Joint Statement of the UN on Russia-Ukraine war

We are outraged about the continuous atrocities and the resulting grave human rights and
humanitarian crises, which have a massive detrimental impact on civilians’ lives, safety and
well-being. We stand in solidarity with the people of Ukraine in these difficult times.

We recall that it is precise during times of war and armed conflict that the right to freedom of
expression and free access to information must be vigorously defended, as it is instrumental for
the promotion of lasting peace, understanding the nature of the conflict and ensuring
accountability.

The UK and our international partners are united in support for Ukraine. The UK government is
providing a range of economic, humanitarian and defensive military assistance to Ukraine, and
is imposing additional sanctions on Russia and Belarus.

In this connection, we highlight the following:

An attack to kill, wound or abduct a journalist and media worker constitutes a war crime.

We are alarmed by reports that Ukraine’s media and internet infrastructure may be intentionally
targeted by Russian forces to disrupt access to information, including using cyberattacks. It is
crucial to ensure that people in Ukraine have continued access to the internet, broadcasting and
other means of communication.

We underline that propaganda for war and national hatred which constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence are profoundly harmful and prohibited under article 20 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

We are concerned at the spread of disinformation concerning the conflict in Ukraine in Russian
state-owned media. However, we believe that disinformation cannot be addressed by blocking
or banning media outlets. Any restriction of freedom of expression should respect the three-part
test of legality, legitimate aim, and necessity and proportionality.

We believe that the erosion of the right to freedom of expression and other human rights over a
prolonged period of time and the silencing of critical voices in the Russian Federation have
contributed to creating an environment that facilitates Russia’s war against Ukraine.
We are:

providing humanitarian aid for vital medical supplies and other help. We have committed almost
£400 million overall, including £220m of humanitarian assistance. This includes matching,
pound-for-pound, £25 million of public donations to the Disasters Emergency Committee
Ukraine humanitarian appeal.

providing military aid to Ukraine, continuing to work with international partners to supply vital
weapons to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. So far we have delivered a wide range of equipment
including main battle tanks, helicopters, thousands of anti-tank weapons, anti-air missiles,
multiple launch rocket systems, armoured vehicles, artillery, small arms and ammunition. We
have also delivered non-lethal aid including helmets, body armour, rations and medical
equipment. In 2022, the UK trained 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers in basic infantry skills and has
committed to training up to 20,000 more in 2023. On 8 February, the Prime Minister announced
plans for an additional UK-led training programme to include Ukrainian fighter jet pilots and
marines.

changing the immigration system to support British nationals and their families who usually live
in Ukraine, and Ukrainians in the UK and their families. We are also offering a sponsorship
scheme, Homes for Ukraine, allowing individuals, charities, community groups and businesses
in the UK to bring Ukrainians to safety – including those with no family ties to the UK.

delivering an unprecedented package of sanctions to cut off funding for Putin’s war machine.
We have now sanctioned over 1,000 individuals, entities and subsidiaries since Putin’s invasion
of Ukraine, including 69 leading oligarchs. We have coordinated with our allies on sanctions
aimed at starving the Russian government of funds to further its unprovoked war against
Ukraine, including a joint decision by all G7 countries to remove Russian banks from the SWIFT
system.

February 2022

On 24 February, Putin launches what he describes as a “special military operation”, ordering tens
of thousands of Russian troops into neighbouring Ukraine from the north, east and south.
Hoping for a swift victory, Russian forces move on the capital Kyiv but are eventually forced to
retreat.

Neighbouring countries and the EU prepare to open their borders to hundreds of thousands of
people fleeing the conflict. Queues at border crossings stretch for several kilometres, although
men of conscription age are prevented from leaving the country.

Western nations impose a widespread package of sanctions on Moscow, in response to the

invasion. These include stopping transactions with Russia’s central bank, banning new
investment and freezing the assets of Russian political and business leaders.
March 2022

At least 441 Ukrainian civilians are killed in the early days of the invasion. UN investigators
subsequently say some of the killings, most notoriously in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha, may
amount to war crimes.

Russia is forced to scale back its war goals following stiff resistance from Ukrainian forces. It
switches focus to the Donbas region where Moscow-backed separatists launched a rebellion in
2014.

The conflict escalates the global food crisis and Ukraine’s government announces a ban on a
wide range of agricultural exports. World food prices reach a record high in March.

April 2022

Dozens of people are killed in a missile strike on a train station in Kramatorsk. It was full of
women, children and elderly people trying to flee the fighting.

"Lacking the strength and courage to stand up to us on the battlefield, they are cynically
destroying the civilian population," Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says.

Later in the month Russia suffers a symbolic blow when the flagship of its Black Sea fleet, the
Moskva, is sunk by what Ukraine claims to be its missiles. The number of people fleeing Ukraine
passes the five million mark according to the UN. Its refugee agency says the conflict has
caused the largest refugee crisis in Europe this century.

May 2022

Finland and Sweden formally apply to join NATO, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

"This is a historic moment which we must seize," NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg says
at a ceremony at NATO headquarters with the Finnish and Swedish ambassadors.

Russia captures the strategic Black Sea port city of Mariupol, following a three-month siege the
Red Cross described as “hell”.

President Zelenskyy delivers a special address on the opening morning of the World Economic
Forum’s annual meeting in Davos. He calls on countries to help set up a fund to rebuild his
country: “We call on everyone to join this platform,” he says.

June 2022
Russian missiles strike a crowded shopping mall in the city of Kremenchuk, killing at least 16
people. A UN spokesman condemns the attack as “deplorable”.

The World Bank approves $1.49 billion in additional financing to help pay the wages of public
sector workers. This increases the bank’s total pledged support, aided by donor countries, to
more than $4 billion.

Russia says that the European Union's decision to partially phase out Russian oil was likely to
destabilize global energy markets, calling it a 'self-destructive' step. EU leaders agreed in
principle to cut 90% of oil imports from Russia by the end of the year.

July 2022

Russian forces capture the city of Lysychansk completing the conquest of Luhansk province in
Eastern Ukraine.

Russian energy giant Gazprom says it will halve gas supplies to Europe through the Nord Stream
1 pipeline. Prior to the war, Europe imported more than 40% of its gas from Russia.

Moscow and Kyiv agree a deal to re-open Ukraine’s Black Sea ports which had been blockaded
by the Russian navy. There are hopes that the breakthrough will ease the global food crisis.

August 2022

Ukrainian forces launch a southern counter-offensive around Kherson, the only land gateway to
Crimea. Russian supply lines, ammunition dumps and an air base in Crimea are targeted.

The UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres says the risk of nuclear confrontation had returned
after decades. He calls the Russian shelling of the Zaporizhzhia facility in Ukraine “suicidal”.

September 2022

European gas prices spike by as much as 30% after Russia says one of its main gas supply
pipelines to Europe will remain closed indefinitely. Gazprom had initially said the Nord Stream 1
pipeline had been closed for temporary maintenance work.

Ukraine launches a counter-offensive in the Kharkiv region in the north-east. A key rail hub
supplying the Russian frontline is recaptured.

Vladimir Putin orders the partial mobilization of hundreds of thousands of reservists. His decree
sparks an exodus of military-age men trying to cross the border into neighbouring countries.

Putin says regions of eastern Ukraine will become part of Russia following local ‘referendums’.
“Any decision to proceed with the annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia
regions of Ukraine would have no legal value and deserves to be condemned," United Nations
Secretary-General Antonio Guterres tells reporters.

October 2022

An explosion badly damages the only bridge linking Russia to the Crimean peninsula, which
Moscow seized in 2014. Days later, Russia retaliates with the first missile strikes on Kyiv in
months.

In the following days, Ukrainian energy infrastructure is targeted in more waves of missile
strikes. The country’s energy minister says at least half of the country’s thermal energy capacity
has been hit. An additional four million children have been plunged into poverty because of the
war, according to a UNICEF report - 2.8 million of them are Russian, the UN agency says.

November 2022

Russia orders its forces to abandon Kherson, the only regional capital it had captured so far. The
Kherson region was one of four that Putin had said would be part of Russia “forever”.

The president of the Ukraine walking with army officers and cameras surrounding him.President
Zelenskyy visits newly liberated Kherson on 14 November, 2022. Image: Reuters.

The EU looks at ways to increase help for Ukraine’s energy sector following “cruel and
inhumane” attacks that have caused widespread power cuts.

"Russia's bombing of (Ukraine's) infrastructure is clearly a tactic to increase human suffering,"

EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson says.

External power is restored to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant two days after it was
disconnected from the power grid following Russian shelling which damaged high voltage lines.
The International Atomic Energy Agency says a protection zone should be placed around the
plant “before it’s too late”.

December 2022

President Zelenskyy addresses the US Congress during his first foreign visit since the war broke
out. He says aid to Ukraine is an investment in democracy.

On Christmas Day, Vladimir Putin says Russia is ready to negotiate over Ukraine. However, Kyiv
says Moscow isn’t serious about talks and says it will not rest until every Russian soldier is
removed from its territory.
The European Central Bank says it expects inflation to remain above its 2% target for the next
three years. Several factors, including the war in Ukraine, caused inflation to spike at 10.6% in
October across the 19 countries that use the euro.

January 2023

Reinforced by recruits, Russian forces make their first battlefield gains in months, capturing the
salt-mining town of Soledar in eastern Donetsk province. They also focus attention on the
strategic town of Bakhmut, key to the prized Donbas region.

The Food and Agriculture Organization says its food price index reached a record high in 2022,
up by 14.3% from 2021. Food prices surged after Russia invaded Ukraine in February. The World
Bank also warns that the global economy could slip into recession in 2023.

“The world overcame apartheid, the pandemic, the financial crisis … Now the world is fighting
Putin. The world will overcome again,” President Zelenskyy tells world leaders during a live
address to the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos.

February 2023

President Zelenskyy says Russian offensives in the east and south are part of a strategy to
make gains before Kyiv receives tanks and other heavy weaponry from its allies. NATO also
begins discussing its request for fighter jets and long-range missiles.

Western countries look at imposing a new raft of sanctions against Russia to tie in with the first
anniversary of the war. US officials say they are looking at sanctioning more banks with links to
Moscow and stepping up enforcement of existing rules.

Experts estimate lost European sales could halve the export revenues of Russian energy giant
Gazprom in 2023. Its revenues from overseas sales may have declined in January to $3.4 billion
from $6.3 billion in the year-earlier period.

Five ways Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed UK government

A year after Vladimir Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine, five IfG experts examine the impact
of the war on the UK.

While the conflict between Russia and Ukraine had been ongoing since the occupation of
Crimea and combat in the Donbas from 2014, it was Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 that
drew heightened condemnation and extensive political and economic sanctions from the UK,
US, EU and aligned nations. But while by far the most significant consequences of the invasion
over the past year have clearly been for the people of the Ukraine (and Russia), the advent of war
in mainland Europe has also had consequences for UK government.

Although there has been a high degree of cross-party consensus around the UK’s stalwart
support for the people of Ukraine, the effects of the war – on domestic policy priorities,
government spending and the UK’s international relations – have shifted political priorities and
debates, with knock on impacts for the framing of other long-term policy questions including net
zero and immigration. Meanwhile, the costs of the war – both in terms of direct military aid and
the effect of the conflict on energy prices and associated inflation – have appreciably narrowed
the finance and economic choices available to the UK’s politicians as they shape their priorities
ahead of the next general election, expected in 2024.

Energy has become the dominant issue in UK politics

British politicians, like others, had got used to a period of low energy prices and stable supplies.
They have now experienced an extraordinary spike in prices (with very high knock-on inflation) –
and even warnings of blackouts. Initially slow to grasp the scale of the crisis, the government
has since provided unprecedented financial support, taking most of the extra £50–60bn in
imported gas costs directly onto its balance sheet.1 It has also been forced to think harder
about the data and systems it needs to support vulnerable households.

The war has not seen the UK’s net zero objective seriously questioned. Instead it has
strengthened political consensus that domestic renewables offer the cheapest and most secure
form of energy. The government is likely to face further pressure on its tentative support for
onshore wind and solar. Energy efficiency – long a neglected policy area – is also back in vogue,
particularly in the Treasury. There is a new target and a new taskforce, though not yet a credible
plan for insulating homes.

The new Department for Energy Security and Net Zero is tasked with plotting the UK’s course
out of the crisis. Even with prices falling faster than expected, next winter still looks challenging
– and energy is likely to remain front and centre of the political agenda well beyond that.

The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities took lead responsibility for what
became ‘Homes for Ukraine’, a community sponsor scheme that recognised the role local
authorities have in supporting refugees once they arrive in the UK.

Foreign Office resource has been redirected to deal with the crisis

Prior to Russia's invasion, the Foreign Office had seen a decline in its Russia expertise - despite
the government having described the country as "the most acute threat to our security" in the
Integrated Review. The muted response to Russia’s invasion of the Crimea in 2014 had already
shown that, as a former UK ambassador to Moscow and Washington put it, “there was a
problem in the Foreign Office; the old Cold War cadre of people just wasn’t there”.

More recently, between 2016 and 2022, the Eastern Europe and Central Asia unit was among the
smallest of the geographical units in the department (pre- and post-merger). Even after the
Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) drew attention to Russian language proficiency as a ‘weak
spot’ in 2015, the number of advanced Russian speakers in the Foreign Office continued to drop
– from 83 in December 2017 to below 60 in February 2022.4

Since the outbreak of war, the Foreign Office has increased the number of people working on
Russia and Ukraine. The then foreign secretary, Liz Truss, wrote to the FAC in March 2022
pointing out the establishment of a “new 24/7 Russia-Ukraine hub” under the leadership of a
director general.5 In July 2022 she wrote to the same committee, detailing the deployment of
over 840 staff to work on response to the crisis.6 Around the same time, it was reported in the
media that Truss was asking for 1,000 additional staff to support her department’s activity,
notably on Ukraine.7

This shift in approach to resourcing Russia and Ukraine is noticeable, and the UK can consider
its response to the war so far a diplomatic success. But while a surge in the number of staff
dealing with the region was always going to be necessary after the outbreak of war, the question
remains as to why the Foreign Office had a comparatively low number of staff focused on the
region prior to Russia’s invasion – and the extent to which that hindered the UK’s response.

The Treasury must grapple with the end of the post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’

As prime minister Boris Johnson promised to increase defence spending from an existing 2% to
2.5% of GDP; his successor Liz Truss went further by committing to 3%. Rishi Sunak has so far
kept his powder dry, relying on the fact that defence budgets have been fixed – front-loaded and
relatively generous – until 2025 to punt off the decision until after the next general election. But
the Ministry of Defence is notoriously leaky when it comes to spending allocations and will,
alongside retired senior officers, ensure that public skirmishes about UK capability and budgets
continue.8

One risk is that leaks and arguments about the size of the army, military procurement and GDP
percentages distract from a serious reckoning on what a new war in Europe means for the
post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’ that has benefited us all. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has
profoundly changed the calculus in deciding where to invest and where to cut. That means
extremely difficult choices for a Treasury gearing up for retrenchment and conscious that
protecting military budgets means cuts would fall even more heavily on public services,
themselves in desperate need of more investment.

Another risk is that Sunak’s can-kicking over budgets postpones the serious investment needed
in military supplies. Western materiel and equipment are being depleted at a rapid rate on the
battlefields of Ukraine, leading to concerns that neither government nor industry have moved to
the war-footing required for resupply. This is of course a problem of money but it is as much one
of logistics. Resupply of materiel is an urgent priority. Serious discussion of defence spending,
procurement and supply will be a new reality for the government for years to come.

We now see more clearly that, in a crisis, for the foreseeable future UK interests are aligned with
the US and Europe, especially if China aligns itself more with Russia.

Britain’s place in the world is clearer – and it is western and European, more than global

The Ukraine conflict prompted a further revisiting of the 2021 ‘integrated review’ into foreign,
security, defence and development policy. In line with the spirit of that pre-Russian invasion
period, the original document was titled “Global Britain in a competitive age”. But beyond the
Johnsonian rhetoric the 2021 document was quite clear-sighted about UK interests. It pledged
to support an “open and resilient international order” but warned that “to be open we must also
be secure” and of increasing competition between states and a fragmented international order.
To that end the review already committed to exceeding NATO spending commitments, and the
UK playing its part in multilateral governance and collective security in a more hard-nosed way.

The ‘global’ in Britain was reflected in an ambition to more deeply engage in the Indo-Pacific, to
adapt to China’s growing power and climate and global health objectives. All reasonable goals,
and the UK is right to maintain a global presence, particularly through soft power reach like the
BBC, climate leadership, international students spending time in the country, and enviable cyber
and intelligence capabilities, as well as to build post-Brexit trade links.

But we now see more clearly that, in a crisis, for the foreseeable future UK interests are aligned
with the US and Europe, especially if China aligns itself more with Russia. Geography and
historic alliances trump global ambitions. The revival of NATO’s purpose and a unified western
response have been a necessary if painful reminder of where UK interests truly lie.
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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This article is about the war ongoing since 2014. For the escalation since February 2022, see
Russian invasion of Ukraine. For other wars between the two nations, see List of wars between
Russia and Ukraine.

Russo-Ukrainian War

Part of the post-Soviet conflicts

Clockwise from top left:

Ukrainian tanks during the 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive;

Russian-installed officials in Moscow ratifying the annexation

of four Ukrainian regions;

Sloviansk city council during the war in Donbas;

Russian bombing during the Siege of Mariupol;

Russian soldiers during the annexation of Crimea;

Fires during the 2014 Revolution of Dignity

D 20 February
a [d]
2014 –
t
present
e

(9 years, 1
month, 1 week
and 5 days)

L Ukraine, also
o Russia
c (spillover into
a Poland,
t Moldova and
i Belarus)
o
n

S Ongoing
t
a
t
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s

T ● Ru
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r of
i Cri
a me
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and
c par
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a of
n fou
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s the
ast
Ukr
aini
an
obl
ast
s in
20
14
and
20
22,
res
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 Belligerents

Ukraine
Russia

Supplied by:
●
Donetsk
For countries providing
[a]
PR
aid to Ukraine since
(2014–2022
2022, see foreign aid to )
Ukraine
●
Luhansk
[b]
PR
(2014–2022
)

Supported by:

[c]
Belarus (2022–present

Supplied by:

For details, see Russian

military suppliers

Commanders and leaders

 Ukraine Russia

​ Volodymyr ​ Vladimir Putin

Zelenskyy ​ Sergei Shoigu
(2019–present) ​ Valery
​ Petro Gerasimov
Poroshenko ​ Yevgeny
(2014–2019) Prigozhin
​ Oleksandr (2022–present)
Turchynov ​ Sergey
(acting; 2014) Aksyonov
​ Oleksii Reznikov (2014)
(2021–present) ​ Aleksey Chaly
​ Andriy Taran (2014)
(2020–2021) ​ Denis Pushilin
​ Andrii (2018–2022)
Zahorodniuk ​ A.
(2019–2020) Zakharchenko
​ Stepan Poltorak (2014–2018)
(2014–2019) ​ Pavel Gubarev
​ Valeriy Heletey (2014)
(2014) ​ Igor Girkin
​ Mykhailo Koval (2014)
(2014) ​ Leonid
​ Ihor Tenyukh Pasechnik
(2014) (2017–2022)
​ Valerii Zaluzhnyi ​ Igor Plotnitsky
(2021–present) (2014–2017)
​ Ruslan ​ Valery Bolotov
Khomchak (2014)
(2019–2021)
​ Arsen Avakov
(2014–2021) Belarus

​ Alexander
Lukashenka

Strength

For details of strengths and units involved at key points

in the conflict, see:
 Combatants of the war in Donbas (2014–2022)

Order of battle for the 2022 Russian invasion of

Ukraine

Casualties and losses

Reports vary widely, but tens of thousands at a

minimum. See Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War
for details.

show

● V
● T
● E

Russo-Ukrainian War (outline)

show

● V
● T
● E

Post-Soviet conflicts

[e]
The Russo-Ukrainian War is an ongoing international conflict between Russia, alongside
[f]
Russian-backed separatists, and Ukraine, which began in February 2014. Following Ukraine's

Revolution of Dignity, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and supported pro-Russian
separatists fighting the Ukrainian military in the Donbas war. The first eight years of conflict also
included naval incidents, cyberwarfare, and heightened political tensions. In February 2022,
Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In early 2014, the Euromaidan protests led to the Revolution of Dignity and the ousting of
Ukraine's pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych. Shortly after, pro-Russian unrest erupted in
eastern and southern Ukraine. Simultaneously, unmarked Russian troops moved into Ukraine's
Crimea and took over government buildings, strategic sites and infrastructure. Russia soon
annexed Crimea after a highly-disputed referendum. In April 2014, armed pro-Russian
separatists seized government buildings in Ukraine's eastern Donbas region and proclaimed the
Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) as independent states,
starting the Donbas war. The separatists received considerable but covert support from Russia,
and Ukrainian attempts to fully retake separatist-held areas failed. Although Russia denied
involvement, Russian troops took part in the fighting. In February 2015, Russia and Ukraine
signed the Minsk II agreements to end the conflict, but the agreements were never fully
implemented in the years that followed. The Donbas war settled into a violent but static conflict
between Ukraine and Russian proxies, with many brief ceasefires but no lasting peace and few
changes in territorial control.

Beginning in 2021, Russia built up a large military presence near its border with Ukraine,
including within neighbouring Belarus. Russian officials repeatedly denied plans to attack
Ukraine. Russian president Vladimir Putin criticized the enlargement of NATO and demanded
that Ukraine be barred from ever joining the military alliance. He also expressed irredentist views
and questioned Ukraine's right to exist. Russia recognized the DPR and LPR as independent
states in February 2022, with Putin announcing a "special military operation" in Ukraine and
subsequently invading the region. The invasion was internationally condemned; many countries
imposed sanctions against Russia and increased existing sanctions. Russia abandoned an
attempt to take Kyiv in early April 2022 amid fierce resistance. From August, Ukrainian forces
began recapturing territories in the north-east and south as a result of counter-offensives. In late
September, Russia declared the annexation of four partially-occupied regions in southern and
eastern Ukraine, which was internationally unrecognized. The war has resulted in a refugee
crisis and tens of thousands of deaths.

Background
Main article: Russia–Ukraine relations

See also: Historical background of the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine

Independent Ukraine and the Orange Revolution

Further information: Orange Revolution

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, Ukraine and Russia maintained close
ties. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
[2]
Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Former Soviet nuclear weapons in Ukraine were
[3]
removed and dismantled. In return, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed

to uphold the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine through the Budapest
[4][5]
Memorandum on Security Assurances. In 1999, Russia was one of the signatories of the

Charter for European Security, which "reaffirmed the inherent right of each and every
participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties
[6]
of alliance, as they evolve." In the years after the dissolution of the USSR, several former

Eastern Bloc countries joined NATO, partly in response to regional security threats involving
Russia such as the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, the War in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and the
First Chechen War (1994–1996). Russian leaders described this expansion as a violation of
[7][8]
Western powers' informal assurances that NATO would not expand eastward.
Protesters in Independence Square in Kyiv during the Orange Revolution, November 2004

The 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was controversial. During the election campaign,
[9][10]
opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned by TCDD dioxin; he later accused
[11]
Russia of involvement. In November, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was declared the
[12]
winner, despite allegations of vote-rigging by election observers. During a two-month period

which became known as the Orange Revolution, large peaceful protests successfully challenged
the outcome. After the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the initial result due to widespread
electoral fraud, a second round re-run was held, bringing to power Yushchenko as president and
[13]
Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister, and leaving Yanukovych in opposition. The Orange

Revolution is often grouped together with other early-21st century protest movements,
particularly within the former USSR, known as colour revolutions. According to Anthony
Cordesman, Russian military officers viewed such colour revolutions as an attempt by the US
and European states to destabilise neighbouring countries and undermine Russia's national
[14]
security. Russian President Vladimir Putin accused organisers of the 2011–2013 Russian

protests of being former advisors to Yushchenko, and described the protests as an attempt to
[15]
transfer the Orange Revolution to Russia. Rallies in favour of Putin during this period were
[16]
called "anti-Orange protests".

At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Ukraine and Georgia sought to join NATO. The response among
NATO members was divided; Western European countries opposed offering Membership Action
Plans (MAP) in order to avoid antagonising Russia, while US President George W. Bush pushed
 [17]
for their admission. NATO ultimately refused to offer Ukraine and Georgia MAPs, but also

issued a statement agreeing that "these countries will become members of NATO". Putin voiced
[18]
strong opposition to Georgia and Ukraine's NATO membership bids. By January 2022, the
[19]
possibility of Ukraine joining NATO remained remote.

In 2009, Yanukovych announced his intent to again run for president in the 2010 Ukrainian
[20] [21]
presidential election, which he subsequently won. In November 2013, a wave of large,

pro-European Union (EU) protests erupted in response to Yanukovych's sudden decision not to
sign the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement, instead choosing closer ties to Russia and the
Eurasian Economic Union. On 22 February 2013 the Ukrainian parliament had overwhelmingly
[22]
approved of finalizing the agreement with the EU, subsequent to which Russia had put
[23]
pressure on Ukraine to reject it.

Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, and pro-Russian unrest

Main articles: Euromaidan, Revolution of Dignity, and 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine

Following months of protests as part of the Euromaidan movement, on 21 February 2014

Yanukovych and the leaders of the parliamentary opposition signed a settlement agreement that
called for early elections. The following day, Yanukovych fled from the capital ahead of an
[24][25][26][27]
impeachment vote that stripped him of his powers as president. On 23 February, the

parliament adopted a bill to repeal the 2012 law which gave Russian language an official
[28] [29]
status. The bill was not enacted, however, the proposal provoked negative reactions in the
[30]
Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine, intensified by Russian media saying that the ethnic
[31]
Russian population was in imminent danger.

On 27 February, an interim government was established and early presidential elections were
scheduled. The following day, Yanukovych resurfaced in Russia and in a press conference
declared that he remained the acting president of Ukraine, just as Russia was beginning its overt
military campaign in Crimea. Leaders of Russian-speaking eastern regions of Ukraine declared
[25][32]
continuing loyalty to Yanukovych, causing the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine.

Russian military bases in Crimea

Main article: Political status of Crimea

At the onset of the conflict, Russia had roughly 12,000 military personnel in the Black Sea
[31]
Fleet, in several locations in the Crimean peninsula like Sevastopol, Kacha, Hvardiiske,

Simferopol Raion, Sarych, and others. In 2005 a dispute broke out over control of the Sarych
[33][34]
cape lighthouse near Yalta, and a number of other beacons. Russian presence was

allowed by the basing and transit agreement with Ukraine. Under the agreements the Russian
military in Crimea was constrained to a maximum of 25,000 troops; they were required to:
respect the sovereignty of Ukraine, honor its legislation, not interfere in the internal affairs of the
[35]
country, and show their "military identification cards" when crossing the international border.

Early in the conflict, the agreement's sizeable troop limit allowed Russia to significantly reinforce
its military presence under the plausible guise of security concerns, deploy special forces and
[31]
other required capabilities to conduct the operation in Crimea.

According to the original treaty on the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet signed in 1997,
Russia was allowed to have its military bases in Crimea until 2017, after which it would evacuate
all military units including its portion of the Black Sea Fleet out of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea and Sevastopol. On 21 April 2010, former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych signed
a new deal known as the Kharkiv Pact, to resolve the 2009 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute; it
[36]
extended the stay to 2042 with an option to renew.

Declaration of military operations

Further information: On conducting a special military operation

No formal declaration of war has been issued in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. When Putin
announced the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, he claimed to commence a "special military
[37]
operation", side-stepping a formal declaration of war. The statement was, however, regarded
[38]
as a declaration of war by the Ukrainian government and reported as such by many
[39][40]
international news sources. While the Ukrainian parliament refers to Russia as a "terrorist
[41]
state" in regard to its military actions in Ukraine, it has not issued a formal declaration of war

on its behalf.

History

Russian annexation of Crimea (2014)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation.

The blockade of military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the capture of Crimea by Russia in
February–March 2014
 Russian troops blocking the Ukrainian military base in Perevalne

[42][43][44][45]
On 20 February 2014, Russia began an annexation of Crimea. On 22 and 23 February,
[44]
Russian troops and special forces began moving into Crimea through Novorossiysk. On 27
[46]
February, Russian forces without insignias began their advance into the Crimean Peninsula.

They took strategic positions and captured the Crimean Parliament, raising a Russian flag.
Security checkpoints isolated the Crimean Peninsula from the rest of Ukraine and restricted
[47][48][49][50]
movement within the territory.

[51]
In the following days, Russian soldiers secured key airports and a communications center.

Russian cyberattacks shut down websites associated with the Ukrainian government, news
media, and social media. Cyberattacks also enabled Russian access to the mobile phones of
[52]
Ukrainian officials and members of parliament, further disrupting communications.

On 1 March, the Russian legislature approved the use of armed forces, leading to an influx of
[51]
Russian troops and military hardware into the peninsula. In the following days, all remaining

Ukrainian military bases and installations were surrounded and besieged, including the Southern
Naval Base. After Russia formally annexed the peninsula on 18 March, Ukrainian military bases
and ships were stormed by Russian forces. On 24 March, Ukraine ordered troops to withdraw; by
30 March, all Ukrainian forces had left the peninsula.

On 15 April, the Ukrainian parliament declared Crimea a territory temporarily occupied by

[53]
Russia. After the annexation, the Russian government increased its military presence in the
 [54]
region and made nuclear threats. Putin said that a Russian military task force would be
[55]
established in Crimea. In November, NATO stated that it believed Russia was deploying
[56]
nuclear-capable weapons to Crimea. Since the annexation of Crimea, certain NATO members
[57]
have been providing training for the Ukrainian army.

War in the Donbas (2014–2015)

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the war in Donbas (2014).

See also: Combatants of the war in Donbas and List of equipment used by Russian separatist
forces of the war in Donbas

Pro-Russia unrest

Main article: 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine

Beginning in late February 2014, demonstrations by pro-Russian and anti-government groups

[58]
took place in major cities across the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. The first

protests across southern and eastern Ukraine were largely native expressions of discontent with
[58][59]
the new Ukrainian government. Russian involvement at this stage was limited to voicing
[59][60]
support for the demonstrations. Russia exploited this, however, launching a coordinated
[59][61]
political and military campaign against Ukraine. Putin gave legitimacy to the separatists

when he described the Donbas as part of "New Russia" (Novorossiya), and expressed
[62]
bewilderment as to how the region had ever become part of Ukraine.

In late March, Russia continued to gather forces near the Ukrainian eastern border, reaching
[63][31]
30–40,000 troops by April. The deployment was used to threaten escalation and disrupt
[31]
Ukraine's response. This threat forced Ukraine to divert forces to its borders instead of the
[31]
conflict zone.
Ukrainian authorities cracked down on the pro-Russian protests and arrested local separatist
leaders in early March. Those leaders were replaced by people with ties to the Russian security
[64]
services and interests in Russian businesses. By April 2014, Russian citizens had taken

control of the separatist movement, supported by volunteers and materiel from Russia,
[65][66][67][68]
including Chechen and Cossack fighters. According to Donetsk People's Republic

(DPR) commander Igor Girkin, without this support in April, the movement would have
[69]
dissipated, as it had in Kharkiv and Odesa. A disputed referendum on the status of Donetsk
[70][71][72]
Oblast was held on 11 May.

Armed conflict

The Russian military buildup along Ukraine's eastern border in February–March 2014

The Donbas status referendums in May 2014 were not officially recognised by the Ukrainian government or
[70]
any UN member state.
In April, armed conflict began in eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed separatist forces and
Ukraine. The separatists declared the People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. From 6 April,
militants occupied government buildings in many cities and took control of border crossings to
Russia, transport hubs, a broadcasting center, and other strategic infrastructure. Faced with
continued expansion of separatist territorial control, on 15 April the interim Ukrainian
government launched an "Anti-Terrorist Operation" (ATO), however, Ukrainian forces were poorly
[73]
prepared and ill-positioned and the operation quickly stalled.

By the end of April, Ukraine announced it had lost control of the provinces of Donetsk and
Luhansk. It claimed to be on "full combat alert" against a possible Russian invasion and
[74]
reinstated conscription to its armed forces. Through May, the Ukrainian campaign focused on

containing the separatists by securing key positions around the ATO zone to position the
military for a decisive offensive once Ukraine's national mobilization had completed.

As conflict between the separatists and the Ukrainian government escalated in May, Russia
began to employ a "hybrid approach", combining disinformation tactics, irregular fighters, regular
[75][76][77]
Russian troops, and conventional military support. The First Battle of Donetsk Airport

followed the Ukrainian presidential elections. It marked a turning point in conflict; it was the first
battle between the separatists and the Ukrainian government that involved large numbers of
[78][79]: 15
Russian "volunteers". According to Ukraine, at the height of the conflict in the summer
[67]
of 2014, Russian paramilitaries made up between 15% to 80% of the combatants. From June

Russia trickled in arms, armor, and munitions.

On 17 July 2014, Russian controlled forces shot down a passenger aircraft Malaysia Airlines
[80]
Flight 17 as it was flying over eastern Ukraine. Investigations and the recovery of bodies
[81][82][83]
began in the conflict zone as fighting continued.

By the end of July, Ukrainian forces were pushing into cities, to cut off supply routes between
the two, isolating Donetsk and attempting to restore control of the Russo-Ukrainian border. By
28 July, the strategic heights of Savur-Mohyla were under Ukrainian control, along with the town
[84]
of Debaltseve, an important railroad hub. These operational successes of Ukrainian forces

threatened the existence of the DPR and LPR statelets, prompting Russian cross-border shelling
[citation needed]
targeted against Ukrainian troops on their own soil, from mid-July onwards.

August 2014 Russian invasion

See also: Battle of Ilovaisk

June–August 2014 progression map

After a series of military defeats and setbacks for the separatists, who united under the banner
[85][86]
of "Novorossiya", Russia dispatched what it called a "humanitarian convoy" of trucks
[87]
across the border in mid-August 2014. Ukraine called the move a "direct invasion". Ukraine's

National Security and Defence Council reported that convoys were arriving almost daily in
November (up to 9 convoys on 30 November) and that their contents were mainly arms and
ammunition. Strelkov claimed that in early August, Russian servicemen, supposedly on
[88]
"vacation" from the army, began to arrive in Donbas.
By August 2014, the Ukrainian "Anti-Terrorist Operation" shrank the territory under pro-Russian
[89]
control, and approached the border. Igor Girkin urged Russian military intervention, and said

that the combat inexperience of his irregular forces, along with recruitment difficulties amongst
the local population, had caused the setbacks. He stated, "Losing this war on the territory that
President Vladimir Putin personally named New Russia would threaten the Kremlin's power and,
[90]
personally, the power of the president".

In response to the deteriorating situation, Russia abandoned its hybrid approach, and began a
[89][91]
conventional invasion on 25 August 2014. On the following day, the Russian Defence
[92][93][94]
Ministry said these soldiers had crossed the border "by accident". According to Nikolai

Mitrokhin's estimates, by mid-August 2014 during the Battle of Ilovaisk, between 20,000 and
25,000 troops were fighting in the Donbas on the separatist side, and only 40-45% were
[95]
"locals".

[96]
On 24 August 2014, Amvrosiivka was occupied by Russian paratroopers, supported by 250
[97]
armoured vehicles and artillery pieces. The same day, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko

referred to the operation as Ukraine's "Patriotic War of 2014" and a war against external
[98][99]
aggression. On 25 August, a column of Russian military vehicles was reported to have

crossed into Ukraine near Novoazovsk on the Azov sea coast. It appeared headed towards
[100][101][102][103][104]
Ukrainian-held Mariupol, in an area that had not seen pro-Russian presence
[105] [106]
for weeks. Russian forces captured Novoazovsk. and Russian soldiers began deporting
[107]
Ukrainians who did not have an address registered within the town. Pro-Ukrainian anti-war
[107][108]
protests took place in Mariupol. The UN Security Council called an emergency
[109]
meeting.
 Residents of Kyiv with Sich Battalion volunteers on 26 August 2014

The Pskov-based 76th Guards Air Assault Division allegedly entered Ukrainian territory in August
and engaged in a skirmish near Luhansk, suffering 80 dead. The Ukrainian Defence Ministry said
that they had seized two of the unit's armoured vehicles near Luhansk, and reported destroying
[110][111]
another three tanks and two armoured vehicles in other regions. The Russian
[111]
government denied the skirmish took place, but on 18 August, the 76th was awarded the

Order of Suvorov, one of Russia's highest awards, by Russian minister of defence Sergey Shoigu
[111]
for the "successful completion of military missions" and "courage and heroism".

The speaker of Russia's upper house of parliament and Russian state television channels
[112]
acknowledged that Russian soldiers entered Ukraine, but referred to them as "volunteers". A

reporter for Novaya Gazeta, an opposition newspaper in Russia, stated that the Russian military
leadership paid soldiers to resign their commissions and fight in Ukraine in the early summer of
[113]
2014, and then began ordering soldiers into Ukraine. Russian opposition MP Lev Shlosberg

made similar statements, although he said combatants from his country are "regular Russian
[114]
troops", disguised as units of the DPR and LPR.

In early September 2014, Russian state-owned television channels reported on the funerals of
Russian soldiers who had died in Ukraine, but described them as "volunteers" fighting for the
"Russian world". Valentina Matviyenko, a top United Russia politician, also praised "volunteers"
 [112]
fighting in "our fraternal nation". Russian state television for the first time showed the funeral
[115]
of a soldier killed fighting in Ukraine.

Mariupol offensive and first Minsk ceasefire

Main articles: Offensive on Mariupol (September 2014) and Minsk agreements

A map of the line of control and buffer zone established by the Minsk Protocol on 5 September 2014

On 3 September, Poroshenko said he and Putin had reached a "permanent ceasefire"

[116]
agreement. Russia denied this, denying that it was a party to the conflict, adding that "they
[117][118] [119][120]
only discussed how to settle the conflict". Poroshenko then recanted. On 5

September Russia's Permanent OSCE Representative Andrey Kelin, said that it was natural that
pro-Russian separatists "are going to liberate" Mariupol. Ukrainian forces stated that Russian
intelligence groups had been spotted in the area. Kelin said 'there might be volunteers over
[121]
there.' On 4 September 2014, a NATO officer said that several thousand regular Russian
[122]
forces operating in Ukraine.

On 5 September 2014, the Minsk Protocol ceasefire agreement drew a line of demarcation
between Ukraine and separatist-controlled portions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.

End of 2014 and Minsk II agreements

See also: 2014 Russian cross-border shelling of Ukraine

On 7 and 12 November, NATO officials reconfirmed the Russian presence, citing 32 tanks, 16
[123]
howitzer cannons and 30 trucks of troops entering the country. US general Philip M.

Breedlove said "Russian tanks, Russian artillery, Russian air defence systems and Russian
[56][124]
combat troops" had been sighted. NATO said it had seen an increase in Russian tanks,

artillery pieces and other heavy military equipment in Ukraine and renewed its call for Moscow
[125]
to withdraw its forces. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs stated that Russian

separatists enjoyed technical advantages over the Ukrainian army since the large inflow of
advanced military systems in mid-2014: effective anti-aircraft weapons ("Buk", MANPADS)
suppressed Ukrainian air strikes, Russian drones provided intelligence, and Russian secure
communications system disrupted Ukrainian communications intelligence. The Russian side
employed electronic warfare systems that Ukraine lacked. Similar conclusions about the
technical advantage of the Russian separatists were voiced by the Conflict Studies Research
[126]
Centre. In the 12 November United Nations Security Council meeting, the United Kingdom's

representative accused Russia of intentionally constraining OSCE observation missions'

capabilities, pointing out that the observers were allowed to monitor only two kilometers of
border, and drones deployed to extend their capabilities were jammed or shot
[127][non-primary source needed]
down.

Pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk in May 2015. Ukraine declared the Russian-backed separatist republics from
[128]
eastern Ukraine to be terrorist organizations.
 [129]
In January 2014, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Mariupol represented the three battle fronts.

Poroshenko described a dangerous escalation on 21 January amid reports of more than 2,000
additional Russian troops, 200 tanks and armed personnel carriers crossing the border. He
[130]
abbreviated his visit to the World Economic Forum because of his concerns.

A new package of measures to end the conflict, known as Minsk II, was agreed on 15 February
[131]
2015. On 18 February, Ukrainian forces withdrew from Debatlseve, in the last high-intensity

battle of the Donbas war until 2022. In September 2015 the United Nations Human Rights Office
[132]
estimated that 8000 casualties had resulted from the conflict.

A stable line of conflict (2015–2021)

Further information: Timeline of the war in Donbas (2015), Timeline of the war in Donbas (2016),
and Timeline of the war in Donbas (2017)

After the Minsk agreements, the war settled into static trench warfare around the agreed line of
contact, with few changes in territorial control. The conflict was marked by artillery duels,
special forces operations, and trench warfare. Hostilities never ceased for a substantial period
of time, but continued at a low level despite repeated attempts at ceasefire. In the months after
the fall of Debaltseve, minor skirmishes continued along the line of contact, but no territorial
changes occurred. Both sides began fortifying their position by building networks of trenches,
[133][134]
bunkers and tunnels, turning the conflict into static trench warfare. The relatively static
[135]
conflict was labelled a "frozen" by some, but Russia never achieved this as the fighting never
[136][137]
stopped. Between 2014 and 2022 there were 29 ceasefires, each agreed to remain in
[138]
force indefinitely. However, none of them lasted more than two weeks.

US and international officials continued to report the active presence of Russian military in
[139]
eastern Ukraine, including in the Debaltseve area. In 2015, Russian separatist forces were

estimated to number around 36,000 troops (compared to 34,000 Ukrainian), of whom

8,500–10,000 were Russian soldiers. Additionally, around 1,000 GRU troops were operating in
[140]
the area. Another 2015 estimate held that Ukrainian forces outnumbered Russian forces
[141]
40,000 to 20,000. In 2017, on average one Ukrainian soldier died in combat every three
[142] [143][144]
days, with an estimated 6,000 Russian and 40,000 separatist troops in the region.

Casualties of the war in Donbas

[145]
Cases of killed and wounded Russian soldiers were discussed in local Russian media.

Recruiting for Donbas was performed openly via veteran and paramilitary organisations.
Vladimir Yefimov, leader of one such organisation, explained how the process worked in the Ural
area. The organisation recruited mostly army veterans, but also policemen, firefighters etc. with
military experience. The cost of equipping one volunteer was estimated at 350,000 rubles
[146]
(around $6500) plus salary of 60,000 to 240,000 rubles per month. The recruits received

weapons only after arriving in the conflict zone. Often, Russian troops traveled disguised as Red
[147][148][149][150]
Cross personnel. Igor Trunov, head of the Russian Red Cross in Moscow,
[151]
condemned these convoys, saying they complicated humanitarian aid delivery. Russia
[152]
refused to allow OSCE to expand its mission beyond two border crossings.

The volunteers were issued a document claiming that their participation was limited to "offering
humanitarian help" to avoid Russian mercenary laws. Russia's anti-mercenary legislation defined
a mercenary as someone who "takes part [in fighting] with aims counter to the interests of the
[146]
Russian Federation".
In August 2016, the Ukrainian intelligence service, the SBU, published telephone intercepts from
2014 of Sergey Glazyev (Russian presidential adviser), Konstantin Zatulin, and other people in
which they discussed covert funding of pro-Russian activists in Eastern Ukraine, the occupation
[153]
of administration buildings and other actions that triggered the conflict. As early as February

2014, Glazyev gave direct instructions to various pro-Russian parties on how to take over local
administration offices, what to do afterwards, how to formulate demands, and promised support
[154][155][156]
from Russia, including "sending our guys".

Russian-backed separatists in May 2016

2018 Kerch Strait incident

Main article: Kerch Strait incident

See also: List of Black Sea incidents involving Russia and Ukraine and Timeline of the war in
Donbas (2018)

The Kerch Strait incident over the passage between the Black and Azov seas
Russia gained de facto control of the Kerch Strait in 2014. In 2017, Ukraine appealed to a court
of arbitration over the use of the strait. By 2018 Russia had built a bridge over the strait, limiting
the size of ships that could pass through, imposed new regulations, and repeatedly detained
[157]
Ukrainian vessels. On 25 November 2018, three Ukrainian boats traveling from Odesa to
[158][159]
Mariupol were seized by Russian warships; 24 Ukrainian sailors were detained. A day

later on 26 November 2018, the Ukrainian parliament overwhelmingly backed the imposition of
[160]
martial law along Ukraine's coastal regions and those bordering Russia.

2019–2020

Further information: Timeline of the war in Donbas (2019) and Timeline of the war in Donbas
(2020)

From left, Russian President Vladimir Putin, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris, France, December 2019

[161]
More than 110 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in the conflict in 2019. In May 2019, newly

elected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took office promising to end the war in
[161]
Donbas. In December 2019, Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists began swapping prisoners
[162][163][164][165]
of war. Around 200 prisoners were exchanged on 29 December 2019. According
[166]
to Ukrainian authorities, 50 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in 2020. Since 2019, Russia has
[167][168]
issued over 650,000 internal Russian passports to Ukrainians.
Russian military buildup around Ukraine (2021–2022)

Main article: Prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Further information: Timeline of the war in Donbas (2021) and Timeline of the war in Donbas
(2022)

From March to April 2021, Russia commenced a major military build-up near the border,
followed by a second build-up between October 2021 to February 2022 in Russia and
[169]
Belarus. Throughout, the Russian government repeatedly denied it had plans to attack
[170][171]
Ukraine.

In early December 2021, following Russian denials, the US released intelligence of Russian
invasion plans, including satellite photographs showing Russian troops and equipment near the
[172]
border. The intelligence reported a Russian list of key sites and individuals to be killed or
[173]
neutralized. The US released multiple reports that accurately predicted the invasion
[173]
plans.

Russian accusations and demands

Further information: Disinformation in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russian
irredentism

Ukrainian deputy prime minister Olha Stefanishyna with NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg at a
conference on 10 January 2022 regarding a potential Russian invasion
In the months preceding the invasion, Russian officials accused Ukraine of inciting tensions,
Russophobia, and repressing Russian speakers. They made multiple security demands of
Ukraine, NATO, and other EU countries. On 9 December 2021 Putin said that "Russophobia is a
[174][175]
first step towards genocide". Putin's claims were dismissed by the international
[176] [177][178][179]
community, and Russian claims of genocide were rejected as baseless.

US paratroopers of 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment depart Italy's Aviano Air Base for Latvia, 23
February 2022. Thousands of US troops were deployed to Eastern Europe amid Russia's military
[180]
build-up.

[181]
In a 21 February speech, Putin questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, repeating an
[182]
inaccurate claim that "Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood". He incorrectly

stated that Vladimir Lenin had created Ukraine, by carving a separate Soviet Republic out of
what Putin said was Russian land, that Joseph Stalin extended Ukrainian territory with lands
from other eastern European countries following the Second World War, and that Nikita
[183]
Khrushchev "took Crimea away from Russia for some reason and gave it to Ukraine" in 1954.

Putin falsely claimed that Ukrainian society and government were dominated by neo-Nazism,
[184][185]
invoking the history of collaboration in German-occupied Ukraine during World War II,

and echoing an antisemitic conspiracy theory that cast Russian Christians, rather than Jews, as
[186][176]
the true victims of Nazi Germany. Ukraine does suffer a far-right fringe, including the
[187][185]
neo-Nazi linked Azov Battalion and Right Sector. Analysts described Putin's rhetoric as
 [188][184]
greatly exaggerated. Zelenskyy, who is Jewish, stated that his grandfather served in the
[189]
Soviet army fighting against the Nazis; three of his family members were killed in the
[188]
Holocaust.

A U.S. intelligence assessment map and imagery on Russian military movement nearby the Ukrainian
border, as on 3 December 2021. It assessed that Russia had deployed about 70,000 military personnel
mostly about 100–200 kilometres (62–124 mi) from the Ukrainian border, with an assessment this could be
[190]
increased to 175,000 personnel. Published by The Washington Post.

During the second build-up, Russia issued demands to the US and NATO, insisting on a legally
binding arrangement preventing Ukraine from ever joining NATO, and the removal of
[191]
multinational forces stationed in NATO's Eastern European member states. These demands
[192]
were rejected by the US and NATO. The demand for a formal treaty preventing Ukraine from

joining NATO was rejected by Western officials as it would contravene the treaty's "open door"
[193]
policy, although NATO made no efforts to comply with Ukraine's requests to join.

Prelude to full invasion

[194]
Fighting in Donbas escalated significantly from 17 February 2022 onwards. The Ukrainians
[195][196]
and the pro-Russian separatists each accused the other of attacks. There was a sharp

increase in artillery shelling by the Russian-led militants in Donbas, which was considered by
Ukraine and its allies to be an attempt to provoke the Ukrainian army or create a pretext for
[197][198][199]
invasion. On 18 February, the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics ordered
 [200][201][202]
mandatory emergency evacuations of civilians from their respective capital cities,
[203]
although observers noted that full evacuations would take months. The Russian government

intensified its disinformation campaign, with Russian state media promoting fabricated videos
[204]
(false flags) on a nearly hourly basis purporting to show Ukrainian forces attacking Russia.

Many of the disinformation videos were amateurish, and evidence showed that the claimed
[204][205][206]
attacks, explosions, and evacuations in Donbas were staged by Russia.

Putin's address to the nation on 21 February (English subtitles available)

[207]
On 21 February at 22:35 (UTC+3), Putin announced that the Russian government would
[208]
diplomatically recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics. The same evening,

Putin directed that Russian troops deploy into Donbas, in what Russia referred to as a
[209][210]
"peacekeeping mission". On 22 February, the Federation Council unanimously authorised
[211]
Putin to use military force outside Russia. In response, Zelenskyy ordered the conscription
[212]
of army reservists; The following day, Ukraine's parliament proclaimed a 30-day nationwide
[213][214][215]
state of emergency and ordered the mobilisation of all reservists. Russia began to
[216]
evacuate its embassy in Kyiv.

[217]
On the night of 23 February, Zelenskyy gave a speech in Russian in which he appealed to the
[218][219]
citizens of Russia to prevent war. He rejected Russia's claims about neo-Nazis and
[220]
stated that he had no intention of attacking the Donbas. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov

said on 23 February that the separatist leaders in Donetsk and Luhansk had sent a letter to Putin
[221]
stating that Ukrainian shelling had caused civilian deaths and appealing for military support.

Full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022–present)

Main article: Russian invasion of Ukraine

For a chronological guide, see Timeline of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Animated map of Russia's invasion of Ukraine through 5 December 2022 (click to play animation)

[222]
The Russian invasion of Ukraine began on the morning of 24 February, when Putin
[223][224]
announced a "special military operation" to "demilitarise and denazify" Ukraine. Minutes

later, missiles and airstrikes hit across Ukraine, including Kyiv, shortly followed by a large ground
[225][226]
invasion along multiple fronts. Zelenskyy declared martial law and a general

mobilisation of all male Ukrainian citizens between 18 and 60, who were banned from leaving
[227][228]
the country.

Russian attacks were initially launched on a northern front from Belarus towards Kyiv, a
north-eastern front towards Kharkiv, a southern front from Crimea, and a south-eastern front
[229][230]
from Luhansk and Donetsk. In the northern front, amidst heavy losses and strong

Ukrainian resistance surrounding Kyiv, Russia's advance stalled in March, and by April its troops
retreated. On 8 April, Russia placed its forces in southern and eastern Ukraine under the
command of General Aleksandr Dvornikov, and some units withdrawn from the north were
[231]
redeployed to the Donbas. On 19 April, Russia launched a renewed attack across a 500
[232]
kilometres (300 mi) long front extending from Kharkiv to Donetsk and Luhansk. By 13 May, a

Ukraine counter-offensive had driven back Russian forces near Kharkiv. By 20 May, Mariupol fell
[233][234]
to Russian troops following a prolonged siege of the Azovstal steel works. Russian
[235][236]
forces continued to bomb both military and civilian targets far from the frontline. The
war caused the largest refugee and humanitarian crisis within Europe since the Yugoslav Wars
[237][238]
in the 1990s; the UN described it as the fastest-growing such crisis since World War
[239]
II. In the first week of the invasion, the UN reported over a million refugees had fled Ukraine;

this subsequently rose to over 7,405,590 by 24 September, a reduction from over eight million
[240][241]
due to some refugees' return.

Ukrainian forces launched counteroffensives in the south in August, and in the northeast in
September. On 30 September, Russia annexed four oblasts of Ukraine which it had partially
[242]
conquered during the invasion. This annexation was generally unrecognized and
[243]
condemned by the countries of the world. After Putin announced that he would begin

conscription drawn from the 300,000 citizens with military training and potentially the pool of
about 25 million Russians who could be eligible for conscription, one-way tickets out of the
[244][245]
country nearly or completely sold out. The Ukrainian offensive in the northeast

successfully recaptured the majority of Kharkiv Oblast in September. In the course of the
southern counteroffensive, Ukraine retook the city of Kherson in November and Russian forces
[citation needed]
withdrew to the east bank of the Dnieper River.

[246][247]
The invasion was internationally condemned as a war of aggression. A United Nations

General Assembly resolution demanded a full withdrawal of Russian forces, the International
Court of Justice ordered Russia to suspend military operations and the Council of Europe
expelled Russia. Many countries imposed new sanctions, which affected the economies of
[248] [249]
Russia and the world, and provided humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine. In

September 2022, Putin signed a law that would punish anyone who resists conscription with a
[250]
10-year prison sentence resulting in an international push to allow asylum for Russians
[251]
fleeing conscription.

According to The New York Times, as of February 2023, the "number of Russian troops killed and
[252]
wounded in Ukraine is approaching 200,000."
Human rights violations
See also: Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Humanitarian situation during the war in Donbas,
and Russian war crimes § Ukraine

Violations of human rights and atrocity crimes have both occurred during the war. From 2014 to
[253]
2021, there were more than 3,000 civilian casualties, with most occurring in 2014 and 2015.
[254]
The right of movement was impeded for the inhabitants of the conflict zone. Arbitrary

detention was practiced by both sides in the first years of the conflict. It decreased after 2016 in
[255]
government-held areas, while in the separatist-held ones it continued. The investigation into
[256][257]
the abuses, including torture, committed by both sides made little progress. According

to OHCHR the closure of three TV channels amounted to a violation of the freedom of

[256]
expression. There were cases of conflict-related sexual violence, however OHCHR believes

that "there are no grounds to believe that sexual violence has been used for strategic or tactical
[258]
ends by Government forces or the armed groups in the eastern regions of Ukraine." OHCHR

estimates that from 2014 to 2021 around 4,000 detainees were subjected to torture and
ill-treatment, approximately 1,500 by government actors and 2,500 by separatist armed groups,
[259]
and reckons that around 340 of them were also victims of sexual violence.

Related issues

Gas disputes

See also: Russia–Ukraine gas disputes, Nord Stream, Nord Stream 2, and Russia in the European
energy sector
 Major Russian natural gas pipelines to Europe

Europe TTF natural gas

Until 2014 Ukraine was the main transit route for Russian natural gas sold to Europe, which
earned Ukraine about US$3 billion a year in transit fees, making it the country's most lucrative
[260]
export service. Following Russia's launch of the Nord Stream pipeline, which bypasses
[260]
Ukraine, gas transit volumes steadily decreased. Following the start of the Russo-Ukrainian
[261][262]
War in February 2014, severe tensions extended to the gas sector. The subsequent

outbreak of war in the Donbas region forced the suspension of a project to develop Ukraine's
own shale gas reserves at the Yuzivska gas field, which had been planned as a way to reduce
[263]
Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas imports. Eventually, the EU commissioner for energy

Günther Oettinger was called in to broker a deal securing supplies to Ukraine and transit to the
[264]
EU.
An explosion damaged a Ukrainian portion of the Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhhorod pipeline in
[265]
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast in May 2014. Ukrainian officials blamed Russian terrorists. Another

section of the pipeline exploded in the Poltava Oblast on 17 June 2014, one day after Russia
limited the supply of gas to Ukrainian customers due to non-payment. Ukraine's Interior Minister
[266]
Arsen Avakov said the following day that the explosion had been caused by a bomb.

In 2015, Russian state media reported that Russia planned to completely abandon gas supplies
[267][268]
to Europe through Ukraine after 2018. Russia's state-owned energy giant Gazprom had

already substantially reduced the volumes of gas transited across Ukraine, and expressed its
intention to reduce the level further by means of transit-diversification pipelines (Turkish Stream,
[269]
Nord Stream, etc.). Gazprom and Ukraine agreed to a five-year deal on Russian gas transit to
[270][271]
Europe at the end of 2019.

In 2020, the TurkStream natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Turkey changed the regional
gas flows in South-East Europe by diverting the transit through Ukraine and the Trans Balkan
[272][273]
Pipeline system.

In May 2021, the Biden administration waived Trump's CAATSA sanctions on the company
[274][275]
behind Russia's Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy
[276]
said he was "surprised" and "disappointed" by Joe Biden's decision. In July 2021, the U.S.
[277][278]
urged Ukraine not to criticise a forthcoming agreement with Germany over the pipeline.

In July 2021, Biden and German Chancellor Angela Merkel concluded a deal that the U.S. might
trigger sanctions if Russia used Nord Stream as a "political weapon". The deal aimed to prevent
Poland and Ukraine from being cut off from Russian gas supplies. Ukraine will get a $50 million
loan for green technology until 2024 and Germany will set up a billion dollar fund to promote
Ukraine's transition to green energy to compensate for the loss of the gas-transit fees. The
contract for transiting Russian gas through Ukraine will be prolonged until 2034, if the Russian
[279][280][281]
government agrees.
In August 2021, Zelenskyy warned that the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline between Russia
and Germany was "a dangerous weapon, not only for Ukraine but for the whole of
[282][283]
Europe." In September 2021, Ukraine's Naftogaz CEO Yuriy Vitrenko accused Russia of
[284]
using natural gas as a "geopolitical weapon". Vitrenko stated that "A joint statement from the

United States and Germany said that if the Kremlin used gas as a weapon, there would be an
appropriate response. We are now waiting for the imposition of sanctions on a 100% subsidiary
[285]
of Gazprom, the operator of Nord Stream 2."

Hybrid warfare

The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has also included elements of hybrid warfare using non-traditional
means. Cyberwarfare has been used by Russia in operations including successful attacks on
the Ukrainian power grid in December 2015 and in December 2016, which was the first
[286]
successful cyber attack on a power grid, and the Mass hacker supply-chain attack in June
[287]
2017, which the US claimed was the largest known cyber attack. In retaliation, Ukrainian

operations have included the Surkov Leaks in October 2016 which released 2,337 e-mails in
relation to Russian plans for seizing Crimea from Ukraine and fomenting separatist unrest in
[288]
Donbas. The Russian information war against Ukraine has been another front of hybrid

warfare waged by Russia.

A Russian fifth column in Ukraine has also been claimed to exist among the Party of Regions,
the Communist Party, the Progressive Socialist Party and the Russian Orthodox
[289][290][291]
Church.

Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns

Main articles: Russian information war against Ukraine and Disinformation in the 2022 Russian
invasion of Ukraine
Further information: Russian disinformation in the post-Soviet era

[292]
Pro-Kremlin TV and radio host Vladimir Solovyov voiced support for his country's invasion of Ukraine.

False stories have been used to provoke public outrage during the war. In April 2014, Russian
news channels Russia-1 and NTV showed a man saying he was attacked by a fascist Ukrainian
gang on one channel and on the other channel saying he was funding the training of right-wing
[293][294] [295]
anti-Russia radicals. A third segment portrayed the man as a neo-Nazi surgeon. In

May 2014, Russia-1 aired a story about Ukrainian atrocities using footage of a 2012 Russian
[296]
operation in North Caucasus. In the same month, the Russian news network Life presented

a 2013 photograph of a wounded child in Syria as a victim of Ukrainian troops who had just
[297]
retaken Donetsk International Airport.

In June 2014, several Russian state news outlets reported that Ukraine was using white
phosphorus using 2004 footage of white phosphorus being used by the United States in
[296]
Iraq. In July 2014, Channel One Russia broadcast an interview with a woman who said that a

3-year-old boy who spoke Russian was crucified by Ukrainian nationalists in a fictitious square in
[298][299][294][296]
Sloviansk that turned out to be false.

In 2022, Russian state media told stories of genocide and mass graves full of ethnic Russians in
eastern Ukraine. One set of graves outside Luhansk was dug when intense fighting in 2014 cut
off the electricity in the local morgue. Amnesty International investigated 2014 Russian claims
of mass graves filled with hundreds of bodies and instead found isolated incidents of
[300][301][302]
extrajudicial executions by both sides.

Russian artist Alexandra Skochilenko was arrested for replacing price tags in supermarkets with anti-war
[303]
messages.

The Russian censorship apparatus Roskomnadzor ordered the country's media to employ
[304]
information only from Russian state sources or face fines and blocks, and ordered media
[305]
and schools to describe the war as a "special military operation". On 4 March 2022, Putin

signed into law a bill introducing prison sentences of up to 15 years for those who publish "fake
[306]
news" about the Russian military and its operations, leading to some media outlets to stop
[307]
reporting on Ukraine. Russia's opposition politician Alexei Navalny said the "monstrosity of

lies" in the Russian state media "is unimaginable. And, unfortunately, so is its persuasiveness for
[308]
those who have no access to alternative information." He tweeted that "warmongers" among

Russian state media personalities "should be treated as war criminals. From the editors-in-chief
to the talk show hosts to the news editors, [they] should be sanctioned now and tried
[309]
someday."

Putin and Russian media have described the government of Ukraine as being led by neo-Nazis
persecuting ethnic Russians who are in need of protection by Russia, despite Ukraine's
[310][311][301]
President Zelenskyy being Jewish. According to journalist Natalia Antonova,
"Russia's present-day war of aggression is refashioned by propaganda into a direct continuation
of the legacy of the millions of Russian soldiers who died to stop" Nazi Germany in World War
[312]
II. Ukraine's rejection of the adoption of Russia-initiated General Assembly resolutions on

combating the glorification of Nazism, the latest iteration of which is General Assembly
Resolution A/C.3/76/L.57/Rev.1 on Combating Glorification of Nazism, Neo-Nazism and other
Practices that Contribute to Fueling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, serve to present Ukraine as a pro-Nazi state, and indeed
likely forms the basis for Russia's claims, with the only other state rejecting the adoption of the
[313][314]
resolution being the US. The Deputy US Representative for ECOSOC describes such

resolutions as "thinly veiled attempts to legitimize Russian disinformation campaigns

denigrating neighboring nations and promoting the distorted Soviet narrative of much of
[315]
contemporary European history, using the cynical guise of halting Nazi glorification".

NAFO ('North Atlantic Fellas Organization'), a loose cadre of online 'shitposters' vowing to fight
Russian disinformation generally identified by cartoon Shiba Inu dogs in social media, gained
notoriety after June 2022, in the wake of a Twitter quarrel with Russian diplomat Mikhail
[316]
Ulyanov.

Russia–NATO relations

Main article: Russia–NATO relations

Russian military aircraft flying over the Baltic and Black Seas often do not indicate their position
or communicate with air traffic controllers, thus posing a potential risk to civilian airliners. NATO
aircraft scrambled many times in late April 2022 in order to track and intercept these aircraft
near alliance airspace. The Russian aircraft intercepted never entered NATO airspace, and the
[317]
interceptions were conducted in a safe and routine manner. Although Russian Foreign
[318]
Minister Sergey Lavrov has characterized the conflict as a proxy war instigated by NATO, he

said: "We don't think we're at war with NATO ... Unfortunately, NATO believes it is at war with
 [319]
Russia." British Prime Minister Boris Johnson rejected Lavrov's allegation that NATO is
[320]
fighting a 'proxy war' in Ukraine. Former CIA director Leon Panetta told the ABC that the U.S.
[321]
is 'without question' involved in a proxy war with Russia.

International reactions
See also: Second Cold War

Reactions to the Russian annexation of Crimea

Main article: International reactions to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation

Ukrainian response

Following Russia's annexation of Crimea, Ukraine blocked the North Crimean Canal, which provided 85% of
[322]
Crimea's drinking and irrigation water.

Interim Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov accused Russia of "provoking a conflict" by

backing the seizure of the Crimean parliament building and other government offices on the
Crimean peninsula. He compared Russia's military actions to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War,
when Russian troops occupied parts of the Republic of Georgia and the breakaway enclaves of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia were established under the control of Russian-backed
administrations. He called on Putin to withdraw Russian troops from Crimea and stated that
 [323]
Ukraine will "preserve its territory" and "defend its independence". On 1 March, he warned,

"Military intervention would be the beginning of war and the end of any relations between
[324]
Ukraine and Russia." On 1 March, Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov placed the Armed
[325]
Forces of Ukraine on full alert and combat readiness.

The Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs was established by Ukrainian
government on 20 April 2016 to manage occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea
[326]
regions affected by Russian military intervention of 2014.

NATO and United States military response

Further information: Operation Atlantic Resolve, European Deterrence Initiative, NATO Enhanced
Forward Presence, and Russia–NATO relations

A U.S. Army convoy in Vilseck, Germany during Operation Atlantic Resolve, NATO's efforts to reassert its
military presence in central and eastern Europe that began in April 2014.

[327]
On 4 March 2014, the United States pledged $1 billion in aid to Ukraine. Russia's actions

increased tensions in nearby countries historically within its sphere of influence, particularly the
Baltic and Moldova. All have large Russian-speaking populations, and Russian troops are
[328]
stationed in the breakaway Moldovan territory of Transnistria. Some devoted resources to
[329]
increasing defensive capabilities, and many requested increased support from the U.S. and
[328][329]
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which they had joined in recent years. The
conflict "reinvigorated" NATO, which had been created to face the Soviet Union, but had devoted
[330]
more resources to "expeditionary missions" in recent years.

In addition to diplomatic support in its conflict with Russia, the U.S. provided Ukraine with
[331]
US$1.5 billion in military aid during the 2010s. In 2018 the U.S. House of Representatives

passed a provision blocking any training of Azov Battalion of the Ukrainian National Guard by
American forces. In previous years, between 2014 and 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed amendments banning support of Azov, but due to pressure from the Pentagon, the
[332][333][334]
amendments were quietly lifted.

Financial markets

The initial reaction to the escalation of tensions in Crimea caused the Russian and European
[335]
stock market to tumble. The intervention caused the Swiss franc to climb to a 2-year high

against the dollar and 1-year high against the Euro. The Euro and the US dollar both rose, as did
[336]
the Australian dollar. The Russian stock market declined by more than 10 percent, while the
[337][338][339]
Russian ruble hit all-time lows against the US dollar and the Euro. The Russian

central bank hiked interest rates and intervened in the foreign exchange markets to the tune of
[clarification needed] [336]
$12 billion to try to stabilize its currency. Prices for wheat and grain rose,
[340]
with Ukraine being a major exporter of both crops.

Later in March 2014, the reaction of the financial markets to the Crimea annexation was
surprisingly mellow, with global financial markets rising immediately after the referendum held
in Crimea, one explanation being that the sanctions were already priced in following the earlier
[341]
Russian incursion. Other observers considered that the positive reaction of the global

financial markets on Monday 17 March 2014, after the announcement of sanctions against
[342]
Russia by the EU and the US, revealed that these sanctions were too weak to hurt Russia. In

early August 2014, the German DAX was down by 6 percent for the year, and 11 percent since
June, over concerns Russia, Germany's 13th biggest trade partner, would retaliate against
[343]
sanctions.

Reactions to the Russian intervention in the Donbas

Further information: International reactions to the war in Donbas

Peace march in Moscow, 21 September 2014

Pro-Russian supporters in Donetsk, 20 December 2014

Ukrainian public opinion

See also: Putin khuylo!

A poll of the Ukrainian public, excluding Russian-annexed Crimea, was taken by the International
[344]
Republican Institute from 12 to 25 September 2014. 89% of those polled opposed 2014

Russian military intervention in Ukraine. As broken down by region, 78% of those polled from
Eastern Ukraine (including Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) opposed said intervention, along with 89% in
[344]
Southern Ukraine, 93% in Central Ukraine, and 99% in Western Ukraine. As broken down by

native language, 79% of Russian speakers and 95% of Ukrainian speakers opposed the
[344]
intervention. 80% of those polled said the country should remain a unitary country.

A poll of the Crimean public in Russian-annexed Crimea was taken by the Ukrainian branch of
Germany's biggest market research organization, GfK, on 16–22 January 2015. According to its
results: "Eighty-two percent of those polled said they fully supported Crimea's inclusion in
Russia, and another 11 percent expressed partial support. Only 4 percent spoke out against
[345][346][347]
it."

A joint poll conducted by Levada and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology from
September to October 2020 found that in the breakaway regions controlled by the DPR/LNR, just
over half of the respondents wanted to join Russia (either with or without some autonomous
status) while less than one-tenth wanted independence and 12% wanted reintegration into
Ukraine. It contrasted with respondents in Kyiv-controlled Donbas, where a vast majority felt the
[348]
separatist regions should be returned to Ukraine. According to results from Levada in

January 2022, roughly 70% of those in the breakaway regions said their territories should
[349]
become part of the Russian Federation.

Russian public opinion

See also: 2014 anti-war protests in Russia

An August 2014 survey by the Levada Centre reported that only 13% of those Russians polled
[350]
would support the Russian government in an open war with Ukraine. Street protests against
[351][352]
the war in Ukraine arose in Russia. Notable protests first occurred in March and large

protests occurred in September when "tens of thousands" protested the war in Ukraine with a
peace march in downtown Moscow on Sunday, 21 September 2014, "under heavy police
[353]
supervision".
Reactions to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Main article: Reactions to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

See also: List of foreign aid to Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War

Ukrainian public opinion

Ukrainian refugees in Kraków protest against the war, 6 March 2022

In March 2022, a week after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 98% of Ukrainians – including 82%
of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine – said they did not believe that any part of Ukraine was
rightfully part of Russia, according to Lord Ashcroft's polls which did not include Crimea and the
separatist-controlled part of Donbas. 97% of Ukrainians said they had an unfavourable view of
Russian President Vladimir Putin, with a further 94% saying they had an unfavourable view of the
[354]
Russian Armed Forces.

At the end of 2021, 75% of Ukrainians said they had a positive attitude toward ordinary Russians,
while in May 2022, 82% of Ukrainians said they had a negative attitude toward ordinary
[355]
Russians.

Russian public opinion

An April 2022 survey by the Levada Centre reported that approximately 74% of the Russians
polled supported the "special military operation" in Ukraine, suggesting that Russian public
 [356]
opinion has shifted considerably since 2014. According to some sources, a reason many

Russians supported the "special military operation" has to do with the propaganda and
[357][358]
disinformation. In addition, it has been suggested that some respondents did not want
[359][360]
to answer pollsters' questions for fear of negative consequences. At the end of March, a

poll conducted in Russia by the Levada Center concluded the following: When asked why they
think the military operation is taking place, respondents said it was to protect and defend
civilians, ethnic Russians or Russian speakers in Ukraine (43%), to prevent an attack on Russia
(25%), to get rid of nationalists and "denazify" Ukraine (21%), and to incorporate Ukraine or the
[361]
Donbas region into Russia (3%)."

United States

On 28 April 2022, US President Joe Biden asked Congress for an additional $33 billion to assist
[362]
Ukraine, including $20 billion to provide weapons to Ukraine. On 5 May, Ukraine's Prime

Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that Ukraine had received more than $12 billion worth of
weapons and financial aid from Western countries since the start of Russia's invasion on 24
[363]
February. On 21 May 2022, the United States passed legislation providing $40 billion in new

military and humanitarian foreign aid to Ukraine, marking a historically large commitment of
[364][365]
funds. In August 2022, U.S. defense spending to counter the Russian war effort

exceeded the first 5 years of war costs in Afghanistan. The Washington Post reported that new
U.S. weapons delivered to the Ukrainian war front suggest a closer combat scenario with more
[366]
casualties. The United States looks to build "enduring strength in Ukraine" with increased
[366]
arms shipments and a record-breaking $3 billion military aid package.

Russian military suppliers

After expending large amounts of heavy weapons and munitions over months, the Russian
Federation received combat drones and loitering munitions from Iran, deliveries of tanks and
other armoured vehicles from Belarus, and reportedly planned to trade for artillery ammunition
[367][368][369][370]
from North Korea and ballistic missiles from Iran.

China may be providing Russia technology it needs for high-tech weapons, and the United
States sanctioned a Chinese firm for providing satellite imagery to Russian mercenary forces
[371]
fighting in Ukraine.

See also

​
​ Modern history portal

​
​ Politics portal

​
​ Russia portal

​
​ Ukraine portal

​
​ War portal
● Outline of the Russo-Ukrainian War
● List of conflicts in Europe
● List of invasions and occupations of Ukraine
● List of ongoing armed conflicts
● List of wars involving Russia
● List of wars involving Ukraine
● Modern history of Ukraine
● New generation warfare
● Russia under Vladimir Putin

Notes

● ^ Self-declared republic since 7 April 2014; annexation by Russia declared on 30 September

2022.
● ^ Self-declared republic since 27 April 2014; annexation by Russia declared on 30 September
2022.
 ● ^ For further details, see Belarusian involvement in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
● ^ There remain "some contradictions and inherent problems" regarding the date on which the
[372]
annexation began. Ukraine claims 20 February 2014 as "the beginning of the temporary
occupation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia", citing the timeframe inscribed on the Russian
[373]
medal "For the Return of Crimea", and in 2015 the Ukrainian parliament officially designated
[374]
the date as such. On 20 February 2014, Vladimir Konstantinov who at that time was a
chairman of the republican council of Crimea and representing the Party of Regions expressed
[375]
his thoughts about secession of the region from Ukraine. On 23 February 2014 the Russian
ambassador to Ukraine Mikhail Zurabov was recalled to Moscow due to a "worsening of [the]
situation in Ukraine". In early March 2015, President Putin stated in a Russian movie about the
annexation of Crimea that he ordered the operation to "restore" Crimea to Russia following an
[372][376]
all-night emergency meeting on 22–23 February 2014, and in 2018 the Russian Foreign
Minister claimed that the earlier "start date" on the medal was due to a "technical
[377]
misunderstanding".
● ^ Russian: pоссийско-украинская война, romanized: rossiysko-ukrainskaya voyna; Ukrainian:
російсько-українська війна, romanized: rosiisko-ukrainska viina.
● ^ Many countries have provided various levels of support to Ukraine short of becoming
belligerents in the war, while Belarus has provided Russian forces territorial access for the 2022
invasion.

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ab
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population of the Crimea fully support Russia's annexation of the peninsula, according to a poll
carried out by the GfK Group research institute in Ukraine, Ukrainian online newspaper
Ukrainska Pravda reported on Wednesday. Another 11% of respondents said that they rather
support the annexation of Crimea, while 4% were against it.
● ^ O'Loughlin, John; Sasse, Gwendolyn; Toal, Gerard; Bakke, Kristin M. (12 February 2021). "A new
survey of the Ukraine-Russia conflict finds deeply divided views in the contested Donbas
region". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Archived from the original on 23 April 2022.
Retrieved 23 April 2022.
● ^ O'Loughlin, John; Sasse, Gwendolyn; Toal, Gerard; Minakov, Mikhail (23 February 2022).
"Public Opinion in the Divided Donbas: Results of a January 2022 Survey on Both Sides of the
Contact Line". Wilson Center.
● ^ Antonova, Natalia (5 September 2014). "Putin walks a tightrope as evidence mounts of
Russians dying in Ukraine". The Guardian. Retrieved 7 September 2014.
● ^ "Dozens Arrested at Moscow Anti-war Protest". Voice of America. 2 March 2014. Retrieved 26
November 2020.
● ^ "Russian anti-war protesters detained in Moscow". Agence France-Presse. 2 March 2014.
Archived from the original on 4 May 2014. Retrieved 17 March 2014.
● ^ Demirjian, Karoun (21 September 2014). "Russian peace march draws tens of thousands in
support of Ukraine". The Washington Post. Retrieved 23 September 2013.
● ^ "Ukrainians want to stay and fight, but don't see Russian people as the enemy. A remarkable
poll from Kyiv". European Leadership Network. 14 March 2022.
● ^ "Perception index of the Russian-Ukrainian war: results of a telephone survey conducted on
May 19-24, 2022". Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. May 2022.
● ^ "Russians with Ukrainian Relatives Trust Their TVs More Than Their Family". Newsweek. 12
May 2022.
● ^ "'Pure Orwell': how Russian state media spins invasion as liberation". The Guardian. 25
February 2022.
● ^ "Russians in the dark about true state of war amid country's Orwellian media coverage". CNN.
3 April 2022.
● ^ "In Russia, opinion polls are a political weapon". openDemocracy. 9 March 2022.
● ^ Yaffa, Joshua (29 March 2022). "Why Do So Many Russians Say They Support the War in
Ukraine?". The New Yorker.
● ^ "Russian Public Accepts Putin's Spin on Ukraine Conflict". Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
12 April 2022.
● ^ "War in Ukraine: U.S. dramatically upgrades its aid package to Kyiv". Le Monde. 29 April 2022.
● ^ "Ukraine gets over $12 billion in weapons, financial aid since start of Russian invasion-
Ukraine's PM". Reuters. 5 May 2022.
● ^ Fram, Alan (11 May 2022). "House approves $40B in Ukraine aid, beefing up Biden request".
Associated Press. Archived from the original on 11 May 2022.
● ^ Pallaro, Bianca; Parlapiano, Alicia (20 May 2022). "Four Ways to Understand the $54 Billion in
U.S. Spending on Ukraine". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331.
● ^
● Jump up to:
ab
● "New weapons for Ukraine suggest preparation for closer combat" washingtonpost.com.
Retrieved 22 August 2022.
● ^ "Iran agrees to supply missiles as well as drones to Russia". The Guardian. 18 October 2022.
Retrieved 14 November 2022.
● ^ "British Defense Ministry: Russia loses 40 armored assault vehicles a day in Ukraine". Meduza.
3 November 2022. Retrieved 14 November 2022.
● ^ Parfonov, Hlib (9 November 2022). "Grouping of Russian Units in Belarus Continues to Swell".
Eurasia Daily Monitor. 19 (167).
● ^ "North Korean ammo will stretch Russia's supply, but with clear limits and drawbacks". NPR.
Associated Press. 7 September 2022. Retrieved 14 November 2022.
● ^ "Ukraine war: What support is China giving Russia?". BBC News. 4 March 2022. Retrieved 12
March 2023.
● ^
● Jump up to:
ab
● McDermott, Roger N. (2016). "Brothers Disunited: Russia's use of military power in Ukraine".
In Black, J.L.; Johns, Michael (eds.). The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia.
London. pp. 99–129. doi:10.4324/9781315684567-5. ISBN 978-1-138-92409-3. OCLC
909325250.
● ^ "7683rd meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Thursday, 28 April 2016, 3 p.m. New
York". Mr. Prystaiko (Ukraine): ... In that regard, I have to remind the Council that the official
medal that was produced by the Russian Federation for the so-called return of Crimea has the
dates on it, starting with 20 February, which is the day before that agreement was brought to the
attention of the Security Council by the representative of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the
Russian Federation started – not just planned, but started – the annexation of Crimea the day
before we reached the first agreement and while President Yanukovych was still in power.
● ^ "'Няша' Поклонська обіцяє бійцям 'Беркута' покарати учасників Майдану".
www.segodnya.ua (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 3 February 2022.
● ^ "Спікер ВР АРК вважає, що Крим може відокремитися від України". Українська правда
(in Ukrainian). Retrieved 3 February 2022.
● ^ "Putin describes secret operation to seize Crimea". Yahoo News. 8 March 2015. Retrieved 24
March 2015.
● ^ "Russia's Orwellian 'diplomacy'". unian.info. Retrieved 30 January 2019.
Further reading
See also: Bibliography of Ukrainian history and List of Slavic studies journals

● Bowen, Andrew (2017). "Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian Strategy in
Eastern Ukraine". Journal of Strategic Studies. 42 (3–4): 312–343.
doi:10.1080/01402390.2017.1413550. S2CID 158522112.
● Bremmer, Ian (1994). "The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine". Europe-Asia Studies.
46 (2): 261–283. doi:10.1080/09668139408412161.
● Derix, Steven. Zelensky: Ukraine's President and His Country (2022) excerpt
● Hagendoorn, A.; Linssen, H.; Tumanov, S. V. (2001). Intergroup Relations in States of the former
Soviet Union: The Perception of Russians. New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-84169-231-9.
● Legvold, Robert (2013). Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century and the Shadow of the
Past. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-51217-6.
● Marples, David R. ed. The War in Ukraine's Donbas: Origins, Contexts, and the Future (2022) excerpt

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