Senga Remedial Law Last Minute Tips November 2022

REMEDIAL LAW LAST MINUTE TIPS
NOVEMBER 2022
FRANCESCA LOURDES M. SEÑGA
A case covered by barangay conciliation proceedings was not brought before the barangay and
instead, plaintiff directly resorted to court. Is the court deprived of jurisdiction to rule on the
case for failure to resort to prior barangay conciliation proceedings?
No. Non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not
jurisdictional in nature. and may be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to
dismiss or in a responsive pleading (Spouses Belvis v. Spouses Erola, G.R. No. 239727, July 24, 2019,
J. Caguioa)
A real action was filed against X in the RTC. X filed an answer with counterclaim and actively
participated in the RTC proceedings. After judgment was rendered by the RTC in favor of
plaintiff, X appealed and the CA affirmed the RTC. On appeal to the SC, X raised lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC as the assessed value of the land allegedly fell within the jurisdiction
of the first level court. The case had been pending for 28 years before lack of jurisdiction was
raised. Should the appeal prosper because lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even
for the first time on appeal?
No. The rule that lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal
is not absolute as a party may be barred from raising it on the ground of estoppel. This exception
applies only when the circumstances in Tjam v. Sibonghanoy are present. Here, it is worse than
Tijam, as the lack of jurisdiction was raised only after 28 years, after an adverse ruling in the RTC
and CA were rendered, and after X actively participated in the proceedings below, seeking
affirmative relief. X is estopped from invoking the ground of lack of jurisdiction. (Spouses
Rebamonte v. Spouses Lucero, G.R. No. 237812, October 2, 2019, J. Caguioa)
There is a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries, before
the MTCC. The driver was convicted and damages were awarded in favor of the private
complainant. The judgment was not appealed and became final and executory. The
prosecution filed a motion for execution against the driver, which was granted. Since the writ
was returned unsatisfied, on motion, the court issued a writ of execution against the driver’s
employer. The employer assails the jurisdiction of the MTCC to render judgment with an
aggregate amount of damages of Php900,000. Will this prosper?
No. Jurisdiction is not determined by the amount ultimately substantiated and awarded by the
trial court. (Davao ACF Bus Lines, Inc. v. Ang, G.R. No. 218516, March 27, 2019, J. Caguioa)
X filed a complaint against Y for damages. In the body of the complaint, X alleged that Y is
liable to X for the amount of Php68Million. However, in the prayer, X alleged that X was
praying for damages that the court may deem just and warranted under the circumstances,
without mentioning the Php68Million amount in the body of the Complaint. Will X be excused
from payment of docket fees in the meantime and it will just constitute as a lien in the
judgment award?
No. This case is similar to the Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals case where
there is a fraudulent attempt to evade the payment of the correct filing fees. To put a stop to this
irregularity, the Supreme Court has ruled that all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the
November 2022 Remedial Law Last Minute Tips
Francesca Lourdes M. Señga
filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. There being no
proper payment of docket fees and there being an attempt to circumvent such proper payment,
the Complaint in this case should be dismissed. (Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp. (IBC-13) v.
Alonzo Legasto, G.R. No. 169108, April 18, 2006)
Does the Machester Ruling apply in all instances of non-payment of docket fees upon filing
of the complaint?
No. It only applies when there is clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay
the correct docket fees, whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide
by paying the additional fees as required. These stringent requirements have been relaxed in the
subsequent case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, which laid down the following
rules:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied
by payment of docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court,
the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee. The phrase “awards of claims not specified in the pleading” was
clarified to refer only to damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading.
Thus, while the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, even
its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as
long as the fees is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when
the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such
payment. (Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp. (IBC-13) v. Alonzo Legasto, G.R. No. 169108, April 18,
2006)
X filed an action against Y, praying for the recovery of the sum of the principal loan of
Php100,000.00, and prayed for such as may be awarded by the court as it may deem proper
under the circumstances. The court, in its ruling, directed Y to pay said principal amount and
moral damages in the amount of Php50,000.00. Y objects to the award of moral damages since
no docket fees were paid therefor as it was not alleged in the complaint and therefore not
included in the assessment of docket fees. Decide.
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The additional filing fee for the claim not specified in the pleading or the claim specified but left
for the determination of the court shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall then be the
responsibility of the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee. (Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. V. Asuncion, G.R Nos. 79937-38, February
13, 1989)
May the implementation of the Ombudsman’s order of preventive suspension in an

Administrative Disciplinary Case be restrained by a TRO issued by the RTC?
No. This will violate the principle of judicial stability or non-interference. The Ombudsman’s
decisions in administrative disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA under Rule 43. The
Ombudsman in such case, is co-equal with RTCs. The RTC has no jurisdiction to interfere with or
restrain the execution of the Ombudsman’s decision in disciplinary cases, and the Ombudsman’s
actions in such cases are beyond the control of the RTC. (Erice v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407,
November 22, 2017, J. Caguioa)
X entered into a contract of loan secured by real estate mortgage with Y. When the loan became
due and demandable, X failed to pay despite demand. May Y file both an action for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage and a collection of sum of money case against X for the full
amount of the loan?
No. In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee
has a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the
filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to
foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or
successive, and each remedy is complete by itself. There exists only one cause of action for a single
breach of that obligation. Plaintiff cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint
for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he
does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. (Marilag v. Martinez,
G.R. No. 201892, July 22, 2015)
A filed a complaint for sum of money against B, a deceased person, and C, for sum of money.
C was impleaded both as alleged representative of B and as alleged debtor of A. In C’s Answer,
C alleged as an affirmative defense the failure to state a cause of action against B. The case
against B was dismissed. C assails the dismissal on the ground that the dismissal should
include the claim against C. Is C correct?
No. C only assailed the claim against B, as representative of B. Courts cannot grant a relief not
prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. Due process
considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope
of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity
to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. (Gaffney v. Butler, G.R. No. 219408, November 8,
2017, J. Caguioa)
May an action for sum of money be filed against a deceased person?

No. Neither a deceased person nor his estate has capacity to be sued. A deceased person does not
have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case. A deceased person or
his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil action as they lack legal personality. The
complaint against a deceased should be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the
claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action. A complaint cannot possibly
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state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action. (Gaffney v. Butler, G.R.
No. 219408, November 8, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Since the debtor is deceased, and the creditor cannot sue a deceased person, what is the remedy
of the creditor?
Creditor must bring a claim against the estate of the deceased debtor in a proper proceeding,
specially by filing a money claim in the settlement of estate proceedings, pursuant to Rule 86. If
no settlement of estate proceedings have been filed, the creditor, may institute the same, and
thereafter file his claim in the said proceedings. (Gaffney v. Butler, G.R. No. 219408, November 8,
2017, J. Caguioa; Rule 86)
The SEC issued guidelines on compliance with Filipino-Foreign Ownership requirements

prescribed in the Constitution and/or existing laws by corporations engaged in nationalized
and partly nationalized activities. X filed a petition for certiorari with the SC against the SEC
to annul said guidelines for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Was the direct
resort to the SC proper and was it enough to only implead the SEC?
No. X violated the rule on hierarchy of courts, by directly resorting to the SC, without showing
any special, important or compelling reason to justify the same. There was failure to implead
indispensable parties, specifically, other public utility corporations subject to the restrictions
imposed by the Constitution, subject of the disputed guidelines. These corporations are in danger
of losing their franchise and property if found not compliant with the restrictive interpretation of
the constitutional provision under review espoused by X. They should be afforded due notice
and opportunity to be heard, lest they be deprived of their property without due process. (Roy III
v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016, J. Caguioa)
What is an indispensable party?

An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action. An indispensable party is one with such a material and direct interest in the controversy
that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so the court cannot proceed without their
presence. The interests of such indispensable parties in the subject matter of the suit and the relief
are so bound with those of the other parties that their legal presence as parties to the proceeding
is an absolute necessity and a complete and efficient determination of the equities and rights of
the parties is not possible if they are not joined. (Roy III v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22,
2016, J. Caguioa; Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 7)
X filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage against the Operator and Owner of the
Jeepney and its driver, because X was injured while X was a passenger in the said jeepney.
May the driver raise the affirmative defense of failure to state a cause of action?
Yes. Since the cause of action is based on a breach of a contract of carriage, the liability of the
owner/operator of the jeepney is direct as the contract is between him and X. The driver of the
jeepney cannot be made liable as he is not a party to the contract of carriage. The parties to the
contract of carriage are only the passenger, the owner and operator of the common carrier. Since
the driver is not a party to the contract of carriage, there is no cause of action against him, and the
complaint against him should be dismissed. (Sanico v. Colipano, G.R. No. 209969, September 27,
2017, J. Caguioa)
What is the test for failure to state a cause of action?
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The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts
which if true would justify the relief demanded. (Heirs of Sadhwani v. Sadhwani, G.R. No. 217365,
August 14, 2019, J. Caguioa)
Differentiate failure to state a cause of action from lack of cause of action.

They are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular action. Failure to state a cause of action refers to
the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading. Lack of cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may
be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings, such as in the answer as an affirmative defense.
Dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been
resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. (Heirs of
Sadhwani v. Sadhwani, G.R. No. 217365, August 14, 2019, J. Caguioa)
Spouses X and Y, foreigners, purchased land and placed the title thereto in the name of one of
their sons, in trust for X and Y. After X and Y died, their other children filed a complaint for
reconveyance and partition, and prayed that said children be declared as lawful owners of the
property, as heirs of X and Y. Did the complaint state a cause of action?
No. Even assuming that the allegations of the complaint are true, it failed to state a cause of action
because the plaintiffs’ right are premised on succession as heirs of aliens who may not own land
or transmit rights over the same by success, and plaintiffs failed to allege that they are heirs of X
and Y under the laws of their foreign country. (Heirs of Sadhwani v. Sadhwani, G.R. No. 217365,
August 14, 2019, J. Caguioa)
A bus line collided with a tricyle. The tricylce driver filed a complaint for damages on the basis
of quasi-delict against the owner of the bus line as employer, who failed to exercise due
diligence in the supervision of her employees. The owner was found liable. The owner
assailed the decision for being void for failure to implead the driver, an indispensable party.
Is the owner of the bus line correct?
No. B, the driver is not an indispensable party to the case since the liability of the owner of the
bus line as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and
direct. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is
liable for the entire obligation. Thus, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not
even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction
over B is not even necessary as the tricycle driver may collect damages from the owner of the bus
line alone. (Cerezo v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004)
A Corp. is engaged in the business of organizing travel tours. Its employee, B, ran over
pedestrian C, a minor, who died. C’s Aunt filed an action for damages on the basis of quasi-
delict against A Corp., as employer and registered owner of the vehicle, and B. The Aunt
alleged that she exercised substitute parental authority over C, and that she raised C, since his
parents and grandparents were all dead. Does the Aunt have legal standing to file the case?
Yes. An actual custodian, such as the aunt, exercises substitute parental authority and is a real
party in interest. The aunt suffered actual personal loss with the death of C, where she suffered
the same anguish as a natural parent would have felt upon the loss of one’s child. She is
capacitated to do what C’s actual parents would have been capacitated to do (Caravan Travel
and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016)
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X filed a civil action against Y on the basis of a Deed of Assignment. In Y’s answer, Y assailed
the validity of the deed of assignment, claiming it was void for being simulated and prayed
that the Deed of Assignment be rescinded. Should there be payment of filing fees on Y’s
counterclaim?
No. There is no payment of filing fees on compulsory counterclaims. OCA Circular No. 96-2009
suspended the payment of filing fees provided in A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated 21 September 2004.
Y’s counterclaim is compulsory because it arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. (G.
Holdings, Inc. v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., G.R. No. 226213, September 27, 2017, J.
Caguioa; A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated 21 September 2004; OCA Circular No. 96-2009 dated 13
August 2009)
X sued Y for sum on money. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that the loan had
already been paid. Y then brings an action against X for damages for filing the previous
baseless suit. If you were X, how will you counter this action?
I will file a motion to dismiss or file an answer, raising the ground of res judicata since the
complaint is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim for damages that should have been filed
in the same action that X previously filed against Y. Since Y failed to do so, he is barred from
raising it and the action should be dismissed on the ground of res judicata. (Lafarge Cement Phil.
Inc. v. Continental Cement Corp., G.R. No. 155173, November 23, 2004 )
X married Y, who had children from a previous marriage. After Y’s death, X learned that a
property in Y’s name was transferred to her children. X brought an action for reconveyance
against said children, claiming he owned the property in Y’s name as it was his funds used to
buy it. In their Answer, the children attached an ante-nuptial agreement of X and Y where it
affirmed that the property regime of the spouses was complete separation of property regime
and that X and Y acknowledged that the properties in each others’ names belong to each other
and that neither had any interest over the same. It also provides that any gift X gave to Y shall
become her exclusive property and he waives any interest therein. The court set the affirmative
defense for hearing, but despite notice, X did not attend the hearing and did not present any
evidence. The RTC dismissed the case on the basis of the affirmative defense. X argues the
dismissal was not proper as his right to be heard was violated and the defense of waiver should
have been set for hearing during a full blown trial of the main case. Is X correct?
No. The court set for hearing the affirmative defense and plaintiff waived the right to appear and
participate therein. The ante-nuptial agreement, which is an actionable document attached to the
answer, was not specifically denied under oath, and as such, plaintiff is deemed to have admitted
its genuineness and due execution. Thus, there is no need for full blown trial on the merits to
settle the issue of whether plaintiff X waived, extinguished and abandoned any rights he may
have over the property. Even assuming hypothetically that the allegations in the complaint are
true that X used his money to buy the property, still the complaint will not prosper as it is a gift
bestowed on Y and X discharged any interest he may have over gifts to Y. (Delgado v. GQ Realty
Development Corp., G.R. No. 241774, September 25, 2019, J. Caguioa)
X wants to have the free patent issued and certificate of title issued in Y’s favor declared void,
claiming that Y fraudulently obtained the free patent solely in Y’s favor. X also wants to have
the land covered by the free patent reconveyed such that X is entitled thereto as a co-owner
and co-heir. May these actions be pursued simultaneously?
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No. An action for reconveyance recognizes the certificate of title issued pursuant to the free patent
as indefeasible. The action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate does not
recognize the free patent as indefeasible. Given the foregoing differences, an action for
reconveyance and an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent cannot be pursued
simultaneously. They may, however, be pursued alternatively pursuant to Section 2, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court on alternative causes of action or defenses. (Mayuga v. Atienza, G.R. No. 208197,
January 10, 2018, J. Caguioa)
What is the consequence of an order declaring the defendant in default?

The court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may
warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claiming to submit evidence, which
reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. A party in default shall be entitled
to notice of subsequent proceedings but shall not take part in the trial. A judgment rendered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for
nor award unliquidated damages (ROC, Rule 9, Sec. 3)
What are the remedies of one declared in default?

The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion under oath to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense. If
the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before
the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a)
of Rule 37. If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and
executory, he may file a petition for relief under 1 of Rule 38. He may also appeal from the
judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to
set aside the order of default has been presented by him Moreover, a petition for certiorari to
declare the nullity of a judgment by default is also available if grave abuse of discretion attended
such declaration. (National Power Corp. v. Baysic, G.R. No. 213893, September 25, 2019)
Mr. X filed an action against Y but the complaint was filed in the name of Tindahan, Mr. X’s
business under his sole proprietorship. The complaint alleges that Y owes Mr. X supplies that
Mr. X will use for his business. May substitution of parties be allowed for Mr. X to instead be
named as the plaintiff?
Yes. A formal amendment of the may be allowed to correct the designation of the party plaintiff,
for while the complaint named the sole proprietorship as plaintiff, the allegations therein show
that said complaint was actually brought by its owner. A defect in the designation of the parties
and other clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court at any
stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the
adverse party. Substitution of the party in this case would not constitute a change in the identity
of the parties because a single proprietorship has no juridical personality separate and distinct
from its owner, and it would not cause any prejudice on the adverse party. (Yon Mitori
International Industries v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 225538, October 14, 2020, J. Caguioas)
X filed an action for sum of money against Y. In the return of service of summons, it was
alleged that Y refused to receive summons, constraining the process server to tender it on Y. Y
claimed that summons was not validly served on Y, because at the time of the service of
summons, Y allegedly was not residing in the address provided by X in the complaint as Y’s
lease had expired, as evidenced by affidavits of neighbors. Is Y’s argument valid?
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No. The process server being a public official, enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
discharge of his official duties and functions. In the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice,
the service of Summons on Y is deemed regular and valid. The Return of Service of the process
server of the RTC constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein. Y did not show any
clear and convincing evidence to overturn such presumption. The statements of neighbors with
respect to a purported lease contract between petitioner Y and his landlord in lieu of a statement
from the landlord himself or the lease contract, are insufficient to disregard the statements made
in the sheriff's certificate after service of Summons. (Yap v. Lagtapon, G.R. No. 196347, January 23,
2017, J. Caguioa)
No settlement of estate proceedings were instituted in relation to deceased Z’s estate. A

complaint was filed against Z, who was already deceased at that time. Summons was served
on Z’s surviving spouse as representative of Z’s estate. Was there valid service of summons?
No. The court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person or estate of Z. As Z was dead at the
time the complaint was filed and no special proceeding to settle his estate had been filed in court,
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over either the deceased or his estate. Summons served
upon Y purportedly as the representative of her late husband was thus invalid. (Gaffney v. Butler,
G.R. No. 219408, November 8, 2017, J. Caguioa)
A complaint was filed against X. There was substituted service of summons. X filed an answer
with counter claim and actively participated in the proceedings. Judgment was rendered
against X. On appeal, X raised for the first time the alleged defective substituted service of
summons and as such the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over X’s person. Will the appeal
prosper?
No. X is estopped from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the person. X actively
participated in the RTC, even seeking affirmative relief from the court by filing a counterclaim.
Such voluntary appearance on the part of X was equivalent to service of summons. (Spouses
Rebamonte v. Spouses Lucero, G.R. No. 237812, October 2, 2019, J. Caguioa)
What affirmative defenses raised in the answer, if granted, will result in a dismissal with
prejudice?
Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting an affirmative defense that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; that the claim or demand set forth in
the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; or that the
claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of statute of frauds,
shall result in dismissal with prejudice and shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim. (ROC,
Rule 15, Sec. 13)
May the court motu proprio dismiss a complaint?

Yes. The court shall motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence
on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, when there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment
or by statute of limitations (Philippine Bank of Communications v. Register of Deeds for the Province of
Benguet, G.R. No. 222958, March 11, 2020, J. Caguioa; Rule 9, Sec. 1)
X filed an action against Y for cancellation of title in Y’s name, on the ground that they are co-
owners. Before an answer could be filed, the parties manifested to the court that they were
entering into a compromise agreement where they would equally share in the property and
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partition the same correspondingly. The court dismissed the complaint. X and Y later died. X’s
heirs brought an action against Y for partition since the land was never actually partitioned.
Y’s heirs moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Should the case be dismissed?
No. There was no judgment on the merits in the first case, as no answer was filed, and no
compromise agreement was submitted to the court or approved by the court. Without judgment
on the merits in the first case, there can be no res judicata. (Abad v. Heirs of Gallardo, G.R. No.
229070, November 10, 2020, J. Caguioa)
A complaint was filed against A. In A’s answer, A alleged the affirmative defenses of
prescription and laches. However, the issues of prescription and laches were not raised in A’s
pre-trial brief, nor were they included in the pre-trial order. Trial ensued and A participated
in the trial, without also raising the issues of prescription and laches. Judgment was rendered
without ruling on the issues of prescription and laches. May these issues be raised and
considered on appeal?
No. These issues can no longer be raised for the first time on appeal as A is deemed to have
waived them when he failed to have them included in the pre-trial order, his pre-trial brief and
to raise it during trial, where A actively participated in. (Republic v. Capital Resources Corp., G.R.
When may an issue not raised in the pre-trial order be ruled upon by the trial court?
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings, and no
amendment of such pleadings deemed amended is necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence. (Rules of Court, Rule 10, Sec. 5)
By exception, may there be theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
trial court but may be considered by a reviewing court?
Yes, when their factual bases would not require presentation of any further evidence by the
adverse party in order to enable him to properly meet the issue raised, such as when the factual
bases of such novel theory, issue or argument is (a) subject of judicial notice; or (b) had already
been judicially admitted. (Borromeo v. Mina, G.R. No. 193747, June 5, 2013)
X filed an action against Y in the RTC for sum of money arising from a loan, with prayer for
writ of preliminary attachment. Upon order of the court, a land registered in Y’s name was
attached. Z moved to intervene, claiming he is the real owner of the land and that Y was a
mere nominal owner. Intervention was denied. Judgment was rendered in the case and it
became final and executory. In the meantime, Z assailed the order denying intervention by
petition for certiorari. Will the certiorari prosper?
No. The RTC decision is already final and executory. Intervention can no longer be allowed in
a case already terminated by final judgment. Also, Z has no legal right to intervene since the
action is for sum of money and the case does not involve the question of ownership over the
land that was attached. Preliminary attachment is only incidental to the cause of action. Z is not
a party in interest without whom no final determination of the recovery of sum of money case
can be had, as he is not even involved in the transaction that gave rise to the loan.(Yu v. Miranda,
G.R. No. 225752, March 27, 2019, J. Caguioa)
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The last day to appeal counted from the date of receipt by the part of the decision fell on a
Sunday. The following Monday was a legal holiday. The party filed the appeal on the next
working day following the holiday or on Tuesday. Was the appeal filed on time?
Yes, because of the pretermission of holidays. Where the last day of the period fixed by law to
appeal falls on a Sunday or a Legal Holiday, the appeal can be filed on the next business day. In
such case, the supposedly last day to appeal will not be deemed the last day because it happens
to be a Sunday or Legal Holiday and instead, the act can be done on the next business day
following that Sunday or Legal Holiday, as in this case. (University of Nueva Caceres v. Torres, G.R.
No. 92234, August 30, 1990)
The trial was set on February 2, 2020, which was subsequently declared a holiday. Will the rule
on pretermission of holidays apply and the trial would be automatically moved to the next
working day following the holiday or on February 3, 2020?
No. The rule does not apply to a day fixed by an office or officer of the government for an act to
be done, which may be on any day within that specified period. If a party is required by law to
file his answer to a complaint within fifteen days from receipt of the summons and the last day
falls on a holiday, the last day is deemed moved to the next succeeding business day. But, if the
court fixes the trial of a case on a certain day but the said date is subsequently declared a public
holiday, the trial thereof is not automatically transferred to the next succeeding business day, as
in this case. (Rural Bank of Caloocan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 230296, 2 April 2018)
The last day to file an Answer fell on a Sunday, October 23, 2022. When is the last day to file a
motion for extension of time for an additional period of 5 days to file the Answer, and when
is the reckoning period for counting the 5-day extension?
The motion for extension of time may be filed on the next working day or Monday, October 24,
2022, following the last day that fell on a Sunday, October 23, 2022, but the reckoning period
should be from the expiration of the period, regardless of it falling on a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday. Thus, the computation of the extension shall be reckoned from October 23, 2022, and the
Answer shall be filed no later than 28 October 2022, or 5 days from October 23, 2022. (A.M. No.
00-2-14-SC, Katipunan Food Service, Inc. v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 230296, 2 April 2018)
What is a demurrer to evidence?

A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is a
remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain an issue. The
question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, had been able
to establish a prima facie case. (Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017, J. Caguioa)
What is the effect of a grant of demurrer to evidence?

It is a dismissal similar to a judgment, which is a ruling on the merits of a case. (Republic v. De
Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017, J. Caguioa)
May an RTC ruling granting demurrer to evidence be the subject of a Rule 45 petition with the
Supreme Court?
No. The propriety of the trial court’s granting of a demurrer to evidence entails a calibration of
the evidence on record to properly determine whether the material allegations of the complaint
were amply supported by evidence. Where the resolution of a question requires an examination
of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and the relevance of surrounding
10
circumstances, and the probability of specific situations, the same involves a question of fact.
Factual questions are not the proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45, the same being
limited only to questions of law. (Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Plaintiff X assails the grant of demurrer to evidence by appeal, alleging that X was sufficiently
able to establish the burden of proof by preponderance of evidence. Is this ground proper in
assailing the grant of demurrer to evidence?
No. In a demurrer to evidence, it is premature to speak of preponderance of evidence because it
is filed prior to the defendant's presentation of evidence; it is precisely the office of a demurrer to
evidence to expeditiously terminate the case without the need of the defendant's
evidence. Preponderance of evidence means evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. What is crucial is the determination as
to whether the plaintiff's evidence entitles it to the relief sought. (Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No.
187448, January 9, 2017, J. Caguioa)
What does the court consider in ruling on a demurrer to evidence?

What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The facts referred to include all the
means sanctioned by the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These
include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and
trial, admissions, and presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendant’s evidence. (Casent
Realty Development Corp. v. Philbanking Corp., G.R. No. 150731, 14 September 2007)
Affirmative defenses were raised in the Answer where defendant alleged that his obligation
has been extinguished. Plaintiff argues that judgment on the pleadings is proper since
defendant effectively admitted the material allegations showing plaintiff’s cause of action in
the complaint. Is this correct?
No. Judgment on the pleadings is improper where defendant interposed an affirmative defense
in the answer. (Iloilo Jar Corp. v. Comglasco Corp., G.R. No. 219509, 18 January 2017)
X filed an action against Y for annulment of title, and attached to the complaint was a Deed of
Sale showing A sold the land to X. In his answer, Y specifically denied X’s right to the property
and the Deed of Sale, arguing that it had no basis as he had been the registered owner of the
land for 10 years after inheriting it from his parents. X moved for judgment on the pleadings
as Y admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Sale for failing to specifically
deny it under oath. Should the motion be granted?
No. The requirement that an actionable document be specifically denied under oath does not
apply where the adverse party is not a party to the instrument, as in this case. Judgment on the
pleadings is not proper because the answer tendered factual issues with Y’s specific denial of the
Deed of Sale. (Abad v. Heirs of Gallardo, G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020, J. Caguioa)
C entered into a loan agreement with D. The loan of D was guaranteed by G. When the loan
fell due, D did not pay, despite demand. C filed an action against D for sum of money, praying
that the court also grant interest and damages. In D’s Answer, D admitted its obligation in the
loan agreement but argued that the action cannot proceed, for the court’s lack of jurisdiction,
since G was placed under rehabilitation in a separate case, where said court issued a stay order.
All claims against G should be brought there. C filed a motion for summary judgement.
Should it be granted?
11
Yes. There was no genuine issue, which calls for the presentation of evidence. The obligation and
the fact of non-fulfillment of the obligation, as well as the execution of the debt instrument, are
admitted by the debtor, D, by not specifically denying the same, with the rate of interest and/or
amount of damages being the only remaining issue. D failed to proffer a plausible ground of
defense because the only defense raised by D was the argument on the lack of jurisdiction of the
RTC in light of the Rehabilitation Court's Stay Order. G, the guarantor, is only subsidiarity liable,
and will only answer if the debtor cannot fulfill his obligation. (Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 233850, July 1, 2019, J. Caguioa)
A complaint for issuance of a lost owner’s duplicate of title was filed and granted. In a petition
for relief under Rule 38, petitioner alleges that there was fraud since the owner’s duplicate of
title allegedly lost was still existing. The RTC granted the petition for relief and set aside the
judgment. Was this proper?
No. The fraud relied upon is intrinsic fraud, that went into the merits of the case, rather than
affecting petitioner’s right to be heard. Intrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that
prevented a fair and just determination of the case, like falsification and false testimony. It does
not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can guard against that kind of fraud. The
fraud that will justify a petition for relief from judgment is extrinsic fraud, or that kind of fraud
which the prevailing party caused to prevent the losing party from being heard on his action or
defense. There is no basis to grant relief under Rule 38. (Tiongson v. Spouses Trinidad, G.R. No.
184944, August 23, 2017)
Give instances when a motion for reconsideration is considered pro forma.

The following are instances where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma: (1) it
was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion
must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision
in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof. (Valencia
(Bukidnon) Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Heirs of Cabotaje, G.R. No. 219984, April
3, 2019, J. Caguioa)
What are the requisites for a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
to be granted
The requisites for the introduction of newly discovered evidence are: (1) the evidence was
discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably
change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged evidence could have very well been presented
during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same could not be considered newly
discovered evidence (Mandin-Trotin v. Bongo, G.R. No. 212840, August 28, 2019, J. Caguioa)
Note: This is also referred to as the Berry Rule
What may be the subject of levy for purposes of execution sale?

Section 9 (b), Rule 39 authorizes a “levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every
kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt
from execution.” It presupposes that the property to be levied belongs to and is owned by the
judgment debtor. (Miranda v. Spouses Mallari, G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018, J. Caguioa)
12
Debtor obtained a loan from creditor. Debtor owned a parcel of land and sold it to A as
evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale. A failed to register the title in his name. After debtor
defaulted, creditor filed an action for sum on money against debtor and won. On execution,
the property in debtor’s name, previously sold to A, was levied and subject of an execution
sale. Credit was the highest bidder. Does creditor have a better right over the property as
against A?
No. A has a better right of possession over the subject property having acquired ownership
thereof prior to the levy on execution that creditor caused to be made upon the subject property.
A judgment debtor can only transfer property in which he has interest to the purchaser at a
public execution sale. Ownership had already transferred to A before the execution sale, when
there was constructive delivery to A upon execution of the deed of sale, although not registered.
The non-registration of the sale does not affect the validity of the sale. The levy made on the
subject property could not have created any lien in favor of creditor because his judgment
debtor had no more right, title or interest thereto or therein at the time of the levy. There was
nothing that was sold and transferred to creditor at the time of the execution (Miranda v. Spouses
Mallari, G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018, J. Caguioa; Civil Code, Art. 1477 and 1497)
May a dismissal on the ground of res judicata be assailed by petition for certiorari?
No. The dismissal on the ground of res judicata is a final order because it terminated the
proceedings and left nothing to be done. Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the
action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review)
and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. (Medina v. Spouses Lozada,
G.R. No. 185303, August 1, 2018, J. Caguioa)
A petition for certiorari was filed with the CA, and was dismissed. The petitioner assailed the
dismissal to the SC by petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Was the remedy correct?
No. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the CA is a petition for review under
Rule 45, which provides that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any
case, regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to the SC
by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over
the original case. Rule 65 cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary
appeal, including that under Rule 45. When a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may
be dismissed outright (Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 218901,
February 15, 2017, J. Caguioa)
X timely filed a notice of appeal. The RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal on the
ground that said appeal is not a proper remedy against the decision of the RTC. X then filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA, which was denied, for failure to file first a motion for
reconsideration against the RTC order denying to give due course to the notice of appeal. Is
the CA correct?
No. While as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is filed before the respondent court, there are exceptions, such as where the order
is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, as in this case. The RTC had no
jurisdiction to deny a timely filed notice of appeal on the ground that it is an improper remedy.
Section 13, Rule 41 provides that the power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to instances
when: (1) the appeal was filed out of time; and (2) non-payment of the docket and other lawful
fees within the reglementary period. The authority to dismiss an appeal for being an improper
remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and not the RTC, as provided under Section 1, Rule
13
50. The RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction (Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017, J. Caguioa)
What is the fresh period rule?

When a motion for new trial or reconsideration against a judgment or final order is filed by a
party, which was subsequently denied by the court, there is a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing said motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration. (Bernardo v. Soriano, G.R. No. 200104, June 19, 2019, J.
Caguioa)
Is the Fresh Period Rule applicable to administrative proceedings?

As a rule, the "fresh period rule" applies only to judicial appeals and does not to administrative
decisions, when the specific administrative rules of procedure explicitly precludes the application
of the fresh period rule. By exception, when the an administrative body’s rules of procedure does
not explicitly preclude the application of the fresh period rule, as when it provides for the same
and also provides that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to such administrative body’s rules,
then the fresh period rule may be applied. (Puerto del Sol Palawan, Inc. v. Gabaen, G.R. No. 212607,
March 27, 2019).
A filed a civil case against B. Judgment was rendered and served on the parties. Within 15 days
from notice of the judgment, A timely perfected a notice of appeal. Within 15 days from notice
of the judgment, B filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC denies to give due course to
A’s appeal since it would be deprived of jurisdiction to rule on B’s motion for reconsideration
if the appeal was allowed. Is this correct?
No. When there is a notice of appeal that satisfies the requirements under Rule 41, the approval
of the notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the court. A party’s right to appeal is not
dependent or on contingent on the opposing party’s motion for reconsideration. Each party has
a different period within which to appeal, which is counted from the party’s respective notice of
the assailed judgment or final order. The timely filing of a motion for reconsideration by one party
does not interrupt the other party’s period of appeal. Section 9, Rule 41 provides that the court
loses jurisdiction in appeals by notice of appeal, upon perfection of the appeals filed in due time
and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. Here, there is no expiration of time
to appeal yet as B still has the time to do so. (Bernardo v. Soriano, G.R. No. 200104, June 19, 2019, J.
Caguioa)
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision, and appellant received a copy thereof on 30
September 2013. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration on 6 December 2013. The CA
denied outright the motion for reconsideration. Was the denial proper?
Yes, because the motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period to do so.
Section 1, Rule 52 provides that a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution of
the Court of Appeals may be filed within 15 days thereof, with proof of service on the adverse
party. Here, the motion was filed more than 2 months from the notice of the decision on 30
September 2013 or on 6 December 2013. The decision has attained finality because of the lapse of
the period within which to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal. (Heirs of Francisco v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 215599, November 28, 2018, J. Caguioa)
When does a question of fact exist?
14
A question of facts exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts
or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility
of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as
their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. (VDM
Trading, Inc. v. Carungcong, G.R. No. 206709, February 6, 2019, J. Caguioa)
Is it absolute that only pure questions of law may be raised before the SC in a petition under
Rule 45?
No. The rule is subject to the following exceptions, among others:
(1) when the findings, are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Prudential Bank v.
Rapanot, G.R. No. 191636, January 16, 2017, J. Caguioa)
X lost before the NLRC in a labor case. After his motion for reconsideration was denied, X filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA, which was denied. X then elevated the CA decision to the
SC under Rule 45. X claims the SC, in this case, may review questions of facts. Is X correct?
No. Only questions of law may be raised against the CA decision and the CA decision will be
examined only using the prism of whether it correctly determined the existence or absence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, and not on the basis of whether the NLRC
decision on the merits of the case was correct. The CA, in the Rule 65 petition, did not have to
assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence on which the NLRC based its decision. The CA only
had to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. However, as
an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if
the same are not supported by substantial evidence. (San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union
v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 200499, October 4, 2017, J. Caguioa)
X, in a bidding, was awarded by Y to provide cargo handling for Y for 10 years. X accepted the
notice of award. Instead of executing a contract, X asked Y to issue several times a hold over
authority in its favor. Before the contract could be executed, Y revoked the award. X filed a
petition for mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Y,
praying that Y formally execute the contract with X in accordance with the notice of award. The
RTC granted the writ. The propriety of the writ was brought before the CA on certiorari. The
CA ruled that the writ was proper. The CA found there was a perfected contract between X and
Y for cargo-handling, upon acceptance of the offer, although unwritten. The CA decision
15
became final. As to the main case, the RTC, on the strength of the CA decision, without
anymore requiring the parties to submit evidence, ruled that there was an agreement between
X and Y and that it should be honored for a period of 10 years from finality of the RTC decision.
Is this correct?
No. In the injunction case with the CA it was held that the 10-year contract had been perfected,
upon acceptance of the offer. The doctrine of the law of the case is applicable. The sole issue for
the RTC’s determination had already been previously resolved. No further proceedings were
conducted by the RTC after the Decision relative to the injunction proceedings had become final.
As such, no evidence to controvert the findings of the CA in the injunction case were presented
in the main case. The factual findings of the CA in respect of the perfected cargo-handling contract
in the injunction proceedings became conclusive. The 10-year period should be counted from the
perfection of the agreement and it was error for the RTC to rule that the 10 years is to be reckoned
from the finality of the RTC decision. (Philippine Ports Authority v. Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services, Inc., G.R. No. 214864, March 22, 2017, J. Caguioa)
What is a frivolous appeal?

An appeal is frivolous if it presents no justiciable question and is so readily recognizable as devoid
of any merit on the face of the record that there is little, if any, prospect that it can ever succeed. In
such case, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 142 of the Rules, the imposition of treble costs may be
justified. (RCBC Bankard Services Corp. v. Oracion, Jr., G.R. No. 223274, June 19, 2019, J. Caguioa)
The prosecution assails the acquittal of an accused by petition for certiorari on the ground
that the RTC did not properly appreciate the evidence of the prosecution. Will the petition
prosper?
No, since an error committed in the evaluation of evidence is only an error of judgment that
cannot be remedied by certiorari. (People v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 242859, January 28, 2019)
What is not appealable under Rule 41 and what may be the remedy against it?
Section 1, Rule 41 provides, no appeal may be taken from:
1. An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
2. An interlocutory order;
3. An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
4. An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on
the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
5. An order of execution;
6. A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending,
unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;
7. An order dismissing an action without prejudice
In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action as provided in Rule 65. (Rule 41, Sec. 1)
There is a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries, before
the MTCC. The driver was convicted and damages were awarded in favor of the private
complainant. The judgment was not appealed and became final and executory. The
prosecution filed a motion for execution against the driver, which was granted. Since the writ
was returned unsatisfied, on motion, the court issued a writ of execution against the driver’s
16
employer (subsidiary liability). The employer assailed such order by certiorari, arguing there
was erroneous award of damages ruled against the driver. Will the petition for certiorari
prosper?
No. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. The supposed erroneous award of damages against the employee pertains only to
mistakes of law and not of jurisdiction, thus putting them beyond the ambit of certiorari. (Davao
ACF Bus Lines, Inc. v. Ang, G.R. No. 218516, March 27, 2019, J. Caguioa)
What are the grounds for petition for annulment of judgement under Rule 47? Explain.
The grounds for a Rule 47 petition are: (i) extrinsic fraud and (ii) lack of
jurisdiction. Jurisprudence also provides that denial of due process is a ground for annulment of
judgment. Extrinsic fraud cannot be a valid ground if it had been availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Lack of jurisdiction means either lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. The violation of one's due process rights is a defect in jurisdiction. Courts, as
guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be expected to deny persons their due process rights
while at the same time be considered as acting within their jurisdiction. Violation of due process
is a jurisdictional defect because when there is violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted from their jurisdiction, such as when there is defective service of summons. (De Pedro v.
Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 158002, 28 February 2005, Arrieta v. Arrieta, G.R. No.
234808, November 19, 2018; Yap v. Lagtapon, G.R. No. 196347, January 23, 2017, J. Caguioa)
What is a writ of preliminary injunction?

A preliminary injunction is in the nature of an ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo during
the pendency of the main case. Matters resolved in injunction proceedings do not, as a general
rule, conclusively determine the merits of the main case or decide controverted facts
therein. Generally, findings made in injunction proceedings are subject to the outcome of the
main case which is usually tried subsequent to the injunction proceedings. (Philippine Ports
Authority v. Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc., G.R. No. 214864, March 22, 2017,
J. Caguioa)
What are the grounds for granting an application for writ of preliminary injunction?
The grounds are:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual. (Rules of Court, Rule 58, Sec. 3; AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents' Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 202342 , July 19, 2017, J. Caguioa)
What should the applicant establish to be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction?

To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must show that:
(1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) this right is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined;
17
(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and

(4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable
damage (AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents' Association, Inc., G.R. No. 202342, July 19, 2017, J.
Caguioa)
X, in seeking for the issuance of injunctive relief, claims that unless restrained, the pre-
termination of the lease would cause them to lose such business with the opposing party. Is
this irreparable injury?
No. The act sought to be enjoined will not result in the full closure or suspension of operations
of X, but will only lead to reduction of its revenues, a loss that may be measured with reasonable
accuracy, and therefore quantifiable or susceptible to mathematical computation. (SM
Investments Corp. v. Mac Graphics Carranz International Corp., G.R. Nos. 224131-32 & 224337-38,
June 25, 2018, J. Caguioa)
When may a TRO be issued ex parte by a trial court?

A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte to preserve the status quo until the hearing
of the application for preliminary injunction, which cannot be issued ex parte. A trial court may
issue a temporary restraining order even without a prior hearing for a limited period of 72 hours
if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury. In this instance, a summary hearing, separate from the application of the preliminary
injunction, is required only to determine if a 72-hour TRO should be extended to 20 days,
inclusive of the 72 hours.
A trial court may also issue ex parte a TRO for 20 days if it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice." The trial court has 20 days from its issuance
to resolve the application for preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on the application for
preliminary injunction during this period, the temporary restraining order is deemed to have
expired. (Philippine Investment Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Mendoza, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2538,
May the court’s determination of whether or not to grant injunctive writ be subject of review?
As a rule, no. The grant or denial of the injunctive relief rests on the sound discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end
involves findings of fact left to the conclusive determination by such court; and the exercise of
judicial discretion by such court will not be interfered with, except upon a finding of grave abuse
of discretion. (AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents' Association, Inc., G.R. No. 202342, July 19,
2017, J. Caguioa)
A filed a complaint praying that A be granted easement of right of way over B’s property, so
that A may pass through it to be able to construct the building on A’s property, with prayer for
issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction so A may be granted temporary
easement. B sought issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain such construction
pending determination of the case, which was denied, there being no clear legal right to the
injunctive writ. With the denial of B’s application for writ of preliminary injunction, without
presentation of evidence, the trial court granted A’s application for writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, and granted temporary easement in favor of A. Was this proper?
18
No. The denial of the application for writ of preliminary injunction against the construction of
the building does not translate to entitlement to a temporary easement before the resolution of
the complaint for declaration of easement of right of way. In granting A’s application for
preliminary mandatory injunction, the RTC prematurely decided disputed facts and disposed of
the merits of the case without the benefit of a full-blown trial wherein testimonial and
documentary evidence could be fully and exhaustively presented, heard and refuted by the
parties. The temporary easement of right of way under Article 656 of the Civil Code, similar to
the permanent easement of right of way pursuant to Articles 649 and 650, can only be
granted after proof of compliance with the prerequisites set forth in the articles duly adduced
during a full-blown trial. (AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents' Association, Inc., G.R. No. 202342,
July 19, 2017, J. Caguioa)
May there be a judgment on a compromise in interpleader where not all the conflicting
claimants agreed to the same?
NO. The compromise agreement without the participation of all other claimants defeats the very
purpose for which the Interpleader had been filed, as it opens the portals to protracted litigation
not only among the opposing claimants, but also between said claimants and the plaintiff.
(Republic v. Heirs of Cruz, G.R. No. 208956, October 17, 2018, J. Caguioa)
A filed a complaint against B before the Ombudsman for violation of the GSIS Act. The
Ombudsman issued an order of preventive suspension against B to last until the
administrative adjudication is completed but not to exceed 6 months. The propriety of the
order of suspension was assailed by B before the Court of Appeals but the CA affirmed the
preventive suspension. B filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for
TRO, praying that the RTC make a definite judicial declaration on the rights and obligations
of the parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of the
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. Should the petition prosper?
No. Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief. They
are not included within the purview of the words “other written instrument” In Rule 63. The
same principle applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, and this is
anchored on the principle of res judicata. A judgment rendered by a court or a quasi-judicial body
is conclusive on the parties, subject only to appellate authority. The losing party cannot modify
or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for declaratory relief. The petition
puts into question the CA-affirmed Ombudsman Order of Suspension, a matter beyond the
ambit of the RTC’s jurisdiction. (Erice v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407, November 22, 2017, J. Caguioa)
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1005 on the rules and regulations on the ban of carrying
firearms during the election period. The Resolution was assailed before the Supreme Court
under Rule 65, and the petition was filed within the 60-day period provided under Rule 65.
The OSG counters that the 30-dsay period under Rule 64 for filing the petition should have
been followed. Is this correct?
No. The 30-day reglementary period under Rule 64 does not apply. The review under Rule 64
stems from the Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which pertains to final orders, rulings
and decisions of the COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers. The petition herein assails the validity of a COMELEC Resolution which was
issued under its rule-making power, to implement the provisions of The BP 881 an RA 7166. Thus,
the period under Rule 64 does not apply. (Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
Operators v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 223505, October 3, 2017)
19
May the court treat a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which assails a decision of a lower
court, as an appeal?
Yes. While as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be a substitute for an appeal,
where appeal is available, by exception, the petition for certiorari may be treated as an appeal, in
the interest of justice, provided that the: (1) petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file an appeal; (2) when errors of judgment are averred;
and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. Thus, a Rule 65
petition may be treated as one for Rule 45. (Privatization and Management Office v. Quesada, G.R.
No. 224507, September 20, 2017, J. Caguioa)
May you assail the decision of the CSC by petition under Rule 65 with the CA?
No. Rule 65 petition may only be availed of when there is no appeal, or any other plain speedy
adequate remedy. There is an available remedy of appeal against the CSC decision, which is by
Rule 43, petition for review with the Court of Appeals. (Cerilles v. Civil Service Commission, G.R.
What is a mandamus writ?

Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty by a tribunal, board,
officer, or person. The petitioner should have a right to the thing demanded and that it must be
the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required; such duty need not be
absolutely expressed, so long as it is clear. (Valmores v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 217453, July 19, 2017, J.
Caguioa)
What is a ministerial duty?

A duty is considered ministerial where an officer is required to perform an act not requiring the
exercise of official discretion or judgment in a given state of facts. If the law imposes a duty upon
a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such
duty is discretionary. (Valmores v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 217453, July 19, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Is the mayor’s authority to issue licenses and permits ministerial?

No. The authority of the mayor to issue licenses and permits is not ministerial, it is discretionary.
The power of the mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Sec.16 of the LGC, known as the general
welfare clause, which encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. Local
government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The mayor
has the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of
the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
The power of the mayor to issue license and permits is a manifestation of the delegated police
power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial.
(Lacap v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 198162, June 21, 2017, J. Caguioa)
CHED issued a Memorandum, which provides that Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) shall
be enjoined to: (1) excuse students from attendance/participation in school or related activities
if such schedule conflicts with the exercise of their religious obligations; and (2) allow faculty,
personnel and staff to forego attendance during academic and related work and activities
scheduled on days which would conflict with the exercise of their religious freedom. A student
of a college received a failing grade for missing classes on the Sabbath day. The student at the
start of the school year asked that the college not assign him school work or classes on the
20
Sabbath day, as it would contravene his religious worship. May X file a petition for mandamus
to compel the College to comply with said Memorandum?
Yes. The CHED memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty imposed upon HEIs. It
provides that a student's religious obligations takes precedence over his academic
responsibilities, consonant with the constitutional guarantee of free exercise and enjoyment of
religious worship. The CHED imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as well as
faculty members, from academic activities in case such activities interfere with their religious
obligations. (Valmores v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 217453, July 19, 2017, J. Caguioa)
|||
The expropriating authority, a public utility corporation endowed with the power of eminent
domain, took the property of the landowner for public use without any negotiated sale and
without instituting an expropriation case for such taking. This constrained the landowner to
file an ejectment suit against the expropriating authority, although the works on the property
were already done. Should the ejectment suit prosper?
NO. The ejectment case would not prosper because of: (1) equitable estoppel since the landowner
was estopped from questioning the propriety of expropriation, not having filed the case earlier,
before the works on its property were done; (2) public policy and public necessity, since the
service being rendered by the public utility on the subject property should not be interfered with.
(National Transmission Corporation v. Bermuda Development Corporation, G.R. No. 214782, 3 April
2019, J. Caguioa)
What should the trial court do?

The trial court may:
(1) dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner filing the proper action for
recovery of just compensation and consequential damages;
(2) dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation to institute the proper
expropriation or condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and
consequential damages assessed therein; or
(3) continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case and determine the just
compensation and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67, if the ejectment court has
jurisdiction over the value of the subject land (National Transmission Corporation v. Bermuda
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 214782, 3 April 2019, J. Caguioa)
A complaint for expropriation was filed. After proceedings, the RTC issued an order of
expropriation. Should the order be assailed by petition for certiorari?
No. Remedy is appeal, and not to file a certiorari. (PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v. National Grid
Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 4, 2019, J. Caguioa)
Will your answer be the same if it is an order of dismissal?

Yes, the remedy is still appeal, and not to file a certiorari. (PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v.
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 4, 2019, J. Caguioa)
Will the appeal of the order of expropriation suspend the expropriation proceedings?
No. Such appeal shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be
paid (PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No.
224936, September 4, 2019, J. Caguioa)
What is the effect if the order of expropriation is not appealed?
21
If no appeal is taken, the order becomes final, the authority to expropriate and the public
use of the property can no longer be questioned. (PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v. National
Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 4, 2019, J. Caguioa)
The RTC issued an order of expropriation. The landowner wants to question the order
on the ground that the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines had no authority
to exercise the power of eminent domain and therefore the expropriation is invalid.
What is the proper remedy?
The proper remedy is to appeal the ruling by Rule 45 to the Supreme Court, since the
argument that the expropriation of the subject property by NGCP is invalid because such
exercise of eminent domain was neither done directly by Congress nor pursuant to a
specific grant of authority. This is legal in nature. The SC will be able to decide on the
validity of the Order of Expropriation by merely looking at the applicable law and
jurisprudence on eminent domain, as well as the law granting respondent NGCP the right
of eminent domain, i.e., RA 9511. (PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v. National Grid
Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 4, 2019, J. Caguioa)
When may consequential damages be awarded to the landowner in expropriation?

Consequential damages may be awarded to the owner if, as a result of the expropriation,
the remaining portion not so expropriated suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. If the
entire property is taken, and there is no remaining portion, consequential damages is not proper.
(Republic v. Spouses Bunsay, G.R. No. 205473, December 10, 2019, J. Caguioa)
Is the fact that there is a remaining portion of property not expropriated sufficient, by
itself, to award consequential damages?
No. It must still be proven by sufficient evidence that the remaining portion suffers from
an impairment or decrease in value (Republic v. San Miguel Vda. De Ramos, G.R. No. 211576,
February 19, 2020, J. Caguioa)
May the value of Capital Gains Tax be awarded to the landowner in expropriation
proceedings, in the form of consequential damages?
No. Transfer of property through expropriation is a sale or exchange and the profit from
the transaction constitutes capital gain. Sine CGT is a tax on passive income, it is the seller
who is liable to shoulder the tax. Consequential damages may be awarded to the owner
if, as a result of the expropriation, the remaining portion not so expropriated suffers from
an impairment or decrease in value. However, courts are not precluded from considering
the value of CGT and other transfer taxes in determining the amount of just
Compensation. Since just compensation requires that real, substantial, full and ample
equivalent be given for the property taken, the loss incurred by the affected owner
necessarily includes all incidental costs to facilitate the transfer of the expropriated
property to the expropriating authority, including the CGT, other taxes and fees due on
the forced sale. These costs must be taken into consideration in determining just
compensation in the same way these costs are factored into the selling price of real
property in an arm's length transaction. (Republic v. Spouses Bunsay, G.R. No. 205473,
December 10, 2019, J. Caguioa)
How may an expropriating authority immediately possess the premises during the pendency
of the expropriation case?
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The requisites for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real
property are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and
(2) the making of a deposit equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to
expropriation. If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and
the amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed by the court. The foregoing rule does not
apply to the immediate possession of the premises in relation to national government projects as
a different basis of amount to be deposited is required in such cases. (Biglang-Awa v. Bacalla, G.R.
Nos. 139927 & 139936, 22 November 2000; Rule 67, Sec. 2)
For expropriation in relation to national government projects, should the implementing agency
wish to take possession of the premises for it to start the implementation of the project during the
pendency of the expropriation case, the implementing agency shall immediately deposit to the
court in favor of the owner the amount equivalent to the sum of:
1. 100% of the value of the land based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR
issued not more than 3 years prior to the filing of the expropriation complaint.
However, in provinces, cities, municipalities, and other areas where there is no land
classification, the city or municipal assessor is mandated, within a period of 60 days
from the date of filing of the expropriation case, to come up with the required land
classification and the corresponding declaration of real property and improvement for
the area; in provinces, cities, municipalities, and other areas where there is no zonal
valuation, or where the current zonal valuation has been in force for more than 3 years,
the BIR is mandated, within a period of 60 days from the date of filing of the
expropriation case, to conduct a zonal valuation of the area, based on the land
classification done by the city or municipal assessor.
By exception, if the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost

urgency and importance, and there is no land classification or no existing zonal
valuation of the area concerned or the zonal valuation has been in force for more than
3 years, the implementing agency shall use the BIR zonal value and land classification
of similar lands within the adjacent vicinity as the basis for the valuation;
2. the replacement cost at current market value of the improvements and structures as
determined by: (a) the implementing agency; (b) a government financial institution
with adequate experience in property appraisal; and (c) an independent property
appraiser accredited by the BSP; and
3. The current market value of crops and trees located within the property as determined
by a government financial institution or an independent property appraiser. (RA 10753,
Sec. 6)
RA 8974 (now RA 10752) provides for standard of assessment of value of land. Does it mean
that just compensation in expropriation for national infrastructure projects ceased to be a
judicial determination?
No. Determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The Standard for Assessment of
Value of Land under RA 8974 is merely a standard which the court may consider to facilitate the
determination of just compensation. It is still the court that renders judgment as to what amount
23
should be awarded and how to arrive at such an amount. In the absence of a finding of abuse,
arbitrariness, or serious error, the exercise of such discretion may not be interfered with (Republic
v. Decena, G.R. No. 212786, July 30, 2018, J. Caguioa)
May a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction be issued against the extrajudicial or judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage?
Yes, provided that there is compliance with the requirements under Rule 57 and additionally,
with the following rules in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended:
(1) No TRO or WPI against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on
the allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not delinquent unless the
application is verified and supported by evidence of payment.
(2) No TRO or WPI against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on
the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the mortgagee
at least the legal rate of interest percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated
in the application for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending.
(12% before effectivity of Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 on 1 July 2013, 6% after the effectivity)
(3) Where a WPI has been issued against a foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the case
shall be speedily resolved. To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the Supreme Court,
through the Office of the Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress of the cases
involving ten million pesos and above.
(4) All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a TRO or WPI, such as the
posting of a bond, which shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt, and the time
limitation for its effectivity, shall apply as well to a status quo order. (Spouses Tumon v. Radiowealth
Finance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 243999, March 18, 2021, J. Caguioa)
X obtained a loan from Y, subject to interest of 50% per month, and to secure the loan, X
executed a real estate mortgage. When the loan fell due, X was unable to pay despite demand.
Y extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. Subsequently, in an action filed by X, the RTC
found that the interest rate of the loan obligation was iniquitous and unconscionable, and
therefore void. What is the effect of this ruling on the foreclosure?
In a situation wherein null and void interest rates are imposed under a contract of loan, the non-
payment of the principal loan obligation does not place the debtor in a state of default,
considering that under Article 1252 of the Civil Code, if a debt produces interest, payment of the
principal shall not be deemed to have been made until the interests have been covered. Since the
obligation of making interest payments in the instant case is illegal and thus non-demandable,
the payment of the principal loan obligation was likewise not yet demandable. With X not being
in a state of default, the foreclosure of the subject properties should not have proceeded. A
foreclosure of mortgage is conditioned on the finding of the correct amount of the unpaid
obligation and the failure to pay said amount. The foreclosure should be invalidated. (Bulatao v.
Estonactoc, G.R. No. 235020, December 10, 2019, J. Caguioa)
A donated to B and C a parcel of land, which they accepted. There was no provision in the
donation, preventing B and C to partition. May B, upon acceptance of the donation, bring an
action for partition?
24
Yes. The law does not make a distinction as to how the co-owner derived his/her title, may it be
through gratuity or through onerous consideration. A person who derived his title and was
granted co-ownership rights through gratuity may compel partition (Logrosa v. Spouses Azares,
G.R. No. 217611, March 27, 2019, J. Caguioa)
What is accion publiciana?

It is a plenary action to recover the better right of possession (possession de jure), which should
be brought in the proper court (depending upon the assessed value of the property) when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year (or for less than a year in cases other than those
mentioned in Rule 70. (Miranda v. Spouses Mallari, G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018, J. Caguioa)
What is the issue in accion publiciuana?

The issue in an accion publiciana is the "better right of possession" of real property independently
of title. This "better right of possession" may or may not proceed from a Torrens title. A lessee,
by virtue of a registered lease contract or an unregistered lease contract with a term longer than
one year may file, as against the owner or usurper, an accion publiciana if he has been
dispossessed for more than one year. A registered owner or one with a Torrens title can
likewise file an accion publiciana to recover possession if the one-year prescriptive period for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer has already lapsed. (Miranda v. Spouses Mallari, G.R. No.
May there be a provisional determination of ownership in accion publiciana?

Yes. Although accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership, however, where
the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who
between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication is not a final
determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the
issue of ownership. The resolution of the issue of ownership in an accion publiciana, like forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, is passed upon only to determine the issue of possession, the
defense of ownership raised by the defendant (i.e., that he, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful
owner). It will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiff's certificate of title. (Miranda v.
Spouses Mallari, G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018, J. Caguioa)
What is an accion reivindicatoria?

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion or reivindicatory action, is an action for recovery of
ownership which must be brought in the proper First Level Court or Regional Trial Court
(depending upon the value of the property) (Macutay v. Samoy, G.R. No. 205559, December 2, 2020)
A verified complaint was filed with the HLURB. The Decision of the HLURB was appealed to
the CA, and thereafter to the SC. During the pendency of appeal with the SC, one of the parties
filed a petition for indirect contempt with the SC on the ground that the other party violated
the injunction order issued by the HLURB. Was it proper to file the indirect contempt case
with the SC?
No. It should be dismissed. Section 12, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal in
stating that, with respect to contumacious acts committed against quasi-judicial bodies such as
the HLURB, it is the RTC of the place where the contemptuous acts have been committed, and
25
not the SC, that acquires jurisdiction over the indirect contempt case. There is absolutely no basis
under the Rules of Court to support the theory that the SC has jurisdiction over a case for indirect
contempt allegedly committed against a quasi-judicial body just because the decision of the said
quasi-judicial body is pending appeal before the SC. To the contrary,
the Rules of Court unambiguously state that it is the RTCs that have jurisdiction to hear and
decide indirect contempt cases involving disobedience of quasi-judicial entities. (Spouses
Rodriguez v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, G.R. Nos. 183324 & 209748, June 19, 2019, J.
Caguioa)
Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in
turn represent Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good
public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable. They claim that
they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writ of kalikasan due to the alleged failure
and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by environmental laws, and violation
of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health and property of all Filipinos. Respondents argue that the petitioners failed to
show that they have the requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather
amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or injury. Are respondents correct?
No. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberalized the requirements on standing,
allowing the filing of citizen’s suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations under
environmental laws. In a petition for writ of kalikasan, it is sufficient that the person filing
represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ. (Segovia
v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Is there also a liberalized rule on legal standing in petitions for writs of continuing
mandamuns?
No. A petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus is only available to one who is
personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R.
No. 211010, March 7, 2017, J. Caguioa)
A petition for writ of kalikasan was filed with the SC. Respondent opposed this on the ground
that the direct filing of the petition with the SC violated the hierarchy of courts. Is the
opposition correct?
No. The magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated under the rules satisfies at least one
of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed where it is
dictated by public welfare. Given that the rules allow direct resort to the Supreme Court, it is
ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly before
it. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, J. Caguioa)
What are the requisites that must be established for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan?
For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:
1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology;
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity; and
3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, J. Caguioa)
26
X filed a petition for writ of kalikasan against respondents government officials, invoking the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology, without stating any rule or regulation violated or
that would be violated. Will the petition prosper?
No. A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a
law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. Here, apart from invocation of the
constitutional right to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology, there is no showing that
public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of X’s
right to a balanced and healthful ecology. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010,
March 7, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippine, representing their children, who in turn
represent Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good
public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable. They filed a
petition for writ of continuing mandamus against respondents public officials, claiming that
they failed to implement the road sharing principle that would divide roads, allowing the use
thereof by carless people or bikers, to reduce air pollution. The basis of the petition is the
failure to implement rules and issuances that would prevent or reduce air quality degradation.
Respondents showed they implemented projects but not in accordance with that provided in
the petition, there being no law requiring the same. Will the petition prosper?
No. Petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the
respondents to be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in
environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for
continuing mandamus. The Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated — a principle.
There is no rule or law that requires the respondents to implement the bifurcation of roads to
implement the Road Sharing Principle in the manner provided in the petition. What the
petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary
act — the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Mandamus lies to compel the
performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and
the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty
being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. In the
performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be
directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. (Segovia v. Climate Change
Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, J. Caguioa)
What is a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP)?

It is an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person, institution
or any government agency or local government unit or its officials and employees, with the intent
to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that such person, institution or
government agency has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection
of the environment or assertion of environmental rights. In application, the allegation of SLAPP
is set up as a defense in those cases claimed to have been filed merely as a harassment suit against
environmental actions.
SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules. It may only be exercised
in the manner and within the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule-making body. It is a
defense that can only be invoked in the same action, before the same court.(Mercado v. Lopena,
G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018, J. Caguioa)
27
How is SLAPP as a defense alleged?

In a SLAPP filed against a person involved in the enforcement of environmental laws,
protection of the environment, or assertion of environmental rights, the defendant may file an
answer interposing as a defense that the case is a SLAPP and shall be supported by
documents, affidavits, papers and other evidence; and, by way of counterclaim, pray for
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. In a criminal case, upon the filing of an information
in court and before arraignment, the accused may file a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the criminal action is a SLAPP. (Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018, J. Caguioa)
A claim was belatedly filed by the BIR, beyond the period provided by the settlement court
for filing claims against the estate, for payment of deficiency income tax, which the
administrator opposed for being time barred pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86. Is this correct?
NO. Section 5, Rule 86 makes no mention of claims for monetary obligations of the decedent
created by law, such as taxes which is entirely of different character from the claims expressly
enumerated therein, such as: "all claims for money against the decedent arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent and judgment for money against the
decedent." (Government of the Philippines vs. Pamintuan, 55 Phil. 13).
Creditor alleges his claim for unpaid services for repair is one arising from law. Is he correct?
No. It arises from contract. Obligations arising ex lege are in the common law system merged into
the category of obligations imposed by law (Maclan v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-7622, May 27, 1955)
Is the filing of money claim an initiatory pleading that requires certification against forum
shopping?
No. The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for
allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86, after granting letters of
testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are
mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims;
otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions. A money claim against an estate
is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in
the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. A money claim is only an incidental matter
in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent
since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. (Sheker v.
Sheker, G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007)
What is the effect of death on an obligation?

As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the
obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented
by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that
are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.
Section 5, Rule 86 allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the
estate of a deceased debtor. Those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is
only the creditor's action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate
court (Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. v. Republic-Asahi Glass Corp., G.R. No. 147561, June 22, 2006)
28
What is the effect of death on the civil liability of the accused?

1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed.
2.The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission: law, contracts, quasi-contracts and quasi-delicts.
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
thereof may be pursued but only by filing a separate civil action and subject to Rule 111. This
separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of
the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.
4. The private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by prescription. (ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 133347, April 23, 2010)
If the act or omission complained of arises from quasi-delict or, by provision of law, results in an
injury to person or real or personal property, the separate civil action must be filed against the
executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.
Example, If victim dies due to fault/negligence of accused, pending case, the basis of action is an
independent civil action under Art. 32, 33, 34, 2176, quasi delict. (People v. Lipata y Ortiza, G.R. No.
200302, April 20, 2016)
On the other hand, if the act or omission complained of arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86. (People v.
Lipata y Ortiza, G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016)
Note: If the accused dies after finality of the conviction with a judgment for civil liability arising
from the crime, then only the criminal liability is extinguished and the money judgment shall be
filed as a money claim against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86.
In case of death of the defendant during pendency of the appeal and judgment is finally ruled
against the defendant, should writ of execution be allowed?
NO. If the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, the plaintiff must afterwards go to the probate
court for an order directing the executor or administrator to satisfy the judgment. The trial court
that originally rendered the judgment has no power to order its execution and a levy on the
properties of the deceased because the same are already in custodia legis in the probate court
where administration proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant are
already pending. Judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed at the time limited in
the notice (to creditors) before the court where the administration proceeding involving the estate
of the deceased are pending, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86. (Paredes v. Moya, G.R. No. L-38051,
December 26, 1974)
29
Why should final money claim judgment be filed with the probate court?
The legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in the testate or intestate proceedings to settle
the estate of a deceased person, the properties belonging to the estate are under the jurisdiction
of the court and such jurisdiction continues until said properties have been distributed among
the heirs entitled thereto. (Domingo vs. Garlitos, et al., June 29, 1963).
What is the period for filing claims against the estate?

The court shall state the time for filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than
12 nor less than 6 months after the date of first publication of notice However, at any time
before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his
claim within the time to do so, court may, for cause shown and on such terms equitable – the
court may allow a claim to be filed within a time not exceeding 1 month (Rule 86, Sec. 2; Afan v.
De Guzman, G.R. No. L-14713, April 28, 1960)
X was appointed by the court as guardian of ward Y, who was taken from X’s custody. What is
the remedy of X?
The guardian’s remedy is a petition for habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto. X, as the judicial guardian of Y, was duty-bound to care for and
protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have custody of Y. Thus,
she is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her
ward. (Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, G.R. Nos. 166470 & 169217, August 7, 2009)
While serving sentence, X filed a petition for habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy on
the ground that he was denied due process because of lack of notice of proceedings in the trial
court. The RTC submitted the case for decision when accused and counsel repeatedly to attend
a hearing for accused’s presentation of evidence. X argued he was never notified of the last
hearing and the promulgation of judgment. However, there were previous hearing settings for
X’s presentation of evidence but X failed to present any witness on said dates. X’s counsel
received notice of promulgation of judgment and filed a motion to defer promulgation. Will
the petition for habeas corpus prosper?
No. Even if it were true that X or his counsel were not notified of the hearings, it is still not enough
to warrant a finding of denial of due process. In the application of the principle of due process,
what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity
to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course,
he cannot be said to have been denied due process. In this case, X was still afforded opportunity
to be heard. The last hearing was not the first scheduled hearing for the presentation of evidence
of the defense as there were previous settings for presentation of evidence but X did not present
any witness. X, through s counsel also received notice of the promulgation. When there is a
deprivation of a person's constitutional rights, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed
ousted of its jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of his
detention. However, X failed to show that the proceedings were attended by his violation of right
to due process. (In re: Abellana v. Paredes, G.R. No. 232006, July 10, 2019, J. Caguioa)
What is the extent of enforceability of the writ of amparo as compared to that of the writ of
habeas corpus?
30
The writ of amparo is enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, regardless of which court issued
it. (A.M. 07-9-12-SC, Sec. 3) If the writ of habeas corpus is issued by the Supreme Court, or any
member thereof, or the Court of Appeals, or any member thereof, it shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines. If granted by the RTC, it shall be enforceable within its judicial region. (ROC,
Rule 102, Sec. 2)
What is the relaxed rule on admissibility of evidence in amparo cases?

It provides that the court will consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and
will consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, rules are reduced to the most
basic test of reason — i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency
with all the other pieces of adduced evidence, Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it
satisfies this minimum test. However, the relaxed rule on admissibility of evidence did not
dispense with the substantial evidence rule. (Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, February 16,
2010)
What is the meaning of an entity engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party in Habeas Data?
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavor. To “engage” means
“to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in
pursuit of a business.
What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting, or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the
element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavor,
for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ
from getting to said person or entity (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29,
2014).
Distinguish RA 9048, as amended, Rule 103 and Rule 108.

1. RA 9048, as amended is the remedy for a person seeking (1) to change his or her first
name or nickname on the grounds that: the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce, The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that by that first name or nickname in the community, or the change will avoid
confusion; (2) to correct clerical or typographical errors in the civil register, (3) to
change/correct the day and/or month of his or her date of birth, and/or (4) to
change/correct his or her sex, where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or
typographical error or mistake, must first file a verified petition with the local civil
registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected
or changed is kept, in accordance with the administrative proceeding. A person may
only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies under Rule 103 or Rule 108 after the
petition in the administrative proceedings is filed and later denied. If the prayer to
administratively change petitioner's first name is denied, the same may be brought
under Rule 103 . If the prayers to administratively correct petitioner's middle name and
surname are denied, the same may be brought under Rule 108
2. Rule 103 is a remedy for a person seeking (1) to change his or her surname or (2) to
change both his or her first name and surname may file a petition
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for change of name under Rule 103, provided that the jurisprudential grounds are
present.
3. Rule 108 is a remedy for a person seeking substantial cancellations or corrections of
entries in the civil registry may file a petition for cancellation or correction of entries
under Rule 108. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register. (Bartolome v. Republic, G.R. No. 243288, August 28, 2019, J.
Caguioa)
What is the coverage of change of name under Rule 103?

The change of name contemplated under this rule includes both the given or proper name and
surname of the petitioner, provided that reasonable grounds therefor are present:
1. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

◦ This may be availed of first through administrative proceeding for the first
name/nickname under RA 9048 as amended. If denied administratively, then an
action under Rule 103 may be availed of
2. when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption;
3. when the change will avoid confusion;
◦ This may be availed of first through administrative proceeding for the first
name/nickname under RA 9048 as amended. If denied administratively, then an
action under Rule 103 may be availed of
4. when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and
was unaware of alien parentage;
5. when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and
6. when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest. (Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, 9 February 1996; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 88202, 14 December 1998; Republic v. Bolante, G.R. No. 160597, 20 July 2006)
Petitioner did not avail of the administrative correction of typographical error under RA 9048,
and instead filed a Petition for Correction under Rule 108 for her first name and sex. The trial
court ruled in favor of Petitioner. On appeal, considering that petitioner did not first file an
administrative case, OSG claims petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies and
observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under RA 9048. Is the OSG correct?
No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction may be
waived, as in this case, where there is failure to timely raise such ground (failure to state a cause
of action). The OSG only raised it for the first time on appeal. Estoppel on the part of the party
invoking such doctrines is among the exceptions to said rules. Non-compliance with such
doctrines does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. (Republic v. Gallo,
G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018)
Petitioner sought to change his surname from “Labayu” to “Labayo” under Rule 108, as it
involved a misspelling in his surname. Is the procedure taken correct?
NO. RA 9048 as amended by RA 10172 already expressly removed the correction of clerical or
typographical errors from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. To obviate any further
confusion on the matter, the SC ruled that typographical or clerical errors in a
person's surname must likewise be corrected through the administrative proceeding under R.A.
32
9048 (as amended by RA 10172). The same rule applies with the correction of spelling in the
surname from “Bartholome” to “Bartolome”. Petitioner may only avail of the appropriate judicial
remedies (filing a Rule 108 petition with the RTC) when the changes/corrections sought through
the administrative proceeding are denied (Bartolome v. Republic G.R. No. 243288, August 28, 2019;
J. Caguioa).
Petitioner Francis Luigi G. Santos filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 seeking
to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" in his Certificate of Live Birth. He alleged
that sometime in 1991, his parents, Lovely Maria T. Guzman and Jose Marie Bautista, Jr., also
known as Ramon Bong Revilla, Jr. (Bong Revilla), met and engaged in an intimate
relationship. He was later born as "Francis Luigi Guzman. His parents were never married
as Bong Revilla was already married to Lani Mercado. Petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth
did not bear the Revilla surname and his father was marked as unknown. However, on April
24, 1996, Bong Revilla executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment recognizing petitioner as
his son. In 1999, Lovely Guzman married Patrick Joseph P. Santos (Patrick Santos), who, in
turn, legally adopted petitioner in 2001. Thus, petitioner's name was changed from "Francis
Luigi Guzman" to "Francis Luigi G. Santos.” Although petitioner lived with his mother, he
grew up close to Bong Revilla and the latter's wife and children and was treated by the family
as a legitimate son. He also claimed that he used the name "Luigi Revilla" when he entered
show business. Thus, he filed the instant petition in order to avoid confusion, to show his
sincere and genuine desire to associate himself to Bong Revilla and to the Revillas, and to
ensure that his records show his true identity as Bong Revilla's son. The OSG argues that
Petitioner availed of the wrong remedy and that he should have filed a petition under Rule
108, and should have impleaded his adoptive and biological fathers, as indispensable
parties.
Was Rule 108 the correct remedy?

No. Petitioner correctly availed himself of the remedy under Rule 103 in order to change
his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" to avoid confusion and to show his sincere desire
to associate himself to Bong Revilla and the Revillas. By these allegations, petitioner
seeks to alter the designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives and is best known and not to effect any clerical or substantial corrections.
(Santos v. Republic, G.R. No. 250520, May 5, 2021, J. Caguioa)
Will the change of surname from Santos to Revilla result in his change of status?
No. While a change in status may legally result in a change of name, such as in
marriages, annulments, legitimations, or adoptions, et al., the reverse is not equally true.
A change of surname under Rule 103 does not necessarily result in a change of
petitioner's status, i.e., from legitimate to illegitimate. A change of name as authorized
under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a change in, one's existing family
relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family
rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity,
civil status, or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he
bears as the label of appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing
him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Indeed, petitioner cannot change his status
as an adopted child of Patrick Santos to an illegitimate child of Bong Revilla by the mere
33
expedient of changing his name as an adoption may only be rescinded in accordance

with law. (Santos v. Republic, G.R. No. 250520, May 5, 2021, J. Caguioa)
Should the petition for change of name be granted?

No, petitioner failed to prove that there is any compelling reason to justify a change of
surname from "Santos" to "Revilla." The use of the surname "Revilla" would create
further confusion rather than avoid it, given that: (1) petitioner has never legally used
the name "Revilla" despite having been acknowledged in 1996; (2) he was legally
adopted by Patrick Santos in 2001; (3) he has used the name "Santos'' for all documentary
purposes since his adoption; (4) although he is publicly known to be the son of Bong
Revilla, he is known by his peers as "Luigi Santos"; (5) even after a change of surname,
Patrick Santos shall continue to be the father named in his birth certificate; and (5) he
only began using the surname "Revilla" when he entered show business.
While petitioner may factually identify and associate with his biological father and his
family, he remains to be the legitimate son of Patrick Santos by virtue of the adoption.
The latter and not the former is thus his true legal identity. As adoption severs all legal
ties between the adoptee and his or her biological parents, there is no basis to allow
petitioner to change his name to "Revilla" simply because he is, biologically, the son of
Bong Revilla and wants to associate himself with the Revilla family. Petitioner’s reasons
for change of name does not fall under any of the jurisprudential grounds for change of
name.
The mere fact that petitioner began using a different name, i.e., "Luigi Revilla," when
he joined show business does not constitute a proper and reasonable cause to legally
authorize a change of name. Any confusion created by the use of said name is mainly
due to the unauthorized use of a name other than petitioner's true legal name.
Convenience is not a recognized ground for change of name, which may be allowed
only for compelling reasons that must be alleged and proved. A sincere desire to
associate oneself to a certain person or family, without more, does not justify a change
of surname. (Santos v. Republic, G.R. No. 250520, May 5, 2021, J. Caguioa)
What is the remedy against the determination of probable cause by the Ombudsman in a
preliminary investigation?
Since Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, does not provide for the remedy of
appeal from the decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases, the
aggrieved party may file an original petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court when the
finding of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (Tirol, Jr., v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 135913, 4 November 1999; Estrada v. Desierto, G.R.
No. 156160, 9 December 2004; Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 229288 , August 1, 2018,
J. Caguioa)
What is the remedy against the ruling of the Ombudsman determination in Administrative
Disciplinary cases?
The remedy against decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative charges, where the penalty
is not light or does not absolve the respondent of the charge, is by appeal to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act insofar as it provides that decisions in
administrative disciplinary cases of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court
34
under Rule 45 was declared unconstitutional for violating the proscription in Section 30, Article
VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court without its advice and concurrence. (Namuhe v. The Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 124965, 124932
& 124913, 29 October 1998; Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998; Gatchalian v. Office
of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 229288 , August 1, 2018, J. Caguioa)
If the decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative charge imposes light penalties (public
censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month or fine equivalent to one month
salary) or absolves the respondent of the charge, such decision under Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act is considered final and unappealable. As such, these decisions, if tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may only be assailed by
means of a petition for certiorari with the CA. (Administrative Order No. 07, Series of 1990, Rule III,
Sec. 7; Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 184083, 19 November 2013)
What are the rules on venue in relation to a criminal charge for libel under the RPC?
The rules on venue of criminal actions for libel are as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may
be filed in the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the RTC
of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the RTC of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be
filed in the RTC of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of
the offense. (People v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720 & 197324, March 5, 2018, J. Caguioa)
What should be alleged in the information as to venue if the basis of venue of the libel
criminal action is the place where the libel was printed and first published:
The Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed
and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial
or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-
condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass. (People v. Macasaet,
G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720 & 197324, March 5, 2018, J. Caguioa)
Is the following allegation of venue in the information for libel sufficient:
“That on April 21, 1999, in Manila City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor and editor, respectively of
Malaya with address at Port Area, Manila City defamed private complainant Narciso Y.
Santiago, Jr., did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by
writing and publishing an article in the Malaya x x x.”
Yes. Paraphrasing the Information, the accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor and
editor defamed the private complainant on April 21, 1999, in Manila City, by writing and
publishing an article in the Malaya with address at Port Area, Manila. It is clear that Port Area,
Manila is where the defamatory article was written and published because that is the address
of Malaya, an unquestionably printed newspaper, wherein the article appeared. That the
35
Information did not expressly state “first published” is of no moment because the word
“published” does not exclude the first publication. The Information alleges with particularity
Port Area, Manila as the place where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first. The
Information need not parrot the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC and expressly use the
phrase “printed and first published.” If there is no dispute that the place of publication
indicated in the Information, which is Manila in the present case, is the place where the alleged
defamatory article was “printed and first published,” then the law is substantially complied
with. After all, the filing of the Information before an RTC of the City of Manila would, forestall
any inclination to harass the accused. (People v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720 & 197324,
X filed a complaint for bigamy against Y. X claims that when she married Y, he was already
previously married to A. Prior to arraignment, Y filed motion to quash information, on the
ground that the first element of bigamy, that Y was previously married to A, was not present.
Allegedly, there was a previous final decree of nullity declaring void the marriage between A
and Y, before Y married X. The trial court granted the motion to quash. X appealed and the CA
sustained the dismissal, X filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC. Should the
petition be given due course?
No. X has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case. Section 5, Rule 110,
provides that all criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In criminal cases, the dismissal of the case
against an accused can only be appealed by the prosecutor or the Solicitor General, acting on
behalf of the State. In appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court, the authority to
represent the State is vested solely in the Office of the Solicitor General. In criminal cases, the
People is the real party-in-interest and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal
proceedings before the Supreme Court. X, the private offended party is but a witness in the
prosecution of offenses. The interest of the private offended party is limited only to the aspect of
civil liability. While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to
pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this
exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case. (Bumatay v. Bumatay, G.R. No. 191320,
April 25, 2017, J. Caguioa)
A, B, and C were charged with rape with homicide. During the trial, the prosecutor filed
a motion to discharge accused A to be utilized as a state witness. The prosecutor argued
that there was no need to present evidence to discharge A as a state witness, since A
was already admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. The RTC denied
the motion for failure of the prosecution to present evidence in support of the prayer to
discharge A as a state witness, who was the only eye witness to the crime. The
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari to assail the denial of the motion, but without
any prayer for injunctive relief to restrain further proceedings in the trial court. In the
RTC, the prosecution moved to suspend several times the proceedings due to the
pending petition for certiorari, which was opposed by the accused on the ground of
right to speedy trial. An NBI agent was present and the RTC asked whether the
prosecution would present it as a witness, to prove the due execution of A’s
extrajudicial confession. The prosecution declined and manifested it would no longer
present further evidence. Accused filed a motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to
evidence, which was granted. Accused filed a demurrer to evidence. Accused was
acquitted. M, the mother of the victim, filed before the CA a petition to annul the order
36
granting demurrer to evidence. The CA dismissed the petition. A motion for

reconsideration was filed but later denied. M appealed to the SC. The case was set for
oral arguments where the OSG appeared, and manifested it was joining M’s cause to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. Does M, the private complainant, have the legal
standing to assail the acquittal?
Yes. While as a rule, a private complainant cannot bring an action questioning a judgment
of acquittal, except insofar as the civil aspect of the criminal case is concerned, in this case,
this issue was rendered moot when the Solicitor General, in representation of the People,
joined the cause of M, thus fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. In any event, M has
an interest in the maintenance of the criminal prosecution, being the mother of the
deceased rape victim. The right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court
which deprives them of due process has always been recognized, the only limitation being
that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double
jeopardy. Here the acquittal is void and the first jeopardy did not attach because the
acquittal was done without regard to due process of law. (Merciales v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002)
Why was the acquittal done without regard to due process of law?
M’s right to due process was violated by the prosecutor’s refusal to present evidence, in
violation of his duty to protect the interest of the offended parties. The public prosecutor,
who was under legal obligation to pursue the action on their behalf, reneged on that
obligation and refused to perform his sworn duty. In rendering the judgment of dismissal,
the trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. A judgment which is void for lack
of due process is equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the right to hear
and determine, not to determine without hearing. The trial court passively watched the
prosecutor bungle the case. The trial court, motu proprio, should have called additional
witnesses for the purpose of questioning them himself in order to satisfy his mind with
reference to particular facts or issues involved in the case. It is not only the State, but more
so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in criminal cases. The acquittal is null
and void and cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy. (Merciales v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002)
W2 executed a complaint-affidavit against H for bigamy, claiming that when they

married, H was still married to W1. An information for bigamy was filed against H,
who, before arraignment, moved to quash the same on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense. It was claimed that the RTC in another case recently
declared the marriage with W2 void, and H presented a decree of such nullity of
marriage as proof thereof. The prosecution countered that at the time H married W2,
H’s marriage with W1 was still subsisting. All elements for bigamy are present as
alleged in the Information. The trial court quashed the information. The prosecution
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. W2 filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA, alleging the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed
the case of bigamy. The CA denied the petition as it was not filed by the OSG on behalf
of the People of the Philippines and that the petition violated H’s right against double
jeopardy.
37
Was there grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash?

Yes. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so quashing the
Information, it considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat
disregarding the settled rule that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts
stated in the information; and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under
exceptional circumstances, none of which is obtaining in the instant petition. All the
elements of bigamy are alleged in the information. A motion to quash is a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the information and any evidence contrary thereto can
only be presented as a matter of defense during trial. The court cannot consider allegations
contrary to those appearing on the face of the information. The nullity of marriage decree
is a evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the Information —
that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a
subsequent marriage. This should not have been considered at all because matters of
defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. (Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824,
December 8, 2010)
What are the exceptions to the rule that facts not stated in the Information will not be
appreciated in a motion to quash?
These are:
(1) when the new allegations are admitted by the prosecution;
(2) when the Rules so permit, such as upon the grounds of extinction of criminal liability
and double jeopardy; and
(3) when facts have been established by evidence presented by both parties which
destroyed the prima facie truth of the allegations in the information during the hearing on
a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
and it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give
due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support
possible conviction (Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010)
Was H’s right against double jeopardy violated?

No. There was no valid arraignment or plea to the charge and the accused was not
convicted or acquitted or the case otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent, since H moved for the dismissal. Jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused
on account of an order sustaining a motion to quash anchored on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense since such ground is not a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense. (Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010)
Note:
General Rule: An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense.
Exception: Unless the motion was based on the following grounds: (1) the criminal action
or liability has been extinguished; and (2) the accused has been previously acquitted or
convicted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent (Rules of Court, rule 117, Sec. 6)
X was charged with murder. X filed a petition for bail and after hearing thereon, the court
denied bail ion the ground that the evidence of guilt was strong. Trial on the merits ensued
and the prosecution rested its case. X filed a demurrer to evidence, which was denied. X filed
a motion to fix bail, alleging that the prosecution was able to show that the crime charged
38
should be homicide only and not murder, relying on People v. Rivera, a case with
substantially the same facts, where the victim was killed during a heated argument, the crime
was only homicide due to the absence of treachery because there was no preparation made
in a manner to ensure the killing of the victim. The RTC denied the motion on the ground
that the evidence of guilt for the death of the victim was strong and it was incumbent on the
accused to take the witness stand, to show otherwise. X moved for reconsideration which
was denied. X filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Was the denial of the motion to fix
bail proper?
No. The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to fix bail because the
prosecution could at best, only convict X of homicide and not murder. Treachery is not present
when the killing was preceded by a heated argument. The determination of whether the
evidence of guilt is strong should be applied in relation to the crime charged, in this case,
murder. The RTC should only have determined whether the evidence of guilt is strong for
Murder, as opposed to simply determining if the evidence that he was responsible for the
victims death was strong. Here, the evidence of X's guilt — for Murder — was not strong. The
RTC should have granted X’s Motion to Fix Bail. (Recto v. People, G.R. No. 236461, December 5,
2018, J. Caguioa)
Accused is charged with rape. The private complainant testified against him on direct
examination. Before she may be subject of cross examination, she died. What is the effect of
the death of the private complainant on her testimonial evidence?
Her direct testimony shall be excluded because the accused is guaranteed by the constitution the
right to cross-examine a witness. The right of an accused to cross-examine a witness is essential
to test the credibility and truthfulness of the testimony offered and likewise provides an
opportunity for the accused to demonstrate substantial inconsistencies that could create
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888, August 22, 2018, J. Caguioa)
What is the purpose of the accused’s right to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the
case against him?
It is designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over the accused for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration
of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
cases. (People v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720 & 197324, March 5, 2018, J. Caguioa)
How do you determine that an accused’s accused’s right to a speedy trial and to a speedy
disposition is violated?
It is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay;
(b) the reason for the delay;
(c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and
(d) prejudice to the defendant.
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial
was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize
anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be
impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately
to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense
39
witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not
imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living
under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained,
his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy. (People v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos.
196094, 196720 & 197324, March 5, 2018, J. Caguioa)
How can the government sustain the right to try the accused despite a delay?
It must show two things:
(a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary
and inevitable delay; and
(b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of
justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay.
Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State.
For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense
should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to
intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice
him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be
weighted less heavily against the State. (People v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720 & 197324,
May the right to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case be waived?
Yes. The accused's failure to timely question the delay would be an implied acceptance of such
delay and a waiver of the right to question the same. Also, his silence may amount to
laches. (People v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720 & 197324, March 5, 2018, J. Caguioa)
A complaint-affidavit was filed against the accused before the prosecutor in 1999. The
prosecutor dismissed without prejudice the complaint more than 8 years from the filing of
the complaint or in 2007. Dismissal was on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to improper
venue. Thereafter, the DOJ found probable cause against the accused and an information
against him was filed in 2008. Accused was arraigned 2 months later. A day after arraignment,
Accused filed a motion to dismiss based on the right to speedy disposition of the case. Is the
accused barred by laches or waiver?
No. The length of delay must be commensurate with the reason thereof. The complaints filed
before the prosecutor was dismissed, without prejudice, for want of jurisdiction by reason of
improper venue. It took the Prosecutor more than eight years from the filing of the complaints
to dismiss without prejudice the complaint. The issue on venue in libel cases is neither a novel
nor difficult one. The more than eight years it took the Prosecutor to resolve a rather routine
issue is inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified. The silence of the accused during such
period could not be viewed as an unequivocal act of waiver of their right to speedy
determination of their cases. The more than eight years delay the Prosecutor incurred before
issuing his resolution of the complaint is an affront to a reasonable dispensation of justice and
such delay could only be perpetrated in a vexatious, capricious and oppressive manner. The
dismissal is warranted because of the violation of the right to speedy disposition of their cases.
(People v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720 & 197324, March 5, 2018, J. Caguioa)
40
An information was filed against X for acts of lasciviousness. During trial, it was proven that
he raped the victim. The information was never amended. May X be conviction of rape?
No. X can only be convicted of the crime charged, acts of lasciviousness, and not the crime proven,
rape. When there is variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved,
and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall
be convicted of the offense proven, which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged, which is included in the offense proved. The offense charged, acts of lasciviousness, is
included in the offense proved, rape. X may only be convicted of the offense charged, acts of
lasciviousness (Rules of Court, Rule 120, Sec. 4; People v. Bongbonga y Nalos, G.R. No. 214771 , August
9, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Accused was charged with rape but during trial it was only proven that accused got the
victim’s hand and placed it on his genitals. Will accused be acquitted?
No, pursuant to the variance doctrine, accused shall be convicted of the proven of the lesser
crime of acts of lasciviousness, which is necessarily included in the crime of rape. (People v. X X
X, G.R. No. 226467, October 17, 2018, J. Caguioa)
In a charge for rape, private complainant dies during the pendency of the case. Will this
result in the dismissal of the criminal case?
No. The case shall proceed because in criminal cases, the offended party is the State and the role
of the private complainant is limited to the determination of the civil liability of the accused.
The death of the private complainant did not extinguish the criminal liability of the accused.
(People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888, August 22, 2018, J. Caguioa)
X was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal use of dangerous drugs. To sustain
a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what must the prosecution prove?
The following elements must be proven:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. (People v. Fatallo y Alecarte, G.R. No.
In cases involving dangerous drugs, what is the significance of the confiscated drug?
It constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain
a judgment of conviction. It is essential that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be
established with moral certainty. The prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that
the substance seized from the accused is exactly the same substance offered in court as proof of
the crime. Each link to the chain of custody must be accounted for. (People v. Fatallo y Alecarte,
In the chain of custody in relation to drugs cases, when and where should the inventory,
photographing and marking take place?
It must be made immediately after seizure and confiscation, at the place of apprehension. It is
only when the same is not practicable that it may be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches
the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. (People v. Fatallo
y Alecarte, G.R. No. 218805, November 7, 2018, J. Caguioa)
In a buy-bust operation, should the required witnesses be present at the time of the
apprehension?
41
Yes, they must be physically present at the time of apprehension. It is a requirement that can
easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its
nature, a planned activity. A buy-bust team has enough time to gather and bring with them the
said witnesses. (People v. Fatallo y Alecarte, G.R. No. 218805, November 7, 2018, J. Caguioa)
If the inventory, marking and photographing is done at a place other than the place of
apprehension, for justifiable reason, should the required witnesses still be present at the
time and place of apprehension?
Yes. The requirement of having the required witnesses to be physically present at the time or
near the place of apprehension is not dispensed with. It is at the time of arrest or at the time of
the drugs' seizure and confiscation that the presence of the said witnesses is most needed.
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more
importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is their presence at the time of seizure and
confiscation that would insulate against the police practice of planting evidence. The presence
of the required witnesses at the time of the apprehension and inventory is mandatory, and that
the law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose. The
presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the
witnesses would be able testify that the buy-bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs
were done in their presence in accordance with law (People v. Fatallo y Alecarte, G.R. No. 218805,
Is the violation of the chain of custody rule fatal?

No, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that (a) there is justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. The prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses. Without
any justifiable explanation, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of
the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable
doubt. (People v. Fatallo y Alecarte, G.R. No. 218805, November 7, 2018, J. Caguioa)
Is the chain of custody rule only procedural?

No. It is a matter of substantive law and it cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects. (People v. Fatallo y Alecarte, G.R. No. 218805, November 7, 2018, J. Caguioa)
What is the purpose of marking in the chain of custody rule?

It is the starting point of the custodial link immediately after seizure. This is vital because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end
of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence.
Hence, while marking is not explicitly found in the law (but such is indispensable for the
required inventory to be credible), the failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized
drugs would cast reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti. (People v. Fatallo y
Alecarte, G.R. No. 218805, November 7, 2018, J. Caguioa)
There was a buy bust operation. 2 sachets of shabu were brought by the informant to the
police A from the accused but no markings were made in the place of seizure. The marking
was later on made by a police B, who did not recover the drugs from the accused. Police B
42
testified that he saw the exchange of items between the accused and the informant poseur
buyer, but he did not see the poseur buyer hand the drugs to Police A. Police B presumed
that the drugs brought by the poseur buyer were the ones delivery by Police A to the police
station. It was testified that Police A brought the drugs to the crime laboratory for
examination, but the dorsal portion for the request for examination showed that the seized
drugs were received from Police C by the forensic chemist who conducted the examination.
The forensic chemist only testified on the examination and did not identify from whom he
received the seized items for examination. The prosecution did not acknowledge or explain
this deviation from the chain of custody rule. Are there lapses in the chain of custody and
what is/are its effect/s?
Yes, there were lapses in the chain of custody. To establish an unbroken chain of custody, it is
necessary that every person who touched the seized item describe how and from whom he or
she received it; where and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession; its condition
when received and at the time it was delivered to the next link in the chain. This requirement
was not complied in this case. These were not complied with. The procedural lapse, left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, without showing how the integrity of the drugs
was preserved, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused
as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. No intact or
unbroken chain of custody was established by the prosecution. The identity and integrity of the
seized drugs were compromised. Consequently, accused must perforce be acquitted. (People v.
Fatallo y Alecarte, G.R. No. 218805, November 7, 2018, J. Caguioa)
May the unexplained lapses in the chain of custody be overlooked by relying on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty?
No. The lapses themselves are affirmative proofs of irregularity. Any divergence from the
prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value
of the confiscated contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the non-compliance is an
irregularity, a red flag, that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will
defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. (People v. Fatallo y Alecarte,
After a buy bust operation, accused was charged will illegal sale and use of drugs. Accused
was tested after his apprehension. It was not shown that the drugs tested were actually seized
from the accused when he was arrested. It was also found during trial that there were other
unexplained procedural lapses in the chain of custody, without showing that the integrity of
the drugs was preserved. What is the effect of these findings as to the illegal sale and use of
drugs charges?
Because of the unexplained lapses in the chain of custody, without showing the integrity of the
drugs were preserved, accused shall be acquitted of the illegal sale. The law provides that any
person apprehended for violating the provisions of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act,
as amended, shall be subjected to a drug test. Since accused was not proven to have violated
the provisions of said law for the alleged illegal sale of drugs, then the drug test conducted on
him has no leg to stand on. His acquittal for illegal use of drugs must necessarily follow. Since
the apprehension of the accused was illegal, it follows that the drug test is also illegal for it is
an indirect result of his arrest. Accused should also be acquitted of the illegal use of drugs. The
results of the drug test cannot be used against accused for they are considered as the fruit of the
43
poisonous tree. If accused was not arrested, he would not have been subjected to a drug test.
(People v. Fatallo y Alecarte, G.R. No. 218805, November 7, 2018, J. Caguioa)
May a court take judicial notice of the publication of the notice of initial hearing for Case No.
123 in the issue of the Official Gazette on October 23, 2021, Volume 62, Number 42, page 8044?
Yes. Given that the Official Gazette is the official publication of the government, the court can
take judicial notice thereof pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129, which provides that a court may
take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (Padayhag v.
Director of Lands, G.R. Nos. 202872 & 206062, November 22, 2017, J. Caguioa)
May courts take judicial, notice of when Quezon City was established?
Yes. Section 1, Rule 129 provides that the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the measure
of time, and the geographical divisions are subjects of mandatory judicial notice. (Bernas v. Estate
of Felipe Yu Han Yat, G.R. Nos. 195908 & 195910, August 15, 2018, J. Caguioa)
What is the original document rule?

It provides that that the original document be produced whenever its contents are the subject of
inquir (Spouses Tapayan v. Martinez, G.R. No. 207786, January 30, 2017, J. Caguioa)
A copy of the Deed of Undertaking was presented during trial. When is the time to object to
the admissibility thereof for violating the original document rule?
In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made at the
proper time, and the grounds specified. Objection to evidence must be made at the time it is
formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the
party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being
offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence
may be made. (Spouses Tapayan v. Martinez, G.R. No. 207786, January 30, 2017, J. Caguioa)
When is evidence formally offered?

Testimonial Evidence is offered at the time witness is called to testify. Documentary and Object
Evidence is offered after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence (Rule 132, Sec. 35)
How is tender of excluded evidence made?

For Object/Documentary Evidence, it is to have the same attached or made part of the record.
For Oral Evidence, one should state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of
witness and substance of proposed testimony (Rule 132, Sec. 40)
A copy of the Deed of Undertaking was presented during trial. During its formal offer, the
opposing party did not raise its inadmissibility for violating the original document rule. May
the opposing party raise such ground on appeal?
No. When a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered
in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived, even if by its nature the evidence is
inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.
Having failed to timely raise the objection when the Formal Offer of Evidence was filed in the
trial court, the opposing party is deemed to have waived the same. (Spouses Tapayan v. Martinez,
G.R. No. 207786, January 30, 2017, J. Caguioa)
44
Accused X was in a detention cell when he voluntarily confessed to the commission of the
crime before members of the media. Is this an inadmissible extrajudicial confession?
No. X was not in a custodial investigation when he made a confession. The fact that the
extrajudicial confession was made while inside a detention cell does not render it inadmissible,
especially since the same was given freely and spontaneously. An extrajudicial confession made
before news reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from police authorities, as in this
case, is admissible. (People v. Dacanay y Tumalabcab, G.R. No. 216064, November 7, 2016, J. Caguioa)
Who has the burden of proof in criminal cases?

In all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. (Maamo v. People, G.R. No. 201917, December 1, 2016, J. Caguioa)
What is proof beyond reasonable doubt?

It does not mean such degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, that produces
absolute certainty; only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind (People v. Gerola y Amar, G.R. No. 217973,
July 19, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Who has the burden of proof in criminal cases?

The burden of proof is placed on the Prosecution. This arises from the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed.
(Maamo v. People, G.R. No. 201917, December 1, 2016, J. Caguioa)
Does the accused have the burden of proof to prove his innocence?
No, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof. The Prosecution must rely on
the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the
evidence of the accused. He must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution
not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. The weakness of the defense put
up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has
not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged
and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it (Maamo v. People, G.R.
No. 201917, December 1, 2016, J. Caguioa)
May the guilt of the accused be established through circumstantial evidence?

Yes. Establishing guilt through circumstantial evidence is akin to weaving a tapestry of events
that culminate in a vivid depiction of the crime of which the accused is the author (People v.
Pentecostes y Cronico, G.R. No. 226158, November 8, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

1. There is more than 1 circumstance;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt (Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 4)
What are the requirements for a statement made during a startling occurrence to be
admissible under res gestae:
45
The following are the requisites:

(i) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
(ii) that the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and
(iii) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888, August 22, 2018, J. Caguioa)
What is a spontaneous exclamation within the meaning of res gestae?

A spontaneous exclamation is defined as a statement or exclamation made immediately after
some exciting occasion by a participant or spectator and asserting the circumstances of that
occasion as it is observed by him. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888, August 22, 2018, J. Caguioa)
Why is res gestae as statements made during a startling occurrence admissible?

The spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration itself may be regarded as the
event speaking through the declarant rather than the declarant speaking for himself. The
admissibility of such exclamation is based on our experience that, under certain external
circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced in
a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance
which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and
perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the
immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and
during the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to
bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just
observed by him. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888, August 22, 2018, J. Caguioa)
What is the test in determining the admissibility of evidence as part of res gestae?
The test is whether the act or declaration was made as a spontaneous reaction and is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself and whether it negates any premeditation or purpose
to manufacture testimony. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888, August 22, 2018, J. Caguioa)
How may spontaneity be determined?

The following factors are then considered in determining whether statements offered in
evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously:
(1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the
statement;
(2) the place where the statement was made;
(3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement;
(4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement
relative thereto; and
(5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.
The rule is that the statements, to be admissible, should have been made before there had been
time or opportunity to devise or contrive anything contrary to the real facts that occurred. What
the law altogether distrusts is not afterspeech but afterthought.
A statement will ordinarily be deemed spontaneous if, at the time when it was made, the
conditions of the declarant was such as to raise an inference that the effect of the occurrence on
46
his mind still continued, as where he had just received a serious injury, was suffering severe
pain, or was under intense excitement. A lack of spontaneity may be inferred from the cool
demeanor of declarant, his consciousness of the absence of all danger, his delay in making a
statement until witnesses can be procured, or from the fact that he made a different statement
prior to the one which is offered in evidence. It should be considered whether there intervened
between the event or transaction and the making of the statement relative thereto, any
circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant which would thus restore his mental
balance and afford opportunity for deliberations. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888, August 22,
2018, J. Caguioa)
Is there an exact period of lapse of time to determine spontaneity?

There are no limits of time within which the res gestae can be arbitrarily confined. These limits
vary in fact with each particular case. The acts or declarations are not required to be
contemporaneous with the primary fact, but they must be so connected with it as to make the
act or declaration and the main fact particularly inseparable, or be generated by an excited
feeling which extends, without break or let-down, from the moment of the event they illustrate.
If the acts or declarations sprang out of the principal transaction, tend to explain it, were
voluntary and spontaneous, and were made at a time so near it as to preclude the idea of
deliberate design, they may be regarded as contemporaneous in point of time, and are
admissible. Cases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence
of the startling event and the making of the declaration. What is important is that the
declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in
the presence of the transaction which they illustrate or explain, and were made under such
circumstances as necessarily to exclude the ideas of design or deliberation. (People v. XXX, G.R.
No. 205888, August 22, 2018, J. Caguioa)
What is the effect of the statement being made at some distance from where the principle
transaction occurred?
A statement made, or an act done, at a place some distance from the place where the principal
transaction occurred will not ordinarily possess such spontaneity as would render it
admissible(People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888, August 22, 2018, J. Caguioa)
The victim walked to X’s house from her house, crying, and told X that she was raped by her
father three times, a few hours earlier. The houses of X and the victim were in the same
municipality. The victim told X how the rapes happened. The victim later died. X testified
on what the victim told her and further testified that the period of time the victim told her
when the crime happened to the time X arrived her house, was the period it would take to
arrive X’s house from the victim’s house by walking. Will the testimony of X as to what the
victim said as to the rape be admissible under res gestae?
Yes. When the victim uttered her statements to X, a few hours after the incidents, the effect of
the occurrence on her mind still continued. Her demeanor showed that she was still suffering
as a result of the violation of her person and honor by her father. While the utterances were not
made contemporaneous to the act described, they remained to be so connected with it as to
make the act or declaration and the main fact particularly inseparable. There is no showing that
an intervening event between the time of the rape incidents and the time of the victim’s
revelation to X that would indicate a restoration of her mental balance. In fact, she was still
under distress when she arrived X’s home. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888, August 22, 2018, J.
Caguioa)
47
The victim was raped thrice on the same day by her father. Three days after, she told her
friend, Y that she had a problem with her father, as he raped her previously. During that 3-
day period, the victim left her home, stayed with her aunt and helped there in the house
chores and also looked for a job. May the Y testify on what the victim told her as part of res
gestae?
No. The circumstances between the time the rape took place and the utterance to Y, three days
later, show that there was a significant break in the connection between the rape incidents and
the time the victim made her statements to Y. The utterances made to Y are far too removed
from the event described as to form part of the res gestae. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888, August
22, 2018, J. Caguioa)
What is the equipoise rule?

It instructs that where inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction. (People v. Floresta y Selencio, G.R. No. 239032, June 17, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe)
When the evidence of the prosecution and the defense are so evenly balanced the appreciation of
such evidence calls for the tilting of the scales in favor of the accused. (Gonzalez v. People, G.R. No.
124491, June 1, 1999)
What is the constitutional basis of the equipoise rule?

It is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond
reasonable doubt. (Gonzalez v. People, G.R. No. 124491, June 1, 1999)
A was drinking with B in A’s house when A told B that he was “hit”. B then heard a cracking
sound behind him, causing him to run away. A’s wife, W, went to A after hearing the gunshot
and saw A bloodied on the floor. A then asked W whether Z was there? After A died, Z was
then charged with the killing of A on the strength of A’s question to W before he died. Z raised
the defense of alibi. The trial court admitted A’s statement as part of res gestae. May Z be
convicted of the crime based on the foregoing evidence?
No. While the statement of A may be considered as part of res gestae, it does not contain any
positive and categorical identification of Z as A’s assailant. It may be argued that A’s statement
meant that Z had something to do with A’s mortal wounds. With these conflicting interpretations
as to the nature of Z’s statement, the equipoise rule will support Z’s acquittal. (People v. Floresta y
Selencio, G.R. No. 239032, June 17, 2019)
X was charged with frustrated homicide. He entered a plea of not guilty. During trial, X
presented evidence to prove self-defense. X was convicted and the court found X failed to
present clear and convincing evidence of the presence of the elements of self defense. X assails
the conviction claiming that the court erred in not appreciating the equipoise doctrine in his
favor. Is X correct?
No. The equipoise rule does not apply because there are no inculpatory facts and circumstances
which are capable of two or more explanations. X already admitted shooting the victim. There is
no more issue as to the innocence or guilt of X. What is left to be resolved is whether he can be
relieved of liability by virtue of the self-defense he pleaded, which he failed to establish. (Fernando
Estabas Mahawan Alias Pado v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008)
48
What is the probative value of alibi?

The defense of alibi is inherently weak and unreliable due to the ease by which they may be
fabricated or concocted. If not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, such defenses are
considered self-serving and are bereft of weight in courts of law. (People v. Pentecostes y Cronico,
What is required to establish the defense of alibi?

Alibi must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that accused was actually in
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and that it was physically impossible
for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission, and not merely
that he was somewhere else. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where
the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where the crime was committed, as well
as to the facility of access between the two places. (People v. Pentecostes y Cronico, G.R. No. 226158,
November 8, 2017, J. Caguioa; People v. Mayingque, G.R. No. 179709, July 6, 2010)
Bank filed a complaint for sum of money against B, for the unpaid use of credit card issued by
the bank. Attached to the complaint are duplicate original copies of statements of account.
MTC dismissed for failure to establish by preponderance of evidence since the signature in
the statements of account are mere photocopies, and there is no showing that the original was
lost or destroyed, and as such, the photocopied documents were disregarded. On appeal, bank
argued that the duplicate originals were attached. RTC affirmed the MTC, as the documents
and signatures were photocopies. On further appeal, Bank claims for the first time that there
was failure of the lower courts to comply with the Rules of Electronic Evidence to consider the
documents as electronic documents and therefore should have regarded the same as original.
When may a court consider an electronic document as evidence?

For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of
admissibility. According to Section 2, Rule 3, Rules on Electronic Evidence, an electronic
document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by the Rules on Electronic Evidence. Rule 5 of said rule lays down the
authentication process of electronic documents. Section 1 of Rule 5 imposes upon the party
seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding the burden of
proving its authenticity in the manner provided therein. Section 2 of Rule 5 sets forth the
required proof of authentication. Before any private electronic document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following
means: (a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have
signed the same; (b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as
may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic
documents were applied to the document; or (c) by other evidence showing its integrity
and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge. As to method of proof, Section 1, Rule 9
provides that all matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an
electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal
knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively
show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein. (RCBC
Bankard Services Corp. v. Oracion, Jr., G.R. No. 223274, June 19, 2019, J. Caguiooa)
May the court consider the statements of account as electronic document evidence?
49
No. The Bank did not comply with the Rules on Electronic Evidence. It failed to
authenticate the supposed electronic documents through the required affidavit of
evidence. Even the section on Business Records as Exception to the Hearsay Rule of Rule
8 requires authentication by the custodian or other qualified witness. In the absence of
such authentication through the affidavit of the custodian or other qualified person, the
said annexes or attachments cannot be admitted and appreciated as business records and
excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence. Consequently, the annexes to the complaint
fall within the Rule on Hearsay Evidence and are to be excluded. (RCBC Bankard Services
Corp. v. Oracion, Jr., G.R. No. 223274, June 19, 2019, J. Caguiooa)
50

Senga Remedial Law Last Minute Tips November 2022

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Senga Remedial Law Last Minute Tips November 2022

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REMEDIAL LAW LAST MINUTE TIPS

May the implementation of the Ombudsman’s order of preventive suspension in an

May an action for sum of money be filed against a deceased person?

The SEC issued guidelines on compliance with Filipino-Foreign Ownership requirements

What is an indispensable party?

What is the test for failure to state a cause of action?

Differentiate failure to state a cause of action from lack of cause of action.

What is the consequence of an order declaring the defendant in default?

What are the remedies of one declared in default?

No settlement of estate proceedings were instituted in relation to deceased Z’s estate. A

May the court motu proprio dismiss a complaint?

What is a demurrer to evidence?

What is the effect of a grant of demurrer to evidence?

What does the court consider in ruling on a demurrer to evidence?

Give instances when a motion for reconsideration is considered pro forma.

What may be the subject of levy for purposes of execution sale?

What is the fresh period rule?

Is the Fresh Period Rule applicable to administrative proceedings?

When does a question of fact exist?

What is a frivolous appeal?

What is a writ of preliminary injunction?

What should the applicant establish to be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction?

(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and

When may a TRO be issued ex parte by a trial court?

What is a mandamus writ?

What is a ministerial duty?

Is the mayor’s authority to issue licenses and permits ministerial?

What should the trial court do?

Will your answer be the same if it is an order of dismissal?

What is the effect if the order of expropriation is not appealed?

When may consequential damages be awarded to the landowner in expropriation?

By exception, if the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost

What is accion publiciana?

What is the issue in accion publiciuana?

May there be a provisional determination of ownership in accion publiciana?

What is an accion reivindicatoria?

What is a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP)?

How is SLAPP as a defense alleged?

What is the effect of death on an obligation?

What is the effect of death on the civil liability of the accused?

What is the period for filing claims against the estate?

What is the relaxed rule on admissibility of evidence in amparo cases?

Distinguish RA 9048, as amended, Rule 103 and Rule 108.

What is the coverage of change of name under Rule 103?

1. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

Was Rule 108 the correct remedy?

expedient of changing his name as an adoption may only be rescinded in accordance

Should the petition for change of name be granted?

Is the following allegation of venue in the information for libel sufficient:

granting demurrer to evidence. The CA dismissed the petition. A motion for

W2 executed a complaint-affidavit against H for bigamy, claiming that when they

Was there grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash?

Was H’s right against double jeopardy violated?

Is the violation of the chain of custody rule fatal?

Is the chain of custody rule only procedural?

What is the purpose of marking in the chain of custody rule?

What is the original document rule?

When is evidence formally offered?

How is tender of excluded evidence made?

Who has the burden of proof in criminal cases?

What is proof beyond reasonable doubt?

Who has the burden of proof in criminal cases?

May the guilt of the accused be established through circumstantial evidence?

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: