WIRES Cognitive Science - 2023 - Smith - Use of Augmentative Interspecies Communication Devices in Animal Language Studies

Received: 12 April 2022 Revised: 22 February 2023 Accepted: 7 March 2023
DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1647
FOCUS ARTICLE
Use of Augmentative Interspecies Communication devices

in animal language studies: A review
Gabriella E. Smith 1,2,3 | Amalia P. M. Bastos 1,2 | Ashley Evenson 2,4 |

2 1
Leo Trottier | Federico Rossano
1
Department of Cognitive Science,
University of California, San Diego, Abstract
La Jolla, California, USA Countless discussions have been generated by the animal language studies,
2
CleverPet, Inc, San Diego, specifically those utilizing mechanical interfaces, termed here Augmentative
California, USA
3
Interspecies Communication (AIC) devices (e.g., lexigrams; magnetic chips;
Comparative Cognition, Messerli
Research Institute, University of
keyboards). Overall, three concerns dominate the field: (1) claims that AIC
Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Medical device using animals manifest linguistic skills remain nebulous, and simpler
University of Vienna, University of alternative mechanisms have been proposed (e.g., associative learning);
Vienna, Vienna, Austria
4
(2) such methodology may be unsuitable as some theorize AIC device inter-
College of Arts and Sciences, Canisius
College, Buffalo, New York, USA faces are not sufficiently ecologically relevant to foster meaningful use; (3) data
may be considered dubious due to potential cueing from experimenters and
Correspondence
lack of systematicity in reporting training and performance. Despite such
Gabriella E. Smith, Department of
Cognitive Science, University of controversy—which eventually led to the field's deterioration around the last
California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman quarter of the twentieth century—this research also saw important successes,
Dr., La Jolla, CA 92093, USA.
Email: g5smith@ucsd.edu
such as improvements in captive animal welfare, the outcomes of which hold
promise for future interspecies communication work.
Funding information
CleverPet, Inc This article is categorized under:
Linguistics > Evolution of Language
Edited by: Geert Brône, Editor KEYWORDS

animal behavior, animal cognition, animal language studies, comparative cognition,
interspecies communication
1 | INTRODUCTION
Systematic attempts to communicate with nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals) have been documented since the
early 20th century. Evolving from projects in the 1930s that compared developmental timelines of humans and chim-
panzees (Jacobsen, 1932; Kellogg & Kellogg, 1934), animal language studies emerged in response to the impossibility of
training nonhuman primates to acquire speech-like vocalizations (Furness, 1916; Hayes & Hayes, 1952; Hayes &
Nissen, 1971; Kellogg, 1968), and the subsequent desire to design an alternative means to achieve interspecies commu-
nication. Acknowledging nonhuman primates' behavioral tendencies to gesticulate (Van Lawick-Goodall, 1968;
Yerkes, 1943), evidencing more flexibility in the manual modality compared to the vocal one in terms of production,
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2 of 12 SMITH ET AL.
F I G U R E 1 (a) Lana's computer (chimpanzee; Rumbaugh et al., 1973); (b) Sarah's magnetic chips (chimpanzee; Premack, 1971);
(c) Kanzi's keyboard (bonobo; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1985); (d) underwater dolphin keyboard (Reiss & McCowan, 1993); (e) Sofia's
keyboard (dog; Rossi & Ades, 2008). Artist's rendition; devices are not to scale.
studies of this kind shifted to examine linguistic abilities via sign language (Fouts, 1973; Gardner & Gardner, 1969;
Miles, 1990; Patterson, 1978; Terrace et al., 1979), or mechanical interfaces (Asano et al., 1982; Premack, 1971;
Rumbaugh et al., 1973; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978a; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1985). Although the animals studied
during the second half of the twentieth century were predominantly nonhuman primates, concurrent projects also
investigated: vocal speech production and competence in cetaceans (Lilly et al., 1968; Richards et al., 1984) and psitta-
cines (Pepperberg, 1981); gestural competence in pinnipeds (Schusterman & Krieger, 1984) and cetaceans (Herman
et al., 1984); and mechanical interface use in cetaceans (Reiss & McCowan, 1993).
For the purposes of this review, the methodology identified as a “mechanical interface” (e.g., lexigrams; magnetic
chips; keyboards) is termed here as Augmentative Interspecies Communication (AIC). Similar in function and design
to Augmentative and Alternative Communication devices—interfaces originally developed and used to produce words
on behalf of language-impaired human users (for a historical review, see Hourcade et al., 2004)—AIC devices were
implemented in interspecies communication studies to reduce issues such as faulty signing by human trainers and
inadvertent cueing (Figure 1). Given the recent popularity of training family pets to communicate with humans via
AIC devices (see Hunger, 2021), and the lack of a review focused on this particular interspecific communication
methodology, this paper specifically traces discussions surrounding scientific claims of linguistic intelligence and
methodological pitfalls to serve as a critical reflection of the AIC device work to inform and orient current and future
research in this field.
2 | CLAI MS
2.1 | Syntax and sentences
Over the course of numerous investigations into human-like language in AIC device-trained animals, claims of linguis-
tic intelligence have varied in theoretical basis. As there is “no universally accepted definition of language” (Hill, 1980),
SMITH ET AL. 3 of 12
arguments for/against the presence of linguistic intelligence have varied, from comprehension of abstract concepts
(Herman & Forestell, 1985; Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, & Boysen, 1980a), comprehension of sentence semantics
(Pate & Rumbaugh, 1983), to the ability to label items (Gill & Rumbaugh, 1974; Mistler-Lachman et al., 1974). Syntax,
facets of which include word order, hierarchical structure, and recursivity (Hill, 1980), has also been a major focus in
the study of language-like abilities in animals. The first claim of simple syntax in an animal using an AIC device was
made by David Premack, based on his published work with Sarah the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes; Figure 1b;
Premack, 1971). Sarah was trained to vertically orient magnetic tokens representing words on a board to form or finish
sentences, as well as match correct phrases to targets. Such abilities were identified by Premack as consistent with syn-
tactic word order comprehension, and thus, with some level of linguistic intelligence. Premack proceeded to propose
that human language evolved from the cognitive abilities he had observed in Sarah, such as conceptualization, refer-
ence, and serial ordering, rather than from primate calls, as was the theory at the time (Schusterman & Gisiner, 1988).
Some critics questioned these claims, however, responding that word order may not be a suitable metric of linguistic
intelligence given its known variance in human populations (Brown, 1973; Hill, 1980).
Premack was not the only researcher using AIC devices to claim syntactic abilities in a subject. Around the same
time, a chimpanzee named Lana (an acronym for Language ANAlogue) was trained by Rumbaugh et al. (1973) to
encode and comprehend stock sentences consisting of lexigrams (symbols denoting words) via a specialized computer
interface. Using this method, Lana could operantly request food or drink items, manipulate her environment, entertain
herself, and answer experimenter questions (Figure 1a; Rumbaugh et al., 1973). Furthermore, by being trained to insert
the appropriate lexigrams in sentence strings, Lana was reported to demonstrate syntactic comprehension (Rumbaugh
et al., 1973; Rumbaugh & Gill, 1977). Critics, however, pointed out that if the researchers' criterion for presence of lan-
guage was “understanding” syntactically correct and incorrect sentences, then even Lana's computer must qualify as
having language-like abilities (Mistler-Lachman et al., 1974). Nonetheless, Rumbaugh et al.'s work with Lana contrib-
uted substantially to conversations regarding the conditions necessary to stimulate learning in humans and other ani-
mals (see Section 3.1) (Limber, 1977).
2.2 | Reference and representation
Discussions into the criteria for linguistic intelligence in AIC device-trained animals included not only theoretical
hallmarks of linguistic intelligence (e.g., syntax) but also cognitive ones. Such conversations considered referential,
symbolic representation a foundational cognitive prerequisite to linguistic intelligence, particularly cases in which
the target object is not present (i.e., displacement) (Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, & Boysen, 1980b). In the case
of the AIC device-trained animals, symbols represent word meanings, but the definition of how such symbolic
representations manifest cognitively has differed among researchers. For example, Savage-Rumbaugh suggested
symbolic representations manifest as the comprehension of abstract concepts and success at referential cognitive
displacement tasks. To test this, Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1978a, 1978b) trained lexigram-trained chimpanzees
Sherman and Austin to identify objects based on categorical identity (e.g., apples are food and not tools) and then
transfer this rule-based knowledge to novel stimuli. The researchers claimed the chimpanzees were successful, and
that such success revealed the subjects' capacity for conceptual comprehension and thus potential symbolic repre-
sentation (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978a, 1978b). Furthermore, after subsequent training on differentiating
requesting and labeling items, Sherman and Austin were then reported to be capable of retrieving absent objects
upon request, and consequently deemed successful at referential cognitive displacement and symbolic representa-
tion (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986). The researchers thus suggested that such abilities could serve as foundational
to the apes' linguistic intelligence.
Premack proposed an alternative definition of representations, one of an internal, mental image of an objects'
features (e.g., apple stem, peel, and red color make up the mental image of an apple, see Premack, 1976). He inves-
tigated this through transfer tasks, charging Sarah first with learning the physical features associated with an
object (e.g., an apple is red, round, and has a stem), and then observing how she performed when the object was
replaced with something dissimilar in appearance but carrying the same label (e.g., apple stimulus replaced with a
blue triangle also labeled “apple”). Premack claimed that Sarah was capable of attributing the same features of an
apple to the blue triangle despite an apple stimulus not being present, and therefore such cognitive displacement
was evidence of mental representation (Premack, 1976). Critics pushed back on these claims, however, pointing
out that Sarah could have merely learned to associate such labels through training rather than rely on a mental
image (Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, & Boysen, 1980b), leaving the connection between mental representations
and linguistic intelligence a matter of ongoing debate.
Such research stirred doubts overall into whether symbolic representations are necessarily foundational to lan-
guage. A study by Epstein et al. examined pigeons' (Columba domestica) capacity to referentially communicate in a
replication of Savage-Rumbaugh's work, and reported that pigeons could select symbols representing words and
short phrases in exchanges between individuals (Epstein et al., 1980). In addition, in their response to Savage-
Rumbaugh et al.'s paper claiming more advanced symbolic communication in lexigram-trained bonobos (Pan
paniscus) compared to chimpanzees (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986), Seidenberg and Petitto recall a study by
Herrnstein et al. in which pigeons learned to associate pecking rates to categorical exemplars in a seemingly refer-
ential way (i.e., pigeons could distinguish between images containing trees and people in both trained and
untrained trials, thus suggesting the capacity for conceptual comprehension; Herrnstein et al., 1976; Seidenberg &
Petitto, 1987). This debate continued when researchers claimed sea lions (Zalophus californianus) could success-
fully transfer the functionality of learned equivalence relations among symbols to novel stimuli (Kastak
et al., 2001; Schusterman & Kastak, 1993, 1998), an ability theorized to be connected to symbolic representation
and a precursor of referential communication and linguistic intelligence in humans (Sidman et al., 1982). Having
pigeons replicate AIC device studies originally executed on nonhuman primates and identifying similar abilities in
nonprimate species like pinnipeds expands the debate from whether the original great apes' performances were
evidence of complex linguistic abilities rooted in symbolic representations, to whether, indeed, both primate and
nonprimate species could be capable of such abilities (see, e.g., Lyn, 2007; Schusterman et al., 2003).
2.3 | Comprehension, production, and association
Another highly contested topic in the animal language projects concerns whether an AIC device-trained subject com-
prehends and produces communicative interactions with comparable proficiency. Regarding comprehension, Savage-
Rumbaugh et al. (1985) reported that their lexigram-trained bonobo Kanzi came to understand spoken English before
he came to communicate through his lexigram keyboard (Figure 1c). Therefore, the team claimed that since compre-
hension “inevitably precedes production” (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1985), Kanzi's understanding of lexigram commu-
nications came as a natural next step. Premack also investigated comprehension of spoken language by chimpanzees,
finding that specific transfer training was required before the generalization of certain vocal commands could be trans-
ferred to novel token constructions (see Premack, 2014).
Regarding production, however, many argued that instead of maintaining complex understanding of what buttons,
tokens, or lexigrams the animals were selecting—and thus using to succeed at tests of linguistic intelligence—AIC
device-trained animals had simply learned to associate certain inputs with contextually appropriate cues. A famous
metaphor for this criticism comes from Roger Brown: Are pigeons trained to bat a ball back and forth playing ping-
pong (Brown, 1973)? Regarding Premack's work, Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, and Boysen (1980b) commented that
Sarah needed only to insert a learned symbol sequence in a simple associate-naming exercise to earn the claim of pro-
ductive linguistic competence, and therefore was not required to take into consideration what the symbols actually
meant. In the case of Lana, Mistler-Lachman et al. (1974) equated the chimpanzee's behavior to that of trained “rats
[discriminating] between the response sequences necessary for food and water in a T-maze … labeling the sides of the
maze as ‘the food side’ and ‘the water side.’” In fact, such accusations of reported productions consisting instead of
operations requiring little cognitive processing came to the determination that food rewards should not be the sole
motivator when training AIC device use and should rather be replaced by the reward of the relevant target itself for a
more reliable interpretation of a subject's productions (see Krause & Beran, 2020).
Similar criticisms were leveled at Savage-Rumbaugh's work. Seidenberg and Petitto (1987) commented that, rather
than engaging in linguistic exchange, Kanzi only knew how to use lexigrams for manding purposes (Skinner, 1957),
such as to obtain objects, engage in activities, or receive attention, and such criticisms continue to be leveled in more
recent reviews of Kanzi's communicative performance (Tomasello, 2017). Note here that Kanzi was and is known to
use lexigrams to narrate or inform, rather than display an intention to obtain anything (Lyn et al., 2011; Savage-
Rumbaugh, 1987). Even so, critics drew a distinction between association-based lexigram use and complex language-
like understanding, stating that the ape's productive use of symbols was purely associative. Thus, the extent to which
animals might be capable of progressing beyond such associations to more advanced comprehension of symbols still
remains unsettled.
3 | METHODS
3.1 | Artificiality
As criticisms into claims of linguistic intelligence in animals arose, so too did those regarding the research methodology.
As mentioned earlier, AIC device studies evolved from questions regarding the language development of apes raised in
human homes, and were designed with the intention of improving controls and preventing inadvertent cueing. Because
of the nature of AIC devices, training and use manifest as simple inputs and outputs of symbol selections. Although some
studies employed a mix of communication modes (e.g., lexigram selection augmented by spoken speech and/or gestures:
Sevcik & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1994), the goal was to make the interactions as clean and precise as possible.
One of the unforeseen outcomes of this methodology, however, concerns the negative effect of the experimental artificial-
ity on the ecological validity of the findings and the motivation of animals to engage with such devices. This was most clear
in terms of how both training methods and AIC devices themselves matched typical, species-appropriate behavior. For
example, critics raised the concern that the symbol-to-word training procedure lacked appropriate comparison to the subject
species' observed communication in the wild or captivity, thus weakening the interpretations of the communications
observed (Cook, 1988; Ristau & Robbins, 1979). Also, in the case of Lana, training methods may have been too rigid, causing
potential frustration and affecting learning. Because of the exactness of Lana's computer, for example, requests that would
make functional sense to a human (e.g., “you move milk in machine” meaning “give me milk”) were rejected until Lana fig-
ured out how to input the correct phrase (e.g., “please, machine, give milk”) or were never realized if Lana gave up
(Gill, 1977). Furthermore, despite several concerns of over-interpretation of results, AIC device training also had the poten-
tial of resulting in the opposite issue: false negatives. For example, apparent lack of comprehension could instead have been
due to the symbols the AIC devices contained, such as topics about which subjects were simply not interested in communi-
cating, or a lack of a large enough breadth of expressions (e.g., emotions and intrinsic interest in nonfood rewards, Ristau &
Robbins, 1979). Both could have potentially decreased or eliminated motivation to interact with the devices.
Such discussions on the topic of ecological validity in AIC device experiments, however, also stimulated critical research
discoveries. For example, while Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1986) found bonobo Kanzi's comprehension of lexigrams to pre-
cede production, they also found that when production eventually occurred, it did so spontaneously and in appropriate con-
texts. Such a breakthrough revealed advanced and nuanced communicative intelligence in the bonobo subjects on par with
human children that, critically, was not expressed by the research team's chimpanzee subjects without extensive training.
Thus, such critical discoveries made in the absence of artificial AIC training not only revealed the essential effect of natural-
istic context on encouraging communication, but also offered critical evidence into the evolution of linguistic intelligence
among primate species. Another critical issue that emerged from the artificial design of AIC device studies is that of animal
welfare. Some critics claimed that the artificial input and output of symbols not only influenced the science at-hand, but, as
a consequence of some projects' limited contact between subjects and researchers (Gill & Rumbaugh, 1977), subjects experi-
enced negative welfare, likened to lab rats running in a maze (Bettoni, 2007). Some animal language scientists defended lab-
oratory use, asserting that, at least for chimpanzees, use of AIC devices is sufficiently ecologically valid given the apes'
known tendencies to use tools in the wild (Gill & Rumbaugh, 1974; Matsuzawa, 1996). In the case of Lana, however, the
chimpanzee was reported to fully engage with the computer only once the experimental design allowed researchers to inter-
act with her, revealing the negative effect of the experimental conditions (i.e. isolation designed to prevent cueing) on her
behavior (Rumbaugh et al., 1973). Upon the realization of the importance of social interaction to stimulate engagement,
however, researchers in this and later projects pivoted to prioritize a social environment in the training of their animals,
yielding fruitful results (Brakke & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995, 1996; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986). The unforeseen benefits of
such discussions rightfully took the form of a complete restructuring of captive animal care and husbandry practices, particu-
larly those of chimpanzees (Collins, 2015). It is now universally accepted that highly intelligent, long-living animals such as
apes deserve adequate care, enrichment, social interactions with conspecifics, and access to environments that encourage
natural behaviors during and after experimentation periods, none of which can be adequately fulfilled when living in a
human home or lab environment.
3.2 | Experimenter influence
Discussions stimulated by AIC device methodology also touched upon the confounding effect of experimenter influ-
ence. Accusations of this kind largely fell into two camps: experimenter sway on subject behavior; and experimenter
interpretation and reporting of data. The former criticism regards a widespread methodological concern in animal stud-
ies, called the Clever Hans Effect. Originating from 1900s Germany, the story of the Clever Hans Effect regards a horse
(Equus caballus) named Hans reported to accurately tap responses with his hoof to questions (e.g., mathematical com-
putations) made not only by his trainer, Herr Wilhelm von Osten, but also those made by unfamiliar people and in the
absence of his trainer (Pfungst, 1907). Hans's intelligence soon reached worldwide fame, earning him not only the nick-
name “Clever” but also a crowd of critics. A gamut of tests closely examined Hans' success and eventually revealed two
conditions in which Hans could not accurately answer the questions posed: when those present did not know the
answer to the question at hand; and when eye blinders were placed on the horse to obscure his field of view. The critics
thus determined that Hans was clever, not explicitly with regards to the subject matter of the questions posed, but
rather in terms of reading the unwitting cues of those around him (e.g., body relaxation) to know when he reached the
expected correct answer.
The Clever Hans Effect made a profound mark on animal research, and despite its development as a more con-
trolled methodology, AIC device research was not spared from such criticism (Sebeok & Rosenthal, 1981). Examples of
the Clever Hans Effect in AIC device work soon came to the surface, evidence including notable decreases in AIC
device-trained subject performance when alone or around unfamiliar trainers, specific behavior reinforcement caused
by researcher delight and praise at apparent innovations, and favored pupils receiving biased attention by researchers
expecting successful performance (Ristau & Robbins, 1979; Umiker-Sebeok & Sebeok, 1981).
The upheaval of the animal language studies caused by such criticisms revealed further sources of concern. A reve-
lation of perhaps equal significance to data tainted by unwitting cues is the human tendency to over/misinterpret find-
ings before investigating simpler, alternative explanations. Several research groups were questioned on their data
reporting, and such errors included selectivity of procedure details, lack in reporting subjects' previous experience, and
interpretations of communication without scientific rationale (Ristau & Robbins, 1979; Terrace, 1979; Umiker-Sebeok &
Sebeok, 1981). A common criticism of this kind involved the reporting of contextually inconsistent productions rea-
soned as innovations, jokes, or typing errors. Examples of this include Lana's use of the period key gratuitously inter-
preted as intended sentence erasure (Ristau & Robbins, 1979), and Premack excusing “Sarah's difficulty…[as] his fault,
not hers” (Umiker-Sebeok & Sebeok, 1981). It is important to note, however, that such criticisms of selective data inter-
pretation and reporting were not universal to all AIC projects.
Despite the controversy stirred by claims of Clever Hans Effect and over/misinterpretation, such discussions have
proved integral to improving the design and execution of subsequent research. Over the last century, animal research
has advanced dramatically to require more stringent experimental controls (e.g., double-blind experimentation), and
extensive documentation of individual subject experience and performance, experimental methodology, and empirical
rationale for reported conclusions (but not without their own faults, see Umiker-Sebeok & Sebeok, 1981). Despite these
advances, it is important to note that some methodological concerns remain at odds with issues raised by the Clever
Hans Effect today, namely the separation of researchers and subjects to prevent cueing instead inhibiting subjects from
engaging at all.
3.3 | Reproducibility
Discussions surrounding data legitimacy also touch on the issue of experimental reproducibility. This concern manifests
at both the individual and species levels, both owing to the fact that the projects' subjects were usually not domesticated
and were often endangered or protected species (e.g., bonobos). At the individual level, an unfortunate realization was
the occurrence of pseudoreplication due to the small sample size, that is, executing repeated measures on the same sub-
jects as a reflection of a species (Umiker-Sebeok & Sebeok, 1981). This is problematic not only as is it an inappropriate
representation of the study species, but it is poor scientific practice and damaging to the data's integrity. Furthermore,
critics pointed out that harnessing chimpanzees' skillful learning of serialized forced-choice tasks is only as valuable as
how accurately they respond within the first few trials of transfer tests (Umiker-Sebeok & Sebeok, 1980). In Premack's
case (see Premack, 2014), Sarah's transfer test accuracy was often reported only as a percentage of 10 trials
(e.g., sometimes not statistically significant), and rarely as first-trial results. The issue of reproducibility also translates
to the species level. Specifically, as a consequence of subsequent, important protections legislated for captive animals of
complex cognitive abilities (Allen, 2016; Collins, 2015; National Aquarium of Baltimore, 2016), many became difficult
to access and obtain for study, thus making future replications of the animal language studies near-impossible
(Krause & Beran, 2020; Lyn, 2017). Therefore, many AIC projects remain the only ones of their kind.
4 | C ON C L U S I ON S
This review recounts the multifaceted discourse surrounding the Augmentative Interspecies Communication (AIC)
devices used in animal language research. It is important to note from a historical perspective that criticisms such as
these subsequently triggered the eventual deterioration of interspecies communication research, causing a marked
decrease in projects and funding around the last quarter of the twentieth century (Pepperberg, 2017, 2021). Despite this,
animal language studies—AIC device research included—greatly impacted the field of comparative cognition.
An example of this comes from David Premack's work. In 1983, Premack discussed the potential effect of AIC device
training on the cognitive abilities of study subjects, specifically how the investigation of symbolic representation
through experimental training procedures affected their expression of more or different advanced cognitive capacities
compared to the abilities of counterparts lacking such experience (Premack, 1983). Years later, Premack's musings were
revisited in experimental form, such as studies indicating that chimpanzee subjects trained on the symbolic representa-
tion of Arabic numerals perform better on mathematical summation tasks (Boysen & Berntson, 1989), and how referen-
tial vocal communication training in Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) facilitates the expression and identification of
abstract concepts among stimuli (e.g., same/different) (Pepperberg & Brezinsky, 1991). Such discoveries have been theo-
rized to serve a valuable purpose in the field of comparative cognition, specifically the opportunity to compare cognition
between subjects in a species rather than between nonhumans and humans, thus serving as a refinement of the com-
parative cognition scientific approach (Kuczaj & Kirkpatrick, 1993).
In response to the evident deterioration of the field over the language-based conflict, some researchers pivoted to
use AIC-like devices as tools in captivity to focus on topics related to animal welfare and cognition. Termed animal
computer interfaces (ACI), such devices are similar to AIC devices in that they are apparatuses consisting of symbols to
be selected by an animal subject, but instead often function more like vending machines in that they do not necessarily
require two-way interaction (Mancini, 2011). Such technology has been designed with the aim to improve and/or aug-
ment the welfare of captive animals (e.g., on farms; in zoos/aquaria; in homes; Westerlaken & Gualeni, 2014;
Wirman, 2014), by offering environmental control and/or source of entertainment (e.g., in sea lions, Winship
et al., 2023; in primates, Martin et al., 2022). For example, Reiss and McCowan (1993) trained captive dolphins
(Tursiops truncatus) to socially request desired objects or activities from humans through buttons on an underwater
keyboard, and found subjects' engagement marked by contextually appropriate, spontaneous vocal imitation of the
computer-generated whistles accompanying the symbols (Figure 1d). Similar methods are continued to be explored to
examine cognition, such as engagement in visual discrimination tasks on touchscreens (e.g., in chimpanzees,
Matsuzawa, 2017; in horses, Schubert et al., 2022; in rodents, Horner et al., 2013). Thus, ACI work and its overlaps with
topics in welfare and cognition are effectively poised to continue themes explored in the original AIC device studies.
Still others remain inspired by the efforts of the animal language studies, continuing past work, and/or revisiting
the cause equipped with the knowledge of past AIC and contemporary ACI research. Importantly, despite dramatic cuts
in funding, many animal language projects (AIC device-facilitated or otherwise) did not disappear altogether: Koko the
sign-language trained gorilla participated in studies related to linguistics and communication (e.g., breath control,
Perlman et al., 2012; Perlman & Clark, 2015) until her death in 2018; Alex the Grey parrot contributed invaluable data
into nonmammalian cognitive and communicative abilities via his functional vocalization training until his passing in
2007, completely restructuring knowledge surrounding avian cognition at the time (e.g., numerical competence and
ordinality, Pepperberg, 2006; Pepperberg & Gordon, 2005); and Kanzi the bonobo still contributes meaningful data into
his comprehension and use of lexigrams to this day (e.g., picture-word mapping, Margiotoudi et al., 2022). Furthermore,
nascent AIC device work has been implemented in more natural environments and designed with species-relevant
behaviors in mind, such as horses (Mejdell et al., 2016) and dogs selecting symbols to request desired objects or activi-
ties (Rossi & Ades, 2008; Figure 1e). This revival's presence has also expanded to the home, as pet owners have begun
to introduce soundboards with aims to facilitate augmentative communication, understanding, and bonding with their
pets (Hunger, 2021). Given the above-mentioned history, this renaissance in the field of AIC device-facilitated interspe-
cies communication should be closely monitored from a scientific perspective. We believe it might yield the potential
not only to advance our knowledge of animal behavior, cognition, and welfare, but also to bring us closer to two-way
communication with animals.
A U T H O R C ON T R I B U T I O NS
Gabriella E. Smith: Conceptualization (lead); investigation (lead); writing – original draft (lead); writing – review and
editing (lead). Amalia P. M. Bastos: Conceptualization (supporting); investigation (supporting); visualization (lead);
writing – original draft (supporting); writing – review and editing (supporting). Ashley Evenson: Conceptualization
(supporting); investigation (supporting); writing – original draft (supporting); writing – review and editing (supporting).
Leo Trottier: Conceptualization (supporting); funding acquisition (lead); investigation (supporting); resources (lead); soft-
ware (lead); writing – original draft (supporting); writing – review and editing (supporting). Federico Rossano: Concep-
tualization (supporting); investigation (supporting); supervision (lead); validation (lead); writing – original draft
(supporting); writing – review and editing (supporting).
A C K N O WL E D G M E N T
The authors thank Dr. Irene M. Pepperberg for her helpful comments and Margaret Asperheim for her assistance in
the early stages of the writing process.
FUNDING INFORMATION
This work was partially funded by CleverPet, Inc.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

Authors GES, APMB, AE, and LT received monetary compensation from CleverPet, Inc while conducting this research.
Senior author Federico Rossano has declared no conflicts of interest for this article.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study
ORCID
Gabriella E. Smith https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6136-6351
Amalia P. M. Bastos https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3037-687X
Ashley Evenson https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1340-3573
Leo Trottier https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4554-5501
Federico Rossano https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6544-7685
R EL ATE D WIR Es AR TI CL ES
Animal communication
Linguistic capacity of non-human animals
Combinatoriality in the vocal systems of nonhuman animals
Event parsing and the origins of grammar
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How to cite this article: Smith, G. E., Bastos, A. P. M., Evenson, A., Trottier, L., & Rossano, F. (2023). Use of
Augmentative Interspecies Communication devices in animal language studies: A review. WIREs Cognitive
Science, 14(4), e1647. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1647

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Received: 12 April 2022 Revised: 22 February 2023 Accepted: 7 March 2023

Use of Augmentative Interspecies Communication devices

Gabriella E. Smith 1,2,3 | Amalia P. M. Bastos 1,2 | Ashley Evenson 2,4 |

Edited by: Geert Brône, Editor KEYWORDS

WIREs Cogn Sci. 2023;14:e1647. wires.wiley.com/cogsci 1 of 12

2.1 | Syntax and sentences

2.2 | Reference and representation

2.3 | Comprehension, production, and association

3.2 | Experimenter influence

CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

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