DocuSign Envelope ID: 5B705D6D-0F43-409D-9FAA-EACFAB51DCFF

Proyect
Proyect name: SE Alena CL17 Date: 08.06.2023
number:
Distribution List

- Fabiano Fortes - Head of PMO & Global Project Management

- Bryan O'Shaughnessy - Chief Operating Officer
- Sebastian Cortés - SHEQ Manager LATAM
- Victoriano Márquez de Prado - O&M Manager LATAM
- Roberto Ramírez - Technical Services Manager
- Claudia Yáñez - Health & Safety Manager
- Claudio Gutiérrez - O&M Manager

Prepared By Function Company

Mainstream LATAM
Pablo Barra Operations Manager

Johnny Pieringer Maintenance Manager

First Approver Company

Function
Mainstream LATAM

Jocelyn Gómez
H&S Deputy Manager

Victoriano Márquez de Prado

O&M Manager LATAM

Final Approver Function Company

Mainstream LATAM

Sebastian Cortés SHEQ Manager LATAM

DocuSign Envelope ID: 5B705D6D-0F43-409D-9FAA-EACFAB51DCFF

Disconnect Failure Report (89AT1-1T)

PE Alena
O&M Management
23–May–2023

Document ID: IFA -CL17-2023-001

Revision Number: 0
DocuSign Envelope ID: 5B705D6D-0F43-409D-9FAA-EACFAB51DCFF

Failure Report
O&M Management

Table of Contents
1. General Background of the Failure. ................................................................................................................................ 3
1.1. Element(s) Failed ............................................................................................................................................................ 3
1.2. Affected Facility .............................................................................................................................................................. 3
1.2.1. Installation(s) generation: .............................................................................................................................................. 3
1.2.2. Instalación(es) transmisión: ........................................................................................................................................... 3

2. Information requested in Of. SEC No. 6485/2012 and in Res. Ex. SEC No. 4764/2014 ..................................................... 4

3. Condition before Failure................................................................................................................................................. 4

4. Description of the Failure ............................................................................................................................................... 5

5. Cause of Failure .............................................................................................................................................................. 5

6. Attention of the Failure .................................................................................................................................................. 6

7. Protection and Control Schemes .................................................................................................................................... 6

7.1. Protections Operated ..................................................................................................................................................... 6
There was no record of events or oscillographs. ........................................................................................................................... 6
7.2. Operations Records ........................................................................................................................................................ 6
7.3. Joint Analysis .................................................................................................................................................................. 7

8. Root cause analysis. ....................................................................................................................................................... 8

8.1. Primary / direct cause .................................................................................................................................................... 8
8.2. Secondary causes ........................................................................................................................................................... 8
8.3. Root Cause...................................................................................................................................................................... 8

9. Recommendations ......................................................................................................................................................... 8

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DocuSign Envelope ID: 5B705D6D-0F43-409D-9FAA-EACFAB51DCFF

Failure Report
O&M Management

1. General Background of the Failure.

The following failure events notified by the Enor Chile Control Center are recorded as indicated:

1.1. Element(s) Failed

Failure

Control Center Siemens Energy

Component Disconnector 220 kV

Equipment 89AT1-1T

Failure Date 23-05-2023

Hours 07:51

1.2. Affected Facility

1.2.1. Installation(s) generation:

Affected Facility disconnection time interrupted power Connection Normalization Time

(MW) Authorization Time
CDC

PE Alena 07:51 0 07:43 09:13

1.2.2. Instalación(es) transmisión:

Affected Facility disconnection time interrupted power Connection Normalization Time
(MW) Authorization Time
CDC

PE Alena N/A N/A N/A N/A

Consumption:

There were no consumptions affected by Cóndor Energía SpA does not have information on the consumptions affected during
the event under analysis.

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Failure Report
O&M Management

2. Information requested in Of. SEC No. 6485/2012 and in Res. Ex. SEC No.
4764/2014

Element ID/ Code Name/Description

Commune ID 8301 Los Ángeles

Failure Code 1015 Personnel or operator error

Physical phenomenon OPE7 Personnel or operator error

Element PR4 Disconnector

electrical phenomenon DI21 Distance (admittance, impedance or reactance)

Mode 14 Several

3. Condition before Failure

During the opening maneuvers of the Alena Substation (owned by MRP) due to scheduled disconnection works to carry out
annual maintenance of the Substation, covered under SD 2023044811, which details the condition of the Substation isolated
from line and without load and/or input of energy to the SEN.

The following medium voltage equipment (33 kV) wer open:52F1 - Circuito 1.

 52F2 - Circuit 2.
 52F3 - Circuit 3.
 52F4 - Circuit 4.
 52F5 - Circuit 5.
 52F6 – Auxiliary Services Transformer.
 52FZ1 - ZigZag Transformer.
 52FT1 - Incomming 1 Power transformer T1.

The following high voltage equipment (154 kV) were open:

 52AT1 - Line power switch - TR1.

 89AT1-2 - High side disconnect switch TR1 (154 kV).
 89AT1-1 - Arrival disconnector of the Santa Luisa line (Tap-off) de 154 kV.

The following high voltage equipment (154 kV) were closed:

 89AT1-2T - High side grounding switch TR1 (154 kV).

The grounding disconnector (89AT1-1T) remains energized at the end of the Santa Luisa – Coyanco (Tap Off) – Alena (Tap-
off) Line, since the line was not opened from the end of the Santa Luisa Substation.

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Failure Report
O&M Management

Figure 1. Unilinear diagram of the Alena 33/154 kV Substation.

4. Description of the Failure

Events are logged as follows:
 On Tuesday 05-23-23, at 07:51:29.490 (UTC), a closing operation (remote closing command) was recorded by the Control
Center for the grounding disconnector with the Santa Luisa Line transmission line - Coyanco (Tap Off) - Alena energized,
causing a fault or three-phase short circuit to ground that causes the opening of the 52A3 power switch at the Santa Luisa
Substation.

5. Cause of Failure
 The event at 07:51:29.490 (UTC) was caused by the erroneous closing of the grounding switch (89AT1-1T) with the Santa
Luisa - Coyanco (Tap Off) - Alena transmission line energized; this produces a triphasic short-circuit fault to ground, which
causes a start-up and tripping of the line protection schemes at the end of the Santa Luisa Substation.

Figure 2. Damage to the power contacts of the 154 kV 89AT1-1T disconnector.

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Failure Report
O&M Management

6. Attention of the Failure

 Failure attention is carried out as indicated:
 Tuesday 23-05-23:
 The Control Center is notified of the erroneous closure of the 89AT1-1T disconnector and the loss of voltage reference
of the Santa Luisa – Coyanco (Tap Off) – Alena Line at the Alena 33/154 kV Booster Substation.
 The Control Center is requested to open the 89AT1-1T disconnector and to carry out the normalization of the 154 kV
Santa Luisa - Coyanco - Alena Line.
 Subsequently, a visual inspection is carried out in the 154 kV Yard, where it was possible to appreciate the damage
suffered by the blades of the 89AT1-1T disconnector.
 At the same time, the download of the list of events is executed from the CP_AT1 Cloth controller and the HMI event
records (substation scada), to determine the origin of the closing and/or closing command of the 89AT1-1T
disconnector, for analysis. . In the protection schemes associated with the line and the power transformer, no event
and oscillographic records were found, since there was no current circulation through the TCAT1 instrument
transformers because the 52AT1 switch was open as part of the maneuvers.

7. Protection and Control Schemes

7.1. Protections Operated
The Operated Protections were:
 Alena step-up substation
There was no record of events or oscillographs.
7.2. Operations Records
 Record of events obtained is attached:
 Alena step-up substation
 Control and Protection Relay CP/AT1 (SIEMENS 7SJ85).

Figure 3. CP/AT1 Controller Event Logs (Siemens 7SJ85).

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DocuSign Envelope ID: 5B705D6D-0F43-409D-9FAA-EACFAB51DCFF

Failure Report
O&M Management
 Scada of the Substation (IHM Level 2).
Referencia de tiempo Tiempo relativo N. de registro de entrada Estructura de función Nombre Valor Calidad Causa Número
23.05.2023 07:51:29.490 738:16:55:00.706 1014 Disconn. 89AT1-1T:Seccionador Orden de cierre on ok (Proceso) Cambio de datos 6.025.401.301
Figure 4. IHM Event Records (Scada Substation).

7.3. Joint Analysis

 On Tuesday 05-23-23, at 07:51:29.490 (UTC), a closing operation (remote closing command) was recorded by the Siemens
Energy Control Center for the grounding switch with the transmission line Santa Luisa - Coyanco (Tap Off) - Alena
stressed, causing a fault or three-phase short circuit to ground that causes the opening of the 52A3 power switch at the
Santa Luisa Substation.
 At the time of the failure, the Alena Wind Farm was without a generation contribution to the SEN, since it was undergoing
operations maneuvers to be de-energized, and thus be able to carry out the planned activities of annual maintenance of
power, control and protection equipment.
 The event at 07:51:29.490 (UTC) was caused by the erroneous closure of the grounding switch (89AT1-1T) with the Santa
Luisa Line (Tap Off) energized, this produces a three-phase short-circuit fault to ground, which starts and trips the line
protection schemes at the end of the Santa Luisa Substation. There is no short-circuit intensity, nor the fault clearance
time, since this cloth belongs to the CGE company.
 The failure occurs due to the lack of visual verification by the control center of the absence of voltage on the line prior to
carrying out the disconnector grounding closing command. In addition, it is verified that the substation control scheme
does not have interlocks (level 0 and 1) for the closing of the 89AT1-1T disconnector, since the closing permissive of this
equipment (89AT1-1T) is not conditioned by absence voltage at the arrival of the Santa Luisa - Coyanco (Tap Off) - Alena
line. This condition allows the closing of the 89AT1-1T disconnector from any command level, only by checking the open
position of the 89AT1-1 disconnector and the open position of the 52AT1-1T switch.

Figure 5. Trigger Logics Loaded in the CP/AT1 Panel Controller.

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Failure Report
O&M Management

8. Root cause analysis.

8.1. Primary / direct cause

 Incorrect closing of the grounding switch 89AT1-1T from the Control Center.

8.2. Secondary causes

 Non-assertive communication between the Siemens Energy Control Center and Substation Operations personnel during
maneuvers (Vaips).
 Absence of enabling electrical and logical interlocks (level 0 and 1) in Parque Alena to protect the closing and/or opening
maneuvers of the 89AT1-1T disconnector due to the presence of voltage from the Santa Luisa - Coyanco Line (Tap Off)
8.3. Root Cause

 Control Center performs remote maneuvers without visual verification in the substation with the help of the operator in
the field.

9. Recommendations
Recommended actions:

 Immediate repair of the grounding blades of the affected disconnector.

 Update the communication protocol for the maneuvers to be executed between the Control Center and the Operations
personnel at the Substation.
 Review and update of the maneuver guide for the Alena Substation, incorporating visual verifications.
 Implement level 0 and 1 interlocks to close the 89AT1-1T disconnector.

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