LORENZO M. TAÑADA v. JUAN C. TUVERA, GR No. 63915, 1986-12-29
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
Facts:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the
disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed
had not been published
The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so... when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.
the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these
decrees,... , the petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are
not; that publication means complete publication; and that the
publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion... should
therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it
is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official
Gazette, he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal
administration of a government agency or for particular persons did
not have to be published;
Issues:
publication to be made?
Ruling:
we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless
it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the... requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted.
"unless it is otherwise provided"- date of effectivity not publication
requirement
This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication.
the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution.  Administrative rules
and... regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published.  Neither is publication
required of the so called letters of instructions issued by
administrative...
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects
only the inhabitants of that place.  All presidential decrees must be
published, including even, say, those naming a... public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements.
The term "laws" should refer to all
laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely
cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
It would deny public knowledge.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined
shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
FELISA P. DE ROY v. CA, GR No. 80718, 1988-01-29
Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed
and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the
death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their
shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former
failed to do so.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, copy
of... which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On
September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987, but this was denied in the
Resolution of October 27, 1987.
Issues:
Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the trial court's decision
Ruling:
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision
holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible
for... the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it
should be due to the lack of necessary repairs."
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners' argument that private
respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore,
petitioners' prior negligence should be disregarded, since the
doctrine... of "last clear chance", which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
MARCH 28, 2013  ~ VBDIAZ
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos).
The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In
the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that
several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate
Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a
letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA
and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention
until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions
covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees
to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita
when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.),
does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This
is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where
the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and
foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received”
by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity”
with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials”
necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process”
and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic
of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity”
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of
petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional
provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if
petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where
he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
CASE DIGEST: AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. SENATE
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
FACTS: On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S.
Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics Committee to
investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator
Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the election of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee
was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives
to the Committee, prompting a delay in the
investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics
Committee
In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the
accusations before the Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee.
Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then
moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred
to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by
the majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners
objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to
the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the
quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel
raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole.
ISSUES: [1] Is Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against
Senator Villar, an indispensable party in this petition?
[2] Is the petition premature for failure to observe the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction or prior resort?
[3] Is the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the
Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole violative
of Senator Villar's right to equal protection?
[4] Is the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole violative of Senator Villar's
right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement
under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution?
[5] Is publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole required for their effectivity?
 
HELD: [1] An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in
the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be
made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In
this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the
petition before the Court. While it may be true that she has an
interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution
706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure
on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be
resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal's interest.
[2] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case.
The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized
skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the
contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within
the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.
[3] While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members
alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the
Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from
pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their
members to the Ethics Committee. The referral of the investigation
to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy
undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of
the members of the Senate, and not violative of the right to equal
protection.
[4] The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules
of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar's right to due
process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate
its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by
this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution,
which states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings."
[5] The Constitution does not require publication of the internal
rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate
that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate,
such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly
provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. Hence,
in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the
Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under
the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee
of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their
publication. PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Valeroso vs. People546 SCRA 450
G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the
boarding house of his children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay
New Era, Quezon City. He was roused from his slumber when four
(4) heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room. They
trained their guns at him and pulled him out of the room.
They then tied his hands and placed him near the faucet. The raiding
team went back inside and searched and ransacked the room. SPO2
Disuanco stood guard outside with him. Moments later, an operative
came out of the room and exclaimed, “Hoy, may nakuha akong baril
sa loob!”Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that “we are
authorized to shoot you because there’s a shoot to kill order against
you, so if you are planning do so something, do it right now.” He was
also told that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However,
he was not shown any proof when he asked for it. Neither was the
raiding group armed with a valid search warrant.According to
petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was illegal. The
gun seized from him was duly licensed and covered by necessary
permits. He was, however, unable to present the documentation
relative to the firearm because it was confiscated by the
police. Petitioner further lamented that when he was incarcerated,
he was not allowed to engage the services of a counsel. Neither was
he allowed to see or talk to his family.Petitioner contended that the
police had an axe to grind against him. While still with the Narcotics
Command, he turned down a request of Col. Romulo Sales to white-
wash a drug-related investigation involving friends of the said police
officer. Col. Sales was likewise subject of a complaint filed with the
Ombudsman by his wife. Col. Sales was later on appointed as the
head of the unit that conducted the search in his boarding
house.SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he
issued to petitioner a Memorandum Receipt dated July 1, 1993
covering the subject firearm and its ammunition. This was upon the
verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3 Timbol identified
his signature34 on the said receipt.Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the
room adjacent to where petitioner was arrested, testified that on
July 10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly entered his room as he
was preparing for school.They grabbed his shoulder and led him out.
During all those times, a gun was poked at him. He was asked where
petitioner was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to petitioner’s
room.Four (4) policemen then entered the room. He witnessed how
they pointed a gun at petitioner, who was clad only in his
underwear. He also witnessed how they forcibly brought petitioner
out of his room. While a policeman remained near the faucet to
guard petitioner, three (3) others went back inside the room. They
began searching the whole place. They forcibly opened his locker,
which yielded the subject firearm.
Issue: Whether penal laws may have a retroactive application?
 
Principles:
1.   As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive
application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law.
An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused.
According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is “not as a right” of the
offender, “but founded on the very principles on which the right of
the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based,
and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations,
but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.” Although an
additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same
is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the
imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum
period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.
2.   Elements of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition:
In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has
the burden of proving the twin elements of (1) the existence of the
subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused
who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding
license for it.
3.   Either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive
Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would
suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
possession of illegal firearms.
As for petitioner’s lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito
testified that a verification of the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing
Serial No. 52315 with the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp
Crame revealed that the seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It
was registered in the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of
Sampaloc, Manila.
As proof, Deriquito presented a certification signed by Roque, the
chief records officer of the same office. The Court on several
occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and
Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any
firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element of possession of illegal firearms. The prosecution more than
complied when it presented both.
4.   Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public
officers like policemen are accorded presumption of regularity in
the performance of their official duties, it is only a presumption; it
may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
The prosecution was able to rebut the presumption when it proved
that the issuance to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was
anything but regular. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the
Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on the verbal instruction
of his immediate superior, Col. Moreno.
However, a reading of Timbol’s testimony on cross-examination
would reveal that there was an unusual facility by which said receipt
was issued to petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual
necessary bureaucratic constraints. Clearly, it was issued to
petitioner under questionable circumstances.
5.   The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by
testimony, even without its presentation at trial. There may also
be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is presented during trial
but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for
example, if it is lost), it is not offered in evidence, as long as there is
competent testimony as to its existence.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the subject firearm and its five (5) live
ammunition were offered in evidence by the prosecution. Even
assuming arguendo that they were not offered, petitioner’s stance
must still fail. The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be
established by testimony, even without its presentation at trial. In
People v. Orehuela, 232 SCRA 82 (1994), the non-presentation of the
pistol did not prevent the conviction of the accused.
The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v. Malinao,
423 SCRA 34 (2004). As previously stated, the existence of the
subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition were established
through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco. Yuson also identified said
firearm.
Petitioner even admitted its existence. We hasten to add that there
may also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is presented
during trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous
event (for example, if it is lost), it is not offered in evidence, as long
as there is competent testimony as to its existence.