Seminá́rio “Avanc̨̨os Northern Alberta Oil Sands

Region, Canada
Technólogicos Para a
Gesta̴̴̴̴͂͂͂͂o de Barragens de
Minerac̨̨ao” -
Prá́ticas Samarco x Prá́ticas
do Mundo

Sean Ennis, P.Eng

Vice President Mining
Richard Dawson, PhD, P.Eng.
Executive Vice President

December 13, 2017

“the dam safety system

applied to the oil sands
industry is the best in the
world” (Morgenstern, 2011)
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 Outline

• Roles and
Responsibilities
• Design Standards
• Technology
Development
• Risk Management
• Dam Safety Reviews

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 Roles and Responsibilities
MAC, 2011:

Accountable
Executive Officer

Independent Tailings
Review Board
(ITRB)

TSF Qualified Engineer of Record

Person (EoR)

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 Engineer of Record (EOR)

• “Is a qualified and competent engineer with

experience commensurate with the
consequence classification and complexity ”
• “Holds the professional responsibility for the
facility design and is responsible for The 2017 HSRC update integrates the
evaluating the adequacy of the as-built EoR into the design, inspection and
facility relative to the design as well as review of a tailings facility.
applicable standards, criteria, and
guidelines”

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 Independent Tailings Review Board (ITRB)

• “Made up of independent subject matters

experts not currently involved in or
responsible for the design, operation or
construction of the facility”
The composition of an Independent
• “Provides non-binding advice and Tailings Review Board… shall be
guidance, but does not direct the work or commensurate with the complexity
perform the role of the Engineer of of the tailings storage facility”
Record”

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 Design Standards – Factor of Safety Criteria Comparison

Brazil
Canada Australia
Phase Condition (ABNT)
(CDA) (ANCOLD)
2006
Potential Loss of
Short Containment
1.5
1.3
Term  1.3
No Potential Loss of
(EOC) Containment
1.3

Long Term (Steady State) 1.5 1.5 1.5

Rapid Drawdown 1.1 1.2 - 1.3
Critical Phreatic Level 1.3
Pseudo-Static ? 1.0
Seismic
Post Earthquake ? 1.2 1.0 – 1.2

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 Samarco Stability Design Criteria

Brazil
Phase Condition (ABNT) Comment
2006
Short Potential Loss of Containment
Term 1.3
(EOC) No Potential Loss of Containment
Existing Brazil
Long Term (Steady State) 1.5 regulatory
standard
Rapid Drawdown 1.1

Critical Phreatic Level 1.3

Pseudo-Static 1.0
Adopt CDA
Seismic
guideline
Post Earthquake/Post liquefaction* 1.2*
* Include static liquefaction
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 Best Technologies and Practices

• Best Applicable Technology Economically

Achievable – BATEA - combination of
technologies and techniques that most EXAMPLES:
effectively reduce the economic, physical,
geochemical, ecological and social risks  Tailings Dewatering
associated with tailings during all stages of Technologies
operation and closure.  Cone Penetration Testing
• Best Available/Applicable Practice – BAP - for Site Investigation
management systems and operational  Real-Time and Remote
procedures to ensure that tailings storage Monitoring
facilities are designed, constructed, operated,
maintained, monitored and closed to support
sustainable mining practices.

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 Tailings Dewatering Technologies

Samarco planning for start-up:

Thickened Tailings
(slimes stream)
Filtered Tailings
(sand stream)

Source:

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 BATEA – Tailings Technology Alternatives Evaluation

Trade off study to determine BATEA for a site

in British Columbia, Canada

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 Operational Filtered Tailings Stack
Eldorado Gold Efemcukuru Mine, Turkey

Controlled Material Placement

Transportation Spreading Compaction

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 Brasil Filtered Tailings Pilot Plant and Test Plots

Thickened
slimes
Filtered
Sand
Tailings Mixture of filtered
Pile 2 slimes and sandy
tailings

Pile 1

Pile 3

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 Samarco Germano Pit Filtered Tailings Design

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 BAP – Site Investigation
Cone Penetration Test (CPT)
ADVANTAGES:
• Fast and continuous profiling
• Repeatable and reliable data
• Economical and productive
• Strong theoretical basis for interpretation
• Additional sensors

LIMITATIONS:
• High capital investment
• Skilled operators
• No soil sample
• Penetration restricted in gravels/cemented layers

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 CONVENTIONAL DRILLING DIRECT-PUSH
& SAMPLING TECHNOLOGY
Lab

Oscilloscope
UD Drop
tube Hammer

Cased SCPTù
Boreholes
qt
FIRM
CHT: fs
u2
Vs, Vp
SAND t50
Vs
SPT: N60
SOFT Fast 2cm/s
Continuous
VST: su, St CLAY Repeatable
Cost effective
PMT: E’
Packer: kvh the Depths of our Experienceold
EXPLORE After Mayne, 2010
new
| www.norwestcorp.com
 BAP – Monitoring
Automated Instrumentation Systems
Sensors
(Vibrating Wire Piezometer, Shape Accelerometer Array (SAA), In-Place
Inclinometer (IPI), Transducer, Tiltmeter, Strain Gauge, GPS, Radar, inSAR)

Datalogging and Telemetry

(Storage and transmission of data via networked radios, cellular or satellite
communication)

Communication
Acquisition andDevices
Analysis
(Web/Server based monitoring software, near real-time readings, alarm criteria
and alert systems, Factor of Safety (FOS) analysis)

Design and Operational Decisions

(Performance based decisions, construction sequencing)

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 BAP - Samarco Monitoring System

Samarco monitoring
control room

Ground-based
monitoring radar
station

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BAP- Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar
(InSAR)

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 Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar (InSAR)

SAMARCO Sela/Tulipa Dams

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 BAP – Mobile Data Collection

Intelltech is a Brazilian technology company

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 BAP - Monitoring Data Trigger Levels
Section G

24IN201
920 920
X-Di splacem ent
910 910
-0.02 - 0 m

24IN205
900 0 - 0.02 m 900

Elevation (m)

Elevation (m)
890 0.02 - 0.04 m 890
880
0.04 - 0.06 m 880
0.06 - 0.08 m
870 0.08 - 0.1 m 870
860 0.1 - 0.12 m 860
850 850
840 840
830 830
820 820
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Distance (m) Action Level

Attention

Alert

Samarco/Norwest using
stress-strain modeling and
Emergency
stability analysis to define
trigger level conditions for key
failure modes

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 Risk Management

FEMA (2015) Dam

Safety Risk
Management
Framework

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 Risk Analysis Techniques

Some examples:
• Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA)
• Bow Tie Analysis
• Event Trees
• Fault Trees
• Reliability Analysis
• Consequential Risk Analysis
• Subjective methods
• Vulnerability Index

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Potential Failure Mode
Failure Category
Description
Large storm exasperated by a
pumping failure leading to a
rising pond level and a
subsequent breach of the dyke.
Unplanned operational rise in the
pond water leading to a rising
pond level and a subsequent
breach of the dyke.
Failure of the TT containment
Dyke Fails by
dykes leading to a wave or flow
Overtopping
event which subsequently
(Reservoir Goes overtops the perimeter dyke.
Up)
Failure of the BBW leading to a
wave or flow event which
subsequently overtops the
perimeter dyke.
Controlling
Positive Factors
Areas
• Freeboard exceeds the incident PMP by a factor of 5.
• Recycle water barges are in place.
All areas. • Very slow increase with sufficient time to implement
mitigations.
• Control of the fresh water intake.
• TT containment is hundreds of meters away from the
perimeter dyke.
• The EETA is planned as a "dry" facility.
EETA • Deposit characteristics limit the mobility.
• Beaching from the perimeter dykes means that any TT
released from the TT containment dykes will have to
overcome a positive beach slope for some distance, as well as
the perimeter dyke freeboard.
• BBW has slumped without consequence.
• TSRU is strong (30 degrees) and compressible.
• Freeboard of 3 m.
WETA
• TSRU feed goes in-pit when storage space is available.
• Current beach above water widths are greater than the
minimum. 50 m of beach above water is added to the
structural zone by Operations as a form of contingency.
• CPT programs demonstrate BAW is dilative for the rate of
rise used to date.
• Industry experience demonstrates that the BAW is typically • BBW liquefaction has been observed in oil sands tailings
Potential Failure Modes Analysis
Warning Time
Adverse Factor (hours, days, Barriers/Controls
weeks)
• Closed water management system. • Containment structure with generous
freeboard.
• Ultimate containment for all site water. • Specific procedures are in place to
Weeks manage a rising pond condition (OMS).
• TT dykes will be higher than the surrounding perimeter • Continuous monitoring.
structure for a period of time.
• Characteristics are not well known.
• Tailings plans are subject to change. Hours
• Steep (30 degrees)TSRU BBW slopes. • Continuous monitoring.
• Removal of FFT supporting the TSRU BBW from the pond for
use in TT.
Hours
• Liquefaction occurs very rapidly and cannot be managed • Beach surveillance program is in place
with the observational method. to measure and confirm the design
minimum BAW.
Hazard Category Recommendations and Comments
• There are no recommendations or comments at
this time.
IV
• Per the CP16 plan CST beach is built in advance of
the TSRU deposit, and therefore, this scenario is
unlikely given the current plan.
• Evaluate critical failure mechanisms.
IV
• Operational risks (non-breach) for TSRU BBW
need to be assessed.
• Although this failure mode could develop
quickly, the potential risk for an overtopping event
IV is considered negligible.
• Liquefaction potential of the BAW relies on the
rate of rise.
• Failure method occurs rapidly and observational

 Identify “credible” failure modes

Liquefaction of the beach leading
to flow slides and failure of the All areas.
dilative. facilities.

Hours
• Procedures in place to control the
placement of the beach and promote
II
method cannot be relied upon.

• Beach construction follows a method specification. • Potential to deviate from past placement methods. drainage. • Verify that method specification is being
dyke.
followed.

 Provide complete descriptions of each failure mode including the initiating event and • Tailings feed is variable.

• Potential for the method specification to be applied

• BBW is assigned an undrained shear strength.

sequence of steps leading to an uncontrolled release from the impoundment

• The design governs the rate of rise.
inconsistently.
• Limited mitigation options due to physical constraints
(space).
• Pore water pressure and inclinometer
monitoring system.
• Revise the monitoring thresholds.

• Shallow (8H:1V) slopes at design controlling sections. • Perform stress strain analysis.

 Describe the magnitude of the breach
• Performance has been within expectations.
• WETA - Up to 280 mm of displacement has been measured in
the shallow foundation (P7).
• Rate of rise is limited to 10 m per year
(OMS).

• Foundation materials get stronger with time.
• Construction pore water pressures dissipate rapidly.
Undrained shear failure through West Dyke (P5 -
• Undrained strength is considered in design.
shallow weak layers in the P9), East Dyke
• WETA - Hl and Pl clays have the potential to generate high • EETA - Potential for a toe berm.
excess pore pressures during undrained shear (i.e. contractive
behavior).
• EETA - Up to 160 mm of displacement has been measured in
Days II
the shallow foundation (P35) on the first lift of the starter

foundation (Hl/Pl clays).
EXPLORE
(P35 - P38)
• Foundation conditions are well characterized. dyke.
the Depths of our Experience | www.norwestcorp.com
• An appropriate level of conservatism has been incorporated • EETA - Cell construction practices lead to elevated shear
24
into the design. WETA - Wick drains to relieve construction stress beneath the starter dyke.
 Dam Safety Risk Controls

• Dam Safety Management System (MAC

Guidelines in Portuguese)
• Operating Plans and Procedures
• Maintenance and Testing of Critical
Equipment
• Surveillance Plans
• Performance Evaluation/Observational
Method
• Mitigation/Repair
• Emergency Management

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 Dam Safety Reviews

“A dam safety review is part of the

dam safety management system that
has the overall goal to protect
people, property and the environment
from harmful effects of misoperation
or failure of dams and reservoirs.”

Companion CDA references:

 CDA (2007, 2013); Dam Safety

Guidelines
 CDA (2014) Technical Bulletin –
Guidelines to Mining Dams

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 Types of Dam Safety Reviews

 Audit type

 Comprehensive

 Detailed Design-based Multi-

disciplinary

 Comprehensive and Detailed

Design and Performance Review

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 Tailings Structures Reviews/Audits at Samarco

Norwest and other international

consultants have recently performed
extensive stability reviews and audits for
tailings structures at Samarco

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 Key Messages – Governance

 Well-defined roles, responsibilities and accountabilities

for key positions (ex. Engineer of Record)
 Independent peer review with international
consultants
 Formal independent review requirements with
Independent Tailings Review Boards (ITRB) reporting to
senior management

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 Key Messages – Best Practices

BAT (Best Available Technology)

 Rapid development of tailings dewatering processes. Samarco
plans to adopt thickened tailings and filtered tailings
technologies

BAP (Best Available Practices)

 Performance management and the observational method
 CPTU is the “standard” for evaluating tailings deposits
 Remote monitoring technologies and systems
 Mining Association of Canada (MAC) tailings guides

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 Key Messages – Process

 Systems based approach ….. Mining Association of Canada (MAC)

Guidelines….Portuguese translation
 Risk Management:
• Failure Modes Identification and Risk Control are critical to the process. Need to
get it right… experience required
• Quantitative Risk Assessment is not exact…. serves to calibrate judgement
• Very High and Catastrophic failure modes dominated by the consequence of
failure - unless the mechanism can be virtually eliminated as non-credible

 Monitoring methods with trigger level criteria tied to failure modes and
appropriate response

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 Obrigado – Thank You

Richard Dawson, PhD, PEng Sean Ennis, P. Eng. P.E.

Executive Vice President Vice President, Mining
___________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________
NORWEST CORPORATION NORWEST CORPORATION
Suite 1830, 1066 West Hastings Street Suite 1830, 1066 W. Hastings St.
Vancouver, BC Vancouver, BC
Canada V6E 3X2 Canada V6E 3X2
Telephone: 604-602-8992 Telephone: 604.602.8992
Email: rdawson@norwestcorp.com Email: sennis@norwestcorp.com
www.norwestcorp.com www.norwestcorp.com

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AS BUILT DAS ESTRUTURAS E
FATOR DE SEGURANÇA
PÓS-LIQUEFAÇÃO

Paulo Cella
Diretor
BVP Engenharia
 ESTRUTURAS
SELA
REMANESCENTES E DIQUES
TULIPA
DE CONTENÇÃO DE
SEDIMENTOS

SELINHA

BARRAGEM
DO GERMANO

NOVA SANTARÉM

S3

S4
ESTRATÉGIA DE PRIORIZAÇÃO
DOS SERVIÇOS
CONTENÇÃO DOS SEDIMENTOS:
SEGURANÇA DAS ESTRUTURAS Nova Santarém
REMANESCENTES: Diques de contenção: S3 e S4
Sela, Tulipa e Selinha, Barragem do Germano
e Santarém SELA, TULIPA E SELINHA
 GOVERNANÇA DE PROJETOS
E OPERAÇÕES
PROJETISTA / DESIGN AUDITORIAS
ESTRUTURA / ATIVIDADE
RESPONSÁVEL REVIEW

Reforço de Selinha, Sela e

Tulipa BVP Norwest
Nova Santarém
PROJETO Reforço Barragem Germano Norwest SEA .
Painel de
Auditoria Consultores
Dique S3 BVP NHC
Externa Independentes
Dique S4 Walm NHC Independente Internacionais

Monitoramento dos
Instrumentos DAM
OPERAÇÃO Geotecnia Norwest
Inspeção das Estruturas DF Consult.
Samarco
Relatório Técnico

AECOM (Auditoria para o MPMG)

BARRAGEM DO GERMANO
BARRAGEM DO GERMANO
NOVEMBRO 2015
 BARRAGEM DO GERMANO
PROJETO DE RECUPERAÇÃO DO PÉ DA BARRAGEM

Berma de Estabilização
(em enrocamento)

Talude da
Barragem do
Germano
Dique de proteção
BARRAGEM DO GERMANO
OBRAS DE REFORÇO (JAN A JUN/2016)
BARRAGEM DO GERMANO
SITUAÇÃO EM
APÓS
OUTUBRO
A RECUPERAÇÃO
2017
Obra concluída em JUNHO DE 2016
ITEM UNIT QUANTIDADES

ENROCAMENTO,
m3 40,482
TRANSIÇÕES, AREIA
LIMPEZA m3 8,150
DIQUE DA SELINHA
DIQUE DA SELINHA
NOVEMBRO 2015
 DIQUE DA SELINHA
NOVEMBRO 2015

H = 90m
DIQUE DA SELINHA
DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ACESSO
DIQUE DA SELINHA
OBRAS DE REFORÇO (NOV A DEZ 2015)
DIQUE DA SELINHA
REFORÇO EXECUTADO

Item Unit Quantidades

Obra concluída em 28 de Dezembro de 2015
ATERRO EM BLOCOS
m3 83,000
COM FINOS
ATERRO COM
m3 12,894
ENROCAMENTO
DIQUES DA SELA E DA TULIPA
DIQUES
DIQUEDA SELA E TULIPA
SELA/TULIPA
DETALHES
SITUAÇÃO EMRECUPERAÇÃO
NOVEMBRO 2015
DIQUES DA SELA E TULIPA
INÍCIO DE 2016

Dique da Ombreira Comum Dique da

Tulipa Sela

Extravasor
danificado
DIQUES DA SELA E TULIPA
OMBREIRA COMUM - INÍCIO DE 2016

Escorregamento
DIQUE DA SELA E TULIPA
SOLUÇÃO PROPOSTA - PLANTA
Berma de Equilíbrio
(Rejeitos Arenosos)

FASE 3
FASE 2
Berma de Proteção
(Enrocamento)
Sela

Confinamento dos
FASE 1 Rejeitos Remanescentes
(Blocos com Finos)

Tulipa
Reforço da Ombreira Comum (Blocos com Finos)
OMBREIRA COMUM
OBRAS - FASE 1 (ABR/SET 2016)
DIQUE DA SELA
OBRAS - FASES 2 e 3 (SET/2016 a FEV/2017)
OMBREIRA COMUM
REFORÇO EXECUTADO

Obra concluída em SETEMBRO DE 2016

Item Unit Quantidades

LIMPEZA DE FUNDAÇÃO m3 57,595

ATERRO EM BLOCOS
m3 50,100
COM FINOS
DIQUES DA SELA E TULIPA
FASE 2 EXECUTADA

Obra concluída em NOVEMBRO DE 2016

Item Unit Quantidades

LIMPEZA m3 71,391
ATERRO EM ENROCAMENTO m3 63,165
ATERRO EM REJEITO ARENOSO
m3 38,340
COMPACTADO
SELA E TULIPA
FASE 3 EXECUTADA

Obra concluída em FEVEREIRO DE 2017

Item Unit Quantities

ATERRO EM BLOCOS
m3 115,400
COM FINOS
ATERRO EM REJEITO
m3 124,184
COMPACTADO
DIQUE DA TULIPA
ADEQUAÇÃO DO SISTEMA EXTRAVASOR

RECUPERAÇÃO DA CALHA DO
IMPLANTAÇÃO DE NOVO EXTRAVASOR ORIGINAL
EXTRAVASOR

Calha original danificada

CALHA
PROVISÓRIA
DIQUE DA TULIPA
NOVO EXTRAVASOR EXECUTADO

MUDAR FOTOS
DIQUE DA TULIPA
VISTA DO NOVO SISTEMA EXTRAVASOR

Calha Provisória

Novo Sistema
Extravasor
BARRAGEM NOVA SANTARÉM
BARRAGEM SANTARÉM
SITUAÇÃO EM NOVEMBRO 2015
BARRAGEM SANTARÉM
REFORÇO IMPLANTADO

Obra concluída em Fevereiro de 2016

Item Unit Quantidades
ATERRO EM BLOCOS COM FINOS
m3 67,000
E TRANSIÇÕES
BARRAGEM NOVA SANTARÉM
PROJETO
BARRAGEM NOVA SANTARÉM
OBRAS (CONCLUSÃO EM JUL/2017)
NOVA SANTARÉM
OUTUBRO 2017
NOVA SANTARÉM
OUTUBRO 2017

ALTURA: 48m
COMPRIMENTO DE CRISTA: 310m
VOLUME DE ATERRO: 732.000 m3
VOLUME DE CONCRETO 8.800m3
VOL. DO RESERVATÓRIO: 7.000.000m3 (EL. 766m)
DIQUES S3 e S4
DIQUES S3 e S4
LOCALIZAÇÃO
CORR. SANTARÉM DIQUE
S3

DIQUE
S4

R. GUALAXO
DIQUE S3
PROJETO E CONSTRUÇÃO 2 FASES Geometria
Altura Total 14,5m
Elevação da Crista 709,50m
Volume do Maciço ± 70.000m³
Elevação da Soleira do Vertedouro 706,00m
Altura do Vertedouro 3,5m
Largura do Vertedouro (PMP) 50,0m
Volume do Reservatório 2,95Mm³

Planta
DIQUE S3
OBRAS (DEZ/2016 A MAR/2017)
Ombreira Direita Ombreira Direita

Fundo do Vale Ombreira

Esquerda
DIQUE S3
OUTUBRO 2017

Alteamento final concluído em Novembro de 2016

DIQUE S4
DIQUE S4
LOCALIZAÇÃO
DIQUE S4
PROJETO
GEOMETRIA
Altura Total 10,5m
Elevação da Crista 699,50m
Volume do Maciço ± 45.000m³
Elevação da Soleira do Vertedouro 697,50m
Altura do Vertedouro 2,00m
Largura do Vertedouro (PMP) 65,0m
Volume do Reservatório 1,05Mm³

Planta

Seção pelo Eixo

DIQUE S4
OBRAS (OUT/2016 A JAN/2017)
 DIQUE S4

Concluído em Janeiro de 2017

Quantidades
Item Unit Volumes

LIMPEZA DE FUNDAÇÃO m3 75,545

BLOCOS DE
ENROCAMENTO E BLOCOS m3 52,535
COM FINOS
DIQUE S4
OUTUBRO 2017
DIQUE S4
OUTUBRO 2017
DIQUE S4
VERIFICAÇÕES DE
ESTABILIDADE
 CRITÉRIOS DE PROJETO
FATORES DE SEGURANÇA ADMISSÍVEIS
Análise Condição Brasil Brasil Canad Austráli
(ABNT (ABNT a a
) ) (CDA) (Ancold)
2006 2017

Final de Antes do enchimento

1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3
Construção do reservatório
Condição permanente
Longo Prazo 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5
de fluxo
Carregamento e
Rebaixamento
descarregamento 1,1 1,1 1,2-1,3 -
Rápido
rápidos
Nível freático
Considera PMP 1,3 1,3 - -
crítico
Pseudo-estática - 1,1 1,0
Sísmica Pós Terremoto/Pós
- - 1,2 1,0-1,2
liquefação
 CRITÉRIOS ADOTADOS PELA SAMARCO
FATORES DE SEGURANÇA ADMISSÍVEIS
Análise Condição Brasil Brasil Canada Austrália
(ABNT) (ABNT) (CDA) (Ancold)
2006 2017

Final de Antes do enchimento do

1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3
Construção reservatório
Condição permanente
Longo Prazo 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5
de fluxo
Carregamento e
Rebaixamento
descarregamento 1,1 1,1 1,2-1,3 -
Rápido
rápidos
Nível freático
Considera PMP 1,3 1,3 - -
crítico
Pseudo-estática - 1,1 1,0
Sísmica Pós Terremoto/Pós
- - 1,2 1,0-1,2
liquefação
AVALIAÇÃO DA ESTABILIDADE
FRENTE À LIQUEFAÇÃO
Etapas de Avaliação:

1. Análise da susceptibilidade ou potencial do solo à falha por liquefação – Determinação das

zonas com potencial de liquefação mediante a caracterização do comportamento dos
materiais sob cisalhamento (contrátil ou dilatante), através da execução de CPTUs e/ou SPTs.
2. Análise do gatilho da liquefação – Avaliar a possibilidade das tensões cisalhantes atuantes
excederem ou não a resistência ao cisalhamento de pico dos solos suscetíveis à liquefação
(durante um abalo sísmico, carregamento, subida do nível de água).
3. Análise de estabilidade liquefeita ou pós gatilho – Análise de estabilidade por equilíbrio de
limite convencional considerando a resistência liquefeita do material contrátil.

Como critério de projeto a Samarco definiu avaliar sempre as etapas 1 e 3.

SUSCEPTIBILIDADE -
ROBERTSON
A suscetibilidade à liquefação é avaliada com base no tipo de
comportamento e sistema de classificação atualizados
de Robertson 2016 (SBTn).
DEFINIÇÃO DAS ZONA
SUSCEPTÍVEIS
Experiência Samarco:
• CPTUs de quase 100 metros de profundidade;
• Zona contrátil acima do nível de água;
• Comportamento contrátil em regiões de altos níveis de tensão (ou grandes profundidades)
DEFINIÇÃO DAS ZONA
SUSCEPTÍVEIS
DEFINIÇÃO DAS ZONA
SUSCEPTÍVEIS
Para definição da resistência liquefeita dos materiais são utilizadas as metodologias de
Olson (2002) e Robertson (2010).

A Samarco realiza análises de sensibilidade

utilizando os percentis de 10%, 33% e 50%.

10° percentil
33° percentil
50° percentil
CONDIÇÕES ANALISADAS
NÍVEL DE ÁGUA
1. Combinação dos dados atuais do monitoramento e das investigações (SPT e CPTU);
2. PMP-Precipitação máxima provavel;
3. Nível freático crítico definido a partir do histórico dos intrumentos e das camadas
susceptíveis à liquefação acima do N.A. atual, PMP;
4. Colmatação parcial do sistema de drenagem interno (avaliação da margem de segurança e
para o descomissionamento das estruturas)
FS liq > 1,2
Não susceptível à liquefação
Susceptível à liquefação
CONCLUSÕES
Verificação da Estabilidade à Liquefação

• Avaliação da susceptibilidade à liquefação (Robertson e Olson)

• Estratigrafia de acordo com resultados de CPT
• Nível d´água definido através de instrumentos e CPT
• Verificação de eventual zona contrátil acima do N.A.
• Análise de estabilidade com parâmetros de resistência liquefeita associados ao 10°
percentil (com análise de sensibilidade para os percentis 33 e 50)
• Análises circulares e planares, rasas e profundas
• Atendimento aos critérios de projeto estabelecidos pela ABNT e CDA
• FS mínimo > 1.2 (pós-liquefação c/ NA medido nos instrumentos e no CPT)
• FS mínimo > 1.1 (considerando a zona contrátil acima do NA e sismo)
Seminário – ”Avanços Tecnológicos
para a Gestão de Barragens de
Mineração”

13 de dezembro de 2017
 No. 343 $19.5bi #1
1 0 0 .0 0 0 em p lo yees 7 co n tin en ts Fo r tu n e 5 0 0 US D o llar in 2 0 1 5 W o r ld ' s Lar g est
+ th an 1 5 0 co u n tr ies En g in eer in g Co m p an y

Page 92
Industry Leading Tailings Expertise
More than 300 tailings projects completed worldwide
Representative Services
• Delivering engineering and
environmental solutions in designing, • Design: Geotechnical, Civil,
monitoring and managing tailings Infrastructure
and waste products
• Construction
• No other high-risk geotechnical • Stewardship
structure offers more competing
objectives and challenges than mine • Water Management
tailings embankments • Training
• Emergency Preparedness
• Risk Management
Sample Project Experience
Sample Project Experience
Summary
• Since April 2016 a team of international specialists with
significant experience in response to natural and mining
disasters from AECOM has conducted monthly
Independent Dam Safety and Stability Audit on behalf of
the Ministério Público de Minas Gerias
- Christina Winckler, John Bove, Claudius Maranhão and Diego
Gomez – geotechnical;
- Casey Robertson, John Sikora and Ned Andrews – hydrology,
hydraulics, sediment transport and river mechanics;
- Monica Menezes – geology;
- Vicente Mello – risk management and planning
- Tat Ebihara and Ray Rinkle – environment restoration;
- Richard Davidson, Ed Toms and Bill Bow – overall QA/QC;

Page 96
The monthly audit encompass
• Field visit to inspect all structures;
• Meetings with the designers responsible for the structures:
- Germano dam;
- New Santarém dam;
- Sela, Tulipa and Selinha dikes;
- S3 and S4 dikes;
- Water management system.
• Meetings with the Samarco’s engineering, construction,
monitoring and operations teams;
• Presentation to the Ministério Público de Minas Gerais.

Page 97
Since the start of the Independent Audit
• AECOM has being on the Germano Complex site more
than 20 times;
• We have received and reviewed around 5,000 documents;
• Submitted 28 audits reports:
- Germano Complex;
- Eixo 1 dam;
- Candonga;
- Tailings Management Plan;
- S4 dike.

Page 98
Germano Complex – Tailings Dam Management System

Page 99
Germano Complex – Tailings Dam Management System

• Reinforce and recuperate remaining structures:

- Germano main dam;
- Sela, Tulipa and Selinha dikes;
- S3 dike.
• Build new structures:
- New Santarém dam;
- S4 dike.
• Separate water from tailings:
- Change the drainage to avoid water going into the Fundão Valley;
- Bay 3 water pumping system.

Page 100
Germano Main Dam – Upper slope

Page 101
 Germano main dam –
toe

Page 102
Sela and Tulipa dikes

Page 103
Selinha Dike

Page 104
New Santarem Dam

Page 105
New Santarem Dam

Page 106
Bathymetric Survey – New Santarem
8,00

Cota 766,00
Volume 6,937Mm³
7,00

6,00

5,00

4,39

4,39
4,39

4,39

4,39

4,39

4,39

4,39

4,39
Volume (Mm³)

4,00

Cota 760,00
3,00
Volume 2,549Mm³

2,00
1,88

1,88
1,88

1,88

1,88

1,88

1,88

1,88

1,88
Cota 756,00
1,00 Volume 0,666Mm³

0,515 0,488 0,465 0,443 0,405 0,374 0,347 0,321

0,548
0,151 0,178 0,201 0,223 0,261 0,292 0,319 0,345
0,00 0,118
fev-17 mar-17 abr-17 mai-17 jun-17 jul-17 ago-17 set-17 out-17

Volume de Contingência até Soleira do vertedor de emergência Volume de Contingência até Soleira do vertedor 2ª Comporta

Volume de Contingência até Soleira do vertedor 1ª Comporta VOLUME DE SEDIMENTOS ACUMULADO

Volume do Reservatório (Soleira do vertedor de emergência - Cota 766,00) Volume do Reservatório (Soleira do vertedor 2ª Comporta - Cota 760,00)

Volume do Reservatório (Soleira do vertedor 1ª Comporta - Cota 756,00)

Entre 20/09 e 31/10 assoreamento aproximado de 26.000 m³.

Page 107
Volume total assoreado de 345.000 m³.
Crest of Dike S3

Page 108
 Water quality – crest of
Dike S3, November 19th

Page 109
Bathymetric Survey, S3
3,50
Cota 706,00
Vol ume 2,95Mm³

3,00

2,50

1,152
1,158
1,173
1,191
1,195
1,197
Volume (Mm³)

2,00

1,50

1,00

1,798
1,792
1,777
1,759
1,755
1,753

0,50

0,00
fev-17 mar-17 abr-17 mai-17 jun-17 jul-17 ago-17 set-17 out-17

Volume de Contingência até Soleira do vertedor VOLUME DE SEDIMENTOS ACUMULADO

Volume do Reservatório (Soleira do vertedor - Cota 706,00)

Evolução do assoreamento da ordem de 6.000 m³ entre setembro e outubro/17.

Page 110
Turbidity Measurements, S3

Monitoramento de Turbidez S3
Turbidez - Montante S3
120,00
Turbidez - Jusante S3
Padrão de Água Doce - Conama 357/2005

100,00

80,00
Turbidez (NTU)

60,00

40,00

20,00

0,00

Page 111
Dike S4

Page 112
 Confluence of Santarem creek and Gualaxo do Norte

Gualaxo do Norte

Santarém creek

Page 113
 January 11th after
22 mm of rain

November 19th
after 39 mm of rain

114
Bathymetric Survey, S4
1,20

Cota 697,40
Vol ume 1,003Mm³
1,00

0,80
Volume (Mm³)

0,60

0,945
0,947

0,947
0,949

0,949
0,955

0,40

0,20

0,048 0,054 0,054 0,056 0,056 0,058

0,00
fev-17 mar-17 abr-17 mai-17 jun-17 jul-17 ago-17 set-17 out-17

Volume de Contingência até Soleira do vertedor VOLUME DE SEDIMENTOS ACUMULADO

Volume do Reservatório (Soleira do vertedor - Cota 697,40)

Page 115
Turbidity Measurements, S4

Monitoramento de Turbidez S4 Turbidez - Jusante S3

120,00 Turbidez - Jusante S4

Padrão de Água Doce - Conama 357/2005

100,00

80,00
Turbidez (NTU)

60,00

40,00

20,00

0,00

Page 116
Page 117
Water Diversion and Management System

Page 118
Pump station of Baia 3 Dike

Page 119
Conclusion remarks
• Factors of Safety:
- Since November 2016 the factors of safety for the structures have
been above 1.5 (for the long term drained loading condition):
 Germano main dam;
 Sela, Tulipa and Selinha dikes;
 Santarém dam.

• Sediment management:
- The bathymetric surveys on New Santarém, S3 and S4 minor
sediment transport
• Water quality:
- The turbidity measurements at S3 and S4 show good water quality

Page 120
Obrigado
Formal Scope from the MPMG