148PART FIVE ToOK FOUR

ne
uos T cicen Constituent')
word for pan (meros),
translation ar intended to De inaeienunte. Esewhere Plato

as if the
soul or mind had hree distinct parts,
the as in D e
speaks
and Timacus, sometimes as f ther were a single stream of mental ene
manifesting itsely tn dferent dcvities, as in the Symposi RY
We
perhaps do well, prsi, lo emeD a r ne nas waried s that he i
hor
speaking uith scienijne prcsion,
but rather on the level of
comversation; and, second, to bear in mind that he is concemed wi"y
and nof wih psyehoioRY. wn a gEneral classijhication of the main
or impulses fo action, ralher than d scientific analysis of the mi
de i
in fact, probably always conscious that m speaking of pans' ('elemene

or what nor) of the soul he is sing a elaphor. (2) What exactly are the
thrre "elements' that Plato descnbes here is little difficulty
with t
them. By 'appetite' Plato means the purely instinctive desires in thei,
Simplest Jom; Is easy enoug, on d common-sense level, to recoom

them. 'Reason' inchudes not only the ability to understand and to think ogniz,
before we at, the faculty of calculation and foresight, but also the ability
tomake up one's mind, the Jacully of deision. The third clement at fin
appears more misellaneous, including, as we have see, such qualities
indignation, courage, detemination, spirnt, and so on. Two illustrations

may help us to understand it. First the distinction, still commonly made,

between "heart' and "head'". When we make that distinction we do nor

include under "heart' the mere antmal instincis; we perhaps inchude more of
the feelings' than Plato, but our meaning is not far Jrom his second 'pat

the Timacus reason is located in the head, spint' in the

of the soul'. (In
Bualer
breast, i.e. hean, and appetite in the belly.) Second, when
analysed the motives of moral action he found them threefold. Conscienc,

a rational faculty capable judgement and having authority; particuiar

of call t
and 'self-love', or, as we might
passions, like hunger and thirst;
today, the 'self-regarding instinct', or perhaps the
instinct of sel-presen
of these
Each two analyses recogmizes
a
ratiot
tion and self-asse rtion."
mind; each recognizes animal nstnt
controlling, authoritative part of the to

ecognizes a third element, one which is not easy a

but each also

Bater

p. y6;
for Butler see Duncan
C Feld. The Philosophy of Plate,
1.
Moral Phuloswphy (Pelican),
 JUSTICE IN STATE AND INDIVIDUAL 149

hut which is perhaps most

comprehens1Vely deseribed as
self-regard, and
relations
jrom sey-a55Eo, tog Se-Tespect, to
our
with
which ranges
others (Butler coupied 'self-love' and "benevolenwe') and our concem for
und goodnamE
ur
reputariOn
uses two words, thumos
and thumoeides, Jor this element in
Plato
he mind. -Neither
is easy lo ransiae. I have used
"anger, '"indignation',
to suit the context best.
as seemed
'spirit'
easier justice
be individual
to see in the if
Wethought it would
for it fhrst in some larger field which also contained it.
we looked
this larger field was the state, and so we set about
We thought
sure we should find justice in it
founding an ideal state, being
theretore transfer our findings to the
because it was good. Let us

fit him, well and good; on the other hand, if

individual, and it they
in the individual is something different, we will
we find justice
detinition. So by the friction
to the state and test our new
return

spark which will illuminate justice 435

of comparison we may strike a

and once we see it clearly we can fix it firmly in our own

for us,

minds. said.
That is the method; let us follow it, he
right
"Then when we apply the _same term.to.two things, one large

not be similar in respect of that to

and the other small, will they
which the common term is applied?

Yes. difference between a

just man and a
Just
"So there will be no

City, so tar as the element of justice goes.

'None.
when its three natura
u we agreed that/a state was just was selt-
each doing their job, and that it
were
Stuents certain other states and
brave and wisc in virtue of
pined and
dispositions of those constituents.
That is so," he said.
to find
'we shall expect
then, my dear Glaucon, 'I continued,
cu, same three
elements in his personality
the individual has the

1. Pauchë.