'MORALS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF VALUES

An A n a l y s i s o f
the Hart - D e v l i n Debate

by

JOHN HARINGTON WADE

LL.B., U n i v e r s i t y o f Sydney, 1969

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THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF LAWS

i n the Department
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THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

A p r i l , 1971
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Vancouver 8, Canada
 ABSTRACT

Morals and the Enforcement of Values - An Analysis

o f the H a r t - D e v l i n Debate

T h i s t h e s i s attempts to d i s c o v e r out o f the debate

between L o r d D e v l i n and H.L.A. Hart the t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s of

decision-making i n cases where there is a conflict between

i n d i v i d u a l moral freedom and social control. It i s structured

i n the form o f an a n a l y s i s of the debate between D e v l i n and

Hart concerning the p r i n c i p l e s f o r and a g a i n s t the enforcement

of morality. There are f i v e main chapters o f the t h e s i s and a

short conclusion.

The first chapter, headed "The Hart-Devlin Debate",

introduces and summarises D e v l i n ' s answers and Hart's criticism

to the f i r s t two h y p o t h e t i c a l questions which D e v l i n addresses

to h i m s e l f , namely, (1) Has s o c i e t y the r i g h t to pass judge-

ment at a l l on matters of morals?, (2) I f s o c i e t y has the right

to pass judgement, has i t a l s o the r i g h t to use the weapon of

the law to enforce it? I t analyses D e v l i n ' s attempt to r a t i o n -

a l l y convert the d e s c r i p t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the m a j o r i t y have

power to enforce m o r a l i t y to the normative p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t

s o c i e t y ought to enforce m o r a l i t y . There i s an observation

t h a t the c o - e x i s t i n g " r i g h t " o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s not

debated by r a t i o n a l argument.

The second chapter under the heading "The Common M o r a l i t y

and the F e e l i n g s T e s t " sets out the f e e l i n g s t e s t as expounded

by D e v l i n as a means to determine which r u l e s o f m o r a l i t y ought

to be enforced. There i s a s p e c i f i e d l i s t of the qualifica-

t i o n s to the f e e l i n g s t e s t which Hart overlooks f o r the most

part. However I reach the c o n c l u s i o n that i t i s d i f f i c u l t to

authoritatively interpret these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s o r t o g i v e them

any substance. D i s c u s s i o n then c e n t r e s around Hart's o b j e c t i o n s

t h a t the f e e l i n g s t e s t i s an a b d i c a t i o n o f reason and a source

of p o t e n t i a l injustice. These o b j e c t i o n s are not s u f f i c i e n t

basis f o r r e j e c t i n g the f e e l i n g s test.

The t h i r d chapter, c a l l e d "Moral P a t e r n a l i s m " , attempts

to i s o l a t e the d i f f e r e n c e i n the views o f Hart and D e v l i n by

analysis o f Hart's phrase " m o r a l i t y as such." Hart c r e a t e s an

a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between " p a t e r n a l i s m " and"enforcement o f

p o s i t i v e m o r a l i t y , " thereby attempting to e x p l a i n which moral

rules ought t o be enforced by a s s i g n i n g these two l a b e l s . My

c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t the o n l y r a t i o n a l distinction lies i n the

a v a i l a b i l i t y o f e m p i r i c a l evidence to prove p h y s i c a l harm and

non-availability o f e m p i r i c a l evidence to prove moral harm.

Hart has a s t r i c t e r onus o f proof than D e v l i n when i t comes to

p r o v i n g harm t o the i n d i v i d u a l .

However, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o s u s t a i n the d i s t i n c t i o n o f

physical and n o n - p h y s i c a l harm as the b a s i s f o r d e c i s i o n s which

we../'want" t o make. The d i s t i n c t i o n i s rendered impotent i n

practice by f i n d i n g elements o f harm to s o c i e t y i n the a c t i o n

of the i n d i v i d u a l and thereby j u s t i f y i n g enforcement o f morals

by using M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y . Concepts o f p r i v a t e and

public harm are e a s i l y used to cloak the r e a l b a s i s o f the

decision. My c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t the r e a l d i f f e r e n c e between

the views o f Hart and D e v l i n , behind a l l the " p r i n c i p l e s , " i s

a difference of value-preference.
 The f o u r t h chapter, under the heading "Value D i f f e r e n c e

between Hart and D e v l i n " d i s c u s s e s t h e p o s s i b l e reasons f o r

the d i f f e r i n g v a l u e p r e f e r e n c e s . I t q u e s t i o n s whether v a l u e

p r e f e r e n c e s can u l t i m a t e l y be t r a c e d to p r e v a l e n t s o c i a l condi-

tions. There has always been h i s t o r i c a l debate concerning the

mysterious balance between i n d i v i d u a l freedom and s o c i a l

control. I n o r d e r to a s s i s t i n identifying the p e r s o n a l values

of Hart and D e v l i n , t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e t h e o r i e s a r e viewed i n

terms o f three t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e l l e c t u a l antinomies. These

antinomies i n v o l v e the problem o f choosing between

(a) Public authority or a Platonic e l i t e

(b) Individualism or collectivism

(c) Reason o r f a i t h ; i n t e l l e c t o r i n t u i t i o n

Both Hart and D e v l i n stand i n d e f i n i t e historical intellectual

p o s i t i o n s and t h e i r t h e o r i e s can be compared to the w r i t i n g s

of numerous l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s . I agree w i t h

those w r i t e r s who argue t h a t a c o n f l i c t between two u l t i m a t e

v a l u e s cannot be s e t t l e d by reason. Can we argue t h a t Hart's

value preference f o r i n d i v i d u a l freedom i n moral matters i s

s u b j e c t to q u e s t i o n due to modern s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s ?

The f i f t h chapter i s g i v e n the name "The I r r e v e r s i b l e

D i s a s t e r Argument." T h i s s e c t i o n analyses D e v l i n ' s o r i g i n a l

argument t h a t s o c i e t y has the r i g h t to preserve i t s common

morality. J u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s argument i s attempted i n

terms o f the r i g h t o f s o c i e t y to prevent ''irreversible disas-

ter." T h i s i s an attempt to d e r i v e a g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e from

an extreme f a c t s i t u a t i o n i n order to a s s i s t to decide the

deadlocked values. I n times o f emergency o r threatened

d i s a s t e r , the v a l u e of i n d i v i d u a l freedom ought to he sub-

o r d i n a t e d to other v a l u e s . An analogy i s drawn between

D e v l i n ' s arguments f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y and

c u r r e n t arguments f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the environment.

However D e v l i n ' s arguments f o r the enforcement of m o r a l i t y ,

even i n terms o f the p r i n c i p l e o f i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r , can

be met by s e v e r a l unanswerable o b j e c t i o n s . A short attack i s

made on D e v l i n ' s theory by a s i m i l a r device o f a p p l y i n g the

theory to a p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of modern s o c i a l condi-

tions. However t h i s c r i t i c i s m does not enable us to subordinate

Devlin's value-preference either. The conclusion i s that Hart

and D e v l i n have d i f f e r e n t v a l u e - p r e f e r e n c e s and their pro-

nounced t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s only dress these preferences

w i t h the garb of r a t i o n a l i t y . U l t i m a t e l y they are only able

to s t a t e the t h e o r i e s which they develop to support their

p e r s o n a l values and cannot e x p l a i n why.

 Page

Chapter I. The H a r t - D e v i i n Debate 1

II. The Common M o r a l i t y and the

F e e l i n g s Test 11

III. Moral P a t e r n a l i s m 18

IV. Value D i f f e r e n c e between

Hart and D e v l i n 30
V. The I r r e v e r s i b l e Disaster

Argument 56

VI. Conclusion 70

Bibliography 73
 THE HART-DEVLIN DEBATE

In our s o c i e t y , we are c o n s t a n t l y s e a r c h i n g f o r p r i n c i p l e s

to a s s i s t the decision-maker answer the q u e s t i o n , "what should

I do?" One a r e a o f our search i n v o l v e s an attempt to r e c o n c i l e

the r i g h t o f the i n d i v i d u a l to freedom w i t h the r i g h t o f s o c i e t y

to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l . A decision-maker, whether

legislative or judicial, can w e l l ask, "Upon what p r i n c i p l e s

should I decide whether t o i n t e r f e r e with i n d i v i d u a l freedom?"

In a democracy he w i l l u s u a l l y be c a l l e d upon t o e x p l a i n the

reasons f o r h i s d e c i s i o n .

L o r d D e v l i n addressed h i m s e l f t o t h i s problem i n the

Maccabaean L e c t u r e on J u r i s p r u d e n c e which was d e l i v e r e d i n 1959

under the t i t l e "The Enforcement o f M o r a l s . " 1

To t h i s l e c t u r e
p

the E n g l i s h j u r i s t Herbert Hart r e p l i e d . This jurisprudential

debate d i s c u s s e s the problem o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l

freedom w i t h s o c i a l c o n t r o l and emphasises the s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n

whether morals should be l e g a l l y e n f o r c e d . J u s t how f a r has

t h i s debate p r o v i d e d a s s i s t a n c e t o the decision-maker? Have any

d e c i s i v e p r i n c i p l e s emerged i n o r d e r to answer the q u e s t i o n ,

"what should I do?"

Before d i s c u s s i n g the t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n i t i s

worthwhile t o note t h a t there i s general agreement t h a t two

Now i n c l u d e d i n a book c a l l e d The Enforcement o f Morals,

by P a t r i c k D e v l i n , London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965.

^"Law, L i b e r t y and M o r a l i t y , " (1963) and "The M o r a l i t y

o f the C r i m i n a l Law," (1965) by H.L.A. Hart.
p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are r e l e v a n t , t h o u g h not n e c e s s a r i l y

d e c i s i v e . Where s o c i e t y i s c o n s i d e r i n g some i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h

the f r e e d o m o f a c t i o n o f an i n d i v i d u a l , we s h o u l d ask, i n t e r

a l i a :

(a) W i l l i t be p o s s i b l e t o e n f o r c e the " i n t e r f e r i n g "

law w i t h a r e a s o n a b l e d e g r e e o f e f f e c t i v e n e s s ?

(b) W i l l the a t t e m p t e d e n f o r c e m e n t o f the " i n t e r f e r i n g "

law c a u s e more harm t h a n the b e n e f i t s w h i c h c o u l d p o s s i b l y be

a t t a i n e d by e n f o r c e m e n t ?

T h e r e i s a modern t e n d e n c y to say t h a t t h e s e p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d -

e r a t i o n s w i l l o f t e n be d e c i s i v e b e c a u s e o f the i n c o n c l u s i v e n e s s

o f t h e o r e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . When i t i s a r g u e d , f o r example,

t h a t the l a w s r e s t r i c t i n g p o s s e s s i o n o f m a r i h u a n a s h o u l d be

a b o l i s h e d , i s the argument b a s e d upon the p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n s

j u s t m e n t i o n e d , o r a p r e d o m i n a n t v a l u e o f p r i v a c y , o r a t h e o r y

o f harm to the i n d i v i d u a l o r to o t h e r s , o r a c o m b i n a t i o n o f

t h e s e r e a s o n s ? We are o b l i g e d t o a t l e a s t a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n

our d e c i s i o n s .

I n o r d e r t o d i s c u s s the t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,

D e v l i n s e t s out t h r e e q u e s t i o n s a d d r e s s e d to h i m s e l f s

1. Has s o c i e t y the r i g h t t o p a s s judgement a t a l l

on m a t t e r s o f m o r a l s ? Ought t h e r e , i n o t h e r
words, to be a p u b l i c m o r a l i t y , o r a r e m o r a l s
a l w a y s a m a t t e r f o r p r i v a t e judgement?

2. I f s o c i e t y has the r i g h t t o p a s s judgement,

has i t a l s o the r i g h t t o use the weapon o f t h e
law t o e n f o r c e i t ?

3. I f so, ought i t t o use t h a t weapon i n a l l

c a s e s o r o n l y i n some; and i f o n l y i n some,
on what p r i n c i p l e s s h o u l d i t d i s t i n g u i s h ? 3

-
-'Devlin, p. 7-8.
 In answer to the f i r s t q u e s t i o n , D e v l i n notes t h a t

people do i n f a c t speak as though there i s a public morality.

4

Even the Wolfenden Report "takes i t f o r granted t h a t there i s

i n existence a p u b l i c m o r a l i t y which condemns homosexuality and

prostitution."5 However i t i s always d i f f i c u l t to convert a

d e s c r i p t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n such as t h i s i n t o a normative proposi-

tion. The f a c t t h a t there i s a p u b l i c m o r a l i t y cannot neces-

s a r i l y mean t h a t there ought to be a p u b l i c m o r a l i t y . How can

Devlin turn a f a c t u a l d e s c r i p t i o n into a right? We w i l l see

t h a t the r e a s o n i n g he chooses meets with c o n v i n c i n g criticism

from Hart.

While answering the f i r s t q u e s t i o n , Devlin's arguments

encompass the second q u e s t i o n a l s o . He s t a t e s t h a t "society

i s not something t h a t i s kept t o g e t h e r p h y s i c a l l y ; i t i s held

together by the i n v i s i b l e bonds o f common thought"^ and i f the

common thought i s not enforced then there i s a danger t h a t

society w i l l disintegrate. S o c i e t y a c c o r d i n g l y has a prima

f a c i e r i g h t to enforce the common m o r a l i t y i n order to ensure

survival. Devlin,' endeavouring t o l o c a t e a " r i g h t , " appeals

to the most b a s i c r i g h t o f a l l — t h e Hobbesian r i g h t o f s u r v i v a l

and self-defense. S o c i e t y , threatened w i t h d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , has

a r i g h t to defend i t s e l f by e n f o r c i n g i t s common m o r a l i t y which

i s the essence o f s o c i e t y . Why i s i t t h a t D e v l i n does not r e s t

n

Report o f the Committee on Homosexual Offences and

P r o s t i t u t i o n (Cmnd. 247, 1 9 5 7 ) .

^ D e v l i n , p. 9«

6
I b i d . , p. 1 0 .
his argument on the s u p e r i o r power o f the m a j o r i t y over the

minority? The reasons t h a t D e v l i n t r i e s to avoid a r g u i n g in

terms of power are t h a t to base the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the

enforcement of morals upon the brute f o r c e of the m a j o r i t y is

not a s a t i s f a c t o r y moral argument and would c l e a r l y pave the

way f o r b l a t a n t abuse o f m a j o r i t y power. In Rousseau's words

"To y i e l d to the s t r o n g i s an act o f n e c e s s i t y , not o f will.

At most i t i s the r e s u l t o f a d i c t a t e o f prudence. How, then,

can i t become a duty?""' ' 1

I t appears t h a t D e v l i n a l s o wishes to argue f o r a r i g h t

o f enforcement above and beyond the democratic r i g h t o f a

government e l e c t e d by the m a j o r i t y . In a democracy, a minority

has c e r t a i n acknowledged r i g h t s q u a l i f y i n g the r i g h t of

majority r u l e (e.g. at l e a s t equal p r o t e c t i o n and due process).

Therefore to base the r i g h t o f enforcement upon the reconcilia-

t i o n o f democratic m a j o r i t y and m i n o r i t y r i g h t s i s to r e s t a t e

the problem o f the whole debate f o r the r e l a t i o n s h i p of individ-

ual freedom and s o c i a l c o n t r o l i s a category w i t h i n the broader

relationship&of minority and m a j o r i t y rights. The r i g h t of

s u r v i v a l i s u n q u a l i f i e d ; the r i g h t of a democratic m a j o r i t y to

r u l e i s q u a l i f i e d ; D e v l i n t r i e s to strengthen the case f o r the

enforcement o f common m o r a l i t y by f i t t i n g i t i n t o the former

right.

Hart p o i n t s out two major flaws i n Devlin's arguments*

S o c i a l Contract by J . J . Rousseau (New Yorkj Oxford

U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ) , p. 172.
 (1) I f s o c i e t y , on the p r i n c i p l e o f s u r v i v a l , can

enforce i t s common m o r a l i t y , then s o c i e t y w i l l "be able to

oppose any moral change, whether good o r bad, and merely

preserve the s t a t u s quo.

(2) There i s no necessary causal r e l a t i o n s h i p between

a change i n the common m o r a l i t y and a p h y s i c a l c o l l a p s e o f

society. On the o t h e r hand, i f D e v l i n i s d e f i n i n g s o c i e t y i n

terms o f ideas and m o r a l i t y , t h e n h e i s merely s t a t i n g a t r u i s m ,

1

namely t h a t s o c i e t y has a r i g h t to prevent change o f i t s common

m o r a l i t y because otherwise i t s common m o r a l i t y w i l l change.

In Hart's words "...even i f the c o n v e n t i o n a l m o r a l i t y d i d so

change, the s o c i e t y i n q u e s t i o n would not have been destroyed

or subverted. We should compare such a development not t o

the v i o l e n t overthrow o f government but to a p e a c e f u l c o n s t i -

t u t i o n a l change i n i t s form, c o n s i s t e n t not o n l y w i t h the

p r e s e r v a t i o n o f a s o c i e t y but with i t s advance."^

However, the i n t e l l e c t u a l weaknesses i n D e v l i n ' s argu-

ment t h a t the enforcement o f common m o r a l i t y i s a s t r o n g right

are s u b j e c t to two q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . F i r s t l y , Hart f e e l s that

D e v l i n ' s argument escapes complete d e m o l i t i o n by some h e l p f u l

confusion. "There i s no evidence t h a t the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f a

s o c i e t y r e q u i r e s the enforcement o f i t s m o r a l i t y "as such."

His (Devlin's) p o s i t i o n only appears to escape t h i s criticism

by a confused d e f i n i t i o n o f what a s o c i e t y i s . " 9

8
Hart (1963), p. 5 2 .

9
Hart (1963). p. 82.
 Secondly, j u s t as D e v l i n has d i f f i c u l t y proving ration-

a l l y t h a t enforcement o f common m o r a l i t y by s o c i e t y i s a " r i g h t " ,

both Hart and D e v l i n would have equal d i f f i c u l t y p r o v i n g that

the o p p o s i t e and y e t c o - e x i s t e n t v a l u e i n the debate, i n d i v i d -

ual freedom, i s a " r i g h t . " I t i s t r u e that both Hart and

D e v l i n place h i g h value upon i n d i v i d u a l freedom, t h a t they

feel i t ought to be a fundamental r i g h t , t h a t i t i s predomin-

ant among the n a t u r a l r i g h t s o f man. However, t o argue

r a t i o n a l l y why i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s a r i g h t i s a tradition-

ally d i f f i c u l t task. We end up d i s c o v e r i n g t h a t t h i s "right"

i s based upon f e e l i n g s , v a l u e s , precedent o r n a t u r a l law.

D e v l i n ' s attempt to show t h a t enforcement o f the common

m o r a l i t y i s a paramount r i g h t i s weak. However, we should

r e a l i z e t h a t Hart does not argue the paramount value o f the

right of individual freedom on e m p i r i c a l o r c o g n i t i v e grounds—

he simply assumes i t o r perhaps bases i t upon i n t u i t i o n .

In answer to the second r h e t o r i c a l question, *^ D e v l i n 1

s t a t e s that the law has a prima f a c i e r i g h t t o enter the

11

field o f enforcement o f m o r a l i t y , though having entered the

f i e l d , a c t u a l enforcement o f morals should o n l y take p l a c e i n

limited circumstances.^ Hart on the o t h e r hand says t h a t the

law prima f a c i e has no r i g h t to e n t e r the f i e l d o f enforcement

1 0
D e v l i n , p. 8 .

n
lbid., p. 1 1 .

1 2
Ibid., pp. 1 6 - 2 0 .
of m o r a l i t y except where harm to others is proved. 1 3

D e v l i n concludes, "I t h i n k , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i t i s not

p o s s i b l e to set t h e o r e t i c a l l i m i t s to the power of the State

to l e g i s l a t e a g a i n s t immorality." ^ 1
However i t i s not clear

what D e v l i n means by "power" because she does i n f a c t set

t h e o r e t i c a l l i m i t s to the " r i g h t " of the State to l e g i s l a t e

against immorality. ^ 1
Dean Rostow's d e s c r i p t i o n of Devlin's

p o s i t i o n i n terms o f H o h f e l d i a n a n a l y s i s i s h e l p f u l to avoid

t h i s confusion between power and right. "The correct

Hohfeldian way of p u t t i n g S i r P a t r i c k ' s t h e s i s , I should

t h i n k , would be to say t h a t the s t a t e has the "power" to

p r o t e c t i t s p u b l i c m o r a l i t y through the law; t h a t the citizen

has no "immunity" a g a i n s t such a c t i o n ; t h a t the s t a t e , however

i s under the "duty" i n e x e r c i s i n g i t s power to enforce and

respect certain equally real " r i g h t s " and " p r i v i l e g e s " of i t s

c i t i z e n s , i n accordance w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s governing B r i t i s h

lawmaking to whicn he addressed so c o n s i d e r a b l e a part of his

l e c t u r e ; and t h a t i n some i n s t a n c e s the s t a t e may have a

" d i s a b i l i t y " ; o r perhaps may not have the " p r i v i l e g e " to

q u a l i f y these r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s of the c i t i z e n even i n

the name o f self-defence." 1 6

This Hohfeldian a n a l y s i s o f D e v l i n ' s arguments i s

1 3
Hart (1963), p. 5.
14
D e v l i n , p. 12.
• ^ D e v l i n , pp. 16-20.
16
Rostow—The Enforcement o f Morals, i 9 6 0 , Cambridge
L . J . 174 at 1 9 5 .
h e l p f u l because i t answers the f i r s t two questions i n terms

of power and throws the crux o f the whole debate upon answer-

ing the t h i r d q u e s t i o n . In terms o f power, i t i s analogous

to a s i t u a t i o n where D e v l i n would say, "Yes, the s t a t e has

territorial j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a l l these m o r a l i t y cases and now

must c o n s i d e r each case on i t s m e r i t s . " Whereas Hart would

say, "The s t a t e has no t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n i n morality

cases though t h i s w i l l require a p r e - t r i a l h e a r i n g to determine

whether each p a r t i c u l a r case c o n t a i n s a m o r a l i t y i s s u e . " An

answer i n terms o f j u r i s d i c t i o n a l power i s r a t i o n a l but i s

an answer which i n i t i a l l y avoids the moral c o r r e c t n e s s of the

e x e r c i s e o f t h a t power i n s p e c i f i c cases. Devlin obviously

•fries to i n c l u d e the moral i s s u e i n h i s answers to the first

two questions. But i n f a c t i t i s not c l e a r whether he has

answered i n terms o f power o r r i g h t . As shown b e f o r e , he

t r i e s u n s u c c e s s f u l l y to r a t i o n a l i s e the e x i s t e n c e of a r i g h t

based on more than mere f o r c e . ' ' 1

F a c i n g the moral dilemma and the e x i s t e n c e o f r i g h t s

cannot be s t a l l e d any f u r t h e r when D e v l i n attempts to answer

1 ft

the t h i r d q u e s t i o n , " I f s o c i e t y has the r i g h t to use law to

enforce p u b l i c m o r a l i t y , ought i t to use enforcement i n a l l

cases or o n l y i n some; and i f o n l y i n some, on what p r i n c i p l e s

should i t d i s t i n g u i s h ? Hart's answer at f i r s t seems c l e a r

—

See previous d i s c u s s i o n pp. 3-4.

"...on the narrower i s s u e r e l e v a n t to the enforcement of

morality M i l l seems to me to be r i g h t . " 1 9

Mill's principle

i s found i n h i s famous essay "On Liberty."

"The o b j e c t of t h i s Essay i s to a s s e r t one

very simple p r i n c i p l e , as e n t i t l e d to govern
a b s o l u t e l y the d e a l i n g s of s o c i e t y w i t h the
i n d i v i d u a l i n the way of compulsion and
c o n t r o l , whether the means used be p h y s i c a l
f o r c e i n the form o f l e g a l p e n a l t i e s , or
the moral c o e r c i o n o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n . That
p r i n c i p l e i s , t h a t the s o l e end f o r which
mankind are warranted, i n d i v i d u a l l y or
c o l l e c t i v e l y , i n i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h the l i b e r t y
o f a c t i o n o f any o f t h e i r number, i s s e l f -
p r o t e c t i o n . That the o n l y purpose f o r which
power can be r i g h t f u l l y e x e r c i s e d over any
member o f a c i v i l i s e d community, a g a i n s t
h i s w i l l , i s to prevent harm to o t h e r s . His
own good e i t h e r p h y s i c a l or moral, i s not
s u f f i c i e n t warrant."2 0

I t was the use of t h i s p r i n c i p l e as adopted by the Wolfenden

21

Committee t h a t o r i g i n a l l y prompted D e v l i n i n t o t a k i n g h i s

p o s i t i o n as s t a t e d i n the Maccabaean L e c t u r e . D e v l i n argues

t h a t M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e i s only one g u i d e l i n e among o t h e r s .

"The e r r o r of j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n the Wolfenden Report i s caused

by the search f o r some s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e to e x p l a i n the division

between crime and s i n . " The Wolfenden Committee put forward

2 2

"Our own f o r m u l a t i o n o f the f u n c t i o n o f

the c r i m i n a l law so f a r as i t concerns the
s u b j e c t s o f t h i s enquiry. In t h i s f i e l d
i t s f u n c t i o n as we see i t , i s to preserve
p u b l i c order and decency, to p r o t e c t the

Hart, 1 9 6 3 , p. 5 .
2 0
John S t u a r t M i l l , U t i l i t a r i a n i s m , L i b e r t y and
Representative Government (Everyman's), p. 72.
21
Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and
Prostituion, 1957.
 c i t i z e n from what i s o f f e n s i v e o r i n j u r i o u s ,
and to provide s u f f i c i e n t safeguards a g a i n s t
e x p l o i t a t i o n and c o r r u p t i o n o f o t h e r s
p a r t i c u l a r l y those who are s p e c i a l l y v u l n e r -
able because they are young, weak i n body o r
mind, i n e x p e r i e n c e d , o r i n a s t a t e o f s p e c i a l
p h y s i c a l , o f f i c i a l o r economic independence.

I t i s not, i n our view, the f u n c t i o n o f the

law to i n t e r v e n e i n the p r i v a t e l i v e s o f
c i t i z e n s , o r to seek to enforce any p a r t i c u -
l a r p a t t e r n o f behaviour f u r t h e r than i s
necessary to c a r r y out the purposes we have
outlined."23

Although D e v l i n r e j e c t s M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e as adopted by

Hart as an absolute guide, he s t i l l c o n s i d e r s i t to be one

r e l e v a n t p r i n c i p l e among o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . "Morality i s a

sphere i n which t h e r e i s a p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and a p r i v a t e

i n t e r e s t , o f t e n i n c o n f l i c t , and the problem i s to r e c o n c i l e

the two. T h i s does not mean t h a t i t i s impossible to put f o r -

ward any general statements about how i n our s o c i e t y the balance

ought t o be s t r u c k . Such statements cannot o f t h e i r nature be

r i g i d o r p r e c i s e ; they would not be designed to c i r c u m s c r i b e

the o p e r a t i o n o f the law-making power but to guide those who

have t o apply i t .

23
Para. 13.
 THE COMMON MORALITY AND THE FEELINGS TEST

What a r e the g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t s and g u i d e l i n e s w h i c h

D e v l i n l a y s down to a s s i s t our p u z z l e d l e g i s l a t o r answer the

q u e s t i o n , "What s h o u l d I do?" He ought t o e n f o r c e , w i t h

c e r t a i n q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , the m o r a l judgements h e l d by the hypo-

t h e t i c a l r e a s o n a b l e man who " i s not e x p e c t e d to r e a s o n a b o u t

a n y t h i n g and whose judgement may be l a r g e l y a m a t t e r o f

f e e l i n g . " 2
^ T h e r e i s the immediate d a n g e r t h a t t h i s g e n e r a l

c r i t e r i a w i l l be t r e a t e d as an a b s o l u t e p r i n c i p l e and D e v l i n

has t a k e n p a i n s to w a r n us t h a t m o r a l d e c i s i o n s c a n n o t be made

by f o l l o w i n g a s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e . A c c o r d i n g l y , the q u a l i f i c a -

t i o n s upon the e n f o r c e m e n t o f the common m o r a l i t y o f the

r e a s o n a b l e man are as f o l l o w s s

(1) T h e r e must be t o l e r a t i o n o f the maximum i n d i v i d u a l

26

f r e e d o m t h a t i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the i n t e g r i t y o f s o c i e t y .

(2) As the l i m i t s o f m o r a l t o l e r a n c e sometimes s h i f t

w i t h c h a n g i n g f a s h i o n , the law o u g h t to be s l o w to i n t e r v e n e

i n any new m o r a l matter. "? 2

28
(3) As f a r as p o s s i b l e , p r i v a c y s h o u l d be r e s p e c t e d .

(4) The law s h o u l d be c o n c e r n e d w i t h the minimum and

not w i t h the maximum o f m o r a l i t y . 2

9

D e v l i n » P. 15.
2 5

I b i d . , P« 16.
2 6

I b i d . , P- 18.
2 7

I b i d . , P. 18.

29 .
7
I b i d . , P. 19.
 (5) Before s o c i e t y can put a p r a c t i c e beyond t h e l i m i t s

o f t o l e r a n c e , the common m o r a l i t y o r f e e l i n g s must make a

d e l i b e r a t e judgement t h a t the p r a c t i c e i s i n j u r i o u s t o s o c i e t y . 3 0

(6) The common m o r a l i t y which ought to be enforced must

o n l y be those moral r u l e s the breach o f which causes intoler-

ance, i n d i g n a t i o n and d i s g u s t . Or, those moral r u l e s , the

breach o f which would s t i l l cause us i n t e n s e f e e l i n g s o f abom-

i n a t i o n even a f t e r calm and d i s p a s s i o n a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n — " m e r e

d i s a p p r o v a l i s not enough to j u s t i f y interference." " " 3 1

(7) Any law on matters o f m o r a l i t y ought to be "deeply

imbued w i t h a sense o f s i n . " 3 2

I t i s t o t h i s " f e e l i n g s t e s t " o f Devlirfs t h a t Hart

r e a c t s most s t r o n g l y and i t i s here t h a t we should l o o k to

f i n d the core o f disagreement between Hart artd D e v l i n . Hart's

o b j e c t i o n s a r e as f o l l o w s :

(1) The f e e l i n g s t e s t amounts to an a b d i c a t i o n o f reason

to the mere f e e l i n g s o f the reasonable man. We should not

s u r r e n d e r the process o f decision-making to f e e l i n g s and

p a s s i o n e s p e c i a l l y when such a v i t a l value as i n d i v i d u a l

freedom i s i n v o l v e d .

(2) D e v l i n ' s hope i s t h a t the reasonable man w i l l

i n c l u d e the q u a l i t y o f j u s t i c e i n h i s f e e l i n g s i n most cases.

Hart i s not as w i l l i n g t o take t h i s r i s k . The f e e l i n g s t e s t

30 ;
I b i d . , p. 1 7 .
3 1
I b i d . , p. 1 7 .
3 2
I b i d . , p. 24.
can be used as a method o f p r e s e r v i n g p r e j u d i c e s , b i g o t r y and

the s t a t u s quo i n moral b e l i e f s . " I t seems f a t a l l y easy t o

b e l i e v e t h a t l o y a l t y to democratic p r i n c i p l e s e n t a i l s accept-

ance o f what may be termed moral populism: the view t h a t the

m a j o r i t y have a moral r i g h t to d i c t a t e how a l l should l i v e . "33

—"To use c o - e r c i o n to m a i n t a i n the moral s t a t u s quo a t any

p o i n t i n a s o c i e t y ' s h i s t o r y would be a r t i f i c i a l l y to a r r e s t

the process which gives s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t h e i r v a l u e . " 3 4

(3) The f e e l i n g s t e s t w i l l i n v o l v e enforcement o f mere

m o r a l i t y o r " m o r a l i t y as s u c h " ^ 3
That i s , enforcement o f a

moral r u l e f o r i t s own sake w i t h l i t t l e o r no evidence t h a t

breach o f the r u l e w i l l cause harm to the a c t o r o r to o t h e r s .

The spirit o f Hart's o b j e c t i o n s i s e n t i c i n g as he

apparently champions i n d i v i d u a l freedom and p r e d i c t s the d i c t a -

torial abuses by the m a j o r i t y which are made p o s s i b l e i f we

agree w i t h D e v l i n ' s f e e l i n g s t e s t . But as Hart enlarges upon

his o b j e c t i o n s we f i n d the apparent d i f f e r e n c e s d i m i n i s h i n g .

L e t us now c o n s i d e r Hart's o b j e c t i o n s more fully.

(l) I t can be argued that D e v l i n ' s f e e l i n g s t e s t does

not amount to an unnecessary a b d i c a t i o n o f reason. I t has a

p r e c o n d i t i o n o f calm and d i s p a s s i o n a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the

i s s u e before a c t i n g upon f e e l i n g s . 3 6
Rostow defends D e v l i n a t

3 3
Hart, (1963), p. 79.
3
\iart, (1963), p. 7 5 .
3 5
Hart, (1963), pp. 18, 2 3 , 2 5 , 32, 41, 82.
36 . , x •
D e v l i n ( i x ) o f Preface
l e n g t h c o n c e r n i n g t h i s c r i t i c i s m and concludes "Nothing i n S i r

Patrick's l e c t u r e would weaken the primary importance of

detached and d i s p a s s i o n a t e s c h o l a r s h i p , conducted at the

h i g h e s t l e v e l of reasonableness we can a t t a i n i n the work of

s o c i a l reform, and the reform of law ."37 When e m p i r i c a l

evidence i s u n a v a i l a b l e or i n c o n c l u s i v e , and our reason still

l e a v e s us a l t e r n a t e courses of a c t i o n , where do we turn?

D e v l i n ' s answer i s t h a t we ought to apply the feelings test

with i t s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s • 3 8
D e v l i n would argue that the fact

t h a t the feelings t e s t plus q u a l i f i c a t i o n s can result in

a t r o c i t y o n l y shows t h a t the t e s t can be wrongly used and not

that i t i s a false t e s t . L i k e w i s e Hart would argue t h a t the

application of M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y i n the area of

morals i s s u b j e c t to abuse. However such abuse i n practice

o n l y shows t h a t the principle i s b e i n g wrongly used, not that

it i s wrong i n i t s e l f . The problem i s t h a t n e i t h e r principle

has s u f f i c i e n t content to i n d i c a t e when e i t h e r i s being

wrongly used. Thus both Hart and D e v l i n have p e r s o n a l concepts

o f how each wants the p r i n c i p l e of l i b e r t y and the feelings

test respectively used. I f the p r i n c i p l e and t e s t are not

interpreted a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r own concepts then each w i l l

label i t as a misuse or f i n d an exception.

One d i f f i c u l t y which a r i s e s i s t h a t these enumerated

qualifications can be looked upon as a mere sop f o r those

37
Refer to f o o t n o t e 16 at p. 197.
who c r i t i c i s e the f e e l i n g s t e s t and f e a r d e s t r u c t i o n o f

i n d i v i d u a l freedom. Devlin himself i n s e r t s the q u a l i f i -

c a t i o n s because o f h i s own uneasiness about a p r i n c i p l e which

s t i p u l a t e s the absolute enforcement o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n . The

question i s , "Do the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s have any substance?"

I t i s t r u e t h a t they do r e q u i r e a procedural pause between

passion and a c t i o n i n the hope t h a t r e f l e c t i o n and d i s c u s s i o n

w i l l modify u n j u s t i f i e d i n t o l e r a n c e . A man can a c t immediately

on s i g h t to i m p r i s o n a homosexual because he f e e l s i n t o l e r a n c e ,

i n d i g n a t i o n and d i s g u s t . But the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s r e q u i r e a

r e f l e c t i v e pause between the i n t o l e r a n c e and the e n f o r c i n g

action. I f the f e e l i n g o f i n t o l e r a n c e i s not f i r s t l y subjected

to the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s then the decision-maker i s a c t i n g i n

procedural breach o f the p r i n c i p l e . However the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s

o f f e r no d e f i n i t e t e s t as to what amounts s u b s t a n t i v e l y t o

unjustified intolerance. Once the procedural aspects a r e

s a t i s f i e d , the content i s u n f e t t e r e d . As p r e v i o u s l y mentioned,

the f e e l i n g s t e s t i s not a p r i n c i p l e o f guidance a t a l l i f we

must r e f e r every case, o r even the d i f f i c u l t cases only, to the

author f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

Although he i s sometimes ambiguous, D e v l i n expects t h a t

there ought to be some r a t i o n a l d i s c u s s i o n before a d e c i s i o n

to enforce common m o r a l i t y i s made. "...the moral judgement o f

s o c i e t y must be something about which any twelve men o r women

drawn a t random might a f t e r d i s c u s s i o n be expected to be

unanimous."39 D e v l i n enlarges upon t h i s p o i n t i n the preface

to h i s book which was compiled s e v e r a l years a f t e r delivering

the o r i g i n a l Maccabaean l e c t u r e . "The e x c l u s i o n o f the

irrational i s u s u a l l y an easy and comparatively unimportant

process. F o r the d i f f i c u l t choice between a number o f r a t i o n a l

c o n c l u s i o n s the o r d i n a r y man has t o r e l y upon a ' f e e l i n g ' f o r

the r i g h t answer. Reasoning w i l l get him nowhere."

(2) D e v l i n , l i k e Hart, o b v i o u s l y r e a l i z e s the dangers

o f u n r e s t r a i n e d l y e n f o r c i n g the f e e l i n g s o f the reasonable man

o r the common m o r a l i t y . History i s f u l l o f examples o f

a t r o c i t y and i n j u s t i c e i n f l i c t e d upon a m i n o r i t y because m a j o r i t y

o p i n i o n d i c t a t e d t h a t i t was r i g h t . The Spanish Inquisition

and Nazi Germany are t e r r i f y i n g i n s t a n c e s . That i s s u r e l y why

D e v l i n attempts to l i m i t the o p e r a t i o n o f the f e e l i n g s t e s t

by the q u a l i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e s enumerated p r e v i o u s l y . I t has

a l r e a d y been noted how d i f f i c u l t i t i s to f i n d substantive

meaning f o r these q u a l i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e s . They tend t o beg the

q u e s t i o n o f what amounts to the maximum t o l e r a b l e l e v e l o f

i n d i v i d u a l freedom. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h i s absence o f a d e f i n i t e

s a f e t y v a l v e on the f e e l i n g s t e s t tends to s u b s t a n t i a t e Hart's

fears. On the other hand Hart argues that because enforcement

o f f e e l i n g s held by the m a j o r i t y i s o f t e n a source of injustice,

then f e e l i n g s ought not to be a guide f o r enforcement. But

because m a j o r i t y r u l e has been abused, t h i s does not mean that

as a matter o f p r i n c i p l e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n ought not to be

ZKJ
Devlin ( v i i i ) o f Preface.
enforced. Abuse o f a r u l e i n p r a c t i c e does not n e c e s s a r i l y -

mean t h a t t h a t r u l e ought not to e x i s t . Fear t h a t a d e l i c a t e

g l a s s s t o p p e r w i l l be broken i s not a s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n to

keep i t hidden w h i l e s a f e l y u s i n g the more s o l i d d e c a n t e r .

As the g l a s s stopper i s a necessary and f u n c t i o n a l p a r t o f

the decanter i t should be used though w i t h constant reminders

o f i t s t r u e f u n c t i o n and d e l i c a c y .

Just as enforcement o f m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t to

abuse, so i s i n d i v i d u a l freedom o f a c t i o n which by gradual

process can undermine a value important to human l i f e . In

o t h e r words, both enforcement o f morals and freedom should be

s u b j e c t to q u a l i t y c o n t r o l , not e x c l u s i o n . "...Hart cannot

prove t h a t the j u s t i f i c a t i o n which D e v l i n o f f e r s f o r the

enforcement o f morals i s i l l u s o r y o r outmoded; he can o n l y

appeal to our own moral sense t h a t i t i s n o t worth the p r i c e . "

Perhaps i t i s p o s s i b l e today t h a t our moral sense t e l l s us

t h a t enforcement o f morals i s worth the p r i c e (see l a t e r under

discussion of " i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r " ) .

A.R. B l a c k s h i e l d , Sydney Law Review 1 9 6 5 - 6 7 ,

pp. 441 a t 4 5 0 .
 MORAL PATERNALISM

(3) Hart p o i n t s out on s e v e r a l occasions that Devlin's

feelings t e s t can i n v o l v e the enforcement o f mere m o r a l i t y or

o
ho
" m o r a l i t y as such." I t i s out o f t h i s c r i t i c i s m t h a t I w i l l
attempt to e x p l a i n a l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e i n the views o f Hart

and Devlin. What does Hart mean by " m o r a l i t y as such?" In

o t h e r p l a c e s he r e f e r s to i t as the enforcement of m o r a l i t y
43

f o r i t s own sake or the enforcement of p o s i t i v e morality.

To answer t h i s q u e s t i o n , we should f i r s t l y note t h a t

Hart, i n o p p o s i t i o n to M i l l , says t h a t i n modern s o c i e t y we

ought not to exclude p a t e r n a l i s m as a motive f o r p a s s i n g

legislation.^ But then Hart c r e a t e s h i s own distinction

w i t h i n M i l l ' s theory and says t h a t M i l l was c o r r e c t to the

extent t h a t he opposed the use o f the c r i m i n a l law as a means

of enforcing p o s i t i v e morality. Somewhere Hart sees a v i t a l

y e t unstated d i s t i n c t i o n between p a t e r n a l i s m and enforcing

positive morality. "The n e g l e c t o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between

paternalism and what I have termed l e g a l moralism i s important

as a form o f a more general e r r o r . I t is difficult to

immediately d i s c o v e r a r a t i o n a l basis f o r t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n f o r

the enforcement o f p o s i t i v e m o r a l i t y i s undoubtedly one form of

paternalism.
Tip
^Hart ( 1 9 6 3 ) , pp. 18, 23, 25, 32, 41, 82.
43
e.g. pp. 23, 20.
^Ibid., pp. 31-32.
45
Ibid., p. 33.
 Hart i m p l i e s t h a t there are c e r t a i n moral r u l e s which

e x i s t f o r t h e i r own sake. But no moral r u l e e x i s t s f o r i t s

own sake; moral r u l e s are expounded f o r the "good" o f mankind

even though c e r t a i n moral r u l e s may be mistaken. The concept

of what i s good f o r mankind w i l l v a r y from group to group o r

even from person to person. A l s o , each group o r person w i l l

have d i f f e r e n t moral r u l e s i n o r d e r to a s s i s t i n a t t a i n i n g

i t s i n d i v i d u a l concept o f goodness. The f a c t t h a t these

moral r u l e s are d i f f e r e n t o r even i n o p p o s i t i o n , does not

immediately concern t h i s argument. The v i t a l p o i n t i s that

the motive behind each moral r u l e i s the "good" o f mankind.

The p r e s c r i p t i o n o f any moral r u l e i s never motivated by a

d e s i r e to cause harm though i n f a c t moral r u l e s may be bad

and i n f a c t cause harm. T h e r e f o r e a l l moral rules,whenever

and wherever s e r i o u s l y p r e s c r i b e d , are f o r the "good" o f man

i n accordance w i t h each r e s p e c t i v e person's d e f i n i t i o n o f

good. When Hart says t h a t m o r a l i t y "as such" should not be

e n f o r c e d , he cannot be s a y i n g t h a t m o r a l i t y should not be

enforced. Rather he i s s a y i n g t h a t m o r a l i t y which does not

embody a c e r t a i n concept o f goodness which he p e r s o n a l l y

supports should not be e n f o r c e d . M o r a l i t y "as such" should

not be e n f o r c e d , but m o r a l i t y should be enforced i f i t i s

the k i n d w i t h which I agree. "...We do not have any moral

For d i f f e r e n t modern concepts of "good" see "An

I n t r o d u c t i o n to P h i l o s o p h i c a l A n a l y s i s " by John Hospers,
p. 4 4 9 .
o b l i g a t i o n s , p r i m a f a c i e o r a c t u a l , t o do a n y t h i n g w h i c h d o e s

n o t , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , have some c o n n e c t i o n w i t h what

makes somebody's l i f e good o r b a d , b e t t e r o r w o r s e . . . m o r a l i t y

was made f o r man, n o t man f o r m o r a l i t y . " ^ ? T h e r e f o r e t o e n f o r c e

p o s i t i v e m o r a l i t y o r m o r a l i t y a s s u c h i s o n l y t o p a t e r n a l l y

impose a c o n c e p t o f r i g h t o r g o o d n e s s ( w h i c h may be f a l s e )

upon a n o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l . H a r t h a s c o n f u s e d t h e i s s u e b y

c r e a t i n g a n a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between " p a t e r n a l i s m " a n d

" e n f o r c i n g p o s i t i v e m o r a l i t y . " I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e r e a l

d i s t i n c t i o n he i s t r y i n g t o make i s b e t w e e n good p a t e r n a l i s m

and b a d p a t e r n a l i s m . The l a b e l s o f " p a t e r n a l i s m " o r " e n f o r c i n g

m o r a l i t y a s s u c h " a r e r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s f o r a d e c i s i o n a l r e a d y

made. The d i s t i n c t i o n w h i c h i s t h e b a s i s o f a d e c i s i o n l i e s

w i t h i n H a r t ' s own c o n c e p t o f good a n d b a d .

I n a l a t e r e s s a y , " M o r a l s a n d C o n t e m p o r a r y S o c i a l

R e a l i t y , " D e v l i n d i s c u s s e s p o s s i b l e m e a n i n g s t o H a r t ' s

d i s t i n c t i o n between p a t e r n a l i s m a n d e n f o r c e m e n t o f p o s i t i v e

m o r a l i t y b u t f i n d s i t d i f f i c u l t t o s u s t a i n s u c h a d i s t i n c t i o n

i n p r a c t i c e a s a c o n c l u s i v e o r e v e n h e l p f u l g u i d e l i n e . He

c o n c l u d e s " I f i t i s p o s s i b l e , w h i c h I d o u b t , t o draw a t h e o r e t -

i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m o r a l p a t e r n a l i s m a n d t h e e n f o r c e m e n t

o f m o r a l i t y , i t i s n o t one t h a t i s r e l e v a n t t o t h e p r e s e n t

argument. The i s s u e i s w h e t h e r t h e r e i s a r e a l m o f p r i v a t e

m o r a l i t y a n d i m m o r a l i t y t h a t i s n o t t h e l a w ' s b u s i n e s s .

j— .
E t h i c s , p. 3 ? . W i l l i a m K. F r a n k e n a .

48
T h i s e s s a y i s a l s o f o u n d i n D e v l i n ' s book The E n f o r c e -
ment o f M o r a l s a t p . 124.
P a t e r n a l i s m , unless i t i s l i m i t e d i n some way as y e t unstated,

must, as I have pointed out, make a l l m o r a l i t y the law's

business."^9 A c c o r d i n g l y , the enforcement o f m o r a l i t y as such

i s e q u i v a l e n t to "bad" p a t e r n a l i s m . And " m o r a l i t y as such"

i n c l u d e s those moral r u l e s where t h e r e i s no necessary and

r e s u l t a n t harm when a breach o f t h a t m o r a l i t y takes p l a c e .

Now l e t us assume t h a t Hart, as he p u r p o r t s t o do, i s

u s i n g M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e as h i s main g u i d e l i n e f o r determinirig

whether morals should be enforced. F o r convenience, we can

summarise M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e o f l i b e r t y — " S o c i e t y should n o t

i n t e r f e r e w i t h the freedom o f a c t i o n o f an i n d i v i d u a l unless

t h a t a c t i o n i s causing harm to o t h e r s . " But Hart i s no l o n g e r

w i l l i n g i n our modern s o c i e t y to apply M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e i n

any area other than morals and he thereby immediately creates

a d i s t i n c t i o n between moral harm and p h y s i c a l harm. :

"In Chapter F i v e o f h i s essay M i l l c a r r i e d

h i s p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t p a t e r n a l i s m to l e n g t h s
t h a t may now appear t o us f a n t a s t i c . He
c i t e s the example o f r e s t r i c t i o n s o f the
s a l e o f drugs, and c r i t i c i s e s them as
i n t e r f e r e n c e s w i t h the l i b e r t y o f the would-
be purchaser r a t h e r than t h a t o f the s e l l e r .
No doubt i f we no l o n g e r sympathise w i t h t h i s
c r i t i c i s m t h i s due i n p a r t t o a general de-
c l i n e i n the b e l i e f t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s know
t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s b e s t , and to an i n c r e a s e d
awareness o f a great range o f f a c t o r s which
d i m i n i s h the s i g n i f i c a n c e to be attached to
an a p p a r e n t l y f r e e c h o i c e o r to consent.
Choices may be made o r consent given without
adequate r e f l e c t i o n o r a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the
consequences; o r i n p u r s u i t o f merely t r a n s -
i t o r y d e s i r e s ; o r i n v a r i o u s predicaments
when the judgement i s l i k e l y to be clouded;

I b i d . , p. 1 3 7 .
 or under i n n e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l compulsion;
or under pressure by others o f a k i n d too
s u b t l e to be s u s c e p t i b l e o f proof i n a
law c o u r t . U n d e r l y i n g M i l l ' s extreme
f e a r of p a t e r n a l i s m there perhaps i s a
conception o f what a normal human being
i s l i k e which now seems not to correspond
to the f a c t s . " 5 0

Why i s Hart w i l l i n g to argue t h a t the law ought to

prevent p h y s i c a l c o r r u p t i o n and y e t not i n t e r f e r e w i t h moral

corruption? He approves of p h y s i c a l p a t e r n a l i s m and yet

disapproves o f moral p a t e r n a l i s m . Why i s there a d i f f e r e n c e

o f motive and how do we d i s t i n g u i s h between the two? It

appears t h a t the only r a t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h a t p h y s i c a l

harm i s f a r e a s i e r to prove i n a law court than moral harm.

We have a c l e a r conception of what amounts to a p h y s i c a l l y

h e a l t h y person and can a l s o produce t a n g i b l e evidence of

p h y s i c a l harm. T h i s i s not so w i t h moral harm. But once you

approve of the s t a t e ' s p a t e r n a l motive then d i s a p p r o v a l of

moral p a t e r n a l i s m can o n l y be l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d on the

b a s i s o f l a c k o f e m p i r i c a l evidence. Hart does not elaborate

upon t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n and i n f a c t o n l y r e f e r s to i t i n p a s s i n g

w i t h an h i s t o r i c a l r e f e r e n c e to " s e c u l a r harm"^ 1
One recent

r e f e r e n c e to t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s found i n the Report of the

L e D a i n Commission.-' 2
While d i s c u s s i n g matters of p r i n c i p l e the

50
Hart ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 3 2 .
The r i g h t o f modern s o c i e t y to embark upon a course of
p h y s i c a l p a t e r n a l i s m i s c e r t a i n l y not undisputed. For example,
see American Motorcycle A s s o c i a t i o n v Davids, 158 N.W.R. ( 2 n d ) ,
p. 7 2 .
5 1
Hart (1963), p. 23.
52
I n t e r i m Report o f the Commission o f I n q u i r y i n t o the
Non-Medical Use of Drugs, Chairman, Gerald LeDain.
Report makes a r e s e r v a t i o n which i s based upon the a b i l i t y

to prove the e x i s t e n c e o f harm. "We simply say t h a t i n

p r i n c i p l e , the s t a t e cannot be denied the r i g h t to use the

c r i m i n a l law to r e s t r i c t a v a i l a b i l i t y where, i n i t s opinion,

the p o t e n t i a l f o r harm appears t o c a l l f o r such a policy."53

I t appears t h a t the mere o p i n i o n o f the s t a t e w i l l i t s e l f be

a c c e p t a b l e evidence o f harm. And the Commission p r e s e r v e s

the r i g h t o f p a t e r n a l a c t i o n where i n the o p i n i o n of society,

t h e r e i s a p o t e n t i a l f o r harm to the i n d i v i d u a l . "The c r i m i n a l

law should not be used f o r the enforcement o f m o r a l i t y without

r e g a r d to p o t e n t i a l f o r harm. In t h i s sense we s u b s c r i b e t o

what Hart r e f e r s to as the 'moderate t h e s i s ' of L o r d Devlin.

We do not s u b s c r i b e to the 'extreme t h e s i s ' that i t is

a p p r o p r i a t e to use the c r i m i n a l law to enforce morality,

regardless o f the p o t e n t i a l f o r harm to the i n d i v i d u a l o r

society."^^

The statements o f broad p r i n c i p l e made by the L e D a i n

Commission can be summarized as f o l l o w s t

(1) Moral b e l i e f s ought o n l y to be enforced where, i n t e r

alia, there i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence a v a i l a b l e o f p o t e n t i a l o r

actual harm t o i n d i v i d u a l s o r to s o c i e t y .

(2) The o p i n i o n of society i s prima f a c i e evidence o f the

e x i s t e n c e o f a c t u a l o r p o t e n t i a l harm.

_
I b i d . , Para. 442.

5 I b i d . , Para. 444.
4
 Hart s t a t e s t h a t a d e f i n i t e c o n c l u s i o n of Stephen's

arguments''-' (and a p o s s i b l e c o n c l u s i o n of D e v l i n ' s arguments)

i s t h a t "we may make punishable by law a c t i o n s which are con-

demned by s o c i e t y as immoral, even i f they are not harmful."56

Here i s the crux o f l o g i c i n the d e b a t e — w h a t does Hart mean by

"harmful"? He can only mean "cannot be proved to be harmful."

Whereas D e v l i n i s ready to accept the s t r o n g l y h e l d f e e l i n g s of

the m a j o r i t y as evidence o f harm, Hart says t h a t he i s not

(though he does, at l e a s t at one stage, take the f e e l i n g s of

the m a j o r i t y i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n ). ^7

In summary of matters of p r i n c i p l e , the d i f f e r e n c e

between Hart's and D e v l i n ' s views seems to come down to a

d i f f e r e n t onus of proof. Hart appears to say t h a t m o r a l l y

p a t e r n a l a c t i o n i s prima f a c i e not j u s t i f i e d unless s o c i e t y

can show t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n proposed to be inter-

f e r e d w i t h i s harmful to the i n d i v i d u a l or to o t h e r s . How

c o n c l u s i v e l y does s o c i e t y have to prove the harm before the

prima f a c i e r u l e a g a i n s t p a t e r n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e i s d i s p l a c e d ?

A b s o l u t e l y , beyond reasonable doubt, or on the balance of

probabilities? Hart's onus of p r o o f f o r showing harm i s a

s t r i c t e r onus. Hart p u r p o r t s to demand some p h y s i c a l manifes-

t a t i o n of the harm; D e v l i n i s w i l l i n g to accept i n some cases

James Fitzjames Stephen, author o f ' L i b e r t y , E q u a l i t y ,

F r a t e r n i t y , " London, I 8 7 3 .

5 6
Hart ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 36.

5 7
Hart ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 41.
the i n t a n g i b l e o p i n i o n o f common m o r a l i t y . In o t h e r words,

reason, "when g i v e n no more a s s i s t a n c e from e m p i r i c a l evidence,

ought to c a l l upon f e e l i n g s to a s s i s t i n the decision-making

process." But Hart would say "No—where the e m p i r i c a l evidence

a v a i l a b l e does not l e a d us to a d e c i s i o n , we should not call

upon c a p r i c i o u s f e e l i n g s ; i n s t e a d we ought to base our d e c i s i o n

upon the e x i s t i n g presumption t h a t i n d i v i d u a l freedom should

prevail." Thus the e x i s t i n g presumption predetermines the

d e c i s i o n i n a l l d i f f i c u l t or c o n t e n t i o u s cases. T h i s means t h a t

a decision,Lstill based upon f e e l i n g s and v a l u e s , i s made e a r l -

i e r and l e s s o v e r t l y i n our r e a s o n i n g process i n the form of a

value-laden presumption.

Hart has d i f f i c u l t i e s i n rationally sustaining his

o b j e c t i o n s to the use o f f e e l i n g s as evidence o f harm to

s o c i e t y or to an i n d i v i d u a l . He notes t h a t a breach of moral-

i t y as such assumes a p u b l i c nature when i t i s harmful to

others as i t then becomes a n u i s a n c e . ^ When e m p i r i c a l evi-

dence o f harm to the i n d i v i d u a l i s i n s u f f i c i e n t , t h e r e may be

s u f f i c i e n t evidence when the mere immorality a f f e c t s o t h e r s .

"...If, i n the case of bigamy, the law i n t e r v e n e s i n o r d e r to

p r o t e c t r e l i g i o u s s e n s i b i l i t i e s from outrage by a p u b l i c a c t ,

the b i g a m i s t i s punished n e i t h e r as i r r e l i g i o u s nor as immoral

but as a n u i s a n c e . " 5 9 T h i s f u r t h e r supports the argument

Hart, ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 41.

5 9
I b i d . , p. 41.
that j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the l i b e r t y of the

i n d i v i d u a l ' s moral a c t i o n depends upon the a v a i l a b i l i t y of

empirical evidence o f harm to the a c t o r or to o t h e r s . Hart,

pursuant to M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e , 6 0
wishes to l i m i t the ground

f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e to those cases where there i s empirical

evidence o f harm to o t h e r s . But the example o f bigamy b e i n g

a case where there i s predominantly a nuisance to others makes

us wonder how easy i t w i l l be to f i n d elements of nuisance or

harm to others i n any a c t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l . I f you look

f a r enough you can convert every " p r i v a t e " act into a "public"

act as every p r i v a t e act at l e a s t a f f e c t s a person's a t t i t u d e s

61

as a member o f s o c i e t y . For example, Graham Hughes, while

d i s c u s s i n g the f a c t t h a t consent i s not a defence to assault

causing grievous b o d i l y harm remarks how the concept o f p u b l i c

harm can e q u a l l y w e l l be useddas a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s

p a r t i c u l a r imposition upon i n d i v i d u a l freedom. On i t s face,

the n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y of the defence o f consent would appear to

be predominantly p r o t e c t i n g the i n d i v i d u a l from h i m s e l f . How-

ever " p u b l i c " harm a l s o e x i s t s because

(a) there i s the general l o s s to s o c i e t y of the services

o f the v i c t i m when s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm i s i n f l i c t e d ,

(b) there i s a consequent p o s s i b l e i m p o s i t i o n on the

public charge,
6-0 —
See footnote number 20.

6 l
71 Yale Law Journal, 1 9 6 1 - 6 2 , p. 662 at 670.
 (c) the a c t o r may become p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y a d d i c t e d to

harming o t h e r s ,

(d) s o c i e t y i s offended because i t f e e l s that consent

to a s e r i o u s i n j u r y i s wrong.

The d i f f e r e n c e between a p r i v a t e and a p u b l i c a c t i s

u l t i m a t e l y o n l y a matter o f degree. But perhaps we can d e f i n e

a p r i v a t e a c t as one which predominantly a f f e c t s the a c t o r and

a p u b l i c a c t as one which predominantly a f f e c t s people other

than the a c t o r . F o l l o w i n g these d e f i n i t i o n s i t i s d i f f i c u l t

to agree w i t h Hart t h a t bigamy i s a crime because i t pre-

dominantly harms others by b e i n g a nuisance to t h e i r feelings.

John S t u a r t M i l l attempted to f a c e t h i s problem of every

p r i v a t e a c t c o n t a i n i n g some element of p u b l i c e f f e c t and con-

cluded t h a t he would p r e f e r open p a t e r n a l i s m r a t h e r than

p a t e r n a l i s m hidden behind a f a l s e d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c

and p r i v a t e effect.

"The d i s t i n c t i o n here p o i n t e d out between

the p a r t o f a person's l i f e which concerns
only h i m s e l f , and t h a t which concerns o t h e r s ,
many persons w i l l r e f u s e to admit. How ( i t
may be asked) can any p a r t of the conduct of
a member of s o c i e t y be a matter o f i n d i f f e r e n c e
to the o t h e r members? No person i s an e n t i r e l y
i s o l a t e d being; i t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r a person
to do a n y t h i n g s e r i o u s l y or permanently h u r t -
f u l to h i m s e l f , without m i s c h i e f r e a c h i n g at
l e a s t to h i s near c o n n e c t i o n s , and o f t e n f a r
beyond them.

In l i k e manner, when a person d i s a b l e s

h i m s e l f , by conduct p u r e l y s e l f - r e g a r d i n g ,
from the performance of some d e f i n i t e duty
incumbent on him to the p u b l i c , he i s g u i l t y
of a s o c i a l o f f e n c e . No person ought to be
punished simply f o r b e i n g drunk; but a s o l d i e r
or a policeman should be punished f o r b e i n g
drunk on duty. Whenever, i n s h o r t , there i s
 a d e f i n i t e damage, o r a d e f i n i t e r i s k of
damage, e i t h e r to an i n d i v i d u a l o r to the
p u b l i c , the case i s taken out o f the pro-
v i n c e of l i b e r t y and p l a c e d i n t h a t o f
m o r a l i t y or law.

But w i t h r e g a r d to the merely c o n t i n g e n t ,

or, as i t may be c a l l e d , c o n s t r u c t i v e i n j u r y
which a person causes to s o c i e t y , by conduct
which n e i t h e r v i o l a t e s any s p e c i f i c duty to
the p u b l i c , nor o c c a s i o n s p e r c e p t i b l e hurt
to any a s s i g n a b l e i n d i v i d u a l except h i m s e l f ;
the inconvenience i s one which s o c i e t y can
a f f o r d to bear f o r the sake o f the g r e a t e r
good o f human freedom. I f grown persons are
to be punished f o r not t a k i n g proper care o f
themselves, I would r a t h e r i t were f o r t h e i r
own sake, than under pretense o f p r e v e n t i n g
them from i m p a i r i n g t h e i r c a p a c i t y o f render-
i n g to s o c i e t y b e n e f i t s which s o c i e t y does
not pretend i t has the r i g h t to exact."62

M i l l ' s answer echoes i n the realms o f the common law o f neg-

ligence. But i t s t i l l begs the q u e s t i o n f o r o n l y w i t h c e r t a i n

kinds o f moral a c t s does an i n d i v i d u a l owe a s p e c i f i c duty o f

care to h i s neighbour. N a t u r a l l y , s o c i e t y should o n l y

i n t e r f e r e where the i n d i v i d u a l has a s p e c i f i c duty o f care and

breaks i t . To complete the c i r c l e - - w h e n does an individual

owe a moral duty o f care to h i s neighbour? He owes a duty o f

care to h i s neighbour i n those cases where h i s moral a c t i o n or

i n a c t i o n w i l l predominantly a f f e c t o t h e r s , t h a t i s , where h i s

moral a c t i o n i s o f a p u b l i c n a t u r e . Once a g a i n we see how the

" s o l u t i o n s " to a c o n f l i c t have the unfortunate h a b i t o f r e -

s t a t i n g the whole problem.

John S ^ a r t M i l 1
a t p. 136 and p. 1 3 8 . See f o o t n o t e
 In summary, d e s p i t e Hart's i n i t i a l proposal to apply

Mill's principle of l i b e r t y to d e c i s i o n s concerning the enforce-

ment o f m o r a l i t y , we soon f i n d t h a t M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e i s stretch-

ed beyond r e c o g n i t i o n . Hart's nuisance t e s t and example o f

bigamy^ 3
b l u r the a l r e a d y awkward d i s t i n c t i o n so important

f o r h i s argument between p r i v a t e and p u b l i c harm. Mill

r e a l i z e d t h a t unless the d i s t i n c t i o n between p r i v a t e and p u b l i c

could be r a t i o n a l l y preserved, h i s whole p r i n c i p l e was consid-

e r a b l y weakened as a means of a s s i s t i n g the decision-maker.

The essence o f M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e would then become a p l e a to us

"to t h i n k i t p o s s i b l e t h a t we may be m i s t a k e n . B e h i n d Hart's

pronounced d i s t i n c t i o n between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e , we f i n d that

the r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n l i e s between p r i v a t e concepts o f r i g h t

and wrong.

Hart ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 41.

D e v l i n , p. 121.
 VALUE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HART AND DEVLIN

I t i s important to remember t h a t the H a r t - D e v l i n debate

aimed at p r o v i d i n g c l e a r g u i d e l i n e s and principles for decision

making i n matters concerning the enforcement of morals. What

p r i n c i p l e s emerge from the debate to a s s i s t i n answering the

question "what should I do?" Unfortunately, the p r i n c i p l e s

which emerge are so i n c o n c l u s i v e as g u i d e l i n e s t h a t one main

l e s s o n i s to beware o f r e l y i n g a b s o l u t e l y upon s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e s .

The d i f f e r e n c e between the views of Hart and D e v l i n emerges as

a d i f f e r e n c e of value r a t h e r than of p r i n c i p l e . In t h i s context

a " p r i n c i p l e " i s used i n the sense of a p r o p o s i t i o n which can be

objectively judged as true or f a l s e and which can be applied

to a s e t of f a c t s and a conclusion? be l o g i c a l l y deduced. The

essence o f a p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t i t purports to be l o g i c a l and

scientific i n the e x p l a n a t i o n of i t s existence and a p p l i c a t i o n .

A "value" i s a p r o p o s i t i o n , i d e a or a t t i t u d e which i s b e l i e v e d

i n of i t s e l f q u i t e independently of e m p i r i c a l or l o g i c a l proof.

For the purpose of a n a l y s i s , here i s a s i n g l e p r i n c i p l e which

i s an attempt to amalgamate both s i d e s of the debate. (This

by no means " s o l v e s " the debate but merely s t a t e s a common

p r i n c i p l e so t h a t we can recapture c l a r i t y and i d e n t i f y the real

place o f disagreement.) " S o c i e t y should not i n t e r f e r e with

the freedom o f a c t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l unless he i s causing

harm to h i m s e l f or to o t h e r s . " The r e a l d i f f e r e n c e i s that

Hart s e t s out a s t r i c t e r onus o f proof to rebut the basic

presumption o f n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e . ^ Why? Hart p r o t e c t s individ-

55
See previous comment on p.24.
ual freedom b a s i c a l l y because o f a d i f f e r e n t value preference

and because o f h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t t h i s p r e f e r r e d value shall

predominate u n t i l d i s p l a c e d by s u f f i c i e n t e m p i r i c a l evidence.

Hart c l e a r l y s t a t e s , "I have a l s o assumed from the beginning

t h a t anyone who regards t h i s q u e s t i o n as open to discussion

n e c e s s a r i l y accepts the c r i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e , c e n t r a l to a l l

m o r a l i t y , t h a t human misery and the r e s t r i c t i o n o f freedom

are e v i l s ; f o r t h a t i s why the l e g a l enforcement of m o r a l i t y

c a l l s f o r " j u s t i f i c a t i o n " i n the form o f the wishes of the

common m o r a l i t y . " 6 6
B l a c k s h i e l d a l s o comes to t h i s conclusion

when he says t h a t "He (Hart) r e l i e s u l t i m a t e l y on two deep

interdependent c o n v i c t i o n s which are beyond u t i l i t a r i a n or

even r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . One i s that i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y

i s an absolute e t h i c a l value; the other i s the p r i n c i p l e

o f j u s t i c e t h a t any p u n i t i v e or other l e g a l e n t e r p r i s e which

cuts down t h i s absolute value r e q u i r e s to be justified." ''' 6

The declared reason f o r Hart's value preference i s the fact

t h a t the m a j o r i t y w i l l enforce p r e j u d i c e d moral o p i n i o n s upon

f,P>
the minority.
Does Hart value i n d i v i d u a l freedom more h i g h l y than

Devlin? Yes--to the extent t h a t he i s more p r o t e c t i v e of that

value. But i t i s obvious that a great p a r t o f Devlin's

6 6
'Hart, (1963), p. 82.
67
A.R. B l a c k s h i e l d , §. Sydney Law Review, 1 9 6 5 - 6 7 ,
p. 441 at 4 5 0 .
68
Hart's value presumption r e c e i v e s s t r o n g support from
Ronald Dworkin—See The New York Review Dec. 17, 1970. A special
Supplement "Taking Rights S e r i o u s l y . " Dworkin argues t h a t where
the b a s i c r i g h t of i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s i n v o l v e d , the government
cannot conduct experiments of d e p r i v a t i o n based upon f e a r s and
f e e l i n g s ; i t must o n l y a c t to l i m i t t h a t r i g h t upon e m p i r i c a l
evidence t h a t the e x e r c i s e of the r i g h t i s c a u s i n g harm.
 o r i g i n a l essay 7
emphasises the importance of individual

freedom. Then where did the d i f f e r e n t v a l u e p r e f e r e n c e s come

from? We can l o o k f o r answers i n education, psychology and

sociology. In f a c t , a t one p o i n t , Hart remarks t h a t there i s

a p e r s i s t e n t philosophy among E n g l i s h judges when d e a l i n g w i t h

the c r i m i n a l law but then he says "These a r e s o c i o l o g i c a l

q u e s t i o n s o f great importance but as they are not the s u b j e c t

of this lecture I will spare you my amateur s p e c u l a t i o n s on

70

these t o p i c s . " ' But we can s p e c u l a t e i n amateur f a s h i o n t h a t

Hart as an i n t e l l e c t u a l i s l o a t h to openly admit t h a t such a

vital v a l u e as i n d i v i d u a l freedom should be l e f t to the whims

of common m o r a l i t y . I t i s a p p a r e n t l y an a b d i c a t i o n o f reason

to mere f e e l i n g s . And y e t i n the course o f h i s c r i t i c a l

a n a l y s i s , he concludes i n a d i s g u i s e d manner t h a t f e e l i n g s

are and ought to be one c o n s i d e r a t i o n when making d e c i s i o n s

about i n d i v i d u a l moral freedom.? 1

The d i f f e r e n c e i n v a l u e s i s

i n d i c a t e d by the u n d i s g u i s e d and b l a t a n t manner i n which D e v l i n ,

a judge w e l l acquainted w i t h the h a b i t s o f j u r i e s , a s s e r t s

t h a t common m o r a l i t y ought to be an important guide to the

q u e s t i o n o f whether c e r t a i n moral standards should be enforced.

It i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n s t y l e o f l i f e as much as a d i f f e r e n c e i n

v a l u e s — t h e y p l a y the r o l e s o f the P r o g r e s s i v e I n t e l l e c t u a l

versus the S o l i d E s t a b l i s h m e n t . D e v l i n ' s theory i s t h a t o f a

D e v l i n , p. 16-20.
7
°Hart (1965), p. 36
7 1
Hart (1963), p. 41.
p r a c t i s i n g judge and t h e r e f o r e does n o t a s p i r e as high as the

more i d e a l i s t i c Hart. Devlin's a t t i t u d e seems to be t h a t human

beings, who f e a r e x p l o i t a t i o n and d e s i r e a secure and e f f i c i e n t

government, w i l l t r y t o prevent i n d i v i d u a l freedom predominat-

i n g over the wishes o f the m a j o r i t y . T h i s Hobbesian a t t i t u d e

shows h i s doubts t h a t i n d i v i d u a l men are c o n s i s t e n t l y capable

of r e a c h i n g a l e v e l o f moral i n t e g r i t y . Devlin casts

innuendos about the f a i t h o f p h i l o s o p h e r s i n the moral i n t e g -

r i t y of minority groups. He says t h a t " s o c i a l reformers are

not as p a t i e n t as p h i l o s o p h e r s and we have not waited f o r

minority groups to a t t a i n moral i n t e g r i t y " ' ' 72

a n c i that those

who over-emphasise i n d i v i d u a l freedom f a i l to r e a l i z e that

"the pimps l e a d i n g the weak a s t r a y f a r outnumber s p i r i t u a l

explorers at the head o f the strong."'' 3

Devlin's theory

purports to be a p r a c t i c a l and workable moral theory f o r

fallible human beings. In h i s words, "For b e t t e r o r worse the

law-maker must a c t a c c o r d i n g to h i s l i g h t s and he cannot there-

f o r e accept M i l l ' s d o c t r i n e as p r a c t i c a b l e even i f as an i d e a l

he thought to to be d e s i r a b l e . " ' ' ^ Devlin's arguments seem to

be both dangerous to i n d i v i d u a l freedom and to present a

challenge to the process o f i n t e l l e c t u a l decision-making. But

Hart's c r i t i c i s m s , upon a n a l y s i s , o n l y confirm that there are

72
D e v l i n , p. 1 0 5 .

73
Ibid p. 108.

I b i d . , p. 1 2 3 .
c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s upon the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s c i e n t i f i c ration-

a l i s m and n a t u r a l i s m i n the area o f moral d e c i s i o n . ? 5 "Hart i s

left ( l i k e D e v l i n ) f i n a l l y able to t e l l us o n l y what he b e l i e v e s .

He cannot t e l l us why. And t h i s i s o n l y another way of saying

that when i t comes to " j u s t i c e " , n e i t h e r judges nor philosophers

q u i t e know what to do."76

As I have concluded t h a t the r e a l crux of the debate i s

a d i f f e r e n c e of v a l u e s , then I should at l e a s t attempt to

i d e n t i f y these v a l u e s . T h i s i s not an easy t a s k . It i s

d i f f i c u l t to d e f i n e e x a c t l y what v a l u e s D e v l i n i s s u p p o r t i n g

as he p u r p o r t e d l y argues f o r procedure r a t h e r than substance.

That i s , i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , he argues t h a t s t r o n g l y h e l d

p u b l i c o p i n i o n , almost r e g a r d l e s s o f content o r substance, ought

to be enforced. Presumably p u b l i c o p i n i o n tends to embody

t r a d i t i o n a l moral v a l u e s , c l i n g s to s e c u r i t y and i s slow to

embrace any r a d i c a l change. When there i s c o n f l i c t , tradition

and p u b l i c o p i n i o n are to be p r e f e r r e d over s o c i a l changes

and i n d i v i d u a l wishes. The d i f f e r e n c e of v a l u e s between Hart

and D e v l i n i s o n l y a matter o f degree and discovering that

d i f f e r e n c e i s rendered d i f f i c u l t by the s i m i l a r statements

made by both o f them. For example, i n a l a t e r essay, Devlin

says t h a t "the t r u e mark o f a f r e e s o c i e t y " i s t h a t " a u t h o r i t y

77

should be a grant and l i b e r t y not a p r i v i l e g e . " This s t a t e -

—
See Ekman—Readings i n the Problems of E t h i c s , p. 78.
? 6
B l a c k s h i e l d at p. 453.

77
ment, t o g e t h e r w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s q u a l i f y i n g the f e e l i n g s

t e s t , are v e r y r e m i n i s c e n t of Hart's whole argument. Hart

p l a c e s a h i g h e r prima f a c i e value upon the freedom and right

o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l and a l e s s e r value on

t r a d i t i o n and p u b l i c o p i n i o n . An important difference i n

a t t i t u d e which has been p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d 78

i s the different

b e l i e f concerning the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the average individual

r e a c h i n g a l e v e l of moral u p r i g h t n e s s . Some i n s i g h t i n t o the

thought process o f Hart can be gained from h i s book "The

Concept o f Law".'' Hart observes

79
t h a t s o c i a l acceptance pre-

dominates i n p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s as a source of a u t h o r i t y

whereas o r g a n i z e d a u t h o r i t y predominates i n more h i g h l y develop-

ed s o c i e t i e s . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s expressed i n terms o f

c o n t r a s t between primary r u l e s of o b l i g a t i o n and secondary

r u l e s of r e c o g n i t i o n . Hart argues that the r u l e s of s o c i a l

acceptance which predominate i n p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s have the

Rn

d e f e c t s o f u n c e r t a i n t y , u n c h a n g e a b i l i t y and inefficiency.

By h i s a n a l y s i s , the remedy f o r these d e f e c t s i s to have second-

ary r u l e s empowering i n d i v i d u a l s to make a u t h o r i t a t i v e de-

t e r m i n a t i o n s or to have secondary r u l e s to determine which of

the primary r u l e s are a u t h o r i t a t i v e . Thus both historically

and l o g i c a l l y , Hart argues t h a t norms of behaviour need some-

t h i n g more than s o c i a l acceptance before they can be considered

_
See p r e v i o u s page 33•
79
H.L.A. Hart, "The Concept of Law", 1961.
I b i d . , pp. 9 0 - 9 2 .
to be law. They must be converted to secondary r u l e s by some

a u t h o r i t a t i v e body which i s i t s e l f governed by secondary

rules. T r a n s p o s i n g these ideas i n t o t h i s debate, i t follows

then that i n Hart's o p i n i o n the b e l i e f s o f the p u b l i c are not

c e r t a i n , f l e x i b l e or e f f i c i e n t enough to amount to secondary

r u l e s and t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n alone i s not an a u t h o r i t a t i v e

source of law.

I t i s h e l p f u l to l o o k at the debate i n the l i g h t of

t r a d i t i o n a l s c h o o l s o f l e g a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought. The

arguments o f both Hart and D e v l i n r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n t themes

and i t i s e a s i e r to i d e n t i f y where each stands historically

than i t i s to s t a t e e x a c t l y what i n n e r v a l u e s each one holds.

In the w r i t i n g s of Rousseau^ 1
some of the paradoxes of juris-

prudence and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y become apparent and i t is

w i t h i n one o f these paradoxes t h a t the a t t i t u d e s taken by

Hart and D e v l i n can be l o c a t e d . Rousseau's theory i s s u b j e c t

to many i n t e r n a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and he can be quoted to support

almost any school o f thought. T h i s i s p a r t l y because he

attempted to r e c o n c i l e the n a t u r a l r i g h t s and freedom of man

w i t h a b s o l u t e government by the people. T h i s attempt failed

and as a r e s u l t Rousseau concluded w i t h p a r a d o x i c a l statements

such as "whoever s h a l l r e f u s e to obey the general w i l l must be

c o n s t r a i n e d by the whole body o f h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s to do sos

81
Rousseau, "The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t " , Oxford University
P r e s s , Ed. Barker..
which i s no more than t o say t h a t i t may be necessary to
Op

compel a man to be f r e e . ' Firstly, one v i t a l i s s u e which

emerges from Rousseau's w r i t i n g i s the t r a d i t i o n a l problem

of who ought to be s o v e r e i g n i n s o c i e t y , a wise d i c t a t o r o r

p u b l i c opinion? He attempted t o answer t h i s q u e s t i o n by

d e v e l o p i n g a concept o f the i d e a l "general w i l l " o f the people.

However he was never able t o f u l l y e x p l a i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p

between the mysterious general w i l l and the a c t u a l w i l l o r

p u b l i c o p i n i o n o f the people. When faced w i t h the constant

problem o f the a c t u a l w i l l f a i l i n g to r e f l e c t the i d e a l general

will, Rousseau opted to take the r i s k o f a p p o i n t i n g an i n t e r i m

d i c t a t o r as s o v e r e i g n . T h i s Wise L e g i s l a t o r would p e r s o n a l l y

decide upon and enforce the general w i l l u n t i l the p u b l i c

understood the general w i l l and embodied i t i n t h e i r o p i n i o n s .

In Rousseau's words,
The general w i l l i s always r i g h t , but the
judgement g u i d i n g i t i s not always w e l l
informed. I t must be made to see t h i n g s as
they are, sometimes as they ought to be. I t
must be shown how to a t t a i n the good i t seeks,
must be p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t the temptations
inherent i n p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s . . . I n d i v i d -
u a l s see the good which they r e j e c t ; the
p u b l i c d e s i r e s the good which i t does not
see. Both, e q u a l l y are i n need o f guidance...
That i s why a l e g i s l a t o r i s a n e c e s s i t y . 8 3

T h i s i s a l s o the o p i n i o n t h a t Hart has chosen though he does

not d i s c u s s h i s d i c t a t o r , wise l e g i s l a t o r o r wise judge. At

£2
I b i d . , p. 184.

8 3
I b i d . , p. 204.
one p o i n t Hart acknowledges t h a t "a u t i l i t a r i a n " w i l l have to

apply c r i t i c a l m o r a l i t y i n order to determine what r u l e s o f

84

m o r a l i t y ought to be e n f o r c e d . He g i v e s a h i n t o f how

important wise judges are to h i s theory i n h i s book "The

Concept o f Law." There, w h i l e r e f e r r i n g to the use o f a

judicial statement as an a u t h o r i t a t i v e guide to the r u l e s ,

Hart makes the statement t h a t "the r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h i s must

f l u c t u a t e both w i t h the s k i l l o f the i n t e r p r e t e r and the

c o n s i s t e n c y o f the j u d g e s . " 5 8
Hart l a y s down the p r i n c i p l e

of l i b e r t y as a g u i d e l i n e f o r moral government and t h i s

p r i n c i p l e i s i n essence p a r t o f the general w i l l o r a p a r t o f

the concept o f j u s t i c e . Now as l o n g as Hart can p e r s o n a l l y

stay a l i v e to i n t e r p r e t t h i s p r i n c i p l e , a l l w i l l be w e l l .

However, i n e v i t a b l y he must face the problem of finding

i n c o r r u p t i b l e P l a t o n i c judges to i n t e r p r e t and enforce

c o r r e c t l y t h i s p a r t o f the general w i l l . T h i s i s an awesome

task f o r i n Rousseau's words "there i s needed a s u p e r i o r

i n t e l l i g e n c e which can survey a l l the passions o f mankind,

though i t s e l f exposed to none: an i n t e l l i g e n c e having no

contact w i t h our nature, y e t knowing i t to the f u l l . " 8 6

If

Hart o f f e r s us a l e s s e r man then he i s immediately s u b j e c t

to the same c r i t i c i s m s which he d i r e c t e d a t D e v l i n ' s theory

of government by p u b l i c o p i n i o n . These c r i t i c i s m s would be

—j.
Hart ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 2 3 .
H a r t , "The Concept o f Law"$ p. 95.
8 5

86 -
Rousseau, "The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t " , p. 204.
such as "Why should the p r e j u d i c e s and b i g o t r y o f a f a l l i b l e

human being be made s o v e r e i g n i n s o c i e t y ? " and "How do we know

t h a t the c o r r u p t i b l e i n d i v i d u a l i n c o n t r o l w i l l govern wisely?"

Hart could r e p l y t h a t t h i s wise l e g i s l a t o r w i l l be c o n t r o l l e d

to a c e r t a i n extent by such r u l e s as M i l l ' s p r i n c i p l e o f

liberty. However we have a l r e a d y noted 8 7

how such moral p r i n -

c i p l e s need t o be c o n t i n u a l l y r e f e r r e d to t h e i r author f o r

substantive meaning and i n v o l v e a very wide and i n t e r p r e t a t i v e

d i s c r e t i o n based u l t i m a t e l y upon personal v a l u e s . When d i s -

i l l u s i o n e d w i t h t h e search f o r i n c o r r u p t i b l e l e g a l guardians

to i n t e r p r e t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f l i b e r t y , Hart, l i k e P l a t o i n his
oo

l a t e r years, would be compelled to enumerate d e t a i l e d rules

to e x p l a i n the meaning o f j u s t i c e as embodied i n t h a t principle. 9 8

D e v l i n has taken the o t h e r p p o s s i b l e path which branches

o f f from the mysterious r e l a t i o n s h i p between Rousseau's general

w i l l and the a c t u a l w i l l o f the people. T h i s course i s a l s o

a p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous one i n i t s pure form and i s a l s o

mystifying i n any m o d i f i e d form. In the realm o f moral govern-

ment, D e v l i n , w i t h some h e s i t a n c y , 9 0
i s w i l l i n g t o take the

r i s k t h a t the a c t u a l w i l l o f the people w i l l r e f l e c t substan-

t i a l l y the i d e a l general w i l l . He s p e c i f i c a l l y r e j e c t s the

concept o f s o v e r e i g n t y v e s t e d i n a P l a t o n i c e l i t e as he b e l i e v e s

7
S e e p r e v i o u s p. 14.
8 8
Plato, "The Laws"
89
See John Hospers, "An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o P h i l o s o p h i c a l
A n a l y s i s " , pp. 449-494 f o r . a d i s c u s s i o n o f the problems o f
d e f i n i n g e t h i c a l terms i n n o n - e t h i c a l language.
9
° S e e p r e v i o u s pp. 11-12.
t h a t the r i s k o f i n j u s t i c e i s g r e a t e r i n t h a t case than where

s o v e r e i g n t y i s vested i n p u b l i c o p i n i o n . "The P l a t o n i c i d e a l i s

t h a t the s t a t e e x i s t s to promote v i r t u e among i t s c i t i z e n s .

I f t h a t i s i t s f u n c t i o n , then whatever power i s s o v e r e i g n i n

the S t a t e — a n a u t o c r a t , i f there be one, o r i n a democracy

the m a j o r i t y — m u s t have the r i g h t and duty to d e c l a r e what

standards o f m o r a l i t y a r e to be observed as v i r t u o u s and must

a s c e r t a i n them as t h i n k s b e s t . T h i s i s not a c c e p t a b l e to

Anglo-American thought. I t i n v e s t s the State w i t h power o f

d e t e r m i n a t i o n between good and e v i l , d e s t r o y s freedom o f

91

conscience and i s the paved road t o tyranny." It i s interest-

ing to see t h a t both Hart and D e v l i n a r e f e a r f u l o f the same

danger, the p o s s i b i l i t y o f tyranny i f either public opinion or

an i n d i v i d u a l are g i v e n a b s o l u t e a u t h o r i t y . Devlin considers

p u b l i c o p i n i o n to be a l e s s e r e v i l . " S o c i e t y must be the judge

of what i s necessary to i t s own i n t e g r i t y i f only because there

i s no other t r i b u n a l to which the q u e s t i o n can be submitted.

T h i s i s the choice t h a t Rousseau would l i k e to have made and i n

f a c t some o f h i s w r i t i n g s give us the c o n f u s i n g impression t h a t

he d i d make p u b l i c o p i n i o n the supreme a u t h o r i t y i n s o c i e t y .

For example i n "The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t " he said

To these t h r e e kinds o f law a f o u r t h should
be added and i t i s the most important o f
them a l l . I t i s to be found not graven on

— _
D e v l i n , p. 89.

9 2
I b i d . , p. 118.
 p i l l a r s of marble or p l a t e s of bronze
but i n the hearts of the c i t i z e n s . It
i s the true f o u n d a t i o n on which the State
i s b u i l t , and grows d a i l y i n importance.
When other laws become o l d and f e e b l e i t
b r i n g s them new l i f e or f i l l s the gaps
they l e a v e untenanted. I t maintains a
People i n the s p i r i t of t h e i r Founder,
and a l l unnoticed, s u b s t i t u t e s f o r
a u t h o r i t y the f o r c e of h a b i t . I r e f e r to
manners, customs and above a l l , o p i n i o n .
T h i s i s a f i e l d unknown to our p o l i t i c i a n s
yet on these t h i n g s depend the success of
a l l the r e s t . 9 3

However Rousseau u l t i m a t e l y sees the n e c e s s i t y f o r an i n t e r i m

wise l e g i s l a t o r as he observed how o f t e n i n j u s t i c e and ignorance

went hand-in-hand w i t h the r u l e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n . Devlin faces

the same problem and cannot guarantee t h a t the a c t u a l w i l l or

p u b l i c o p i n i o n w i l l be uncorrupted. Unlike Rousseau, he has

no s t a t e d p o l i c y of education or reform other than references

to the need f o r r e l i g i o u s f a i t h to provide a base f o r moral

conviction. He states that "No s o c i e t y has y e t solved the

problem o f how to each m o r a l i t y without r e l i g i o n . So the law

must base i t s e l f on C h r i s t i a n morals and to the l i m i t o f i t s

a b i l i t y enforce them..." 7
D e v l i n a l s o exhorts p u b l i c opinion

to be c a r e f u l and to r e f l e c t upon the importance o f i n d i v i d u a l

moral freedom before a c t i n g to r e s t r i c t t h i s freedom. -* 9

i n

other words, he i s r e l y i n g upon the wisdom of the p u b l i c and

the a u t h o r i t y o f t h e i r r e l i g i o u s f a i t h to embody j u s t i c e i n

93
"The S o c i a l Contract" p. 220.
94
D e v l i n , p. 25.
public opinion. And i n any case, i n a democracy, i t i s a

l e s s e r e v i l f o r i n j u s t i c e to be i n f l i c t e d by p u b l i c o p i n i o n

than i t i s f o r i n j u s t i c e to be i n f l i c t e d by an i n d i v i d u a l or

elite group.

Where D e v l i n ' s theory s u f f e r s from the p o t e n t i a l i n -

j u s t i c e s i n f l i c t e d by the enforcement of p u b l i c o p i n i o n ,

Hart's theory i s s u b j e c t to the p o t e n t i a l i n j u s t i c e s inflicted

by the "wise" i n d i v i d u a l or P l a t o n i c e l i t e which i n t e r p r e t s

the meaning o f phrases such as " i n d i v i d u a l freedom" and "harm"

to others". I f we i n t e r p r e t D e v l i n ' s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to the

f e e l i n g s t e s t as b e i n g s u b s t a n t i v e , i n s t e a d o f merely procedural, 9 6

then D e v l i n a l s o f a c e s the same problem as Hart, t h a t i s f i n d i n g .

a wise r u l e r to i n t e r p r e t the substance o f the qualifications.

I f the p e r s o n a l v a l u e s and wisdom of the wise l e g i s l a t o r are

s u b j e c t to appeal or c o r r e c t i o n , then who i s to make up the

appeal court? I f the appeal i s based upon p u b l i c o p i n i o n then

we f i n d o u r s e l v e s d i s c u s s i n g the other broad p h i l o s o p h i c a l

school o f which D e v l i n i s a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . In t h i s school,

ultimate sovereignty i s invested i n p u b l i c opinion. It i s

immediately apparent how e a s i l y one school of thought r e f e r s

to the other a p p a r e n t l y opposing school i n an attempt to c r e a t e

a more j u s t theory o f law and government. However, the search

for j u s t i c e means t h a t the t h e o r i e s l o s e coherence. Thus Hart

f i n d s h i m s e l f unavoidably r e f e r r i n g to p u b l i c o p i n i o n as a

See previous d i s c u s s i o n on p.l5»

source o f a u t h o r i t y 9 7
though i n general he d e c l a r e s the poten-

tial e v i l s of enforcing public opinion. Also D e v l i n , like

Rousseau, could have c a l l e d upon a wise l e g i s l a t o r to l i b e r a t e

p u b l i c o p i n i o n by a p p l y i n g a s t a t e d concept o f m o r a l i t y o r

n a t u r a l law. But D e v l i n i s u n e a s i l y r e c o n c i l e d to h i s own

theory t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n ought to govern without any pre-

condition of justice. I t i s o n l y when he r e a l i z e s the extremes

of i n j u s t i c e l a t e n t i n a s t r i c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f h i s theory

t h a t he t r i e s to s l i p a c r o s s i n t o the r e a s s u r i n g system o f

a u t h o r i t y under a wise l e g i s l a t o r . Hart s u f f e r s from the same

problem. As Rousseau created a m b i g u i t i e s i n h i s theory by

t r y i n g to r e c o n c i l e these two p o s s i b l e s o v e r e i g n s , so both Hart

and Devlin create s i m i l a r ambiguities i n t h e i r own t h e o r i e s .

U l t i m a t e l y , a u t h o r i t y must r e s t w i t h a s i n g l e s o v e r e i g n and

it appears t h a t u l t i m a t e l y D e v l i n choses p u b l i c o p i n i o n and

Hart chooses a wise l e g i s l a t o r . Hart o n l y r e f e r s i n p a s s i n g to

the problem o f who would be u l t i m a t e s o v e r e i g n i n his theory 9 8

99

and would probably t r y to a v o i d the c o n c l u s i o n reached here. 7

The debate can be placed i n a second broad category o f

i n t e l l e c t u a l thought which f o l l o w s on d i r e c t l y from the para-

d o x i c a l answers g i v e n t o the q u e s t i o n o f "Who ought to be

sovereign i n society?" T h i s category d e a l s with the t r a d i t i o n a l

antinomy between c o l l e c t i v i s m and i n d i v i d u a l i s m and asks the

97

Hart (1963), pp. 41 and 5 1 .

I b i d . , p. 80.
99
See p.39 concerning the d i f f i c u l t y o f r e a c h i n g any o l h e r
conclusion.
question "Which i s more important, the i n d i v i d u a l or the

community?" "Whether the i n d i v i d u a l or the community i s the

ultimate value i s a problem which was studied in a l l its

p r i n c i p a l a s p e c t s by Greek p h i l o s o p h e r s . To the issues as

formulated by P l a t o , A r i s t o t l e and the S t o i c s thousands of

years have added an i n f i n i t e number of i l l u s t r a t i o n s and

v a r i a t i o n s but l i t t l e that i s e s s e n t i a l l y new." 100

Attempts

to combine i n d i v i d u a l autonomy w i t h the s u p e r i o r power of

the community to create a coherent l e g a l theory have always

failed. For example, the t h e o r i e s of both Locke and Rousseau

fail to e x p l a i n how the supreme r i g h t s of the m a j o r i t y can be

r e c o n c i l e d w i t h the i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s of the i n d i v i d u a l .

Ultimately, i n every theory of government, e i t h e r the i n d i v i d u a l

o r the community w i l l p r e v a i l . Duguit's theory of law reaches

a c o l l e c t i v i s t conclusion s i m i l a r to the theme of Devlin's

essay. He says t h a t a " r u l e o f law e x i s t s whenever the mass of

i n d i v i d u a l s composing the group understands and admits that a

r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t the v i o l a t i o n o f the r u l e can be socially

1 01

organized." Such t h e o r i e s as t h a t of D e v l i n ' s are open to

the c r i t i c i s m that they may f o l l o w the course of Neo-Hegelian

philosophy. Certain philosophers w r i t i n g a f t e r Hegel's death

g l o r i f i e d the a b s t r a c t i d e a l o f the s t a t e w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t

102
the i n d i v i d u a l was rendered u t t e r l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t . This
100
W. Friedmann, "Legal Theory", F i f t h E d i t i o n , p. 88.
1 0 1
D u g u i t 2 Columbia L.R. 22 and Friedmann, p. 232.
102
stream o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought has been i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the

extremes o f F a s c i s t I t a l y and Nazi Germany i n the t w e n t i e t h

century. Therefore the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f t o t a l i t a r i a n abuse

l a t e n t i n D e v l i n ' s theory are an i n e v i t a b l e cause f o r c r i t i c i s m

from Hart e s p e c i a l l y i n the l i g h t o f r e c e n t h i s t o r i c a l events.

"For there are i n the a c t u a l working o f democracy many f o r c e s

l i k e l y to encourage the b e l i e f t h a t the p r i n c i p l e o f democratic

103

r u l e means t h a t the m a j o r i t y a r e always r i g h t . " J

Savigny

and E h r l i c h are a l s o r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f one s i d e o f t h i s antinomy.

Savigny*s " V o l k s g e i s t " and E h r l i c h * s " L i v i n g Law o f the People"

are i d e a s which are b r o a d l y m i r r o r e d by D e v l i n when he uses

such phrases as "a n a t i o n ' s thought" and "accepted public

standards.

On the other hand Hart r e f l e c t s ideas from the h i s t o r i c a l l y

i n d i v i d u a l i s t s c h o o l s o f thought. The S t o i c s f i r s t developed a

l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y e x p r e s s i n g the i d e a o f the i n d i v i d u a l as a

reasonable being detached from the community i n which he l i v e s .

A f t e r the Reformation, the i n d i v i d u a l emerged as an important

e n t i t y i n h i m s e l f r a t h e r than b e i n g o n l y a p a r t o f the l a r g e r

s o c i a l organism. T h i s i d e a r e a l l y blossomed w i t h the propaga-

t i o n o f the " i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s o f man" by Locke. Hart

embodies such i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s i n h i s theory when he assumes

the b a s i c value o f i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . H o b b e s was a l s o an

1 0 3
S e e Hart (1963), pp. 7 9 - 8 1 .
104

D e v l i n , pp. 96 and 9 8 .

1
°' See Hart,
5
(1963). p. 82.
i n d i v i d u a l i s t though he coupled t h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s m w i t h a

theory that l e d to p o l i t i c a l a b s o l u t i s m . 1 0 6
Kant's categor-

ical imperative was a l s o based on the r a t i o n a l nature o f an

individual. But i t i s w i t h the u t i l i t a r i a n s , Jeremy Bentham

and John S t u a r t M i l l , t h a t Hart f i n d s the s t r o n g e s t bond o f

thought c o n c e r n i n g the v a l u e o f the i n d i v i d u a l . "Bentham's

l e g a l p h i l o s o p h y i s an u t i l i t a r i a n i n d i v i d u a l i s m . His

individualism i n s p i r e d h i s numerous and v i g o r o u s l e g i s l a t i v e

e f f o r t s , a l l d i r e c t e d towards the emancipation o f the i n d i v i -

dual from the many c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s and i n i q u i t i e s

which impeded, i n England a t any r a t e , the f r e e p l a y o f f o r c e s

t h a t was to give full scope to i n d i v i d u a l development.

Bentham measured the i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t i n terms o f p a i n and

p l e a s u r e and b e l i e v e d t h a t the i n t e r e s t o f the community

consisted o f a sum o f the i n t e r e s t s o f a l l the i n d i v i d u a l s i n

t h a t community. Hart a l s o b e l i e v e s t h a t the cumulative r e s u l t

o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom w i l l be the good o f the community and he

adopts "the c r i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e , c e n t r a l to a l l m o r a l i t y , that

1 Oft

human misery and the r e s t r i c t i o n o f freedom are e v i l s . "

John S t u a r t M i l l , b a s i c a l l y an i n d i v i d u a l i s t , t r i e d to r e c o n c i l e

i n d i v i d u a l and community i n t e r e s t by f o r m u l a t i n g hisprinciple

of l i b e r t y . 1 0 9
We have seen how i n e v i t a b l e c o n f u s i o n and paradox
1 0 6
Hobbes, "Leviathan".
1 07

'Friedmann, "Legal Theory", p. 312.

1 0 8
Hart (1963), p. 8 2 .

See p r e v i o u s p. 9»
 110

arise out o f t h i s attempt to r e c o n c i l e such opposing values.

Hart i n h e r i t s these problems when he a p p l i e s M i l l ' s principle

to the q u e s t i o n o f enforcement o f morals.

A third traditional c o n f l i c t can be i d e n t i f i e d i n the

H a r t - D e v l i n debate. I t can be b r o a d l y l a b e l l e d as the c o n f l i c t

o f F a i t h and Reason o r narrowly l a b e l l e d as a dichotomy between

Intuition and I n t e l l e c t . 1 1 1

"Time and a g a i n b e l i e f i n the power o f

reason has been f o l l o w e d by d i s t r u s t o f
reason and corresponding f a i t h i n i n s t i n c t .
I n t e l l e c t i s pitched against i n t u i t i o n ,
r e f l e c t i o n against l i f e . In p h i l o s o p h y ,
the r a t i o n a l i s m o f the e i g h t e e n t h and the
p o s i t i v i s m o f the n i n e t e e n t h century
a n a l y s i n g l i f e and t h i n k i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l l y ,
a c c o r d i n g to the p r i n c i p l e o f c a u s a l i t y ,
have been f o l l o w e d by a widespread r e v o l u -
tion. I t s battle cry i s i n s t i n c t rather
than i n t e l l e c t , the i n n e r meaning o f t h i n g s ,
r a t h e r than t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,
the t o t a l i t y o f l i f e i n i t s meaning and v a l u e
r a t h e r than the a n a l y s i s o f i n d i v i d u a l phen-
omena a c c o r d i n g to cause and e f f e c t . " 1 1 2

This t r a d i t i o n a l c o n f l i c t whether law i s p r i m a r i l y a matter o f

i n t e l l e c t o r i n t u i t i o n i s present i n the H a r t - D e v l i n debate.

D e v l i n ' s t h e o r y depends upon a h i s t o r i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between

knowledge and b e l i e f and between t h i n k i n g and p o s t u l a t e s . He

rejects the optimism o f n i n e t e e n t h century thought t h a t every-

t h i n g i s capable o f b e i n g known and understood by the human

mind. Hart, i n comparison, has more confidence i n r a t i o n a l i t y

and the a b i l i t y o f the human mind to make deductive d e c i s i o n s

See previous p. 14.

Ill
Friedmann, "Legal Theory", pp. 83-85.
about c r i t i c a l m o r a l i t y . By l o g i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f M i l l ' s

p r i n c i p l e o f l i b e r t y , Hart argues t h a t c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n s can

be reached. He goes i n t o a n a l y t i c a l d e f i n i t i o n s o f terms

such as "harm to o t h e r s " , " p a t e r n a l i s m " and "the enforcement

of m o r a l i t y " to show t h a t the p r i n c i p l e can be l o g i c a l l y

a p p l i e d to a s e t o f f a c t s . J
Hart h i m s e l f has remarked t h a t

one o f the popular meanings o f " p o s i t i v i s m " i s "the c o n t e n t i o n

that a l e g a l system i s a 'closed l o g i c a l system' i n which

c o r r e c t l e g a l d e c i s i o n can be deduced by l o g i c a l means from

predetermined l e g a l r u l e s without r e f e r e n c e t o s o c i a l aims,

p o l i c i e s , moral s t a n d a r d s . " ^ 1 1
In c o n t r a s t , D e v l i n ' s theory

is e m p i r i c a l to some extent as i t i s based upon the a v a i l -

a b i l i t y o f evidence o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n and y e t he wants p u b l i c

115

o p i n i o n to be shaped by an u l t i m a t e metaphysical a u t h o r i t y . J

He could be l a b e l l e d as a n a t u r a l lawyer because o f h i s hope

t h a t moral r u l e s w i l l be d e r i v e d from b e l i e f i n God. However

his political theory l e a d s him t o r e j e c t the i d e a t h a t moral

v a l u e s a c q u i r e d by r e l i g i o u s f a i t h ought to be e n f o r c e d . Due

to p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f l o c a t i n g a s o v e r e i g n and the

fallibility o f i n d i v i d u a l human beings, he argues that only

those moral b e l i e f s h e l d s t r o n g l y by p u b l i c o p i n i o n ought t o

be enforced. Hart on the o t h e r hand avoids a metaphysical

__
See f o r example Hart (1963), pp. 38-43.
S.958
1:L
Harvard L.R. V o l . 71, 593 a t 601.

U5
n a t u r a l law b a s i s f o r d e c i d i n g upon moral r u l e s . In h i s

book "The Concept o f Law" he a s s e r t s t h a t the n a t u r a l law

d o c t r i n e " c o n t a i n s c e r t a i n elementary t r u t h s of importance

f o r the understanding o f both m o r a l i t y and law. These we shall

endeavour to d i s e n t a n g l e from t h e i r m e t a p h y s i c a l s e t t i n g and

116

r e s t a t e here i n s i m p l e r terms." I t i s not c l e a r whether

Hart d e r i v e s h i s moral v a l u e s by n o n - c o g n i t i v e or n a t u r a l i s t

ethical methods. 1 1 7
To c l a s s i f y the v a l u e s o f Hart and D e v l i n

i n t o e t h i c a l s c h o o l s o f thought would i n v o l v e a complete study

i n i t s e l f and w i l l not be undertaken i n t h i s paper. However

whatever may be the method by which Hart d e r i v e s moral r u l e s ,

he c e r t a i n l y r e l i e s upon l o g i c and a r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e when

t r y i n g to decide which moral r u l e s ought to be e n f o r c e d . My

a n a l y s i s o f the debate l e a d s me to conclude that ultimately

a choice between moral v a l u e s cannot r e s t upon r e a s o n . In the

words o f O l i v e r Wendell Holmes, " I t i s t r u e that b e l i e f s and

wishes have a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l b a s i s i n the sense t h a t their

foundation i s a r b i t r a r y . You cannot help e n t e r t a i n i n g and

f e e l i n g them, and t h e r e i s an end o f i t . " 1 1 8

Also Friedmann,

w h i l e d i s c u s s i n g the t h e o r i e s o f Radbruch, comes to the con-

c l u s i o n that " l e g a l r e l a t i v i s m i s t h e r e f o r e concerned w i t h the

u l t i m a t e meaning of l e g a l systems but does not see i t s task i n

Hart, "The Concept o f Law", p. 184.

117
'For d i f f e r e n t e i t h i c a l schools o f thought see Ekman,
"Readings i n the Problems o f E t h i c s " , Frankena " E t h i c s " o r
Hospers "An I n t r o d u c t i o n to P h i l o s o p h i c a l A n a l y s i s " .
118
Holmes, 32 Harvard L.R., (1918), p. 40.
s u g g e s t i n g a choice between o p p o s i t e v a l u e s . This c h o i c e i s

a matter f o r personal d e c i s i o n s ; a matter not of s c i e n c e but

of conscience. R e l a t i v i s m does not evade p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s ,

119

but does not wish to g i v e them a s c i e n t i f i c cloak". y

Radbruch h i m s e l f s a i d "I have no f e a r of irreconcilable

antinomies, to decide o n e s e l f i s to l i v e ! " ° 1 2

Legal science

and philosophy can r e v e a l these antinomies, but cannot indicate

a c h o i c e between them. T h i s does not amount to an abandonment

of the search f o r a h i e r a r c h y of v a l u e s . I t j u s t means that

the h i e r a r c h y of a b s o l u t e v a l u e s cannot be demonstrated

scientifically. However i t i s v i t a l l y important t h a t the

c o n f l i c t i n g v a l u e s are s t r i p p e d to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e cores by

scientific i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n every case before d e c l a r i n g t h a t

the c o n f l i c t i s beyond s c i e n t i f i c settlement. The school o f

Reason has not t r a d i t i o n a l l y argued that l o g i c and s c i e n c e are

u s e l e s s i n moral matters, r a t h e r t h a t they are i n c o n c l u s i v e .

T h e r e f o r e i n the next s e c t i o n , I w i l l endeavour to examine

whether an a n a l y s i s o f s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s can a s s i s t i n choosing

between the v a l u e s o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom and social cohesion.

To begin with, can we throw any l i g h t upon the importance

of i n d i v i d u a l freedom i n our modern s o c i e t y ? I t seems t h a t an

understanding o f our own v a l u e s w i l l give us a deeper i n s i g h t

___
i n t o the process of d e c i s i o n making than w i l l the

Friedmann, p. 192.

120
Radbruch, 3 Annaire de l ' i n s t i t u t international de
p h i l o s o p h i c du d r o i t , p. 1 6 2 .
e x p o s i t i o n o f general moral p r i n c i p l e s . On the one hand there

are w r i t e r s such as Herbert M a r c u s e 1 2 1

s a y i n g that today the

minds of most people have been so manipulated by modern s o c i a l

c o n d i t i o n s and communications t h a t m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n i s no

l o n g e r l i k e l y to r e f l e c t t r u t h or j u s t i c e . On the other side

o f the c o i n , i t i s p o i n t e d out t h a t the c l i m a t e of moral f r e e -

dom has l e d to u n w i l l i n g n e s s to enforce moral r u l e s upon

i n d i v i d u a l s f o r "to c l a i m i n f a l l i b i l i t y i s to take the path of

f a n a t i c i s m ; to impose our own values on others makes us zealots

122

and tyrants." In an age of moral r e l a t i v i s m we often lose

our nerve to impose our concept o f "the t r u t h " upon others—our

c o n v i c t i o n s are o n l y another l i m p i d personal p o i n t of view.

"How can we r e s o l v e our d i f f e r e n c e s when the assurance of

c o g n i t i v e or moral c e r t i t u d e i s o n l y an i l l u s i o n f a t h e r e d by

a wish?" 1 2 3
Both s i d e s o f the debate continue to be argued

p o l i t i c a l l y without apparent r e s o l u t i o n .

The broader i s s u e o f the H a r t - D e v l i n debate, namely, the

r e l a t i o n s h i p o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom and social control, has

o f t e n been d i s c u s s e d h i s t o r i c a l l y both i n terms o f general

d o c t r i n e and s p e c i f i c values. John Stuart M i l l said, "the

p r a c t i c a l question, where to place the l i m i t - - h o w to make the

f i t t i n g adjustment between i n d i v i d u a l independence and social

121
Herbert Marcuse, "A C r i t i q u e o f Pure Tolerance",
(Beacon Book).
122
Joseph Tussman, " O b l i g a t i o n of the Body P o l i t i c " , p. 114.

I b i d . , p. 115.
c o n t r o l — i s a s u b j e c t on which n e a r l y e v e r y t h i n g remains to
124

be done." Law and m o r a l i t y have always endeavoured to serve

these twin g o a l s — p u b l i c and private interest. Historically,

the m a j o r i t y o f men have been w i l l i n g to emphasise s o c i a l

c o n t r o l above t h e i r d e s i r e f o r freedom as r e l a t i v e s o c i a l peace

and s t a b i l i t y are obvious p r e c o n d i t i o n s to i n d i v i d u a l freedom.

We u s u a l l y d e s i r e p u b l i c s e c u r i t y as a means to the later

a c q u i s i t i o n o f p r i v a c y and freedom. T h i s i s a symptom of our

b a s i c Hobbesian f e a r - * f e x p l o i t a t i o n by those who

1 2
0 are more

powerful. And here we f i n d a v a r i a b l e which w i l l directly

i n f l u e n c e the onus of p r o v i n g harm. The evidence of harm

n e c e s s a r y to rebut the presumption o f n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e with

the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l vary a c c o r d i n g to s o c i a l conditions. In

other words, the i d e a l balance between the v a l u e s of i n d i v i d u a l

freedom and s o c i a l a u t h o r i t y s h i f t s i n emphasis depending upon

prevalent social conditions. Thus i n extreme s o c i a l conditions,

i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s r e s t r i c t e d where there is a possibility

t h a t s o c i a l d i s a s t e r may r e s u l t from the e x e r c i s e o f t h a t

freedom. We are w i l l i n g to accept l e s s e m p i r i c a l evidence of

harm. S t r i c t censorship d u r i n g war i s an obvious example. A

recent example i s the a c t i o n o f the Canadian government r e s t r i c t -

i n g i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y by l e g i s l a t i o n i n order to suppress the

a c t i v i t i e s o f a s e p a r a t i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n known as the P.L.Q.

124~
M i l l , "On Liberty;• p. 68.
125
Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan." P e l i c a n Ch. XIII,
pp. I83-I88.
The words o f the preamble o f the emergency r e g u l a t i o n s ° are

s i m i l a r t o the s p i r i t o f D e v l i n ' s a r g u m e n t ? t h a t s o c i e t y has

12

a r i g h t to preserve ideas and moral values:

Whereas i t continues
i n Canada t h a t men and
f r e e o n l y when freedom
f o r moral and s p i r i t u a l
1aw;...
to be r e c o g n i z e d
i n s t i t u t i o n s remain
i s founded upon r e s p e c t
values and the r u l e o f

And whereas the Government o f Canada d e s i r e s

to ensure t h a t l a w f u l and e f f e c t i v e measures
can be taken a g a i n s t those who thus seek to
destroy the b a s i s o f our democratic govern-
mental system, on which the enjoyment o f our
human r i g h t s and fundamental freedoms i s
founded, and to ensure the continued p r o t e c t -
i o n o f those r i g h t s and freedoms i n Canada.

Therefore, H i s E x c e l l e n c y the Governor

G e n e r a l - i n - C o u n c i l , on the recommendation o f
the Prime M i n i s t e r , pursuant to the War
Measures Act, i s pleased hereby t o make the
annexed r e g u l a t i o n s t o provide emergency powers
f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f p u b l i c order i n Canada.

I t has been argued t h a t s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f h i s genera-

t i o n profoundly i n f l u e n c e d the emphasis which M i l l himself

placed upon i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y .

The e a r l i e r U t i l i t a r i a n s d i d n o t regard
l i b e r t y as the most important means l e a d i n g
to s o c i a l happiness. The change i n John
S t u a r t M i l l i s i n t e l l i g i b l e i n the l i g h t o f
the p o l i t i c a l developments o f the time. The
e l d e r U t i l i t a r i a n s had been w a r r i n g a g a i n s t
p r i v i l e g e and the s i n i s t e r i n t e r e s t s o f the
few. They c o u l d e a s i l y persuade themselves
t h a t s o c i a l d i s t r e s s and p o l i t i c a l abuses were
the work o f those m i n o r i t i e s whom they were

12~fS
War Measures Act, P u b l i c Order Regulations, 1970,

October 1 6 .

127
See d i s c u s s i o n on pp. 3-4.
 attacking. But M i l l wrote a t a time when
much o f t h i s d e s t r u c t i v e work was done,
when i t was becoming apparent t h a t the t a k i n g
away o f unjust p r i v i l e g e s from m i n o r i t i e s d i d
not o f i t s e l f give s o c i a l happiness. Power
had passed from an o l i g a r c h y to a democracy
and now the U t i l i t a r i a n s saw t h a t the demo-
c r a t i c government i n t e r f e r e d w i t h l i b e r t y
not l e s s but more than formerly."128

D e v l i n a l s o notes that an emphasis upon one value may be a

product o f the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f one p a r t i c u l a r g e n e r a t i o n .

About M i l l , D e v l i n says "His admonitions were addressed to a

s o c i e t y which was secure and s t r o n g and hidebound. Their

r e p e t i t i o n today i s to a s o c i e t y much l e s s s o l i d . As a t r a c t

f o r the times, what M i l l wrote was superb, but as dogma i t has

1 2 9

l o s t much o f i t s appeal." y
I agree w i t h L i n d s a y and D e v l i n

t h a t t h e o r i e s o f t e n r e f l e c t the p o l i t i c a l o r s o c i a l problems

of the age i n which they were w r i t t e n . Then which o f Hart's

and Devlin's t h e o r i e s i s most a p p l i c a b l e to modern s o c i e t y ?

Are we i n a g e n e r a t i o n c o n t i n u a l l y threatened with conformity

and massive i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h p r i v a c y and freedom o r a r e we i n

an age where c h e r i s h e d t r a d i t i o n a l values and a u t h o r i t y a r e

being undermined by an undue emphasis upon i n d i v i d u a l freedom?

i o n

There a r e numerous w r i t e r s , J
both modernxand a n c i e n t , who

analyse s o c i a l ills under one o r the other o r a s u b t l e v a r i a t i o n

o f these two c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . The next chapter s e t s out an

128
A.D. L i n d s a y , I n t r o d u c t i o n to John S t u a r t M i l l ,
" U t i l i t a r i a n s i m , L i b e r t y and Representative Government, (p.xv),
See a l s o Hart (1963), p. 32.
129
^ D e v l i n , p. 122.
130
For modern examples, see w r i t i n g s o f Herbert Marcuse
and Joseph Tussman.
attempt to choose between the v a l u e s o f D e v l i n and Hart i n

the l i g h t o f modern s o c i a l phenomena and the present p o p u l a r

value response to the problem o f p o l l u t i o n . I have chosen

examples where i t would seem to be obvious t h a t individual

freedom ought to be subordinated to p u b l i c o p i n i o n . Then I

w i l l attempt to e x t r a c t a g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e from the examples.

 IRREVERSIBLE DISASTER ARGUMENT

Is i t p o s s i b l e today to envisage s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s which

would a l t e r Hart's b a s i c value p r e f e r e n c e f o r i n d i v i d u a l moral

freedom? Can we s u c c e s s f u l l y argue t h a t Hart's v a l u e preference

f o r i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s u n r e a l i s t i c and open to q u e s t i o n i n

our modern-day s i t u a t i o n ? The Quebec M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e ,

Jerome Choquette, i s an example of a person whose emphasis upon

one value a p p a r e n t l y changed due to p r e v a i l i n g s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s .

Taking o f f i c e as a champion of i n d i v i d u a l freedom, Choquette

i s r e p o r t e d as now s a y i n g , "I remain a l i b e r a l , but a r e a l i s t i c

liberal. Democracy has to f i n d a p p r o p r i a t e means to defend

i t s e l f a g a i n s t organized crime and t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t y , and

i f we're not r e a l i s t i c enough to r e a l i s e that s i t u a t i o n , and

i f we want to keep p r e a c h i n g Great P r i n c i p l e s o f Freedom of

the I n d i v i d u a l , then we're m i s s i n g the p o i n t . "^O j - terms of

n

the present a n a l y s i s , Choquette would now require less empirical

evidence o f harm than p r e v i o u s l y i n o r d e r to j u s t i f y an encroach-

ment upon the c h e r i s h e d value of i n d i v i d u a l freedom.

L e t us look by way of analogy a t the p h y s i c a l problem o f

environmental control. In t h i s chapter, I take a stand w i t h

a n t i - p o l l u t i o n a t t i t u d e s p u r e l y f o r the purpose of a n a l y s i s

i n an attempt to f i n d a c l e a r p r i n c i p l e i n which individual

moral freedom i s subordinated to other v a l u e s . P o l l u t i o n i s an

_
The P r o v i n c e , Newspaper, Vancouver, 2 3 r d January,
example of how an a t t i t u d e of l a i s s e z - f a i r e has changed into

a popular demand f o r c o n t r o l of i n d i v i d u a l s . T h i s amounts to

an i d e n t i f i a b l e swing i n the v a l u e s held by the m a j o r i t y . The eco-

l o g i c a l d i s a s t e r of p o l l u t i o n r e s u l t s from the f a i l u r e of

society to c o n t r o l disposal of waste m a t e r i a l s and individual

use of the environment. The r e s u l t i s a threatened upheaval

to the whole of human l i f e . The consequences of p o l l u t i o n w i l l

take years of d e d i c a t e d work to r e p a i r . But o n l y when the

ecological deterioration reaches d i s a s t e r p r o p o r t i o n s are we

f i n a l l y prompted to take any a c t i o n to impose r e s t r a i n t s and

to r e p a i r the wreckage to n a t u r e .

The f a c t of p o l l u t i o n continued before our very eyes

for years--but we w e r e ' e i t h e r unaware of the decline or refused

to impose r e s t r a i n t s on individual disposal practices because

these r e s t r a i n t s would be too difficult. For the sake of

expediency, freedom of commerce and u n w i l l i n g n e s s to impose

v a l u e s , the ecological d e c l i n e was c l a s s i f i e d as a problem

for each i n d i v i d u a l to s o l v e and not r e a l l y as a problem justi-

f y i n g government i n t e r v e n t i o n . The only d i f f i c u l t y i s that we

all breathethe same a i r , swim at the same beaches and enjoy the

same b e a u t i e s of n a t u r e . There i s l i t t l e empirical evidence

to show that initially ecological decline causes harm to any-

t h i n g e l s e than our senses and feelings. I t i s only l a t e r that,

e c o l o g i c a l l y speaking, the l a c k of r e s t r a i n t of one person w i l l

affect another.

It i s b e i n g wise a f t e r the event to say now that s u f f i c i e n t

foresight coupled w i t h determined r e s t r a i n i n g a c t i o n would have

at l e a s t l e s s e n e d the disasters of e c o l o g i c a l pollution. Some

would say t h a t p o l l u t i o n i s a necessary by-product of our

progressive i n d u s t r i a l society. However, when the necessary

by-product t h r e a t e n s our enjoyment of l i f e , and t h r e a t e n s the

v e r y e x i s t e n c e of one important human v a l u e , then i t i s time

to re-arrange our s c a l e of v a l u e s . Even a person who has

i n d i v i d u a l freedom a t the top o f h i s h i e r a r c h y of values would

a l s o have a e s t h e t i c v a l u e s somewhere on h i s s c a l e . Now if

c e r t a i n a e s t h e t i c q u a l i t i e s are threatened, not o n l y w i t h

damage, but with e x t i n c t i o n or i r r e v e r s i b l e harm, then the

h i e r a r c h y o f v a l u e s ought to be a l t e r e d t e m p o r a r i l y . Thus the

i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r theory c a l l s f o r some r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of

c o n f l i c t i n g v a l u e s , d e s p i t e p e r s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s and d e s p i t e

the l a c k of e m p i r i c a l evidence to prove t h a t the harm w i l l be

irreversible. We w i l l d i s c u s s l a t e r the problem of who has

the a u t h o r i t y to c l a s s i f y the f a c t s . J

The words spoken by the advocates f o r environmental

c o n t r o l have a s u r p r i s i n g s i m i l a r i t y to words and phrases

embodied i n D e v l i n ' s essays and repeat h i s argument i n a

d i f f e r e n t context. "An e t h i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , i s a d i f f e r e n -

t i a t i o n o f s o c i a l from a n t i - s o c i a l conduct. An e t h i c ecologi-

cally, i s a l i m i t a t i o n on freedom of a c t i o n i n the s t r u g g l e

f o r e x i s t e n c e . . . . A l l e t h i c s so f a r evolved r e s t upon a s i n g l e

premise t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l i s a member of a community o f inter-

dependent p a r t s . His i n s t i n c t s prompt him to compete f o r h i s

See p.64.
p l a c e i n the community, but h i s e t h i c s prompt him t o co-operate

perhaps i n order that t h e r e may be a p l a c e t o compete f o r . " 1 3 2

The p o s s i b i l i t y o f i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r does e x i s t i n our

s o c i e t y more than i t d i d i n the p a s t . "...Given the d e n s i t y

and intensity of l i f e i n the modern c i t y one simply cannot

l e a v e the r o l e o f nature and the o r g a n i s a t i o n o f green p l a c e s

to chance o r to the p r i v a t e domain." 33 1

We are warned a g a i n s t

r e l y i n g absolutely on b a s i c r i g h t s or p r i n c i p l e s . "...The

r i g h t to p o l l u t e has become a major p h i l o s p h i c a l and l e g a l

assumption; we tend to r e q u i r e detailed s c i e n t i f i c proof of

d i r e c t , p e r s o n a l damage t o man as a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r even

considering r e s t r i c t i o n o f any r i g h t to p o l l u t e . " ^ 1 3

We have

seen how D e v l i n ' s t h e s i s makes s i m i l a r o b s e r v a t i o n s i n the moral

realm. For example, " I f we are n o t e n t i t l e d t o c a l l our

society ' f r e e ' unless we pursue freedom t o an extremity that

would make s o c i e t y i n t o l e r a b l e f o r most o f us, then l e t us

s t o p short o f the extreme and be content w i t h some o t h e r name.

The r e s u l t may not be freedom u n a l l o y e d , but there a r e a l l o y s

which s t r e n g t h e n without c o r r u p t i n g . " J J

O f t e n we hear warnings

of ecological " d i s i n t e g r a t i o n " u n l e s s r e s t r a i n t s a r e imposed.

"We w i l l go down i n h i s t o r y as an elegant t e c h n o l o g i c a l society

s t r u c k down by b i o l o g i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n for lack of ecological

132
"Challenge f o r S u r v i v a l 1968—Land, A i r and Water f o r
Man i n M e g a l o p o l i s , " e d . P i e r r e Dansereau, p. 43.
133
^ I b i d . , p. 66.
1 3 4
Ibid., p. 160.

135
Devlin, p. 123.
understanding." J

The popular argument continues t h a t as environmental

c o n t r o l i s not an exact s c i e n c e , we must e r r on the s i d e o f

l i m i t a t i o n o f freedom to p o l l u t e . T h i s e r r o r w i l l mean some

unnecessary l i m i t a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l freedom u n t i l our under-

s t a n d i n g and knowledge i n c r e a s e s . Can we argue i n the same

manner f o r enforcement of moral standards? That i s to ask

"Is the value p r e f e r e n c e as p o p u l a r l y embodied i n the d r i v e

a g a i n s t p o l l u t i o n a l s o a p p l i c a b l e to the moral realm?" Hart

would immediately answer "no". However t h i s answer i s too

b l a t a n t and all-encompassing. There are circumstances when

even Hart would want to answer "yes" but he then c l o a k s such

cases under the p r i n c i p l e o f harm to o t h e r s . The popular

argument continues t h a t because m o r a l i t y i s not an exact s c i e n c e

we must a c c o r d i n g l y ( i n times o f threatened d i s a s t e r ) e r r i n

f a v o u r of the value o f s o c i a l cohesion w i t h some unnecessary

l i m i t a t i o n s upon i n d i v i d u a l freedom u n t i l our moral under-

s t a n d i n g and knowledge i n c r e a s e s . However one d i s c o u r a g i n g

f a c t o r i s t h a t we do not seem to be capable o f a c q u i r i n g and

then p a s s i n g on to succeeding generations a l a s t i n g moral under-

s t a n d i n g to which we pay more than l i p - s e r v i c e . Each genera-

t i o n s t r u g g l e s to a c q u i r e i t s own moral c o n v i c t i o n s by a p a i n f u l

process o f t r i a l and error.

"Challenge f o r S u r v i v a l " , p. 154.

 Where a change has the tendency to be d i s a s t r o u s or

i r r e v e r s i b l e , i t i s obvious t h a t we ought to take care lest

t h a t change take p l a c e . Therefore, where there i s a danger

t h a t a change w i l l be the b e g i n n i n g of the r o t — o r the first

step i n undermining a value which i s b a s i c to the enjoyment

o f human l i f e , we ought to take steps to prevent t h a t change.

Here I am attempting to make a d i s t i n c t i o n between harm and

i r r e v e r s i b l e harm o r d i s a s t e r . Harm, i n t h i s context, is

the n e c e s s a r y e v i l which r e s u l t s from a p o l i c y of t o l e r a t i o n

o f c e r t a i n d e v i a t i o n s from conduct considered to be good. But

t o l e r a t i o n does not r e q u i r e t h a t you t o l e r a t e d e v i a t i o n s which

threaten the l i k e l i h o o d of the very e x i s t e n c e of what i s

considered to be good. I r r e v e r s i b l e harm i s conduct which may

l e a d to the eventual d e s t r u c t i o n of a concept o f goodness.

N a t u r a l l y t h i s " d e f i n i t i o n " begs the q u e s t i o n "Who distinguishes

and how do you d i s t i n g u i s h between t o l e r a b l e harm and i r r e v e r s -

i b l e harm or d i s a s t e r ? " The d i f f e r e n c e w i l l always be a matter

of degree. In a d i s a s t e r s i t u a t i o n , i t i s important to be wise

before the e v e n t — e s p e c i a l l y as i n a world which i s an urban

v i l l a g e i t w i l l become i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t to emerge from a

d i s a s t e r without i n c u r a b l e deformity. Dworkin, while d i s c u s s i n g

obscenity, reasons i n s i m i l a r terms. "...At some p o i n t i n the

d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f community standards the m a j o r i t y w i l l not

o b j e c t to f u r t h e r d e t e r i o r a t i o n , but that i s a mark of the

corruption's success, not proof t h a t there has been no corrup-

tion. I t i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y which makes i t impera-

t i v e t h a t we enforce our standards w h i l e we still have them.

T h i s i s an e x a m p l e — i t i s not the o n l y o n e — o f our w i s h i n g the
137

law to p r o t e c t us from o u r s e l v e s . " ' J

Although I agree with

t h i s general p r i n c i p l e c o n c e r n i n g the p r e v e n t i o n of i r r e v e r s -

i b l e harm, i t s use i n p r a c t i c e w i l l cause i n e v i t a b l e c o n t r o -

versy. Each i n d i v i d u a l , group or m a j o r i t y w i l l decide upon

the a p p l i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e a c c o r d i n g to p e r s o n a l v a l u e s

and beliefs.

In the area o f morals, Hart says t h a t s o c i e t y will

continue to e x i s t i f c e r t a i n core m o r a l i t y changes; people

will go on l i v i n g . However, the q u a l i t y of t h e i r life-style

may be i r r e v e r s i b l y lowered by the change. We understand the

man who says "I am prepared to take the dangerous s t e p of

making a d e c i s i o n to enforce t h i s moral r u l e thereby p l u g g i n g

one hole i n the l e a k y dam of m o r a l i t y . " The concept of p r e s e r -

v a t i o n by enforcement of t h a t which i s v a l u a b l e i s r e f l e c t e d i n

the Interim Report of the LeDain C o m m i s s i o n . 138

"The r i g h t of

s o c i e t y to p r o t e c t i t s e l f from c e r t a i n kinds o f harm. Without

e n t e r i n g i n t o the d i s t i n c t i o n between law and m o r a l i t y , we also

s u b s c r i b e to the general p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t s o c i e t y has a r i g h t

to use the c r i m i n a l law to p r o t e c t i t s e l f from harm which t r u l y

t h r e a t e n s i t s e x i s t e n c e as a p o l i t i c a l l y , s o c i a l l y and econom-

i c a l l y v i a b l e o r d e r f o r s u s t a i n i n g a c r e a t i v e and democratic

process of human development and self-realization."

1 3 7
D w o r k i n , 75 Yale L . J . (1966) 986 at p. 1004.

Para. 443.
 It i s d i f f i c u l t t o determine when a t o l e r a t e d immorality

w i l l begin the r o t o r break the back o f a p r e v a l e n t moral

value. And although t o l e r a n c e o f i n d i v i d u a l d e v i a t i o n i s

i t s e l f a moral v i r t u e , i f t o l e r a n c e i n s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s may

l e a d to i r r e v e r s i b l e l o s s o f important moral v a l u e s , then we

should not take the r i s k . Be i n t o l e r a n t now and thereby prevent

at l e a s t one p o s s i b l e means o f d e s t r u c t i o n o f those important

v a l u e s which we b e l i e v e t o be e s s e n t i a l t o human f u l f i l l m e n t .

D e v l i n d i d not o r i g i n a l l y ( i n the Maccabaean L e c t u r e )

argue the case f o r enforcement o f common m o r a l i t y i n the express

terms o f a v o i d i n g some i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r . However t h i s i s

the i m p l i c a t i o n o f h i s b a s i c argument t h a t s o c i e t y has the

r i g h t to preserve i t s e l f and prevent undermining o f core values

which are the s t r e n g t h o f s o c i e t y . ^ 1

T h i s i s an important

l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g which should be argued when c o n s i d e r i n g the

q u e s t i o n whether to enforce a c e r t a i n moral r u l e . However i t

i s one argument amongst others and, as we s h a l l see, does not

g i v e d e c i s i v e weight t o e i t h e r s i d e o f the debate.

We began by q u e s t i o n i n g the emphasis which Hart places

upon i n d i v i d u a l freedom i n the context o f modern s o c i e t y . Has

D e v l i n ' s o r i g i n a l argument, i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms o f i r r e v e r s i b l e

d i s a s t e r , c a s t doubts on Hart's v a l u e p r e f e r e n c e ? The answer

is "No"—for there a r e s e v e r a l unanswerable o b j e c t i o n s to the

Deviin, p. 10.
i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the enforcement o f

morality.

(1) Who i s to be the P l a t o n i c judge of which moral

change i s the b e g i n n i n g o f the r o t ? We cannot prevent a l l

moral change and n e i t h e r do we want t o — b u t who i s to decide

the correctness o f the proposed enforcement?

(2) I t can be argued t h a t i t i s so important that

i n d i v i d u a l freedom remain u n r e s t r i c t e d t h a t we must run the

r i s k of i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r . "Rational morality must still

i n s i s t on i n d i v i d u a l moral l i b e r t y and even i f non-enforcement

o f morals i s a t h r e a t to s o c i a l s u r v i v a l , m o r a l i t y (or demo-

c r a c y ) demands that we take the risk." ^ 1 0

(3) What amounts to a c c e p t a b l e evidence t h a t some i r r e -

v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r w i l l probably occur? This restates the

problem of whether the f e e l i n g s of the common m o r a l i t y are

a c c e p t a b l e evidence i n most cases as the essence of p r e v e n t i n g

d i s a s t e r i s to act q u i c k l y at the f i r s t warning of deterioration.

But immediately the t h e o r e t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s upon premature

a c t i o n must be a d d e d — t h e r e must be a c l e a r and present danger

and we ought to r e l a t e the g r a v i t y of the e v i l threatened to

the l i k e l i h o o d o f r e a c h i n g that evil.

(4) Why should the d i s a s t e r r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n be applicable

i n only our modern s o c i e t y ? H i s t o r y has shown t h a t mankind has

f4~0
Blackshield i n d i c a t e s a s i m i l a r v a l u e - p r e f e r e n c e to
Hart. See p. 452.
s u r v i v e d through c y c l e s of both good and bad moral change, and

a d i s a s t r o u s moral change has u s u a l l y been f o l l o w e d by revival

or reformation. But t h i s i s a k i n d o f moral f a t a l i s m which

p l a c e s us at the whim o f u n p r e d i c t a b l e moral f a s h i o n . It

seems obvious t h a t we should at l e a s t attempt to preserve

fundamental moral v a l u e s . However someone c o u l d e a s i l y label

the advocate of the i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r p r i n c i p l e as a

prophet of gloom and doom and p o i n t out the h i s t o r i c f a c t that

some sense of d i s a s t e r has always hovered over s o c i e t y . Even

P l a t o s a i d "...When I considered a l l t h i s , the more c l o s e l y

I s t u d i e d the p o l i t i c i a n s and the laws and customs o f the day,

and the o l d e r I grew, the most d i f f i c u l t i t seemed to me to

govern r i g h t l y . Nothing could be done without trustworthy

f r i e n d s and supporters; and these were not easy to come by i n

an age which had abandoned i t s t r a d i t i o n a l moral code but found

it impossibly d i f f i c u l t to c r e a t e a new one. At the same time

law and m o r a l i t y were d e t e r i o r a t i n g at an alarming r a t e . . . . n l

4l

(5) Mill argues t h a t " i f the claims of individuality

are ever to be a s s e r t e d , the time i s now, while much i s s t i l l

wanting to complete the enforced assimilation. It i s only i n

the e a r l i e r stages t h a t any stand can be s u c c e s s f u l l y made

a g a i n s t the encroachment.... I f r e s i s t a n c e waits till life is

reduced n e a r l y to one uniform type, a l l d e v i a t i o n s from t h a t

type w i l l come to be considered impious, immoral, even
142 •
monstrous and contary to n a t u r e . " Here M i l l i s using a

s i m i l a r i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r argument to j u s t i f y p r e s e r v a -

t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l i t y before he has e m p i r i c a l evidence t h a t

i n d i v i d u a l i t y w i l l probably be destroyed. Early over-caution

i s more d e s i r a b l e than r e p e n t i n g at l e i s u r e when such an

important v a l u e as i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s i n v o l v e d . Thus we find

t h a t t h i s attempt to r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f y D e v l i n ' s value p r e f -

erence can b a c k f i r e . The same i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r theory,

i m p l i e d i n D e v l i n ' s essay, i s here used to support the o p p o s i t e

s i d e of the the debate. When a breach of a moral p r i n c i p l e will

e v e n t u a l l y l e a d to more than harm, such as d i s a s t e r or i r r e -

v e r s i b l e harm, then j u s t i f i c a t i o n e x i s t s f o r p r e s e r v i n g and

e n f o r c i n g one moral value i n p r e f e r e n c e to other v a l u e s . This

p r i n c i p l e ought to be a p p l i e d , even though there i s l i t t l e

e m p i r i c a l evidence t h a t the d i s a s t e r or i r r e v e r s i b l e harm w i l l

a c t u a l l y eventuate; the standard or p r o v i n g harm has been

lowered. " B e t t e r to cut out one p o s s i b l y f a u l t y eye than to

r i s k the i r r e v e r s i b l e f i r e s of h e l l " i s a p r i n c i p l e which can

be e q u a l l y w e l l a p p l i e d by both Hart and D e v l i n . Thus although

both Hart and D e v l i n would agree w i t h the i r r e v e r s i b l e disaster

p r i n c i p l e as I have s e t i t out i n t h i s chapter, each has h i s

own i d e a of when i t ought to be a p p l i e d . A l l we can say i s

t h a t D e v l i n , b e i n g l e s s t o l e r a n t toward i n d i v i d u a l d e v i a t i o n ,

John S t u a r t M i l l , p. 105.
would invoke the p r i n c i p l e more o f t e n than Hart. This i s

analogous to s a y i n g t h a t D e v l i n ' s theory i n v o l v e s e n f o r c i n g

moral r u l e s more o f t e n than Hart's theory. Thus although I

agree w i t h the p r i n c i p l e , i t does not u l t i m a t e l y help to choose

between Hart and D e v l i n . The i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r argument

r a i s e s the debate to another l e v e l but u l t i m a t e l y asks the

same q u e s t i o n , "When should m o r a l i t y be enforced by means of

the law?"

At the b e g i n n i n g of t h i s chapter, I asked whether i t i s

p o s s i b l e today to envisage s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s which would a l t e r

Hart's b a s i c value p r e f e r e n c e f o r i n d i v i d u a l moral freedom? I

have chosen a category o f extreme s i t u a t i o n s under the'.heading

o f " i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r " and t r i e d to formulate a p r i n c i p l e

t h a t would enable a c l e a r non-value choice between v a l u e s . This

attempt has proved to be u n s u c c e s s f u l and the p r i n c i p l e can

o n l y be a p p l i e d by u s i n g the same v a l u e s as i t i s meant to

distinguish. A s i m i l a r a s s a u l t can be made upon D e v l i n ' s v a l u e -

p r e f e r e n c e i n the l i g h t o f modern s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s . The assault

would take the f o l l o w i n g form. As modern s o c i e t y i s so d i v e r s e

and fragmented i n i t s b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s , a theory which

depends upon the e x i s t e n c e of some common b e l i e f s and m o r a l i t y

w i l l have d i f f i c u l t y f i n d i n g such b e l i e f s . This w i l l be

e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i f D e v l i n ' s statement t h a t no s o c i e t y has y e t

been able to teach morals without r e l i g i o n ^ 1 3

i s correct, for
modern s o c i e t y can c e r t a i n l y be l a b e l l e d as s e c u l a r r a t h e r

than r e l i g i o u s . I t c o u l d then be argued t h a t D e v l i n ' s theory

should not be f o l l o w e d u n t i l t h e r e i s a deep r e l i g i o u s revival

i n our p l u r a l i s t i c s o c i e t y . I f D e v l i n was once w i l l i n g to

take the r i s k t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n would embody j u s t i c e on a

m a j o r i t y o f o c c a s i o n s , he ought not to take t h a t r i s k now as

p u b l i c o p i n i o n has no u n i t y or d i r e c t i o n . T h i s argument i s

s i m i l a r to the r e a s o n i n g o f Herbert M a r c u s e ^ who 1

says t h a t

the p u b l i c i s no l o n g e r capable of determining i t s own good.

Therefore Marcuse, r e m i n i s c e n t o f Rousseau, advocates t h a t an

i n t e r i m P l a t o n i c e l i t e nought to be empowered to determine and

enforce the p u b l i c good u n t i l the p u b l i c i s educated sufficient-

l y to resume a government organized on democratic principles.

Here the attempt to d i s c r e d i t D e v l i n ' s v a l u e - p r e f e r e n c e i n

modern s o c i e t y breaks down f o r a t l e a s t two reasons. Firstly,

D e v l i n would d i s a g r e e w i t h the a n a l y s i s t h a t a p l u r a l i s t i c

s o c i e t y no l o n g e r has some common bonds o f thought which p u b l i c

o p i n i o n w i l l want to e n f o r c e . T h i s i s the same problem as

e x i s t e d w i t h the i r r e v e r s i b l e d i s a s t e r argument, namely t h a t

t h e r e i s no a u t h o r i t a t i v e body to c l a s s i f y the f a c t s .

Secondly, D e v l i n c l e a r l y f e e l s t h a t Marcuse's s o l u t i o n o f

empowering a P l a t o n i c e l i t e c o n t a i n s more r i s k s o f i n j u s t i c e

See f o r example Herbert Marcuse "A C r i t i q u e o f Pure

Tolerance".

See p r e v i o u s p. 64.
than government i n the area of moral enforcement by a d i v e r s e

and wavering p u b l i c o p i n i o n . Thus the a p p l i c a t i o n of Devlin's

and Hart's t h e o r i e s to opposite and extreme i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of

modern s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s does not reduce e i t h e r theory to

absurdity.
 CONCLUSION

N e i t h e r p a r t y to the debate f i n d s a s i n g l e principle

which w i l l a s s i s t the decision-maker without eventually r e l y i n g

upon u n d e r l y i n g p r i v a t e v a l u e s and a t t i t u d e s . The irreversible

d i s a s t e r theory, although g i v i n g some i n s i g h t i n t o D e v l i n ' s

p o s i t i o n , can e q u a l l y w e l l he used to support Hart's arguments.

L i k e w i s e , the a n a l y s i s of modern p l u r a l i s t i c s o c i e t y does not

e a s i l y produce a p r i n c i p l e which can s e r i o u s l y q u e s t i o n

Devlin's value-preference. Once a g a i n , the arguments are

r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s f o r values a l r e a d y chosen. The how does one

f i n d a meaningful p r i n c i p l e to determine which of two values

should p r e v a i l ? Friedmann answers i n the f o l l o w i n g manner.

"The agony o f the d e c i s i o n , the conscious choice between v a l u e s

w h i c h — l i k e the c l a i m to s e c u r i t y from t r e a s o n of the organized

community and the c l a i m to i n d i v i d u a l freedom of conscience

and o p i n i o n — h a v e equal i n t r i n s i c v a l u e , but have to be a d j u s t e d

i n a concrete s i t u a t i o n — i s the n o b l e s t h e r i t a g e of homo

s a p i e n s . L e g a l philosophy can a i d i n the c h o i c e : i t cannot

146

and should not e l i m i n a t e i t . " I b e l i e v e t h a t at a c e r t a i n

stage, a n a l y s i s i s no l o n g e r h e l p f u l . The c o n f l i c t i n g values

can o n l y be s t a t e d s e p a r a t e l y and a choice made by intuition.

Intuition i t s e l f i s unavoidably a t t a c h e d to psychology and

theology. Then i t comes down to a matter o f p o l i t i c a l phil-

Friedmann, p. 36k.
osophy as to whose i n t u i t i o n ought to be given abolute

authority. ^? 1
Hospers, at the conclusion of an a n a l y s i s of

modern e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s asks an i d e n t i c a l q u e s t i o n , "How then

are we ever to s e t t l e these disagreements about e t h i c a l f a c t s ,

which may p e r s i s t even a f t e r there i s no l o n g e r any disagree-

1 48

ment about n o n - e t h i c a l facts?" At t h i s p o i n t he r e p l i e s

t h a t u l t i m a t e l y disagreements about -.ethical f a c t s must be

s e t t l e d by i n t u i t i o n though there are s e v e r a l important matters

which must be i n v e s t i g a t e d before we reach that conclusion.

However, having d e a l t w i t h such f a c t o r s as "our personal desires,

our human p r e f e r e n c e s i n our own behalf, wishful thinking,

149

c l e v e r r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s and the l i k e " , we are sometimes

l e f t w i t h an unsolved c o n f l i c t o f v a l u e s . Then, o n l y by

i n t u i t i o n can we e i t h e r make a d e c i s i o n or s e l e c t an e t h i c a l

o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l school of thought. To Hart and Devlin, who

p l a c e a s t r o n g emphasis upon e i t h e r the v a l u e of i n d i v i d u a l

freedom or s o c i a l c o n t r o l , M i l l ' s words taken from a d i f f e r e n t

150

context seem to be very a p p l i c a b l e . J

"Rarely when two views

are opposed does one c o n t a i n a l l the t r u t h and the other

complete f a l s i t y . Far more common i s i t to f i n d each view

c o n t a i n i n gSeep a rptrse v io o
f u sthed i st cr uu stshi.o.n. ipages
n the human
37-43.mind, one-sidedness
148
Hospers, "An Introduction to P h i l o s o p h i c a l Analysis",
p. 492.
149
I b i d . , p. 493.

John S t u a r t M i l l , p. 105.
has always been the r u l e and many sidedness the e x c e p t i o n .

Hence, even i n r e v o l u t i o n s of o p i n i o n , one p a r t of the t r u t h

u s u a l l y s e t s while the other r i s e s . Even p r o g r e s s , which ought

to superadd, f o r the most p a r t o n l y s u b s t i t u t e s , one partial

and incomplete t r u t h f o r another; improvement consisting

c h i e f l y i n t h i s , t h a t the new fragment of t r u t h i s more wanted,

more adapted to the needs o f the time than that which i t d i s -

151

places." The p a r a d o x i c a l v a l u e s , s o c i a l c o n t r o l and individual

freedom, cannot e i t h e r e x i s t m e a n i n g f u l l y alone.

Today, the decision-maker still asks "What should I do

to r e c o n c i l e these two values?"

We w i l l , as human beings d e s i r i n g p r e d i c t a b i l i t y i n our

affairs, continue to s e a r c h f o r r u l e s and p r i n c i p l e s to a s s i s t

the decision-maker. We do not want to l e a v e him u n a s s i s t e d or

u n r e s t r i c t e d and yet there i s great d i f f i c u l t y i n p r o v i d i n g

him w i t h g u i d e l i n e s o t h e r than our own personal values. It i s

not an a b d i c a t i o n o f reason to admit t h i s and then to endeavour

to shape our personal values as they ought to be.

Mill, "On L i b e r t y " , p. 105.

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Cmd. No. 247, Wolfenden Report ( A u t h o r i s e d Am. Ed. 1 9 6 3 ) .

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U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 6 5 ) .

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H.L.A. Hart - The M o r a l i t y o f the C r i m i n a l Law 1965.

H.L.A. Hart - The Concept o f Law, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press.

Dworkin - L o r d D e v l i n and the Enforcement o f Morals, 75 Yale

L . J . 986 ( 1 9 6 6 ) .

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(1962).

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H.L.A. Hart - 35 U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago 1

H.L.A. Hart - 71 Harvard Law Review, (1958).

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A. B l a c k s h i e l d - 1967 Sydney Law Review V o l . 5, p. 441.

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Thomas Hobbes - L e v i a t h a n , Pelican.

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Dennis L l o y d - The Idea o f Law, P e l i c a n .

J.S. M i l l - On L i b e r t y , Everyman's L i b r a r y .

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