded or undercommanded events.

This approach to Ie command and control is designed to always support task­

level operations, so it does not really change what happens on the work level
very much. Effective manual labor is what we respond to do, so if it works .. .it
works. The problem with a lack of command and control is mostly with the
boss, not the workers. The Ie shows up (like everyone else) to play their
position, and that includes the ongoing ability to move the troops when what
usually works does not work, and it is now time to quickly move the hot-zone
workers out of the inside. The Ie must continually ask and answer the basic
strategic control questions:

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Chapter 5 Functions of Command

• Have I effectively evaluated incide t conditions?

• Have I done a risk-management evaluation?

• Have I made a conscious, offensive/defensive decision?

• Have I gotten the troops into their positions based on lC orders or

SOPs .. .or have they freelanced into those positions?

• Am I in a position to observe and listen to progress/exception/comp1etion/

condition reports so that I can effectively evaluate changing conditions?

• Have I forecasted what will happen in the future (5/1 0/15 minutes ahead)?

• Do I know if my troops are okay?

• Can I move the troops, if conditions change?

This concern for command and control does not mean that the IC must over­
manage every routine event just to advertise their on-scene presence. What it
does mean is that the IC sets up the command post (or a series of upgraded
command posts) from the very beginning of our an-ivaI by effectively evaluat­
ing conditions, assigning the troops to working positions, and then letting the
workers do their tasks. This can (and many times should) be a very "quiet"
level of command, but behind it is an IC t~at is tracking work progress, evalu­
ating conditions, maintaining the inventory and accountability system, and
being in a continuously awake position ready to prevent/react to changes that
could hurt the workers. If the operation is going okay and task level efforts
are working according to plan, the IC can pretty much quietly and calmly ask
for progress reports and then quietly and calmly thank the reporter for the
good news. This is what happens most of the time, but when what we usually
do that normally gets the job done, does nat work (like it usually does), and
the IC does not like the way the operation looks/soundslfeels, he/she must
"punt" ("punt" = standard football tactic that converts offensive ops to defen­
sive ops and improves field advantage .. .) and, many times, either reinforce
current operating positions and make them bigger, or go from an offensive to
a defensive posture and approach.

Creating an effective command balance, between "quiet" and "noisy," is all

part of the art of command. The troops lose confidence and respect in the
command process if the IC is continually blabbing at the top of his/her lungs,
just to hear his/her own regal voice when it is not needed. They lose respect
for an IC who won't listen to the reports from the workers all over the inci­
dent scene, and then fails to use the command-post position to integrate that
ongoing intelligence into a continuously safe and effective plan. Conversely,
if a normally cool, "quiet" IC raises his/her voice (just a little), and tells the
troops to move, it becomes a high-attention event that gets a quick and
unquestioning reaction.

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SUPPORTS INCIDENT SAFETY

Our basic job is to put our bodies between the customer and the incident prob­
lem, and to do whatever is required to protect that customer. Search and
rescue operations, along with incident stabilization operations under tough
incident conditions, require the workers to routinely encounter and deal with
hazards and exposures that no other occupation would ever consider, or ever
imagine. "Normal" jobs do not call upon workers to aggressively run into a
high-hazard area, and do whatever fast manual labor it takes to chill that hot
zone. In fact, most people in control of their faculties just naturally run out of
the places that we run into. Establishing the basic strategy is how we decide
(very simply) where it is okay to run in, and where it is not a real swell idea
to run into. Based on this go/no go (inside) approach, the clear, quick, con­
cise decision to operate either offensively or defensively serves as the practical
and fundamental basis for operational safety and survival.

The standard offensive/defensive modes create a simple game plan that

describes, in survival terms, where we can (and cannot) go, and what we can
(and cannot) do. Managing the incident within a conscious, deliberate
inside/outside strategy attempts to keep the incident problem from killing the
workers. Separating the two modes, keeps the workers from killing each other.
Our active problem-solving approach creates the need for a very special safety
program. That safety approach must be customized to provide a standard
occupational response to the regular and special hazards that we encounter.
Given the confusing, time compressed, and dangerous incident setting where
we operate, the safety program must include a set of standard procedures that
make up a complete welfare and survival package. The command and opera­
tional team must go into the incident with a very practical understanding of the
capabilities and limitations of each part of the safety system. The Ie must be
\
able to identify the type and degree of hazard(s) that are present and then be
able to evaluate how effectively the components of our safety program will
protect our workers from those hazards. Being able to evaluate incident haz­
ards, in the terms of our safety-system capabilities, becomes a major way that
the Ie decides on, and manages overall incident strategy.

The command system must continually consider how well the standard safety
routine can protect the workers, based upon cuo-ent and forecasted incident
conditions. Having the Ie match safety-system capabilities, with incident
conditions, creates the very practical context of what is strategically safe, and
what is strategically not safe. What a safe offensive position means (in an
IMS context) is that all the pieces and parts of our standard safety system can
protect a hot-zone worker from the interior conditions that are present at that
time. In these cases, it is okay for our troops to use the standard safety rou­
tine to go inside of the hazard area, and directly engage the incident problem
offensively. What defensive means is that the hazard level of interior condi­
tions exceeds the capability of the standard safety system we use to effectively
protect our workers. In these cases, we must get out (if we are inside), or stay
out and keep responders away from those hazard-zone conditions. When this

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Chapter 5 Functions of Command

happens, we operate defensively on the incident problem from outside

of the hazard area. While the bz,sic offensive/defensive definition is
pretty simple (why it works), it takes a great deal of operational
and command system experience, skill, and support to quickly eval­
uate, manage, and safely adjust the strategic mode under actual
incident conditions. Regardless of the strategy, we must always
conduct incident operations within a highly calculated
safety plan that describes, in detail, how we will oper­
ate. This is critica~ to us because what is safe to us is
not at all what is safe to a drill-press operator, a wait­
ress down at Joe's Diner, or a shirt salesman (all
important jobs). What safe does mean (to us) is that
the consistent application of our standard safety system will provide a
round-trip ticket into and out of the hazard area. Our standard safety rou­
tine is made up of the following basic safety components:

• Functions of Command
• Risk Management
• Fit for Duty Firefighters
• Personal Protective Equipment
• Safety SOPs

FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND (COMMAND SAFETY)

Consistently having an on-scene IC, who is performing the eight standard
command functions, serves as the basic foundation of how we manage both
the life and property interests of the customer, and the safety, welfare, and sur­
vival of our responders . Given the usual (a nd sometimes unusual) hazard
level we encounter, the command safety routine must automatically integrate
into the regular IC's job and must become a habitual way that the IC operates.
It is impossible to effectively protect Mrs. Smith and her stuff, if the IC is try­
ing to somehow save Firefighter Smith because he/she is in trouble, because
of bouncing around somewhere outside our standard safety routine. The IC
does his/her regular job and plays his/her strategic position in the overall safe­
ty plan by performing the regular command functions-each function does its
own very special part of both the command and safety processes. Big prob­
lems (again, both command and safety) occur if the IC skips a function. In
fact, the effect of skipping (or screwing up) a command function usually
"pops out" (as a problem) as some S0l1 of safety difficulty. A simple way to
understand how the IC plays his/her safety role is to substitute the word "safe­
ty" whenever the word "command" appears. In that way, the standard eight
command functions each automatically do double duty. Automatically con­
necting and integrating safety with command becomes a simple, powerful way
the IMS always protects the workers. The corrimand safety aspect of each
function is presented (in this book) at the end of all eight command function
chapters. The basic safety objective of each command function includes:

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Chapter 5 Functions of Command

A major foundation of our risk-management approach is that every piece and

part of our operational routine must be done within standard safety proce­
dures, all the time. Integrating standard safety procedures into our regular
operational routine creates the capability for us to take on an elevated level of
risk. When we say risk, we mean going into the hazard zone to attempt a res­
cue (big risk) , or to extinguish the fire (lit:le risk). It doesn't mean that we
take a big risk by driving at 80 mph, bustin' red lights, and not wearing our
breathing apparatus. The following is a ri sk-management plan that effectively
integrates into our regular IMS. The plan expresses a standard, three-level
risk approach to our workers doing dangerous , potentially fatal incident work:

1. We will risk a lot to protect a savable life. This is a situation where

we evaluate that there is a viable customer who is tW'eatened and
trapped by the incident problem, and where a physical rescue is possi­
ble. This is the only place and time in our response and operational
routine where it is acceptable to expose a worker to a high level of
risk. High level of risk means that we will go up to ("push") the lim­
its of our standard safety system.

2. We will risk a little to protect savable property. This is a situation

where there is savable property that is tW'eatened by the incident prob­
lem, and where the IC evaluates that the regular personal and
operational safety systems will adequately protect the workers, so that
they can directly stabilize the incident problem and protect that prop­
erty. These are situations where the rescue priority has been
completed and the remaining level of risk is light to moderate. In
these cases, standard offensive operations can complete the incident
stabilization function by protecting savable property.

3. We will not take any risk to protect lives or property that are already
lost. This is a situation where the incident problem has evolved to
such a point that lives and property are no longer savable. The IC
must quickly evaluate such conditions and then declare and manage
the incident as a defensive operation. This is a critical time for our
risk-management plan and requires strong control by the IC and the
command system, because our workers responded to save people and
stuff, not watch it being damaged and destroyed.

The above three levels of risk can only be assumed in a highly calculated and
controlled manner. Highly calculated refers to department SOPs, training, and
refinement that must be followed all the time, to take any level of risk.
Controlled means always using a strong and effective incident management
system to conduct operations . There can be no substitute or exceptions to cal­
culated and controlled.

We always begin our operational response with the assumption that we can
make a difference for our customers by conducting standard incident opera­
tions. This creates an optimistic beginning for our response ...this is a good
thing. Our risk-management approach is based on us always conducting oper-
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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

Function 1. Assumption/Position---establish IC at the very beginning of

operations to insure that we start under control, stay under
control, never lose control

Function 2. Situation Evaluation-create safe operations based on accurate

initial and ongoing incident evaluation and information man­
agement

Function 3. Communications-keep everyone linked together so that we

can stay connected to get in/do our jobs/move quickly/get out
quickly (if necessary)

Function 4. Deployment-provide, manage, and protect our workers with

the timely dispatch of adequate, appropliate, resources

Function 5. StrategylIAP-safely position and move (where necessary)

workers based on actual (and forecasted) conditions, within a
standard risk-management plan

Function 6. Organization-decentralized sector bosses geographically and

functionally manage incident operations and worker welfare
more directly

Function 7. ReviewlRevise-continually evaluate and revise (as required)

operations to effectively connect the current incident action
plan to changing conditions

Function 8. Transfer/Continue-continue to support an IC and command

team throughout operations and support safety, by strengthen­
ing command continuation through effective transfer, upgrade,
and conditions

RISK MANAGEMENT
Taking personal risks, in a standard manner, is a regular part of our emergency
responders going into the hazard area to do their jobs ( .. .just another day at
the office). It is critical to our worker's survival that the organization decides
and clearly expresses how, where, when, and why we will take such hot-zone
risks ...this is what creates the "standard" manner. This risk-management deci­
sion/plan becomes a very practical expression of our most critical
organizational philosophy-how we will actually manage the connection
between risk and benefit (lives/property) at service-delivery time ("is the risk
to my troops worth the benefit to the customers?"). The plan must be straight­
forward, easy to remember, and simple to apply under difficult incident
conditions. Standard (offensive/defensive) strategy management is the basic
way we structure a consistent incident response that acts out what we say in
the risk-management plan . The context of risk in this safety plan does not
relate to how we manage and operate stuff like response gadgets, trucks,
equipment, and the hardware we routinely pack with us as we do our jobs.
What it (risk) means is the actual level of occupational hazards and exposures
that the organization will let our workers take in doing their hazard-zone jobs.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

ations within standard operational and safety SOPs. Rescue operations in the
hot zone are the only place where, based on the possibility of saving a threat­
ened customer, the plan allows workers to take a significantly higher level of
risk, and those operations are based on a deliberate situation evaluation, a con­
scious decision by the Ie, and the continual application of safety SOPs. The
initial Ie (Ie #1) should evaluate, decide, and declare the overall offensive or
defensive strategy in the initial radio report. This is where the standard risk­
management plan (and decision) begins. The offensive/defensive strategy
should again be reevaluated and re-declared after an "all clear" has been
achieved. Both are critical decision points for the Ie-in the very beginning
the Ie must decide if taking a big risk to try to do a primary search (and pos­
sibly make a rescue) is possible, based on conditions. What a significantly
higher level of risk means, in operational terms, is that the rescuer may take
the standard safety routine up to the limits of the capability of one or more of
the routine safety system components, based on the possibility of making a
save. These are typically very intense operations that require careful, quick
command, and strong, effective action from the entire team. Once the rescue
box is checked ("all clear") is another risk-management moment of truth for
the Ie. Based on the "all clear," there is no longer a life safety problem pres­
ent. Now the Ie must decide if it is worth the risk to the inside troops to
continue to stay in the hazard zone to try to physically stabilize the primary
incident problem which is now fire control.

FIT-FOR-DUTY PLAYERS
It is impossible for the safety system to outperform the personal capability
and approach of the workers that the system is designed to protect. Effective
incident operations require well-trained members who understand and willing­
ly work within the command, operational, and safety system. They must have
the personal aptitude (brains, personality, work ethic) and basic skill to do the
mental, physical, and emotional part of their job. They must also understand
how the other players on the strategic, tactical, and task levels connect and
complement each other to form an integrated team. The team must have
enough experienced members to work with and look after the welfare of the
new, young, and inexperienced. Incident work is dirty, difficult, and danger­
ous, and requires responders that are smart, sensible, disciplined, and grown
up. Everyone must both play his/her position and play well with others. The
overly aggressive must be firmly moderated, and the timid must be patiently
inspired. Successful incident site survival is many times the result of workers
who have a highly mature combination of independence and obedience-inde­
pendence to maintain an awareness of and react to the conditions around
them, and the obedience to quickly respond to orders from those who see
unsafe stuff that they don't. Hot dogs are nice at a ball game, and cowboys
are fun to watch at the movies, but they are a hazard at incident operations,
where we must go in together, stay together, and come out together. Leave
the kitchen-table baloney guys and gals back at the station to tell each other
tall tales, and take the quiet, smart players who know when to be quiet and
when to make noise, when you go to the hot-zone party.

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PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

A standard part of every occupational safety program involves the Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) ensemble that is used to protect the workers who
come in direct contact with the incident hazards. PPE (simply) is how we
"dress" the worker for the trip to the hazard zone. This equipment must be
designed to resist the very personal physical insults that the expected environ­
mental hazard(s) will present to the workeL ..that's why it's called personal
protective equipment.

It is critical that the strategic/tactical/task levels operate with a realistic and

accurate understanding of how PPE performs under actual incident conditions,
and what the equipment can and cannot do. Every part of the system has
safety limits that must not be exceeded. Just because our responders are
"dressed for the event" does not mean that they are indestructible. No seat
belt, cab cage, or religious medals can effectively protect our bodies when the
rig we are riding on collides violently with trees, trucks, or trains. Un belted
occupants who are thrashing about the ca'J of an apparatus that is off its
wheels, generally bump their heads badly(!). The most modern fire suits will
only take a full direct thermal hit for a few seconds. Our anatomy and physi­
ology cannot stand up to structural collapse (squish!). Getting dunked into
tetraglobuladeath makes you DRT (Dead Right There). Containers flying
through the air at hazmat incidents can create headless/limbless responders.
Whenever the best designed SCBA has run out of air, it's the end of the line,
if the wearer is still sun-ounded by products of combustion (gasp, then DRT) .
Body armor protects your belly button, but not your head. A big part of the
offensive/defensive decision must necessarily be based on the very primitive
(and powerful) act of the IC looking directly at the incident hazard level and
saying go/no go, based on his/her knowledge of PPE capability. It's lots bet­
ter if the IC has personally experienced how that PPE actually performs, based
on living through a bunch of smart (and probably some dumb) hazard-zone
experiences ... scar tissue creates a memory that many times produces lots of
life-saving flashbacks.

SAFETY SOPs
A common risk-management reference is that we will conduct all safety oper­
ations in a "highly calculated manner." Our safety SOPs are the foundation of
how we calculate that operational manner: the careful, consistent, and com­
plete way we develop, teach, apply, and review how we conduct these safety
activities acts out the "highly" part of "highly calculated." This approach and
objective of managing these procedures is to protect our most valuable asset
(troops), so that important fact makes them the highest priority part of IMS
and our SOPs must create a detailed description of the safety routine that is
applied to every part of the response operation.

Unlike most of our SOPs, which are mam:ged mostly as guidelines, safety
directives are written, taught, and enforced as rules. As an example, if the

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

emergency response driving-safety procedure says to stop (completely) if the

light is red (which it does), that isn't just a good idea, or something we do if
our biorhythms are in a compliance mode that day. Stop means that we
absolutely stop, all the time, every time. The reason for this stop rule
is really simple and very important-it wrecks both our day, our road
neighbor's day, and our response to the customer's bad day, if we
don't show up at Mrs. Smith's kitchen fire because we didn't fol­
low the safety SOP(s), and now we are upside down in the middle
of an intersection, standing on our heads, hanging by our seat belts.
Fire trucks sitting on their tops, with all wheels spinning in the air
(look like upside-down, dead elephants), are not configured or capable
in any way to apply water on Mrs. Smith's rapidly extending kitchen fire.
She called us because she really needed help, and because she had the confi­
dence that we had the professional experience and brains to safely respond
and actually arrive at her house in one piece. She has been paying for our
service for her entire taxpaying adult life and had not needed us until this very
moment. The tough part about kitchen-fire show time is that, when the show
starts, it's going to go on with us or without us ...the outcome with us (and
most of all, for her) is a lot better.

The routine for each response and tactical function must be packaged up in an
SOP that outlines how the local response agency will actually use their
resources to perform the standard safety function that goes with that activity.
The SOP must provide a detailed description of how those safety activities
will be conducted. The separate SOPs collectively make up a complete safety
program that is applied from the receipt of the customer's request for service
until we are safely "back home." The ongoing application and refinement of
the whole program creates the basis of the safety culture for our organization,
and provides a very practical picture of what safety "looks, sounds and feels
like" when it is being applied to real incident conditions and operations.
Incident safety SOPs generally involve the following basic activities:

Preparation-All team members must understand and be competent in their

role and contribute to the capability of their unit.

Ready-Responders receive the call for service and must know where they
are going, how to get there, who is going with them, and what radio frequency
is assigned to their incident.

Get Set-Everyone who is going on the call is safely on the truck, seated and
belted, the officer has checked with all crew members to verify they are physi­
cally in attendance, emotionally intact, and mentally present and ready to
respond.

Go-All warning devices are blinking, spinning, oscillating, blasting, yelping,

shining, whining, reflecting, and strobing. The overhead station apparatus
door is all the way up and all the compartment doors on the truck are closed­
now the rig can hit the road.

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Chapter 5 Functions of Command

DrivingIRiding-Everyone stays in seat belts, the officer gathers information,

looks, listens, manages the radio and helps with navigation/acts as a
traffic/access/routing lookout. Driver obeys all department response speed
limits, stops where required, slows down where it's smart to slow down, does­
n't scare road neighbors, the crew, or themselves.

Standard Arrival-Unit goes into the regular staging/assignment/accounta­

bility cycle according to SOPs-IC enters them into logginglinventory
/tracking system that continually follows them on a tactical work sheet
throughout the incident.

Hazard Zone IDlEntry-Officer evaluates the hot-zone perimeter and veri­

fies that the crew is fully protected (PPE), intact (together), and assigned as a
single resource with a specific task level job to do or to a sector by the IC
before they cross the hot-zone "line."

Continuous Commo Contact-Hazard-zone teams maintain portable radio

contact with their sectorllC-no contact with boss = no hazard-zone operation
(simply, get out).

Incident Scene Hazard ID-Entire crew continually evaluates hazard profile

around them and makes immediate location/function changes to protect them­
selves/others from current and changing conditions . Officer reports ongoing
condition/hazard changes to the sector/Ie. .. this reporting is always a big deal
because the hazard-zone troops = IC/sectoi· "eyes and ears."

Safety Tactical Reserve-IC quickly establishes Rapid Intervention Crew

(RIC) who maintains continuous availability to respond to any hazard-zone
safety issue. IC upgrades size and number of RIC teams based on the ongo­
ing incident profile (i.e., size and complexity).

Exit Rules-Crew goes in together/stays together/comes out together. Officer

always evaluates crew condition, air management, fatigue level, and maintains
awareness of exit profile. Officers maintain, whenever possible, a "back door"
for quick (Plan B) exit or reinforces exit route with hose lines, lights, and fire­
fighters.

Sector Operations-Unit effectively connects (and stays connected) with

sector officer for direction/redirection/coordination based on incident condi­
tions, work details, and hazards.

Safety/Accountability Officer Support-IC assigns safety/accountability

officer(s) who provides active, on-line safety surveillance, supervision, and
support to hot-zone workers.

RotationlRehab-IC/sectors continually audit fatigue profile based on manu­

al labor time, weather/environmental conditions, and assignment time, as the
basis for rotating work units through a rehab sector.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

RetUl'n to Quarters-Officer verifies attendance, welfare, sanity of crew

members, thanks sector/IC helpers for their support, affectionately insults lad­
der crews, and heads home following all traffic regulations. Unit always
drives "friendly," crew waves at customers (particularly kids and beautiful
people). Officer continues to monitor crew's physical/mental/emotional wel­
fare and provides whatever support is needed.

The IC must operate with the consistent assumption (going into the incident)
that everyone who shows up at the event is automatically (and completely)
following the standard safety plan. This safety SOP compliance assumption
becomes a critical part of the offensive/defensive strategic process. It is
impossible for the IC to make an effective and survivable strategic decision if
there is any question about safety participation. Simply, the IC cannot assign
any tactical/task position that involves any level of hazard, if there is not
absolute, on-going confidence that every worker is properly protected, operat­
ing under control, and inside the safety game plan . The IC reinforces this
basic, initial safety assumption once the operation gets going by creating an
incident organization with decentralized company and sector bosses, assigning
safety/accountability officers, establishing RIC teams, and supporting the hot­
zone workers with all of the systems discussed in the deployment chapter.
These efforts are in place to handle the parts of the event that require a quick,
standard response. These pieces of the system are designed to create an auto­
matic compliance to safety procedures, and are not in place to have long,
philosophic discussions at the incident scene, between bosses and workers, on
how important safety is.

We show up at the incident with exactly the same anatomy and physiology as
Mrs. Smith. What makes us different from her (wearing slippers and a night
gown) is that our well-trained and highly-motivated humans are protected by
occupational safety hardware and software that allows us to both go into (and
stay long enough to get the job done), and to also always maintain the capa­
bility to come out of the hazard zone. It's tough to explain that we stayed
outside and looked into the windows at her burning kitchen, because we were
too untrained, stupid, or undisciplined to put on our protective bat suits (com­
plete with bat masks), and stamp out thermal evil with our hydraulic bat guns.

Having the IC select a standard strategic option connects the hazard profile
(type, size, location) with the capabilities (and limitations) of the standard
safety plan. The plan is based on smart players, who understand and automat­
ically follow standard safety procedures. This consistent safety compliance
creates the capability for the IC to operate with the confidence that the safety
system follows the workers wherever they go, and protects them (wi thin the
limits of that system) while they do the work that goes with the selected strat­
egy-offensive places are where our safety systems work okay, so we can go
inside. Defensive places are producing hazards that are bigger and badder
than the protective capability of our standard safety system, so we must stay
outside. The IC and the team must always do the "safety math" that connects
(and compares) incident conditions with the capabilities and limitations of the

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

Chapter 5 Functions of Command

standard safety system. Included in this "math" is the assumption that Mrs.
Smith didn't go to bed, on kitchen-fire night, in Nomex jammies with a
portable radio and an SCBA under her pillow. This is why we are in the hot­
zone management business, and that business requires our workers to always
dress in their fire-resistive smurf suits, and follow the safety game plan when
they go into the hot zone to spend some quality time with the Smith family
and their stuff.

INCIDENT ACTION PLANNING (lAP)

The lC develops and uses the offensive/defensive strategic decision to estab­
lish the overall operational approach. The IC uses this inside/outside decision
as the foundation to connect where the task level workers go, and basically,
what they do when they get there. A rapid evaluation of incident conditions
starts this strategic development process. The ongoing situation evaluation
(i.e., determining the presence, intensity, and reaction to critical factors) is
used to continually adjust the offensive/defensive decision (and the matching
lAP), based on changes that occur once the operation gets started. Going into
the incident with such a standard placement-oriented operational plan creates
a strong, regular beginning for managing the incident. While making the
offensive/defensive strategic call creates this regular start, it does not (and is
not designed to) produce a detailed game plan that can be assigned to respon­
ders to act out. This is where the lAP COP.les in and causes the strategy to "go
to work."

The lAP must be directly related to the strategy, but not be a substitute for it.
The distinction between the strategy and the lAP is simple. The strategic
decision describes the overall approach (and position) of the operation, and
drives the lAP. The lAP provides the tactrcal assignments required to achieve
the offensive/defensive objective. The order of development is important-the
strategy comes first and drives the lAP. The lAP must follow and match the
strategy. It can be very painful when we start operations out with an emotion­
ally developed initial response that directly bounces us into the interior of a
hazard zone that has not been effectively evaluated. Taking just the short (but
critical) time required to evaluate the entire incident picture, and then develop­
ing a rational determination if we can effectively (and safely) connect an exit
to an entry (for the troops), creates a can/cannot standard and a safe begin­
ning. The development and execution of an lAP becomes the "show time" for
all the pieces and parts of IMS. Simply, the lAP describes how we are going
to actually attempt to solve the customer's problem. The lAP provides a stan­
dard basis for developing a simple, concise, flexible, and easy to understand
focus on what is expected to happen before assigning units. It allows the IC
to utilize a consistent "strategy first. .. then lAP" model to fonnulate a plan
that provides for standard (predictable, dependable) outcomes. Operating
without an lAP may be a form of IC "free enterprise." It is absolutely critical
the IC share and refine his/her focus (lAP) with the other incident players . An
lAP also requires that the IC develop a plan before committing resources.

Identify StrJegylD
!
velop Incident Action Plan (lAP)
 Functions of COl1unand Chapter 5

We practice for the "big one," on the "small ones." The habits we form deter­
mining strategy and developing lAPs on day-to-day incidents cany over to our
major events. This can be a disaster, based on the habits we have developed.
If an operation starts in a piecemeal fashion, with each company committing
itself to its own plan, the entire operation will be at a continuous (and haz­
ardous) disadvantage. Many times, these very individual, non-unified plans
involve everyone just doing what feels the best (sensual action). Such a frag­
mented approach can creep into any operation, simply because so much of our
business is done in situations that are obviously offensive, in manageable­
sized buildings. These situations can usually be controlled by a fast,
aggressive, unstructured (by the IC) attack. This repeat business can produce
a dangerous set of habits, when these responders act like independent con­
tractors. They fall into the habit of attacking, in an uncoordinated manner,
and their efforts usually put the fire out. Many times, they "stretch" the
accountability system, routinely low or out of SCBA air, and use hose line
nozzle flows that barely put the fire out. These routine, smaller situations
are generally very forgiving, and for most of our service, this activity rou­
tinely takes place at residential incidents, where the majority of our activity
occurs. A major problem occurs when these responders develop a "residen­
tial mentality" (and approach) and apply these dangerous, everyday residential
habits into a larger, different, and more complex, generally commercial-type
situations. Having the IC habitually develop an lAP, along with the applica­
tion of well-practiced SOPs that individually apply to the cunent incident, is
the best chance we have of producing an effective and safe beginning, middle,
and end to that incident.

TACTICAL PRIORITIES
The lAP is based on the four standard tactical priorities that establish the
major operational activities required to extend a complete, integrated effort.
These tactical priorities identify the four separate functions that must be com­
pleted in order to establish the overall incident response. They are in order:

1. Rescue
2. Fire Control
3. Property Conservation
4. Customer Stabilization

The list gives the IC a set of functions (what to do), priorities (when to do
them, and in what order), and benchmarks (how to tell when each function is
completed). Tactical priorities provide the IC with a simple, short list of
major categories tpat act as a practical 1-2-3-4 guide during the difficult initial
stages of fIreground planning. The lAP must be short, sweet, and
simple ... complicated plans and guides tend to break down during this critical
time.

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

Chapter 5 Functions of Command

Tactical Sequence
Tactical priorities MUST be approached in order. The unique realities of the
fireground are that the Ie usually gets one shot at certain activities. In most
cases, the Ie has only one chance to launch an initial primary search (other­
wise, it isn't a "primary" search). Often, there is only one chance to do an
initial, interior, offensive attack, only one chance to conserve property that is
being damaged, and the Ie has a limited time frame to effectively deal with
the customer's personal needs. The Ie cannot reverse injury, death, or loss
after it occurs. The Ie can only interrupt the sequence leading to these events.
Therefore, tactical priorities represent intervention plans, in an appropriate
order, to solve the basic problems that are typically present at most incidents.

Even though the tactical priorities are interrelated, they are separate and must
be dealt with in sequence. The Ie cannot proceed on to the next priority
before assigning sufficient resources to reach the objective (completion report­
ed as a "benchmark") of the CUlTent prior:ty. The Ie must focus on
completing the current objective. This requires command discipline, for there
are cases where the needs of the CUlTent activity may not be obvious. This
occurs many times when there is initially not a visible rescue need-the Ie
must in these cases assign companies to complete the primary search, as a
standard practice. It's highly embalTassing to us, and painful to the customer,
when we skip rescue and go on to fire control and then stumble over some
poor soul who was anxious for us to pull him/her out but never got looked
after because we failed to follow the standard game plan.

Sometimes activities may have to be comJined to achieve the objective of the

CUlTent priority. As an example, lots of times we must begin to control the
problem that is creating the need to rescue those who are threatened by that
problem, while we attempt to make the rescue. These control efforts serve to
protect the workers as they go about their rescue activities. The framework of
the priority list helps keep the Ie straight. The Ie must use the standard prior­
ities to "line up" the standard tactical activities, but sometimes in having to
combine priority activities we might get an "under control" before we get an
"all clear"-when this happens, the Ie must continue to do whatever is
required to complete the primary search .. . the Ie must guard against this
becoming an operational habit-which means we are routinely skipping res­
cue, and then catch it almost as an afterthought.

Tactical Priority Approaches

The Ie is generally trying to achieve the same basic objectives from one inci­
dent to the next. Tactical priorities offer a regular set of "hooks" on which the
Ie can hang tactical activities, in order to develop this standard approach. With
the standard approach, the Ie can manage the basic work sequence at every
incident, in the same manner. This creates a consistency the troops can under­
stand, and dependability they can trust. The Ie lines up rescue, fire control,
property conservation, and customer stabilization as standard performance tar­
gets for the entire team . This standard lAP approach must become a habit.
Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

Each of the four tactical priorities requires a somewhat different tactical

approach from both a command and operational standpoint. During rescue
operations, the IC is attempting to locate and remove threatened occupants.
The IC must, if necessary, be prepared to write off as much property as is
required to accomplish this objective. The Ie's approach is life-safety orient­
ed, strongly influenced by a compressed and sometimes desperate time frame.
The IC may fight the fire in order to complete the primary search, but the IC
stays in the rescue mode until he/she receives an "all clear" report.

When involved with fire control efforts, the IC is attempting to find the fire,
cut it off, and put it out. This may require an aggressive, crude, heavy-duty
operation, if the IC is to stabilize the fire. It may be necessary to beat up the
building with standard fire fighting action performed to accomplish support
functions, like forced entry, ventilation, the opening up of walls, ceilings, and
floors, and to operate nozzles. This is a conscious, managed trade off of
fire-fighting damage against fire damage. The simple fact is, unless the IC
gets on with putting out the fire, he/she will soon run out of building.
In propelty conservation activities, the IC is attempting to identify and protect
the value of all that survived the fire and the fire fighting. The IC is now a
conserver, where before the IC may have had to do some fire-fighting damage.
Once the rescue and fire-control boxes have been checked, time is less critical,
so loss-control operations can be more delicate.

Customer stabilization involves providing whatever services we can, to assist

the customer in their recovery. How we take care of Mrs. Smith and her
house, pets, and personal possessions leaves the lasting memory she
has of us, and of our service. Working with the Red Cross and other
community assistance agencies is a smart way to provide medium­
range things like food, shelter, care for pets, and transportation that
helps to "reconnect" her life after a difficult event. The old-time routine of
leaving Mrs. Smith, in her pajamas sitting on the curb in the dark after her
house burned, holding her Siamese cat, is now completely unacceptable.*

Benchmarks
The objectives of each priority are reflected in the following benchmarks or
completion:

"ALL CLEAR"-the primary search is completed

"UNDER CONTROL"-the fire is controlled (i.e., forward fire

progress stopped, no additional units will be required and there is no

imminent danger to firefighters)

"LOSS STOPPED"-property conservation is complete

*See Essentials of Fire Department Customer Service by the author. Available

through Fire Protection Publications 800-654-4055 or 405-744-5723.
Identify Strategy/Develop IncidentAction Plan (lAP)

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Chapter 5 Functions of Command

"CUSTOMER STABLE"-we have attended to the short/medium

range needs of our customers

The benchmarks are achievement signals that tell the Ie when one basic prior­
ity function is completed, and the operation can go on to the next major
activity. The priority activities offer the foundation (and road map) of the
lAP. The benchmark establishes practical objectives that are simple, straight­
forward, and easy (i.e., possible) for the Ie to concentrate on under actual
incident conditions.

While the Ie must attempt to satisfy the objectives of each function in

sequence, he/she must be prepared to overlap and mix activities to achieve the
current benchmark. Notable examples are situations in which it is necessary
to accomplish interior tenability through some fire-control actions before
being able to do a primary search, when we have the opportunity (and
resources) to initiate salvage operations, while active fire-control efforts are
still being extended, or when a responder puts Mrs. Smith inside a vehicle and
explains what action we are taking, and begins the recovery process while the
incident is underway. In situations that require mixed tactical priOlity activi­
ties, the Ie must realize that he/she is in the process of achieving the current
benchmark, even though conditions and/or resource levels allow some other
priority to simultaneously be in progress. Effective operations require the sep­
arate tactical priorities to be done in a highly seamless and integrated way.
The Ie must create a continuous effort that moves through and accomplishes
the objective of each priority, in a smooth, streamlined effort. This is really
what the lAP attempts to do, and is why :he word "action" is used.

INCIDENT ACTION PLANNING

There is a natural inclination to think of every incident situation as being dif­
ferent. This "disconnected" mental outlook causes the Ie to consider each type
of event as a totally new experience. This approach is dysfunctional because it
becomes a huge barrier to us being able to "file" our experiences, and then
access, and apply what happened at these previous jobs to the next incident.
Being able to constructively and progressively use this experience is how we
get smarter. The Ie is usually confronted with a fairly standard array of inci­
dent factors, and uses the standard inventory of organizational resources for
incident operations. Effective les (with cumulative, rather than single-event
experience) soon discover that fires, EMS situations, and special operations
events are more similar, than dissimilar. If the Ie can develop a standard
approach, and then customize the lAP to fit each situation, he/she will begin to
develop an ongoing plan, approach, or style that can be refined and built upon.

The day-to-day application of a standard c:pproach, over time, develops an abili­

ty in the Ie that continually improves. Each expelience adds on to past
experiences, and gives the Ie the opportunity to become increasingly more
effective. The Ie should try not to make the same mistake twice (you generally
don't learn much from a mistake the second time you make it). The Ie also can

Ident~fy Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

 Functions of Command Chapter 5

profit from the experience (both positive and negative) of others and deposit
these lessons into hislher own "experience bank." Beware of ICs who must
commit every possible incident screw-up, in order to learn the elements of each
situation. They beat up a lot of people and stuff while receiving their education.

An lAP should be developed whenever command is established and it should

be evaluated, reviewed, and refined throughout the incident. In some fairly
simple, straightforward cases, a single lAP may be all that is needed. These
are typically situations where the incident problem can be resolved quickly. In
many other incidents, based on the nature, length, complexity, and severity of
the incident problem(s), a series of connected/"progressive" lAPs may be need­
ed to match (and overpower) dynamic conditions, as a longer, more
complicated incident evolves. The plan should be reviewed and updated after
each tactical benchmark has been completed based on the standard risk-man­
agement plan-particularly when an "all clear" has been completed.

When an lAP is developed by the IC, it involves using the basic steps required
to start, conduct, revise, and conclude incident operations. These steps
include the following lAP activities:

1. lAP evaluation checklist

2. lAP (Plan A)
3. Tactical needs
4. Available resources and assignments
5. lAP evaluation and revision (Plan B, C, D ... )

1. The lAP Evaluation Checklist

lAP planning is where we use the incident information management and criti­
cal factor consideration discussed (extensively) in Chapter 2. How that
intelligence is actually applied becomes a critical IC evaluation function.
These factors include the regular elements that are the basis of the initial and
ongoing size up :

• Customer profile
• Life hazard
• Fire
• Exposures
• Time (i.e., elapsed incident time)
• Building
• Occupancy
• Arrangement/access
• Non-fire hazards/problems (EMS, violence, hazmat, tenorism, etc.)
• Resources
• Action
• Personnel safety
• Unknown factors
• Special circumstances

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

 Chapter 5 Functions of Command

Developing "lAP Plan A" is the basic reason the IC (and the team) does the
initial incident evaluation. Keeping Plan A effectively and safely connected to
current incident conditions is the reason we do the ongoing situation evalua­
tion. We go to the incident to act, not to just evaluate, so the size-up process
must result in effective action . The critical factors are very practical, dynamic
categories of important information that Dust produce an effective fAP. The
IC must become skillful in understanding those factors and effectively using
them as the basis for getting the job done .

2. Incident Action Plan (Plan A)

This statement provides a simple description of the basic tactical approach to
be taken. This fAP describes the initial action the IC decides upon that will
solve the incident problems within the basic overall incident strategy.

"Fast, offensive interior attack with hand lines to support and complete
primary search/rescue operations, and control fire in the room of origin,
ventilate, and check for fire extension in the attic ... salvage operations
will follow fire contro!."
... or
"Defensive attack with elevated and ground-level masterstreams to pro­
tect Side B and Side D exposures . Hand lines into exposures for
interior protection. All members will operate outside collapse zones."

3. Tactical Needs
The IC must identify the major tactical needs that must be completed.
These needs become the basis for assigning specific tasks to companies,
such as:

Interior hand-line attack

Complete primary search
Offensive Control fire
{ Check attic/ventilate
Initiate required salvage

Masterstream attack
Protect exposures-Side B & D
Deffensive Knock down main body of fire
{ Hand lines inside Exposure B & D
Collapse zone control

4. Available Resources and Assignments

The tactical work sheet should provide the IC with an inventory of
assigned and available resources. The IC must identity the types of
units responding to the incident and list the assigned companies in a

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

1 --­
 Functions of Command Chapter 5

standard manner. This simple "fill-in-the-box" listing gives the Ie a

quick reference of the available units. A comparison of the units, that
are available with the tasks that must be completed, provides a basis for
determining the number and type of companies that will be required.
This approach of matching workers to tasks and locations becomes a
practical basis for keeping track of and managing resources.

The IC's timing, when making specific assignments to specific companies, is

an important factor in effectively integrating each unit into the lAP. Ideally,
the Ie should give assignments to arriving companies as they report to their
staged (level 1) positions. Staging procedures are designed to provide a stan­
dard system to put companies to work in an orderly manner. The system
should be designed to assist both the Ie and the responding companies in get­
ting the right assignment at the right time.

The primary objective of staging is to prevent companies from rolling directly

into the middle of the incident and then becoming totally entangled in confu­
sion and congestion, before the Ie can give them an assignment. Staging
holds resources in uncommitted positions, until the Ie is ready to assign them.
They are uncommitted because they haven't passed the last water supply or
haven't passed the last access point to any side of the incident. Using the
staging report to trigger the assignment from the Ie creates the effective tim­
ing of putting companies to work, and eliminates giving the company an order
while they are en route to the scene. Without staging, a company can easily
become "lost" in the system.

The Ie must match task assignments with the basic capabilities of each unit.
Everyone can perform search and rescue, engines supply and manage (apply)
water, ladders clear the way and open up , medics provide emergency care, and
squads do whatever else is needed. The Ie must analyze and assign tasks
based on the general profile of needs and capabilities. This mix and match
approach mobilizes everyone within the attack plan and takes maximum
advantage of the different capabilities of the various types of units.

The Ie must learn to quickly translate tactical conditions into orders that can
be assigned to companies/sectors. This becomes the "shorthand" the Ie uses
to cause lAP execution. We blabbed on and on, in the deployment chapter,
about the order model and how the Ie goes through the order development
process. The lAP is where all of our communications procedures come

Ident{fy Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

------- - -- - - - - - ----- - -
Chapter 5 Functions of Command

together and is what causes the action to actually occur. Such order giving is
the major tool that the Ie uses to solve the incident problem. The Ie must
develop the ability to look at an incident and then to just naturally and instinc­
tively process the conditions they see intc a set of integrated, lAP-oriented
orders that can be given (and carried out) by a team of responders. This is, in
its most primitive form, the difference between a strategic-level command
officer and a task-level, action-oriented officer.

The purpose of the order model is to provide a standard method for processing
orders given on the incident scene. To be of any use, the order model must be
understood and used all the time, every ti:ne, by all those operating at the inci­
dent.

While staging procedures and specific Ie orders becoine a safe and standard
way to get responders into the lAP, SOPs also create the capability for an
organization to develop standard roles/positions/actions for responders to take
based on their arrival order. These predetermined plans work best at locations
and types of incidents where we do a lot of repeat business. During these
SOP-driven situations, the Ie must take command and log units into the
inventory (on a tactical work sheet), as they assume their standard
position/function. Maintaining this inventory from the very beginning of
operations works best when these units quickly report they are in their stan­
dard spot, doing the standard job that goes with that predetermined
assignment. This approach can streamline the initial assignment of units, but
does not change the need for an in-place Ie doing the functions of command.
Once those units get in their planned position, the "game" begins and requires
the Ie to respond to changing conditions and the effect of the operational
action, no matter if they were ordered into that spot by an Ie or an SOP.

lAP EVALUATION AND REVISION

The Ie combines the situation evaluation. previous experiences, and the appli­
cation of standard procedures to develop and execute the most effective initial
lAP (Plan A). The lAP must be big enough, well placed, and effectively
timed to directly get ahead of and overpower the incident problem. Most of
the conditions we are trying to convert, from out of control to under control,
are typically moving very quickly. To be effective, we must develop an lAP
with the operational speed that matches (or exceeds) the evolution of the inci­
dent. Based on the speed of the event, it generally doesn't take very long to
evaluate how effective Plan A's efforts are. Based on this compressed time
frame , the Ie must quickly evaluate how well Plan A is working, once it gets
going. Having the Ie do the standard functions of command, from the very
beginning of the operation, provides the management foundation for both
establishing and then adjusting the lAP. Performi ng the first four (4) com­
mand functions becomes the launching pad for the Ie to be able to do the
action planning that is required to create safe and effective incident opera­
tions. Strong command assumption, accmate situation evaluation, effective
control of the communications process, and fast, practical deployment all

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

 Functions of COlnmand Chapter 5

position (and package) the IC to produce a simple, straightforward, doable

game plan (lAP). The IC must use these command functions to develop the
most accurate Plan A possible to match incident conditions. Sometimes the
plan quickly solves the problem . Other times the IC must tweak that plan in
some way that reinforces and expands Plan A to better make it fit the situa­
tion. Things like adding a backup line, assigning a company to assist,
providing more ventilation, calling for additional resources, or assigning sector
officer support all "stretch" Plan A's effectiveness. Incident conditions move
quickly, so the feedback loop is extremely short between evaluation and action.
It's really pretty simple to determine the accuracy of the IC's evaluation-just
develop and apply the lAP he/she feels will match (and solve) that condition
and see if it works. As an example, if the IC (and the team) thinks that the fire
can be handled offensively with two 1-3/4" attack lines and those inside lines
quickly knock the fire down-good evaluation. If those same attack lines are
put in place and operate and the fire does not react (go out), this means that the
fire is, for whatever reason, different from the initial Plan A evaluation. Now
it's tweak time. This short-term feedback reality is what makes the IC's job so
robust. The IC does not have to wait around for a month and a half to get the
review committee's report. All that the IC has to do, in most cases, is just look
out the windshield of the Suburban and in a minute or two he/she will know if
the grand (or not so grand) plan worked or not.

Every plan has a limit to which it can be expanded and modified, so the IC
must decide how much tweaking can be added to Plan A before it is trying to
do the wrong thing, the wrong way. When this happens, the IC must go to
Plan B. Effective timing combined with pessimistic forecasting, becomes the
basis of going from Plan A to Plan B. The IC doesn ' t want to give up on a
plan that can be saved-but also doesn ' t want to continue to make an ineffec­
tive investment in a plan that can't be saved, either because it was flawed to
begin with, or conditions changed so much that they made the original plan
obsolete. The lAP is how the IC connects action to conditions, and how
this happens has a life and death effect on the customers, and our workers.
How the review and revision process occurs is the subject of its own spe­
cial Command Function (#7).

Command Safety: Strategy/Incident Action Plan

Having IC #1 take the time required to consciously decide in the very begin­
ning of operations if the troops will go inside or stay outside, becomes the
position basis for worker safety and survival. Firefighters are routinely (and
sadly) injured and killed because they are in offensive positions, under defen­
sive conditions. Sometimes this happens because of an incorrect initial
strategic decision. Other times, the IC fails to recognize that conditions have
changed from offensive to defensive, and to then quickly react to those
changes. Either way, firefighters are operating in positions they shouldn't be
in, and sometimes are injured or killed by conditions that exist in these posi­
tions. The IC must always separate offensive and defensive operations in the
same area. Interior crews are quickly (and seriously) assaulted by outside fire

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

 Chapter 5 Functions of Command

streams that are directed into and on top of them when they are on the inside.
Keeping offensive and defensive operations separated is a big part of what
"command and control" actually means (in the street). Combining inside and
outside operations, in the same place, is always a potentially fatal mistake.
Standardizing the strategic approach among all of the response team (ahead of
the incident) becomes a major part of the standard safety program. The basis
of this approach involves the entire response team understanding and agreeing
to the overall strategic game plan. A standard risk-management plan is the
foundation of that approach. The risk-management plan indicates (short and
simple) where we will take big, little, or no risks, based on the possibility of
saving a life, protecting only savable property, or where lives and property are
already lost.

The IC must evaluate the basic hazards tl:at are present, and then connect the
capability of our standard safety program to protect firefighters from those haz­
ards. Making the connection of current and forecasted hazards to the
capability (and limitations) of our safety system becomes the "safety math"
that defines if we operate inside or outside. The IC is the only person who has
the capability (command post, more powerful radios, tactical work sheet, com­
mand aide, etc.) to receive, process, and react to information from the entire
incident operation. The IC must then integrate all that information into an
overall picture of ongoing incident safety. and quickly react by holding posi­
tions, reinforcing those positions, or mov ing troops to new positions, based on
changing conditions. Sometimes those changes are significant enough that the
IC must change the overall strategy. How the IC has set up command (from
the very beginning) becomes the foundation of the capability to effectively
manage the overall strategy and to quickly move the troops, when it is neces­
sary. Maintaining a strong command position with effective communications
in place, building an adequate organization that covers the entire incident, and
managing responders within a standard \Nork cycle sets the stage for being able
to manage and move (if necessary) hazard-zone workers. Being able to make a
quick change in strategy from offensive to defensive, under active, intense inci­
dent conditions will always test the command and control capability of a local
IMS .

The lAP is the operating partner of the overall strategy and becomes an
important part of the safety plan. Being able to summarize the overall strate­
gy in a brief, exchangeable, easy to understand plan is the basis for
developing the orders that act out the strategic decision. The lAP becomes a
very logical and standard way for the IC to answer (simply) the question,
"What's the planT Having everyone work on a common, unified plan creates
a safe and focused effort among the team members. The opposite is also
true-we are not effective until, and unless, we have a plan. The regular res­
cue/fire control/property conservation/customer service tactical priorities
COMMAND TO ALL
create a safe and focused effort among the team. These regular priorities
UNITS - ABANDON THE
become the standard performance targets of the lAP and create the capability
BUILDING. WE'RE

GOING DEFENSIVE.

for the IC to attach the appropriate risk-management option to the current tac­
tical activity. This approach requires the IC to reevaluate and sometimes

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

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 Functions of Command Chapter 5

reorder the risk-management plan options as operations continue, and as that

operational effort accomplishes one tactical priority and moves on to the next.
A major place where this occurs is when the rescue ("all clear") benchmark is
achieved. The Ie must realize that the operation is now directed toward pro­
tecting property, and must decide if the current risk level that is present will
allow the interior attack to be continued. If the risk level is big, the Ie must
go defensive, because the risk-management plan states that we will only take a
big risk to protect a savable life. Many times, this is a tough decision for the
Ie because the rescuers are aggressively ensconced and operating inside the
hazard area, are close to the incident hazard, and have the hose lines in place
that they used to protect themselves during the search- this is a major
moment of truth for the risk-management process. It's lots better to deal with
a bunch of frustrated attackers, than to load them in body bags because what
felt good killed them ... nobody said that being an Ie would be easy.

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

Chapter 5 Functions of Command

CHAPTERS

STRATEGY/INCIDENT ACTION PLAN

INCIDENT COMMANDER CHECKLIST

• Apply the standard risk-management plan throughout the incident

• Decide on the overall offensive/defensive strategy using the critical

factors

• Declare the strategy as part of the initial radio report

• Manage and control operations within the basic strategy

• Implement an incident action plan to match the overall strategy

• Use critical factors to develop the lAP

• Include strategy, location, function, and objective in the lAP

• Use tactical priority benchmarks as the action-planning road map

• Re-announce ongoing strategy confirmation as part of elapsed time

reports

• Do not combine offensive/defensive operations in the same fire area

(compartment)

• Use the incident organization and communications to connect and act

out strategy/plan

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

- _._. _ - -- ­
 Functions of Command Chapter 5

COACHING VERSION
Take the time in the beginning to consciously decide if we go inside or stay
outside. Wherever conditions permit, front-end load a rapid, strong, offensive
attack. Always control those overly aggressive souls, who have a post­
hypnotic suggestion that all initial operations are automatically offensive, and
instinctively jump into the interior, even if they are about to wear it
(Kamikaze fire fighting). Our strength is a quick, agile force-if you aren't
bigger and badder than the problem, the problem wins ... so stay out of its
way; don't get it on you; and blast it safely from the outside, to keep it where
it is ("in the box"). Stay connected to the troops and always be ready to
change strategyllocation to m atch changing conditions. Never, ever, trade live
firefighters for dead customers or lost property. Initially and periodically ask
yourself, "Is what we're trying to accomplish worth the risk to our human
resources (firefighters)?" If the answer is "no," stop doing what you're doing,
account for your firefighters, and move them to safe positions. Remember,
you didn't start the fire ... the fire is not your fault, just your problem . God
meant some buildings to burn (basically, the unsprinklered ones) ... when this
happens, burn it down with class.

Identify Strategy/Develop Incident Action Plan (lAP)

 FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND

CHAPTER 6

ORGANIZATION

- - -_. ­

I
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND
CHAPTER 6:

ORGANIZATION

MAJOR GOAL

TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE INCIDENT ORGANIZATION USING THE

SECTOR SYSTEM TO DECENTRALIZE AND DELEGATE GEOGRAPHIC
AND FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

This chapter is the biggest one in this book. This is because organization is
the "M" and the "s" in IMS. This function represents the system we use
to actually stmcture the management of incident scene resources. The
incident scene organization becomes the "box" that the IC uses to do
the seven other functions. The majority of incident management prob­
lems can be traced back to some type of strategic and organizational
snafu. This is one of the reasons that small-scale incidents tend to run
smoother than their large-scale counterparts. Small events require
fewer resources and tend to be over quickly. Things significantly
change when operations escalate beyond the control capability of
the initial wave of attackers/problem solvers, and we call for
additional resources. We must have a system in place that quick­
ly allows the IC to decentralize the incident scene into smaller,
more manageable, effective, and safe work units. This represents
the reason we have and use an organizational (and operational) sys­
tem-so the IC can manage the incident. Effective incident scene
organizations do not happen by accident. They are the product of
all the participants coming to an agreement, before the incident, on
how they will alTange themselves and operate together at the scene
(all of them), and how they will play their assigned roles.

While the preceding five functions are a lot sexier (after all, how much fun is
organizing, compared to deploying), this function can be the Ie's best friend.
When we examine the incident scene "check list" and take a look at who is
responsible for all the incident activities, we find that most overall management
responsibility falls squarely on the Ie. The IC is responsible for making sure
we get an "all clear" in the fire occupancy, that all seven sides (top, bottom,
four sides, and inside) of the flfe are addressed and scene safety is effectively

Organization

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.. - - -­
 Chapter 6 Functions of Command

in place for all the incident players. No one is more connected to creating the
tactical responses that create overall incident outcomes, (both positive and neg­
ative) than the Incident Commander. The IC becomes the poster child for how
well the organization gets set up, operates. and ultimately performs. Often
times you will hear the Ie's troops lovingly jest about once beautiful buildings
that have been transformed into spacious parking lots, as a Chief "Nanny­
Noony" signature fire. The bottom line is the IC is pretty much responsible for
everything that happens at the incident scene until he/she delegates it to another
person (regardless of how well the IC delegates or performs, the troops will
just naturally still tease him/her. .. just comes with the room as they say).

In the early command system development days (late 60's), the words incident
scene organization conjured visions of enormous ICS incident management
organizational charts, complete with an ectire array of management boxes that
are required to be filled with some type of management person. The big-time
ICS system founders invented and still use lots of special command system
words. We have the sitsat (situation status), restat (resource status), firestat
(fire status), thermostat (stay alive at 55), hemostat (status of bleeding cus­
tomers), and laundromat (if logistics has dry socks) boxes. The initial
reaction of lots of local responders was that the show (incident action, i.e., fire
fighting) could not get started until all the different "boxes" got filled. This
really turned a lot of people (firefighters) off. The war cry heard from Mount
Fire Attack was, "Did we come here to manage, or did we come to
fight. ..charge!" Many of the visionary, educated, and "cosmopolitan" ICS
gurLlS wisely dismissed these change-resistant behaviors as the typical reaction
to a new system. They reasoned (conectly) that you could not manage large­
scale operations (or any operation for that matter) on experience, procedures
(i.e., SOPs), and training alone. You needed some type of management sys­
tem to make sure that incident objectives were organized and met. The folks
who hung out on Mount Fire Attack (lets just go ahead and call them the
locals) argued that, "All that new-fangled management mumbo-jumbo sure
was snazzy, but it seems to push the fire attack back to second fiddle." It felt
like it is better suited for "the big one." Like most everything else in the
American Fire Service, both sides thought they were right, so what we did
was fight, bicker and launch disparaging remarks about and to one another.
Here are the results of this on going 30-year incident management experiment:

1. Well-organized incidents will always produce better outcomes than their

unorganized counterparts (as it pertains to things like fire loss, firefighter safe­
ty, and basic customer service).

2. Any local organizational system that requires the initial responders to sig­
nificantly delay the initial incident stabilization (attack), in order to implement
the organization, will fail. The key to building a sLlccessful, local, used-on­
every-event, incident scene organization is to match and balance the size of
the structure of the organization with the number of companies/resources
operating at the incident scene. The challenge is to "build" the organization
as it is needed, to match the profile of the incident problem(s).

Organization

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 Functions of Command Chapter 6

3. Our consistent experience has reflected that the time we spend developing
an effective local incident management structure from the very beginning of
operations saves an enormous amount of time "in the middle" of the event.
Being well organized, well placed, and well commanded is the quickest way
to correct out-of-control problems to being under control.

4. No command system will effectively compensate for a lack of basic com­

petence. Effective incident operations absolutely require experienced, skillful
participants on every level who have the personal and professional capability
to effectively play their IMS role.

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
When Mrs. Smith has her kitchen fire she needs LIS now. What she doesn't
need is a focus group that shows up and does a week and a half of analytical,
double-blind, longitudinal, seasonally adjusted studies to decide on the most
prudent course of action, and what type of organizational structure will be
required to effectively mitigate her problem. The systems we use must oper­
ate in the fast-and-dirty realities of the street. The incident scene organization
must:

• Be put into action from the moment we are dispatched and arrive.

• Expand at a pace that matches the deployment of required resources

(will accommodate incidents requiring a single unit all the way up to
the "big one" that requires everything you got).

• Be designed around your own local jurisdiction's limitations and capa­

bilities.

• Be used for every incident.

• Have somewhere for your neighbors (mutual/automatic aid) and other

response agencies to fit in and play (unified command).

THE THREE BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL LEVELS

Every incident can be broken down into three basic organizational levels.

Each level is very important and a failure at any level will make the entire sys­

tem ineffective. No part of the system can consistently outperform the

non-performance of another level. The three levels are:

• Strategic-This is where the IC and command team live. The strategic

level involves the activities necessary for overall operational control,
establishing objectives, managing the strategy, setting priorities, allocat­
ing resources, and to think ahead. This organizational level is designed
around the IC and the command team, operating in the Command
Mode, and working out of a stationary command post.

Organization
 Chapter 6 Functions of Command

• Tactical-The first management "subdivision" of incident scene organi­

zation is accomplished by assigning sector responsibilities. Sector
officers are responsible for the tactical deployment of assigned resources,
evaluation, and communication with the Ie. They are assigned by the IC
and supervise directly at the site of the assigned activity in order to meet
the operational objectives given to t:lem by the Ie.

• Task-The most important level of the organization is the task level

where the work is actually performed by assigned companies and other
TACTICAL
resources. Building a local organization from the bottom lip, places the
emphasis on the action level. This is desirable since this is where the
customer gets rescued and their problem gets solved. The effective IC
will realize that his/her function is to support the workers doing these
crucial jobs. On particularly the local level of everyday command, the
strategic and tactical levels are in place to support the task level; it is
not the other way around.

Incident organization is the function of command that the IC uses to connect

(or manage) his/her resources with whate\'er problem the customer is having
in order to meet the incident objectives (for fires this is RESCUE-FIRE
CONTROL-PROPERTY CONSERVATION-CUSTOMER STABILIZA­
TION).

The three-level (task/tactical/strategic) incident organization is built around

the type, size, and severity/complexity of the incident. The system is best
described as "all risk." The IC assigns sectors (management subdivisions)
based on incident needs. This system can be, and is, used for fires, medical
responses, technical rescues, hazardous materials incidents, managing
responses to natural disasters, wildland fires, or your department's yearly bar­
b-q. The basic system used to manage each type of incident is always the
same, the only thing that changes is what sectors are used. As an example,
lots of fire incidents have an IC that manages roof, south, east, west, rehab,
and safety sectors. The IC commanding a car wreck manages extrication,
treatment, and transportation sector.

Always using the system for every response, builds familiarity and provides a
structured, standard response each time out. The system defines roles and
responsibilities for all the participants, and the ongoing use of the system
becomes the foundation of continuous improvement. This is a key factor in
starting incident operations under control, and then always staying in control.
Regular use of the system, forces us to focus on incident outcomes, which is
why we show up in the first place. Using the system causes us to develop our
own local standard operating procedures (SOPs) that produce organizational
agreements before the incident ever occurs. Issues like who is in charge, what
the incident objectives are, how we will manage ourselves, and how resources
will be assigned are discussed ahead of time and trained upon, making them
second nature. After the incident is over, the system provides a logical place
to review and evaluate (critique) how well the people and procedures per-

Organization

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 Functions of Command Chapter 6

formed. Lessons learned get plugged back into the "front end" of the system,
so we are always improving our operations and service delivery. This regular
day-to-day use of the standard command system on every response, eliminates
the "saving-it-for-the-big-one" syndrome.

Saving the system for the big one is just another way of saying we don't have
a system that we consistently use. Organizations that operate under this
approach are fun to watch in action, but painful to be part of at show time.
They usually feature the highest-ranking member circling the incident scene,
in a haphazard, concentric orbit, shouting orders in the radio to him/herself,
and to long dead, early-role models whom he/she patterned this orbiting
career around. This spiraling chaos is only expanded by the arrival of more
higher-ranking officers with the same management styles. The flip sides of
these multiple-commander scenarios are incidents with no one in command.
These operations are based on everyone quickly jumping out of whatever
vehicle brought them and into whatever activity feels best to each individual.
Once all the fun assignments are taken (interior, close to the problem) later
arriving companies are forced to do one of two things, overpower the initial
arriving units and take their hose lines; or assume outside positions and direct
masterstreams into the fire area (this is very dangerous and should never be
done). The incident scene must be organized. One person (the IC) needs to
manage incident activities and those incident operations should support cus­
tomer-based outcomes.

We must remember that we lead primarily by example. Therefore, the atti­

tude, attributes and approach pertaining to IMS that are communicated day to
day by our ICs have a lot to do with how our troops will view command in
general. An effective IC routine might include:

• Stay trained
• Show up on calls
• Exercise self control
• Care about the troops and customers
• Be flexible
• Lead by example
• Always use the local IMS
• Deal with set backs
• Always do better the next time and expect others to do so, as well

The IC does the first five functions of command to get the operation going.
>Arrives >evaluates >communicates >deploys >strategyIIAP. Now the big
buckaroo has opened a can of worms, if he/she can't control the rest of the
posse that is stampeding towards the scene-showing up and sounding like
banshees wanting to go to work (with the IC or without the IC). Simply, if
you can't organize and manage resources (on any/every level), don't call
them. How the IC captures and maintains control is by creating a standard
incident organization. The organization must be able to match the speed, size,
and complexity of the incident, and must have the following characteristics:

Organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

• Be able to get up and get started instantly at every incident.

• Have three standard levels: strategic-tactical-task.

• Use sectors to manage both the inc1dent geography that is present and
the functions that are needed.

• Be able to expand quickly to match the profile of the incident.

• Control the position and function of all incident scene resources and
workers.

Lets use typical local fire department responses to take a look at a "model"
system, starting out at the small end of the incident food chain, escalating up
to the day a meteor fall s out of the sky and smashes into the local MetroMal1.

ONE- OR TWO-UNIT RESPONSE

The vast majority of our local incidents are one- or two-unit calls for service.
These incidents include EMS calls (on lots of two-unit EMS responses the
first unit being basic life support (BLS) fi rst responders, and the second unit
being the advanced life support (ALS)/transportation component); service
calls; vehicleltrash/dumpsterland vegetation fires; or any other incident that
only requires one or two units.

These types of incidents make up the majority of our service delivery. The
way we operate on these every day, "bread-and-butter" incidents serves as the
foundation for expanded mega-unit operations.

When Mabel dispatches Engine 1 on a dumpster fire, the response is pretty

predictable. The crew assembles on the apparatus. The firefighters put on
their protective gear. The officer acknowledges that they are responding and
pulls any needed maps. Everyone belts in and they head down the road. The
organization for these types of incidents is simple and basic. After giving a
brief radio report, "Engine 1 onscene with a working dumpster fire, we can
handle." The officer of Engine 1 automatically becomes the Ie. By virtue of
being the first arriving offlcer of the first arriving (and reporting) unit, he/she
is the Ie. Some systems do not require the officer of a single unit response to
announce they are "Command"-it is just assumed. Other systems do require
a declaration of command on single-unit responses. Orders, directions, and
objectives are very straightforward and are generally given by the company
officer using face-to-face communications. After the initial arriving officer
sizes up the situation and determines their single company can handle it,
he/she simply supervises the crew and makes sure everything that needs to be
done gets done. Successful single company operations are routinely per­
fOlmed without very much in the way of order giving by the company officer.
Firefighters who are well trained and oper::tte with good SOPs, do not require
much direction in performing their task (driving apparatus, pulling hose lines,
etc.). Safe and effective task-level performance becomes the foundation for

Organization
 Functions of Comm,and Chapter 6

building the organization. These types of incidents are short term and don't
require much, if any, on-scene organizational support (beyond SOPs, doing
the standard safety routine, training, and playing your position). Short and
sweet, show up, put out the dumpster fire, be certain there isn't any exten­
sion, wave at a couple of kids, fill up your water tank, let Mabel know
you're going back into service, stop by the local ice cream shop and then
head home.

SMALL-SCALE, MULTIPLE-UNIT RESPONSES

The types of incidents that fall into this category are house fires, small com­
mercial structures, and multiple-patient medical incidents, These
types of incidents typically require two or three engine compa­
nies, a ladder company, a battalion chief, and perhaps a couple
pieces of auxiliary equipment (utility trucks, ambulances, etc.),
Mrs. Smith's infamous btchen fire falls into this category.
The incident organization begins when the officer of the first arriving unit
announces hislher arrival to the scene over the assigned tactical channel, gives
an onscene report, and assumes command. This initial radio report is very
powerful. The initial report puts an Ie in place; it should automatically put all
the other responding resources into level 1 staging. This gives the Ie time to
take initial action, formulate an lAP, and get a closer look at the problem,
before having to assign (or worrying about companies freelancing) other units.
When the Ie decides what to do tactically with the second arriving engine
company, he/she calls them over the tactical channel and gives them their
assignment. Levell staging SOPs generally have the first-in ladder company
report directly to the scene and start any required "truck work" as per SOPs .
If the Ie wants the ladder company (or anyone else) to do so mething different
(from standard initial company functions-described in SOPs), he/she calls
that unit and provides whatever assignment is required . In fact , the Ie can
issue a direct order to alter any automatic assignment SOP to match the cur­
rent needs of the incident. From an apparatus standpoint, companies are
necessarily limited to the basic function of their apparatus (i.e., engine compa­
nies-pumps and water toolslladders-Iadders and truck tools). From a
human standpoint, the responders should ideally be trained on all operational
functions. The more inter-changeable those responders are, the stronger the
operation becomes. Most incidents typically end up with more equipment
than people, so such interchangeability gives the Ie the capability to "plug in"
responders wherever they are needed. (Author's note-You must remember
that truck companies* thrive on forcibly taking things apart. Another fun
activity for these "rear brain thinkers" is to find engine companies and take
their hose lines from them. When the Ie orders ladder companies to do some­
thing different from these normal, instinctive primitive-smashing activities, they
will become lUghly agitated and display the behavior patterns of gazelles being

* The American fire service uses the terms truck and ladder interchangeably
to describe the same unit (longer rigs with ladders and lots of tools) and calls
what they do "truck work."

Organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

stalked by lions. This is an observation of great affection ; all of the author's

children are cUlTently or recently have been assigned as officers on busy ladder
companies.)

The system must be fluid and easily expanded. If Mabel dispatches Engine 1
to a dumpster fire, and they find that a dumpster has set a full-sized building on
fire when they show up, Engine 1 has to be able to get more help for the
expanded problem (as we discussed in the stunning Deployment Chapter). The
way they do this is by radioing Mabel, giving her an onscene report, requesting
more resources, and assuming command. This jacks the system up to the next
level. Engine 1 now has more resources coming, they are taking effective
action, and E-l 's officer is the Ie. As the cequested resources show up, they
announce their an-ivaI and automatically stage in standard level 1 staging posi­
tions. This puts them in a predictable, standard spot where the IC can assign
them according to the lAP. If the initial attack solves the problem (puts the fire
out), expanding the organization stops ... IMS serves the responders, not the
other way around. If the problem continues (or gets worse), the IC assigns
resources to key tactical positions. The officers of the initial units to these
positions should be assigned sector officer responsibilities. Sector officers
become the IC's decentralized (away from the command post) field agents in
these locations. The sector positions come with the authority and responsibili­
ty to manage the major work activities (wichin the IC's plan) in their assigned
area or function. The IC automatically delegates responsibility to manage the
details that go with that assignment. This is a big deal because those details
can rapidly become command quicksand to the Ie. This is a major benefit for
the IC, as he/she has given tactical control over to a person who is in a better
position (right where the action is) to manage those details.

Being the IC of any incident is a lot like the bug-eyed guy, on the old (black
and white) Ed Sullivan* Show, who had tce plate spinning act. Think of com­
panies as plates. The company officer of a one- or two-unit incident who is
the IC can easily spin the one or two plates he/she has to manage. When an
incident requires the services of three or four units, it has (or should have) a
command officer assigned to it. A chief officer should be able to spin three or
four tactical plates, without difficulty.

MEDIUM- TO LARGE-SCALE INCIDENTS

Serious organizational difficulties can occur when a solo IC tries to spin too
many plates. This is when the organizational function of command becomes
the IC's best friend. A significant problem occurs when the IC requests and

* For our young readers: Ed Sullivan was a guy who had a variety show on TV
about 40 years ago. He had a bunch of very special and quirky performers who
made all SOltS of goofy presentations. One of those was a somewhat frantic
character that used to balance and spin plates on poles. He would get an amaz­
ing number of them going at one time before they all crashed down on him ... it
was a lot simpler time when us plain folks were pretty easy to entertain.

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

assigns additional companies, at a rate that exceeds the development

of the incident organization. In short order, the IC will become over­
loaded with the details of managing a large number of companies
scattered all over the incident site. The IC will soon be in the odd sit­
uation of being overwhelmed , yet still in need of more resources to do
the job. (This places the IC in roughly the same position as Custer
calling for more Indians.)

Command must develop and build an organization that matches the deploy­
ment of resources to the incident scene. The IC accomplishes this by
breaking the incident scene down into manageable "subunits" called sectors.
These subunits are either geographic (a place) or functional (a special activi­
ty), and they are managed by people who we will refer to as sector officers.

THE ROLE OF SECTORS

A sector* is a smaller, more manageable unit of incident scene organization.
Sectoring is a standard system of dividing incident scene command into these
smaller units or pieces.

The standard management function of delegation is achieved by the IC

through the use of sectors. This assignment and the sharing of
responsibility and authority becomes a major support mechanism
(best friend) allowing the IC to divide command, reduce
stress, and maintain control while dealing with increasing
operational size, area, complexity, and pace.

Once adequate/effective sectors have been established, the

IC can concentrate on overall strategy, incident action plan
management, evaluation, and resource allocation. Each of the
sector officers becomes responsible for the tactical deployment of
the resources at the IC's disposal, communicating needs and progress
back to Command.

THE ADVANTAGE OF SECTORING

The sector system provides direction and support to the operating units so that
they can achieve their objective safely and effectively.

Utilizing sectors provides the following advantages:

• Reduces the IC's span of control-divides the incident scene into more
manageable units.

* We use the term sector, which is widely used in the local structural fire­
fighting community. For systems that use groups and divisions please
substitute those terms wherever sector is used.

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Chapter 6 Functions of Command

• Creates more effective incide~t scene communications-permits the IC

to exchange information with a limited number of individuals (sector
officers) who directly supervise teams of workers. This reduces overall
radio traffic by allowing workers and sector officers to communicate
face to face, freeing the radio for more critical IC to sector officer inter­
action, growth, and self actualization. Communications necessarily
become a reflection of the organization; effective communication results
from effective organization (pretty parents have pretty children). The
organizational chart becomes the communications flow plan.

• Provides a standard and logical system to divide large geographical

incidents into effectively sized units-sector officers evaluate, manage,
and track people (companies)/work (benchmarks) and reporting agents
(tactical-plate spinners) eliminate the need for the IC to orbit the entire
incident scene, and allow the IC to concentrate on strategy from one
standard, command-post position.

• Provides an array of major support functions-these are to be selected

and assigned according to the particular needs of each situation. The
execution and details of these specific operations becomes the responsi­
bility of the sector officer, not Com:nand.

• Improves firefighter safety-allows each sector officer to maintain more

direct control of the position and function of the companies assigned to
their sectors at all times. Sector officers concentrate on their assigned
areas and are in a position to move personnel based on incident condi­
tions and the IC's decisions.

The use of sectors gives the IC an ongoing capability to manage any type of
incident encountered using the same basic management system, whether it is a
fire, major EMS alarm, earthquake, structural collapse, falling meteor, or any
combination of the above.

ASSIGNING SECTORS
Sectors are assigned based on the followir;g factors:

• Early fire stage overload-when the number of assigned and operating

companies threatens to overload the IC's ability to command. Direct
tactical-level control should be delegated (earlier than later) to sector
officers before the IC's ability to cope is exceeded. The early and prop­
er use of sectors can and will consistently keep the IC from being
overloaded and going insane.

• Major operation predicted-when tte IC forecasts that the situation will

become a major operation, soon exceeding his/her span of control. The
faster the IC predicts the build up, the faster the correct organization can
be in place to avoid playing catch up ... order early, order big, manage
well.

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

• Isolated or remote tactical positions-when fire companies are operat­

ing in positions over which the IC has little or no control (i.e., complex,
interior operations or on a side of the fire the IC cannot see).

• Dangerous conditions-when the IC must maintain close control over

operating companies faced with unusually dangerous conditions.
Scenarios involving unsafe structural conditions, hazardous materials,
quickly changing conditions, or "one-way in/one-way out" problems
require close supervision and control.

• Where special functions are needed-like hazmat, safety, rescue, rehab,

staging, etc.

SECTOR OFFICERS
The sector officer should be briefed on the overall strategy and tactical objec­
tive of his/her area or functional assignment. Although the number of units
assigned to an individual sector will depend upon needs and conditions, three
to fIve companies are a practical span of control for most active situations.
Part of the IC's job is to maintain awareness, inventory, and tracking of the
number and designation of companies assigned to each sector and the particu­
lar capabilities of that sector officer. It doesn't make much sense for the IC to
delegate his/her sector officers into their own state of insanity by exceeding
their span of control (three to five). When a sector is "maxed," create another
sector or assign more organizational support to those sectors. Such support
could include upgrading the rank/experience of the sector officer, adding
safety/accountability officers to the sector, providing more command post co­
ordination, etc. Sectors are most effective when they are assigned in
anticipation of their need, rather than in crisis. It's difficult when they must
play catch up in their area/function.

The IC serves as the resource allocator for each incident and, once sectors are
established, assigns companies based on resource request from the sector offi­
cers. Having the IC allocate resources establishes the capability to continually
maintain an on-line awareness of the size and status of the incident. By
requiring the IC to assign resources, it allows him/her to enter the resource
into the inventory and tracking system (discussed in the Deployment chapter).

Once a company has been assigned to a sector, it is the responsibility of that

sector officer to get his/her company into action. In turn, company officers
will supervise their own crews in performing their assigned specific task.
Company officers communicate directly with their sector officers to describe
conditions in their area, work progress, resource/support needs, and other crit­
I ical factors.
~.
The recommendation to establish sectors should be made by anyone who
identifies conditions, positions or functions that require sector operation.
Each sector must be supervised by a sector officer who may be a chief, com­
pany officer, firefighter, or a qualifIed specialist.
Organization

------

Chapter 6 Functions of Command

Initial sector supervision in significant/esc8lating situations is many times given

to a company officer who arrives in that tactical position first. This requires
himlher to act as both a sector officer and company officer. This approach starts
building the incident organization from the very beginning of us going to work,
and sends a message that we are setting up a sector-based organization. The IC
should attempt to replace these officers with subsequently arriving command
officers, as quickly as possible, using regular transfer procedures (Chapter 8)­
thus returning the company officer to directly supervise hislher crew.

To efficiently do their jobs, sector officers must be outfitted with the same pro­
tective gear as their companies, and must be in a position to actually supervise
the work that is being performed. They should be easily identifiable, assuming
a conspicuous position. When the identification of sector officers is not obvi­
ous, there is bound to be confusion. Sector vests, different colored helmet or a
full Indian headdress (fire resistive) can help to reduce some of this confusion.

The strength of the sector system is that supervision and support are decen­
tralized in a way that moves a sector boss right to where the work is
physically being performed. These sector bosses serve as the Ie's eyes and
ears and become the area/function reporting agents back to the Ie. The weak­
ness of the sector system is that in some very active situations, everyone
(including the sector officer) is seriously insulted by those same incident con­
ditions. Dense smoke, high heat, excessive noise and rushed confusing work
routines create an extremely challenging environment to do any sort of "regu­
lar management." Simply, the sector guy/gal is as disadvantaged by these
conditions as the workers. The sector officer, in most cases, has more mobili­
ty than companies attached to hose lines, using tools, and assigned work
positions. They can circulate in the sector area, evaluate work efforts, and
move to better portable-radio transmission (in/out) positions. The IC and
command team must understand how such conditions affect the sector offi­
cer's ability to manage their assigned area-particularly interior positions with
little or no visibility (a definite red flag). Everyone must operate with an
awareness of how potentially dangerous these visibility-impaired (by smoke)
situations can be, particularly in large-floor area commercial situations.

A current structural firefighting IMS deve 10pment has involved providing a

sector-team approach (similar to the command team). Adding a safety officer,
accountability officer and a RIC team to t21e sector creates this team capabili­
ty. Based on tactical conditions and the physical layout of the sector area
(access, arrangement, distance(s), structural conditions, etc.), the sector officer
must decide how to position the team members. This arrangement could be
somewhat different for each situation, but the strength of the approach is that
the team creates a balance of inside-work supervision and outside support that
is close to (and concentrating on) the "culTent events" going on in and around
their hazard area. Our service has historically underestimated and under­
reacted to what it actually requires to effectively protect inside workers in
high-hazard, offensive, structural fire-fighting situations. While this sector­
team approach requires the response of m8re supervisory and support

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

• Isolated or remote tactical positions-when fire companies are operat­

ing in positions over which the IC has little or no control (i.e., complex,
interior operations or on a side of the fire the IC cannot see).

• Dangerous conditions-when the IC must maintain close control over

operating companies faced with unusually dangerous conditions.
Scenarios involving unsafe structural conditions, hazardous materials,
quickly changing conditions, or "one-way in/one-way out" problems
require close supervision and control.

• Where special functions are needed-like hazmat, safety, rescue, rehab,

staging, etc.

SECTOR OFFICERS
The sector officer should be briefed on the overall strategy and tactical objec­
tive of his/her area or functional assignment. Although the number of units
assigned to an individual sector will depend upon needs and conditions, three
to five companies are a practical span of control for most active situations.
Part of the IC's job is to maintain awareness, inventory, and tracking of the
number and designation of companies assigned to each sector and the particu­
lar capabilities of that sector officer. It doesn't make much sense for the IC to
delegate his/her sector officers into their own state of insanity by exceeding
their span of control (three to five). When a sector is "maxed," create another
sector or assign more organizational support to those sectors. Such support
could include upgrading the rank/experience of the sector officer, adding
safety/accountability officers to the sector, providing more command post co­
ordination, etc. Sectors are most effective when they are assigned in
anticipation of their need, rather than in crisis. It's difficult when they must
play catch up in their area/function.

The IC serves as the resource allocator for each incident and, once sectors are
established, assigns companies based on resource request from the sector offi­
cers. Having the IC allocate resources establishes the capability to continually
maintain an on-line awareness of the size and status of the incident. By
requiring the IC to assign resources, it allows him/her to enter the resource
into the inventory and tracking system (discussed in the Deployment chapter).

Once a company has been assigned to a sector, it is the responsibility of that

sector officer to get hislher company into action. In turn, company officers
will supervise their own crews in performing their assigned specific task.
Company officers communicate directly with their sector officers to describe
conditions in their area, work progress, resource/support needs, and other crit­
ical factors .

The recommendation to establish sectors should be made by anyone who

identifies conditions, positions or functions that require sector operation.
Each sector must be supervised by a sector officer who may be a chief, com­
pany officer, firefighter, or a qualified specialist.
Organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

Initial sector supervision in significant/escalating situations is many times given

to a company officer who arrives in that tactical position first. This requires
him/her to act as both a sector officer and company officer. This approach starts
building the incident organization from the very beginning of us going to work,
and sends a message that we are setting up a sector-based organization. The IC
should attempt to replace these officers with subsequently arriving command
officers, as quickly as possible, using regular transfer procedures (Chapter 8)­
thus returning the company officer to directly supervise hislher crew.

To efficiently do their jobs, sector officers must be outfitted with the same pro­
tective gear as their companies, and must be in a position to actually supervise
the work that is being performed. They sl:.ould be easily identifiable, assuming
a conspicuous position. When the identification of sector officers is not obvi­
ous, there is bound to be confusion. Secter vests, different colored helmet or a
full Indian headdress (fire resistive) can help to reduce some of this confusion.

The strength of the sector system is that s:.Jpervision and support are decen­
tralized in a way that moves a sector boss right to where the work is
physically being performed. These sector bosses serve as the IC's eyes and
ears and become the area/function reporting agents back to the Ie. The weak­
ness of the sector system is that in some very active situations, everyone
(including the sector officer) is seriously insulted by those same incident con­
ditions. Dense smoke, high heat, excessi'e noise and rushed confusing work
routines create an extremely challenging environment to do any sort of "regu­
lar management." Simply, the sector guy/gal is as disadvantaged by these
conditions as the workers. The sector officer, in most cases, has more mobili­
ty than companies attached to hose lines, using tools, and assigned work
positions. They can circulate in the sector area, evaluate work efforts, and
move to better portable-radio transmission (in/out) positions. The IC and
command team must understand how such conditions affect the sector offi­
cer's ability to manage their assigned area-particularly interior positions with
little or no visibility (a definite red flag). Everyone must operate with an
awareness of how potentially dangerous these visibility-impaired (by smoke)
situations can be, particularly in large-floor area commercial situations.

A current structural firefighting IMS development has involved providing a

sector-team approach (similar to the command team). Adding a safety officer,
accountability officer and a RIC team to tje sector creates this team capabili­
ty. Based on tactical conditions and the physical layout of the sector area
(access, alTangement, distance(s), structural conditions, etc.), the sector officer
must decide how to position the team members. This arrangement could be
somewhat different for each situation, but the strength of the approach is that
the team creates a balance of inside-work supervision and outside support that
is close to (and concentrating on) the "culTent events" going on in and around
their hazard area. Our service has historically underestimated and under­
reacted to what it actually requires to effectively protect inside workers in
high-hazard, offensive, structural fire-fighting situations. While this sector­
team approach requires the response of m~re supervisory and support

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

personnel, those people could not be doing anything more important than pro­
tecting our most valuable resource (E-l) . The structural fire-fighting
community should take a page out of the special operations book-when the
hazmatologist put two of his/her technicians in a smurf suit (body bag with a
window), he/she has an army of support people, right at the edge of the warm
zone, reciting chemical poetry to each other over bone mics in their helmets­
a very smart, safe approach.

When a company is assigned from staging to an operating sector, that compa­

ny will be told what sector/sector officer to report to. The sector officer will
be informed by command what particular companies or units have been
assigned to his/her sector. It then becomes the responsibility of the sector
officer to directly contact the company, by radio or in person, to transmit
instructions on the specific actions required.

The primary function of the company officer working within a sector is to

directly supervise the operation of the crew while they perform their assigned
tasks. As with sector officers, they too must advise their supervisor (in this
case the sector officer) of conditions, work progress, exception, completion
and, if necessary, additional support and resources required. They must
inform their boss (IC/sector) of anythjng that affects the safety of anyone con­
nected to the incjdent. This reporting is particularly important when
conditions change in a way that can't be seen from the command post.

Companies working within a sector should communicate directly with their

sector officer using non-radio modes (face to face) whenever possible. The
radio (tactical channel) will be used for "sector officer to sector officer" and
"sector officer to command" transmissions. Obviously, this plan does not
apply to criticaVtactical/safety messages or "emergency traffic," which can be
initiated by anyone at any time.

Sector officers are responsible for the following basic functions:

• Directly supervise work in the sector.

• Monitor personnel safety, accountability, and welfare.

• Develop a sector lAP (that integrates with the overall lAP).

• Redirect sector activities as required.

• Request additional resources from the IC as required.

• Integrate and coordinate actions with other sectors as required.

• Advise the IC (regularly) of situation status, changing conditions,

progress, completion, and exception reports.

• Decommit companies as operations are completed.

Some of the more frequently used sectors are described at the end of this chapter.

Organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

ORGANIZING MEDIUM- TO LARGE-SCALE

INCIDENTS
The incident scene is always in a constant, dynamic state of change. If we are
winning, the problem is going away. If the problem is winning, it is getting
bigger and badder. When we have to go bigger (i.e., calling for more
resources) to match, defeat, and eliminate the problem, there has to be a sys­
tem in place that allows the IC to kick the organization up a notch, so he/she
can manage the extra resources required to solve the problem. The organiza­
tion must keep pace with the deployment of required resources. If it falls
behind the resource level, and if the "gap" keeps getting larger, the IC will
find himlherself quickly overwhelmed and in need of therapy (and then med­
ication). When the IC is no longer able to effectively manage the strategic
level, the incident management system will unravel. If sectors/companies
can't connect and communicate with the IC, eventually they will take inde­
pendent action. The incident organization blueprint must be put into place
immediately to deal with the current and -:'orecasted incident conditions, and
be able to escalate to the point of managing all of the resources that are neces­
sary. The organization must accommodate the rest of the incident players
(automatic/mutual aide, law enforcement, utility companies, etc.), and anyone
else who gets thrown into the mix (the customer, Coast Guard, Little Sisters of
the Poor, etc.).

The incident management organization is initiated when the officer of the first
arriving unit (usually an engine company) gives an initial on scene radio
report and assumes command. As other units arrive (in level I or II staging)
the IC puts them into action. When the IC forecasts the need to sectorize,
he/she should assign the initial companies to the different tactical locations
and functions, around the incident scene, sector-officer responsibilities. Using
a fire in the local MetroMall, as an example, we can "watch" the evolution of
the incident scene organization:

• First unit to the scene (Engine 1) assumes command.

• The initial IC orders Engine 2 to lay a supply line to the east and to pull
attack lines for search rescue and fire control. Assigns officer of Engine
2 east sector.

• Ladder 1 arrives to the scene. The IC assigns them to the roof to venti­
late. Assigns officer of Ladder 1 roof sector.

• Engine 3 arrives. The IC assigns ttem to lay a line supply line to the
west and to pull attack lines for search rescue and fire control to the
west. Assigns the officer of Engine 3 to assume west sector.

• The battalion chief (BC) arrives to the scene. The BC obtains progress
report(s) and transfers command from the initial IC (Engine 1) and
assigns himlher to assume south sector.

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

The incident is not five-minutes old and there are four sectors in place, along
with the Ie (a Be) operating in the command mode. Everyone talks about the
first-five minutes being the most important. The Ie has a sector (and a crew)
in the fire occupancy, sectors on both sides of the fire, and another on the roof
over the fire occupancy. In this example, the fire is sunounded by an
organization (sectors) and crews. The Ie is in a position to assign anoth­
er alarm (level) without having to add another tactical piece (sector) to
the organization. The Ie is in a position to get first-hand information ~ EAST
from sector officers, as opposed to basing all of hisfher decisions on
assumptions and visual factors from the limited, stationary, command-
post position. The Ie is truly in a strategic mode, and with the help of
the initial company officer and sectors, can maintain a strategic position. The
sectors were quickly and painlessly put in place during the front end of the
operation. The Ie gave orders and made assignments. Sector officers are in
place to report on conditions/progress, request any needed resources, and
manage activities in their assigned areas. Now that the organization is in
place, the Ie can focus on the big picture, react to repOlis, and allocate
resources (many "monkeys" are off his/her back). As areas around such a sig­
nificant incident require attention/action, the Ie assigns companies to those
locations. Just like the front end of the event, the Ie would assign the officer
of the initial unit sent to those places sector officer responsibilities.

COMMAND TEAMS
Highly trained, well-equipped, fiercely motivated fire-fighting companies can
seem to accomplish the impossible. While this is a marvel to behold, it is a
natural law (physics) that there is only so much that anyone can do. As an
incident escalates, more engine and ladder companies are required to bring the
situation under control. The same is true for managing the incident. There is
only so much commanding, controlling, and communicating a single Ie can
do, before vapor lock sets in. Incident operations can grow and move very
quickly. The Ie can quickly exceed hisfher attention span and become over­
whelmed with radio traffic, keeping up with the tactical work sheet,
information management, planning, forecasting, calling for additional
resources, and fulfilling all the functions of command. The one thing the Ie
needs at this point is (attention span) support. As the incident organization
requirements mushroom, so does the command capability needed to manage
those resources. The Ie cannot operate behind the veiled curtain of com­
mand, like the Great Oz. The main incident-management player (Ie) needs
support (along with love, bottled water, and Snickers candy bars). As the inci­
dent escalates, so must command. The following describes a basic,
local-management team that can quickly form and front-end load an effective,
strong command effect into an incident operation. The command team con­
cept is designed to fill the gap between a single Ie and the full-blown IMS
section (safety, ops, planning, logistics and admin) level. In most cases, the
command team can effectively create a response that puts a big hit on a local
problem, and quickly solves or limits, and controls the incident problem. The
team eliminates the need for long-term , big-time organizations.

Organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

• The Incident Commander is the first player of the command team.

• As the incident escalates the next member of the team assumes the role
of the support officer. This person should be a "command type." It can
be the second-in battalion chief, first-in chief from a neighboring city,
or third-in ladder company engineer. Whoever it is needs to be quali­
fied in incident management.

• The third and final member of the trio becomes the senior advisor. The
senior advisor is generally going to be the highest-ranking member of
the command team.

• Support members, like command vehicle drivers, aides, FITs, etc., also
provide assistance by playing support/organizational roles . These folks
can be plugged in as initial section positions (like safety and logistics).
This gets the system up and running much quicker (as opposed to leav­
ing these spots vacant while waiting for later-arriving command
officers). Over time, these support players become very well versed in
managing these positions, and strengthening the overall effectiveness of
the command team.

Command teams are an organizational response to quickly provide enough

command and control to rapidly bring a significant local incident under con­
trol. Command teams are a quick-and-dirty response to managing the swift
escalation of enough resources to bring the incident under control in the front
end of our best window of opportunity (ea.:-liest/smallest). Building a full­
blown incident organization with the use of sections (explained later in this
chapter) is a much slower process. This section-oriented approach is appropri­
ate when you're going to manage a large incident spread, over an extended area
that will go on for a long time, but it is toc slow to put into operation for the
short, intense, and dangerous time frames which local fire, EMS, or special
operations incidents occur in. This level of command provides a "SWAT-team"
approach to incident management. The command-team approach is designed
to get enough local command expertise and support quickly in place to manage
the rapid-fire assignment of the front-end resources required to get the job
done. This is truly high impact, quick, street-oriented command.

EVOLUTION OF THE COMJfAND TEAM

The first in command officer (usually a battalion chief) assumes command
from the initial IC (usually a company officer). This upgrades incident com­
mand by transferring command from a fast attacker to someone in a fixed ,
stationary command post. If the initial assignment stabilizes the situation, this
is as far as command (the incident organization) needs to grow. On the other
hand, if the incident keeps growing so does the command component. The
next-in command officer (again, usually a BC) reports to the command post
and assumes the role of support officer. IT: some systems, the support officer
shows up with the command post vehicle. The support officer roles and
responsibilities:

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

• Evaluate and recommend changes to the incident action plan-the IC

and the support officer continually engage in a "challenge-and-verify"
exchange.

Note-"Challenge and verify" is a process where team members do not

automatically accept the existing plan and require the other member to
continually describe and defend what is going on. It is done in a highly
supportive way and is not meant to second guess or micromanage (par­
ticularly the IC). It is a very effective approach for improving the
quality of safety decisions and to verify both the overall strategy and the
details of the incident action plan. The reader should examine the cur­
rent programs being developed in Crew Resource Management for a
complete description of the basic program.

• Provide direction relating to tactical priorities, specific critical incident

factors, and safety.

• Evaluate the need for additional resources .

• Assign logistics responsibilities.

• Assist with the tactical work sheet for resource control, accountability,
and tracking.

• Evaluate the incident organization and span of control.

Many times plugging a support officer into the command post is all that is
needed to bring a fast-moving incident, bordering on becoming out of control,
back into balance. A support officer serves as the Ie's "shield" by keeping all
the IC attention-diverting distractions away from the Ie. This allows the IC to
stay on the tactical channel and to continually focus on the tactical priorities.

The third member of the command team is the senior advisor. The senior
advisor is normally the highest-ranking member of the command team.
His/her focus is looking at the entire incident and its impact from a broader
perspective and providing direction, guidance, and "fatherly/motherly advice"
to the rest of the command team. The roles and responsibilities of the senior
advisor include:

• Review and evaluate the incident action plan, and initiate any needed
changes (more challenge and verify).

• Provide ongoing review of the overall incident (the big picture).

• Review the organizational structure, initiate change or expansion to

meet incident needs.

• Recommend section and branch functions as required.

• Manage appropriate sections as needed.

Organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

• Provide liaison with other city agencies and officials, outside agencies,
property owners and tenants.

• Forecast (and react to) the effect thi s incident will have in tomorrow
morning's newspaper (front page, above the fold).

When a support officer and senior advisor are suppolting the IC in the com­
mand post, you have an integrated, three-person team working together to
perform the function s of command. The IC should use the radio designation
"Command" and will generally be the only member of the command team
talking on the radio.

A WORD ABOUT CHIEF 'S AIDES

Chief's aides (or FITs-Field Incident Technicians-buggy boys, drivers,
techs or whatever else you call them) add a whole new dimension to expand­
ing the capability of command. An aide allows the responding chief officer
(usually a battalion chief) to start filling out the tactical work sheet, while
responding to the incident, along with being able to more closely monitor the
radio and other communication devices (mobile data terminals, mobile com­
puter terminals, phones, preplans, etc). It provides for a safer response to the
incident scene because if the chief has to drive, he/she will attempt to do all
these activities while driving code 3 (ligh t and siren), which isn't really a very
safe thing to do. It is pretty tough to gaze off at the thermal column that is
sucking large dogs and small cars into itself, while listening to the tactical
radio traffic, manipulating all the
electronic devices in the rig, figure
out the best route to the event, and to
start formulating an lAP, while trying
to avoid Martha in her '72
Oldsmobile. By the time the IC
drives to the scene, he/she is exhaust­
ed and in need of some quality time
in a decompression chamber. It is
much more advisable for the IC to
have someone (the aide) drive
him/her to the incident scene.

Once the Chief arrives at the scene, there are several options for using the aide:

• Serve as the initial support officer. Having the aide fill out the tactical
work sheet, keep track of who's on the scene, and where they are pro­
vides the necessary "command support" to keep the IC (the chief)
operating on the strategic level. This support creates an effective level
of command support during the critical beginning of operations. It is
hard to catch up later, if this work is not done early. It also lets the IC
do the situation evaluation, while tracki ng, and accountability is handled
by the initial support officer (aide).

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

• Provide recon. During the initial phases of

incident operations, the IC will generally only

have a few units assigned to tactical positions.

These "reporting positions," along with the

Ie's field of vision (what the IC can see), com­

poses most of the information the IC has to

base the lAP on. The IC can send the aide to

do a 360 around the incident site and report back

on conditions, arrangement, access, number of

patients, hazards, or any other tactically significant

piece of information. This recon info puts the IC in a

better position to make assignments based on need, as

opposed to sending tactical units on information safaris.

This is especially important when the IC has scarce on­

scene resources (common in the front end of the event).

During these information junkets, it is important that the

aide stay in safe positions. The aide (and everyone else) is forbidden to

enter the hazard zone, unless with (at least) a partner, properly dressed,

equipped, and ordered to go there by the Ie.

• Assign the aide as the initial safety sector. Some fire departments uti­
lize their chief aides in this fashion. When the command duo arrives to
the scene the chief assumes command from the initial IC, while the aide
dresses out in the appropriate safety attire and assumes safety sector.
The aide provides recon info to the IC and monitors the scene/workers '
safety. This provides a huge nudge for the entire scene safety profile.
A person whose main focus and responsibility is to monitor the safety
and welfare of the workers is established and put into place in the very
beginning of the incident. The safety sector officer becomes the "safety
manager," repolts to the IC, and helps make sure that everyone who
showed up to the scene, leaves the scene-intact.

Teaming an aide up with the chief greatly expands the amount of command
and control that a fire department can pull off in the front end of the incident,
where our chances of success (and the risk to our workers) are the greatest.

SPAN OF CONTROL
The IC sectorizes the incident scene to maintain an effective span of control.
Most experienced ICs put the ideal span of control between four to six *.
Based on doing a lot of incident management, one of the biggest elements in
deciding the proper span of control is what type of task is being performed
and what type of environment it is being performed in. Engine company offi­

* The span of control limit of four tosix is a universal observation that refers
to management units on every level. .. it would describe the number of workers
on the company level, the number of companies on the sector level and the
number of sectors an IC can effectively manage on the strategic level.

Organization
l ___­ -..... . - -. - -­
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

cers probably have their hands full if they are supervising their crew conduct­
ing a primary search in a house that is fully charged with smoke. A working
company officer may be able to assign a couple more companies into initial
action, but as far as keeping track of where they are, what they are doing, and
communicating with them on the radio, he/she's really not in the best location
to manage that span-of-control power curve. What we attempt to do in the
fast-attack mode is to "authorize" an initial arriving company officer to com­
bine quick action and quick command, to cake advantage of a situation that is
underway and getting worse. The strength of fast action is just that-fast
action. This is very much an approach for creating fast and effective action on
the local level. We realize that our fast-acting IC is in a compromised com­
mand position, but we make that (local) trade off simply because if the
fast-acting actor/actress overpowers and solves the incident problem, we don't
have to continue to escalate the operation (both action and command). Simply,
when we put the fire out, everything gets better. On the other hand, a battalion
chief operating in the command mode can easily manage four to six individual
crews that are engaged in some type of small- to medium-sized incident activi­
ty. If the resource requirements are going to exceed four to six companies, our
intrepid IC must forecast the escalating fu~ure and start to sectorize when mak­
ing assignments. Now the IC has kept his magic, span-of-control number
around four to six. This number doesn't include the non-tactical sectors the IC
may have operating at the incident scene. These sectors tend to be functional
and in many fire departments are activated almost automatically (invisibly).
Let's use our MetroMall fire as an example. The IC ended up with an east,
west, south, north, (or sides A, B, C and D) and roof sector. These sectors had
a direct role in completing the tactical priorities. Off to the side of the fire
attack there were a number of other sectors. They include:

• Public Information Officer (PIO)

• Occupant Services

• Rehabilitation (Rehab)

• Investigations

• Staging

• Safety

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

E-4 .E -11
E-5 E-3
E-7 E -12

These non-tactical (support) functional sectors require little to no supervision

from the Ie. In most cases, the Ie requests those functions to respond and
whoever had the "duty" in that area (job) goes to the incident. When they get
to the scene, they quickly report in to the Ie that they are there. The Ie gives
them whatever directionlinformation they need to get started, and then they're
off and running. The response of many of these functional sectors is automat­
ic as a working fire is declared, or more alarms are struck. These become
SOP-driven sectors, and over time, their operation automatically matches the
size, severity, and needs of the incident. When the initial Ie reports on the
scene with a working structure fire, Mabel automatically sends out a utility
truck for lights, air, and the beginning of a rehab sector. When the Ie requests
a fire investigator, they will report "on the scene" when they get there and
start the investigation . All the Ie really needs to know is that the investigator
showed up and is doing hisfher job. Staging is, in effect, for all incidents.
Level II staging is automatically activated for the resources sent out on multi­
ple alarms. Many systems have units dispatched on greater alarms go to a
non-tactical channel. When the first engine company on the 2nd alarm arrives
to the level II staging location, they automatically contact the command post
(usually a logistics person) on their channel, and let them know who they are
and that they are assuming staging sector. All the Ie knows is that level II
staging is up and running. "Pre-loading" these sectors in this fashion will give

Organization
 Chapter 6 Functions of Command

command the luxury of being able to directly concentrate on the tactical sec­
tors working for him/her, along with getting (automatically) the required
support with very little direction from the Ie. The system is simple, fast,
local, and effective.

BRANCHES
The goal of whatever system a departmem uses to organize the incident scene
should have the capability to manage any level of needed incident resources.
Sometimes (not often) on the local level, an incident may require most, if not
all, of a department's (a nd sometimes all their neighbor's) resources. These
incidents will usually be the lead story on all the local newscas ts and probably
the nation al ones too. These major incidents (referred to as the "Big One" by
the locals) can find command quickly overwhelmed with sectors (both geo­
graphic and functional). The next su bdivision between command and sectors
are BRANCHES. Branch officers operate on the coordination level and man­
age whatever sector officers command assigns to them . Command should
consider the use of branches when:

• The incident is forecasted as a major event that will end up eventually

needing many sectors.

• The incident has two or more disti nctive components (a large fire, along
with a major evacuation).

• The incident is spread over a large geographical area (such as a wild­

land fire, several crash sites, a large commercial structure, mUltiple
floors, etc.).

• Anytime the number of operating sectors starts to overwhelm command.

This is a late indication to expand t~e organization .. .lots better to fore­
cast and stay ahead of the game.

Effective incident operations have command operating on the strategic level.

Sector officers operate on the tactical level. Branch officers provide coordina­
tion (and connection) between command and sectors. When command has a
need to group sectors together and keep their function separate, they should be
assigned to a branch. As an example:

• Medical Branch-Extrication, treatment, triage and transportation sec­

tors

• Hazardous Materials Branch-Entry team, entry control, hazmat, envi­

ronmental, and decon sectors

• Fire Control Branch-East, west, north, south, and roof sectors

• Evacuation Branch-North evacuation, west evacuation, and relocation

sectors

Organization
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 Functions of Command Chapter 6

BRANCH OFFICERS:
Coordinate between the strategic level (command) and the tactical level (sec­
tors).

• Serve as the IC's "front-line" managers.

• Manage assigned sectors and other related resources.

• Will usually be located away from the command post whenever possible
(close to their area of responsibility). They should be positioned in some
type of a vehicle-Suburban, sedan, van, chariot, etc. Something that
has radios, phones, and whatever staff support they need to calTY out
their mission.

The activation of branches signifies that the incident is going to be split into
(typically large) separate pieces. Each branch should ideally operate on it's
own radio channel. When command makes a branch assignment, the branch
officer should be briefed on the following:

• Overall incident action plan.

• What their assignment is (fire, medical, evacuation, etc.) .

f·
I • What their objectives are.
I
i
~. • What sectors and other resources are assigned to them.
I

• What radio channel they will be Qperating on, and their

radio designation.

• Any other pertinent information ("be advised we need

I
~
to keep the fire from crossing the river, and by the way
it is raining frogs in your area, good luck."
i Organization
I

I
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

Branch officers should contact the sectors assigned to them and let them know
they are now reporting to a branch boss, along with what radio channel they
will be operating on. Once branch officers are in place, command will com­
municate with them, as opposed to the sectors assigned to the branch. Branch
officers work for command; sector officers work for branches. Branch offi­
cers follow the same reporting and operating protocols when dealing with
command as sectors.

SECTIONS
Command is responsible for

managing the functions of

command for the incident. As

the incident, or some aspect

of it, grows in size or com­

plexity, it can quickly

overwhelm, or at least

_severely preoccupy,
Command . Before this
becomes a problem, the com­
mand team should be
expanded to deal with what­
ever issue has become a
major problem. Initiating
sections becomes the next step
in expanding the incident organi­
zation to support the command team (IC. support officer, senior advisor). The
functions performed by the sections were initiated, integrated, and performed
by the participants who operated the command process in the beginning (com­
mand team). Now based on the size, complexity, and duration of the incident,
sections are created to focus on the major areas of operations and command .
When the IC (command team) implements sections, these sections report to
the IC. Incident management needs and involvement at any incident can be
broken down and assigned to sections in five basic areas. They are:

SAFETY SECTION

LOGISTICS SECTION

OPERATIONS SECTION

PLANNING SECTION

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

The managers of these sections are called "chief' (i.e., ops chief, plans chief,
etc.)

SAFETY
More and more fire departments are automatically implementing the response
of safety officers to the incident scene. Smaller depar~ments may use a single

Organization

- - --_.. -- --- -- -- -- - - - -­
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

person. Larger departments may have several officers who are assigned to the
safety function. The focus of these safety folks is to monitor the safety and
welfare of the people operating in the hazard zone. Safety officers can also
serve as recon agents. They are normally located in exterior positions and are
often times the first organizational players to notice changing conditions­
particularly in operating positions not visible from the command post. The
main mission of safety officers is to monitor the safety of personnel who are
operating in the hazard zone. Safety sector officers operating in forward posi­
tions, should report directly to the Ie. During larger expanded operations or
during complex, high-hazard incidents, it may be advantageous to implement
a safety section . Once the position is staffed, the safety sectors should report
to the safety section chief. If it is possible, they should operate on a channel
other than the main tactical channel. When this system is used, the safety sec­
tion chief should be operating in the command post so he/she has instant
access to the command team. Safety officers have the authority Gust like
everyone else) to stop unsafe acts and cause people to move out of unsafe
conditions. This in no way diminishes the IC's "authority" to run the incident
-it simply makes the operation safer, and what sane, non-ego driven, fire­
service professional would argue with that.

The safety section is responsible for:

• Supervising safety officers.

• Evaluating all aspects of the overall operation that affects safety.

• Monitoring the safety of the workers operating in the hazard zone.

• Evaluating changing incident conditions (are they getting better or

worse).
f
o

• Evaluating changing structural conditions (are they getting

better or worse).

• Stopping unsafe acts.

• Setting up and managing RIC teams.

• Managing accountability within the hazard zone.

• Evaluating the operation as it relates to the risk-management

plan.

• Evaluating if the strategy matches the conditions

• Assisting sector officers with managing the points of entry (entry con­
trol) .

• Coordinating and providing technical assistance with IC and other sec­

tions.

organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

LOGISTICS
The logistics section is the support mechanism for the organization. Logistics
provides services and support systems to all the organizational components
involved in the incident. Logistics provides the organization whatever "stuff"
it needs to operate effectively at the incident scene. Fire companies are set up
to deliver a self-contained, big bang of task-level service. They must maintain
an inventory (EMS supplies, hose, nozzles, foam, five-gallon cool cans, sun­
flower seeds, etc.) to get them through most of the incidents they respond to.
When the meteor falls out of the sky, we need to raise the logistics bar a notch
or two. Logistics roles and responsibilities include:

• Managing rehab sector (hydration, rest, food, medics, shade/mist, heat,

love, and dry socks).

• Managing personnel accountability outside the hazard zone.

• Managing staging. ,

• Providing and managing any needed supplies or equipment.

• Forecasting and obtaining future resource needs (coordinate with the

planning section).

• Providing any needed communicati:::ms equipment.

• Providing fuel and needed repairs for equipment.

• Obtaining specialized equipment or expertise per command.

• Providing food and associated supplies.

• Securing any needed fixed or portable facilities.

• Coordinating immediate Critical Incident Stress Debriefing.

• Providing any other logistical needs, as requested by command.

• Supervising assigned personnel.

OPERATIONS
The operations section is responsible for the tactical priorities, and (along with
the safety section) the safety and welfare of the personnel working in the
operations section. The operations section chief uses the tactical radio chan­
nel(s) to communicate strategic and specific objectives to sectoribranch
officers. When the operations section officer is sitting in the command post,
next to the IC, he/she should use the radio designation "Command." If he/she
is operating outside of the command post, it makes more sense to use the
radio designation "Operations."

Organization

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 Functions of Command Chapter 6

The operations section chief is most commonly used in large wildland inci­
dents (this makes sense because IMS was invented by our wildland
brothers/sisters). For most of our local events, the IC serves the role of the
operations chief. As the incident escalates, the response and addition of the
command team members increases and maintains the IC's ability to manage
the incident. For most of our local day-to-day business, the operations sec­
tion's responsibilities are performed by the IC and command team.
Operations roles and responsibilities include:

• Coordinating activities with the Ie.

• Implementing the Incident Action Plan.

• Assigning units to sectorslbranches based on tactical objectives and

priorities.

• Building an effective organizational structure through the use of

branches and sectors.

• Providing and coordinating branch's and sector's tactical objectives.

• Providing for life safety.

• Determining needs and requesting additional resources.

• Consulting with and informing other sections and the incident

command staff, as needed.

PLANNING
The planning section is responsible for gathering, assimilating, analyzing, and
processing information needed for effective decision making. Information
management is a full-time task at large and complex incidents. The planning
section serves as command's "clearing house" for information. This allows
command to have a single person provide them with information instead of
having to deal with multiple information sources. Critical information should
be immediately forwarded to command (or whoever needs it). Information
should be used to make longer-range plans (than we do for regular opera­
tions). The planning section officer's goal is to plan ahead of current events,
and to identify the need for resources before they are needed. Planning sec­
tion's responsibilities include:

• Evaluating current strategy and lAP with command.

• Refining and recommending any needed changes to lAP.

• Evaluating incident organization and span of control.

• Forecasting possible outcome(s), hazard behaviors, contingency plans

(answer "what if?").

• Evaluating future resource requirements.

Organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

• Utilizing technical assistance as needed .

• Evaluating tactical priorities, specific critical factors , and safety.

• Gathering, updating, improving, and managing information with a stan­

dard systematic approach (define).

• Establishing a demobilization plan.

• Acting as liaison with any needed outside agencies for planning needs.

ADMINISTRATIVE
The administrative section evaluates and manages the organizationaillegal
risk, fmancial, political, and community requirements for the organization's
involvement in the incident. The administrative section's roles and responsi­
bilities include:

• Procuring services and/or supplies from sources within and outside the
fire department or city, as requested by Command (coordinated with the
logistics section).

• Documenting all financial costs of L'1e incident.

• Documenting for possible cost recovery, for services and/or supplies.

• Analyzing and managing legal risk for incidents, such as a hazardous

materials clean up.

• Establishing a PIO and community relations contact with admini stra­

tors, politicians, community groups, media, etc.

• Serving as command's liaison with city officials (both political and

administrative), litigators (and other lawyer types), and regulatory agen­
cies (EPA, FBI, OSHA, DOT, etc.).

• Monitoring and coordinating emergency service delivery to the rest of

the community, during major incidents, to ensure adequate coverage.

• Serving as the Emergency Operations Center representative in the com­

mand post and provides briefings to the EOC staff.

• Managing investigations.

• Managing critique preparations.

The administrative section is responsible for obtaining any and all needed
incident documentation for potential cost-recovery efforts, or litigation.

These five areas are staffed as SECTIONS . Section chiefs will usually be
ranking members. Until the IC assigns these sections, Command is responsible
for any function that falls within that secticn. The beauty of the section system

Organiz.ation
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

(like the rest of IMS) is you only need to expand the parts that are required.

Some incidents may require very little tactical intervention, but they may have
very long, large, confused, or complicated back ends. A hazmat spill is a
good example. These types of incidents may take less than an hour to elimi­
nate the immediate risk, but the clean up may take weeks, and cost millions of
dollars, and become huge community/mediaJpoliticaVlegal festivals. After the
hazmat part of the organization gets decommited, some type of administrative
section should be in place to deal with issues like:

• Who is responsible for the spill?

• Who is going to clean it up?

• How will it be cleaned up, and how long will it take?

• What do the regulators (EPA, DEQ, OSHA, etc.) have to say?

• Will people be displaced from their homes and businesses, and how will
they be cared for?

• Who will pay for it?

• How will effective community contacts be established and maintained?

• Will there be any legal action?

If the local fire depmtment doesn't answer these questions, prior to calling a
hazardous materials, clean-up contractor, they shouldn't be surprised when they
get the bill . An administrative section sorts out these questions before hand.

Each section chief builds whatever type of organization he/she needs to sup­
port the function. This can be done through the use of branches, sectors, or
whatever else is required to meet the needs of each particular situation .

Sometimes combining sections makes sense. In our hazmat example, it may

be effective to have the administrative and planning sections merged under the
same person. Most of the planning going on is directly related to things that
deal with the administrative section. The important benchmark of the system
is that the needs of the incident are met.

The Ie should, wherever possible, assign section responsibilities to the person

who normally deals with those functions on a regular basis.

UNIFIED COMMAND
Whenever an incident is co-managed by two or more separate organizations, it
is operating within a unified command. These organizations can be the fire
departments from two or more different communities getting together to fight
a fire, a fire department and police department managing a fire with a large

Organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

evacuation, or any other combination of i:lcident scene responders coming

together to manage service delivery. Typically, unified command scenarios
involve large incidents that require the efforts of several (some times lots) dif­
ferent response agencies to bring it under control.

Full blown, long-term incidents requiring unified command will often require
the activation of the community's Emergency Operation Center (EOC). When
the incident organization escalates to this point, the fire department Incident
Commander will be operating in the field, and the person managing the EOC
will be called the Incident Manager. If the incident is spread over a large geo­
graphic area (i.e., a large power outage, a flood, hurricane, talking sheep, etc.),
the affected areas should be broken up into manageable units. Each unit
should be run by a branch officer. These branch officers report to the Ie.

The key to this command cooperation is for the main players of each local
organization who will be involved in the unified command system, getting
together before the event ever happens, and figuring out what their roles will
be when they must go into the brave new world and actually operate together.
This pre-event relationship management should encourage the adoption of
IMS by all the local players and create a well-defined process of integrating
all the players into the game. This is really quite critical. This will help elim­
inate the old time, "I'm-in-charge" syndrome that produces all the traditional
resistance to playing nicely.

Some incidents will have a certain agency take the lead, while the others pro­
vide support. In these situations, the agency that is most capable of dealing
with the situation at that given time will be "in command" (lead agency status).

Example-There is a fire at the city's main powerplant. The workers at the

plant see the fire and like good citizens report it to the fire department. When
the fire department arrives they determine that it is unsafe to extinguish the
fire until the power has been secured. At this point the power company takes
a leading role in the operation. Once it is verified the power is secured (off),
the fire department assumes the lead and deals with the remaining unener­
gized fire. This operation will require coordinating the actions of all three
levels of the incident scene organization among the participating agencies.
The IC from the fire department, or his/her designee, will have to hook up
with his/her counterpart from the utility company and the power plant man­
agers to coordinate incident operations.

The relationships in this scenario aren't any different from what happens on a
day-to-day basis in any of our communities. Incident operations are routinely
carried on with four or more different agencies all the time. Mrs. Smith's
kitchen fire can have five different agencies providing service at the same time
-the fire department putting out the fire, electric and gas company securing
utilities, the police directing traffic and keeping order, a separate EMS
provider evaluating/treating Mrs. Smith, and a social service agency, like the
Red Cross, providing after-the-fire relief. These events aren't about the

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

responders' egos, who is in charge, or who has the authority to do this or that.
The reason these operations are successful is because they are centered around
all the different responders' customer-Mrs. Smith. In fact, these incidents,
where a group of agencies routinely operate together, are where we develop
the habits to just naturally help each other, and get along nicely. If we devel­
op this cooperative approach, just doing day-to-day stuff, it's a lot easier to be
nice when we meet new, different, "foreign" troops at an "away game" (either
ours or theirs).

Unified command scenarios are not any different from regular events. The
incident is bigger and more complex and higher-ranking members of each
organization are taking the leading roles (which is often times why there are
ego-related problems), but the relationship part of the equation is the same.
We are successful when we play to our strengths, and operations are centered
on the customer(s).

The next section of this chapter describes the frequently used sectors that the
Ie uses to manage most of our local, day-to-day incident activity. As we
mentioned earlier, we use the term "sector" to describe the most basic and
common "sub-unit" used to delegate authority and responsibility, and to
decentralize the incident scene into more manageable pieces. Many systems
use the term sector to describe these tactical-level assignments. Many other
systems use the term "division" and "group" to describe the same tactical sub­
unit (a division is geographic-a group is functional). It really doesn't matter
what you call them. What does matter is that the Ie has a "seamless" way to
organize the incident scene and that all the incident players understand the
local terminology.

If your local jurisdiction uses the term "divisions/groups" replace the term
sector with the appropriate title. This is the only difference between the two
systems.

FREQUENTLY USED SECTORS

Directional Sectors

Designations-North, South, East, West,

Side A, B, e, D, Floors 1,2,3,4"., Interior, Quadrants, Exposures.

Geographic sectors are the different tactical "places" the incident scene gets

divided into. The Ie covers the entire operational area by creating sectors that

subdivide the incident into geographic pieces. As the IC starts to assign

resources to particular geographic tactical locations, it makes sense to "sector­

ize" those locations. The basic operational sectors for most structure fires will

fall into these categories. Geographic sectors are more "self contained" than

their functional counterparts. When the IC assigns north sector to the interior

of a structure fire, they are generally given an objective that is fairly broad,

and includes the basic operational functions required to take control of condi­

tions in that area. Many times, the order sounds something like "extend an

Organization

- - -.-- - ­ - ----- -
 Chapter 6 Functions of Command

attack line from the north, do search, rescue, and fire control. Keep the fire
from extending to the north." The sector officer, in effect, becomes the IC for
all activities in the north sector. As the north sector initiates operations, their
efforts will center on the objectives assigr:.ed by the Ie. As the tactical objec­
tives in the sector are met, the sector officer reports progress back to the IC,
and evaluates what needs to be done next. This means the sector officer is
responsible for the four, basic organizatio:1al-tactical objectives (rescue/fire
control/property conservation/customer stabilization), along with firefighter
safety in that sector.

The command team performs a critical function when they "layout" the inci­
dent scene, by assigning sectors to cover all the critical command and
operational areas and functions that are required to manage the incident. This
sector "map" provides the template for how the incident will be organized.
The command system provides a standard set of sector names for those sepa­
rate and different assignments. These sector names are widely used in our
service. They are simple, universal, and create almost an instant understand­
ing. When a responders get an assignment (to a sector), they know where to
go and pretty much what they will be doing. Correctly creating and naming
this sector "overlay" provides the foundat:on for effective and safe operations.
While this sounds simple, and for smaller. routine incidents it is, it can be
challenging for larger, longer, more unusual situations . When we screw it up ,
it's a lot like taking a trip with Christopher Columbus ... at any given moment
we really don't know our location, when we arrive we don't know where we
are, and when we get back we don't know where we've been. Effectively
connecting incident geography and functions to the incident organization cre­
ates accurate orientation and eliminates tmvel and anival confusion.

While the focus and scope of directional sectors is broad, functional sectors
are generally a lot more nanow and very specific in what they do. A ventila­
tion sector is more concerned with moving the products of combustion out of
the structure than anything else. A water resource sector officer doesn't (and
shouldn't) care about the primary search, they just want to find and pump
enough water to the north sector so that they can complete the search, while
the ventilation sector makes the nasty heat and smoke go away.

The IC should assign the initial officer sent to these different geographical
locations, sector responsibilities. If Engine 1 is the first unit sent to the south,
the company officer should be assigned as the south sector. This places both
the tactical and the task responsibilities on the person who has the best shot at
capturing early control of those levels, and who is in the best position for
starting a management plan for that area, in this case, the captain on Engine 1.
This early sectorization is the basis of establishing off-site (from the IC) com­
mand helpers all over the incident, and facilitates keeping the IC operating on
the strategic level.

Sector officers should avoid getting so involved in task-level activities that

they can't manage their sector duties. It doesn't make much sense for a sector

Organization

1­ - - - - -­ - - ­
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

officer to be pulling hose lines, especially if there are several companies

assigned to his/her sector. The sector officer is put in place to manage the dif­
ferent activities going on in the sector, not to actually do them. Sector officers
must be in a position where they can always talk to the Ie. If the sector offi­
cer doesn't have the equipment (a working radio) or the ability (pulling line
instead of listening to the working radio) to stay in contact with the IC, then
he/she really isn't the sector officer. In fact (and in effect), there isn't any sec­
tor officer at all. No sector officer equals no sector. So what you end up with
is a group of companies assigned to that tactical area with no one in overall
charge of that area. This is bad. Now instead of managing the incident, the
IC gets to spend the next precious five minutes sending in RIC teams to see if
everyone is still alive in what he/she has deluded him/herself into thinking
was the north sector. These "glitches" almost always end up being a product
of the sector officer becoming distracted from the radio duties with some type
of task-related function. Sector officers must be married to the radio.
Company officers have a normal inclination to be task oriented. Upgrading
the sector officer position to a chief officer as quickly as possible will free the
company officer to join his/her crew and should provide a more management­
oliented, tactical focus in the sector (chiefs are in a better position to maintain
such a tactical focus and manage communications with the IC).
i -

Being able to assign command officers to sectors started by company officers

is a big-deal way the IC increases and strengthens our decentralized command
capability. Company officers serving as the sector managers (officers) are real
IMS heroes because they are in the tough spot of having to do double duty in
the typically exciting and potentially dangerous beginning stages of the event.
Everyone must understand they are doing two jobs (sector/company officer)
and support that position, until a command person (and aide) can come in and
take over the sector.

When the sector officer arrives to the assigned sector, he/she should do a size
up and quickly develop some type of a plan. The IC will often times make
sector assignments (location/objective/resources), and give orders based on
having very little detailed information about the conditions in that local sector
area. This is particularly normal in the front end of the incident. Once the
sector officer gets into place, he/she should report back to the IC with:

• Position ("we're on the south side").

• Conditions ("we've got lots of fire").

• Actions ("we're attacking with a 2-inch hand line").

• Any needed resources ("we need another engine company").

Note
The sector officer should be futuristic in his/her request for resources.
Early in the operation, the first arriving sector officer should advise the
IC, "I need one immediate engine and will need a total of three engines
and one ladder." The progress reports must then describe the adjust-
Organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

ments in the plan and request for additional units. This approach gives
the Ie the capability to begin to deploy to the level that will eventually
be needed.

Effective sector control revolves around the sector officer's ability to manage the
position and function of all the resources assigned to them. Effective operations
also include coordinating their activities with those of other sectors. South sec­
tor coordinates with roof sector on where (and when) to cut a hole, keeps north
sector from blasting them with powerful hose stream and vice versa.

Sector officers need to keep a running inventory of

who is assigned to their sector. The best way to
do this is to always operate within their e:'fec­
tive span of control and maintain
ongoing, face-to-face communica­
tions with the officers of their
assigned companies and periodic
radio transmissions with the Ie.
At certain standard-time frames,
when tactical objectives are met,
and when special events occur,
the Ie will ask sector officers for
PARs. This helps keep track of where all the players are, and is an absolutely
critical benchmark for firefighter safety. If the sector officer can't keep track
of all of his/her assigned units, something needs to be done to remedy the sit­
uation. Split the sector, assign a safety/accountability officer to help keep
track of assigned resources, slow operations down in the sector, decommit
some of the units assigned to the sector, or some other action to bring the sec­
tor under control. The Ie has got to keep the organization at least even (and
preferably, a little bigger) with the size/pace of the deployment of resources
around the incident scene. If the Ie thinks that assigning eight engine compa­
nies to a single sector officer, in the interior of a burning structure that is
charged with smoke, is going to work, then the support officer needs to send
the Ie to the mental health unit for a basic review of span-of-control therapy.

ROOF SECTOR
The Ie begins incident operations with a certain amount of information.
Some of this information is provided by Mabel, when she dispatches the call.
Stuff like the address where the incident was taking place, what the reported
problem was, and who else was responding. Other pieces of information the
Ie has to figure out for him/herself. These information nuggets come to the
Ie initially in mostly a visual form. Things the Ie sees-what the building
looks like, obvious fire conditions, access to the structure, and what type of
occupancy is involved . All these separate pieces of information get smushed
together and serve as the foundation of the Ie's incident action plan. In the
magical world of quick-paced, fast-attacking, offensive fire fights, the Ie will
always start off with a certain number of knowns, but on the other side of the

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

situation-evaluation coin, there are just as many unknowns that must be found
out. One of the biggest and baddest unknowns is what's go ing on in the over­
head-concealed space (the attic). The importance of thi s unknown is relative
to the size and type of the attic/roof/truss area that the IC's troops are operat­
ing under and around (along with any customers who may be waiting for us to
rescue them, which is the main reason we are facing these dangerous dilem­
mas in the first place). Successful incident operations require the IC to
eliminate these clitical information unknowns as quickly as possible. The
quickest way to do this is by assigning someone (usually a company) to "find
out" these unknowns . This is best done by starting with the most critical
unknown and working your way to the least critical. Speaking in the general
terms of fire behavior (heat rises), the first (most critical) unknown to check is
the attic in fire areas that directly expose the attic, i.e., single-story buildings
or top floors. There is no other critical, factor-management function a ladder
company does that has a greater impact on performing the tactical priorities
and firefighter safety than topside recon, information management and tactical
operations. Oftentimes (especially in large structures), this is done by cutting
a hole in the roof. The IC should assign the first company (usually a ladder)
which is sent to the roof (roof sector). In most systems, this will be the first
ladder company to the scene. It is imperative that the officer of this first com­
pany to the roof (roof sector) gives the IC a report that includes:

• Roof type (peaked, flat, lightweight, bowstring, etc.).

• Condition of the roof (stable or unstable).

• Fire conditions (smoke from vents, any venting fire, etc.).

• Construction features (parapet walls, sky lights, fire walls, truss design ,
etc.).

• A description from the roof of the basic "footprint" of the building

based on the location and arrangement of walls and building divisions.

• Visual observation from roof on all sides of building. Report conditions

on sides/shafts of building not seen by the IC from the command post.

• Heavy roof loads (tile, water tanks, hvac equipment, etc .).

• Conditions of the attic (clear, smoke, heat, fire).

• Action taken (vent holes cut, where, and effect) .

I
I If it is not clear whether to cut or where to cut, the roof sector should coordi­
I· nate ventilating (opening the roof) with the IC and sectors operating on the
I
inside of the structure.

Ultimately, we do vertical ventilation to make the structure safer for firefight­

ers to operate in (so they can rescue the customers, put the fire out, and save
their stuff). The condition of the roof/attic (especially in larger structures) is a
critical information factor that must be a standard piece of tactical recon used

Organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

to develop the attack plan. If the roof sector reports that the roof is unsafe to
be on, it is a clear indication to the IC, that it probably isn't a safe place to be
under. This is a good time to reevaluate the attack plan, begin to move the
troops, and make a switch from an offensive strategy to a defensive one (at
least in that fire area).

SAFETY SECTOR
A safety sector should be a regular pari of ongoing incident scene operations. The
safety sector is established to advise the IC of existing or potentially unsafe concli­
tions. There must be a high level of trust between the IC and the safety officer.
They should be closely connected in order to manage the overall strategy, the lAP
and the specific hazards that exist. By natu~e (and assignment), the safety sector
is very mobile and highly dynamic, moving ar·ound all places and parts of the inci­
dent scene. The safety sector officer should be dressed in the appropriate
protective gear, and if he/she is going to be located in the hazard zone, he/she
needs to have a partner (remember no singles where the use of an SCBA is
required) and the safety sector's location noted on the accountability chart.

Safety must constantly evaluate:

• Structural conditions.

• The tenability of the positions personnel are operating in.

• Personnel wearing the proper safety gear.

• Personnel operating in a safe manner.

• Personnel effectively inside the accountability system.

Since the safety sector is highly mobile and orbits the incident scene, he/she
can provide (in addition to safety support) valuable recon information to the
IC This information should be based on both safety conditions and, some­
times, tactical needs in uncovered areas, " Safety to Command-be advised
you have fire working to the rear of the structure; you'll need an engine com­
pany back here;" or critical safety information, "Safety to Command-be
advised you've got heavy smoke pushing out of a fifteen-foot crack in the wall
on the east side of the structure." Information that is going to affect the strate­
gy (a change from offensive to defensive) should be transmitted immediately to
Command, or directly through the communications center as emergency traffic.

The safety sector should communicate critical, safety information over the
assigned tactical channel, so all the incident players can monitor safety-related
transmissions.

When operations within a particular sector are especially hazardous or com­

plex, a safety officer should be assigned to that sector. The safety sector
officer should have whatever technical expertise is required to monitor the

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

operation's safety needs (i.e., it's a high-angle rescue, the safety sector should
have a comprehensive understanding of knots, ropes, and mechanical sys­
tems). Often in such a situation, it makes sense to assign a member of the
technical team as the sector safety officer (e.g., hazmat, confined space).

Larger, more hazardous and complex operations may require multiple safety
sector officers. These safety sector officers need to coordinate sector activities
with the sector officers assigned to those tactical assignments (i.e., north,
south, hazmat, etc.). Both sector officers are now running different pieces of
the operation. The tactical sector officer is attempting to achieve whatever the
assignment is for the sector (search and rescue, fire control, stop the hazmat
leak, keep the world from blowing up, etc.). The safety sector is managing
the safety for the sector. They are tracking the location of the resources
assigned to the sector, evaluating conditions, and maintaining an awareness of
hazards in that sector area.

The safety sector and the IC must operate with a high degree of coordination
and interaction. The safety sector must be empowered to operate with the full
authority to halt/colTect unsafe acts without delay or permission of the IC In
these cases, the safety sector must immediately advise the IC of such action
because it may change the lAP. The safety sector also causes routine COlTec­
tions that involve the use of safety equipment, position of resources, and other
incremental changes that don't change the lAP. The IC must use these ongo­
ing adjustments to keep the lAP cU1Tent, based on the safety of the troops.

STAGING SECTOR
The staging sector is in charge of level II staging. When calling for more
resources beyond the initial assignment, it is many times desirable to have
them all respond to a specific location, adjacent to the incident scene. Ideally,
the IC should select the level II staging location, but if the IC doesn't specify
a location for level II staging, the first unit to arrive should select the most
suitable place to set up a staging area, and announce it to responding units and
the IC Staging areas should be close enough to provide the best access to the
scene, but located far enough back to be out of the way. Staging should also
be set up in a safe location (out of collapse zones, possible explosion areas,
out of the line of fire for armed insurrections). After level II staging is in
place, all requested resources (including specialized equipment) should
respond to the staging area unless instructed to do otherwise.

When companies arrive in staging, they report to the staging officer and stand
by close to their apparatus with crew intact: The staging officer logs each
company in and keeps an inventory of all resources and equipment assigned to
staging. Some sort of system needs to be in place, ahead of time, that details
what happens when staging starts running low on companies. Either staging
lets command know when resources get low, and Command orders more
through dispatch, or Command has staging automatically call for more
resources when they get down to a certain level.

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Chapter 6 Functions of Command

Level 2 staging is a very simple concept and procedure, but it produces a big
payoff in reducing incident comrnunicaticns, and maintaining control of
resources during the active part of incider:.t operations. Being able to call for,
and place, additional resources in a standard place (close to the scene/easy in,
easy out), managed by a command helper (staging sector officer) creates a
huge operational advantage to everyone at the incident. For the IC, it's easy
to call for help, have it located in a standard place and way (SOP), close to the
scene, and being able to bring it in when it's needed, and assign it where it's
needed. For responders, the staging concept eliminates any confusion because
they have a standard place to go and a standard way to be assigned.

Level 2 staging locations can be set up anywhere that makes sense. Some
incidents may require multiple staging areas (wildland fires, high-rise fires, or
any other incident spread over a large area, or remote areas, that take a while
to get into).

VENTILATION SECTOR
Some structural fire-fighting incidents will require the use of a ventilation sec­
tor. This will usually be assigned initially to the officer of a ladder company.
This sector is typically established in, mu] ti-story buildings, highrise, or large
structures with lots of smoke in them. The ventilation sector will need to
develop a plan that includes:

• Where is the smoke now, and where is it going.

• What is creating all the smoke?

• Where are built-in building/construction features (reversible HVAC sys­

tems, pressurized stairwells, doors, windows, etc.)?

• How to get rid of the smoke (horizontal, vertical, or mechanical ventila­

tion or a combination of the two)?

• What responders will be needed?

• What tools and equipment will be needed?

• What is the time frame for putting all the pieces together and removing
the smoke?

• Where will the smoke be vented (outside vs. other parts of the structure
or other structures)?

The ventilation sector should coordinate their activities with the other affected
sectors. The ventilation sector will often work with building engineers, espe­
cially in large, complex, or highrise buildings. It is advantageous for the
ventilation sector officer to physically handcuff him/herself to the building
engineer. This reduces the possibility of the engineer "wandering" off.

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

Just by its nature, the activities of the ventilation sector can encompass the
entire structure. Companies assigned to the ventilation sector may find them­
selves moving from floor to floor, from one side of the structure to the next,
and back again. Accountability and safety becomes more important for them
because the players in this sector, many times, will be moving from one haz­
ardous area to the next. All the folks operating in this sector should have a
portable radio, and the companies should stay together, and check in with the
sector officer periodically, to inform him/her of their progress and location.
Often times, these personnel will be operating directly above the fire. When
they are positioned in places where they may encounter the fire, they should
be protected by charged hose lines for their own safety.

WATER SUPPLY SECTOR

The water supply sector represents a concentrated effort directed toward pro-
1- viding a continuous, sufficient water supply. The water supply details of a
local area should be included as a standard part of prefire plans . The water
supply sector officer should use water supply and area maps to first survey
the regular hydraulic profile of the immediate fire area, and then to scout for
any alternate supply sources. Creativity is often the order of the day for water
supply. The use of portable pumps, large-diameter hose, tanker shuttles (not
water-canying aircraft), portable tanks, and relay-pumping operations require
reconnaissance to collect all the necessary elements, coordination to set up,
and support to operate. Water supply problems are potentially devastating to
the IC-it is important that the IC plan early (critical part of a pre-incident
plan) for effective management by quickly establishing a water supply sector
officer in places that require lots of hydraulic management and coordination.

In incident operations that require big-time water supply efforts, the water sup­
ply sector may have as many resources under his/her command, as the
operations paI1 of the event. Lots of ground tankers, hauling and dumping
water into portable tanks, create the need for command integration and control,
particularly for extended operations. The IC must provide sufficient resources
to the water supply sector in these cases-it's tough to win, if the IC can't hold
the red monkey 's head under water.

RESOURCE SECTOR
The function of the resource sector is to provide a supply pool for operating
sectors, and serve as a "jumping-off" (or "on-deck") point for equipment and
personnel, close to the action . Once the IC has determined the need for a
resource sector, the IC should designate a location safely outside the hazard
zone, yet close and convenient enough for support of the recipient sectors.
(DUling a highrise fire, the resource sector is generally two floors below the
fire.) It is the job of the IC to set up a resource sector and then for the resource
sector officer to anticipate the specific equipment and personnel needs, request
them through the command system, and keep them ready for action.

Organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

This sector may also be used as a "forward" personnel-staging area close to

the operational area. In these cases, apparatus will be left in the staging area
while the companies repOli to the resource sector intact, with full protective
clothing and any needed tools and equipment. These crews are available for
assignment to an operating sector and may be returned (i.e., rotated back) to
the resource sector after the completion of their task and after being rehabbed.

The use of resource sectors is a real quick, simple, understandable way to

locate workers and work stuff closer to w~ere the work is actually occurring.
In cases where hard-working crews must De rotated and rehabbed, it's highly
effective to locate those ready/rehabbed crews in a resource sector, where they
are ready to go back to work. The use of both staging and resource sectors is
a major way we manage local events so that resources are in the standard sta­
tus of "close and ready to go to work"-but not overcrowding the work area.
It is almost as bad to have too much resot:rce than not enough, and these
pieces of the organizational approach are a major way we get "just enough"
(at the right time, in the right place).

The longer the system manages the regular-work cycle by using standard
organizational elements (like staging, resource and rehab), the more skillful
they become in effectively using local resources to get the right number of
workers and bosses in the right place at the right time.

SALVAGE SECTOR
The IC should assign a salvage sector when it is going to take several compa­
nies to address the salvage needs at the incident because there is a lot of stuff
to save. Most salvage operations are directed toward not only reducing/elimi­
nating the fire damage, but the secondary fire-fighting damage (the damage
we do in order to put the fire out). Salvage activities historically come toward
the end of the fire event. It doesn't make much sense to start salvage opera­
tions, if the IC is using all the incident resources to somehow complete the
primary search and get an "all clear" in the fire occupancy. Starting salvage
prior to knocking the fire down is probably also premature unless there are
resources available to do both simultaneOl.:sly. On the other hand, it is point­
less to send crews in to salvage someone's possessions that have a foot and a
half of soaking wet insulation lying on top of them. This is even more frus­
trating when none of the insulation is the slightest bit charred. Good salvage
work is a product of the IC, sector officers, and companies recognizing when
the fire is under control (under control doesn't mean the fire is completely
extinguished, it just isn't going to get any bigger, and it can be controlled with
the fire attack units that are already in place) and slowing the operation down.
Completing a primary search and getting 2n all clear in the involved and
exposed areas is by far the number one tactical priority. If smashing every
last content in the structure helps to get an all clear any quicker, then damn
the torpedoes and smash away (it doesn't, so don't). Fire control is a distant
second to the safety of lives in the tactical priority food chain, with property
conservation (salvage activities) coming in third. This is the way we have

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

done business since Ben Franklin was a hoseman. If we ask Mrs. Smith when
should fire control take a back seat to salvage, she would say when you start
needlessly damaging the personal possessions (that could be saved) that define
her life. Mrs. Smith feels a lot more strongly about her antique china hutch,
wedding album, and the ashtray her grandson made her 15 years ago for
Christmas, than she does about her ceiling, roof, and plaster board walls. If
we have knocked the fire down and are now simply checking for extension,
we must salvage first. The reason we put out Mrs. Smith's fire is to save her
stuff. Mrs. Smith is right; it isn't the other way around.

The salvage sector is responsible for protecting the customer's stuff.

Obviously the first order is to remove the fire . After the fire is stopped, it is
very important to evict the remaining products of combustion from the atmos­
phere. Many times when the fire is held to a certain portion of the structure,
and it hasn ' t extended into the concealed spaces, simply removing the smoke
from the remainder of the structure is all that is needed to stop the loss. If
ceilings and walls don't need to be opened up in these unaffected areas and no
water is going to be introduced in or around them, it makes more sense to
close these areas off and leave them alone. The next property damage culprit
is the water. During the firefight, water is good. After the fire is out, water is
bad. If the area to be salvaged is inundated with water, sometimes it is easier
to remove the contents than it is to remove the water. In places that actually
have winter (not Phoenix), water turns solid ... even more problems.

Most structure fires don't require the use of a salvage sector. Each geographic
sector (north, side A, etc.) will automatically handle the salvage needs in their
sector. If they need more resources to complete salvage activities, they simply
call command and request them. When it is determined that the salvage needs
at an incident will require a full-blown salvage sector, the IC should assign
them specific areas to salvage (i.e., the floor below the fire, the occupancy to
the west, etc.). The salvage sector will need loss-control tools to function
properly. Things like salvage covers, plastic sheeting, hall runners, water
vacs, scoop shovels, squeegees, salvage boxes, plastic bags, etc. Most of
these romantic tools are carried on ladder companies and ladder officers will
usually become the salvage sector officer, but any company can be assigned to
assist with salvage efforts.

Coming up with a salvage plan isn't rocket science. Start with the stuff that is
in harm's way, and work your way out. If someone needs to open up a ceiling
to check for extension, take the 30 seconds required to move things out of the
way, or cover it up. If something is getting wet, move it. The way we salvage
our customer's homes and businesses is the last impression they have of us.

Smart salvage operations require smart rekindle awareness. In the old days, a
rekindle was a hanging offense, so we (literally) wrecked structures by tearing
down most of the interior finish. We didn 't cover much up , so the ceiling and
wall covering generally landed on top of lots of the personal stuff that was on
top of flat spots, tables, etc. We then shoveled it all outside the fire area and

Organization
Chapter 6 Functions of Command

soaked it down and bingo! No rekindle, no paperwork, and no spiritual coun­

seling session with your 87-year old battalion chief who was really grumpy
because he had to fill out 37 different forms and send them all off to the rekin­
dle God/Godess. Now we are a lot more delicate-we pause when we achieve
fire control, cover up, and continue to verify the fire is out. Given the change
from our old scorched-earth approach, we need to still be concerned about
rekindles. The IC must use thermal imaging, compressed air foam (if avail­
able), and hold companies after fire control long enough to be certain the fire is
completely out. Saving Mrs. Smith 's stuff is good customer service, but mak­
ing sure that the first event, is the last event, is really good customer service.

The need for early and aggressive salvage is a legitimate and important reason
to call for additional resources . Wherever the IC can do salvage, along with
rescue and fire control, loss will necessarily be reduced-this is a function of
having adequate resources that arrive and go to work while loss can be effec­
tively reduced/eliminated. If we are applying water on the third floor, and the
art gallery is on the ground floor, we had better get ahead of gravity and get
the pretty pictures covered up before the "landscapes" get watered.

REHABILITATION (REHAB) SECTOR

Fire fighting is the smartest form of manual labor and the most physically
demanding work on the planet. Crawling into to a burning structure encapsu­
lated in 60 to 70 pounds of protective gear is difficult all by itself. Couple this
with dragging pressurized hose lines, swinging primitive tools, and all the
other task-associated things we do at the incident scene, it is not hard to imag­
ine why our feet hurt at the end of the day. The IC must make provisions to
rehab crews periodically at the incident scene. If the incident is extended over
a longer time frame, the IC needs to assign a rehab sector. Tired workers are
accidents waiting to happen. Rehab becomes a key component in the fire­
fighter safety equation. Modern SCBAs come much closer than their earlier
counterparts in delivering the rated time capacity of their cylinders. If crews
are engaged in active fire fighting (as opposed to inactive), it is a good rule of
thumb to rehab them after each cylinder. This is preferred to over working
your troops until they drop and calling for two more alarms, one to treat the
wounded, and the other to take their place. You only hurt the ones you love
(but shouldn't). We should send the companies that get there first, home first,
as opposed to the old time "first-in, last-out" prehistoric approach.

Rehab should be located close enough to the incident scene to provide easy
access, but far enough away to be out of hann's way (smoke, falling bricks,
getting run over, etc.) . You ought to be able to take your turnouts off, yet not
need a mule train to get there. During periods of extreme weather, rehab
should provide protection from the elements (hot, cold, rain , snow, dark, mete­
or showers, etc.). Sometimes this requires having some type of vehicle,
portable shade, fans , or misting devices. For cold weather, heaters, portable
protection from the elements, blankets, hot cocoa, and a travel agent (come to
Phoenix) are appropriate.

Organization
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

For full-scale rehab operations-rehab sector (village*) should contain a utility

truck (lights and air), a paramedic unit (evaluation/treatment) an ambulance
(transportation), and some type of canteen service (food and fluids).
Companies who have been working should be cycled through rehab for
any needed medical evaluation, rest, hydration, and food. Crews should
stay intact while in rehab. When crews are sufficiently rehabbed, they
should be moved to a resource sector. A standard term to describe 9­
place where workers are located, who are ready (rested, fully equipped,
intact, supervised, etc.) to go to work, is "on deck." Rehab should be
staffed with enough support folks to track companies (accountability)
assigned to rehab and provide all the needed rehab functions.

ACCOUNTABILITY SECTOR
The IC and command team is responsible for personnel accountability on
the strategic level. The IC tracks incident scene resources by filling out, and
keeping the tactical work sheet current. The IC expands his/her capability to
manage and track incident scene resources by assigning staging and rehab
sector officers.

Sector officers are responsible for incident scene accountability on the tactical
level. As sector officers request and are assigned resources by the IC, it
becomes the sectors officer's responsibility to keep track of what resources
they have, along with the general location of where they are.

Company officers are responsible for keeping their crews intact and operating
within the system (assignment by the IC, properly equipped, portable radio,
etc.).

For most of our local events, this is enough accountability to safely and effec­
tively manage incident operations. Occasionally, the IC will be faced with an
incident, or tactical situation, that requires more organizational support to con­
trol and manage where the troops are. When (actually, before) accountability
becomes a challenge at the incident site, because of the larger number of
resources to keep track of, or because of the greater hazard crews are exposed
to, the IC should assign an accountability sector.

The accountability sector officer (ASO) should be physically located in the

command post, if at all possible. The ASO manages personnel accountability
r
for all the crews that are operating in the hazard zone. The ASO is going to
require a staff of accountability officers (AOs). The AOs are assigned to each
sector (north, interior, etc.) that have units that are operating in the hazard
zone. After receiving their assignment, the AOs report to their sector, and col­
lect the passports for all the crews that are assigned to their sector, and

* "Villages" simply involve assembling multiple units in one place and using
them together-like the rehab example here-assembling command vehicles
from different agencies together could be another "village" example.

Organization
 Chapter 6 Functions of Command

assemble them on the status board (see the well-explained accountability sys­
tem overview in Chapter 4-Deployment). After verifying that the passports
match up with the assigned companies, the AO reports back to the ASO that
their "inventory" of crews matches up. As companies enter and exit the sector,
the AO verifies that the crew is intact. This accountability "net" can be expand­
ed by assigning an AO to rehab sector (everyone eventually ends up in rehab).
Once AOs are assigned around the incident site, they can notify one another,
along with the ASO, about the movement of the troops. As an example, when
Engine 1 leaves north sector to go to rehab, the north sector AO verifies that the
crew is il~tact (by referring to the passport and talking to E-l), and then radios
the rehab AO to let them know to expect Engine 1, which has a PAR.

This accountability organization (the ASO and the AOs) can be filled by staff
responders, a company out of staging, or anyone else who is familiar with the
system. The accountability sector should operate on it's own radio channel, if
at all possible.

On the strategic level, having an accountability sector builds a layer of redun­

dancy for tracking assigned resources. It also tightens up accountability
around the incident site and within the hazard zone sectors-where it is need­
ed the most. As crews enter the hot zone, the AO notes the time they went in
and monitors that the crews exit (or are okay) at a predetermined time limit
(fIve or ten minutes). Teaming up an AO with a sector officer provides anoth­
er set of eyes that is only focused on the conditions in the sector, along with
making sure that crews that go into the hazard zone, leave the hazard zone­
intact and together.

PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTOR

The media routinely shows up at many of the exciting events we respond
to ... something to do with the first and fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. The IC must establish an effective link with the media through a
public information sector. This sector provides a regular place for the media
to assemble -away from the command post-and a single person (or staff in
really big deals) to provide the information required for complete and accurate
reporting. When the public information sector is regularly used, it builds con­
fidence in both the media and fire department personnel and causes both
groups to play nicely.

The news business places a major emphasis on television "on-the-spot" report­

ing, as seen on televised news broadcasts. If the event is big and spectacular
enough, it doesn't matter what time it is, or what else is on, the media will go
with it live. TV is more interested in the wow! than the where, or the what (if
it bleeds, it leads). This production invol ves videographers and reporters who
continuously listen to radio scanners and respond to quickly capture all the
action. Typically, these men and women are agile and athletic, and their work
places a premium on showing the excitement, the closer the better. This built­
in aggressive motivation dictates that we develop and manage a strong system

Organization

1­
 Functions of Command Chapter 6

to provide all incoming reporters with safe access to visual shooting spots and
reporting positions.

The best approach is to educate the media about fire department operations
and how they can best fit in.* It is important to establish strong relationships
and a standard game plan with the media prior to meeting up with them, out at
the OK Corral in the middle of a gunfight. This relationship is usually cen­
tered around the fire department's public information officer (PIO). When the
media shows up they want to get the best video/pictures they can, along with
the details of the story. What happened, was anyone hurt, what are you doing
to fix it, do you think I'm pretty, are primarily the standard questions news
reporters will ask. A PIO who works with the media, on a day-to-day, inci­
dent-to-incident basis, naturally gets to know them both professionally, and
personally, and will soon figure out what is important to them, what needs
they have (and how we can help meet those needs), along with letting them
know how we operate, and why we do what we do. Within a short period of
time, the media will come to the scene and seek out the PIO. This process
becomes a huge help to the Ie. When the IC doesn't have to deal with
reporters and videographers, he/she can concentrate on managing the incident.
The last thing a busy IC needs, when struggling to get the fire area searched
and the fire attacked, is a high-tech reporter (in high heels) shoving a Sony
with an aircraft landing light on top of it in his/her face and asking how the IC
feels about making two thirds of a zip code a gigantic parking lot.

During large-scale incidents that involve a lot of agencies, the PIOs from the
respective groups should develop and operate a Joint Information Center
(JIC). This streamlines the release of standard information and provides the
media with a central contact point.

We need to keep in mind that whatever information or access we provide the

media will go out over the airwaves, for the entire world to see. We must
operate with the reality of their right to report about what is happening in the
community, with the rights to our customer's privacy. This process must be
done in good taste and with compassion toward the customers and their fami­
lies (and injured firefighters and their families).

!.- OCCUPANT SUPPORT SECTOR

Our organizations are set up to deliver service in the short term. When Mrs.
Smith calls us on kitchen-fire day, we show up quickly, make sure the Smith
family is out of harm's way, put the fire out, and take care of her stuff during
the event (people/pets/pictures/pills). We solve Mrs. Smith's immediate prob­
lem (her burning kitchen). After we stabilize Mrs. Smith's emergency, the

* In Phoenix, our PIOs have conducted one-week Media Academies where

media folks come and learn What/how/why we do what we do. This has pro­
duced a gigantic improvement in media relations, and in the accuracy of
reporting about our operations.

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Chapter 6 Functions oj Command

operation is pretty much over for us. We roll up our hose, load our tools back
onto the apparatus, tell Mabel in dispatch we are going back into service, and
we head off into the wild-blue yonder. We are not in a position to provide the
long-term support Mrs. Smith is going to require to get her life back in order.
The thing we want to avoid is the gap that exists from the time we are finished
with our task at the Smith home, to the time the other support systems come
in to play on Mrs. Smith's behalf. We go: Mrs. Smith through the most dan­
gerous part of her emergency, the fire itself. The hardest (and longest) part of
the event is yet to. come, rebuilding her home, and putting her life back into
order. . .in addition to the very short-term challenge of where she and Fluffy
(toy poodle) are going to sleep tonight.

The IC should assign someone as quickly as possible to become the occupant

support sector (OSS). This person is responsible for joining Mrs. Smith and
becoming her personal advocate. The first thing the OSS should do is explain
to Mrs. Smith exactly what we are doing ~o her home, in order to put the tire
out. A phone should be provided for Mrs . Smith to contact any family mem­
bers she needs to talk to, along with phoning her insurance agent. If Mrs.
Smith doesn't have any family or friends she can stay with, some type of
relief agency, like the Red Cross, should be contacted. These organizations
can make arrangements with area hotels to provide, in many cases, several
days' lodging for our fire customers at no charge to them. Many of these
agencies can be at the scene within an hour of receiving the call for help.
This is very good for both the customer and us. We put our response unit
back into service, thereby putting protection back into place in our response
area, more quickly, and we don ' t drive off and abandon Mrs. Smith. She is
left with somebody who cares about her, and her problem, and is going to
extend services to her (in some cases) over the next several days.

Mrs. Smith's insurance agent will in most cases send out a claim's adjuster
immediately. Most insurance companies try to get someone to the scene with­
in an hour of being called . The insurance agent will work to get Mrs. Smith
alternative living quarters, if they are required, and will take care of securing
her premises. If Mrs. Smith doesn't have insurance, we need to do whatever
we can to be certain that her home is secured before we leave.

If Mrs. Smith isn't able to return to her home, she will need some of her stuff.
Things like clothes, purse, money, medici nes, and toiletries. If the fire didn't
destroy these things, we should help her round them up. We should tour the
inside of her home to show her what was done by the fire, and what we did to
put it out. Most after-the-fire letters we get from our customers have high
praise for the salvage work we did. When Mrs. Smith sees that we took great
care in protecting the things that mean so much to her, it will lessen the
impact of such a catastrophic thing (a fire) that has just happened to her.

The IC should also utilize an OSS at fires in business occupancies. If the

owner of the business is not on the scene, he/she should be contacted and
advised about what is happening. Most b-Jsinesses need several things to con-

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 Functions of Command Chapter 6

tinue operations. They are:

• To put the fire out.

• To retrieve and protect business records.

• To provide power/phones.

• To have computers up and running.

• To have office space (hotel rooms can be converted quickly).

The OSS serves in the same role to the business owner, as he/she did for Mrs.
Smith. First they explain what we are doing to put the fire out, and control
damage. The OSS should act as a liaison between the business owner and
insurance company, power company, and phone service provider. Many
times, a business can quickly rent space somewhere else, and continue to con­
duct business, if their phones are operational.

In the old days, we would literally leave Mrs. Smith, in her pajamas, sitting on
the curb across the street from her burned out home. We'd hop on big red, tap
the air hom, wave at her, and head "back to the bam." We weren ' t being
mean or indifferent-it's just the way we did business. Now we do OSS .
Now is better.

INVESTIGATIONS SECTOR
The investigation sector is responsible for managing the investigation of how
the fire occurred. While most fire departments do some type of
investigation about cause and origin, most fires only require a
single investigator to determine fire cause. Many times, one
of the on-scene company officers is able to determine what
happened in simple, routine situations. The IC will usually
establish an investigation sector when the fire is over a
certain dollar amount, when someone was injured or
killed due to the fire, or when suspicious circumstances
exist, which may indicate the fire was intentionally set.

Investigation sectors can have personnel from several dif­

ferent agencies working in them. Depending on the
circumstances surrounding the fire, members of the ATF, FBI,
along with representatives from state and local law enforcement, may show up
to the scene. All of these agencies' efforts and activities should be coordinat­
ed through the investigation sector, as long as the local fire department
controls the incident scene where there is still any hazard present. When the
local police are in charge of criminal investigations, the IC must support and
fit into their organizations, based on interagency planning that ideally took
place well ahead of the event.

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Chapter 6 Functions of Command

MEDICAL SECTORS
Frequently, the incident management system will be used to manage medical
and mass casualty incidents. Today in the American fire service, EMS has
become our most frequent emergency service delivery activity. IMS is a full
service management and command system, and while it was originally devel­
oped for fire control , it is now most frequently used in most departments to
manage multiple patient/multiple unit EMS situations. The organizational
beauty(!) of the system is that the Ie uses the standard sector management
approach and assigns the sectors that are required to manage each particular
situation, and can create special sectors to meet special needs. Extrication,
treatment, and transportation are the most frequently used sectors at these
types of incidents.

EXTRICATION SECTOR
Many of the medical incidents we respond to require us to extricate our cus­
tomers from their vehicles, and the other places they are "stuck." Accident
sites with trapped patients can be quite chaotic, so it is very important to have
some type of extrication plan . These efforts should start with a survey of the
scene for obvious safety concerns. The scene should be made as safe as pos­
sible by directing traffic around the accident, or closing the roadway down, if
necessary. This should be coordinated with local law enforcement. Leaking
fuel and other associated hazardous materials should be covered with a
staffed, charged hose line. This becomes critical if treatment is going to take
place (putting EMS providers in the vehicle with the patients) while extrica­
tion is going on. The Ie must assign a quick initial triage of the entire
accident scene, especially if there are several vehicles that will have to be
opened lip. After getting a patient count, the Ie should be notified on the total
number of patients, their triage priority, the location, and how many require
extrication. The next thing that needs to be decided is if you're going to treat
in place, or take the patients to a treatment area. If there are only a few
patients, and it is safe to treat in place, this is a viable option. If there are
numerous patients or the area isn't safe er:ough, a treatment area should be
established and utilized. Extrication needs to coordinate their activities with
the treatment sector. The extrication sector is responsible for both extricating
and delivering patients to the treatment sector.

TREATMENT SECTOR
The treatment sector should coordinate evaluating and triaging the accident
site with the extrication sector. Mass casualty incidents are best served when
a treatment sector is set up. The treatment sector should be located in a place
that is safe, large enough (two to three treatment folks per patient), and is
readily accessible for ambulance loading. The treatment sector is responsible
for patient care until the patients can be evaluated, treated, and packaged for
transportation to the proper medical facili !y. Once the treatment sector gets
the triage information on patient count and severity, they need to make sure

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they have enough resources to treat all the injured. This should be coordinat­
ed through the Ie and passed on to the transportation sector so they will know
how many ambulances to order. The treatment sector officer should not be
treating patients. His/her focus must be on categorizing patients, calling for
and managing the resources required to treat the injured, and coordinating
with other sectors and the Ie.

TRANSPORTATION SECTOR
Transportation is the last stop in the patient-flow process. Transportation
should set up in a spot that is close to the treatment area with "in-and-out"
ambulance access. Old time Ies say pick a transportation sector location, then
place treatment in between transportation and the incident. The transportation
sector will need to get the patient totals, make sure the necessary number of
ambulances are called for, and coordinate with the communications center to
find the appropriate hospitals, that have the current capability to accept the
patient(s). Treatment should prioritize which patients are transported first,
based on patient information from the treatment sector. As ambulances come
into the scene, they should be assigned to specific patients. This eliminates
the ambulance attendants getting caught up in treatment efforts and disappear­
ing into treatment activities, while a patient is waiting in the back of their unit
to be taken to the hospital. Large numbers of patients produce large trans­
portation efforts. Management of this sector requires strong control and
adequate resources. The transportation sector officer must deal with com­
mand, the treatment sector officer, and dispatch for hospital availability. The
transportation sector may use a regular staging area/officer or may establish
ambo staging to coordinate the multiple ambulances coming into the trans­
portation area. This is, often times, the most hectic part of a medical incident.
The transportation sector should be assigned early, with enough staff to
accomplish its mission.

ENTRY CONTROL SECTOR

The Ie should establish an entry control sector (formerly lobby sector) when­
ever it becomes necessary to tightly control access in and out of a certain area
of the incident scene. The entry control sector serves as a standard organiza­
tional method to create a "gate" into these areas . Highrise and hazmat are
several incidents that routinely use entry control sectors.

Entry control sector personnel directly process authorized firefighters into and
out of the operational area, and maintain a roll call of individual entrance and
exit times. The entry control sector becomes an important part of the account­
ability system because it can maintain a tighter level of access control.

If an area has been declared unsafe, the Ie can assign an entry control sector
to its entrance, to deny access to everyone.

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 Chapter 6 Functions of Command

EVACUATION SECTOR
When an incident's evacuation needs escalate past the point of operational
crews getting "all clears" in their sectors, the IC should consider establishing
an evacuation sector. These situations usually involve some type of hazardous
materials, and their effect on the people in the surrounding structures and
neighborhoods. These incidents are generally long-term events. The decision
to evacuate will usually be based on what is burning, released, or spilled.
Technical specialists will probably make the decision on whether or not to
evacuate or protect in place, and the area :hat needs to be evacuated. The
evacuation itself must be managed through the command post.

After the decision to evacuate is made, the IC should assign specific bound­
aries where the evacuation is to occur. Ttese boundaries should be further
divided into manageable areas for crews to start evacuating. The use of maps
and assigning specific quadrants will help ensure that all areas are covered.
Before any evacuation activities take place, relocation centers need to be
established. Relocation centers should be chosen based on being out of the
hazard area (consider wind shifts), what facilities they have, and their proxim­
ity to the scene. Local information about relocation centers should be in the
geo-base data system of the dispatch/deployment system. This facilitates
quicker movement of customers to those centers.

Crews who are actually performing the evacuation need to be dressed in the
proper level of protection. If the evacuato::-s need to wear level A haz-mat suits
to do the evacuation, Command should consider leaving people in the area in
protected places (inside with windows and doors closed). The IC must create
the organizational SUppOlt (sectors with adequate resources) to continually
monitor the welfare of "protect-in-place" customers. The IC must provide
whatever services are required to be certain they are okay where they are.

Local law enforcement should be used as much as possible in the evacuation

effort. They will be needed to close streets, deny access, and keep the peace.

HAZARD SECTORS
Hazard sectors are most often used to manage incidents involving hazardous
materials. Members of a department's hazardous materials team generally
staff these sectors. These types of incidents can be very complex, involving
any number of chemicals with very scientific names. Hazardous materials
responders tend to be very technical, highly-trained individuals with a far off
look in their eyes. They routinely deal with substances with names like
tetraethyldeath, KFB, and OHSHIT. Many of the occupancies that use, manu­
facture, or process large amounts of hazardous materials will have their own
fire brigades and emergency response teams in place to deal with any emer­
gency that may occur. These highly trained, technically proficient folks
should be incorporated into any incident plan, and be used to their best ability.
In some communities, these on-site responders may be the only haz mat

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 Functions of Command Chapter 6

trained responders. If this is the case, we playa supporting role for them.
Hazardous materials incidents will generally be organized around several haz­
mat related sectors. Each of these sectors will deal with a different
component of the overall operation. Somebody who speaks and understands
the "hazmat language" should be located in the command post. This person
will serve as a liaison between the technical side of the hazmat operation and
the Ie. The hazmat sectors will often communicate on a different radio chan­
nel. The hazmat person (who is really serving as the hazmat branch) located
in the command post should monitor and communicate with the hazmat sec­
tors over this channel.

The following are commonly used sectors at hazmat related events:

• Entry control sector

• Entry team
• Back up team
• Research sector
• Safety sector
• Hazard sector
• Decontamination (decon.) sector
• Environmental sector

The hazard sector will establish the different operational or "hazard control­
zones" for the incident. The incident site can be broken into three different
zones. They are:

Hot Zone-This is where the problem is actually occurring. Personnel

who operate within the hot zone will require the proper protective
equipment, along with a certain level of expertise. Most of the folks
operating in the hot zone will be members of the haz mat team, and any
other support players they may need. The hot zone should be identified
with some type of entry control tape. Entry into and exit out of the hot
zone must be tightly controlled, and should be made through an entry
control sector. Once the hot zone is established by the hazard sector,
the only resources operating there, should be at the request of the haz­
ard sector.

Warm Zone-The warm zone is outside the immediate

area of risk. The warm zone establishes a perimeter

around the hazard zone. The warm zone should be locat­

ed outside of the potential blast/fire area. Standard,

structural fire fighting turnout gear should furnish

required protection. Entry control sector will be located

in the warm zone. While the entry team will be operating in the

hot zone, the backup team and any RIC teams should be located in the

warm zone. Personnel who are wearing the proper protective gear

should address evacuation needs in the warm zone.

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Chapter 6 Functions of Comnwnd

Cold Zone-The cold zone is a perimeter around the warm zone.

Local law enforcement should provide security around the cold zone.
Special protection should not be required for anyone in the cold zone.
Any evacuation needs outside of the cold zone should be done with the
local police department. Level II staging, the command post, and all
other uncommitted resources should be located in the cold zone.

The hazard sector is responsible for all activities within the hot zone. Efforts
are centered around controlling fires, spills, and vapor releases. By its very
nature, the hot zone is a pretty dangerous place (that's why it's called "hot").
Safety becomes a primary concern during hazardous materials incidents.
Backup teams of "2 out for every 2 in" should be in place, prior to effecting
any tactical operation within the hot zone.

DECON SECTOR
The decon sector is responsible for decontaminating people at the scene.
Simple decon operations are as easy as hosing firefighters off with a booster
or small hose line after a fire. Decon operations that entail large numbers of
people, biological agents, or a whole host of toxic chemicals will chal­
lenge the response of any organization, and may require
technical and operational help from outside the local area.
Decon should be located in an area that is easily accessible by
people requiring decon. This will generally be adjacent to the
entry control area of the hazard sector, since most of the time
when we set up decon, it is for our own personnel. It may be
necessary to corral and establish a safe refuge area until
decon is established. Decon should collect all decontaminat­
ed clothing and personal articles, bag them, then send
contaminated folks through the decon showers. Showers and
the rest of the decon process should be set up to guard people's
privacy. When deconning the public (our customers), separate
facilities for men, women, and families should be provided . It is
important that people have something to wear after they have gone
through the sector. Some type of disposable coverall works nicely.

If the people being deconned require medical treatment and transportation, the
receiving facility should be notified in advance. This should be done as
quickly as possible, as many people who self-rescue themselves will drive
directly to the hospital. One contaminated person, who lands unannounced
inside a hospital, can seriously disrupt that facility's operation.

Decon must address the run off from the showers. The decision about what
happens with the run-off water should be made prior to starting the decon
effort. Emergency decon run off should be addressed, as part of the waste
stream from the incident. This is generally done after the event. Where
exposed (and possibly contaminated) customers have immediate, life-safety
issues, decon must be done quickly, and will delay how run off is managed.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 6

ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR
Once the situation has been stabilized, it moves into the next phase, which is
to start turning the scene back over to the responsible party. The next hurdle
that needs to be dealt with is the clean up. The fire department is not respon­
sible for the clean up, and we need to be sure we keep it that way. Hazardous
materials clean ups can be both time consuming and expensive. Small-scale
clean ups can cost thousands of dollars and disrupt the property for weeks.
Many regulatory agencies show up at the scene of significant hazardous mate­
rials incidents to evaluate the risk to the community. The environmental
sector should work with these responders and the property owner to come up
with some type of plan that addresses the clean up. Hazardous-waste disposal
companies may be called to the scene to remove the contaminated material.
This must be coordinated among the fire department, regulatory agencies, and
the responsible party. Our job is to stabilize the immediate hazard. Once that
is done, we need to be able to transfer the scene to the responsible party(s).
The regulatory agencies that show up have the legal power to cause clean
up/recovery activities to take place. Our role in the incident, at this point, is
to provide/ensure that the necessary state and federal agencies are connected
to the clean up activity. Those agencies will insure scene support to the con­
tractor. Most fire departments do not want to get directly involved in clean-up
operations. The environmental sector should work in concert with the admin
and planning sections in complicated, widespread hazmat events.

RESCUE SECTOR
The IC assigns a rapid intervention team (RIC) at the scene of incidents that
are, or potentially can be, hazardous to his/her troops. Many departments
automatically dispatch an extra engine or truck company to reported working
fires, to serve as the RIC team. The IC should assign a company to become
the RIC team, when companies are operating in the following positions:

• Any working fire (IDLH atmosphere*).

• One way in-one way out.

• Marginal situations (completing the primary search in deteriorating con­

ditions).

• Positions where the fire can move above, below, or behind them.

The RIC team should be wearing the proper safety gear while they standby. If
they are needed to go in and get crews out of harm's way, they need to be
ready to go in immediately. The RIC team should be staged "on deck" in a
position where they would most likely be needed (just outside the sector) and
they should monitor the tactical channel. The RIC team must have the tools
and equipment they will need for any rescue effort at their immediate dispos­
al. The IC assigns a RIC team "on deck" to standby and to be quickly

* Immediately dangerous to life and health

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available to enter, locate, protect and remove his/her troops if necessary. The
RIC team needs to be dressed, equipped, intact, forward deployed and "on the
radio" so they can react quickly.

RIC teams serve as an in-place, ready-to-go tactical reserve that the IC puts in
place, prior to needing it. RIC teams become the centerpiece of
lost/trapped/missing firefighter procedures. While all incident management
activities are designed to keep these types of catastrophic events from happen­
ing, an effective incident management system must contain some type of
contingency plan for dealing with these types of situations. ICs who have had
to manage the rescue of lost/trapped troops talk about time slowing down,
space closing in, and everything getting darker. This is absolutely the worse
situation any IC can ever be faced with. There must be some regular organi­
zational plan and response when this difficult situation occurs. This plan may
be the only thing that keeps the "shades from coming down" for the IC (and
everyone else). This plan must be well known to all the incident players and
it must be trained on, and practiced with, so everyone is proficient with their
roles and responsibilities.

When firefighter(s) get into trouble at the incident scene, there must be some
easy way for them to call for help. Some fire departments have reserved the
word, "mayday," as the radio sign that someone is in immediate need of help.
When the IC gets a mayday over the radio, he/she must tightly control all the
ensuing radio traffic. A mayday is a reall y big-deal signal that the incident
and incident operations have changed in a way that is threatening to the work­
ers. After the may day is transmitted, the IC needs to find out:

• Who is in trouble?

• Where they are?

• What condition are they in?

• What resources do they need-or, what resources are needed to get

them out.

After getting as much of this information as possible, the IC should send the
RIC crew into action. The RIC crew will serve as the rescue sector when used
in this fashion. When the IC gets reports that someone is in trouble, the oper­
ation will shift into a firefighter rescue mode. The IC should:

• Request another alarm.

• Get a personnel accountability report (PAR) on all assigned units (or

any unit not having a PAR must notify the IC).

• Open up exits to the exterior of the structure that will assist with the
rescue effort.

• Begin the search from the last known location of the missing person(s).

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 Functions of Command Chapter 6

• Provide whatever fire control (along with ventilation) support is neces­

sary to rescue the lost/trapped/missing member(s).

• Have medical support and transportation standing by.

Note
The concept and practice of using RIC teams has changed our approach
(and mentality) of maintaining a tactical reserve, while we have troops
operating in the hazard zone. This change is an operational response to
continually maintaining the capability to rescue ourselves. The IC is in
a difficult position when there is a RIC team standing by, and there are
critical tactical needs that are not being addressed-particularly if those
needs involve any life-safety issues where customers are threatened.
It's pretty difficult to explain/defend that we lost a little kid in the back
bedroom (as an example), and we had a complete crew of ready respon­
ders who didn't react because they were dedicated to our safety and not
the kid's. In such a case (critical rescue), 100 out of 100 ICs (including
the author) will assign the RIC to go after the kid and order more
resource-the answer to this dilemma is for the IC to anticipate, based
on the existence of active (hazardous) conditions, the need for more
resources, and to quickly call for that response. Simply, the IC must
order early, order big, and manage well; this isn't just some snappy slo­
gan-it needs to be a practiced, expected, standard way we
deploy ... anyone who doesn't believe this has never lived through an
event that was two-companies short and one-body bag long.

2 IN2 OUT
Firefighter safety and survival is an ongoing concern for anyone involved in
the fire service. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) has enacted regulations that deal with this
issue on a tactical level. While this regulations has several different
pieces and parts, it affects the initial structural fire attack by dictat­
ing, that before anyone (firefighters) enters the structure, that two
firefighters must be standing by outside the hazard zone. These
two people, in effect, serve as the initial rapid intervention crew
(IRIC). At least one member of the IRIC must be fully turned out,
monitor the tactical channel, and be ready to immediately go in and
assist with any needed firefighter rescue. The other member of the
!RIC can have other duties, but they must be able to immediately leave
what they're doing to assist the first member of the IRIC with a firefighter res­
cue. There are only two exceptions to this regulation:
r" 1. The initial-arriving unit has information that strongly indicates that
not everyone is out of the structure. This information may be given as
part of the initial dispatch, or by witnesses when the unit arrives to the
scene. This information, and the fact that an IRIC will not be estab­
II­ lished, should be part of the initial or follow-up radio report.
Example-"Engine 25 is on the scene of a working house fire, the
II
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Chapter 6 Functions of Command

neighbors report a person is trapped, we'll be going inside with a 13/4 "
line for search and rescue, E-25 will be command and there will not
be an IRI c."
2. The fire is of a small enough size that it can be controlled with a
portable extinguisher, and it doesn't require the use of an SCBA
because the conditions have not reached IDLH levels.

COMMAND SAFETY
How the IC sets up and keeps the incident organization going becomes one of
the regular IMS functions the IC uses to initially capture, and then maintain,
control of the incident. Overall organizational and operational control is a big
deal in how the troops survive (or don't s:Irvive). Overall incident control is a
major safety responsibility of the IC. What control actually looks like and
acts like (on the most primitivelimportant level) is the ability of the command
system (IC) to manage the position and function of incident resources-most­
ly hazard-zone workers. The foundation of incident control is that the IC
knows who is in the hazard-zone, where they are, what they are doing (gener­
ally), who is their boss, if they are okay, and what the conditions are around
those workers. Simply, based on that current information, if the IC can quick­
ly change the where and what of the troops' position and function, then the IC
is in control. If the IC can't pull off those changes, then the IC is out of con­
trol (of at least those troops). The IC creates and maintains a standard
incident organization to create this level of position and function control. The
size and "shape" of the organization must match the individual profile of the
cun-ent incident so that all of the involved and exposed areas are covered by
geographic operational sectors. The support requirements of the incident cre­
ate the need for a set of functional sectors that match the particular needs of
that incident. The sector bosses (both geographic and functional) now become
the IC's command partners, who are directly responsible for the safety of the
workers assigned to their sector. The IC creates an incident organization,
using sectors as the major way to maintain a manageable span of control and
to prevent command overload. The IC must realize that worker safety and
survival is a major reason and benefit of quickly creating an effective incident
organization that starts under control, stays under control, and never loses
control of the safety of the hazard-zone workers. The system works because
sector officers are physically located righ: where the work is being done so
they can directly observe, evaluate, and react to the safety issues in their area.
They can communicate with the IC and other related sectors to exchange
information on the work progress and conditions that are occun-ing in their
area/function. Sector bosses are empowered to do whatever is required to
always match the position/function of their workers, with cun-ent and forecast­
ed safety conditions. If conditions get better, they keep going. If conditions
don't get better (which means they generally are getting worse), the sector
boss calls in more resources and increases the efforts in that area, or moves
the troops to a safe position, and notifies the IC of the changing conditions.
While sectors are the decentralized, off-site managers within the incident
organization, the IC (and command team) is the only person who is in a static

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 Functions of Command Chapter 6

spot that is intensely connected to the hazard zone and can keep track of the
overall safety status of resources and incident conditions on a strategic level.
This command safety responsibility is a major reason why the system must
require the IC to stay put inside the command post, and be continuously avail­
able to receive and react to hazard-zone safety information. The IC is the
person who sets up the incident organization and then assigns resources to that
organization. He/she must record those assignments on a tactical work sheet,
as they occur. Simply, no one else performs these stationary command func­
tions like the IC does. Knowing who and where everybody is becomes
particularly critical when (for whatever reason) the safety of the hazard-zone
workers becomes an issue-now the IC must quickly orchestrate and coordi­
nate a response wi th the sectors that protect the h·oops. The sectors aren't
much good if they aren't right where the work is being done. The IC isn't
much good if he/she is getting a nose powdering so he/she can go on televi­
sion when the interior sector is yelling over the tactical channel for two more
hose lines and a RIC team, because the fire just snuck in behind them. When
the chips are down, the incident organization works (and the troops stay safe)
because both the IC and the sectors play their positions.

Another organizational way the IC protects the workers is by setting

up the standard function al sectors that focus on critical, safety­
welfare activities. Sectors like safety, accountability, and rehabilita­
tion provide direct assistance, protection, and relief to our troops.
They work with the IC and the geographic sector officers to assist
and support the safety needs of the incident workers. The ongoing
operation of these safety-related sectors must occur in an almost
automatic and integrated way, as the IC builds and operates the inci­
dent organization. How the IC organizes the incident is a big deal to
both operational effectiveness (for the customer) and safety (for the
workers) . Most of the time, when an incident command operation is
out of balance, it means the incident organization is screwed up in
some way. It is generally impossible for the task and tactical levels
to out perform a poorly designed (and managed) incident organiza­
tion that is too slow and too small. When this happens, life is a lot
less safe for the workers and the customers. Simply, well-managed
incidents are well-organized incidents. Well-organized and well-
managed incidents are safer incidents, that have better outcomes.

i-

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 Chapter 6 Functions of Command

CHAPTER 6

ORGANIZATION

INCIDENT COMMANDER CHECKLIST:

• Quickly develop an incident organization to keep everyone connected.

• Match and balance the command organization to the size/structure/com­

plexity of the operating resources .

• Forecast and establish geographic/functional sectors.

• Accomplish effective delegation and span-of-control management

through early sectoring.

• Correctly name sectors and landmarks.

• Assign and brief sector officers-provide objectives.

• Limit units assigned to sectors to five (5).

• Serve as resource allocator to sectors.

• Build a command team (IC/SO/SA).

• Build outside agency liaison and public information into the organiza­
tion.

• Operate on the strategic level-support tactics-task levels.

• Evaluate progress reports, assist, and coordinate sector activities.

• Implement management sections (ops, planning, logistics, administra­

tion, safety) and branches to provide support and connect operational
and command escalation-delegate.

• Use the organizational chart as the communications flow plan .

• Allow yourself to be supported in the process.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 6

Coaching Version
"Quickly create a sector-based organization to delegate area (seven sides) and
major functional responsibility. Organize early and aggressively-develop
and then (you) push your own power curve. Establish only the organizational
part of the command system that is required to get the job done. Don't get
overloaded with excessive organization because you're too big-don't play
catch up because you're too small. Assign the initial unit to an area or func­
tion as a sector for early organization and control. Take on command-team
partners before you get into trouble. Stay in the command post, listen critical­
ly, support your sectors and let them manage right from where the action is
actually going on-you manage the strategy-allocate resources-emphasize
safety-and remember operational micromanagement sucks, but safety micro­
management is beautiful."

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 FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND

CHAPTER 7

I REVIEW, EVALUATION, AND REVISION

 Functions of Command Chapter 7

FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND
CHAPTER 7:

REVIEW, EVALUATION, AND REVISION

MAJOR GOAL

TO CONFIRM THAT THE CURRENT INCIDENT ACTION PLAN IS

MEETING THE TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE INCIDENT AND
ADEQUATELY PROVIDES FOR THE SAFETY OF THE WORKERS, AND
TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS ANY AREAS THAT ARE NOT COVERED

The functions of command layout the natural order of how the IC utilizes and
applies the incident management system, in order to achieve the tactical
benchmarks for the incident. While review, revision, and evaluation is the
seventh function, it is something that the IC does throughout the incident,
beginning in the front end of incident operations. The officer of the first arriv­
ing company identifies the critical factors, sizes up the problem,
takes control of the communications process, determines the
proper strategy and resource requirements, develops an incident
action plan (lAP), and assumes command. This all happens very
quickly. In fact, when command assumption goes according to
plan, it is "quiet," smooth, and almost transparent to someone
outside the system. In most cases, only a few minutes separate the customer's
initial call for help to Mabel in the communications center to the time the ini­
tial IC arrives at the scene and takes action. This standard, front end begins
incident operations under control and within a structured plan. Having the Ie
perform the standard command functions from the very beginning of incident
operations provides the launching pad for the revision process, that is required
to keep the strategy and lAP matching conditions. The investments the IC
makes early in the incident can provide big-time benefits when the IC must
make changes later on. Sadly, the opposite is also true. When the standard
command routine is not followed, the negative effect is generally not felt until
later on, when the Ie needs the performance of that command function com­
ponent, and it is simply not in place. Most of the time it is extremely difficult
to recreate the opportunity that occurred ten minutes ago to implement a stan­
dard function , that was not put in place when it should have been.

The fast-attacking company officer IC (le #1) quickly did the first five func­
tions of command from an outside position. This command activation
Review, Evaluation, and Revision
 Chapter 7 Functions of Command

typically occurs within a minute of the in;tial Ie's arrival on the scene. The
incident size up is part of this process. The mobile, company officer Ie ini­
tially evaluates incident conditions from an exterior position. That same Ie
then starts gathering more information and revising the front-end incident size
up and the lAP, after he/she goes inside the structure and finds out what con­
ditions are like there. This ongoing evaluation and reevaluation of the critical
incident factors (both from inside and outside positions) is the basis of both
setting up and keeping the incident action plan current.

The Ie, and everyone else operating at the scene, must constantly be evaluat­
ing whatever the problem is (described in critical factors) and the effect the
control efforts are having. Evaluation isn"t something that just gets done
intermittently every five or ten minutes. The incident scene is a constantly
changing place. During the active period of the incident, the situation is either
getting better or worse, it never just stays the same. As an example of such a
change, five minutes ago everything may :1ave looked like it was going
according to plan but in the last forty-five seconds a big crack has suddenly
appeared in the structure. Three minutes :"rom now the whole corner of the
building is going to give the rest of the structure, and any unfortunate souls
anywhere near it, a fatal lesson in gravity. The biggest reason we do never­
ending size up-evaluation-revision--evaluation-revision ... is so our
workers can operate safely, complete the tactical priorities, and go home
okay after the party.

The capability to evaluate what's going on and then to correctly respond to

these current conditions is the ultimate reason for doing the functions of com­
mand. This is how we match actions to conditions. The system puts the Ie in
a position to be able to pull this off. If the initial attack wave solves the prob­
lem in the first five minutes, there is not g::ling to be a whole lot of
reevaluating going on. In fact, there will not be a whole lot of anything going
on organizationally, besides well-placed (tactically), task-level action. The
first six functions of command basically get quickly and seamlessly addressed
(we hope) in the initial on scene report, and as the Ie assigns operational/man­
agement responsibilities to the initial companies that are placed in key tactical
positions. If the first wave doesn't solve the problem, then having performed
the standard command functions from the very beginning places the Ie is in a
position to expand, reposition, or to change the overall strategy. The attack­
altering decision will be made after evaluating what effect/success the initial
wave had. This is information that will come to the Ie in the form of visual
factors (my, isn't that fire a lot bigger than it first appeared), and
progress/reconnaissance reports from the various sector officers ("We can't
locate the fire, but our helmets are melting, we're leaving-have a nice day").

Evaluation is affected to a great extent by the evaluator's physical location. A

fast-attacking Ie will have a pretty good idea of what the conditions are on
the inside of the burning structure he/she currently inhabits (glorious working
conditions) . An Ie who is outside, operating in the command mode (not as
exciting, but a lot dryer), should have a good overall view of the entire inci-

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

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 Functions of Command Chapter 7

dent site and a broaderlbetter view of the effect the attack is having. Sector
officers should be in positions that give them a good view of activities and con­
ditions in their sector. These different views get reported back to the Ie in the
form of progress, completion, and exception reports. Together these reports
serve as the foundation for ongoing incident evaluation. This basis of evalua­
tion requires reports from all sides of the fire (or whatever seems to be
the incident problem). The Ie will focus on the most critical areas first,
and then as time and resources allow, these "views" should be expanded
to include all sides. For structure fires, these areas are the seven tactical
sides-(the top and bottom, four sides, and the inside) and the hidden
spaces (attics, false ceilings, basements, sub floors, mezzanines, etc.),
that are connected to the seven sides. The command structure, strategy,
and lAP form the foundation for everything else that the Ie and respond­
ing resources will be doing at the incident. Resources cannot be assigned
within a command structure that does not exist; the wrong strategy can be fatal;
and a non-existent plan cannot be evaluated and kept current.

Effective incident operations involve a series of ongoing adjustments to the

action that is taken all over the incident site. The command system empowers
the responders who are assigned to those areas to be responsible for doing
their part of the lAP, managing the details of their area, and then keeping that
action effective, based on cun-ent conditions. Because of that ongoing need
for action/adjustment, the Ie must assign companies/sectors to cover the
entire event. Lots of bad stuff (surprises) occurs when a problem exists in an
area/function that is "uncovered." When this happens, that problem will wors­
en, become apparent, and now the Ie is behind the "operational-power curve"
in getting ahead of, and solving that condition. First establishing a basic lay­
out of the incident area, and then making the assignments and adjustments
that are required to cover those areas, is a major job of the Ie. The adjust­
ments can be small, medium, or large. The officer in the area making the
adjustment must realize that sometimes those changes will be major enough to
require a change in the overall incident strategy. When this occurs, that offi­
cer must do some very deliberate communication with the Ie, in order to pull
off (i.e., coordinate/execute) that strategic change.

The ongoing evaluation must address:

• Firefighter safety
• Tactical priorities

The first thing the Ie must always evaluate is if the current strategy is con-ect.
The safety of the workers must be a regular, ongoing piece of the evaluation.
The Ie uses the strategy as the basic foundation to manage worker safety. The
strategy drives the plan, and declaring the strategy clearly defines the type of
operations that will be conducted at the scene. Offensive operations are cen­
tered around first providing for life safety, by extending and completing a
primary search, and getting an "all clear" in the fire occupancy. Defensive oper­
ations are centered on stopping the spread of the fire to exposures. As the
incident progresses, the Ie periodically must evaluate and confirm that the prop-

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

Chapter 7 Functions of Command

er strategy is being employed, and then assume that everyone is operating with­
in those strategic parameters/positions. The Ie must apply the standard
risk-management plan as the tactical prior:ties are completed and benchmarks
are reported. This ongoing process becomes a big deal in review and evalua­
tion.

Example:

The Ie is operating at the scene of a fire in a large commercial building. The

Ie sizes up the fire as offensive, and assigns units to the interior. Interior
crews, under the direction of a sector officer, report they have a good-sized
fire that they think they can extinguish wi th a couple more attack lines and
vertical ventilation . The Ie sends a ladder company to the roof to ventilate,
and assigns them as roof sector. The Ie also assigns several more engine
companies to the interior. A few minutes later the Ie watches a member of
the ladder company pull a supply line off an adjacent engine
company and hook it into the ladder truck. The roof sector
then reports they have cu t a dandy hole that now is venting
the products of combustion (heat, smoke, fire gases, small
dogs, etc.)-just like it' s supposed to. The Ie's steel-trap
mind now takes the last three pieces of information that
he/she has seen and heard, and comes to the conclusion
(based on the evaluation) that the ladder company may be getting
ready to do something that can be very dangerous (and dysfunc­
tional) . Now, because of the strategic evaluation process (offensive),
the Ie contacts roof sector and inquires about the supply line being
hooked into the ladder truck. Roof sector comes back with some radio goobly
gook like, "We're preparing to standby just in case." The Ie visualizes a 1000
GPM masterstream being forced into a ve:1t hole, from above, onto three
unsuspecting engine crews on the inside C:nterior sector). Since evaluation is
useless unless you do something with it, the Ie contacts roof sector and orders
them not to charge the supply line to their rig. This is a conscious, in-atten­
dance Ie malOng sure all the incident players match their tactics to the
strategy (this prevents firefighters from lOlling one another). The flip side of
this coin is to make sure that the strategy matches the conditions. When the
roof sector reports to the Ie that the attic (i .e., truss loft) is full of fire, the
roof is unsafe, and they are abandoning their position, the Ie needs to switch
strategies. This piece of critical information becomes an evaluation item that
indicates the offensive strategy is no longer safe, or appropriate. This is an
effective Ie using standard "red flags" (i.e ., safety alerts) to match the strategy
to the conditions (this prevents the conditions from lOlling the Ie's troops).

The two different basic strategies provide the standard operational template
for the way the organization is going to address the tactical priorities and fire­
fighter safety. Within the risk-management plan, the priorities are the
hierarchy the Ie uses for evaluation, decis:on-making, and creating effective
action in the four standard operational areas (rescue/fire control/property con­
servation!customer stabilization).

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 Functions oj Command Chapter 7

Rescue-Incident activities must always first consider life safety. In active

offensive fire situations, the Ie must put an interior attack in place to get an
"all clear" ("all clear" signals that the primary search is complete). If rescue
becomes a bigger operational challenge (big groups , large areas, advanced
stage of the fire), the Ie needs to decide on how to address rescue activities.
The Ie must decide to remove the customers from the fire, or the fire from the
customers. Putting a hit on the fire may buy the Ie more time to complete the
primary search and get the "all clear." On the other hand, the Ie needs to stay
focused on the rescue priority, and make sure that firefighting activities don't
supercede completing the primary search. Tactical revision must begin with
what is required to obtain an "all clear." Even though resources might be
assigned tasks that overlap the tactical priorities, the Ie should not proceed
from one priority to the next, until that tactical benchmark (of completion) is
achieved . .. that's why we call them benchmarks. If interior crews haven't got
the "all clear" on the structure, it doesn't make any sense for ladder crews to
be carrying in salvage equipment; they should be assisting with the search in
some way (like searching, ventilating, forcing entry, or supporting the attack).

The rescue phase of the operation typically occurs in a very compressed time
frame and does not lend itself very well to very much revision. The reason
for this is the biological reality that unprotected people do not hold up very
well under fire conditions. Offensive fire operations are quickly initiated and
conducted around doing a primary search, and getting a rapid "all clear" for
the fire area. We have a very short window of opportunity to complete these
operations . The things that slow down the initial search (access, barriers,
smoke, and heat) will eventually delay the rescue beyond the viability of those
trapped by the products of combustion, unless those barriers are somehow
removed (and removed fairly quickly). Unprotected occupants do not have
the time for the Ie to go through three or four revision cycles before they end
up succumbing to the products of combustion. As the fu·e area fills up with
the products of combustion, and time goes by, the rescue operation shifts from
a primary search to a body recovery. The Ie must follow the primary search
with a secondary search (that comes after knocking the fire down, lighting up,
and ventilating the involved and exposed areas). We generally do not find a
lot of inside customers who have lived through all the fire stages that lead up
to a secondary search, who are waiting for us to rescue them. The IC's initial
lAP, and assignments to later arriving units, must focus on getting the fire area
searched quickly, and doing it right the first time.

The traditional, attack-revision process took a deep breath when the "all clear"

r was given, that signaled that the primary search was completed. Life safety
had been addressed, and we could check that box off of our tactical work
sheet, and the Ie could now concentrate on the fire control phase. Too many
times, we have overlooked ourselves in the life-safety equation. The Ie needs
to keep in mind that what the "all clear" means is that non-turnout wearing
life forms are not in the structure, but that there are still people inside (fire­
fighters are people too). The biggest benefit of evaluation and revision (and
the number one reason why we do it) is to make sure that our responders

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

Chapter 7 Functions of Command

leave the scene in basically the same shape they arrived in (maybe tired, but
sitting up, and intact) . The IC must reev21uate the risk level to the inside
operating firefighters, who are involved in continuing to conduct interior fIre
control operations in an area, where a pri:nary search has been completed and
reported . Our standard risk-management plan indicates that we only take a
big risk to protect savable lives. If the remaining fire control risk level is
high, the IC must order everyone out of that area, and shift to defensive opera­
tions . This is difficult to do because inside attackers are in place, operating
with fire streams, and want to kick the fire's ass. This is where the IC must
cowboy up, order the attack commandos outside, and blast the red devil from
outside the collapse zone. Most of the time the frustrated attackers will mut­
ter, "We almost had it when Chief Retreat pulled us out." Clear-eyed,
steady-nerved ICs must not be distracted by that normal "send-me-in-coach"
reaction. This is where the risk-managelrent rubber actually meets the road ,
and is probably the most critical call an IC ever makes. Whoever said the deal
about "fight another day" was a smart character. We ought to change the risk­
management plan, if we don't actually do what it says. What changing the
plan means is writing down that it's okay to trade a firefighter's welfare (or
life) for a piece of property that De Worth Brown is going to haul to the land­
fill three days after the fire ... no sober, expelienced IC wants to, or would
ever, make that change.

Fire Control-While we use the same IMS components to manage a full

range of risk and services, structural firefighting is the most defining basic
service we deliver. It is the operational priority where we spend the most inci­
dent time, and where we expend the most organizational effort. Structural
fires are all "local" and are always dangerous, and exist in a very compressed­
time frame . This quick-time frame creates the most serious home-town
command system challenge. Simply, fires in buildings bum very quickly, and
will not wait for any system to get itself set up, so we must build and execute
a command routine that matches the fire's profile and timetable. Evaluation
and revision for fire control efforts must be very dynamic and need to answer
the simple question, "How will we put the fire out and survive doing it?" The
answer to this question will be based on:

• Evaluation of the critical incident factors-the Ie's prioritization of the

critical factors, in accordance with the tactical priorities, sets the stage for
assignments given to resources to carry But the lAP. This is where the revi­
sion process must start-being able to take control of the critical factors (as
they relate to the incident problem) is the reason we were called. Structure
fires burn along a very standard scale (this was well described in the fast
paced Chapter 5). This standard "burn scale" creates the framework, so the
IC can connect the extent (or phase) of the fire to the appropriate opera­
tional strategy. For most regular structu:-e fires that display conditions in the
beginning and middle of the fire scale, an offensive strategy is appropriate.
If the fire continues to bum out of control, it will take possession of enough
of the structure that it cannot be extingUlshed from offensive, interior posi­
tions (and maybe, only eventually, from defensive ones). The IC maintains

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 Functions of Command Chapter 7

a position to be able to manage all the resources, in such a way that he/she
creates a standard outcome.

• Correct action-Standard actions matched to standard conditions are

designed to produce standard outcomes. When such action doesn't have a
"standard" effect on conditions, a "warning light" should start blinking on
the IC's "radar screen." Operational actions are task-driven activities
that are designed to have a positive effect on the problem (fire bad­
water good). These actions are trained on and stored (i.e.,
established, practiced, and refined) in the form of SOPs. Highly­
qualified workers (firefighters), using various tools, equipment, and
apparatus, accomplish these task-level activities. The execution of
different, connected, and integrated tasks becomes the tactics. A sec­
tor officer manages teams of workers (companies) and is responsible to
make sure the proper tactics are employed within that sector. The sector
officer becomes the onsite manager (IC's command partner) for that
area/function, and makes sure that the correct action is taken, based on the
overall incident action plan (lAP). The sector officer must adjust the actions
being taken within the sector, based on changing conditions, and report
these changes back to the Ie. Structural firefighting revision points to pon­
der (as an example) for attack positioning:
• Are interior conditions okay for continued offensive operations
• Location of the attack
• Covering the primary search
• Protecting interior access (stairs, halls, lobbies, etc.,)
• Protecting the unburned portions of the fire area
• Cutting the fire off from separate, uninvolved areas

The evaluation question the IC must ask is, "Are all the correct key
attack/operational/support points being covered, and is it safe to stay?" The
IC reviews and maintains control of the basic operating positions through
accurate revision, strong organization, and fast communications (beam me
up Scotty). When a fire control/support position is working, the IC should
maintain that activity, and when needed, reinforce the efforts of that posi­
tion/function. If the current positions are losing their effectiveness, the IC
must re-evaluate, and coordinate possible position changes.

• Size of the attack

Evaluation question-Is the attack response large enough to control the
fire?
This simple question is rooted in the basic laws of physics. When fuel
burns, it produces heat. The centerpiece of the IC's attack is still good old­
fashioned heat-absorbing water. The IC must always evaluate which force
I. is bigger (fire/water) and which can out perform the other. When the IC is
able to apply more water than the fire can match with heat, we win. Until
the IC reaches this level, the fire will continue to burn and eventually win (if
the IC can't overpower it).

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

Chapter 7 Functions of Command

The IC's capability to do this depends on a steady stream of hydraulic-based

resources (engine companies, hose wagons, tankers, fireboats, and for the
divine IC-floods). These resources are put into action using the regular
incident organization. Our forefathers appropriately named this event a fire­
fight. The IC vs. the fire. Firefighters vs. the products of combustion (the
fire's evil demons). The IC must constantly evaluate the effect his/her
forces are having in their guest against :he fire. The completion of the four
tactical priorities hinges on the IC's ability to engage the fire, and overpow­
er/control it. In every firefight, the IC must evaluate the need for resources
and increase his/her capability where it is lacking .

• Timing and amount of support

Evaluation question- Is the fire attack receiving adequate support ?
I once overheard a conversation between an old , salty BLS (basic life sup­
port) ladder captain (LC) and a young cosmopolitan ALS (advanced life
support) paramedic engine captain (Ee).
LC: "Do you ever wonder why e:lgines are only responsible for four
things (stretch hose, pump hose, operate nozzles, search and rescue)
and Ladders are responsible for sixteen different things (ventilation,
forcible entry, providing access, lighting, etc.)?"
The younger captain looked at the older officer for a good minute and
said with a crooked smile-
EC: "Because you guys have a lot more free time to think about it."

The IC will base the initial attack on whatever critical-factor information is

(or is not) available. As the attack progresses, the IC will get reports back
from operating sectors, laced with new critical factor information. Much of
the front-end critical factor information will detail the obstacles and barriers
that separate the hydraulic-delivery units from the fire. These barriers
come in the form of structural feat:.lres (locked doors, walls and ceil­
ings, security features) or from the fire itself (heat and smoke).
Ladder companies (typically) remove these physical hindrances by
-...-,r--, ~~III!II~'~. providing ventilation, forcible entry, and provision of access. Where
ladder companies are not available, the IC must assign those duties to
some other unit. This very practical operational need requires our
responders to be highly interchangeable and versatile. The fire gains a
head start, directly related to the extent that these barriers separate fire­
fighters and water from the fire. If this separation goes on long enough, the
fire simply takes over, moves up the standard involvement scale, and wins
the battle.

Sometimes the attack effort can produce enough pumping capability and
water to float all the ladder trucks away, yet the fire may continue to burn.
The structural firefighting process is really pretty simple. If the fire is
inside, the water must go inside. Putting water on the outside (in those
cases) may feel good (and even look good to the uninitiated), but it really
doesn't affect the fire very much. Most buildings are designed to shed
water and they are fairly "dumb"-i.e., they don ' t know the difference

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 Functions of Command Chapter 7

between rain and Engine 3's deck gun. The problem is to get past all the
barriers and apply water directly onto the base of the fire (an ancient truth),
during the time frame when an interior, offensive attack is still possible.
The IC should take note of the times when there is plenty of water available
in the charged hose lines, but the fire keeps getting bigger. These are times
to ask for feedback from the interior positions, and increase and inspire the
support effort required to get those fire streams into effective positions, dur­
ing the offensive period.

• Adequate back up
Evaluation question-Are adequate resources in place to reinforce the cur­
rent operation?
Once the initial attack has been put in place, the IC has got to start forecast­
ing and asking the "what ifs." The IC needs to balance back-up resource
needs on the realities of what's going on, what still needs to be done, and all
the potential unknowns . This reality check should always include some
effective, tactical reserve to provide uncommitted resources, that can be
quickly assigned to tactical needs that develop as the incident continues .

The smart IC will always try to maintain additional resources in reserve.

These tactical reserves can be used to:

• Reinforce current positions

• Provide relief for frrefighters in critical positions
• Cover new positions or function s
• Operate as a rapid intervention crew (RIC)

While the IC needs to keep a sufficient tactical reserve ready to go to work

as soon as the need is identified and adequate resources are provided, there
is no need to hold excessive resources at the scene that could go back in
service, and be available for response.

Every tactical position should be evaluated in terms of initial/ongoing ?

attack, and then of back-up resources. These back-up units provide the nec­ -
essary reinforcement and support to the critical attack positions (sectors).
Once all the work teams are in motion, the IC should check his/her tactical
work sheet and ask the classic question, "What am I going to do if... ?"
When the answer is, "I don't have anyone to do it," he/she has reached the
current resource limit, and the IC must now consider calling for additional
resources, if it appears there might be additional work to be done.

The IC must understand how important it is to maintain an uncommitted

tactical reserve (staged resources) that can be quickly assigned when, and
where, it is needed . This requires the IC to make a fast and accurate
deployment forecast, early in the event, translate that forecast into a
resource level, and then order whatever is required to fill those needs.
Before we developed command and operational SOPs ("old days"), it was a
common practice to routinely assign all the units on the scene and when the
last unit was committed, call for more resources one at a time. IMS has set

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Chapter 7 Functions of Command

up an IC who can predict and react to the future. Now the IC can call for
help early, and use the regular work cycle to bring resources into the scene,
stage them in standard uncommitted positions, and have them closely avail­
able to assign where and when they are needed. Sometimes we operate with
an "everybody-plays" mentality that can congest the work area. It is very
easy for the IC to end up with seventeen firefighters working in a 10' by 12'
bedroom (usually detected by the soune of SCBA tanks clanging into each
other). It is a good practice for the IC to base assigning resources to exist­
ing positions, upon requests from that area's sector officer. The skill is
balancing resources to allow enough workers to do the job, while staging
enough players as a tactical reserve out of the way until they are needed.

Back up companies, waiting for assignrr:ent at a staging position, can be

plugged into any holes that are detected in the attack plan that routinely
occur, beginning with primary tasks, and moving to support gaps. These
back-up positions become particularly critical when the fire is still burning,
and there is plenty of unburned, good real estate left to consume. The clever
IC develops a realistic respect for such potential, and automatically lines up
reserves waiting "on the bench" to be sent into the game, as they are needed.

The entire team must understand and follow the regular work cycle that is
used to control the position and function of everyone on the scene. Having
responders assigned to only one standard category of the regular work cycle
(responding/staged/assigned/rehabbecllgoing home) creates the basis of this
capability. Having everyone follow this standard work cycle is how the IC
is able to maintain this "on-the-bench" resource. The entire operation is at a
huge disadvantage if there is a contest between the IC and a group of anx­
ious, uncommitted responders, who will not assume and maintain staged
positions until they are assigned. Responders must show up with the self­
discipline to follow the standard plan .. .anything else is simply freelancing.

Note on back up:

The author (elderly insomniac) was recently listening (as usual) to a
3:00 a.m. working-fire operation on the monitor. The IC had done all
the standard front-end stuff accordir:g to SOPs. The only problem was
the fire wasn't reacting to "the plan:' Once it was obvious the fire was
winning, the IC transmitted over the tactical channel- "Can anyone tell
me why this fire is not going out?" A moment later, a calm radio voice
said, "Command, if you get another line in the back, it'll go out." The
IC ordered another attack line in the rear. About two minutes later the
IC declared the fire under control. The little operetta reflected:
• An IC who identified that standard action was not producing standard
results.
• An IC who was smart (and secure) enough to ask why what he had
put in place wasn't working.
• A responder who was in a positior: to see the problem and who was
smart (and secure) enough to tell the boss how to fix the problem.

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

 Functions of Command Chapter 7

• An incident management operation where the IC had maintained a tacti­

cal reserve that could be quickly assigned to "plug up" a hole in the lAP.

Soon after the "under control," the radio eavesdropper fell asleep and happi­
ly dreamed of effective, hard-hitting command post operations that, by their
very existence, caused significant incident problems to cower and disap­
pear. .. the dreams of the old are many times bizane.

• Operational control
Evaluation question-Does the Ie have effective command of the operation ?
The following potentially-discomforting questions can be used to evaluate
whether or not the IC is actually in control, which in turn will reflect if the
IC is, in fact, really in command;
• Can the IC control him/herself?
• Can the IC maintain an effective command position?
• Does he/she know what's going on in all of the critical areas ?
• Does the IC have an lAP?
• Can the IC control the strategy?
• Will the troops listen and talk to the IC?
• Will the troops follow the IC's instructions?
• Can the IC evaluate the effectiveness of the operation and make deci­
sions?
• Can the IC change the assignment, location, and status of his/her
resources?
• Can the IC call for help and get it?
• Can the IC enforce his/her plan before, during, and after the event?
• Is the IC responsible for the overall outcome?

"Yes" answers describe the extent to which the IC is really in control of the
incident. "No" answers describe the extent to which the incident operation
is actually out of control.

The IC needs to continually evaluate his/her ability to command and control

the operation. Both the size and scope, along with an evaluation of the
potential of the incident problem, will dictate the resource requirements, and
the command component needed to manage those resources. A single IC,
even one operating in a strong command system and coming equipped with
a sage aide, can find him/herself quickly overwhelmed with a fast-moving
incident. The command part of incident operations has got to be able to
keep up with the deployment requirements of the incident. Positive incident
outcomes are based on the IC managing the incident, according to both the
overall strategy and the lAP. The IC needs the level of command support
that is required to put the plan in place, and keep it current all the way to the
conclusion of the incident.

Many systems automatically program the response of command support

when the IC upgrades the assignment. This brings us to our next evaluation
item:

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

Chapter 7 Functions of Command

• Adequate resources
Evaluation question- "Has the Ie balanced resources with tactical prob­
lems ?"
The standard review process must include an evaluation of the resource
level available to the Ie. Some tactical situations move very quickly, while
others develop slowly. The IC must call for, assign, and manage enough
resources to effectively intercept and overcome the incident problem (time­
temperature curves, bleeding patients, etc.)

Deploying an adequate concentration of resources (amounUtype/time) ahead

of the problem avoids operating in a crisis mode, where companies are con­
tinually chasing the incident problem, and being driven back and out by an
inadequate resource level, that cannot get ahead of deteriorating, but escalat­
ing incident conditions. (The objective is to make the problem go away, not
vice versa.)

A critical command prediction is evaluating and forecasting conditions and

deciding if the companies assigned to the initial response can adequately
stabilize the problem. Likewise, this is a crucial factor during the evalua­
tion/revision process. The earlier the IC makes this evaluation, the more
effectively he/she can manage the resource curve by calling for more help
when it is required (or even better yet- before it is required). The earlier
the IC makes this decision, the better the chance for these additional units to
positively impact the problem.

The quickest way to trigger the response of the closest help, provide for
more move ups , and indicate to everyone in the system that the IC has
expanded the response to an incident is to simply request a standard greater
alarm (described in the spellbinding Chapter 4 on Deployment).

While the IC can special call any particular unit that is needed, he/she
should resist the temptation to piecemeal assistance (too little/too late) by
dribbling in one company after another. Usually, the overall resource pool
needs to be increased. The extra alarm system can provide a number of
companies, command players, and support units responding together, with a
significant, collective capability to expand the response both tactically and
organizationally.

When the IC correctly calls for help earl y in the operation, he/she will be in
the unavoidable position of having to de;::l with the new incoming compa­
nies at a most difficult time. This is the very exciting front-end period of
having to take on the incident problem at its peak. The IC is just starting in
the very beginning of operations to implement the lAP, and the chaos factor
is at its highest.

The unstructured (i.e., outside SOPs) arrival of additional resources, each

enthusiastic to get in on the action, can cause havoc with even a well­
designed action plan. The staging procedure, discussed in Chapter 4,

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 Functions of Command Chapter 7

provides a simple system to assist everyone with initial deployment. These

concepts apply to all incident scenarios, and they are particularly useful dur­
ing the fast-moving initial period on expanding local events, when the IC is
trying to place companies in the correct place, to do the most effective action.

Staging protocols provide for responding companies to pause in standard

uncommitted positions, until they receive instructions from the Ie.
"Uncommitted" means the crew is intact, they haven't passed their last
water supply (for engines), and they can access any side of the incident they
are assigned to. This gives command the time to decide who goes where,
control communications, and to facilitate the quick integration, and
tracking of all the players in the game plan.

The IC will be ahead of the game if he/she identifies the conditions that
will typically require additional resources, including:
• The actual, or potential, life hazard exceeds the rescue capability of the
initial assignment.
• The seriously affected patients outnumber the workers.
• The actual, or potential, property protection demands exceeds the fire
control, and property conservation capability of the initial assignment.
• All companies are committed, and the situation is not under control.
• Customer stabilization needs exceed the capability of on-scene resources.
• Firefighters are depleted, exhausted, trapped, or missing.
• The IC runs out of (or needs) more of a special resource.
• The commitment of operating companies is not effective, and a major
redeployment is necessary.
• The situation becomes so widespread and/or complex that the IC cannot
cope. This requires quickly calling for a larger command organization
and sector/branch support.
• The IC instinctively feels uncomfortable with conditions at the current
resource level (don ' t disregard instincts).

Action Plan Revision

The standard review items (you just read them) allow the IC to check the
progress of the lAP throughout the operation, make necessary minor changes,
or point out where to make any needed transitions. A transition is a significant
adjustment in tactics or strategy, which is accomplished smoothly, without a
complete disintegration and reconstruction of the incident-scene operation.

When the initial plan does not meet the needs of the situation, a tactical and/or
I strategic transition is required. When the game plan is almost on target, only
small adjustments are required. On the other hand, a major transition may
I require changes in attack size, attack location or even overall strategy.
1­ Smooth, safe, controlled transitions require active coordinated management.
Regular progress reports are an important part of keeping the lAP current. If
the IC goes to sleep and is not receivinglrequesting progress reports, he/she
simply cannot adjust the plan.

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Chapter 7 Functions of Command

Obviously, it is more effective and much easier on everyone to begin the opera­
tion on a realistic basis, using a healthy degree of pessimism, than it is to start
off with a bad plan and stick with it, to the bitter end. It is more comfortable
(and safer) to downscale rather than get caught short. A good lAP allows room
for minor adjustments and can be expanded as conditions change. It is always
challenging to manage huge transitions that require major orchestration.

Evaluation of the lAP must be a routine and continuous process in order to hit
a moving target-the fire, oozing hazardous materials, dynamic bleeding
patients, etc. The IC must be able to make transitions as quickly as the need
is identified (isn't that why we do such revisions?). Some days the transition­
al process is easy, but sometimes on bad cays, even minor tune-ups seem
almost impossible.

Salvage Command
The IMS system is designed to be used from the moment the first arriving unit
shows up, expand to meet the needs of the incident, and terminate when the
incident is brought to its conclusion. The natural and painless escalation of
the system is dependent on the first-arriving member, usually an officer of an
engine company, fulfilling the first five fU:1ctions of command. This sets the
stage for the initial-arriving chief officer to transfer command and continue to
build/reinforce the initial wave of attack/problem solvers. It's real nifty when
the chief gets on the scene and there are three sectors already established, with
an in-place IC, who is operating with a lucid, straightforward lAP. This
makes the command transfer process fit like Cinderella'S glass slipper. This
will always be a goal and benchmark of effective incident operations. The
more the organization trains on, practices, does, critiques, revises, and tinkers
with "front-end" command, the better it gets, and the easier it becomes to fun­
nel the beginning into bigger/longer/more complicated/expanded operations,
making it the normal routine for all the incident players. This builds skill in
the players, and consistency in the process . While this is the goal of the sys­
tem, we need to take our rose-colored glasses off for a few minutes and deal
with the reality that life won't always be so perfect for the second-aniving IC.
We need some type of command transfer contingency plan for "Prince
Channing" (our second-arriving IC), who expected to encounter our pretty lit­
tle Cinderella, but actually is now dancing with a 400-pound gorilla.

When the responder (generally a chief), who will inherit command from IC #1
shows up, and units are already operating at the incident scene with some type
of command problem (no one in command, no clearly defined lAP, lots of
confusion and mayhem, screamers dominating the tactical channel or even
worse-total silence), the system now has to recover, before it can effectively
and safely move forward. As we have mentioned throughout this book, the
true indicator that the system is in place and working is if the IC can control
the position and function of all the incident scene resources and personnel.
This includes all the resources that were if' place before the current IC arrived.
This need for IC #2 to effectively inherit what IC #1 has (or has not) done cre-

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 Functions of Command Chapter 7

ates a critical and very practical need to effectively connect those two times,
places and people ... the "two" simply mean the time before and the time after
the transfer of command. The IMS must cause every stage of the operation to
understand and assist what is going to happen as the event evolves-virtually
everything that occurs must fit into what will happen next (and next, and
next. .. ). If the first IC allowed (for whatever reason) the incident to get out­
side the boundaries of the IMS system, the next lucky IC is going to have to
rein the organization under control, before much of anything else can effec­
tively and safely happen organizationally and operationally. The biggest
problem with having to play catch up with the command system is that there
are no incident-problem timeouts (so you usually don't catch up). The victims _~_F

will continue to bleed, the fire will get bigger, hazardous materials will keep
oozing out of their containers, and the hits will just keep coming (as Dick
Clark says so well). The IC doesn't stand much of a chance in controlling
whatever the incident problem is, if he/she can't control the troops. First,
bring the troops under control, and then start addressing the incident problem.
This doesn't mean that everyone who is already in place and operating has to
stop what they're doing (treating patients, fighting fire, etc.), it's just that the
workers must be brought into the incident management system. Basically,
what the second IC (usually a chief) must now do is implement an effective
level of incident control which is (in effect) "salvage command."

Command can get out of whack for a variety of reasons. Most of those rea­
sons are a product of the initial IC being overwhelmed from the onset of
aniving on the incident scene. In most cases, the initial IC is an engine com­
pany officer. When the initial IC is in a fast-attack position, he/she will be
operating in, or close to, the physical confines of where the incident problem
is occurring (burning buildings, dangerous rescue/severe life safety situations,
etc.). Along with being up close and personal with the incident problem, the
IC is shackled to the fast-pace and the adrenaline-driven condensed time
frame that these types of incidents occur within. The IC of the single engine
company that Mabel dispatched to a "check alarm sounding" may find them­
selves calling for lots more help from the inside of a large, occupied, burning
structure two minutes later. There is a list of about ten things the initial IC
needs to address, but he/she is only going to be able to realistically do two or
three of them. If the initial IC is so heavily involved in solving (physically,
mentally, and organizationally) the incident problem, he/she may become dis­
tracted away from the extra responsibility of being "Command." Proverbially,
this is known as being up to your ass in alligators. The IC may want to give
the next-in engine company an order that sounds like "lay a line to the east side
of the structure, pull an 2" attack line to the intelior to back us up, and bring in
an 8' pike so we can pull some ceiling," but the order comes out as, "Help!"
The fast-attack command mode works when one of two things happens.

1. The initial IC creates a big enough response to solve the problem.

This is the world most of us homeys live in. The vast majority of our
local working incidents are handled this way. The first-in unit (and
IC) will either eliminate the problem or put a big enough hit on it to

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 Chapter 7 Functions of Command

buy enough time for the rest of the organization to quickly come in
behind him/her, and support, and reinforce what was started.

2. Command is transferred to a regular, full-time conunand person. The

second-in IC will generally be a response chief. This person arrives in
a vehicle designed around the job of being command. If the initial
fast-attacking IC isn't able to bring the problem under control, com­
mand needs to be upgraded by transferring it to an IC, who can
operate in the command mode inside a command post. The fast,
front-end escalation and transfer of command (particularly when tak­
ing command of out-of-control incidents) is greatly enhanced when
the chief has an aide. A chief's aide is a major command support ele­
ment (the aide serves as the initial support officer).

Many times, the front end of local IMS sets the stage for the entire event. Based
on this reality, we must use initial alTivers to start the command system. Our
consistent hometown experience shows that IC #1 is generally a fast-
attacking company level officer who must pedorm in a highly-schizophrenic
manner. He/she must combine action and command at the toughest point in
the operation (the beginning) . IC #ls are generally on the scene in the begin­
ning with just their company, the event is actually underway and they don't
have a lot of real accurate information. They are "stuck" in between doing
some fast IC stuff (command functions) , and initiating some fast (operational)
action. Company officers get up in the morning to act like team leaders because
they really like supervising, and participating with their company in directly solv­
ing incident problems. The IMS recruits these company officers to act like the
IC who has overall incident responsibility (because they are, at that beginning
time, the only fire depattment representative on the scene) and at the same time
to also attempt to begin to stabilize the incident problem. While they generally
do a great job as the initial IC, the system must understand the position (literally)
they are in, and what they can and cannot do in the fast-attack mode. They can
do some quick, front-end command action by assigning another two or three
units to the lAP, and then go to work (physically). They cannot go to work and
simultaneously conduct complete command-level direction. This is why the
deployment system must provide for the stwdard response of adequate command
level (i.e., chief officers) responders who always establish the next level of com­
mand. The system must understand that we routinely don't get that command
level until, and unless, we get command-level players in place and operating.

Gaining Control
For practical purposes, we will refer to the second-in IC as the "chief." If
your department doesn't operate this way, just substitute your local routine. If
your department assigns the engineer of the second-due tanker as the second
IC, just plug that person into the "chief" role of the text. It doesn't matter
what rank the second-in IC is, as long as the person who is the IC is capable
of filling this role (training, education and experience). The second IC must
still perform the role of command in the transfer process.

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 Functions of Command Chapter 7

"Salvage command" defines a set of activities and functions the Ie does in

order to regain and/or reinforce management and control of where the workers
are, and what they are doing. The Ie can't hope to manage the incident prob­
lem, if he/she can't manage the workers. This is really a big deal. Being out
of control at the incident scene is the most common element in tactical fire­
fighter fatalities. When workers crawl around in the products of combustion
without a real Ie (located outside the hazard area sitting in a command post,
supported, and doing the functions of command), they are on their own, on the
task level, with no strategic-level support (or protection) . No one is connect­
ing the hazard-zone workers to the outside world. If we think just sending a
chief to the scene means someone is in command, we are just kidding our­
selves. Unless the Ie knows who is assigned to the incident, who is actually
on the scene, where they are, what they are doing, if they are basically okay
and can cause all the players to stop doing one thing and start doing another
(like leave the inside of the structure before it cooks, traps or falls on them),
then that Ie is not really in command. The challenge for the chief is to be
able to do a set of recovery activities, that quickly bring an incident operation,
that is underway and going to hell in a hand basket, back under control.

How Ie #1 (the company officer) and Ie #2 (the chief) connect becomes a

critical part and place in local IMS. The need for this transfer to occur in a
quick, smooth, and safe way, is actually a major local command system per­
formance requirement that makes the front end of local command application
different (and lots more difficult) than the expanded levels of IMS. What
makes this transfer so tough is that it must occur very fast and that it must
occur at the most difficult period of the incident. We should not be distracted
because the process occurs so routinely and that the problem is so simple. We
have burned up more property and knocked off more local responders doing
repeat, regular, everyday, structural firefighting incidents on the Main Streets
of America because the first Ie disappeared in the smoke and the second Ie
never caught up to the event-power curve. In these cases, lots of bad, painful,
sometimes fatal stuff occurs because conditions changed almost instantly, and
the task-level workers were in the wrong place, at the wrong time. What we
do at the very beginning of operations sets the stage for what happens (good
and bad) for the rest of the event. When the first Ie is a bit out of place, the
second Ie simply doesn't have forty-five minutes to get the incident right side
up. Our local systems work if they are fast, standard, and safe ... this is what
makes local systems local.

Responding to and arriving on the scene

As the chief responds to the scene, he/she will get a certain amount of informa­
tion over the radio, and visually (thermal columns, smoke, running masses,
updrafts containing dead livestock, etc.). Radio traffic is a very good indicator
of whether or not the incident players are under control. Based on what the
chief sees and hears, he/she will determine if the incident management system
is (or is not) in place and operating properly. If the chief was a part of the
original dispatch, then he/she has heard and seen (from a distance) the incident

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Chapter 7 Functions of Command

from its very beginning. If the chief got dispatched (or just responded) later
on during the incident and was not monitoring the tactical channel, he/she will
be at a much bigger disadvantage not being part of the original alarm and
coming into the middle of the play. It is important to keep in mind that we
are talking about getting command and control back from an out-of-control
situation. One of the by products of these clusters is that the chief will more
than likely have lots of unknowns when the transfer of command occurs. The
[lIst order of business is to find out who is assigned to the incident. This is
information that can be gathered on the dispatch or while responding to the
scene. Having an aide drive the chief to the incident gives the next-in IC time
to listen to radio traffic, start filling out a !actical work sheet, reference any
preplans, and any other pre-arrival activity that will put him/her in a stronger
position to transfer and take command, and get the incident under control.

One of the leading causes of incidents getting out of balance is simply the
absence of anybody being in command. This can happen due to a variety of
reasons:
o The incident was initially dispatched as a single-unit response. The

arriving unit balanced it out to the next response level (called for more
help), and never formally assumed command.
o The initial-arriving officer (or member) never assumed command due to

inexperience, transmitting the on-scene report on the wrong radio chan­

nel (or no radio channel), or became so directly involved in attack
activities he/she failed to perform any command functions .
o Command was passed by the first IC to someone who was not on the

scene and did not hear the "pass."

o Two units arrived simultaneously and each assumed the other was going

to take command .

From an incident management standpoint, it really doesn't matter why the ini­
tial arriving unit didn't assume conunand-the effect is the same. No one is in
charge of managing the incident. If the in:tial-attack wave solves the problem
quickly, the fact that there wasn't really anyone in command almost becomes
transparent. This sets the entire organizati8n up in the future for a nasty sucker
punch. You start to hear babble like, "Command really isn't as
important as putting the fire out," This statement, and others like it,
supposes you can only do one or the other. This theory is dangerous
and short sighted. With no one effectively in command, if the initial­
attack wave doesn't solve the problem, the organization doesn't stand
a chance to organize (actually reorganize) and manage not only the
initial attackers, but also the addi tional responders who are required
to bring the incident under control. In fact, adding additional respon­
ders to an uncommanded incident only increases the size of the cluster. This
type of organizational thinking leads to catastrophe. These catastrophes have
well known names that become our classic mistake events. This problem is
pretty easy to fix . Make sure that someone is always in command, performing
the standard functions. Mabel down at communications can support getting
command in place by simply asking over the tactical channel, "Who is in com-

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 Functions of COl1unand Chapter 7

mand?" If Mabel doesn't do this, the responding chief should.

The responding chief should generally stay off the radio until he/she arrives
on the scene. The exception to this rule is when basic organizational stuff
isn't being addressed. If the first arriving unit doesn't assume command, the
chief should ask alarm, over the tactical channel, to verify that someone is in
command. This should in most cases help "wake up" whoever was supposed
to be the initial IC to assume command. If the first-in unit gives an incom­
plete onscene report, like simply announcing, "Engine 7 on scene, and the
horizon looks like a nuclear device was just exploded," the responding chief
should ask for a condition/progress repOli. In many cases this is all that is
needed to kick start the system into gear.

The most logical way to go through the progression of salvaging incident

command is to look at what defines being "command." The job description
for the IC is packaged up in the eight functions of command so it only makes
sense to use those same functions to get control back.

Assume, Confirm, Position Command & Continuing,

Transferring, and Terminating Command.
The Chief upgrades command when he/she arrives on the scene and transfers
and takes command. Many times when there is a command problem present,
this command transfer will physically move command from an out-of-balance,
fast-attacking (interior) command mode, and place it in an under-control
(exterior) command mode. In most cases, the second IC (the chief) is better
versed and more experienced in incident management, along with being in a
better physical position, to handle all the activities, tasks, and decision
making that is required to get the incident back under control. Once the
chief transfers command, he/she needs to stay inside the command post,
which is in most cases his/her response vehicle. The last thing an out-of­
control situation needs is an out-of-control chief running around the
incident scene. The command post should be parked in a position that
offers a good view of the incident, but is out of the way for apparatus to
access the immediate area. The new IC should keep all the windows rolled up
with the doors locked. Out-of-control incidents usually come equipped with
lots of (out-of-control) people, who "need" to talk with the chief. Everyone
makes their way over to the command post, so they can engage in some type
of personal dialogue with the new Ie. If these folks have something impor­
tant to say, they need to do it over the radio. The chief's aide needs to deflect
all these distractions from the IC, so the chief can spend his/her time and
energy getting the incident back under control.

During early periods of initial IMS development as everyone is trying to learn

and fit into the new system, it's pretty natural for a line to form outside the
command post. The folks in this line are accustomed to dealing with the IC
face to face. A smart (and humane) way to deal with them is to position a
liaison sector officer outside the CP, who can communicate, support and direct

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Chapter 7 Functions of ComTnand

them to the right place/function. During the critique, their needs should be
analyzed and training directed to everyone to get them into the regular IMS,
using standard SOPs. Over time, everyone just naturally gets taken care of in
the standard work cycle and communications process, and the CP becomes the
strategic worksite of the IC, and not the incident gathering place. Using
Snickers bars and bottled water now attracts responders to the rehab area,
where we can better meet their physical recovery and social gathering needs.

In "salvage situations," the new IC must resist the urge to become preoccupied
(and distracted) with the fact that the initial IC missed the front-end window
of opportunity to get the incident started off under control. At this point, the
important issue is that the incident is (in fact) out of control. The reasons and
details of the command and control difficulties should be addressed in the
post-incident critique or with a private conversation after the incident. The
new IC must put all of his/her time and energy into getting the incident organ­
ized, and making sure that all the workers are safe.

If there is an in-place IC, the chief should follow the regular transfer of com­
mand procedures (described in the next chapter) and simply become the new
IC. If there is not an IC effectively in place in a standard way, the chief
assumes command by announcing that he/she in on the scene and giving an on
scene report. This initial report does several powerful things that positively
impact gaining control :
• Puts an IC in place
• Establishes level 1 staging for all responding resources
• Sends the message over the tactical channel that someone is in charge.

The initial report activates the command system and serves as the basis of
identifying the roles and responsibilities cf all the incident players. This
reduces everyone's confusion level.

Taking over an out-of-control incident is not an easy task. The new IC will
need a certain amount of support (and love). This will depend on how many
units have been deployed into the hazard zone, and the level of risk those units
have been exposed to. A lone IC may be initiating command operations at the
ragged edge of his/her capability. An IC that is equipped with an aide will be
in a much stronger position. The aide takes over the tactical work sheet while
the IC manages the tactical channel and strategic decision making. This puts
the new IC in a much stronger position to do the other six functions, and to
round up the incident players and get them back into the fold.

Situation Evaluation
The second IC begins the evaluation process at the time of dispatch. When
Mabel shares the dispatch with all the responders, she will include all the
available standard information. Two of the biggest evaluation nuggets are the
occupancy type and the problem. As the IC responds, he/she will get a far off
look at whatever is going on (large thermal columns, plaid smoke, gigantic

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 Functions of Command Chapter 7

ants, etc.). Another piece of key information is the running commentary of

the on-scene players that is being broadcast over the tactical radio channel.
The radio traffic will be the chief's first indicator of whether or not the inci­
dent is under control. The radio traffic should match up to the conditions. If
IC #1 gives an initial report of, "A deep-seated fire in the rocket fuel plant.
We're going in on tank water and making an interior attack with the booster
line," they should be stopped and redirected. The responding chief needs to
(in this example) get on the tactical channel and order everyone to stage at
least a quarter mile away.

A problem occurs when the first-in IC gives a vague or incomplete on-scene

repOli. It is very frustrating when you are responding to a column of smoke,
that is visible from outer space, and the first-in unit reports that they are "On
the scene of a working fire, going in for fire attack." The next due IC (and
everyone else responding on the call) only knows that something is on fire.
The quickest and easiest way to rectify this is to contact the on-scene IC,
over the tactical channel, and ask what is on fire and for a progress report.
The long-term solution is to critique, train and reinforce standard on-scene
reporting. The best way to build the habit (and ability) of good size up is
to build the skills of good on-scene reporting, in accordance with SOPs.
Simply, you can't give an acceptable report without doing adequate size up.

The most urgent evaluation item is the safety of the firefighters. Many times,
the IC is making this determination before he/she says anything on the radio.
The chief will gather lots of size-up information during his/her response.
Radio traffic that doesn't match the conditions (from a distance) must produce
red-flag warnings to the responding chief. When the chief arrives on the
scene, he/she has to quickly figure out what the critical incident factors are­
the first one (and most important) the IC already knows, things are out of
balance. If the incident has burned beyond the window of effective (i.e., safe,
survivable) interior operations, the IC has got to immediately move everyone
out to safe, exterior positions. The quickest way for the new IC to do this, is
by requesting emergency traffic, and ordering everyone to evacuate the struc­
ture. If the chief has the option, he/she can get a great deal of visual
information by doing a 360-degree drive around of the incident site, before
locating the command post in a semi-permanent spot. This will show condi­
tions on all four sides of the building (for structure fires). This will provide
the basis for the chief to deploy resources where they are needed .

When the IC js taking command of an out-of-control situation, the first order

of business is to make sure that everyone is safe. This must be part of the size
up and is only possible if the IC knows:
1. Who is on the scene?
2. Where are they, and what are they doing?

This is information that is available:

• On the original dispatch or from the communications center
• Listening to the tactical channel while responding

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Chapter 7 Functions of Command

• From the initial IC after transferring command

• Or, by the IC asking alarm to indicate who is assigned to that incident

Once the IC figures out the status of all the incident players, he/she can con­
tinue sizing up the incident and focus on the critical factors that must be
addressed.

Situation evaluation is centered on the critical incident factors, as they relate

to the risk-management plan, and the tactical priorities. After the chief trans­
fers command, the next order of business is to find out what units are in place
and operating, and what resources are uncommitted (responding or staged). If
somebody cannot be accounted for, the IC quickly changes operations, imple­
menting standard lost, trapped, or missing firefighter procedures. After the IC
accounts for all assigned resources, then he/she can proceed with the rest of
the size up. Based on the critical factors, the IC needs to determine if the
appropriate strategy is being used. This decision is based on:
• The IC's visual size-up from the command post. (This size up includes
standard conditions, fire profile, building layout, interior access, obvi­
ous safety concerns, etc.)
• Conditions/progress reports from operating sectors/companies
• The length of time units have been engaging the incident problem, and
how long it will take to move them to safe locations, when switching
from offensive to defensive strategies (if necessary).

A major part of the size-up process is a determination of our ability to com­

plete the standard tactical priorities. If the new IC's initial size up indicates
that the troops are seriously threatened, this implies an immediate change in
the lAP. When the safety profile for fully-protected firefighters is so severe
that their safety becomes the most immediate priority, the new IC must ask
(and answer) these two, key size-up questions:

Are there savable lives?

The answer to this question must be based on a realistic analysis of the inci­
dent situation. A single-family residence, with a working fire at 3:00 a.m. is a
completely different situation than the same fire in a vacant, locked-up/board­
ed-up commercial building. The search and rescue pliority is a ten for an
occupied house-especially if there are reliable reports that people are inside.
A vacant burning structure has a much lower search and rescue priority. The
effective IC knows that we use the same standard system to manage a dynam­
ic and wide range of incidents that are in a variety of stages. We use this
standard system to make strategic determinations, implement action plans, and
manage the troops in obtaining the custooer-service objectives, while keeping
them (the troops) safe. Size up is where the IC evaluates fire conditions and
the other critical factors (like occupancy type and use), against the tactical pri­
orities. It is absolute lunacy to begin every single fire operation under the
assumption that the building is full of cooing babies and white fluffy puppies.
This is the mindset that "offensive no matter what" kamikaze firefighters use
to justify their habitual non-thinking offensive actions (aka "rescue alibi").

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

 Functions of Command Chapter 7

What are the conditions?

The amount and intensity of the products of combustion becomes the environ­
ment in which the new Ie must manage operations. The products of
combustion have a very predictable effect on the structure, the contents, and
any unprotected people inside that fire area. The capability of any fire attack
is directly tied to the size and intensity of the fire. The basic principle is sim­
ple. When the fire takes control of a certain percentage of the structure, the
outcome (i.e., defensive) is quickly moving toward a foregone defensive con­
clusion. Even if a rabid, unsafe and misdirected offensive attack is able to
extinguish the fire, the outcome still remains the same. Any unprotected peo­
ple or property in the fire area are almost instantly affected, and if the forward
fire progress is not quickly stopped, they will be lost. Several days later, vic­
torious firefighters can drive by the scene of their latest high-risk conquest and
watch DeWorth Brown (our favorite demolition crew) haul it off to the place
where all completely and partially burned up buildings go (the dump).

The reader must visualize where (and when) the Ie is trying to connect oper­
ating positions with incident conditions. What is going on at this time is
typically crude and not very precise. In spite of all the fancy and sophisticat­
ed theories about how decision making occurs, what the Ie generally does is
quickly evaluate conditions, select an attack option that matches what has
worked in the past, and uses that decision to take a shot at solving the incident
problem. If that decision works, which it does most of the time, the Ie uses
that plan to complete the operation. If that plan does not work, then the team
must change the size, location and approach of the attack. This process must
occur in the most violent, dangerous, unforgiving, environment within an
almost impossible time frame. To do this, effectively, requires an enormous
amount of experience, practice, intelligence, and courage. This is particularly
true as subsequent mTiving officers reinforce and expand command, by going
through the command transfer process.

The new Ie has to "guess" what conditions looked like when the gang first
got there, and compare that to what they currently look like. Unorganized
beginnings are often the result of the initial attackers being greeted with rapid­
ly expanding, late-stage offensive conditions. Effective actions generally
aren 't the problem during these scenarios. The initial attack wave can become
so focused on eliminating the incident problem, that it doesn't properly imple­
ment the incident management system. The new Ie must factor the effect the
initial attack had (or didn't have). It is a bad sign when the new Ie arrives on
the scene five minutes after the initial attack wave began operations, and con­
ditions have not improved or have gotten worse. This is a very dangerous
point in the operation . The Ie can sometimes reinforce the initial attack and
make things bigger/better, but must remember that it is always better, safer
and less painful to switch to a defensive strategy, too early, as opposed to too
late. Whether an all clear has been obtained will impact this decision, but it is
important to keep in mind that the fire really doesn't care. If the fire has eaten
up enough of the structure, then it is only a matter of time (a short time) until
the building falls down. Time is the Ie's (and everyone else's) enemy.

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

- - -- .. -­
 Chapter 7 Functions of Command

Putting out the fire makes the operation safer and buys time to complete all
the tactical priorities. If the fire is burning "past" the offensive efforts, and the
attack isn't controlling the fire, interior forces are venturing closer to "no­
man's land."

The IC must estimate the amount of time it will take to move the troops out of
the structure under normal circumstances. let alone in the midst of the exciting
final stages of offensive operations, when the fire is beginning to overpower
the attack. If the fire has burned beyond the window of effective interior oper­
ations, the IC must inunediately repositiw everyone out to safe and more
effective exterior positions. The quickest way for the new IC to make this
strategic shift is by requesting emergency traffic over the tactical radio chan­
nel, announcing that, "We are going defensive," and then individually calling
(and verifying) each company and sector to assure that they evacuate/abandon
the structure. A big piece of this decision will be based on both visual evalua­
tion from the command post, and reports the IC gets from units operating in
forward areas, which brings us to conununications.

Comlnunications
Controlling the communications process is always vital for the Ie. The IC is
going to get the incident back under control by talking over the radio. The
major tools the IC has at his/her disposal are the radio, a tactical work sheet,
and, if he/she's lucky, an aide. Yes-we aTe going to "put it out over the radio."
The days of the chief showing up and standing in the middle of the street, fully
turned out in battle dress, so the troops get a warm fuzzy feeling, and know
everything is going to be okay just by his very presence, are over. The same
out-of-date procedure that takes the chief to the inside of the structure, so
he/she can direct and personally run things is also history. The IC cannot hope
to gain control of an out-of-control incident by suiting up (most of them didn't
bother with turnouts anyway-it slowed them down) and going inside to make
it all better. The IC has got to be outside, managing the incident from inside a
command post. The conunand post provides the IC with the most ideal (as is
possible) communications center at the scene of the incident. This is why we
send an IC to the scene. The last thing an out-of-control situation needs is a
WE'VE CAPTURED THEIR LEADER higher ranking, out-of-control officer showing up to add another layer of confu­
sion. What most out-of-control incidents lack is a command presence over the
tactical channel that is running the whole show. These incidents tend to have
plenty of Indians, they generally don't have a chief (chief = a real IC operating
in the conunand mode, who is managing the functions of conunand).

The IC is going to start the transfer of conunand process over the radio by
contacting the current IC (if one is actually in place) and letting him/her know
that he/she is taking command. Example:
"Battalion 1 to command."
"This is command go ahead Battalion 1."
"Be advised I'm on the scene and I will be assuming command."
"1 copy, Be 1 is taking command"

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

 Functions of Command Chapter 7

What are the conditions?

The amount and intensity of the products of combustion becomes the environ­
ment in which the new Ie must manage operations. The products of
combustion have a very predictable effect on the structure, the contents, and
any unprotected people inside that fire area. The capability of any fire attack
is directly tied to the size and intensity of the fire. The basic principle is sim­
ple. When the fire takes control of a certain percentage of the structure, the
outcome (i.e., defensive) is quickly moving toward a foregone defensive con­
clusion. Even if a rabid, unsafe and misdirected offensive attack is able to
extinguish the fire, the outcome still remains the same. Any unprotected peo­
ple or property in the fire area are almost instantly affected, and if the forward
fire progress is not quickly stopped, they will be lost. Several days later, vic­
torious firefighters can drive by the scene of their latest high-risk conquest and
watch DeWorth Brown (our favorite demolition crew) haul it off to the place
where all completely and partially burned up buildings go (the dump).

The reader must visualize where (and when) the Ie is trying to connect oper­
ating positions with incident conditions. What is going on at this time is
typically crude and not very precise. In spite of all the fancy and sophisticat­
ed theories about how decision making occurs, what the Ie generally does is
quickly evaluate conditions, select an attack option that matches what has
worked in the past, and uses that decision to take a shot at solving the incident
problem. If that decision works, which it does most of the time, the Ie uses
that plan to complete the operation. If that plan does not work, then the team
must change the size, location and approach of the attack. This process must
occur in the most violent, dangerous, unforgiving, environment within an
almost impossible time frame. To do this, effectively, requires an enormous
amount of expelience, practice, intelligence, and courage. This is particularly
true as subsequent arriving officers reinforce and expand command, by going
through the command transfer process.

The new Ie has to "guess" what conditions looked like when the gang first
got there, and compare that to what they currently look like. Unorganized
beginnings are often the result of the initial attackers being greeted with rapid­
ly expanding, late-stage offensive conditions. Effective actions generally
aren't the problem during these scenarios. The initial attack wave can become
so focused on eliminating the incident problem, that it doesn ' t properly imple­
ment the incident management system. The new Ie must factor the effect the
initial attack had (or didn't have). It is a bad sign when the new Ie arrives on
the scene five minutes after the initial attack wave began operations, and con­
ditions have not improved or have gotten worse. This is a very dangerous
point in the operation. The Ie can sometimes reinforce the initial attack and
make things bigger/better, but must remember that it is always better, safer
and less painful to switch to a defensive strategy, too early, as opposed to too
late. Whether an all clear has been obtained will impact this decision, but it is
important to keep in mind that the fire really doesn't care. If the fire has eaten
up enough of the structure, then it is only a matter of time (a short time) until
the building falls down. Time is the IC's (and everyone else's) enemy.

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

- - -- ._._--­
 Chapter 7 Functions of C01nmand

Putting out the fire makes the operation safer and buys time to complete all
the tactical priorities. If the fire is burning "past" the offensive efforts, and the
attack isn't controlling the fire, interior forces are venturing closer to "no­
man's land."

The IC must estimate the amount of time it will take to move the troops out of
the structure under normal circumstances. let alone in the midst of the exciting
final stages of offensive operations, when the fire is beginning to overpower
the attack. If the fire has burned beyond the window of effective interior oper­
ations, the IC must immediately reposition everyone out to safe and more
effective exterior positions. The quickest way for the new IC to make this
strategic shift is by requesting emergency traffic over the tactical radio chan­
nel, announcing that, "We are going defensive," and then individually calling
(and verifying) each company and sector to assure that they evacuate/abandon
the structure. A big piece of this decision will be based on both visual evalua­
tion from the command post, and reports the IC gets from units operating in
forward areas, which brings us to communications.

Communications
Controlling the communications process is always vital for the Ie. The IC is
going to get the incident back under control by talking over the radio. The
major tools the IC has at his/her disposal are the radio, a tactical work sheet,
and, if he/she's lucky, an aide. Yes-we a::-e going to "put it out over the radio."
The days of the chief showing up and standing in the middle of the street, fully
turned out in battle dress, so the troops get a warm fuzzy feeling, and know
everything is going to be okay just by his very presence, are over. The same
out-of-date procedure that takes the chief to the inside of the structure, so
he/she can direct and personally run things is also history. The IC cannot hope
to gain control of an out-of-control incident by suiting up (most of them didn't
bother with turnouts anyway-it slowed them down) and going inside to make
it all better. The IC has got to be outside, managing the incident from inside a
command post. The command post provides the IC with the most ideal (as is
possible) communications center at the scene of the incident. This is why we
send an IC to the scene. The last thing an out-of-control situation needs is a
we"VE CAPTURED THEIR LEADER higher ranking, out-of-control officer showing up to add another layer of confu­
sion. What most out-of-control incidents lack is a command presence over the
tactical channel that is running the whole show. These incidents tend to have
plenty of Indians, they generally don't have a chief (chief = a real IC operating
in the command mode, who is managing t;le functions of command).

The IC is going to start the transfer of command process over the radio by
contacting the cunent IC (if one is actually in place) and letting him/her know
that he/she is taking command. Example:
"Battalion 1 to command."
"This is command go ahead Battalion 1."
"Be advised I'm on the scene and I will be assuming command."
"I copy, Be 1 is taking command"

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

 Functions of Comnwnd Chapter 7

The Ie must become connected to all the incident players . The Ie uses the
radio to accomplish this. The major and most obvious evidence that an in­
place and operating Ie exists is if there is some audible evidence that he/she is
managing the incident over the radio. It is vital that the Ie quickly takes con­
trol of the incident communications process. When the initial Ie doesn't take
charge of incident communications, companies tend to give reports to no one
in particular, and pretty much take independent action. The problem when
there is not an Ie in place, managing and controlling communications, is that
none of the action gets recorded, tracked, coordinated or controlled. On the
other hand, sometimes people will talk too much on the radio. The Ie needs
to shut these blabbermouths up and use that airtime to regain control of the
incident. A major way the Ie uses to bring the incident back under control is
to become the central player over the radio.

Before the Ie starts talking, he/she should have an lAP formulated so he/she
can attach the communications to some type of lucid plan. The new Ie should
contact all operating companies/sectors and get reports describing their loca­
tion, what they are doing, what conditions they are encountering, and if they
are okay. Once the Ie secures, records and tracks this information, and
assumes control of the communications process, he/she can move ahead to
controlling the troops and the deployment process.

Deployment
The Ie gains and maintains control of the deployment process by becoming
the central management player for the incident. The Ie seizes control of
the deployment process by requesting resources (usually in the form of
alarms), assigning units, and tracking their locations. The incident man­
agement system works when there is a single, in-place, and operating Ie
who can manage the deployment of everyone operating at the incident
scene. This is an "ahead-of-the-event" organizational agreement.
Staging procedures provide the foundation (i.e., "entry gate") for manag­
ing the arrival and assignment of incident scene resources . Freelancing
in the beginning of the incident is the nasty effect of ineffective front­
end deployment management. Staging procedures define, ahead of the
event, how units will approach the scene, receive an assignment, and go to
work. If responding companies don't announce their arrival on the scene, and
they take independent action, sending the most capable and seasoned Ie to the
scene is an exercise in futility. All the incident scene participants must abide
by the organizational rules (staging SOPs), that describe how they arrive on
the scene and get plugged into the IC's lAP. The Ie cannot bring this part of
the deployment cycle into balance during the event; it must be something
agreed upon (organizationally) ahead of time.

We routinely respond to incidents that are out of control (that's what we get
paid for and the reason our communities provide us with beautiful red, gold­
leafed, fire engines with polished aluminum wheels that can pump 1500 GPM
at draft). The last thing that we should do when we get to the scene of the

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

Chapter 7 Functions of Command

customer's out-of-control problem, is become out of control ourselves. This

operational approach (being out of contrcl) can happen when the initial group
of problem solvers arrives at the scene and there is a lot of work that must be
done very quickly. When the initial IC gets so caught up in the task level that
the functions of command go undone, it sets up the entire incident scene
organization to begin unraveling . When a fast-attacking company officer IC
(lC #1) assigns more than two or three units, they are at the very edge of their
command effectiveness. If this initial attack hit doesn ' t control the incident
problem, command needs to be transferred to an IC who will be operating out
of a command post (i.e., the chief-IC #2).

The new IC uses the other seven functions of command to manage deploy­
ment. Doing these other seven functions puts the IC in a position where
he/she can manage the position and funct ion of all operating resources (the
true test of the system). If any of the other seven functions are out of balance,
they must be "fixed" before the IC can control deployment.

Q When the new IC takes over an incident that has turned into
~ a freelancing party, he/she has got to regain control over the
units already operating, while keeping the uncommitted
resources in available and "deployable" positions (staged).
Getting freelancing companies back into the assignment invento­
ry and tracking system can be like trying to put toothpaste back
into the tube. The only way t8 get the previously deployed units
incorporated into the IC's lAP is to transfer command (Function
#8), contact them over the radio (Function #3), find out where they
are and what they are doing (Fur:ction #7), what conditions they are
encountering (Function #2), make sure the actions match the strategy
and lAP (Function #5), and assign them initial sector officer responsibilities
(Function #6) ... try that with PowerPoint.

Sometimes uncommanded (i.e., screwed up) incidents will produce companies

working in positions and doing things that are simply not salvageable. The IC
should not attempt to salvage such ineffective and/or unsafe tactical positions,
and must cut the losses, and move resources to new places and functions that
support the lAP.

The IC manages deployment by using a tactical work sheet to record and track
all assigned resources. This is vital. While it is duck soup for an IC to easily
keep track of a couple engines and a ladder company off the top of his/her
head, it isn't going to work for bigger, fast-paced, longer-duration operations.
The IC needs to start recording unit assignments from the onset of the inci­
dent. Recording this information should begin at dispatch (this is only
possible if you have someone driving you to the incident). The tactical work
sheet is the standard recording form, and serves as the IC's "blueprint" for
keeping track of who is assigned to the incident, along with where they are,
and who they are assigned to (which sector). Command must keep the tacti­
cal work sheet current and accurate.

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

- - - - - --
 Functions of Command Chapter 7

One of the first deployment-related items the IC must determine is if there are
enough resources assigned to the incident. The IC has got to provide enough
resource in time to overpower the incident problem. If the initial attack activi­
ties are in the proper positions, these positions can be re-enforced if required.
If the first responders have put themselves in ineffective or unsupportable
positions, the IC must play catch up and get resources to where they are need­
ed. If all it takes to accomplish this is a few minor adjustments with already
in-place companies, this will be easier for the IC to pull off. If wholesale
position changes are called for, the IC should plan to fill these key tactical
positions with new companies. This may double the resource requirements
that are needed to effectively solve the incident problem.

The IC must maintain an ongoing awareness of where the workers are and if
they are safe. Accountability on the strategic level is accomplished by main­
taining the tactical work sheet, and periodically getting PARs from all
units/sectors that are operating in the hazard zone. The IC adds another layer
of safety capability by assigning RIC crews to positions where they will most
likely be needed.

The IC should always maintain an uncommitted tactical reserve. If conditions

change, and the IC needs to go to plan B, he/she may need exJra companies to
make the operational change. It is a bad feeling when you desperately need
another company to take on a critical task, and your next available unit is ten
minutes away. The IC avoids this "command nausea" by maintaining a tacti­
cal reserve in staging.

Incidents that require lots of resources are going to need more command part­
ners to help the IC with controlling and
managing deployment. An important part of the
deployment process is managed in the rehab sec­
tor. Long duration incidents require the cycling
of companies in and out of rehab. When units
are assigned to rehab , they need to report there
with their crews intact. When personnel are ade­
quately rested, hydrated, and evaluated, they
should be located in an "on-deck" forward stag­
ing area adjacent to rehab. This area needs to be
staffed by someone who reports back to the
command post, with the inventory of units that
are available. This provides the IC with a
resource pool that is close and convenient.

Strategy-Incident Action Plan & Review, Evaluation, and Revision of

the Attack Plan.
It is second nature for firefighters to take quick (instant) action when they get
to the scene. One of the by-products of this instinctive urge to automatically
engage the incident problem can be an incomplete size up and an inadequate
(or no) incident action plan. Fast action feels good. As later aniving units get

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

Chapter 7 Functions of Command

to the scene, their natural reaction is to support the efforts of the initial attack­
ers. This is commonly refelTed to as the "ready, fire, aim syndrome." When
the new Ie arrives on the scene and transfers command, he/she is in the unen­
viable position of having to make sense of where all the previously deployed
resources are, find out what they are doir:.g, and if they are safe. The new Ie
then has to figure out how to rein them back into the system, and incorporate
them into the incident action plan. At a slow-moving incident, the new Ie
may get a whopping two minutes to pull this off. A fast moving fire at 3:00 in
the morning may only offer the Ie a few seconds to somehow begin to move
everyone out of the building, before very bad things happen.

The first thing that the new Ie must confirm and verify is that the strategy
matches CUlTent incident conditions. An initial, fast-attacking company officer
Ie will usually be located inside and up close to the incident problem. From
inside, it is impossible to evaluate overall incident conditions. The problem
can be several minutes old, and conditior:s may have changed since the initial
Ie arrived and went inside. What may have appeared to be a nice, neat little
offensive fire two to three minutes ago may have become a big, ugly "get-out­
now" defensive situation.

The effective Ie must constantly evaluate the hazards present to the workers.
When deciding the strategy, formulating, evaluating, and revising the incident
action plan, the Ie should ask the question, "What difference will our attack
efforts make, and is the risk I'm taking with my firefighters, worth what I'm
trying to accomplish?" When the building has disappeared in clouds of pres­
surized smoke, and the reports from operating units are full of bad news, it is
time to punt and change strategies (from offensive to defensive). If firefight­
ing forces are having difficulty maintaining interior positions, due to the heat
and smoke, it is a safe assumption that any unprotected occupants, along with
any property, are essentially lost within that fire area. At this point in the
operation, the tactical priorities within that given fire area now only apply to
the IC's troops. The Ie has got to rescue the workers from fatal operating
positions!conditions. The quickest and simplest way to do this is by calling
for emergency traffic and telling everyone to get out to a safe location (out of
collapse zones), then verify (over the radio) by making specific contact with
sectors and companies that they have a PAR, and are in fact out and away.

After the new Ie determines the correct strategy, he/she must come up with a
revised incident action plan. The lAP describes how the tactical priorities are
going to be completed. lAPs for defensive fires establish cut off points for the
fire, while clearly defining unsafe areas (collapse zones). lAPs for offensive
fires describe and assign area (usually sector) responsibilities for getting all
clears and fire control. To do this, the Ie has got to find out what and where
the fire is, if the fire can be controlled, and what areas have been searched,
along with what areas still need to be searched.

The last thing an out-of-control (or even under-control) incident needs is a

twelve-page incident action plan (in fact, if there is one, that could be the rea-

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

 Functions oj Comm.and Chapter 7

son the event is out of control). The simpler the lAP, the better
chance the Ie has to pull it off. The Ie can't pollute his/her mind E1
E2
with the details of every single task that is going to have to be e3
E4
L1
accomplished during the course of the incident. The fastest way to L2
R1
get everyone on the right (and same) page is to address the stuff e,
Be3
U1
that must be done flrst. Start with the assignments that impact get­
ting the fire area searched, controlling the fire and keeping
firefighters safe. Orders should be based on the tactical priori­
ties-"Get an all clear in the occupancy to the south. Keep the fire
fElO
from extending through the attic." The easiest way for the Ie to
~rJ
make sense out of this is with a tactical work sheet. A simple line
drawing of the building, the fire areallocation and the placement of
apparatus, attack lines and personnel is quick to sketch, and pro­
TACTICAL

vides an effective overview of where everyone is. The drawing WORK SHEET

provides a visual map of what the attack currently looks like, and
will help identify any uncovered tactical areas.

If previously deployed companies are in good tactical positions, the Ie should

leave them in place, contact these units and request progress reports. This
will provide the Ie with the most current info regarding the conditions,
progress, and any needs in those key tactical areas. Based on this info, the Ie
will add any needed re-enforcement to those positions, or start to place addi­
tional resources in uncovered tactical positions. Here are some rules of thumb
for placing units in key tactical positions for offensive fire attacks:
• First units to the immediate fire area for search, rescue and fire control.
• The area with the most critical life-safety potential should be addressed
next.
• The most dangerous direction/avenue of fire spread should be the next
area covered.
• The first support task (ladder/truck work) to be considered is ventilation
of the fire area.
• Any large space adjacent to the fire must be quickly checked for fire
extension. These areas include attics, floors above and below the fire
and basements. The construction features of the structure, along with
the location of the fire, are the determining factors in what order these
areas get checked.

Rule of thumb for defensive fires:

• Establish collapse zones and keep apparatus and personnel out of them
• Masterstreams on the main body of the fire
• Establish cutoff points from safe locations
• Surround and drown ... keep the buildings next door from burning
• Write off what is already lost
• Identify and protect exposures (best way is water/foam on them)

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

Chapter 7 Functions of Command

Organization
Organizing the incident scene is probably the quickest way to get the opera­
tion back under control. This is a lot simpler, if the Ie only has three or four
units operating at the scene, as opposed to six or more. The Ie builds the
organization using sectors. Once the Ie figures out who is operating in key
tactical positions/functions, he/she should assign the officers of those units
sector responsibilities. Any other personnel and resources operating within
that area get placed under that sector officer's control. This places all
assigned members under the IC's management-organization umbrella.

The Ie should start sectorizing as soon as possible-starting with the first

units in key positions then moving onto units in adjoining areas. Once the Ie
identifies who these companies are and contacts them over the radio for a
progress report, he/she should:
• Find out what conditions are in their area
• What other units they have operating with them and if they have a PAR
• Detelwine their progress toward completing the tactical priorities (res­
cue and fire control) or tasks
• Find out if they need any assistancelresources
• Assign them tasks that fit into the lAP
• Assign them as the sector officer for that area, and confirm what other
units/resources are assigned to them

The infOlwation the Ie collects from sectors gets plugged into evaluating the
lAP, and keeping it current. When the Ie has critical unknowns, he/she
assigns a company to those areas, assigns them initial sector officer responsi­
bilities and asks for a condition report on that unknown piece of information.

Once everybody is assigned to a sector, the Ie can more easily control the
position and function of all the incident scene players. This allows the Ie to
quickly make minor adjustments to the lAP and provides the quickest and
safest way to change strategies. Sectoring also reduces radio communications
and causes units assigned to the same area (sector) to work together. If opera­
tions within the sector are especially complex or hazardous, the Ie should
assign the sector to a chief officer, as quickly as possible. The Ie should also
assign a safety sector to monitor activities, and help manage the risk to
responders operating within that sector.

The Ie needs to assign any needed comrmmd support. This is where an aide
is so valuable. An Ie, along with an aide, have a lot better chance to bring a
rapidly deteriorating incident back under control, than a lone Ie does. Even if
the Ie comes equipped with an aide, eventually they will reach their critical
command velocity and will need to expand the command organization, based
on incident size, scope, and complexity. The Ie must do this before he/she
becomes overwhelmed. When the Ie is taking command of an out-of-control
situation, he/she has to do more in a shorter amount of time. The Ie must
quickly forecast if he/she will need more command support and call for

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

 Functions of Command Chapter 7

resources quickly. Whatever "command components" (section responsibilities

along with command team positions) the Ie doesn't delegate, he/she will end
up becoming directly responsible for. In significant situations, the lone Ie can
become quickly overpowered .

The Role of the Ie

Good outcomes are a product of effective, well-managed operations. These
outcomes are achieved by the combined efforts of the task-level workers. The
IC's role is to bring the efforts of all these different incident participants
together, using a current lAP, and managing the incident on the strategic level.
If the initial Ie allows incident management to become out of balance, the
next-in Ie has got to quickly establish his/her presence by transferring and
taking command. The Ie must manage the incident, and cannot allow the dif­
ferent pieces and parts of the incident to gang up and overwhelm
himlher. Effective incident management requires a continuous
series of operational adjustments that are the result of an effec­
tive review and revision system. Ideally, these adjustments
should be made automatically, by each level of the incident
organization, in a coordinated way, based on changing condi­
tions and the effect of action in their position . Incident
conditions are seldom ideal, and the Ie must in some cases take
the major revision role, in getting and keeping operations on a
safe and effective track.

Most local response systems dispatch multiple officers to significant incidents.

The coordinated participation of these officers is designed to strengthen the
command system, and to expand the effectiveness of the strategic level of
direction. The system only works, when every current Ie does the standard
Ie job. Simply, the system is designed for subsequent arriving officers to
help, not rescue, the cun·ent Ie (and many times in these situations, the
troops). The fairly extensive presentation on "salvage command" that we just
labored through, describes the recovery action required of the next Ie, in situ­
ations that are not effectively under control of the current Ie. Doing salvage
command is necessary (but not normal), and must be done only when the
standard command functions are not being performed. Operating systems
should not make the need for such salvage command efforts a habit. Salvage
command situations must be carefully and critically critiqued, and assistance
must be directed to the out-of-control Ie. The command system is designed
to be established at the beginning of our anival. When we fail to perform the
command functions the way they are designed to be done, we many times
miss that opportunity forever. Even the most capable and experienced Ie,
who comes into the middle of a screwed up incident, can only establish
enough control, so that we all (hopefully) get to go home.

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Chapter 7 Functions of COlnmand

COMMAND SAFETY
Sometimes responders are operating in their assigned positions doing their
part in the lAP, and conditions change in a way that produces "new hazards"
to those firefighters. The possibility (and severity) of those changes create the
need for the IC (and the entire command and operational team) to continually
evaluate and exchange information about those safety conditions, and to
always be in a position to revise how the troops are protected, when such
changes effect their welfare. Generally those dynamic situations involve a
rapid increase in fire/smoke levels, deteriorating structural conditions and/or
anything that limits, or seriously restricts, the exit options of inside crews.

The entire command process must automatically be set up by the IC from the
beginning of operations. Developing the ·'agility" (and natural anticipation) to
quickly respond to changing conditions must become a standard part of IMS.
The regular command functions establish the standard foundation for the
ongoing review and revision that must be performed to protect the hazard­
zone workers. Establishing strong (standard) initial command is the starting
point for effective incident control (Function #1). Critical incident evaluation
begins to identify the operating safety of current positions. The ongoing fore­
casting of changing conditions emerges from that initial evaluation (Function
#2). Having the IC quickly take control cf the communications process, cre­
ates the structure and system for the exchange of critical safety information
(Function #3). Providing adequate/appropriate resources creates the hardware,
human and system capability to "defend" the safety of operating positions
(Function #4). Quick, correct determination of the overall strategy causes the
IC to match inside/outside operating positions to current conditions (Function
#5). Creating an effective geographic and functional organization puts sector
bosses close to the workers, and to where the work is being done (Function
#6). Always performing these functions at every incident puts the IC in a
strong position to perform the review/revision function. Not doing the first six
functions does just the opposite, and when these functions are not established,
when they should be, we lose the capability to quickly and effectively respond
to changing conditions that threaten the safety and welfare of firefighters.

The IC must continually consider the standard review items that affect the
safety of incident operations. Critical-inc:dent factors describe the presence
and intensity of the most important conditions and provide the basis for decid­
ing how to connect a safe and effective response to those conditions. Creating
correct action is how things that are out-of-control are converted to under con­
trol. The IC must continually evaluate and adjust incident operations to
effectively make the connection between action and outcome. Worker safety
becomes a major consideration in that evaluation and adjustment. The size of
the operational effort will determine if the hazards, that are present, will be
overpowered, and if conditions will improve. The IC must provide and man­
age the resources that are required to back up and support the attack efforts.
These resources must provide an operational response that adequately protects
the workers in the hazard zone. Using these items as the major pieces of the

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

 Functions of Command Chapter 7

review and revision process gives the Ie the capability to continually make the
adjustments that cause the lAP to match CUITent conditions. There is a direct
connection between how closely the lAP matches current conditions, and the
safety of the workers. The more out-of-balance the lAP becomes with what's
going on now, the more unsafe the incident becomes. In fact, evaluating the
current level of worker safety is the most effective way (and should be the
starting point) to review operational effectiveness, and to determine the need
for revision-simply, the most compelling reason for the Ie to make a change
in the operation is that there is some problem with the safety of the troops.

Be very careful of what looks like a nothing (or not much) showing, benign­
looking event, that "sucks" the attackers inside and then puts the Ie to sleep.
Situations where the command-post inhabitants are sitting around talking on
their cell phones, slapping each other on the back and gossiping about the fire
chief are disasters waiting to happen. The Ie must always be implement­
ing, expanding, or managing the standard command functions, wherever
and whenever our workers are in the hazard zone, and there is any level
of hazard present (reread always and any). In fact, low-level offensive situa­
tions are (from a dynamic change standpoint) the most potentially dangerous
because they have the most space left on the severe end of the scale left to
change. Based on this "space" (on the scale), they create bigger chances for
us to make safety screw ups. The future of what are, upon our arrival, big
defensive events with fire equally distributed in every part of the building are
no big mystery. Just wait a minute and they will collapse and go out (no sur­
prise). What can be a big '01 surprise is when a situation that is 1.7 on the
scale, rockets to a 6.5 in what seems like thirty-eight seconds and there are fif­
teen inside workers up close and personal to the rocket going off.

Nothing will cause the bottom end of the Ie to become as intimately attached
to the command post seat cover as when what looked like a little nickel-dime
tactical deal caused (actually sucker punched) the Ie to skip all the standard
command stuff, and now a big-time problem that was hiding behind/under an
attic, ceiling, basement or wall pops out and captures the inside workers. This
causes the Ie to get a muffled mayday and now there is no system support set
up and in place to do what must be done to find/protect/remove the troops.
When it is time to revise, it is time to revise-this need is driven by changing
conditions that must trigger red-flag reactions in the Ie.

The physical incident conditions are going to change when and where the
incident chemistry and physics tell them to. These conditions could care less
if the command system is set up and if the Ie is in place ready to welcome the
change. To make it more difficult (and unsafe), this is absolutely the most
impossible time to attempt to establish (i.e., set up) the system components
that should have been put in place twenty minutes ago, when it was possible
to get them going, as a regular part of the command (functions) routine.
Sometimes, a response chief will arrive on the scene and become Ie #2 and
will inherit just such an out-of-balance situation. They must do whatever is
required to salvage command to establish the safety of the troops. If the

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

Chapter 7 Functions of Command

troops are in a position that is salvageable, the new Ie must add resources to
that spot-if the positions are not savable, the Ie must quickly reposition the
troops. Having to do salvage command sucks, and pretty much always
involves some safety problems. IMS is designed for subsequent arriving rank­
ing officers to help manage the challenge created by changing/expanding
incident conditions. The system is set up in a way that, if your immediate
subordinate is not operating according to SOPs, it's your responsibility to cor­
rect it. The system is not designed for those arriving officers to save the
incumbent Ie because they screwed up and failed to set up the standard sys­
tem. If this happens very often, senjor system managers must provide
whatever training, direction or inspiration required so the system is established
automatically every time.

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

 Functions of Command Chapter 7

CHAPTER 7

REVIEW, EVALUATION, AND REVISION

INCIDENT COMMANDER CHECKLIST:

• Regular command system elements established in the beginning provide

the framework for mjdpoint review- revision:

• strong standard command

• sectors
• SOPs
• risk-management plan
• strong communications
• standard strategy/action planning
• CatTY out command functions (one-eight) in a standard order
• Receive, confirm and evaluate conditions-progress reports
• Use standard strategy/action plan review as the checklist for revision:
• firefighter safety
• does strategy match conditions
• first, second, third priority progress
• correct action
• location of attack
• size of attack
• timing and support
• adequate back up
• adequate resources
• have a Plan B
• Quickly make transitions based on the safety profile of changing/fore­
casted conditions

• feedback from sectors/companies

• quick evaluation
• move the troops
• regroup-go to Plan B

Quickly provide "salvage command" if necessary

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Chapter 7 Functions of Command

Coaching Version
"Set up in the beginning so you can move and maintain control to always
match your current plan with the current conditions. Pay attention and keep
forecasting where the problems are going. Use strong sectors and ongoing
communications to stay in control and be effective. Control conditions by
controlling the troops and their action-don't live with a bad situation ... don't
stay in or reinforce bad positions ... evaluate, react, revise, do something differ­
ent, if it is required to get ahead of the incident problem. Always maintain a
way out of the hazard zone that is protected with attack lines and crews, so
firefighters are in a retrievable position. Always consider retreat and survival
(as an option), and be ready to move quickly. Unless there is a possible criti­
cal rescue, be extremely careful of having firefighters positioned closely to
desperate fire-control situations, where the only way they can possibly survive
is to put the fire out. Don't screw around with deteriorating conditions.
Establish a plan, and then keep it current-remember, it's almost impossible
to revise a non-plan."

Review, Evaluation, and Revision

FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND

CHAPTERS

CONTINUING, TRANSFERRING, AND

TERMINATING COMMAND

 Functions of Command Chapter 8

FUNCTIONSOFCOM~ND
CHAPTERS:

CONTINUING, TRANSFERRING, AND

TERMINATING COMMAND

MAJOR GOAL

TO PROVIDE THE REQUIRED DURATION OF COMMAND NECES­

SARY TO COMPLETE THE TACTICAL PRIORITIES, TO STANDARDIZE
HOW COMMAND IS TRANSFERRED AND UPGRADED, AND TO
INSURE THAT OPERATIONS ARE SAFELY CONCLUDED

Continuation of Command
The service-delivery process begins when the customer dials the three num­
bers that connect to Mabel, down in the communications center. Mabel turns
the customer's service request (fire, EMS, technical rescue, demonic posses­
sion ... ) into a dispatch that gets the first wave of problem solvers on the road.
The first person who anives on the scene of the customer's problem, initiates
command operations, along with taking some type of initial action that begins
to fix the incident problem. As later-arriving units show up, the IC assigns
them to the incident according to the lAP.

This command system provides us (and the customers) with the best shot at
effectively eliminating the incident problem. Thankfully, most of what's caus­
ing our customer's bad day is solved by the initial wave of responders (if not,
our communities would be vaporizing right now). The initial IC provides the
level of command needed for the vast majority of these kinds of service­
delivery events.

A fast-attacking, mobile IC can direct his/her crew and assign another several
units to the incident problem over their portable radio. If this first action
solves the problem (completes the tactical priorities), the evolution of com­
mand ends there. It is counterproductive to build a command organization
that is big enough to manage the invasion of a foreign country just to run a
simple two-engine, one-ladder assignment. Our standard objective is to pro­
vide enough command to manage the units that will be required, for the length
of time it is going to take to complete the tactical priorities for the incident.

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

~ -------------------------------------
 Chapter 8 Functions of Command

The ability of the Ie to effectively conduct command operations, over this

time period, determines the overall management effectiveness of the entire
operation. Every tactical situation involves a different combination of the
standard elements that affect the length and intensity of operations . A bed­
room fire in a small house may require a short, fairly low-intensity effort,
while a working fire in a larger, more complex commercial "target hazard"
may present a long, high-intensity effort. A fast-attacking IC's ability to be
the Ie "maxes out" fairly early on the time-intensity command scale. When
we look at the fa st-and-dirty position of such a fast attacker, we quickly real­
ize that they are not in a position to go much beyond the fairly early (i.e., low)
time-intensity stages . It's pretty tough to fill out the second wave of the attack
and build the functional support the attack organization is going to require,
when you 're inside the hazard area, up close and personal, fighting the inci­
dent problem and all the exiting stuff that problem is producing.

The fast-attacking Ie can put the necessary (and critical) front end in place of
the incident command operation but that is pretty much the limit anyone
should expect from him/her. At this (fast attack) point in the operation, the
only way to take command (along with the overall operation) to the next level,
is to transfer it to an Ie who will operate in the command mode located in a
strategic position (i.e., command post). This must be a requirement for any
operation that exceeds the fast- attacking IC's ability to manage. The incident
scene organization should never expand beyond what the Ie can effectively
manage-and this becomes the reason that multiple officers are routinely dis­
patched.

Occasionally, we encounter an incident thc.t the initial-attack wave cannot

overwhelm and fix (the fireworks factory). When this happens, the system
mu st be able to be quickly moved to the next level of command. This usually
happens when the chief (or whoever is the second-in IC) arrives on the scene.
TransfeITing, continuing and "bumping up" command to the next level is very
nice when the initial Ie took command, developed an lAP, assigned the next
several units to key tactical positions, and assigned them sector-officer respon­
sibilities within that plan. This sets up the next-in Ie to take over a
well-organized operation. This coordinated front-end effort allows the next­
in-line Ie to take command in a streamlined , coordinated manner, and to
continue efforts towards incident stabilizaCon, as opposed to having to salvage
the initial attack wave before moving forward (as discussed in the last riveting
chapter in the salvage command section).

The evaluation and planning that go into tre incident action plan must include
a size up of the size and profile of the command elements that will be required
to effectively and safely manage the incident. If thi s planning process is not
done, the Ie has not really provided for cO:ltinuing command. Using a bed­
room fire level of command on an incident in a commercial building will
always lead to a bad ending that will burn up a lot of savable property and
will place firefighters at unacceptable and unnecessary risk.

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

I
 Functions of Command Chapter 8

Continuing Command Factors

The IC considers the following major factors when deciding how to provide
continuing command:

• INCIDENT TYPE

Fire, medical, mass casualty, hazmat, technical rescue

• LIFE-SAFETY CHARACTERISTICS

Number, location and condition of victims, or potential victims

• FIRE-AREA PROFILE

Size, nature, and arrangement of fire load and exposures

• INCIDENT CONDITIONS

Fire location, intensity, and the direction and avenue of travel, hazmat

release, number of patients, etc.

FIREFIGHTER SAFETY

The position and function of the hazard-zone workers, in relation to the

standard risk-management plan

• SPECIAL FACTORS
Weather (what takes fifteen minutes to do in normal weather condi­
tions could take three hours in bad weather-wind, heat, cold), social
disturbances (riots, snipers, bad voodoo), not enough resources or the
right type of resources

The size and complexity of a tactical situation will regulate the duration of the
operation (duh!). The IC begins incident operations by initiating command
and managing all incident activities, until the incident is declared under con­
trol. At this point in the operation, the IC terminates command, having
commanded everything in between-kinda' like a command-filled creme
doughnut. This in-between part (the command creme filling) varies the most
in regard to size and complexity of the operation. The longer the event, the
more the IC will depend on, use, and delegate the basic command functions.
More complex operations require a larger, command and control organization
and a larger/more specialized commitment of resources. During this impor­
tant period of the fire fight, it is the IC's job to continue the essential
command functions until the standard rescue, property protection, and cus­
tomer stabilization outcomes are achieved.

The IC must overmatch incident conditions with the response he/she can
assemble and manage. Short and active operations require the IC to call for
the required number of resources, hit the fire hard, and overpower it quickly.
In these cases, the middle period is short and tough, yet really feels good
when done effectively.

When faced with larger incidents, the IC must conduct campaign operations
over a longer period of time. Operations will be effective only to the extent

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

Chapter 8 Functions of Command

that they can get and stay ahead of the incident problem and overpower it.
The combination of size, high-operational intensity, and long duration will test
the entire service delivery system in the most severe way.

If the Ie is going to win, he/she must be prepared to establish and sustain

effective operations longer than the incident problem is able to last. If the Ie
runs out of gas before the fire stops, he/she (along with everyone else with the
exception of the incident problem) loses. The implementation and operation
of the command functions covered earlier, provides the basic framework for
the Ie to extend the direction, control, and support necessary during the entire
operation. It would be foolish and frustrating to develop a command structure
that did not last for as long as it was needed.

During the course of these longer, "high-octane" events, the assigned compa­
nies will work until they become tired. Tlen they will, as a standard
procedure, cycle through rehab until they are revitalized enough to re-join the
fracas. The one person who is usually overlooked in getting to rest between
rounds is the Ie and the command team. Managing fast-paced and dangerous
incidents can be both mentally and emotionally draining. Several things affect
how long someone can remain in command. The biggest factor is how well
the Ie is supported . An Ie in a command position with a support officer, sen­
ior advisor, and full-blown command staff may be able to manage an incident
for several hours, whereas a "Lone-Ranger" Ie may become fried after thirty
minutes of managing an intense, significant, fast-moving incident.

The Ie should begin incident operations with a realistic size up and prediction
of what level of "command" will ultimate~y be required. The Ie needs to
"grow" the incident organization at a pace and rate that he/she can manage.
The capability of the IMS to escalate both the operational and command lev­
els is how the system matches itself to the profile of the incident. The Ie uses
the functions of command as the tools to pull off this escalation. The Ie must
balance all the system parts as operations are extended. If the incident
resources are added faster than command can organize and manage, then the
incident response is out of control. This can happen at any point during the
operation for a variety of reasons:

The Ie is in the wrong command position.

This is generally a result of the initial Ie (a company officer) starting com­
mand operations off in the fast-attack mode. As a general rule, a fast­
attacking Ie can assign and manage two or three other units. This first wave
of incident management should end in one of two standard ways-the incident
is brought under control, or command is transfened to an Ie (usually the
chief) who will be operating in the command mode, and on the strategic level.
If the fast-attacking Ie is left in command of an expanding operation, he/she
will eventually vapor lock and shut down, or ignore being the Ie altogether,
and take company-level action, doing what they really want to do-fight fire.
It is unrealistic to wrap the Ie in the therrral and respiratory protection need-

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 8

ed to operate and survive in a burning structure, and expect him/her to assign

another alarm and a half to the incident, from inside that burning building.
The fast-attacking IC is in no position to keep track of assigned resources,
control the communications process, keep the overall incident action plan cur­
rent, deploy resources according to that well-thought out and current plan,
while forecasting probable outcomes along with a back-up plan. The simple
solution to this problem is to take advantage of the first-aniving officer who
sets up effective fast action and then to transfer command to an IC who will
operate on the strategic level in the command mode (inside a command post).

The IC becomes overwhelmed.

Just as the fast-attacking IC can only do so much in the way of incident
management (based on hislher position), the same holds true for an IC
operating in the command mode. In large-scale, complex or unusually
hazardous operations, a Lone-Ranger IC can become quickly over­
whelmed and shut down, just like his/her fast-attacking counterpart-just
at a somewhat higher level. The solution to this dilemma is to support the
IC in a timely fashion. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways. The
most common, is to equip the IC with a full-time assistant-a.k.a. an aide,
FIT (Field Incident Technician), Buggy Boy, etc. This dynamic duo can be
further supported by using the command team that is outlined in Chapter 5,
Organization. The command organization must always be able to keep track
of, and manage, the position and function of the incident resources/personnel
and recognize, forecast, and evaluate critical factors.

The IC and/or the rest of the command organization

are ground down and worn out.
The effective IC manages the work force in such a way that leads to the best
possible incident outcome. Incident-time lines for local responders on the tac­
tical level are, for the most part, of a short duration. This is the nature of our
work-buildings bum for a short period of time (in most cases, we put them
out before they run out of fuel), patients can only bleed for so long until they
are gone for good, etc. While these types of incidents are like roller-coaster
rides, they don't last all that long; occasionally, we do get an all-nighter that
will test the endurance of the IC and his/her troops. The rest and rehab of
personnel becomes very critical at these types of events. If the IC wears the
workforce out during the first forty-five minutes of a five-hour event, there
will be no one left to do manual labor-type stuff. The same principle applies
to the Ie. Incident management can be a lot like ironing. After you do it for
a few hours, it just wears you out. The IC is human-just like everyone else,
and needs periodic rest periods, and to be relieved when he/she has reached
his/her critical, command-overload point. A regular piece of planning for
extended (campaign), service-delivery events should include deciding how
long a person stays in command of the operation. Operations that last more
than a few hours should have some type of rotation and relief for the IC, and
the rest of the command staff. It is imperative that the IC be relieved of com-

Continuing, Transferring, and Term.inating COlnm.and

Chapter 8 Functions of Command

mand if he/she starts showing signs of personalizing the incident, and adopt­
ing a zealous approach to incident operati::ms (through the assumption of
responsibility and a deep sense of guilt over the badness that the incident has
inflicted on an otherwise pure community). It is not unusual to hear an IC
suffering from this affliction ask his senior advisor, "Let me command just
until I need glasses."

These long-duration incidents are typically very-high profile. A natural piece of

organizational response to these events is for the entire command staff to show
up during the front end of the incident. This gets all the needed command sup­
port in place and running early in the incident (this is good). A problem occurs
when the incident problem is still a probleo hours later, and all the command
players are worn out and ready to go home and collapse (this is bad). This cre­
ates a command void-an incident that must be managed and no one is left to
command it. The solution to this problem is not to let it happen. The key is to
quickly identify the long-range nature of the incident, then to come up with
some type of IClcommand staff rotation/work schedule. The plan should have a
thirty-minute overlap of relief shifts for a seamless hand off. Any position,
function, or other responsibility that is going to be required throughout the event
should also be plugged into some type ofrotation . The goal is to bring the inci­
dent to a conclusion without having to hospitalize or institutionalize any part of,
or worse yet, the entire department's command and support staff.

COMMAND FUNCTIONS
The command process begins when the first person shows up to the scene,
assumes command, and initiates each standard function. The ongoing execu­
tion of those activities represents how the IC "works the system." Eventually,
these separate functions combine into an integrated-command process that
extends and sustains ongoing, overall incident command.

The following standard command functions are critical in providing continu­

ing command:
• Command positioning
• Incident communications
• Strategy and attack planning
• Incident organization

Command Positioning
The IC must maintain a stationary vantage point where he/she can assemble a
staff of helpers (command team) and increase communications effectiveness,
particularly during campaign-style operations.

Usually, incident command starts in the front seat of the initial-arriving

engine, which is quickly abandoned, in order to lead the attack directly to the
incident problem, and is then transferred through a series of different com­
mand officers/vehicles, as they arrive on the scene. The IC plays with a big

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 8

advantage when he/she can escalate and upgrade the command environment to
match the physical and strategic management needs of the situation.

We have blabbed throughout this book about all the glorious advantages of a
command post. Being able to upgrade and improve the IC's operating position
using the vehicle of subsequent-aniving response officers who normally show
up as the incident response grows, creates the critical capability for the IC to
physically improve the conduct of command operations for the duration of an
extended event. The longer the incident goes, the more critical the physical
position of the IC and the command team becomes. Command of short-term
operations with a limited number of responders can be effectively conducted
from the front seat of a pumper/ladder and then from a portable radio. Medium­
range operations with a chief and an aide in the front seat of an SUV (i.e.,
Suburban) with their boss helping from the back seat, last about thitty minutes.
About then, everyone's neck seizes up from having to swivel around to some­
how communicate face to face (major command post advantage). As the
incident escalates or just continues (or both), the IC must increase the size of the
command team to match the incident profile. This creates the very simple need
for a bigger "office" for more staff workers. Every local system must develop
its own "fleet" of response vehicles to do all the functions that are required for
effective incident operations. The vehicle inventory that supports the command
system is as critical as those that pump water (engines) and provide access (lad­
ders). An IC sitting on a tree stump, under a tree, talking on a pOltable radio is
effective for about fifteen minutes and up to about two engines and one well­
behaved ladder company. If the problem is still going on much beyond that
point, the IC had better fold up the TV tray and retreat inside a vehicle with a
mobile radio, a tactical work sheet and an overhead light. The process is criti­
cal, but not very complicated-we don't have a strategic level of command,
until we have an IC in a strategic command position.

Incident-Scene Communications
The IC is able to sustain a continuous command and control capability only to
the extent to which he/she can maintain an effective communications link to
the outside world and to the work agents (sectors and companies). This con­
nection provides the IC with the capability to request additional resources,
exchange information, change assignments and locations, scream for help, and
to assemble the information necessary to match actions to current conditions.

A major part of the IC's ability to conduct extended command operations is

directly connected to how well that IC can establish, maintain and control the
communications process. The IC uses the regular command system components
to create this capability. Using the command post advantage provides the physi­
cal setting. A support officer and senior advisor perform the standard assistance
routine that allows the IC to concentrate on "staying on the air." Sectors create
the organizational capability to maintain an effective span of control. Using
multiple frequencies divides up and effectively distributes the communications
"load" into manageable groups and prevents channel saturation.

Continuing, Transferring, and Tenninating Command

Chapter 8 Functions of Command

Once the Ie gets the "office" set up, most of the business is over the radio;
therefore, the ability to control the frequencies becomes critical. The Ie must
react to anything or anybody who knocks him/her off the air. The communi­
cations process can be a best friend or a worst enemy. Most long, tactical
festivals become a communications Super Bowl. The Ie will always be chal­
lenged to remain on the air.

Strategy and Incident Action Planning

The basic offensive/defensive strategy decision that the Ie develops to start
operations, and the incident action plan that emerges from the strategic deci­
sion, provides the foundation for continuing command .

The Ie's major job during the middle period of operations is to keep the inci­
dent action plan working, making the necessary adjustments to continually
match the plan with the CUlTent incident conditions and the way the incident
problem is reacting to control efforts. The incident action planning process
provides a regular system to translate a set of tactical items (critical fireground
factors, size and hazard, fire stage, and tactical priorities) into a sane plan that
should always evolve from the simple risk-management plan and an offen­
sive/marginal/defensive fire fighting philosophy.

This action plan development and use keeps operations going long enough to
reach the tactical conclusions included in the plan. The plan provides the Ie
with a list of realistic objectives for doing the tactical operations necessary dur­
ing the hard-work phases of the incident, c.nd a timetable to help decide how
long it will take to move operations through this continuing command period.
The Ie cannot terminate operations until either all the incident action plan
boxes have been checked off, or the fire wins and burns up those boxes.

Most local events are relatively short-duration events-even though they go

on for what sometimes seems like forever. Based on that typical time frame,
the Ie does most lAP management "on line" by developing the plan (based on
the strategy), and then making incremental revisions to that original plan
based upon how well the attack is going. Once the plan gets set up, most of
the command team's efforts revolve around exchanging information and pro­
viding the direction and feedback requirec to keep that initial plan going (and
incrementally revised). Most of the time, the original lAP provides an effec­
tive level of forecasting and response to end the event. Sometimes, unusual
events occur on the local level, like fires in big piles of stuff (tires, compost,
sawdust, shredded material, agricultural material, ultra-sized buildings, natural
disasters, terrorist acts, etc.). When such an incident goes on for a lot longer
than the usual period, the Ie cannot use the original lAP for the duration of
the event, so he/she must develop a series of successive lAPs that describe
what action will be taken throughout a series of time periods. The Ie uses
these separate (and progressively developed) lAPs to communicate with all
the geographic and functional sectors on what the operating plan will be for
that phase (time period) of the event.

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 8

Many of these extended operations require the participation of multiple agen­

cies, and hopefully become unified-command events. The approach of using a
series of lAPs to decide and describe who does what, where they will do it,
and identifying a definitive time period is an effective way to communicate,
coordinate, and connect a lot of different specialties that must come together
and play nicely. Those lAPs can be distributed in written/electronic form, can
be passed around the incident site, or done face to face in briefing meetings
(or some combination of all the forms) . Whenever possible, there should be
some face-to-face interaction where the written lAP material is used as a ref­
erence. There is convincing evidence that in dynamic situations, information
that is not passed face to face or in other direct confirmation modes is often
not properly assimilated, and the impact/content is largely lost.

The lAPs provide a progressive series of operational "snapshots" that connect

with each other, to lead the incident response efforts through the operational
stages (beginning/middle/end), that are required to solve the incident prob­
lems. lAPs necessarily have a limited life expectancy-they become obsolete
pretty quickly, as control efforts continue and conditions change. But effec­
tiveness and safety problems occur when the IC gets behind the lAP power
curve, so he/she must stay ahead of that changing profile, so that extended
efforts are periodically revised and communicated to the team. The ongoing
series of lAPs must connect with each other (so the next one starts where the
last one stopped). The series of connected lAPs can provide an effective place
to indicate the command staff roster that provides for the rotation of the com­
mand players.

Incident Scene Organization

Effective incident organization is a major management tool the IC uses to sus­
tain a safe, coordinated and standard eff0!1 during ongoing (extended)
operations. The command organization must be designed and operated to match
the committed resources, along with the tactical reserve (staging, RIC, etc).

Delegating geographic and functional responsibility to command partners

(sector officers) reduces the Ie's span of control and increases and supports
the ability to operate at the strategic level. This system of developing a stan­
dard, decentralized command staff provides off-site managers (away from the
IC) who directly supervise the assigned activities, report progress and needs
back to the Ie.

The IC builds the organization by setting up sectors, as incident operations

grow in size, complexity, and hazard level. The arrival of additional command
officers provides the IC with "natural players" for these assignments. This
standard organization is of particular value during long operations. Replacing
first-in company officers, who are operating as initial-sector officers, with
later-arriving chief officers, helps to improve the level of command and con­
trol within the sector, along with upgrading the information, reporting, and
overall direction abilities. Company officers typically get the operations start-

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

Chapter 8 Functions of Command

ed. If the initial deployment of resources within that sector doesn't solve the
problem and more units need to be assigned, the sector officer should be
upgraded to a chief officer, as soon as operationally possible.

Ideally, the IC would like to arrive at the game in a bus filled with lots of
good players, plenty of reserves, and a coaching staff to help him/her consis­
tently execute plays throughout the game. If the organization has not been
developed to adequately support the game plan during all four quarters, plus
an occasional overtime, the game may be lost because as long as there is fuel
present, the fire will never run out of its natural capability, energy, and inclina­
tion to injure and kill all the victims, and ~o conduct, convect, and radiate
destruction on all the real estate.

The IC uses the routine response of local officers to quickly assemble a stan­
dard command team. The team includes em IC, support officer, and senior
advisor, who come together in a highly planned and practical manner and
operate in an integrated way, designed to front-end load a local event with a
strong command presence. Creating this command "punch," as quickly as
possible, attempts to capture control of cri tical conditions at the earliest possi­
ble time and at the stage where those problems are the most solvable.
Typically, this command-team response, along with the efforts of the home­
town troops, overwhelms and solves most local incident problems. The team
must identify and respond to situations wt:ere the command team 's efforts are
simply not big enough to provide the level of command that is required.
When this occurs, the team must evolve (escalate) into the next level of com­
mand organization. These longer (campaign) incidents generally require a
larger command commitment to the standard organizational areas. These IMS
areas are represented by section-level officers who manage, safety, operations,
logistics, planning and administration. The organization is expanded and
strengthened when a full-time, strategic-level officer can concentrate on man­
aging these standard areas. Expanding the command organization is another
regular way the IC stays ahead of the incident problem, maintains an effective
span of control, and expands the operational support effort.

A major IC function is to always match the size of the command organization

with the size of the incident and the levels of deployment that will be required.
It is just as much a problem if the organization is too big and created too quick­
ly, than it is if the level of command is not escalated quickly enough. Creating a
huge organization in the very beginning of operations is slow, overly bureaucrat­
ic and constricts effective action. If the organization is escalated too slowly (a
more common problem), it can be dangerously behind the incident profile. The
strength of local IMS is to establish command with the initial-arriving respon­
der, who starts command and control at the very beginning, and then to escalate
the size (and shape) of the organization to match incident conditions. Creating
an effective balance between the size of the organization and the incident profile
is a big-time way that the IC creates effective command continuity.

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 8

Command Transfer
A crisis can exist any time that many potential ICs arrive at the incident. The
quickest way to destroy effective maneuvers, is to allow competing command
maniacs to wander through the fire area, each trying to convince the workers
that he/she is the real IC by shouting conflicting orders. Some orbit clockwise
while others move counterclockwise. Some move jerlUly side-to-side while
mashing their teeth (along with their mic button), displaying the symptoms of
somebody having a seizure. ALL PRODUCE CHAOS. The end result is a
big burn, unless the troops can hide from the roving generals/werewolves long
enough to put out the fire or solve whatever the incident problem may be.
The resolution is a system, which allows only one IC at a time, and defines
command transfer rules to be used when passing the baton from the current IC
to the new one.

To provide continuous command, the first fire department unit or officer arriv­
ing at the scene should assume command, until relieved by a ranking officer,
or until command is passed (transferred) or terminated. The initial assump­
tion of command is mandatory-period. This process allows an IC to begin
the manageme nt functions by providing a strong, direct, and right-off-the bat
command. As more companies and command officers arrive, the system is
strengthened and expanded to whatever level incident needs dictate.

Note on "passing command"­

Passing command was an option in the early development of our sys­

tem. This was an option that the initial-arriving unit or member had

when arriving to the scene of an incident that required hislher (the

person who would be the IC) immediate physical involvement (i.e.,

rescue) . The initial uniUmember to the scene could "pass command"

to the next unit that arrived on the scene. Since this transfer of com­

mand usually took place between two company officers, we called it

passing command. Passing command creates major front- end opera­

tional problems when the initial arriving unit "passes command" as

part of the initial radio report and no one else is on the scene. This

creates confusion for subsequent arriving officers/members concern­

ing who is in command (no one), or who is supposed to ass ume

command (who knows?). It is much more effective to transfer com­

mand to someone that is on the scene. This is usually done over the

tactical radio channel and is coordinate between the IC (the initial

arriver) and a subsequent arriving unit.

Example-"Command to E-2, we are rescuing people from second

story window on the west side of the structure; I am transferring com­

mand to you."

"E-2 copies, you're making rescues from the second floor, west side, I

will assume command."

"E-2 to dispatch, be advised I will be assuming command."

Transferring command (as opposed to passing command) eliminates

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

Chapter 8 Functions of Command

the possibility of beginning incident operations without an in-place Ie

(a very bad thing) .

Every response organization must outline the chain of command and describe
(in SOPs) how command will be transfened. This system may be based on a
"picture" of the organization. That picture is based on a variety of factors that
are generally a reflection of local size, history, culture, the leadership sty Ie,
and the stage of command system development of that particular department.
The local command transfer SOP should also include how that organization is
going to interact and get along with its neighbors (mutual and automatic aide) .
The system(s) needs to know what happens and how things are going to work
when the first-in Ie is from the town next door. Be very wary of neighbors
who want your help (engines and ladders), but don ' t want you commanding
"in their city," or won't take orders from anyone but their chief.

Regardless of the local chain of command used, it must be customer centered,

safety oriented, comfortable for the user, and must work for the organization.
The details are not as important as the fact that a standard system is adopted,
used, evaluated, and refined based on the effectiveness and safety of the local
experience of that system.

The way to decide who will be the Ie during the command transfer process
might include:
• The responder who got there first
• The highest-ranking officer
• The oldest (seniority)
• The person with some special experience, knowledge or talent (like cat
juggling)
• The person with the command duty (designated on a rotating basis)
• The toughest (be careful of weapoEs)
• Social security numbers (ascending or descending)
• The person who lost (or won) the toss

The system should provide for some practical limit to the number of times
command is actually transferred. In most cases, two turnovers will get a com­
mand team in place. More than two transfers often tend to create more
confusion than actual command improvement (begins to look like musical
chiefs to the players and fans).

The following transfer procedure might apply to a medium-sized department

with an on-duty command staff:
• First-arriving company officer (or member) to the scene automatically
assumes command. In most cases, if the offensive strategy is being
employed, the initial Ie will be operating in the fast-attack mode.
• The first arriving battalion chief assumes command after completing
command transfer procedures and continues to perform the functions of
command. This moves the Ie frore a fast-attack mode into a command
mode (for offensive operations).

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

 Functions of COI17.mand Chapter 8

• Division/deputy chief (shift commander) arrives to the scene and sets up

the command van and assumes the position of support officer. This ele­
vates the capability of command to the next level-a full sized,
command post equipped with major command partners and support
The next-arriving ranking officer assumes the senior advisor position­
filling out the remainder of the command team .
• Assumption of command by higher-ranking officers (deputy and above)
is discretionary.

During the early days of command system development, the transfer of com­
mand was very formal (it looked a lot like the changing of the guard) and the
SOPs were rigidly followed. At that time, there were not a lot of officers who
were familiar with the command system, so it was critical that the most capa­
ble person became the Ie. Now, after twenty years of system development,
training, and actual commanding, lots more of our troops understand the sys­
tem, and can effectively serve as ICs . Now it does not make much sense for
command transfer to occur between equally capable players. The current
challenge is now not so much who is in command, but that there is one person
who is, in fact, effectively in command, and that person is adequately support­
ed, and that the system is consistently used. Simply, that single person can
only do what a single person can do, and when he/she becomes overloaded,
what is needed is more command team players involved-but they must oper­
ate in a planned, practiced, integrated (team) manner. This is why command
teams are so effective on the local level. They take advantage of three capable
people who each playa standard role. They are collectively able to do a great
deal more than what any single person can do, regardless of how capable that
\~ ~
single person is. Playing a position on the command team becomes a special­
ty, and like any other specialty, the longer they study, practice and play, the
better they become. The team approach to command has reinforced the move­
ment from "ego-based" command to a functional-centered system, where rank
~ ,~

~
(always important) becomes a less critical reason (in and of itself) to assume
command. In a well-managed system, a fire chief would no more jump into a
command team that was adequately staffed and operating effectively, than put
on a Level A suit and barge into a hazmat operation.

The actual command transfer is regulated by a very simple, straightforward

procedure that includes:
1. The current IC assume a standard command position: Nothing showing
-investigative, Fast Attack-attacking, Command-inside command
post
2. The arriving ranking officer contacts the IC directly. Face to face is
preferable, but not usually possible, when the initial IC is in the fast­
attack mode. Command transfer by radio is the norm for these
situations.
3. The IC being relieved will provide a briefing that includes:
• Situation status-"What you have?"
• Deployment and assignment-"What's been done?"
• Tactical needs-"What you need"

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating CfJmmand

Chapter 8 Functions of Command

This briefing concludes with a confirmation of command transfer using the

order model-('Tve got it"). This should be declared over the tactical chan­
nel, so it becomes well known by all the players who is in command, and
what position (fast attack vs. command mode) they are operating in.

• Whenever possible, the use of tactical work sheets to outline the loca­
tion and status of resources will assist the transfer process.
• The regular use of the radio designation "command" always stays with
the current IC, and simplifies the entire process. Most command trans­
fers will go unnoticed by the workers. Usually they don't care who is
in command, as long as someone is in command, and answers them on
the first-radio call.
• Command officers should eliminate all unnecessary radio traffic while
responding. Airtime during the response period is generally scarce, crit­
ical, and at a premium. It can be very confusing if every officer with a
radio within five miles wants to know what color the smoke is.
Basically, everyone should shut up unless they know some critical piece
of info that will help the effort.

Transfer and Rank

The arrival of a ranking officer at the incicent scene does not, in and of itself,
mean that command has been transferred to that ranking officer. Command is
only transferred when the standard procedure is completed. The system is
designed to keep officers honest. If they cutrank the current IC, they can
transfer command from the IC, join the command team, or they can work
somewhere in the command staff. The sys.tem is designed to encourage the
additional responding command officers to report to the command post area
(level 2 staging for chiefs). These officers are available to the IC for com­
mand relief, as sector officers, staff assistants, or in any other assisting
capacity. Since engines respond to help engines, and ladders respond to help
ladders, it only seems fair and functional tlat chiefs respond to help chiefs.

The response and arrival of ranking officers at the incident is designed to

strengthen the overall effort of the entire team. The purpose of transferring
command is to improve the quality of management and leadership that is in
place to support the efforts of the workers.

REMEMBER: A good, basic, command transfer rule is: if you can't improve
the quality of command, don't transfer it.

The entire rank structure is built upon the .?rinciple of ascending experience
and capability. If functioning correctly, it should be the higher the rank, the
higher the capability. The longer the incident management system is in place
and the more it is used, the better it is understood throughout the entire organ­
ization. The system can only be effective when everyone at the incident is
familiar with the details that desctibe standard operations.

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

.-- ._- ­
 Functions of Command Chapter 8

It is the responsibility of ranking officers to continually assume a leadership role

in removing the mystery from the command system. Managers of the system
must establish a standard operation, prepare all the players to operate in that sys­
tem, provide opportunities to apply it, and extend feedback that reinforces good
peliormances and educates mistakes. Beware of the officers who say it takes
fifty-eight years to learn how to take comnuuul-you may not live that long.

This approach toward senior-officer support, creates an atmosphere where rank­

ing officers understand they are always responsible for the ultimate outcome,
but are comfortable in letting a junior officer, who is effectively commanding a
fire scene, continue in the command role. In fact, the necessary location,
assignment, and status information is usually difficult to exchange during the
compressed and very active time period of active local incidents when it is typi­
•
cally done. In these cases, the ranking officer may choose to move the junior
officer IC into a more effective command vehicle, join him/her in that new
II location, and assist in completing the command checklist. This pretty well
describes the front end of assembling a command team. Such situations pro­

I
vide a bright spot for both officers. The young, aspiring officer completes a

positive command job that reinforces all the lessons, with his/her boss sitting
nearby. The senior officer demonstrates confidence in the junior officer, pro­
moting command growth and personal development. Junior IC scenarios are
stature building for everyone involved. Command will be considered to be
transferred within this context by virtue of the ranking officer being present and
by that presence, they are "officially" involved in the command process.

The escalation/evolution of command and the incident

management system
This purpose of this book is to describe and explain the different system com­
ponents that local fire departments, and other local emergency services
organizations, use to manage the events that they respond to (and deliver serv­
ice to), within their local response areas. We (the locals) use a command
organization to manage all incident activities (work) and make sure that every­
one (the workers) goes home when the event is over.

All the organizational investments we made ahead of the event (SOPs, train­
ing, experience, etc.) facilitate making incident operations more effective and
safer. All of these front-end investments provide a strong foundation to con­
duct incident operations. These different, service-delivery pieces must
somehow be packaged/connected together when someone calls for help, and
we go out to conduct incident operations. That is what the incident manage­
ment system does for us.

The IC is the "hub" of the incident management system, responsible for man­
aging the completion of the tactical priorities, and keeping the workers safe.
The IC uses the incident management system to those ends, expanding the
command organization to the level required to make sure the work gets done,
without making casualties out of the workers.

l_______________ c_ o_n_ti_n_U_in_g_,_T._'_'a_n_sfi
_e_r_r_in_g_,_a_n_d Terminating Command
Chapter 8 Functions of Coml1'land

Approximately 98% of the sys tem explained in thi s book is used both nation­
ally, and internationally, in incident management systems around the world.
These organizational subcomponents include:
• Sectors (or divisions and groups)
• Branches
• Sections
• Incident commander (IC)
• Incident manager (for EOC operations)

The 2% of this book (the localized part) describes and explains command
teams (IC, SUppOlt officer and senior advisor). Some students of IMS have
suggested that the command team is just a different way to name section posi­
tions. The analysis goes something like this:
• IC = operations section
• Support officer = planning section
• Senior advisor = incident commander
The Phoenix Fire Department has used a command team approach for inci­
dent management for about the last ten years. The command team is a local
management component/tool that greatly reduces the need for full-blown,
section-level operations. Most of the local events we respond to are of a short
duration. These day-to-day events are handled by on-duty resources . A com­
mand team puts three command players ir. place, operating and managing the
system, in a short period of time. The coomand team is put in place to quick­
ly front-end load the right amount of incident management in the short-time
frames that structure fires occur within.

The IC is responsible for every aspect of incident management. The IC shares

this responsibility by assigning management responsibilities to sectors (divi­
sions and groups), branches, and sections. These different sys tem subunits
take over the management function for their assigned area, (the roof sector
manages all the personnel and stuff up on the roof-the logi stics sec tion man­
ages all the personnel and stuff in logistics, etc.). When the IC makes these
assignments, he/she clears a little more space off the "management plate" (by
delegating those responsibilities to somebody else). While this assists to keep
the IC operating on the strategic level, it s~ill doesn't directly support him/her
with actually being "command." This is why we developed, use, and refine
the command-team concept. Instead of orce person having to take on a rapidly
escalating incident problem, we now have three. Simply, we try to rapidly
escalate the command capability (by assenbling the team), in the front end of
the incident, to match the rapidly escalatir,g event profile. It doesn't do much
good, if we develop this command capability ten minutes after the "window of
intervention" opportunity burned down.

The command team is responsible for whatever functions they don't delegate.
If the command team doesn't implement section positions, they are responsi­
ble for the functions that fall under those positions. For the vast majority of
incidents that we respond to, this works out quite well. These incidents happen
in short, dangerous, and action-packed time frames. We don't have the time to

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 8

fly in the five members (they usually live in different states), that make up the
overhead team. This in no way is meant as any disrespect to section positions
and overhead teams. If we are going to take on an event that will last two
weeks, consume 100,000,000,000 BTUs of fuel, and evacuate five zip codes,
we are going to use a management system (with sections and a lot of other
management boxes) that supports running an incident of that size. It is one
thing for the command team to do the planning that is needed for a 20,000
square-foot building, that is going to take a two-hour fire fight to bring under
control. It is quite another to have the command team take on the entire plan­
ning function that is required to fight a fire spread over fifty-square miles of
urban-wildland interface.

Figure A

The three command-team positions are separate and different from section
positions . They are a local response to quickly managing the strategic level of
incident operations. A fast-attacking company officer, either rapidly solves
the incident problem, eliminating the need to take the escalation of command
any further; however, if the incident problem isn't quickly brought under con­
trol, command is transferred to the chief, who escalates command by
operating in the command mode, inside a fixed and stationary command post
(hopefully with an aide). If the incident problem continues to flourish, and
more resources are required, the command component of the operation also
needs to expand. This happens (locally) when the command van arrives on
the scene and the command team begins to assemble. If the command team
determines that the operation will continue to escalate, they implement what­
ever pieces of the system are required to effectively and safely manage the
incident (this includes the section positions). The command team implements
section positions to maintain their ability to remain strategic (controlling the
position and function of workers in the hazard zone, continually evaluating the
incident critical factors, and keeping the strategy and JAP current). See
Figure A.

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

Chapter 8 Functions of Command

1. COMMAND LEVEL #1
COMPANY OFFICER IC
(OR INITIAL ARRIVING
MEMBER/UNIT)
2. COMMAND LEVEL #2
BATTALION CHIEF IC
(OR LOCAL EQUIVALENT)
3. COMMAND LEVEL #3
COMMAND TEAM
(IC/SO/SA)
4. COMMAND LEVEL #4
COMMAND TEAM WITH
SECTION POSITIONS
IMPLEMENTED
5. COMMAND LEVEL #5
FULLY EXPANDED
INCIDENT ORGANIZATION
REPORTING TO THE
INCIDENT MANAGER (1M)
IN THE EOC

Figure B

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 8

The system we use to manage local events has five separate and distinct "lev­
els of command." They are (see Figure B):
l. Initial assumption of command. Done by the initial-arriving member.
This person is most often a company officer.
2. Transfer #l-normally from a company officer to a battalion chief.
3. Upgrade of command-assembling a command team (IC, SO, SA).
4. Expanded system-a command team is in place and has implemented
section positions.
5. Activation of an emergency operations center (EOC). This level of
local incident management escalation is nOlmally used for events that
last several days (hopefully not months), and probably lead the national
news. The command team retains command of field operations, and
reports to the incident manager (1M) in the EOC.

Each level of command has a "maximum" management capability. This scale

ranges from a fast-attacking company officer, managing a couple of engines
and a ladder company at a structure fire, all the way to a event that requires
every available resource in the community (natural disasters, large wildland
fires, alien invasion, etc.). Command should be escalated to the next level
before the current IC's (or command levels) plate becomes too full to effec­
tively manage the incident. See Figures C, D, E and F

Figure C

Ie

I
r I
SECTOR SECTOR
2 4

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

Chapter 8 Functions of Command

Figure D

ENTRY SECTOR SECTOR SECTOR

CONTROL
SECTOR 2 3 4

E2

Figure E

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 8

FigureE

~_S_AF_E_T_Y--lli ADMIN. 11 LOGISTICS] IPLANNING I

The system must transition from one command "level" to the next automati­
cally, seamlessly, and without a lot of fanfare and permission. As the
resources required to bring incident conditions under control escalate, so must
the system we use to manage those resources. The system must always be in
a mode where it is adding to itself. In most locales each alarm level (i.e., 1st
alarm, 2nd alarm, etc.) picks up the response of additional command players.
Don't call for more help, if you can't manage it when it gets there. If the
current IC isn't able to effectively perform the functions of command (for
whatever reason), it puts the next "level" in a position where they have to "sal­
vage command" (lyrically explained in Chapter 7).

Terminating Command
When the IC comes to the end of the tactical priorities, he/she must decom­
mit/demobilize the operating companies and terminate command. This phase
may range from very simple, during lightweight and middleweight situations,
to a long and complicated operation requiring a massive amount of final coor­
dination at the end of long, campaign operations.

Continuing, Transferring, and Tenninating Command

Chapter 8 Functions of Command

The normal sector system used to get coopanies into action can usually be
applied to place them back in service when their tasks are completed. In other
more complex cases, the IC may have to create an ending lAP that describes
the demobilization phase of the operation. The demobilization plan will have
specific tasks and functions assigned to specific officers. In more routine
events, the IC may assign one officer to determine which companies have
their crews and gear intact and are ready to leave. This officer must coordi­
nate that unit's departure with the IC and the communications center until all
units are back in service. The more effectively the process is completed, the
quicker companies go back into service.

It makes sense to return companies to quarters based on their fatigue factor.

Simply, the companies that arrived first should leave first. This philoso­
phy supplies the workers who are in the best physical condition to
. Q participate in manual labor; thereby, maximizing the effectiveness
• • £J of the available human resources. Obvious extensions of this
J

resource management style, includes a rehabilitation sector, auto­

matic rotation of fatigued companies, c2nteen services, safety sectors and
front-end loaders instead of scoop shovels. An array of water additives (com­
pressed air foam) reduces overhaul time, and the physical wear and tear on the
troops.

Some organizations do just the opposite, and the fire becomes tre personal
possession of the first arrivers. It is refer~ed to as "their fire," which defies
any sort of basic and sensible personnel conservation. These systems are gen­
erally operated by officers who think of long, manual overhaul operations,
involving large piles of fire-damaged material as character-building experi­
ences (these same officers tend to also act strange during full-moon periods).

As the operation winds down, the IC can reduce the size of the command
structure. The IC can often reverse the command transfer process and essen­
tially de-escalate command to a lower-ranking officer. Command can be
assigned to one of the company officers who will be leaving the scene last or
will be maintaining a "watch line" to secure the scene and monitor final extin­
guishment.

At the end of the incident, the command team must decide how the incident
critique will be conducted. Incidents come in all shapes and sizes and the cri­
tique should be done in a way that matches the event profile. Gathering the
responders and discussing the operational and command details of the incident
before everyone goes home is a useful (and simple) way to review smaller­
sized operations. Doing this right at the end of the incident takes advantage of
reviewing the incident while events are fresh in the participants' minds. Such
a "front-yard" critique can be as effective as any of the larger ones based on
their recent occurrence (we haven't showered yet) and small size. Smaller
(more routine) incidents make it a lot easier for the IC to assemble most of the
incident players together to review the operation, because the players are a lot
more likely to all still be on the scene at the end of the event.

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating COTnmand

 Functions oj Command Chapter 8

At larger, longer events, companies who arrived earlier have many times been
rotated back to their quarters, and replaced with later-arriving units. This
makes it difficult to do a critique at the end of operations because many of the
key players have left the scene. In these situations, a larger, later critique
must be arranged to include those who were in attendance. At very long,
involved operations, the command team should designate a documentation
function to capture the details of what happened in writing, by photography
and video, securing radio tapes, and by interviewing participants. The earlier
this effort takes place, the easier and more accurate the final result will be.
Every department should develop local critique SOPs, that meet the needs of
their organization. We must operate with the understanding that virtually
every experience must be reviewed, so we can continually learn, and not lose,
the lessons that doing our work teaches us. Some of the most profound things
that we will ever learn come from some small, repeat, no big deal, piece of
our business .. . a small incident can contain a big lesson.

At the end of the operational period, the Ie mlist verify how the troops are
doing physically and emotionally, before they leave the scene. The IC must
then provide whatever SUppOlt is required, based on that evaluation. Where
hard, manual labor has been done over a long period, those troops must be
thoroughly rehabbed and evaluated before they leave the scene. In extreme
cases, after on-scene rehab and evaluation, those fatigued crews should be
taken out-of-service for some period when they return to quarters. In high
stress injury/damage/death situations, the affected players should be debriefed
by officers who are trained in clitical incident support. Those officers should
evaluate and provide whatever other level of clinical SUppOlt and follow-up
that is required. Many times in these high-stress deals, it makes sense to
assemble the responders at a central place, provide refreshments and food, and
discuss what happened. After a difficult experience, most of us want to hang
out with our co-workers and bosses, and to process with that group what hap­
pened at the incident. This approach in no way diminishes how critical
professionally trained, clinical-type folks are to the recovery process, but most
of our personal focus and orientation occurs inside our own organization, and
by how our homies treat us. Just having those trained professionals and their
services available to us, sends a strong, supportive message. There is no ther­
apy that creates and maintains the sanity of our workers, as much as being
able to consistently participate in well-managed incidents, inside a well-man­
aged organization, supported by capable bosses who genuinely care about the
troops. This creates the feeling in responders that the customer and their situ­
ation received every possible service, and had the very best chance to survive
and recover.

Continuing, Tran.sjerring, and Terminating Command

Chapter 8 Functions of Command

Command Safety-Continuing, Transfer and

Terminating Command
Responder safety requires a continuous level of command support from the
beginning to the end of the incident. Big problems occur if the IC does not
outlast the incident, and somehow match the level and duration of command
to the incident conditions. A command lapse can occur in the beginning, mid­
dle or end of the incident. When such a laj)se occurs, hazard-zone workers
simply do not have anyone on the strategic level looking out for their safety.
Responders , who are assigned and working in the hazard zone, must operate
with the confidence that there is an effective level of command and control in
place to protect them. Matching the profile of command to incident condi­
tions requires the IC to develop and maintain an ongoing level of prediction
that produces a profile of how the incident will evolve, and then to keep revis­
ing that profile as the operation continues. A major reason the IC does this
planning is to provide quick, strong, long-lasting supervision and direction to
keep operations standard and safe. Not being able to maintain an effective
level of command (for any reason) should always be a critical reason to go
defensive, and if that occurs, the IC must quickly move troops out of the haz­
ard zone.

Always following the standard command transfer process is another important

safety factor. Having multiple officers anive on the scene can create a huge
safety (and operational) mess if there is no:: a strong, practical procedure on
how command will be established. Having multiple, competing ICs can
quickly confuse and disrupt the command process and abruptly wreck any
effective level of command and control. Multiple officers can all believe they
are the IC and then act out that belief if there is not a clear, simple process
followed that insure that only a single IC is in place doing the regular function
of command. Standard command transfer procedures insure that this occurs.
These procedures should be designed to meet local conditions and refined
over time as they are actually used. When the troops are in trouble and yell
for quick help from the IC, it's bad news when either no one answers them or
five lunatic, look-a-like ICs each try to out-communicate one another.

Throughout this book the reader has been exhausted with an ongoing discus­
sion on how critical maintaining a stationary, remote position inside a CP
vehicle is to effective strategic level command operations . Now it is time (in
Command Function #8) for the IC to get out of the CP and directly view the
dehazardized-hazard area, and to visit with the troops. It is critical for the IC
to see the incident areas that were described remotely by operating units and
the command staff. Having the IC "make an appearance" creates the capabili­
ty to assess the condition of the responders. and to react to any needs they
have. Sometimes, thi s is short and sweet a:1d the IC just makes a brief contact
with the troops, sees they are okay, and thanks them for their efforts. In more
complicated, difficult events the IC must spend more time to "check in" with
the workers, and to be certain they are okay. Responders are typically tough,
resilient characters who can tolerate the wear and tear of incident operations.

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 8

Situations that involve unsavable customers, or the injury/death of their fellow

workers, require special welfare and recovery support. It is critical that bosses
know the humans who are under their care and understand what will "get to
them." Effective res realize that incident decommittment must go on for
whatever time it takes for the workers to recover from the work. Sometimes it
can involve a lot more than just sending the troops home after they reload the
supply line back on the rig.

Continuing, Transferring, and Tenninating Command

Chapter 8 Functions of Command

CHAPTER 8

CONTINUING, TRANSFERRING, AND

TERMINATING COMMAND

INCIDENT COMMANDER CHECKLIST:

• Estimate the length of command required.

• Consider the time for completing each tactical priority.

• Consider life safety, incident/fire area profile, incident/fire conditions.

• Develop and support an organization that outlasts the event.

• Assume, maintain and upgrade effective command positioning.

• Develop and maintain effective fireground communications.

• Keep the incident action plan going (and growing, if necessary).

• Use standard command transfer (both ways).

• Provide rehab, rotation and relief for the IC and command staff.

• Assure that all pertinent information is passed up and down the chain of
command.

• Reduce the command structure as p2rt of the ending stages of incident

operations.

• Place resources back into service wi~h a demobilization plan.

• Insure an adequate critique process is underway before decommitment.

• Provide required critical incident support.

Continuing, Transferring, and Terminating Command

 Functions of Command Chapter 8

COACHING VERSION

"Set up command to outlast the incident problem. Use CP advantage, estab­

lish sectors, invest in sound, realistic, and current evaluation, and connect
everyone with effective communications . Use the command staff to support
long-term IC impact, potency, and durability. Don't beat up the entire com­
mand staff during the front end of long campaign events, and then run out of
command gas in the middle. Forecast incident time, and assign rotating teams
to provide ongoing command. Effective command transfer and escalation
must use our regular, organizational-management capability to strengthen,
expand, and improve command. All that the fire understands is water and
could care less if a captain or deputy chief is the Ie. If you can't improve the
quality of command, simply don't transfer it. Look in the responder's eyes at
the end of the deal, and see if he/she is okay. If the responder is okay, send
him/her homelif nobody is home, buy some donuts , hang out, and visit with
him/her until everything is okay."

Continuing, Transferring, and Tenninating Command

 Appendix

APPENDIX
This appendix contains the applicable sections of the NFPA 1561, Standard on
Emergency Services Incident Management, 2002 edition. The appendix con­
tains Chapter 1, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of the standard (these are the chap­
ters that Fire Command applies to). The material from NFPA 1561 is used
with NFPA permission; the full standard is worth reading for any incident
commander. Each subsection of these chapters is referenced back to the
applicable parts of text contained in the book, the material in italics is the
author's language(not NFPA's). The incident management system described
and explained in Fire Command meets the requirements of 1561.

The end of each chapter of Fire Command contains a section titled, Command
Safety. This describes the IC's role in managing the safety of the workers.
Command Safety focuses on the safety impact of the IC effectively managing
each of the eight functions of command.

It is difficult (if not impossible) to distill the safety portion out of what we do
strategically, tactically, and on the task level. When we are managing and
conducting emergency service operations we must make safety a regular and
automatic part of the operation. The incident management system is designed
to get the work done safely - we all go home when the event is over. The
safety piece of the incident management organization (Safety Section, Safety
Sector, etc.) enhances and strengthens incident operations.
I•
I. .

Chapter 1 Administration
* Scope. This standard shall contain the minimum requirements for an inci­
dent management system to be used by emergency services to manage all
emergency incidents.

Purpose. The purpose of this standard shall be to define and describe the
essential elements of an incident management system.

Sections 1.1 and 1.2 introduce what 1561 is designed to accomplish-define

and describe the minimum requirements for any and all incident management
systems (IMS). 1.1 requires the use of an IMS to manage all emergency inci­
dents. The system requirements (required to create, operate maintain and
refine a local IMS) are listed in the UP FRONT chapter, pages 53-62. This
section of the text walks the reader through the different pieces that are
required to build an effective IMS package (which meets 1561).
Appendix

1.3 Application.

1.3.1* This standard shall apply to organizations and other agencies that pro­
vide rescue, fire suppression, emergency medical care, special operations, and
law enforcement.

1.3.2 This standard shall apply to other emergency services, such as public,
military, or private fire departments, fire brigades, and other assisting and
cooperating agencies.

1.3.3* This standard shall not apply to industrial fire brigades or industrial flfe
departments meeting the requirements of NFPA 600, Standard on Industrial
Fire Brigades.

1.3.4* Many of the performance objectives of this standard shall be permitted

to be achieved in a variety of ways. This standard shall not restrict any juris­
diction from exceeding these minimum requirements or from adopting a sys­
tem tailored to meet local needs while satisfying the minimum requirements
of this standard.

1.4 Equivalency. Nothing in this standard is intended to prevent the use of

systems, methods, or devices, of equivalent or superior quality, strength, fire
resistance, effectiveness, durability, and safety over those prescribed by this
standard. Technical documentation shall be submitted to the authority having
jurisdiction to demonstrate equivalency. The system, method, or device shall
be approved for the intended purpose by the authority having jurisdiction.

Sections 1.3 and 1.4 specify that any organization that provides emergency
services (see 1.3. 1) will use an IMS. The only exception to this are industrial
fire brigades/departments which fall under the requirements of NFPA 600.
The system described in the FIRE COMMAND text is an "all risk" system
designed to be used for every incident, Function #6, page 268. Section 1.4
allows the flexibility to "localize" the IMS each organization chooses to use,
so long as the chosen system meets the requirements of 1561. UP FRONT,
page 34 explains the basic goals/requirements of command SOPs and the
importance of developing them around the local jurisdiction that uses the sys­
tem.

Chapter 4 System Structure

4.1 General.

4.1.1 The purpose of an incident management system shall be to provide

structure and coordination to the management of emergency incident opera­
tions, in order to provide for the safety an health of emergency services
organization personnel and other persons involved in those activities.
 Appendix

UPFRONT, pages 22-23, explains the impact and benefit that IMS has on
worker safety. Function #6-0rganization, in its entirety, describes how to
develop the incident scene organization in order to structure and coordinate
incident operations to effectively deal with the incident problem, and to pro­
vide for the safety and welfare of the emergency workers.

4.1.2* This standard shall meet the requirements of Chapter 8 of NFPA 1500,
Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, and
OSHA 29 CFR 1910.120(q) (3).

4.1.3 * The incident management system shall integrate risk-management into

the regular functions of incident command. The risk-management plan shall
meet the requirements of Chapter 4 of NFPA 1500.

Function #5, pages 241-243, describes a comprehensive and easily under­

standable risk-management plan. Every activity that occurs within the IMS is
based on this risk-management plan-it is always in effect.

4.2 Implementation.

4.2.1 * The emergency services organization (ESO) shall adopt an incident

management system to manage all emergency incidents.

UP FRONT chapter, pages 53-62 covers the essential elements of what a local
IMS must contain.

I 4.2.2 The incident management system shall be designed to meet the particu­
lar characteristics of the incident based on size, complexity, and operating

,I
environment.

The system described throughout the text is "all risk," Function #6, page 268.

I
Function #6, pages 269-270, outlines the requirements contained in 4.2.2.

Function #6, pages 270-273, provides examples of three different sized inci­
dent scene organizations (one- and two-unit responses, small scale, and mali­
um-to-large scale operations). These examples show the actual
implementation and escalation of the system.

4.2.3 The incident management system shall be defined and documented in

writing.

UP FRONT chapter, pages 53-62, covers the essential elements of what a

local IMS must contain.

4.2.4 Standard operating procedures (SOPs) shall include the requirements for
implementation of the incident management system and shall describe the
options that are available for application according to the needs of each partic­
ular situation.
Appendix

Function #1 , pages 67-70, explains that the IMS is activated when the initial­
arriving responder arrives to the incident scene and assumes command.
Function #6, page 279-320, describes the different organizational pieces (sec­
tors, branches, sections, command teams) that can be used to manage differ­
ent situations.

4.2.5 * The ESO shall prepare and adopt written plans, based on the incident
management system, to address the requirements of the different types of inci­
dents that can be anticipated.

IMS described in the text is an "all risk" system, Function #6, page 268.
Function #6, pages 279-320, describes the different organizational pieces
(sectors, branches, sections, command teams ) that can be used to manage a
wide range of incidents. The different organizational elements described in
the text (sectors, etc.) need to be incorporated into a local response plan for
the different type of incidents the organization responds to (i.e., hazardous
materials, structure fires , major medical incidents, technical rescue, etc.).

4.2.6* The plans described in 4.2.5 shall address both routine and unusual
incidents and shall provide standardized procedures and supervisory assign­
ments that can be applied to the needs of situations of differing types, sizes,
and complexities.

The standardized procedures, referred to in 4.2.6, applies to the local

response plan (tactical plans) for use at the different type of incidents the
response agency responds to. The supervisory assignments (organizational
positions-i.e., sectors, branches, etc.) are described in Function #6, pages
279-320.

4.2.7* The incident management system s~lall be utilized at all emergency

incidents.

Function #1 , pages 67-70, describes implementing the IMS from the onset of
incident operations. Function #8, page 367, explains factors that effect the
continuation of command. Function #8, pages 375-379, describes the transfer
of command. These different elements of the IMS ensure that the system is
used from the beginning to the end of incident operations, improving the effec­
tiveness of incident operations, and providing for the safety of the emergency
workers.

4.2.8 The incident management system shall be applied to drills, exercises,

and other situations that involve hazards similar to those encountered at actual
emergency incidents and to simulated incidents that are conducted for training
and familiarization purposes.

4.2.9* The incident management system described in this standard shall be

used by trained individuals and applied in a manner that meets the needs of
each particular situation.
 Appendix

UPFRONT, pages 53-62, describes the design, implementation, use, review,

and training cycle involved in implementing an IMS. The functions of com­
mand (1-8) described in the text becomes the job description for the incident
commander:

4.2.10 The incident commander shall apply the incident management system in
a manner that is appropriate for the circumstances of each specific situation.

This is a process where the Ie assumes command (Functions #1 and #3), sizes
up the situation (Function #2), identifies the strategy and formulates a inci­
dent action plan (Function #5), makes assignments (Function #4) and builds
an effective organization to manage all incident activities (Function #6). The
system elements are standard but they are applied to the unique circumstances
of each incident. The incident needs drive the IMS.

4.3 Communications.

4.3.1* The incident management system shall include standard operating pro­
cedures for radio communications that provide for the use of standard proto­
cols and terminology at all types of incidents.

Function #3, pages144-145, provides a basic communications overview that is

required to conduct incident operations.

4.3.2 Clear text shall be used for radio communications.

Function #3, page 143, describes the use ofplain text in radio communica­
tions. An example of clear text is shown in Function #3, pages 155-156
(description of initial radio report).

4.3.3 The communications system shall meet the requirements of the emer­
gency response agency for routine and large-scale emergencies.

4.3.4 An ESO shall provide one radio channel for dispatch and a separate tac­
tical channel to be used initially at the incident.

4.3.5 When a Tactical Level Management Component (TLMC) has been

implemented, an ESO shall provide a dispatch channel, a command channel,
and a tactical channel.

4.3.6* An ESO shall provide additional radio channels for the volume of com­
munications relating to incidents with multiple tactical channels and for the
complexity of multiple emergency incidents.

4.3.7 The communications system shall provide reserve capacity for complex
or multiple incidents.

4.3.3-4.3.7 all deal with the design of the local communications system (hard­
Appendix

ware). Function #3, page 142, describes using the system to match incident
needs.

4.3.8* Standard telminology shall be established to transmit information,

including strategic modes of operation, situation reports, and emergency noti­
fications of imminent hazards.

The different strategic modes (and what they are called) are described in
Function #5, pages 226-230. Situation reports can be found in Function #3,
pages 160-161. Emergency traffic is described in Function #3, pages 161-162.

4.3.9 The radio capabilities shall provide fur communications with mutual aid
resources or other agencies that could be expected to respond to a major incident.

Communications with outside agencies is discussed in Function #3, pages

151-162.

4.3.10* The communications system shall provide a standard method to give

priority to the transmission of emergency messages and notification of immi­
nent hazards over that of routine communications to all levels of the incident
command structure.

4.3.11 * In ensuring that clear text is used ~-or an emergency condition at an

incident, the ESO shall have an SOP that uses the radio term emergency traf­
fic as a designation to clear radio traffic.

4 .3.12 Emergency traffic shall be declared by an incident commander (IC),

TLMC, or member who is in trouble or subjected to an emergency condition.

4.3.13 When a member has declared an emergency traffic message, that per­
son shall use clear text to identify the type of emergency, change in condi­
tions, or tactical operations. The member who has declared the emergency
traffic message shall conclude it by transrr.itting the statement, "All clear,
resume radio traffic."

4.3.10-4.3.13 all refer to emergency traffic radio procedures. Emergency traf­

fic is described in Function #3, pages 161-162.

4.3.14 The incident management system shall provide SOPs for a telecommu­
nicator to provide support to emergency incident operations.

4.3.15 Telecommunicators shall be trained to function effectively within the

incident management system, and shall meet the qualifications required by
NFPA 1061, Standard for Professional Qualifications for Public Safety
Telecommunicator.

4.3.14 and 4.3.15 apply to the dispatch center personnel. Function #3, pages
145-146, outlines the role of dispatch in incident operations. Function #3,
 Appendix

page 161-162, describes dispatch's role in emergency radio traffic operations.

4.3.16* The incident commander shall be provided with reports of elapsed

time-on-scene at emergency incidents in 10-minute intervals from the ESO
Communications Center, until reports are terminated by the incident com­
mander.

Function #5, page 233 describes how elapsed time notifications impact the
strategy review process.

4.4 Multi-Agency Incidents.

4.4.1 * The ESO shall develop an integrated incident management system in

coordination with other agencies that are involved in emergency incidents.

4.4.2* The incident management system shall provide a plan to coordinate

with other agencies that have jurisdiction at the incident scene.

4.4.3* This plan shall include a standard procedure to designate one incident
commander or to establish unified command.

4.4.4* Where the incident is under the command authority of a single emer­
gency services organization, the incident commander shall provide for liaison
and coordination with all assisting and cooperating agencies.

4.4.5 Where the incident is under the overall jurisdiction of another agency
that has not implemented an incident management system, the emergency
services organization shall utilize the incident management system to manage
I
its own operations and coordinate its activities with the agency having overall
I.
I
jurisdiction.

Sections 4.4.1-4.4.5 are covered in Function #6, pages 293-296.

4.5 Command Structure.

4.5.1 The incident management system shall provide a series of supervisory

levels to be implemented to create a command structure.

4.5.1 is accomplished by using sectors, branches and sections to subdivide the

incident scene and assign functional responsibilities. This is explained in
Function #6, pages 279-320.

4.5.2 The particular levels to be utilized in each situation shall depend on the
nature of the incident and the scale and complexity of emergency services
organization activities at the scene.

The particular needs of each incident drives the organizational structure that
the Ie uses to manage the incident. The general organizational elements used
Appendix

for incident management are described in Function #6, pages 279-320.

4.5.3 The incident management system shall be modular to allow the applica­
tion of only those elements that are necessary at a particular incident and to
allow elements to be activated or deactivated as the needs of the incident
change with time.

The organizational system requirements are listed in Function #6, page 267.

4.5.4 The system shall provide for a routine process of escalation as additional
resources are utilized.

This process is described in Function #6, pages 270-273, with examples of

organizing small, medium, and large incidents. Function #8, pages 379-385,
describes the escalation of the system. The details of what the different orga­
nizational elements are, and how they are implelnented (by the IC) along with
how they are managed, is contained throughout Function #6.

4.5.5 The incident commander shall determine which levels and elements of
the incident management system are to be implemented in each case and shall
develop the command structure for each insident by assigning supervisory
responsibilities according to standard operating procedures.

This process is described in Function #6, pages 268-320 and in Function #8,
pages 379-386.

4.5.6* The command structure for each incident shall maintain an effective
supervisory span of control at each level of the organization.

Span of control issues are covered in Funcrion #6, pages 283-286.

4.5.7 An effective span of control shall be determined by the ability of each

supervisor to monitor the activities of assigned subordinates and to communi­
cate effectively with them.

Function #6, pages 273-277, explains maintaining an effective span of control

in operational areas (sectors).

4.5.8 The incident management system shaH define standardized supervisory

assignments.

Function #6, pages 267-270, explains the three basic organizational levels
along with their responsibilities. These three different levels provide the basis
(or blueprint) for delegating the authority and responsibility when making
supervisory assignments (assigning sectors, branches, etc.). The actual sys­
tem elements (sectors, etc.) are listed in Function #6, pages 279-320.

4.5.9 The assignments described in 4.5.8 shall be activated upon assignment

 Appendix

by the incident commander.

Function #6, pages 273-279, explains the IC's role in building an effective,
sector-based incident organization. Function #6, pages 270-273, provides
examples of actually implementing the system; the other organizational ele­
ments are covered in Function #6, pages 286-295. Function #6, pages 379­
385, describes the escalation of the strategic level of this organization.

4.5 .10* Standardized supervisory assignments shall define the role, authority,
and responsibilities of assigned personnel.

4.5.11 Assignments shall be defined by function or by location at the scene of

the incident, or by a combination of function and location.

4.5.12 The scope of authority to be delegated at each supervisory level shall

be outlined in standard operating procedures.

4.5.13 An assignment that is defined by function shall be based on performing

or supervising a particular function or set of functions.

4.5.14* An assignment that is defined by location shall be based on supervis­

ing all activities that are conducted within a designated area.

4.5 .15 The area shall be defined by standard terminology or specified by the
incident commander at the time of assignment.

4.5.16 The incident commander shall have the authority to modify standard
assignments or to apply them in a manner that suits the particular needs of an
incident.

4.5.17 It shall be the responsibility of the incident commander to clearly iden­

tify the parameters of an assignment when deviating from the standard assign­
ments in 4.5.10.

Sections 4.5.10-4.5.17 all deal with making organizational assignments (sec­

tors, branches, sections) and the subsequent authority and responsibility that
come with those assignments. The decision making process the IC uses to do
this along with the system the IC uses to actually accomplish it is contained
throughout Function #6.

4.6 Training and Qualifications.

4.6.1 * All personnel who are involved in emergency operations shall be

trained in the incident management and personnel accountability systems.

4.6.2 The ESO shall provide periodic refresher training.

4.6.3 Personnel who are expected to perform as incident commanders or to be

Appendix

assigned to supervisory levels within the command stmcture shall be trained

in and familiar with the incident management system and the particular levels
at which they are expected to perform.

4.6.4 The ESO shall define training and experience requirements for supervisors.

4.6.5* The incident commander shall make assignments based on the avail­
ability, qualifications, and expertise of individuals.

Sections 4.6-4.6.5 pertains to training and familiarity with the IMS. The
UPFRONT section, pages 53-62, explains the elements required for an effec­
tive IMS. Assignments made because of an individual's particular expertise
(i.e., hazmat, technical rescue, senior command officer, etc.) are explained in
Function #6, pages 279-319. Upgrading the Ie's position (the transfer of
command) is explained in Function #8, pages 375-385. Supporting the Ie
(implementing command teams) is described in Function #6, pages 279-282.

4.7 Resource Accountability.

4.7.1 The incident management system shall provide for resource accountabil­
ity at the incident scene.

4.7.2* The ESO shall adopt and routinely use a system to maintain accounta­
bility for all resources assigned to the incident.

4.7 .3 The system adopted in accordance with 4.7.2 shall also provide a
process for the rapid accounting of all personnel at the incident scene.

4.7.4 All supervisors shall maintain a constant awareness of the position and
function of all personnel assigned to operate under their supervision. This
awareness shall serve as the basic means of accountability that shall be
required for operational safety.

4.7.5 The incident management system shall maintain accountability for the
location and function of each company or unit at the scene of the incident.

4.7.6 Fire depattment personnel who respond to the incident on fire apparatus
shall be identified by a system that provides an accurate accounting of those
personnel actually responding to the scene with each company or on apparatus.

4.7.7 Personnel who arrive at the scene of the incident by means other than
emergency response vehicles shall be identified by a system that accounts for
their presence and their assignment at the ircident scene.

4.7.8 The system shall include a specific means to identify and keep track of
personnel entering and leaving hazardous areas, such as confined spaces or
areas where special protective equipment is required.
 Appendix

Sections 4.7.1-4.7.8 pertain to the different methods the IC and the rest of the
incident management organization keep track of assigned personnel. Keeping
track of assigned personnel falls under the broad umbrella of accountability.
Each level of the incident scene organization (described in Function #6, pages
267-268) is responsible for managing accountability for their level (i.e., IC,
Sector Officers, Company Officers). Function #4, pages 204-211, describes
the responsibilities and methods the different organizational levels use to man­
age accountability around the incident site (for their assigned personnel).
One of the big ways we manage accountability at the incident scene is to build
an effective incident organization (explained in Function #6). In fact all eight
jitnctions of command have a profound effect on the Ie's (and everyone else's)
ability to manage incident scene accountability. Using the whole system (IMS
and the eight functions) effectively manage most of the incident accountability
needs. A formalized accountability system (passport based) is shown and
described in Function #4, pages 209-211. This system meets the requirements
of sections 4.7.6-4.7.8.

4.7.9* The incident management system shall include an SOP to evacuate per­
sonnel from an area where an imminent hazard condition is found to exist and
to account for the safety of personnel.

4.7.10 The SOP described in 4.7.9 shall include a method to notify immedi­
ately all personnel as specified in 4.7.2.

Sections 4.7.9 and 4.7.10 are both accomplished by moving personnel from
offensive positions to defensives ones. Function #4, page 206, describes the
system the IC uses to manage personnel when switching from an offensive to
defensive strategy. The communications piece of this capability is described
in Function #3, pages 161-162.

4.8 Personnel Accountability.

4.8.1 The personnel accountability system shall be used at all incidents.

4.8.2* The emergency services organization shall develop the system compo­
nents required to make the personnel accountability system effective.

4.8.3* The standard operating procedures shall provide the use of additional
accountability officers based on the size, complexity, or needs of the incident.

4.8.4 Where assigned as a company/crew/unit, members shall be responsible

to remain under the supervision of their assigned supervisor.

4.8.5 Members shall be responsible for following personnel accountability

system procedures.

Sections 4.8.1-4.8.5 pertain to the different methods the IC and the rest of the
incident management organization keep track of assigned personnel. Keeping

oJ
Appendix

track of assigned personnel falls under the broad umbrella of accountability.

Each level of the incident scene organization (described in Function #6, pages
267-270) is responsible for managing accountability for their level (i.e., IC,
Sector Officers, Company Officers). Function #4, pages 204-211, describes
the responsibilities and methods the different organizational levels use to man­
age accountability around the incident site (for their assigned personnel).
One of the big ways we manage accountability at the incident scene is to build
an effective incident organization (explained in Function #6). 1n fact all eight
functions of command have a profound effect on the Ie's (and everyone else's)
ability to manage incident scene accountability. Using the whole system (IMS
and the eight functions) effectively manage most of the incident accountability
needs. Function #4, pages 307-308, describes the role of the accountability
sector.

A formalized accountability system (passport based) is shown in Function #4,

pages 209-211 . This system meets the requirements of sections 4.8.1-4.8.5.

4.9 Incident Scene Rehabilitation.

4.9.1 The incident commander shall consider the circumstances of each inci­
dent and make provisions for the rest and rehabilitation of personnel operating
at the scene.

4.9.2 The provisions required by 4.9 .1 shall include medical evaluation and
treatment, food and fluid replenishment, and relief from extreme climatic con­
ditions, accordjng to the circumstances of the incident.

4.9.3 All members entering and leaving the rehabilitation area shall be
assigned by the incident management system and be tracked through the per­
sonnel accountability system.

4.9.4* The emergency services organization shall develop standard operating

procedures that outline a systematic approach for the rehabilitation of mem­
bers operating at incidents.

4.9.5 Provisions addressed in these procedures shall include medical evalua­

tion and treatment, food and fluid replenishment, crew rotation, and relief
from extreme climatic conditions .

4.10 Incident Scene Rehabilitation Tactical Level Management Component.

4.10.1 * The rehabilitation tactical level management component shall be des­

ignated per department standard operating procedures, for such incidents as
large-scale incidents, long-duration incidents, or those associated with signifi­
cant temperature extremes.

4.10.2 The rehabilitation tactical level management component shall be estab­

lished in a safe environment away from tte hazardous area of the incident.
 Appendix

Sections 4.9.1-4.10.1 are achieved by implementing and using a

Rehabilitation Sector. Function #6, pages 306-307, describes the roles and
responsibilities of the Rehab Sect01: Function #8, pages 385-387, also address
the rehab activities the IC must manage when terminating incident operations.

4.11 Evaluation and Triage of Emergency Responder Injuries.

4.1l.1 * In the event of an injury to a fIrefIghter, the medical tactical level

management component shall assess and treat the injury based on local med­
ical protocol and standard operating procedures. At escalating incidents, addi­
tional medical assistance shall be dispatched.

Maintaining enough tactical reserve to meet incident needs is covered in

Function #7, pages 335-337. Medical Sectors are covered in Function #6,
pages 312-313.

4.11.2 Medical control for basic and advanced life support and other providers
shall be established by the authority having jurisdiction.

4.11.3 The assigned medical control shall come from a base hospital or shall
be permitted to come from a central dispatch/control facility.

Sections 4.11.2 and 4.11.3 are a local issue that is managed by the organiza­
tion that delivers emergency medical services for the local jurisdiction.

4.12 Risk Management. (Reserved)

Chapter 5 System Components

5.1 Incident Commander.

5.l.1 * The incident management system shall clearly identify who is in over­
all command at the scene for the duration of the incident.

The establishment and identification of the IC is explained (in great detail)

throughout Function #1.

5.1.2 The incident management system shall provide for the transfer of the
assignment of incident commander to take place one or more times during the
course of an incident.

The transfer of command process is explained throughout Functions #1 and #8.

5.l.3* Following the initial stages of an incident, the incident commander

shall establish a stationary command post. In establishing a command post,
the incident commander shall ensure the following:
(1) The command post is located in or tied to a vehicle to establish pres­
ence and visibility.
Appendix

(2) The command post includes radio capability to monitor and communi­
cate with assigned tactical, command, and designated emergency traf­
fic channels for that incident.
(3) The location of the command post is communicated to the communi­
cations center.
(4) The incident commander, or his or her designee, is present at the com­
mand post.
Command post operations are explained in Function #1, pages 85-90.

5.1.4 The incident commander shall maintain an awareness of the location and
function of all companies or units at the scene of the incident.

The IC's ability to control (and maintain an awareness of) the position and
functions of all operating resources is achieved by maintaining a tactical work
sheet and building an effective incident organization. Tactical work sheet
management is covered in Function #2, pages 11 3-117 and Function #4,
pages 199-201 . Organization is explained in Function #6.

5.1.5 The incident commander shall be responsible for overall perso nnel
accountability for the incident.

Strategic level accountability is explained in Function #4, pages 205-206.

5.1.6 The incident commander shall initia:e an accountability and inventory

work sheet at the beginning of operations and shall maintain that system
throughout operations.

The resource and inventory tracking section of Function #4, pages 199-201
and Function #2, pages 113-117, satisfies the requirements of section 5.1.6.

5.1.7 The incident commander and members who are assigned a supervisory
responsibility for a tactical level managerLent unit that involves multiple com­
panies or crews under their command shall have assigned a member(s) to
facilitate the ongoing tracking and accountability of all assigned companies.

The accountability organization described in Function #6, pages 307-308,

includes the use of accountability officers to track personnel accountability for
the different operational sectors.

5.1.8 The incident commander shall be responsible for monitoring tactical,

command, and designated emergency traffLc channels for that incident.

The IC's role in the communications process is explained in Function #3.

Function #6 describes the communications needs and requirements for the dif­
ferent size and types of incidents the IC mllst manage.

5.1.9 The incident commander shall be responsible for developing and/ or

approving an Incident Action Plan (lAP) This plan shall be communicated to
 Appendix

all staged and assigned members at an incident.

Function #2 explains the different factors the Ie uses to size up the incident
situation. Function #5 describes how the Ie selects the proper strategy and
then formulates an lAP that matches the strategy to the incident conditions.
The Ie communicates (Function #3) the lAP as he/she assigns units (Function
#4) and assigns sector, branch or section responsibilities.

5.1.10* Standard operating procedures shall provide for one individual to

assume the role of incident commander from the beginning of operations at
the scene of each incident.

Function #1 explains and describes implementing an Ie to begin operations.

5.1.11 * Standard operating procedures shall define the circumstances and pro­
cedures for transferring command to another on-scene officer/member and
shall specify to whom command shall be transferred.

Function #1 explains and describes implementing an Ie to begin operations.

Function #1 also describes how command is transferred to later arriving offi­
cers/members. The methods described in the text satisfy the requirements of
sections 5.1.10 and 5.1.11.

5.1.12* The incident commander shall provide for control of access to the
incident scene.

The way the Ie controls resources and incorporates them into the incident
action plan is described in Function #4, pages 190-195 (Function #1, page
84, also describes the standard status categories). Staging and accountability
procedures are explained in Function #4, pages 201-211.

5.1.13* The following risk-management principles shall be utilized by the

incident commander:
(l) Activities that present a significant risk to the safety of personnel shall
be limited to situations where there is a potential to save endangered
lives.
(2) Activities that are routinely employed to protect property shall be rec­
ognized as inherent risks to the safety of personnel, and actions shall
be taken to reduce or avoid these risks.
(3) No risk to the safety of personnel shall be acceptable where there is no
possibility to save lives or property.

5.1.14* The incident commander shall evaluate the risk to personnel with
respect to the purpose and potential results of their actions in each situation.
In situations where the risk to emergency service personnel is excessive, as
defined in 5.1.13, activities shall be limited to defensive operations.

The risk-management plan explained in Function #5, pages 241-243 meets the
Appendix

requirements of 5.1.13 and 5.1.14.

5.2 Command Staff.

5.2.1 * Command staff functions shall include those elements of the incident
management system that operate in direct support of the incident commander
and contribute to the overall management of the incident.

5.2.2* Standard operating procedures shall define the roles and responsibilities
of personnel assigned to command staff fur:ctions. Three specific staff positions
shall be identified: information officer, liaison officer, and incident safety officer.

5.2.3* Additional staff functions shall be assigned, depending on the nature

and location of the incident or on requirements established by the incident
commander.

Section 5.2.1-5.2.3 are satisfied by the organizational elements described in

Function #6, specifically command teams and chief's aides, pages 279-283,
sector officers, pages 295-320, branch officers, pages 287-288 and section
chiefs, pages 288-293. Pages 379-385 describe the escalation of command.

5.3 Information Officer.

5.3.1 The information officer shall act as a liaison between the media and the
incident commander.

5.3.2 The information officer shall consult with the incident commander
regarding any constraints on the release of information and shall prepare press
briefings.

The Information Officer (referred to as PIO in the text) roles and responsibili­
ties explained in Function #6, pages 308-309, meet the requirements of 5.3.1
and 5.3.2.

5.4 Liaison Officer.

I
5.4.1 The liaison officer shall provide a ponnt of contact for assisting and
cooperating agencies.

5.4.2 The liaison officer shall identify current or potential interagency needs.

The Liaison Officers function falls under the administrative section's area of
responsibility (Function #6, pages 292-293) and meets the requirements of
5.4.1 and 5.4.2. Where the different organiz.ational jJositionsfall (who they
report to) is up to the local jurisdiction. The important thing is that the func­
lion these different sectors are responsible for what gets done. A lot of the
functional, non-tactical related sectors (liaison, PIO, investigations, etc.) do
not report to the Ie-all of those listed report to the administrative section.
 Appendix

All of this is somewhat transparent since ultimately everyone reports back to

the Ie (either directly or through his/her incident boss).

5.5 Incident Safety Officer (ISO).

5.5.1 * The incident safety officer shall be integrated with the incident man­

agement system as a command staff member. (See Annex C.)

The Safety Section, explained in Function #6, pages 28-29, satisfies the

requirements of section 5.5.1.

5.5.2* Standard operating procedures shall define criteria for the response or
appointment of an incident safety officer.

5.5.3 If the incident safety officer is designated by the incident commander,

the fire department shall establish criteria for appointment based upon 4.6.5.

5.5.4* The incident safety officer and assistant incident safety officer(s) shall
be specifically identifiable on the incident scene.

Function #6, pages 300-301, defines Safety Sector roles and responsibilities
and meets the requirements of 5.5.2-5.5.4.

5.6 Incident Scene Safety.

5.6.1 The incident safety officer shall monitor conditions, activities, and oper­
ations to determine whether they fall within the criteria as defined in the fire
department's risk-management plan. When the perceived risk(s) is not within
these criteria, the incident safety officer shall take action as outlined in 5.1.13.

5.6.2 The incident safety officer shall ensure that the incident commander
establishes an incident scene rehabilitation tactical level management unit dur­
ing emergency operations.

Rehabilitation sector as described in Function #6, pages 306-307, is a regular

part of incident scene operations and should be implemented to whatever
degree (size and scope) that they are required to meet the rehab needs of the
personnel operating at the incident scene.

5.6.3 The incident safety officer shall monitor the scene and report the status
of conditions, hazards, and risks to the incident commander.

5.6.4 The incident safety officer shall ensure that the fire department's person­
nel accountability system is being utilized.

5.6.5 The incident commander shall provide the incident safety officer with
the incident action plan.

5.6.6 The incident safety officer shall provide the incident commander with a
 Appendix

risk assessment of incident scene operations.

5.6.7 The incident safety officer shall ensure that established safety zones, col­
lapse zones, hot zones, and other designated hazard areas are communicated
to all members present on scene.

5.6.8 The incident safety officer shall evaluate motor vehicle scene traffic haz­
ards and apparatus placement and take actions to mitigate hazards.

5.6.9 The incident safety officer shall monitor radio transmissions and stay
alert to transmission barriers that could result in missed, unclear, or incom­
plete communication.

5.6.1 0* The incident safety officer shall communicate to the incident com­
mander the need for assistant incident safety officers due to the need, size,
complexity, or duration of the incident.

5.6.11 The incident safety officer shall survey and evaluate the hazards associ­
ated with the designation of a landing zone and interface with helicopters.

The dispatch centel; the safety section, safety sector officers, accountability
sector and accountability officers, rescue sectors and RIC crews, along with
the tactical sector officers they are working with, make up the management
team(s) the IC uses to connect the strategy and lAP to incident outcomes
while keeping the workers safe and alive. The system described in the text
begins with the arrival of the initial unit and escalates based on the needs of
the incident. At the end of each Function is a command safety section that
describes how the IC manages the safety (J.nd welfare of the workers by being
"command" (effectively peljorming the functions of command). This system
is used to manage all the risks the workers (and customers) are exposed to.
The system described in the text meets the requirements of sections 5.6.1-5.6.11.

5.7 Fire Suppression.

5.7.1 The incident safety officer shall meet the provisions of Section 4.3 dur­
ing fire suppression operations.

Utilizing a Safety Sector that meets the level described in Function #6, pages
300-301, satisfies section 5.7.1.

5.7 .2 The incident safety officer shall enst.:re that a rapid intervention crew
meeting the criteria in Chapter 8 of NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department
Occupational Safety and Health Program, is available and ready for deploy­
ment.

Rescue sector and 2 in-2 out in Function #6, pages 317-320, describes a rapid
intervention crew (or team) that meets 5.7.2

..

 Appendix

5.7.3 Where fire has involved a building or buildings, the incident safety offi­
cer shall advise the incident commander of hazards, collapse potential, and
any fire extension in such building(s).

5.7.4 The incident safety officer shall evaluate visible smoke and fire condi­
tions and advise the incident commander, tactical level management compo­
nent officers, and company officers on the potential for flashover, backdraft,
blow-up, or other fire event that could pose a threat to operating teams.

5.7.5 The incident safety officer shall monitor the accessibility of entry and
egress of structures and the effect it has on the safety of members conducting
interior operations.

Utilizing a safety sector that meets the level described in Function #6, pages
300-301, satisfies section 5.7.3-5.7.5. Utilizing emergency communications,
Function #3, pages 161-162, to notify the Ie (and everyone else) of eminent
hazards satisfies 5.7.4.

5.8 Emergency Medical Service Operations.

5.8.1 The incident safety officer shall meet provisions of the authority having
jurisdiction during EMS operations.

5.8.2 The incident safety officer shall ensure compliance with the depart­
ment's infection control plan and NFPA 1581 , Standard on Fire Department
Infection Control Program, during EMS operations.

5.8.3 The incident safety officer shall ensure that incident scene rehabilitation
and critical incident stress management are established as needed at EMS
operations, especially mass casualty incidents.

5.9* Hazardous Materials Operations. Where hazardous material operations

are being conducted using personnel trained at the hazmat technician level, the
incident safety officer shall appoint a technical safety officer (TSO) who
meets the requirements of NFPA 472, Standard for Professional Competence
of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents.

5.10 Special Operations.

5.10.1* Where special operations incidents occur, as outlined in NFPA 1670,

Standard on operations and Training for Technical Rescue Incidents, the inci­
dent safety officer shall appoint a technical safety officer who meets the appli­
cable requirements specified in NFPA 1006, Standard for Rescue Technician
Professional Qualifications .

5.10.2 The incident safety officer shall maintain communication and hazard
assessment awareness with assigned technical safety officers and assistant
safety officers.

- - - - - - _/

Appendix

5.11 Accident Investigation and Review.

5.11.1 Upon notification of a member injury, illness, or exposure, the incident

safety officer shall immediately communicate this to the incident commander
to ensure that emergency medical care is provided.

5.11.2 The incident safety officer shall initiate the accident investigation pro­
cedures as required by the fire department.

5.11.3 In the event of a serious injury, fatz.lity, or other potentially harmful

occurrence, the incident safety officer sha] request assistance from the health
and safety officer.

Sections 5.8-5.11 address the roles and responsibilities of the safety officer.
These are SOP-based job descriptions that pertain to fulfilling the safety offi­
cers organizational role and not necessarily incident scene responsibilities.
For sections 5.8.2, 5.9 and 5.10.1 refer to the specific standards that are cited.

5.12 Post Incident Analysis.

5.12.1 The incident safety officer shall participate in the post incident analysis.

5.12.2* The incident safety officer shall prepare a written report for the post
incident analysis that includes pertinent information about the incident relat­
ing to safety and health issues.

5.12.3 The incident safety officer shall include in the post incident analysis
information about issues relating to the use of protective clothing and equip­
ment, personnel accountability system, rapid intervention crews, rehabilitation
operations, and other issues affecting the safety and welfare of members at the
incident scene.

Section 5.12 covers the Safety Officer's role in post incident critiques.
Critiques are covered in Chapter 8, pages 386-387.

5.13 General Staff.

5.13.1 An incident management system shall include the general staff sections
of operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration.

Function #6, pages 288-293, describe the roles and responsibilities of the sec­
tion positions, satisfying 5.13.1.

5.13.2 Operations Functions.

5.13.2.1 Operations functions shall refer to those tactical components of the

incident management system that are withln the primary mission of the emer­
gency services organization.
 Appendix

5.13.2.2* The incident commander shall assign intermedjate levels of supervi­

sion and organize resources following standard operating procedures based on
the scale and complexity of operations .

5.13.2.3* All supervisors assigned to operations functions shall support an

overall strategic plan, as directed by the incident commander, and shall work
toward the accomplishment of tactical objectives.

5.13.2.4 Supervisors assigned to operations functions shall be accountable for

all resources assigned under their span of control and for coordination with
higher levels of the command structure and with other supervisors at the same
level. The safety and health of all personnel shall be primary considerations.

Function #6, pages 290-291, explains the role of the operations section and
meets the requirements of sections 5.13.2.1-5.13.2.4.

5.13.3 Staging.

5.13.3.1* The incident management system shall provide a standard system to

manage reserves of personnel and other resources at or near the scene of the
incident.

5.13.3.2* When emergency activities are being conducted in a location where

there would be a delay in activating standby resources, the incident command­
er shall establish staging areas close to the area where the need for those
resources is anticipated.

Staging is explained in Function #4, pages 201-204, which satisfies sections

5.13.3.1 and 5.13.3.2. Staging sector is explained on pages 301-302.

5.14 Planning Functions .

5.14.1 Planning staff functions shall include those components of the incident
management system that are involved with information management that sup­
ports the incident commander and other levels of the incident command struc­
ture.

5.14.2* The incident management system shall include a standard approach

for the collection, evaluation, dissemination, and use of information.

5.14.3 The planning staff shall account for the organizational structure, avail­
ability of resources, deployment of resources, and situation status reports.

5.14.4 The incident management system shall include standard methods and
terminology to record and track the assignment of resources for the duration
of an incident.

... 5.14.5 The incident management system shall include a standard approach uti­

- ----/

 Appendix

lizing technical advisors to support the development of strategic plans and to

assist the incident commander.

Function #6, pages 291-292, describes the Planning Section and satisfies sec­
tions 5.14.1-5.14.5.

5.15 Logistics Functions.

5.15.1 Logistics shall provide services and support systems to all the organiza­
tional components involved in the incident including facilities, transportation,
supplies, equipment maintenance, fueling, feeding, communications, and med­
ical services, including responder rehabilitation.

5.15.2* When implementing high-rise logistics, the following functions shall

be included:
(1) Base
(2) Lobby control
(3) Ground (stairwell) support
(4) Communications

Function #6, page 290, describes the logistics sections and satisfies section
5.15.1. Section 5. 15.2 falls under the localjurisdiction's high-rise tactical
plans. Examples of decentralized staging area can be found in Function #4,
page 204.

5.16 Finance/Administration.

5.16.1 * The incident management system shall provide finance/administrative

services where necessary.

5.16.2* The incident commander shall assign finance/administrative functions

based on the needs or complexity of the incident.

Function #6, pages 292-293, describes the administrative (finance) section

and meets the requirements of sections 5.16.1 and 5.16.2.

5.17 Supervisory Personnel.

5.17.l Risk-management principles shall be employed routinely by superviso­

ry personnel (supervisors) at all levels of t}1e incident management system to
define the limits of acceptable and unacceptable positions and functions for all
personnel at the incident scene.

Risk management is explained in Function #5, pages 241-243 and meets the
requirements of 5.17.1.

5.17.2* Supervisors shall assume responsibility for activities within their span
of control, including responsibility for the safety and health of personnel and

~c
_ _ _ _ __ _
 Appendix

other authorized persons within their designated areas.

Function #6, pages 273-279, describes the role of sectors. Function #6, pages
267-270, describes the roles and responsibilities of the three organizational
levels.

5.17 .3* Supervisors shall work toward assigned objectives, within the overall
strategy defined by the incident commander. They shall, on a regular basis,
report progress, or lack of progress, in meeting those objectives as well as any
deviation from established plans.

5.17.4 Supervisors at each level of the command structure shall receive direc­
tion from, and shall provide progress reports to, supervisors at a higher level.

Sector and company communications are explained in Function #3, pages

149-150 and 160-164. The essential communications activities are listed in
Function #3, pages 144 and 166. These communications guideline meet the
requirements of 5.17.3 and 5.17.4.

5.17.5 Supervisors shall be alert to recognize conditions and actions that cre­
ate a hazard within their span of control.

5.17.6 All supervisors shall have the authority and responsibility to take
immediate action to correct imminent hazards and to advise their supervisor
regarding these actions. Pages 273-277 explain sector officer's roles and
responsibilities.

Function #2, pages 121-123, describes the team evaluation and reaction to the
incident critical factors. This" team" approach of moving critical infonna­
tion along the three organizational levels keeps the strategy and action plan
current to the conditions and keeps the workers safe. This approach meets
sections 5.15.5 and 5.17.6.

5.17 .7 Supervisors shall coordinate their activities with other supervisors at

the same level and shall provide direction to supervisors at a lower level or to
personnel within their span of control.

Fun ction #6 provides a basic overview of the incident organization and how
all the incident players work together.

:5.17.8* Where conflicting orders are received at any level of the incident man­
agement system, the individual receiving the conflicting order shall inform the
individual giving the order that a conflict exists. If the conflicting order is
required to be carried out, the individual giving the conflicting order shall so
inform the individual who provided the initial order.

The system described in this book doesn 't address dealing with conflicting
orders. The system is designed to immediately put an Ie in place (Function
Appendix

#1), do an initial and on-going size up of the incident critical factors

(Functions #2 and #7). The Ie divides the incident scene by building an e.ffec­
tive incident organization. Using the sysrem (all eight Functions) helps to
eliminate conflicting orders from occurring. In the event (however unlikely)
that conflicting orders do occur, the "fix " listed in 5.17.8 will keep all effected
parties properly informed. Anytime conflicting orders occur on the incident, it
should be addressed in the post incident critique to help prevent any future
occurrence.

5.17.9 All supervisors shall maintain a constant awareness of the position and
function of all personnel assigned to operate under their supervision. This
awareness shall serve as the basic means of accountability that shall be
required for operational safety.

Function #4, pages 204-208, explains the accountability responsibilities of the

three organizational levels and meets the requirements of 5.17.9.