Article 43

PSİKOLOJİK VE
SOSYOLOJİK
PSİKOLOJİK VE SOSYOLOJİK YÖNLERİYLE

YÖNLERİYLE
VERGİLENDİRME
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Rana DAYIOĞLU ERUL

VERGİLENDİRME
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
SOCIOLOGICAL
ASPECTS OF TAXATION
Merkez Mağaza
53. Sokak No: 29 Dögol Caddesi No: 49/B
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Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Rana DAYIOĞLU ERUL
ISBN 978-625-8275-20-9
Gazi Kitabevi
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PSİKOLOJİK VE SOSYOLOJİK
YÖNLERİYLE VERGİLENDİRME
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF
TAXATION
PSİKOLOJİK VE SOSYOLOJİK
YÖNLERİYLE VERGİLENDİRME
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF
TAXATION
Editör
Rana DAYIOĞLU ERUL
PSİKOLOJİK VE SOSYOLOJİK YÖNLERİYLE
VERGİLENDİRME
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS
OF TAXATION
"En İyi Editör

Akademi, Bir Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Rana DAYIOĞLU ERUL
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ÖNSÖZ
Vergi psikolojisi, vergi ile ilgili olarak mükellef algılarını, tepkilerini

ve düşüncelerini inceleyen bir kavram olup diğer bir ifadeyle bireysel
(subjektif) görüşleri yansıtmaktadır. Vergilendirmenin toplumsal/
sosyolojik yönünü inceleyen vergi sosyolojisi ise vergileri toplumsal bakış
açısıyla ele alarak vergilendirmenin toplumsal tutum ve davranışlar ile
ilişkisini incelemektedir.
Bireysel davranışlar ile ilişkili olan vergi psikolojisi ve toplumsal

davranışlar ile ilişkili olan vergi sosyolojisi birbirleriyle ilişkili ve birbirini
tamamlayan kavramlar olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Vergi psikolojisi
ile vergi sosyolojisi arasındaki bu ilişki, bireyin toplumu, bireysel tutum
ve davranışların da toplumsal tutum ve davranışları etkilemesinden ve
oluşturmasından ileri gelmektedir. Bu nedenle bu eserde, birbiriyle ilişkili
olan bu iki kavramı kapsayan çalışmalar birlikte ele alınmaktadır.
Bu eser, vergi psikolojisi ve vergi sosyolojisi alanlarında, derli toplu

bir çalışma yapılması ve bu çalışmanın ilgili alanda literatüre katkı
sağlayarak konuya ilgi duyan araştırmacılara kaynak teşkil etmesi amacıyla
oluşturulmuştur.
Bu eserin hazırlanmasında değerli çalışmaları ile esere katkı sağlayan

yazarlara, eserlerin değerlendirilmesinde derin bilgi birikimleri ile katkıda
bulunan hakem ve danışma kuruluna ve esere ilişkin fikrin oluşmasından
basım sürecine kadar her aşamada destek olan değerli hocalarım Prof. Dr.
Fatih Saraçoğlu, Doç. Dr. Cem Barlas Arslan ve Dr. Öğretim Üyesi İsmail
Engin’e çok teşekkür ederim.
Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Rana DAYIOĞLU ERUL

Ankara - Eylül 2022
HAKEM VE DANIŞMA KURULU
Prof. Adrian Sawyer University of Canterbury
Prof. Jose Felix Sanz Sanz Complutense University of Madrid
Prof. Santiago Alvarez Garcia University of Oviedo
Prof. Dr. Ahmet Burçin Yereli Hacettepe Üniversitesi
Prof. Dr. Elif Sibel Çakar Kırıkkale Üniversitesi
Prof. Dr. Fatih Saraçoğlu Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi
Prof. Dr. Hilmi Ünsal Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi
Prof. Dr. Murat Atan Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi
Prof. Dr. Nevzat Saygılıoğlu Atılım Üniversitesi
Prof. Dr. Nurettin Bilici Çankaya Üniversitesi
Prof. Dr. S. Saygın Eyüpgiller Işık Üniversitesi
Doç. Dr. Abdurrahman Taraktaş Anadolu Üniversitesi
Doç. Dr. Cem Barlas Arslan Anadolu Üniversitesi
Doç. Dr. Eda Özdiler Küçük Ankara Üniversitesi
Doç. Dr. Hilmi Çoban Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi
Doç. Dr. Hüseyin Kutbay Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey Üniversitesi
Doç. Dr. Mehmet Ela Osmaniye Korkut Ata Üniversitesi
Assos. Prof. Mercedes Burguillo Cuesta University of Alcalá
Doç. Dr. Mine Nur Bozdoğan Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi
Doç. Dr. Necmettin Çelik İzmir Katip Çelebi Üniversitesi
Doç. Dr. Selçuk Buyrukoğlu Sivas Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi
Doç. Dr. S. Şehnaz Altunakar Mercan Dicle Üniversitesi
Doç. Dr. Ulvi Sandalcı Dumlupınar Üniversitesi
Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Abdullah Ömercioğlu Kırıkkale Üniversitesi
Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Ayşegül Durucan Kırıkkale Üniversitesi
Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Elif Yılmaz Furtuna Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi
Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Emin Ahmet Kaplan Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey Üniversitesi
Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Fatih Çavdar Trakya Üniversitesi
Dr. Öğretim Üyesi İsmail Engin Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi
Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Onur Uçar Osmaniye Korkut Ata Üniversitesi
Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Suna Şahin İstanbul Yeni Yüzyıl Üniversitesi
Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Şahin Yeşilyurt Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi
Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Yasin Aydoğdu Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi
Dr. Kenneth Tester University of Exeter
İÇİNDEKİLER
ÖNSÖZ.....................................................................................................V
HAKEM VE DANIŞMA KURULU.................................................. VI
İÇİNDEKİLER................................................................................... VII
Verginin Uyumu Kavramı ve Bu Bağlamda Vergi Yurttaşlığı

Kavramının Yeniden Yorumlanması.......................................................1
Elif Sibel ÇAKAR - Muhammed Hakan OKÇU
Nudging Taxpayers to Comply: Reflections About the Effect of

Deterrence and Non-Deterrence Behavioral Interventions Depending
on Taxpayers’ Motivational Postures....................................................19
Alexander TRUZKA - Žiga PUKLAVEC - Erich KIRCHLER
Vergiye Uyumlu Gelir Vergisi Mükelleflerine İndirim Uygulamasının

Vergi Psikolojisi Açısından İncelenmesi................................................49
Fatih SARAÇOĞLU
Exploring the Tax Compliance Behaviour of High Net Worth

Individuals in Malaysia..........................................................................69
Natrah SAAD - Abdul Salam MAS’UD - Saliza ABDUL AZIZ - Nor Aziah ABD MANAF
Türkiye’de Vergi Ahlakının Belirleyicileri: Ne Değişti?......................91

Recep TEKELİ
Public Finance and the Methodology of Scientific Research

Programs................................................................................................137
Richard E. WAGNER
Vergi İsyanı: Toplumsal Tepkilerin İktidar Kudretini

Sınırlandırması......................................................................................163
Abdulkerim EROĞLU - Özgür SARAÇ
VIII İçindekiler
Hekim Kazancının Vergilendirilmesi: Vergi Uyumu Açısından

Ampirik Analiz......................................................................................195
Mustafa Necati CERRAHOĞLU - Hakan YAVUZ
İbn Haldun ve Vergi..............................................................................225

Esra Berika DÖNMEZ - Recep YÜCEDOĞRU
Türkiye’de Vergi Afları ve Vergi Etiği Üzerindeki Etkileri..............267

Abdullah ÖMERCİOĞLU
Vergi İsyanları Üzerine: Gandhi’nin Tuz Yürüyüşü Örneği............303

Deniz ABUKAN
Vergi Kültürünün Analizi: Türkiye Örneği........................................333

Orçun AVCI - Hüseyin DİRİCAN
Vergiye Gönüllü Uyum Kapsamında İzaha Davet Müessesesinin

Değerlendirilmesi..................................................................................359
Arzu POLAT - Onur UÇAR
Voluntary Versus Enforced Tax Compliance: Testing the Slippery

Slope Framework for Turkey...............................................................379
Rana DAYIOĞLU ERUL - Emin Ahmet KAPLAN
Güneşin Vergilendirildiği Ülke: İngiliz Toplumunun Pencere

Vergisine Yönelik Tepkileri..................................................................413
Şahin YEŞİLYURT - İmran ARITI ERDEM
Sigara Üzerinden Alınan Vergilere Karşı Halo Etkisinin Varlığı.....447

Arzu POLAT
Bir Kamu Politikası Aracı Olarak Vergilendirmenin Sosyo Psikolojik

Boyutunun Seçmen Tercihleri Açısından İncelenmesi: 24 Haziran
2018 Milletvekili Genel Seçimi Örneği................................................463
Burcu KUZUCU YAPAR - Merve DURMUŞ
İçindekiler IX
Davranışsal Finans Açısından Verginin Yatırımcı Psikolojisine

Etkisinin İncelenmesi............................................................................489
Burcu ZENGİN
Vergi Uyumunda Dürtme Stratejileri: Seçili Ülke Uygulamaları.........517

Fatma TURNA
Şövalyelerden Savaşa Katılmamaları Karşılığında Alınan Bir

Vergi: Scutage........................................................................................551
Funda BUZ
Vergi Bilincinin Artırılmasında Vergi Haftasının Rolü: Deneysel Bir

Araştırma...............................................................................................563
Mehmet ÖKSÜZ
Vergi Denetiminin Vergi Uyumuna Etkisi..........................................597

Muharrem ÇAKIR
Yönlendirici Vergilendirmenin Mükellef Tercihleri Üzerindeki Etkisi:

Alkopop Örneği.....................................................................................617
Merve YOLAL EROĞLU
Tax Ethics in the Design of International Tax Law............................645

Sevda KARTAL
Mali Sosyolojinin Temelleri, Evrimi ve İşlevi.....................................667

Zehra AKGÜNGÖR
Atatürk Dönemi Vatandaşlık Eğitimi Kapsamında Vergi Bilinci....689

Mehmet Metin ARSLAN - Cem Barlas ARSLAN
EXPLORING THE TAX COMPLIANCE
BEHAVIOUR OF HIGH NET WORTH
INDIVIDUALS IN MALAYSIA
Natrah SAAD*
Abdul Salam MAS’UD**
Saliza ABDUL AZIZ***
Nor Aziah ABD MANAF****
Abstract
A significant number of high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) whose

contribution accounted for more than 11% of personal income tax collections
has been caught in tax malfeasance over the period of 2009-2013 through
Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) tax audits. Notwithstanding this,
very few attempts were made to understand the non-compliance behaviour of
HNWIs. Therefore, this article explores their level of compliance behaviour and
its underlying reasons, and how such behaviour can be improved. Survey and
interviews with tax professionals who had experience dealings with HNWIs were
conducted. A descriptive and thematic analysis were employed, and the findings
suggest that majority of HNWIs comply with their tax obligation, but others may
had engaged in non-compliance due to lack of knowledge.
Few strategies including tax education, appropriate penalty, audit process,

issuance of capital statement was recommended. The results will be of immense
benefit to IRBM in formulating relevant strategies.
Keywords: HNWIs, Non-compliance, Thematic Analysis, Tax Education,

Audit Process
*
Associate Professor, Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz School of Accountancy, Universiti
Utara Malaysia, natrah@uum.edu.my, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9661-0131.
**
Dr., Federal University Dutse, Nigeria, masudabdussalam@yahoo.com, https://orcid.
org/0000-0002-1722-9798.
***
Associate Professor, Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz School of Accountancy, Universiti
Utara Malaysia, saliza@uum.edu.my, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7664-2865.
****
Professor, Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz School of Accountancy, Universiti Utara
Malaysia, aziah960@uum.edu.my, https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8985-9900.
70 Exploring the Tax Compliance Behaviour of High Net Worth Individuals in Malaysia
INTRODUCTION
Tax non-compliance of high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) is a

major issue of concern for tax authorities globally (Rosli, Ling & Embi,
2018). There are four underlying reasons for such concern. The first is the
complex nature of the transactions and businesses of HNWIs. Some are
internationally mobile, making it difficult to establish their principal place
of residence. They also have a variety of income sources and complex
business arrangements. Secondly, they contribute a significant share of tax
revenue. For instance, the top 0.5% of individual taxpayers in the United
Kingdom contribute 17% of the total income tax; in Germany, the top 0.1%
of the taxpayers pay 8% of the total income tax, and similarly, in the United
States, the top 1% of the individual taxpayers contribute 40% of the total
individual income tax collection (OECD, 2009). Similar trend is reported
in Malaysia, where the top 0.32% contributes 11.95% of total individual
tax collection in 2013 (Rosli et al., 2018). Thirdly, HNWIs are perceived
to more likely to engage in aggressive tax planning due to the complexity
of their businesses and variety of income sources available. Lastly, though
in reality HNWIs contribute a high proportion of tax, the public mostly
perceived this category as paying the least amount of tax. Therefore, this
brings forth the issue of integrity of the tax administration as the offences
of HNWIs are more likely to attract public attention (OECD, 2009).
Hence, studies were undertaken in some countries around the world

in order to understand HNWIs’ tax compliance behaviour. For instance,
the study of OECD (2009) which covers 14 countries (Australia, Canada,
Ireland, Germany, France Japan, Mexico, the Netherland, New Zealand,
Norway, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States and Switzerland)
concludes, among others, that HNWIs pose a significant challenge to tax
administration. Similarly, a study undertaken by Kangave et al. (2016)
in Uganda also demonstrates that a modest increase in tax revenue from
HNWIs is possible with proper administration of taxes.
In Malaysia, Rosli et al. (2018) reported that majority of taxpayers

with a total income of RM1 million to RM3 million tend to engage in
tax malfeasance. About 11% of personal income tax collections has been
evaded by the HNWIs over the period of 2009 to 2013 (Rosli et al.,
2018). During the same period, out of 511 HNWIs being audited, 319
Natrah SAAD - Abdul Salam MAS’UD - Saliza ABDUL AZIZ - Nor Aziah ABD MANAF 71
(representing 62%) were found to engage in tax malfeasance. A bigger

challenge is that the number of this category of taxpayers is growing over
years. The number of HNWIs in Malaysia increased from about 990 in 2015
to 1,020 in 2016 (The Star, 2017). Notwithstanding this, the only available
studies relating to the compliance behaviour of HNWIs in Malaysia is by
Saad et al. (2021) and Rosli et al. (2018). Rosli et al. (2018) examined
the influence of economic factors such as tax rate, income level, income
sources and tax agent on HNWIs’ compliance behaviour which are mainly
based on readily available data at the Inland Revenue Board Malaysia
(IRBM). While a later study by Saad et al. (2021) employed survey data to
explain the compliance behaviour of HNWIs. In order to add to the scarce
literature available in the area, this study attempts to examine the level of
compliance behaviour of HNWIs; and understand their behaviour from the
perspective of tax professionals who mostly interact with them. Further,
strategies on how to improve their compliance are sought.
1. UNDERSTANDING HNWIS
The most commonly applicable definition of HNWIs is that of OECD
(2009), which refers to individuals with a net worth totalling USD1 million
either directly or through trust and other controlled entities. In contrast, in
Australia, HNWIs are considered as those who effectively control a net
worth of A$30 million or more directly or through their associate, while
in South Africa, HNWIs are those with 7 million Rand gross income and/
or 75 million Rand gross wealth (Kangave et al., 2016). In Uganda, three
criteria are used in defining HNWIs (Kangave et al., 2018). The first is
rental income or land and property transaction. This is so considering the
fact that Uganda is a real estate economy. In relation to this, an individual
is considered an HNWI if he/she generates a rental income of USD142,000
annually or engages in the buying and selling of land for which the value
exceeds USD285,000 in a five-year period.
Secondly, shareholding is also used as a criterion, where an investor

in a private company whose annual turnover exceeds USD14.3 million is
considered as an HNWI. Similarly, a shareholder of multiple companies
with a turnover between USD4.3 million and USD14.3 million is also
considered as an HNWI. Lastly, bank deposit is also classified as useful
indicator of wealth. A person is classified as an HNWI if he/she has a
loan portfolio of over USD1.5 million in a five-year period or has bank

transactions of over USD1 million annually. In Malaysia, HNWIs is defined
in terms of both income and wealth. In terms of wealth, HNWIs are those
whose total net assets or total net joint assets with a spouse exceeds RM3
million or its equivalent in foreign currencies, excluding the value of his
or her primary residence. In terms of income, consideration was given for
individuals and joint annual incomes of RM300,000 or RM400,000 or its
equivalent in foreign currency. OECD (2013) classified HNWIs for some
selected OECD member countries and OECD non-member countries,
including Malaysia. In Malaysia, OECD (2013) classified HNWIs as
individuals with a statutory income over RM1 million, assets over RM5
million, or both together over RM5 million. For the purpose of this study,
the definition of OECD (2013) was adopted.
2. TAX NON-COMPLIANCE OF HNWIS

Tax non-compliance of HNWIs is a major issue of concern for tax
authorities globally (Rosli et al., 2018). Generally, there are two main
schools of thought in tax compliance. One is based on the economic
theory while the other is based on the behavioural theory. The first school
is an extension of Becker’s (1968) economics of crime model in which
the taxpayer’s decision to evade depends on the risk involved in the
evasion process. Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) economic deterrence
theory extend Becker’s (1968) economics of crime model through the
consideration of probability of detection and penalties based on the
expected utility theory. Though economic deterrence has been prominent
in tax compliance literature (Sapiei & Kasipillai, 2013), it was argued
that economic determinants alone cannot fully explain compliance
behaviour, especially when detection probability is low. Eventually, the
incorporation of behavioural factors, and more specifically sociological
and psychological factors, was made (see Fischer, Wartick & Mark, 1992;
Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Loo and Ho, 2005, Palil & Mustapha, 2011). A
suggestion was made by Hasseldine and Bebbington (1991) and James and
Alley (2002) where socio-psychological factors and fiscal psychological
factors should be studied alongside economic deterrence variables.
Specifically, in the context of HNWIs there is a paucity of empirical

evidence regarding the factors that explain tax non-compliance. For
instance, the earlier studies such as OECD (2009), Kangave et al. (2016),
Van Vuuren (2016), Rossi (2018), as well as Kangave et al. (2018)
centred on tax administration issues of HNWIs in terms of complexity
of identifying the sources and nature of their income, opportunity for
non-compliance through aggressive tax planning aided by tax advisors,
integrity to tax administration, audit approach, whistle blowing, offshore
amnesty program, and exchange of information program. The only study
that focused on estimating the determinants of tax non-compliance of
HNWIs is Rosli et al. (2018). While the study has utility values, it focused
mainly on economic determinants estimated through IRBM’s audited
data such as tax rate, income level, income source, and use of tax agent.
However, suggestions have been made in the literature where economic
factors alone cannot explain tax compliance and needs to be supported with
socio-psychological factors and fiscal psychological factors (Hasseldine &
Bebbington, 1991; James & Alley, 2002). It is also important to note that
the above-mentioned studies are quantitative in nature and focusing more
on the economic factors contributing towards their compliance behaviour.
Hence, this study aims to bridge the gap by revealing HNWIs tax
compliance decision, the underlying motivations towards such behaviour
as well as how to improve their compliance behaviour. This is pertinent
considering their potential tax contribution towards the nation.
3. RESEARCH METHOD
A survey and interviews were employed with tax professionals as a
proxy for HNWIs to answer the objectives of the study. This is so, because
tax matters are sensitive issue that HNWIs may not be willing to disclose.
Furthermore, like other countries, tax affairs of the HNWIs are normally
managed by tax professionals (particularly Big Four) due to its complexity.
For the survey, 500 questionnaires were distributed. Out of that, 123
responses were collected, but 23 were later dropped from the analysis as
they stated that they did not handle HNWIs clients.
Table 1. Summary of Survey Responses
Description Number of Percentage

Questionnaires (%)
Questionnaires Distributed 500 100.0
Returned Questionnaires 123 24.6
Invalid Questionnaires 23 4.6
Usable Questionnaires 100 20.0
As for interview, five tax professionals of Big Four who had been
dealing with HNWIs were interviewed in December 2020. Prior to the
interview sessions, the participants were briefed on the objectives of the
research and the confidentiality of their identity. Each interview session
took approximately 20 to 30 minutes which was recorded with the consent
of the participants and transcribed accordingly. To ensure the correct
information was gathered, note taking was also performed. The transcripts
were then analysed using thematic analysis, following Braun and Clarke
(2006). Thematic analysis is a method that identifies, analyses and reports
patterns within data. This thematic analysis was performed in six phases
following the step-by-step guide by Braun and Clarke (2006). The phases
are data familiarisation, initial code generation, themes search, review of
themes, defining the themes, and naming the themes.
4. RESULTS
This section describes the results of the study. It begins with demographic
information of the respondents and followed by the survey and interview
findings.
4.1 Demographic Information

Table 2 illustrates the demographic characteristics of the respondents.
From 100 respondents, 56 were males (56%) and 43 were females
(43%). With respect to the type of firms that they represented, 60 (60%)
respondents were from small firms, followed by mid-sized firms with 32
respondents (32%) and only 6 respondents (6%) were from the Big Four.
The respondents were asked about their experience as tax professionals.
The results indicate that most of them (65%) have experience of five years
and above as tax professionals, while the remaining respondents (34%) had
experience of less than five years.
Generally, 50% indicated that most of their clients are small companies,
followed by mid-sized companies (36%) and individuals (4%). Irrespective
of this, all the tax professionals admitted that they have HNWIs clients.
This is important to ensure that their perceptions reflect their experience in
dealing with HNWIs.
Table 2. Demographic Information
Demographic Profile Frequency Percentage (%)

Gender:
Male 56 56
Female 43 43
Missing 1 1
100 100
Size of the firms:
Small Firm 60 60
Mid-size Firm 32 32
Big Four 6 6
Missing 1 1
100 100
Number of years as tax agent:
Less than 5 years 34 34
5-10 years 24 24
More than 10 years 41 41
Missing 1 1
100 100%
Type of clients (Majority):
Individual 4 4
Small companies 50 50
Mid-size companies 36 36
Large companies 7 7
Missing 3 3
100 100
4.2 Level of HNWIs Compliance Behaviour
The level of compliance behaviour of HNWIs were measured in terms

of overstating expenses and underreporting incomes. For each category,
three (3) items were stated as highlighted in Table 3 and Table 4. The mean
value for overstating expenses is reported at 2.53 with standard deviation of
0.84. This reveals that tax professionals perceived HNWIs to have clearly
understood the non-compliance behaviour and did not support the action.
Indeed, additional expenses, ambiguity expenses, and unnecessary non-
allowable deductions were not claimed unintentionally by the HNWIs.
Table 3. Descriptive Analysis for Noncompliance Behaviour - Overstating Expenses
Overstating Expenses n Minimum Maximum Mean SD
HNWIs may believe that

adding a little bit of what they
actually spent when reporting 100 1 4 2.55 0.93
in the business is permissible.
HNWIs believe that when they

are not really sure whether
or not they deserve a tax
deduction, it makes sense 100 1 5 2.64 0.97
to take a chance and take a
deduction anyway.
HNWIs may consider it

permissible to stretch allowable
deductions by including non- 100 1 4 2.39 1.02
allowable deductions.
Overstating Expense 100 1 4 2.53 0.84
For under-reporting income, the mean value for every item is below
2.50 which indicates that tax professionals perceive that the HNWIs were
not in favour of under-reporting their incomes. Overall, the mean score for
the three items is 2.21 with a standard deviation of 0.84. In other words,
the HNWIs considered that it is tax non-compliance if they did not report
a certain income, exclude extra income, as well as hide some cash income
generated from other sources of income, contract or services rendered.
Table 4. Descriptive Analysis for Noncompliance Behaviour – Under-reporting Incomes
Under-reporting Incomes
(UI) n Minimum Maximum Mean SD
HNWIs may consider it
permissible not to report an
income in a tax return for 100 1 5 2.05 1.01
business done among them
(UI1).
HNWIs may believe it is
acceptable to report income
without including extra income 100 1 5 2.22 0.99
generated from other sources
of income (UI2).
HNWIs may perceive that it is
permissible not to report cash
100 1 4 2.37 1.02
being paid for a contract or
services rendered (UI3).
Underreporting Incomes 100 1 5 2.21 0.84
Based on the descriptive findings, it appears that HNWIs are generally

compliant with the tax laws. The possible reason could be the fact that they
did not want to jeopardize their reputation following the non-compliance
behaviour. Results from interview may provide more insights on their
compliance decisions.
4.3 HNWIs’ Compliance Behaviour

As indicated earlier, five tax professionals were engaged to partly
address the objectives of the study. All of them had more than 10 years’
experience dealing with HNWIs. However, their identities are disguised
consistent with confidentiality and anonymity principles. Using thematic
approach, the findings are categorised into the following sub-sections.
Informants were first asked about their perceptions on HNWIs
compliance behaviour based on their experience dealing with them.
Generally, the informants categorised HNWIs into four groups. The first
group refers to expatriates who are Chairman of companies or Board of
Directors, while the second group consists of Malaysians with big fortunes.
The third group of HNWIs are royal families and politicians, while the
other group are HNWIs who are involved in shadow economy or illegal
businesses. Based on this category, the informants generally perceived that

the expatriates and the wealthy or super rich HNWIs have been complying
with the tax laws. This group forms 85% of HNWIs who comply with
their tax obligations. However, the 15% who do not comply are from the
third and fourth groups. The reason being is that the royal families and
politicians believe that they are above the law. Their connections with
the ruling government may help them escape from any audit or penalties.
As for HNWIs that are involved in the shadow economy, they may not
comply due to the nature of businesses that they are in. Notwithstanding
the fact that incomes from illegal activities are also taxable, they may not
be interested to declare considering the legal impact. This is evidenced in
the comments below:
“When I look at the HNWIs who are in this category (expatriates),
usually the compliance is very high because they have no choice but to
make sure that they are compliant. Because as board of directors, board
members etc. that is liability even personally on director. On the company
side and the personal side, it is taken care of. I am sure the company is
doing properly.”
(Informant 1)
“There are different categories of HNWIs. Some are generational
wealth. Some might be because of being politicians, affiliations, etc.
and suddenly got offer for things, they got special project and become
sudden multi-millionaire. The non-compliance could be from this group
of sudden millionaires. Also, those involved in shadow economy (illegal or
corruption). Some of them may want to comply but if they comply, it will
open their misconduct.”
(Informant 2)
“There are two types of HNWIs. One is by generation (multi-generation)
and the second one is newly rich group. This newly rich people, I’m pretty
sure that their awareness is very low, extremely low. Multi-generation
HNWIs, I would comfortably say, that two-third of this group, the basic
knowledge is there. And this multi-generation, most of them are very
educated and in fact some of them are very good in financial matters.”
(Informant 3)
“HNWIs generally will be complying. Their compliance will be very

high. They will not be falsifying returns, but there will be tax planning.
As to whether they are disclosing offshore income, that is the question.
The local source income they will disclose properly. Offshore income is
not taxable anyway. As for compliance, they will do to comply with the
minimum requirement. They won’t go overboard. These are the clean
people, but they will use the system to circumvent it, they will use the law.”
(Informant 4)
“Only few groups who really don’t care about submitting the forms.
Sometimes, it is the people who are protected in this country, for example,
politicians and royalty. They couldn’t care, really don’t care because
they think they are above the law. Then you have another group who are
involved in illegal sector, underground sector and of course the privileged
people who cannot be touched particularly because you are connected to
politicians and royalty.”
(Informant 4)
“I believe HNWIs are complying with their tax obligations. However,

there is mindset of the people that HNWIs are not paying tax. In fact, most
of their incomes are non-taxable incomes such as dividend and capital
gain. It is not fair to simply claim that HNWIs are not complying.”
(Informant 5)
4.4 The Underlying Motivations towards HNWIs’ Compliance

Behaviour
To understand more on HNWIs’ compliance decision, the informants

were asked the underlying reasons One important point highlighted
by informants on why HNWIs are inclined towards compliance is their
reputation and freedom to enjoy their lives. They feel that it is not worth
damaging their reputation for not paying tax or creating problems with tax
authorities. This is highlighted in the statements below:
“Generally, HNWIs are compliant especially those who have always

being rich. The amount they paid is nothing compared to what they have.
They won’t take risk of damaging their reputation.”
(Informant 1)
“Majority of HNWIs want to comply properly. They don’t want to mess

around with tax authorities around the world. If they do, they cannot move,
they cannot enjoy their assets.”
(Informant 4)
Interestingly, when probed further on the non-compliance issue, the

informants admitted that even some HNWIs who have complied in terms
of submitting the return forms may engage in some acts of non-compliance
activities. While one informant confirmed that it is intentionally made, the
other informant claimed it could be due to tax ignorance or lack of advice.
“There are cases that I’ve gone through before. Basically, they will
try to hide directors’ expenses (which are non-allowable expenses) within
the company’s expenses. Usually, they record directors’ expenses under
entertainment or travelling expenses. Apart from directors’ expenses, they
will also manipulate benefit in kind. Sometimes, they will register directors’
cars under company’s names in order to enjoy the benefits. Usually, they
will claim more than the actual expenses.”
(Informant 2)
“They should have filed the return. They may have missed out
information, or they may not know that they have to declare. For example,
if they have sold their property or something, they may have not declared
that. Another problem is, HNWIs don’t have time to handle this matter,
they give it to tax advisors. Sometimes, HNWIs are serviced by possibly
the tax advisors who don’t have the capacity to service them. That’s why
they end up being non-compliant.”
(Informant 4)
“Based on my observation, I would say that their non-compliance

behaviour is because of lack of awareness”
(Informant 3)
4.5 Strategies to Improve Compliance Behaviour among

HNWIs
Following their comments on the compliance level of HNWIs, the

informants were asked on the potential mechanisms to improve compliance.
The important point highlighted by the informants collectively is tax
education as below:
“Education is important. For other countries who have world income

scope they don’t have so much of this problem right, because they don’t
need to prove that income is from Malaysia or outside Malaysia, because
everything is taxable anyway. So, it is easier for those countries. For us,
the determination of income-source is crucial because we use territorial
scope. So, education is essential.”
(Informant 1)
“Go back to education program. The IRBM must provide useful

education programs to educate HNWIs on chargeable incomes, chargeable
person, time to submit and applicable tax rates. That is important to comply
with Income Tax Act. Explanation notes through Public Rulings would help
too.”
(Informant 5)
“I think the only thing we can do is to persuade and educate them. They
need to be responsible to the country, where they have made the money and
they ought to pay tax, that is more on parenting them to comply.”
(Informant 4)
“To certain extent, HNWIs may not comply because of lack of awareness.
Awareness can be created in the form of education and marketing. My
main concern here is the marketing should be done in multilingual. Of
course, we can see nowadays several marketing has been done in Malay
and English, but I still think it should be multi language, like Mandarin
and Tamil, in order to reach them out. Also, we must reach out to schools.
To create awareness on tax matters at the young age will result in low
vandalism rate and high mutual respect. In fact, it will create the value that
whatever you earned, not all are yours. Creating awareness at the micro
level will create a healthier lifestyle.”
(Informant 3)
There are mixed opinions expressed by the informants on the use of

penalty as a mechanism towards improving compliance. This is highlighted
in the following statements:
“If you are going with penalty and stick approach, they are immune to
this. And those who are carrying out illegal businesses, they are dealing
with all those misconducts on day-to-day basis, they are prepared to bribe,
corrupt every segment, they used to this. So, that kind of penalty is not
something that they are worried about.”
(Informant 4)
“Personally, I do not think that penalty will improve compliance.

The IRBM imposed penalty of 45% even though in the Act, it says 100%
penalty. Why? What we are not happy is that every time there is audit, their
aim is to raise additional assessment and penalty. Perhaps, that is the only
way for the IRBM to deter offences. Otherwise, people will not bother.
Normally people would say, we claim first, if caught during audit, then we
pay, or else, we will get away. That is why the IRBM must adopt penalty
mechanism in their tax administration, I guess. They have no choice.”
(Informant 5)
“I don’t think severe penalty will help. In fact, the higher the penalty,
HNWIs will be more motivated to not comply. It will trigger them to further
hide their incomes.”
(Informant 2)
“Even penalty will not work. They don’t bother about it. They don’t care.
Whatever happens they can get out. Even if you catch them, they will pay
the money. Penalties are not deterrence, because they have gone beyond
penalties that have been applied. I mean if there is stricter enforcement and
apply it across the board like imprisonment or something like that, then it
may work. But the problem is whether the enforcers themselves will have
the power or the willpower to do so.”
(Informant 4)
Another strategy highlighted by the informants is the audit process,

where mixed views were demonstrated. One informant agreed that the
audit process would help deter the non-compliance behaviour, while the
other informant felt that it will not work, especially on hard-core evaders.
The other two informants claimed that the audit process is not right where
the IRBM officers had already a preconceived idea about the taxpayers
even before they began reviewing the documents.
“Audit will really help improve compliance. Some of my clients, they

have been audited every year. But for me the audit will make HWNIs
comply with tax laws. During audit, we will advise clients to prepare
for audit purpose. Usually, once they receive the letter, they will pass to
us for preparation and further discussion. The audit process does not
necessarily involve field audit. I think desk audit is enough. Once they sent
the document, they alert the clients, they made HNWIs to always comply
with the laws.”
(Informant 2)
“Audit will also not work. Even if you catch them, fine I will pay the
money. Then we will see how to settle, once in 10 years, so what.”
(Informant 4)
“When we discuss with people at the top, the deputy DG and things
like that, everything seems to be agreeable and all that, but then when
it comes to each branch when they carry out the audit etc., although the
broad guidelines are there, but how they implement it, again, will be
human factor that come in. They will go back to the KPI. I don’t care about
other things, but I need to collect this amount of tax. If I am going to be

reasonable, then I am not going to meet my target. I don’t’ care, I will just
raise the assessment and you pay, you can appeal, and court may agree
with you, and there will be reduction at the end, but for me I already meet
my KPI. The reduction is not counted. They refuse to see reasons especially
when it comes to the end of the year when they have to look at the KPI,
everybody goes crazy. They don’t want to listen anymore as I need to meet
my KPI. The audit process is wrong.”
(Informant 1)
“It is the role of the IRBM to perform audit. Every time they conduct
audit, they will make sure there is additional assessment. That results
in taxpayers’ disappointment. They will motivate those who comply and
perform audit and investigation on non-compliant taxpayers. Are they
performing their duties diligently and equitably?”
(Informant 5)
“Enforcement should be a broad-based enforcement rather than

a focused enforcement. We are a very small country. IRBM keeps on
expanding, which is good. From my observation, there are 14 prime lines
of enforcement. Besides that, they have focused targeted group. When you
keep on expanding the enforcement, with KPI-oriented, they will target on
those who are wealthy. That is how the enforcement is being tailor-made.
It is not a healthy enforcement. Enforcement should be total enforcement.
The objective is correct, but the mean is not correct. At the end of the day,
what would be happening? The lawyers will be making money. The idea
of enforcement is not correct from the beginning. Internal audit function
should be an independent function. Audit should be wide based. We should
audit everyone rather than focus on certain people. The purpose of audit is
to create awareness and to flag the mistake.”
(Informant 3)
In relation to audit, informant 3 also highlighted a number of expenses

that HNWIs normally attempt to manipulate in their tax reporting. In this
instance, tax auditors may need to give more attention to these types of
expenses.
“Maybe the auditors can focus more on hotspot areas such as directors’
fees, entertainment and travelling expenses, and benefit in kinds. They
will set up small number of errors to be identified by the IRBM and hide
the substantial ones. Usually when the IRBM found the small number of
mistakes and met their KPI, then they are happy. But there are other serious
and substantial amount hidden are overlooked.”
(Informant 2)
The informants also highlighted the use of automatic exchange of

information (AEOI) as a potential mechanism to improve the compliance
of HNWIs. In this instance, however, further improvements may need to
be considered as raised in the following claims:
“AEOI is a good step. The information, which is coming, triggers

the HNWIs to become more tax conscious. That is a good move. That is
working well. They are getting more conscious because of the AEOI where
the tax authorities are calling them up and say how did you have RM15
million in Singapore, how do you have RM100 million in London. What
happened, now explain. All you have now is exchanging information from
finance institution only, say if more in future under the pillar 1 pillar 2, we
will be getting more information on properties and other assets they have,
then you will have more things, more will be unearthed. But at the end of
the day, you can’t unearth everything because the HNWIs still hide it in
few things like paintings, coins, and a lot of things which are unrecorded,
unregistered but kept.”
(Informant 4)
“The difficulty that HNWIs face now because of the AEOI, the tax
authorities are now like IRBM for example, they start to receive all this
information about the foreign income of these people now. Where the
HNWIs are concerned, most of them, the accumulation of the wealth is
not just one generation. It is from few generations before. Unfortunately,
I find that it is a bit unreasonable to ask these people to account for their
wealth, everything that they had, based on 1 Dec 2017 balances. When
you asked them to explain and provide documentary evidence to prove
that the money that they have there is not income from Malaysia, they
have not been taxed, how to prove? Do you think the grandparents had
all evidence? To me, that is ridiculous because IRB stance is like this. You
cannot give me documents, you cannot explain to me, you cannot show to
me, you cannot prove to me that this is not Malaysian source, I will raise
the assessment. So, if you have hundred million in foreign bank accounts,
you cannot give me all these, I will raise the assessment on that hundred
million assuming them as Malaysian source income of which you have not
taxed before, and I want to tax you now. How can that be? May be, you
take 2017 as the opening figure. And whatever you have received from
offshore all information, you take that as opening balance. Then maybe the
incremental increase in 2018, 2019, you ask them to explain, this is easier
because it is within their control.”
(Informant 1)
Another suggestion forwarded by the informants are the issuance of

capital statements by HNWIs as supplementary to their return forms. This
is important to clarify the misunderstanding of other taxpayers that HNWIs
are not paying taxes. At the same time, the issuance of a capital statement
will provide more transparent information to the tax authorities on the
financial status of HNWIs and their types and sources of incomes. Below
are the comments shared by the informants:
“In order to put HNWIs at the same level playing field, the tax return
forms should have a column on capital statement. In this column, the
HNWIs have to report all incomes whether taxable or not. This statement
is important to highlight the sources of incomes which are not taxable
such as dividends and investment in foreign currencies. It is easy to justify
that HNWIs do pay tax on chargeable incomes. The other column is not
considered chargeable incomes, so no tax is due.”
(Informant 5)
“If you asked for the capital statement, then things come out. Capital
statement is one way bringing the HNWIs, you make them conscious of
their responsibility. HNWIs capital statement is just one way to discover.
I am talking about the real HNWIs, the remaining 85% who may not be
complying. If you do the net worth statement, they will come out properly.
Every year they will be looking at it and taking care of their taxes more
properly. Because I am sure 85% of HNWIs want to file their taxes properly.
Sometimes they don’t know. They don’t realise their tax agents’ mistakes.
Even the tax agents themselves don’t know how to fulfill this. They may not
have the right information and they don’t ask the right person.”
(Informant 4)
The final mechanism of improving compliance suggested by the

informants is implementation of cooperative tax compliance (CTC). This
approach has been implemented by many developed countries in their
effort to improve compliance. This is important because HNWIs are the
main contributors of tax revenue. Furthermore, their income tax matters
are more complex compared to other taxpayers. Hence, they may need
more assistance as compared to others.
“Presently, with the use of technology and understanding of individual

and corporate taxpayers on the importance of tax reporting, together with
the efficiency of the IRBM, I think it is a high time to implement CTC in
order to improve compliance”
(Informant 3)
To conclude, informants were in view that tax education, penalty, audit,

AEOI, capital statement and CTC may play an important role in improving
the compliance of HNWIs.
CONCLUSION
The current study contributes to the literature in several ways. First,
it provides the understanding on the level of HNWIs’ tax compliance
behaviour, and the underlying reasons of such behaviour. While generally,
HNWIs appear to be compliant with their tax obligations, it seems that
the public perception that HNWIs are not paying enough taxes partially
agreed by the tax professionals. In fact, they claimed that the majority are
paying accordingly to ensure their reputation is not tarnished following the
tax disputes. Interestingly, they further suggest that a certain elite group
may have engaged in noncompliance behaviour with the perceptions
that they are above the law. Having said that, the tax professionals do
admit that minority of HNWIs may engage in noncompliance due to
lack of knowledge or professional advice. Second, this study highlights
several strategies to improve compliance amongst HNWIs, which include

improving tax education, imposing suitable penalty, conducting appropriate
audit process/enforcement, utilizing the AEOI, issuing capital statement
and implementing CTC. Third, the study on HNWIs itself has added to
the scarce literature available. This is due the fact that the potential tax
contribution by HNWIs is relatively huge as compared to other group of
taxpayers.
This article is not without its limitations. The use of questionnaire

survey and interview among tax professionals in Malaysia may create
bias. However, considering their experience dealing with HNWIs, their
thoughts are found relevant and reliable. However, there are still rooms
for improvement and gaps to be covered in future research. For instance,
conducting a document review of noncompliant HNWIs may provide
information on the aspects that is potential for evasion. Conducting
interviews with tax auditors may also offer explanations to HNWIs’
compliance behaviour decision-making.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We would like to thank the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia for the
grant awarded that enable the conduct of this research. Also, we would like
to thank the Research and Innovation Management Centre of UUM who
have facilitated the process.
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PSİKOLOJİK VE

PSİKOLOJİK VE SOSYOLOJİK YÖNLERİYLE

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Rana DAYIOĞLU ERUL

"En İyi Editör

© Gazi Kitabevi Tic. Ltd. Şti.

Dizgi/Mizanpaj Gazi Kitabevi

Gazi Kitabevi Tic. Ltd. Şti.

Bahçelievler Mah. 53. Sok. No: 29 Çankaya/ANKARA

Dögol Cad. No: 49/B Beşevler/ANKARA

0.312 213 32 82 - 0.312 213 56 37

Meteksan Matbaacılık ve Teknik Sanayi Tic. A.Ş.

Vergi psikolojisi, vergi ile ilgili olarak mükellef algılarını, tepkilerini

Bireysel davranışlar ile ilişkili olan vergi psikolojisi ve toplumsal

Bu eser, vergi psikolojisi ve vergi sosyolojisi alanlarında, derli toplu

Bu eserin hazırlanmasında değerli çalışmaları ile esere katkı sağlayan

Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Rana DAYIOĞLU ERUL

HAKEM VE DANIŞMA KURULU.................................................. VI

Verginin Uyumu Kavramı ve Bu Bağlamda Vergi Yurttaşlığı

Nudging Taxpayers to Comply: Reflections About the Effect of

Vergiye Uyumlu Gelir Vergisi Mükelleflerine İndirim Uygulamasının

Exploring the Tax Compliance Behaviour of High Net Worth

Türkiye’de Vergi Ahlakının Belirleyicileri: Ne Değişti?......................91

Public Finance and the Methodology of Scientific Research

Vergi İsyanı: Toplumsal Tepkilerin İktidar Kudretini

Hekim Kazancının Vergilendirilmesi: Vergi Uyumu Açısından

İbn Haldun ve Vergi..............................................................................225

Türkiye’de Vergi Afları ve Vergi Etiği Üzerindeki Etkileri..............267

Vergi İsyanları Üzerine: Gandhi’nin Tuz Yürüyüşü Örneği............303

Vergi Kültürünün Analizi: Türkiye Örneği........................................333

Vergiye Gönüllü Uyum Kapsamında İzaha Davet Müessesesinin

Voluntary Versus Enforced Tax Compliance: Testing the Slippery

Güneşin Vergilendirildiği Ülke: İngiliz Toplumunun Pencere

Sigara Üzerinden Alınan Vergilere Karşı Halo Etkisinin Varlığı.....447

Bir Kamu Politikası Aracı Olarak Vergilendirmenin Sosyo Psikolojik

Davranışsal Finans Açısından Verginin Yatırımcı Psikolojisine

Vergi Uyumunda Dürtme Stratejileri: Seçili Ülke Uygulamaları.........517

Şövalyelerden Savaşa Katılmamaları Karşılığında Alınan Bir

Vergi Bilincinin Artırılmasında Vergi Haftasının Rolü: Deneysel Bir

Vergi Denetiminin Vergi Uyumuna Etkisi..........................................597

Yönlendirici Vergilendirmenin Mükellef Tercihleri Üzerindeki Etkisi:

Tax Ethics in the Design of International Tax Law............................645

Mali Sosyolojinin Temelleri, Evrimi ve İşlevi.....................................667

Atatürk Dönemi Vatandaşlık Eğitimi Kapsamında Vergi Bilinci....689

A significant number of high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) whose

Few strategies including tax education, appropriate penalty, audit process,

Keywords: HNWIs, Non-compliance, Thematic Analysis, Tax Education,

Tax non-compliance of high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) is a

Hence, studies were undertaken in some countries around the world

In Malaysia, Rosli et al. (2018) reported that majority of taxpayers

(representing 62%) were found to engage in tax malfeasance. A bigger

Secondly, shareholding is also used as a criterion, where an investor

loan portfolio of over USD1.5 million in a five-year period or has bank

2. TAX NON-COMPLIANCE OF HNWIS

Specifically, in the context of HNWIs there is a paucity of empirical

Table 1. Summary of Survey Responses

Description Number of Percentage

4.1 Demographic Information

Table 2. Demographic Information

Demographic Profile Frequency Percentage (%)

4.2 Level of HNWIs Compliance Behaviour

The level of compliance behaviour of HNWIs were measured in terms

Table 3. Descriptive Analysis for Noncompliance Behaviour - Overstating Expenses

Overstating Expenses n Minimum Maximum Mean SD