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CRM Presentation Ver1.0
CRM Presentation Ver1.0
▪ Software H
▪ Hardware
▪ Environment S L E
▪ Liveware
▪ Liveware
L
S – Software
The aircraft computer system, but also
includes checklists, manuals, charts etc.
H – Hardware
Anything that has a physical existence
such as the controls and switches
on the flight deck.
SHELL model definitions CRM THEORY 6 / 94
E – Environment
The surroundings in which the crew operates
(including the flight deck and outside of it).
L – Liveware
You as well as any other person whom you
interact with in the course of your duties
including your crew members and others.
L/H – Liveware-Hardware interface CRM THEORY 7 / 94
▪ Important (eg. avionics) switch next to a less important (eg. lights) switch
▪ Similar shape and size of levers, switches
▪ Scattered controls for the same systems
S L E
▪ Checklists
▪ Performance manuals L
▪ Quick Reference Handbooks (QRH)
▪ Speed/Thrust tables
▪ Airway charts
▪ SID & STAR charts
▪ Approach plates
▪ FMS usage
L/S – Liveware-Software mismatches CRM THEORY 10 / 94
▪ Incorrect interpretation of
performance criteria
▪ Misreading approach plates
▪ FMS programming errors
▪ Checklist mismanagement
▪ Misinterpretation of the QRH
L/E – Liveware-Environment interface CRM THEORY 11 / 94
▪ Duty time L
▪ Fatigue
▪ Operational factors
▪ Weather
▪ Illness
▪ Stress
L/E – Liveware-Environment mismatches CRM THEORY 12 / 94
Research into CRM issues by NASA shows that the two most significant
factors in the promotion of good CRM and MCC principles are:
▪ Verbal
Spoken or written words and the way of their expression.
▪ Non-verbal
Body language, eye-contact, posture, gesticulation, touch, silence etc.
▪ Image
An impression is created as a result of one’s appearance.
Achieving effective communication CRM THEORY 17 / 94
IDENTIFY FEEDBACK
1. Information gathering
2. Advocacy / Assertiveness
3. Listening
4. Questions and conflict resolution
5. Overcoming the barriers to communication
Information gathering CRM THEORY 19 / 94
In an emergency, some decisions must be made under extreme time pressure with
very little opportunity for the analytical decision-making process. The intuitive decision-
making process is based on gut reaction, experience and training.
A good leader will have the support of the team in critical situations, bearing in mind
that CRM principles still apply in the intuitive decision-making process.
Listening CRM THEORY 21 / 94
Conflict resolution
▪ If crew members are not communicating effectively, there will inevitably
be conflicts.
▪ Opposite opinions CAN be constructive when dealt with effectively!
▪ Synergy may be used to resolve conflict.
Critique
▪ Critique can significantly improve the performance of the crew.
▪ The time of giving it starts at the briefing stage and continues until the
de-briefing.
▪ The critique should consist of an objective viewpoint of how the mission is
going and all crew members should be actively encouraged to analyze it.
▪ Always take the critique as a constructive advice and not as a personal
offense.
▪ Give it in a proper way and receive it in a proper way.
▪ Check if you can profit of the critique you received and decide if you keep
it or not.
Overcoming communication barriers CRM THEORY 25 / 94
▪ Spoken words,
▪ Way of speaking (volume, pitch etc.), or
▪ Body language?
Quiz time! CRM THEORY 27 / 94
Words
7%
Body language is not used as much because the hands and eyes of the
pilots are occupied (for flying and instrument scanning). Furthermore, there
may be darkness, smoke etc. in the cockpit.
Tips for communication in the cockpit CRM THEORY 29 / 94
1. Spoken words:
Talk consciously, try to be clear and short.
2. Way of speaking:
Use a consistent tone, try not to show emotions.
3. Body language:
Point out only necessary things.
Do not gesticulate, especially when hand flying.
Misconceptions regarding communication CRM THEORY 30 / 94
ASSUMPTION REALITY
Message received is identical to what was sent. Messages sent and received are rarely the same.
You only communicate when you plan to do so. Communication is a continual process.
Communication ceases after reception. Communication continues until response to the feedback occurs.
The meaning of a word is determined by the sender. The meaning of a word is determined by the receiver.
Communication breakdown is the fault of the receiver. Communication breakdown is often the fault of the sender.
Decision making
Objective CRM THEORY 32 / 94
DODAR
DODAR CRM THEORY 34 / 94
Gather all the information possible from all available sources to assess the options
Options
available.
COMMUNICATE
(gather information & identify the problem)
MONITOR IMPLEMENT
The first rule CRM THEORY 36 / 94
A few examples:
▪ Overconfidence
▪ Poor communication
▪ Loss of situation awareness
▪ Conflicting personalities
▪ „Get-there / home-itis”
Useful advices for Diagnosing and Information gathering CRM THEORY 38 / 94
▪ Carefully identify where the indication is, and then identify the location of
the failed system
There have been many examples of the crew shutting down a good engine or isolating a
serviceable system through hasty action and lack of monitoring.
Useful advices for Diagnosing and Information gathering CRM THEORY 39 / 94
▪ It may help to adjust the panel light illumination for better visibility of any
printed information next to the gauges and lamps intended to help identify
which engine or system it affects.
Useful advices for Diagnosing and Information gathering CRM THEORY 40 / 94
▪ Other team members such as Cabin Crew, Air Traffic Control, Ground
personnel may also have valuable information that will help the decision-
making process.
▪ Once the problem is identified, gather all information that will assist in
identifying the available options.
Situational awareness
What is situational awareness? CRM THEORY 42 / 94
It includes:
▪ position and terrain information,
▪ flight parameters (airspeed, altitude, attitude etc.),
▪ any technical or operational deficiencies which might affect the flight.
The human mind creates an image, a model of the reality. The quality of this
model (how true it is compared to the real world) depends on many factors:
▪ Available information
▪ Human perception
▪ Experience
▪ Biases
▪ Orientation
▪ Technical Knowledge
▪ Flying Skills
▪ Experience
▪ Human Factors
▪ Briefings
▪ Communications
▪ Teamwork
Multi-crew situational awareness CRM THEORY 46 / 94
In a multi crew environment, each pilot will have his own level of awareness
about the situation.
The total situational awareness will not be the sum of all the individual's
situational awareness, but that of the person who will make the decision
(normally the Captain)!
Why is it important?
In the 1977 Tenerife accident, two Boeing 747s collided on the ground. One crew (PanAm) had good
situational awareness and knew that the other aircraft (KLM) was taking off towards them.
At least one of the crew of the KLM aircraft also realised the situation but was unable to persuade the
Captain to wait with the take-off, so that the situational awareness level in the KLM aircraft remained at
the level of the Captain.
583 people lost their lives. This accident is (and hopefully will stay) the deadliest in aviation history.
Loss of situational awareness CRM THEORY 48 / 94
Whilst not forgetting the overall picture, during this course we will concentrate
on the activities of the flight operations team and more specifically, on the
tasks and roles associated with the flight deck of a multi crew aircraft.
Leadership and Followership CRM THEORY 54 / 94
Acquired leadership
▪ The captain is not necessarily the leader all the time.
▪ The captain has the ultimate authority which is an assigned function, however if
the First Officer is the pilot flying (PF), he/she acquires the leadership function
whilst fulfilling that role.
▪ Leadership skills can be learned and improved throughout a crew member’s life.
Effective leadership
▪ The leader is the key person whose strategies and actions enhance the
performance of the team. This is accomplished by utilizing good communication
skills to clearly define the task, assign roles and accept any feedback.
▪ The leader should be able to inspire the group to want to achieve a successful
outcome to the task. The success of the task depends to a large extent on the
quality of the leadership.
NOTEC - Non Technical Skills CRM THEORY 56 / 94
The leader must act as the crew manager to co-ordinate crew performance.
This includes:
Inquiry
The way that we act also affects the whole team. This reaction can either
be advantageous or dangerous in the flight environment.
Personality CRM THEORY 63 / 94
▪ Resignation: People who have this attitude are defeatists who believe
that no matter what course of action they adopt, it will not affect the
outcome
They may feel that the result is pre-determined so any intervention will be ineffective
Behavioural styles CRM THEORY 66 / 94
▪ People Oriented
▪ Task Oriented
▪ Both or none
Behavioural styles CRM THEORY 67 / 94
▪ People Oriented
Those who consider the feelings of others first when making a decision. A person who exhibits a
high people orientation and low task orientation can be considered a caring person.
▪ Task Oriented
Consideration is first given to the task or goal in the decision-making process. Personal
effects are disregarded. A person who exhibits high task orientation and low people
orientation is considered to have an aggressive style of behaviour.
▪ Both or none
A person who has low people and task orientation is considered autonomous or a loner.
A person who has high people and task orientation is considered to be assertive. This is
the ideal behavioral style to obtain the best performance from the team.
Behavioural styles CRM THEORY 68 / 94
Assertive behaviour CRM THEORY 69 / 94
Aggressive behaviour does not consider the feelings of others and must be
strictly differentiated from assertive behaviour.
Assertive behaviour CRM THEORY 70 / 94
▪ An aggressive person often has difficulty in applying the "what is right not
who is right'' principle
▪ An aggressive person need not become passive, but needs to learn to
use the positive aspects of aggression in a less hostile manner
Cultural differences CRM THEORY 74 / 94
There are some cultures which believe that a junior crew member should
never question the actions or decisions of the captain or the more senior CM.
These events occur beyond the influence of the flight crew increasing the
operation complexity of a flight, by placing attention and management
demands on the crew, if safety margins are maintained.
The level of demand that these threats place on the crew range from
insignificant and discretely manageable, to complex sequences of
interactions with each other, requiring significant attention from the crew.
Threat categorization CRM THEORY 78 / 94
▪ Latent threats
These are not obvious to the flight crew and are generally hidden by the
system.
▪ Overt threats
These are present on a given day and are either anticipated or not by the
crew. They can be either Environmental or Organizational.
Latent threats - Examples CRM THEORY 79 / 94
Thunderstorms, turbulence, poor visibility, wind shear, icing conditions, IMC, extreme
Weather
temperatures
Terrain High ground, slopes, lack of visual references (black hole effects and other visual illusions)
Overt threats – Organizational – Examples CRM THEORY 81 / 94
Operational On-time performance pressure, delays, late arriving aircraft or flight crew, poorly
Pressure matched crew (e.g. inexperience with route)
Aircraft system, engines, flight controls or automation anomalies or malfunctions,
Aircraft
MEL/CDL items with operational implications, other threats requiring crew attention
Cabin Cabin events, flight attendant errors, distractions, interruptions, door security
Aircraft repairs on the ground, maintenance log problems, maintenance events and
Maintenance
errors
Aircraft loading events, fueling errors, agent interruptions, improper ground support,
Ground/Ramp
de-icing
Dispatch Load sheet errors, crew scheduling events, late paperwork, changes or errors
They are actions or inactions by the flight crew that lead to events that
were not what the organization or flight crew intended or expected.
Manual handling errors such as speed and position deviations, incorrect flaps,
Flight Control
speed brake, auto-brake, thrust reverser or power settings
Systems / Radio / Incorrect packs, altimeter, fuel switch or radio frequency settings or incorrect
Instruments anti-icing techniques
Undesired aircraft states are conditions caused by the crew that could reduce
normal margins for safety. These are often the result of poor Threat and Error
Management by the crew and require some form of action. Examples:
▪ Aircraft Handling
▪ Vertical, lateral or speed deviations
▪ Unnecessary weather penetration or unauthorized airspace penetration
▪ Unstable approach or long, floated, firm or off-centerline landings
▪ Operation outside aircraft limitations
▪ Ground navigation
▪ Runway or taxiway incursions
▪ Wrong taxiway, ramp, gate or hold spot
▪ Taxi above speed limit
▪ Incorrect Aircraft configuration
▪ Incorrect system configuration
▪ Incorrect engine configuration
▪ Incorrect weight and balance configuration
TEM model CRM THEORY 88 / 94
Roles and responsibilities defined and understood for normal and non-
Workload assignment
normal situations
Monitor and
Crew actively monitor and cross-check systems and each other
cross-check
Operational tasks are given correct priority to ensure primary flight duties are
Workload
adequately managed, task fixation is avoided and workload capacities are not
Management
exceeded
Evaluation and Crew decisions are collectively analyzed to verify the existing plan is the best
Modification of Plans option
Crew openly question and clarify current plans adopting an attitude where
Inquiry
nothing is assumed correct or knowledge is complete and unchallengeable
Assertiveness Critical information and solutions are posited assertively and without hesitation
Home exam CRM THEORY 93 / 94