(eBook PDF) Ethics: History, Theory,

and Contemporary Issues 7th Edition

Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebooksecure.com/download/ebook-pdf-ethics-history-theory-and-contemporary
-issues-7th-edition/
 CON TE N TS
h
Preface / xiii
Introduction / xv

PART I: HISTORICAL SOURCES

Introduction, Alasdair MacIntyre / 1
1. Plato / 5
Euthyphro / 5
Defence of Socrates / 16
Crito / 33
Phaedo (115b−118) / 42
Republic (selections) / 44
2. Aristotle / 124
Nicomachean Ethics (selections) / 124
3. Epicurus / 179
Letter to Menoeceus / 179
Leading Doctrines / 181
4. Cicero / 184
On Duties (selections) / 184
5. Epictetus / 204
Enchiridion / 204
6. Augustine / 215
Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love (selections) / 216
7. Thomas Aquinas / 222
Summa Contra Gentiles (selections) / 223
8. Thomas Hobbes / 237
Leviathan (selections) / 237

vii
viii CONTENTS

9. Joseph Butler / 248

Fifteen Sermons (Sermons I, II, III, IX, XI, XII) / 249
10. David Hume / 283
A Treatise of Human Nature (selections) / 283
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (selections) / 295
11. Immanuel Kant / 320
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals / 320
12. Jeremy Bentham / 360
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (selections) / 360
13. John Stuart Mill / 369
Utillitarianism / 369
14. Henry Sidgwick / 404
The Methods of Ethics (selections) / 404
15. Friedrich Nietzsche / 433
On the Genealogy of Morals (selections) / 433

PART II: MODERN ETHICAL THEORY

Introduction, James Rachels / 469
16. G. E. Moore / 479
Principia Ethica (selections) / 479
17. H. A. Prichard / 486
Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? / 486
18. A. J. Ayer / 496
Language, Truth, and Logic (selections) / 496
19. C. L. Stevenson / 502
The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms / 502
20. John Dewey / 513
Theory of Valuation / 513
21. R. M. Hare / 545
Freedom and Reason (selections) / 545
22. J. J. C. Smart / 556
Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism / 556
23. Bernard Williams / 564
A Critique of Utilitarianism / 564
CONTENTSix

24. W. D. Ross / 581

The Right and the Good (selections) / 581
25. John Rawls / 591
A Theory of Justice (selections) / 591
26. David Gauthier / 613
Why Contractarianism? / 613
27. T. M. Scanlon / 624
What We Owe to Each Other (selections) / 624
28. Barbara Herman / 641
On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty / 641
29. Philippa Foot / 655
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives / 655
30. Christine Korsgaard / 662
Skepticism About Practical Reason / 662
31. Thomas Nagel / 676
Moral Luck / 676
32. Susan Wolf / 685
Moral Saints / 685
33. Jean-Paul Sartre / 698
Existentialism Is a Humanism / 698
34. G. E. M. Anscombe / 705
Modern Moral Philosophy / 705
35. Julia Annas / 718
Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing / 718
36. Nomy Arpaly / 729
Moral Worth / 729
37. Virginia Held / 744
Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory / 744
38. Gilbert Harman / 760
The Nature of Morality (selections) / 760
39. J. L. Mackie / 771
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (selections) / 771
40. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong / 782
Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology / 782
x CONTENTS

41. Mary Midgley / 800

Trying Out One’s New Sword / 800
42. James Rachels / 804
Egoism and Moral Skepticism / 804

PART III: CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS

Introduction, Peter Singer / 811
43. Judith Jarvis Thomson / 815
A Defense of Abortion / 815
44. Don Marquis / 826
An Argument That Abortion Is Wrong / 826
45. James Rachels / 837
Active and Passive Euthanasia / 837
46. Philippa Foot / 841
Killing and Letting Die / 841
47. Peter Singer / 847
Famine, Affluence, and Morality / 847
48. Travis Timmerman / 855
A Reply to Singer / 855
49. Tom Regan / 862
We Are What We Eat / 862
50. Henry Shue / 868
Global Environment and International Inequality / 868
51. Karen Hanson / 879
Facing Facts and Responsibilities / 879
52. Laurence Thomas / 883
What Good Am I? / 883
53. Celia Wolf-Devine / 887
Proportional Representation / 887
54. N. Ann Davis / 893
Sexual Harassment in the University / 893
55. Margaret Crouch / 910
Sexual Harassment in Public Places / 910
CONTENTSxi

56. Judith Jarvis Thomson / 918

The Trolley Problem / 918
57. Judith Jarvis Thomson / 932
Turning the Trolley / 932
58. Thomas Nagel / 942
Death / 942
59. Richard Taylor / 947
The Meaning of Life / 948
 PRE FACE
h
The most comprehensive collection of its kind, Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary
Issues, seventh edition, is essentially three books in one. Its fifty-nine selections offer
instructors the opportunity to construct courses in ethics combining, as wished, the his-
tory of moral philosophy, modern ethical theory, and contemporary moral problems. The
readings are reprinted, wherever possible, without omissions. Historical works presented
unabridged are Plato’s Euthyphro, Defence of Socrates, and Crito, Kant’s Groundwork for
the Metaphysics of Morals, Mill’s Utilitarianism, Dewey’s Theory of Valuation, and Sartre’s
Existentialism Is a Humanism.

NEW TO THIS EDITION

• Joseph Butler, “Sermon IX”

• Substantial excerpts from Henry Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics
• Articles by Tom Regan and Henry Shue on environmentalism
• Articles by Nomy Arpaly on moral worth and Travis Timmerman on famine relief
• Articles by Karen Hanson, Laurence Thomas, and Celia Wolf-Devine on affirmative
action
• Articles by N. Ann Davis and Margaret Crouch on sexual harassment
• Newer selection by T. M. Scanlon on contractualism
• More essays (over one-third in Parts II and III) by women

READINGS ADDED TO THIS EDITION

• Joseph Butler, “Sermon IX”

• Henry Sidgwick, from The Methods of Ethics
• T. M. Scanlon, from What We Owe to Each Other
• Nomy Arpaly, “Moral Worth”
• Travis Timmerman, “A Reply to Singer”
• Tom Regan, “We Are What We Eat”
• Henry Shue, “Global Environment and International Inequality”
• Karen Hanson, “Facing Facts and Responsibilities”
• Laurence Thomas, “What Good Am I?”

xiii
xiv PREFACE

• Celia Wolf-Devine, “Proportional Representation”

• N. Ann Davis, “Sexual Harassment in the University”
• Margaret Crouch, “Sexual Harassment in Public Places”
A selection by Camus and essays by T. M. Scanlon, Joel Feinberg, Nicholas L. Sturgeon,
John McDowell, Mary Anne Warren, Rosalind Hursthouse, John Arthur, Elliot Sober, Henry
Shue, and Daniel J. Hill from the previous edition are omitted.

RESOURCES FOR STUDENTS AND INSTRUCTORS

This book is supported by a variety of supplemental materials. For instructors, there

are PowerPoint lecture outlines and an Instructor’s Manual with summaries and fifteen
­multiple-choice, ten true/false, and four essay questions per reading. For students, there
are three study questions designed to check their basic understanding of key points. These
resources, along with an interoperable LMS cartridge, are available through OUP’s Ancillary
Resource Center: https://oup-arc.com/. For more information, please con­tact your Oxford
University Press ­representative or call 1-800-280-0280.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The idea for such an inclusive volume developed from conversations with Robert Miller,
executive editor at Oxford University Press, and we remain grateful for his initial encour-
agement and continuing support. We also wish to express our thanks to editorial assistants
Sydney Keen, Anna Deen, Molly Zimetbaum, and associate editor Alyssa Palazzo for their
generous help, to senior production editor Marianne Paul for her conscientiousness, and to
other members of the staff at Oxford University Press for valuable assistance throughout
production.
Changes to the seventh edition in part reflect recommendations made by our colleagues
as well as reviewers chosen by the publisher. These reviewers include: Paul Hughes
(University of Michigan—Dearborn), David Murphy (Truman State University), Thanassis
Samaras (University of Georgia), Gary Jaeger (Vanderbilt University), Karin Brown (San
Jose State University), L. Dean Allen (Northwest Florida State College), Jami Anderson
(University of Michigan—Flint), Joseph Grcic (Indiana State University). We appreciate
their thoughtful advice.
We wish to acknowledge again the contribution of Christa Davis Acampora (City
University of New York, Hunter College and the Graduate Center), who provided the abridg-
ment of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. Finally, we are especially grateful to
Andrew Forcehimes for offering valuable suggestions about the contents and structure of the
book as well as helping to formulate introductions and study questions.
 INT RO D U CTI O N
h
All of us from time to time reflect on the moral dimension of our lives: what sorts of persons
we ought to be, which goals are worth pursuing, and how we should relate to others. We may
wonder about the answers to these questions that have been provided by the most profound
thinkers of past generations; we may speculate whether their conflicting opinions amount to
disagreements about the truth or are merely expressions of their differing attitudes; we may
consider how their varied theories might help us understand moral issues of our own day.
This book of readings provides the materials to address these matters. In Part I we have
­collected the most influential ethical theories from nearly 2,500 years of philosophical
thought, beginning in ancient Greece with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle and continuing
through ­medieval and modern times to Sidgwick and Nietzsche. Part II c­ ontains recent
­articles that explore theoretical issues concerning the nature of moral judgments, the
resolution of moral disagreements, and the evaluation of moral t­heories. Part III offers
reflections on contemporary moral problems, including abortion, euthanasia, and global
economic inequality. In each case thoughtful arguments for and against are presented for
your consideration.
Which philosophical positions are correct? Just as each member of a jury at a trial needs
to make a decision and defend a view after considering all the relevant evidence, so each
philosophical inquirer needs to make a decision and defend a view after considering all the
relevant arguments. This book makes available in convenient form the materials on which
to base your thinking. The challenge and excitement of philosophy, however, is that after
taking account of the work others have done, the responsibility for reaching conclusions is
your own.
Should you wish to learn more about particular moral philosophers or specific moral
issues, an excellent source to consult is the Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd ed. (Routledge,
2001), edited by Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker. It contains detailed entries
with bibliographies on every significant topic in the field.

xv
ETHICS
h
 PA RT I
h
Historical Sources

INTRODUCTION
Alasdair MacIntyre
Alasdair MacIntyre is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.

Moral philosophy is often written as though the history of the subject were only of secondary
and incidental importance. This attitude seems to be the outcome of a belief that moral
concepts can be examined and understood apart from their history. Some philosophers have
even written as if moral concepts were a timeless, limited, unchanging, determinate species
of concept, necessarily having the same features throughout their history, so that there is a
part of language waiting to be philosophically investigated which deserves the title “the
language of morals” (with a definite article and a singular noun). In a less sophisticated way,
historians of morals are all too apt to allow that moral practices and the content of moral
judgments may vary from society to society and from person to person, but at the same time
these historians have subtly assimilated different moral concepts—and so they end up by
suggesting that although what is held to be right or good is not always the same, roughly the
same concepts of right and good are universal.
In fact, of course, moral concepts change as social life changes. I deliberately do not
write “because social life changes,” for this might suggest that social life is one thing,
morality ­another, and that there is merely an external, contingent causal relationship between
them. This is obviously false. Moral concepts are embodied in and are partially constitutive
of forms of social life. One key way in which we may identify one form of social life as

From A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century
by Alasdair MacIntyre. Reprinted by permission of the author and the University of Notre Dame Press.

1
2 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE

distinct from another is by identifying differences in moral concepts. So it is an elementary

commonplace to point out that there is no precise English equivalent for the Greek word
δικαιοσυ′νη [dikaiasune], usually translated justice. And this is not a mere linguistic defect,
so that what Greek achieves by a single word English needs a periphrasis [longer phrasing]
to achieve. It is rather that the occurrence of certain concepts in ancient Greek discourse
and of others in modern English marks a difference between two forms of social life. To
understand a concept, to grasp the meaning of the words which express it, is always at least
to learn what the rules are which govern the use of such words and so to grasp the role of the
concept in language and social life. This in itself would suggest strongly that different forms
of social life will provide different roles for concepts to play. Or at least for some concepts
this seems likely to be the case. There certainly are concepts which are unchanging over
long periods, and which must be unchanging for one of two reasons. Either they are highly
specialized concepts belonging within stable and continuing disciplines, such as geometry;
or else they are highly general concepts necessary to any language of any complexity. I have
in mind here the family of concepts expressed by such words as and, or, and if. But moral
concepts do not fall into either of these two classes.
So it would be a fatal mistake to write as if, in the history of moral philosophy, there had
been one single task of analyzing the concept of, for example, justice, to the performance of
which Plato, Hobbes, and Bentham all set themselves, and for their achievement at which
they can be awarded higher or lower marks. It does not of course follow, and it is in fact
­untrue, that what Plato says about δικαιοσυ′νη and what Hobbes or Bentham says about
justice are totally irrelevant to one another. There are continuities as well as breaks in the
history of moral concepts. Just here lies the complexity of the history.
The complexity is increased because philosophical inquiry itself plays a part in changing
moral concepts. It is not that we have first a straightforward history of moral concepts
and then a separate and secondary history of philosophical comment. For to analyze a
concept philosophically may often be to assist in its transformation by suggesting that it
needs revision, or that it is discredited in some way, or that it has a certain kind of prestige.
Philosophy leaves everything as it is—except concepts. And since to possess a concept
involves behaving or being able to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances, to alter
concepts, whether by modifying existing concepts or by making new concepts available or
by destroying old ones, is to alter behavior. So the Athenians who condemned Socrates to
death, the English parliament which condemned Hobbes’ Leviathan in 1666, and the Nazis
who burned philosophical books were correct at least in their apprehension that philosophy
can be subversive of established ways of behaving. Understanding the world of morality
and changing it are far from incompatible tasks. The moral concepts which are objects for
analysis to the philosophers of one age may sometimes be what they are partly because of
the discussions by philosophers of a previous age. . . .
It is all too easy for philosophical analysis, divorced from historical inquiry, to insulate
itself from correction. In ethics it can happen in the following way. A certain unsystematically
selected class of moral concepts and judgments is made the subject of attention. From the study
of these it is concluded that specifically moral discourse possesses certain characteristics.
When counterexamples are adduced to show that this is not always so, these counterexamples
are dismissed as irrelevant, because not examples of moral discourse; and they are shown
to be nonmoral by exhibiting their lack of the necessary characteristics. From this kind
Historical Sources3

of circularity we can be saved only by an adequate historical view of the varieties of moral
and evaluative discourse. This is why it would be dangerous, and not just pointless, to begin
these studies with a definition which would carefully delimit the field of inquiry. We cannot,
of course, completely avoid viewing past moralists and past philosophers in terms of present
distinctions. . . . But it is important that we should, as far as it is possible, allow the history
of philosophy to break down our present-day preconceptions, so that our too narrow views
of what can and cannot be thought, said, and done are discarded in face of the record of what
has been thought, said, and done.
 1
h
PLATO
Plato (c. 428–347 b.c.e.), the famed Athenian philosopher, wrote a series of dialogues, most
of which feature his teacher Socrates (469–399 b.c.e.), who himself wrote nothing but in
conversation was able to befuddle the most powerful minds of his day. The Euthyphro,
Defence of Socrates, and Crito are generally considered among Plato’s earlier dialogues,
offering an account of events immediately preceding, during, and after the trial of Socrates,
who, having been found guilty of impiety, was put to death by the Athenian democracy.
Common to all three dialogues is the Socratic assumption that possessing a virtue suffices to
be able to give an account of it, or, in other words, those who cannot provide an account of
a virtue do not possess it. The Republic, regarded by most as Plato’s greatest work, presents
a unified view of central issues in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics,
political philosophy, philosophy of art, and philosophy of education. Plato’s central concern,
however, was the relationship between justice and happiness. He maintained that a just life
is superior to an unjust life, both intrinsically and instrumentally.

Euthyphro
2a Euthyphro. What trouble has arisen, Socrates,
to make you leave your haunts in the Lyceum,
and spend your time here today at the Porch
of the King Archon? Surely you of all people
don’t have some sort of lawsuit before him, as
I do?
Socrates. Well no; Athenians, at any rate,
don’t call it a lawsuit, Euthyphro—they call it
an indictment.
b Euthyphro. What’s that you say? Somebody
must have indicted you, since I can’t imagine
your doing that to anyone else.
Socrates. No, I haven’t.
Euthyphro. But someone else has indicted
you?
Socrates. Exactly.
Euthyphro. Who is he?
Socrates. I hardly even know the man
myself, Euthyphro; I gather he’s young and
unknown—but I believe he’s named Meletus.
He belongs to the Pitthean deme—can you
picture a Meletus from that deme, with straight
hair, not much of a beard, and a rather aquiline
nose?
Euthyphro. No, I can’t picture him, c
Socrates. But tell me, what is this indictment
he’s brought against you?
Socrates. The indictment? I think it does
him credit. To have made such a major discovery
is no mean achievement for one so young: he
claims to know how the young people are
being corrupted, and who are corrupting them.

From Defence of Socrates, Euthyphro, and Crito, translated by David Gallop. Copyright © 1997 by Oxford University Press.
Reprinted by permission of the publisher and translator.
5
6
He’s probably a smart fellow; and noticing
that in my ignorance I’m corrupting his
contemporaries, he is going to denounce me to
the city, as if to his mother.
d Actually, he seems to me to be the only one
who’s making the right start in politics: it is
right to make it one’s first concern that the
young should be as good as possible, just as a
good farmer is likely to care first for the young
plants, and only later for the others. And so
3a Meletus is no doubt first weeding out those of
us who are “ruining the shoots of youth,” as
he puts it. Next after this, he’ll take care of the
older people, and will obviously bring many
great blessings to the city: at least that would
be the natural outcome after such a start.
Euthyphro. So I could wish, Socrates, but
I’m afraid the opposite may happen: in trying to
injure you, I really think he’s making a good start
at damaging the city. Tell me, what does he claim
you are actually doing to corrupt the young?
b Socrates. Absurd things, by the sound of
them, my admirable friend: he says that I’m
an inventor of gods; and for inventing strange
gods, while failing to recognize the gods of old,
he’s indicted me on their behalf, so he says.
Euthyphro. I see, Socrates; it’s because you
say that your spiritual sign visits you now and
then. So he’s brought this indictment against you
as a religious innovator, and he’s going to court
to misrepresent you, knowing that such things
c are easily misrepresented before the ­ public.
Why, it’s just the same with me: whenever I
speak in the Assembly on religious matters and
predict the future for them, they laugh at me as if
I were crazy; and yet not one of my predictions
has failed to come true. Even so, they always
envy people like ourselves. We mustn’t worry
about them, though—we must face up to them.
Socrates. Yes, my dear Euthyphro, being
laughed at is probably not important. You know,
Athenians don’t much care, it seems to me, if
they think someone clever, so long as he’s not
imparting his wisdom to others; but once they
d think he’s making other people clever, then
PLATO
they get angry—whether from envy, as you say,
or for some other reason.
Euthyphro. In that case I don’t much want
to test their feelings towards me.
Socrates. Well, they probably think you
give sparingly of yourself, and aren’t willing to
impart your wisdom. But in my case, I fear my
benevolence makes them think I give all that
I have, by speaking without reserve to every
comer; not only do I speak without charge, but
I’d gladly be out of pocket if anyone cares to
listen to me. So, as I was just saying, if they e
were only going to laugh at me, as you say
they laugh at you, it wouldn’t be bad sport if
they passed the time joking and laughing in the
courtroom. But if they’re going to be serious,
then there’s no knowing how things will turn
out—except for you prophets.
Euthyphro. Well, I dare say it will come
to nothing, Socrates. No doubt you’ll handle
your case with intelligence, as I think I shall
handle mine.
Socrates. And what is this case of yours,
Euthyphro? Are you defending or prosecuting?
Euthyphro. Prosecuting.
Socrates. Whom?
Euthyphro. Once again, someone whom 4a
I’m thought crazy to be prosecuting.
Socrates. How’s that? Are you chasing a
bird on the wing?
Euthyphro. The bird is long past flying: in
fact, he’s now quite elderly.
Socrates. And who is he?
Euthyphro. My father.
Socrates. What? Your own father!
Euthyphro. Precisely.
Socrates. But what is the charge? What is
the case about?
Euthyphro. It’s a case of murder, Socrates.
Socrates. Good heavens above! Well,
­Euthyphro, most people are obviously ignorant b
of where the right lies in such a case, since I
can’t imagine any ordinary person taking
that action. It must need someone pretty far
advanced in wisdom.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute
this electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1
with active links or immediate access to the full terms of the
Project Gutenberg™ License.

1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form,
including any word processing or hypertext form. However, if
you provide access to or distribute copies of a Project
Gutenberg™ work in a format other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or
other format used in the official version posted on the official
Project Gutenberg™ website (www.gutenberg.org), you must, at
no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a copy, a
means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
request, of the work in its original “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other
form. Any alternate format must include the full Project
Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,

performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™
works unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or

providing access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works provided that:

• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the
method you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The
fee is owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
but he has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to
the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty
payments must be paid within 60 days following each date on
which you prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your
periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked
as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information
 about donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation.”

• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who

notifies you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that
s/he does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and
discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of Project
Gutenberg™ works.

• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of

any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in
the electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90
days of receipt of the work.

• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.

1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project

Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different
terms than are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain
permission in writing from the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, the manager of the Project Gutenberg™
trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3
below.

1.F.

1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend

considerable effort to identify, do copyright research on,
transcribe and proofread works not protected by U.S. copyright
law in creating the Project Gutenberg™ collection. Despite
these efforts, Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, and the
medium on which they may be stored, may contain “Defects,”
such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt
data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other
medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.

1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES -

Except for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in
paragraph 1.F.3, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation, the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
and any other party distributing a Project Gutenberg™ electronic
work under this agreement, disclaim all liability to you for
damages, costs and expenses, including legal fees. YOU
AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE,
STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH
OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH
1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER
THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR
ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE
OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If

you discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of
receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you
paid for it by sending a written explanation to the person you
received the work from. If you received the work on a physical
medium, you must return the medium with your written
explanation. The person or entity that provided you with the
defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu
of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or
entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.
If the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund
in writing without further opportunities to fix the problem.

1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set

forth in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’,
WITH NO OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR
ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied

warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this
agreement violates the law of the state applicable to this
agreement, the agreement shall be interpreted to make the
maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by the applicable
state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision of
this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.

1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the

Foundation, the trademark owner, any agent or employee of the
Foundation, anyone providing copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in accordance with this agreement, and any
volunteers associated with the production, promotion and
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, harmless
from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, that
arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project
Gutenberg™ work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or
deletions to any Project Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any Defect
you cause.

Section 2. Information about the Mission of

Project Gutenberg™
Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new
computers. It exists because of the efforts of hundreds of
volunteers and donations from people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the

assistance they need are critical to reaching Project
Gutenberg™’s goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™
collection will remain freely available for generations to come. In
2001, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was
created to provide a secure and permanent future for Project
Gutenberg™ and future generations. To learn more about the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and how your
efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 and the
Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.

Section 3. Information about the Project

Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-
profit 501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the
laws of the state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by
the Internal Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal
tax identification number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation are tax
deductible to the full extent permitted by U.S. federal laws and
your state’s laws.

The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500

West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact
links and up to date contact information can be found at the
Foundation’s website and official page at
www.gutenberg.org/contact

Section 4. Information about Donations to

the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without
widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission
of increasing the number of public domain and licensed works
that can be freely distributed in machine-readable form
accessible by the widest array of equipment including outdated
equipment. Many small donations ($1 to $5,000) are particularly
important to maintaining tax exempt status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws

regulating charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of
the United States. Compliance requirements are not uniform
and it takes a considerable effort, much paperwork and many
fees to meet and keep up with these requirements. We do not
solicit donations in locations where we have not received written
confirmation of compliance. To SEND DONATIONS or
determine the status of compliance for any particular state visit
www.gutenberg.org/donate.

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states

where we have not met the solicitation requirements, we know
of no prohibition against accepting unsolicited donations from
donors in such states who approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot

make any statements concerning tax treatment of donations
received from outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp
our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current

donation methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a
number of other ways including checks, online payments and
credit card donations. To donate, please visit:
www.gutenberg.org/donate.

Section 5. General Information About Project

Gutenberg™ electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could
be freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose
network of volunteer support.

Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several

printed editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by
copyright in the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus,
we do not necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any
particular paper edition.

Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.

This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™,

including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new
eBooks, and how to subscribe to our email newsletter to hear
about new eBooks.