POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE MEDIA 195

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POLITICAL CULTURE
Political thinkers through the ages have acknowledged the importance of attitudes,
values and beliefs. However, these past thinkers did not see them as part of a 'political
Political culture

culture'. Burke (see p. 35), for instance, wrote about custom and tradition, Marx (see
Culture, in its broadest

p. 40) about ideology, and Herder (see p. 132) about national spirit. All of them,
sense, is the way of life

nevertheless, agreed about the vital role that values and beliefs play in promoting the
of a people. Sociologists
and anthropologists
stability and survival of a regime. Interest amongst political scientists in the idea of tend to distinguish
political culture emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as new techniques of behavioural between 'culture' and
analysis displaced more traditional, institutional approaches to the subject. The 'nature', the former
classic work in this respect was Almond and Verha's The Civic C1,1.Jture (1963), which encompassing that
used opinion surveys to analyse political attitudes and democracy in five countries: which is passed on from

the USA, the UK, West Germany, Italy and Mexico. This work was stimulated, in one generation to the

part, by a desire to expl�in the collapse of representative gg:y_e;;rp.,!!l�ar Italy, next by learning, rather

Germany, and elsewhere, and the failure of democracy in many newly independent
than through biological
'Mankind, in general,judge more by their eyes than their hands;
developing states after 1945. Although interest in political culture faded in the 1970s
inheritance. Political

for all can see the appearance, but few can touch the reality.' and 1980s, the debate has been revitalized since the 1990s as a result of efforts in
scientists, however, use

Eastern Europe to construct democracy out of the ashes of communism, and growing
the term in a narrower

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, The Prince (1532) anxiety in mature democracies, such as the USA, about the apparent decline of social
sense to refer to a
people's psychological
capital (see p. 200) and the advent of culture wars. However, there is also debate about orientation, political
whether or not political culture is shaped by the ideas and interests of elite groups. culture being the
PREVIEW This, in turn, is linked to rival views of the mass media (see p. 204) and the extent to 'pattern of orientations'
Much of politics takes place in our heads. Ultimately, what we believe about the society in which we live which government can now manipulate political communication, considered later in to political objects such

may be more important than the reality of its power structure, and the actual distribution of resources and the chapter. as parties, government,
and the constitution,
opportunities within it. Perception may not only be more important than reality; in practical terms, perception
expressed in beliefs,
may be reality. This highlights the vital role played by what is called 'political culture'. People's beliefs, symbols Approaches to political culture
symbols and values.
and values structure both their attitude to the political process and, crucially, their view of the regime in which
The civic-culture approach
Debate about the nature of political culture has often focused on the idea of civic
they live. However, there is significant disagreement about the nature and role of the political culture, not least

culture, usually associated with the writings of Almond and Verba (1963, 1980).
over whether it sustains democracy or is aligned with the interests of dominant groups. Others have highlighted

Almond and Verba set out to identify the political culture that most effectively upheld
concerns about the political culture's (apparently) declining capacity to foster civic engagement and a sense

demo ratic politics. They identified three general types of political culture:
of social belonging. The issue of the political culture also draws attention to the extent to which the politics of
modern societies is conducted through the media in its various forms. The media constitute much more than
a channel of communications; they are part of the political process itself, affecting, and not merely reflecting, A Pfrticipant political culture. This is one in which citizens pay close attention to
the distribution of power in society at large. As such, it has long been accepted that print and broadcast media politics, and regard popular participation as both desirable and effective.
• A s�bject political culture. This is characterized bfuore passi��..Q!1g§!__Qt��
(newspapers, magazines, television, radio, and so on) have a major impact - for good or ill - on democracy.
However, the advent of electronic-based digital media Capps, biogs, websites, and the like), and especially the
�1 the recognition that they have only a ve�dcapacity to influence
\
\ OV,ernment.
increasing incorporation of social media into everyday life, has both transformed established debates about the
v.,,� � V'i�/ Culture war: A political
� j
role of the media and raised a host of new issues. These range from concerns about foreign influence on aspects
of domestic politics, including elections, to guestions about the implications of the spread of 'fake news'. 'aA arochial political culture. This is ed by the bsence of a sense of citizenship,
rii battle over values and

\, "th people identifying with their l cali rathJ than the nation, and having lifestyles usually reflecting

neither the desire nor the ability to participate in politics.

the tension between
KEY ISSUES social conservatism
Although Almond and Verba accepted that a participant culture came closest to the (traditionalism) and social
• How do individuals and groups acguire their political attitudes and values?
democratic ideal, they argued that the 'civic culture' is a blend of all three, in that it Ii�� (progressivism)
• Do democratic regimes depend on the existence of a distinctive 'civic culture'? reconciles the participation of citizens in the political process with the vital necessity c cultur · A set of
• Are modern societies characterized by free competition between values and ideas, or by a 'dominant' culture? for government to govern. Democratic stability, in their view, is underpinned by if.iG-atti�des which
a political culture that is characterized by a blend of activity and passivity on the /
are crucial to the success
a How has the relationship between politics and the media been understood?
part of citizens, and a balance between obligation and performance on the part of
(
of modern democracies.
a Has the use of social media revolutionized the media's political role? government. l u r LQJ\
• Do we now live in a 'post-truth' world?

194
196 POLITICS
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In their initial study (1963), Almond and Verba concluded that the UK came closest
to a civic culture, exhibiting both participant and subject features. In other words,
while the British thought that they could influence government, they were also
willing to obey authority. The USA also scored highly, its relative weakness being
that, as participant attitudes predominated over subject ones, Americans were not
particularly law-abiding. The difficulty of building or rebuilding a civic culture was
underlined by the examples of both West Germany and Italy. By the early 1960s,
neither country appeared to have a strong participant culture; while the subject
culture was dominant in Germany, parochial attitudes remained firmly entrenched in
Italy. Almond and Verba's later study (1980) highlighted a number of shifts, notably
declining national pride and confidence in the UK and the USA, which contrasted
with a rise in civic propensities in Germany.
The civic-culture approach to the study of political attitudes and values has, however,
been widely criticized. In the first place, its model of the psychological dispositions
that make for a stable democracy is highly questionable. In particular, the emphasis
on passivity and the recognition that deference to authority is healthy has been
criticized by those who argue that pol�tic_a l participation (see p. 461) is the very stuff
of democratic government. Almond and Verba suggested a 'sleeping dogs' theory of
democratic culture that implies that low participation indicates broad satisfaction
with government, which politicians, in turn, will be anxious to maintain. On the
other hand, when fewer than half of the adult population bothers to vote,. as regularly
occurs in the USA, this could simply reflect widespread alienation and ingrained
disadvantage. (The link between declining participation rates and the health of the
political system is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 20.)
Second, the civic-culture thesis rests on the unproven assumption that political
attitudes and values shape behaviour, and not the other way round. In short, a civic
culture may be more a consequence of democracy than its cause. If this is the case,
political culture may provide an index of the health of democracy, but it cannot be
seen as a means of promoting stable democratic rule. Finally, Almond and Verba's
approach tends to treat political culture as homogeneous; that is, as little more
than a cipher for national cul�ure or national character. In so doing, it pays little
attention to political subcultures and tends to disguise fragmentation and social
conflict. In contrast, radical approaches to political culture tend to highlight the
significance of social divisions, such as those based on class, race and gender (see
Chapter 8).
The Marxist approach
A very different view of the role and nature of political culture has been developed
within the Marxist tradition. Although Marx portrayed capitalism as a system of
class exploitation and oppression operating through the ownership of the means of
production, he also acknowledged the power of ideas, values and beliefs. As Marx and
Engels put it in The German Ideology ([1846] 1970), 'the ideas of the ruling class are in
every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which isJ:.he_rnlin�al fQr.c..e..o.£.s.o.ciety,
is at the.. same time the;:.uli:ng intellecfiial force'. In Marx's view, ideas and culture are
part of a 'superstructure' that is conditioned or determined by the economic 'base:
the mode of production.
These ideas have provided Marxism with two theories of culture. The first suggests that
culture is essentially class-specific: as members of a class share the same exgeriences
and have a common economic posit.ion, eP,j_ mterests, they are likely to have broadly
similar ideas;"' values and belie& i;, Marx's words, 'it is not the consciousness of
men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their
consciousness'. Proletarian culture and ideas can therefore be expected to differ meaning 'leader') is,
in its simplest sense,
markedly from bourgeois ones. The second theory of culture emphasizes the degree
the ascendancy or
to which the ideas of the ruling class (what Marx referred to as 'ideology') p�rvade
domination of one
society and become the 'ruling�'..._qf..1.�ge. In this view, political culture, or
element of a system
even �ng more than bourgeois ideology. What is important over others. In Marxist
about this view is that it sees culture, values and beliefs as a form of power. From the theory, the term is
Marxist perspective, the Il!:!1ction a£ ideology.is to recaucile-suhor:dii:1ate--G1a.sses to used in a more specific
their �l2�11.Qy_p.ropagatii:1g-myths, d(}lusiens and falsehoods (in sense. In the writings of
Engels' words, 'false consciousness'). Later Marxists have understood this process in �ci (see p. 198),
terms of bourgeois 'hegemony'. hegemony refers to the
ability of a domini!rit
Modern Marxists have been quick to acknowledge that, in no sense, do the 'ruling ':!ass to exercise power
ideas' of the bourgeoisie monopolize intellectual and cultural life in a capitalist society, � winning the con�e,Clt
excluding all rival views. Rather, they accept that cultural, ideological and political of those it subjugate}, as
competition does exist, but stress that this competition is unequal. Quite simply, ideas an alternative to the use
and values that uphold the capitalist order have an overwhelming advantage over of coercion. As a non­
ideas and values that question or challenge it. Such ideological hegemony may, in coercive form of class
fact, be successful precisely because it operates behind the illusion of free speech, rule, hegemony typically
open competition and political pluralism - what Herbert Marcuse (see p. 41) termed operates through
the dissemination of
'repressive tolerance'.
bourgeois values and
The most · tial twentieth-century exponent of this view was Antonio Gramsci beliefs throughout
(see p. 198) ramsc rew attention to the degree to which the class system is upheld society.
not simply b uneqiialewttonrie-arr po 1tica power, bnt-als.QQY- bourgeois hegemony�
,jl/ rl"\.
This consists of the spiritual and cultural supremacy of the ruling class, brought about
through the spread of bourgeois values and beliefs via 'civil society'; the mass media,
the churches, youth movements, trade unions, and so forth. What makes this process
so insidious is that it extends beyond formal learning and education into the very
common sense of the age. The significance of Gramsci's analysis is that, in order for
socialism to be achieved, a 'battle of ideas' has to be waged through which proletarian
principles, values and theories displace, or at least challenge, bourgeois ideas..
The Marxist view of culture as ideological power rests on the distinction between
subjective or felt interests (what people think they want) and objective or real
interests (what people would want if they could make independent and informed
choices). This draws attention to what Stephen Lukes (2004) called a 'radical view of
power' (see p. 9): 'A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary
to B's interests'. Such a view of political culture has, however, attracted considerable
criticism. Some have argued that it is unwarrantedly patronizing to suggest that the Bourgeois ideology: A
values and beliefs of ordinary people have been foisted upon them by manipulation Marxist term, denoting
ideas and theories that
and indoctrination. The acceptance of capitalist values and beliefs by the working
/
serve the interests of the
classes may, for instance, merely reflect their perception that capitalism works.
bourgeoisie by disguising
The dominant-ideology model of political culture may also overstate the degree of the contradictions of
homogeneity in the values and beliefs of modern societies. While a 'ruling' ideology capitalist society.
 l'.:18 1-'ULI 111....:::,
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KEY THINKER I
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT (1901-90)
ANTONIO GRAMSCI (1891-1937)
joined the Socialist UK political philosopher. Oakeshott was a professor of political science at the London
Italian Marxist and social theorist. The son of a minor public official, Gramsci
Italian Communist School of Economics from 1951 1968. His collection of essays
until his retirement in
Party in 1913, and in 1921 became the General Secretary of the newly formed
Mussolini in 1926. He Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (1962) and his more systematic work of political
Party. Although an elected member of parliament, he was imprisoned by
his death. His Prison Notebooks (Gramsci, 1971), written in 1929-35, philosophy, On Human Conduct (1975), are often seen as major contributions to
remained in prison until
'scientific' determinism conservative traditionalism. By highlighting the importance of civil association and insisting
tried to counterbalance the emphasis within orthodox Marxism on
l struggle. Although proponents of on the limited province of politics, he alsodeveloped themes closely associated with riberal
by stressing the importance of the political and intellectua
t his life a Leninist thought. Though often seen as an advocate of a non-ideological style of politics, in line
Eurocommunism have claimed him as an inAuence, he remained throughou
witfi the ideas of Edmund Burke (see p. 35), Oakeshott inAuenced many of the thinkers
and a revolutionary.
Source: Getty Images/ of the New Right.
Laski Diffusion
Source: LSE Archives

The defence of traditional values and established beliefs has been one of the central
may provide a dominant class with self-belief and a sense of purpose, it is less clear,
themes of neo conservatism, advanced in the USA by so cial theorists such as Daniel
as Abercrombie et al. (1980) argued, that subordinate classes have been successfully
Bell (1976) and Irving Kristol (1983), who have warned against the destruction
integrated into this value system. Finally, the Marxist view, which purports to
of spiritual values brought about bo th by market pressures and by the spread of
establish a link between unequal class power and cultural and ideological bias, may
permissiveness. The problem with this position, however, is that it assumes there is an
do nothing more than describe a tendency found in all so cieties for pow�rful groups
authoritative moral system upon which order and stability can be based. The simple
to propagate self-serving ideas. Whether this constitutes a dominant value system, in
fact is that, in mo dern multicultural and multi-religious so cieties, it is doubtful
which a co herent and consistent message is disseminated through the media, schools,
whether any set of values can be regarded as authoritative. To define certain values as
the churches, and so on, is rather more questionable.
'traditional', 'established' or 'majority' values may simply be an attempt to impose a
particular moral system on the rest of society. Indeed, empirical evidence appears to
The conservative approach support the view that political culture is becoming increasingly fragmented, and that
Conservative thinkers have loµg supported their own view of political culture in mo dern so cieties are characterized by growing moral and cultural diversity.
the form of tradition (see p. 81) and, in particular, 'traditional values'. These are
values and beliefs that have supposedly been passed down from earlier generations Political culture in crisis
and so constitute a kind o f cultural bedro ck. Conservative politicians regularly call
Decline of social capital?
for such values to be 'strengthened' or 'defended', believing that they are the key to
so cial cohesion and political stability. In the UK in the 1980s, for example, Margaret The process of political and economic reconstruction in former communist states has
Thatcher called for the resur�ection of what she called 'Victorian values', while John stimulated renewed interest in the issue of political culture since the 1990s. This is
Major's ill-starred 'Back to Basics' initiative attempted much the same in the 1990s. In because pervasive state control over a number of generations had evidently destroyed
the USA, Ronald Reagan embraced the notion of the 'frontier ideology' , harking back or suppressed the so cial connections and sense of civic responsibility that usually
to the conquest of the American West and the virtues of self-reliance, hard work and sustain democratic politics. In other words, there was a perceived need to rebuild
adventurousness that he believed it exemplified. Not uncommonly, such values are civil society (see p. 6), in the sense of a realm of autonomous groups and associations,
linked to the family, the church and the nation; that is, to long-established institutions including businesses, interest groups, clubs, and so on. Indeed, such ideas can be
that supposedly embody the virtues of continuity and endurance. traced back to Alexis de To cqueville (see p. 271), who, in the nineteenth century, �d
explained the USA's egalitarian ins��p.d dem9qatic_practkes.b.y-rnfoi:ence to
In his essay 'Rationalism in Politics', Michael Oakeshott (1962) developed a further the Americans ..IQ.� for ar_y�i ation and ci.Y.is;.�ation. No sooner had this
defence of continuity and tradition. Oakeshott argued that traditional values and reviv�rn with political culture arisen in relation to postcommunist states than
established customs should be upheld ID.� res�unt::of±hett farfii iarity, it was being applied to perceived problems in mature demo cracies.
.-,----;-----·----··· --
which engenders_ ·-------------·__..
..--- �-�nse of reassurance, stability
..._.,.....
at1d security.
..··
This suggests that there
is a general human disposition to favour tradition over innovation, the established
Robert Putnam, for example, argued that variations in the uaj!!yyf lo ca��E�ent
in different re ions..£0�.!}'.��er_: d.�!.�E.. 1P.lE!.. �sl.l?.y_�e P.I�nce, or absence, of traditions
over the new. To be a conservative, Oakeshott suggested, is 'to prefer the familiar to the
of civic engagement, reflected in differing levels of voter turno ut, newspaper
u�n, to ����c L ���tried, fact !_CJ my��ry, the a__:� _ al !9.Jh<'! poJ�ble,
readership, and membership of choral societies and football clubs. Iri Bowling Alone
the lilil!��c:!_�o th:_���µnd, the n��t, the suffi_c;ien.t.to_th<'!_.§�P-�r ab�dant,
(Oakeshott, 1962). (2000), Putnam drew attention to the USA's declining_'.s.Qfial_gipital', and argued
the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss' .�,r�•
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that other industrialized countries are likely to follow US trends. He highlighted
the emergence of a 'post-civic' generation. This was demonstrated by a 25-50 per
Social capital cent drop in the number of voluntary clubs and associations since 1965, and by
The concept of social sharp declines in attendance at public, town and school meetings, as well as in
capital was developed in the membership of, and work done for, political parties. Putnam's view, which is
the 1970s to highlight influenced by communitarianism, explains declining social capital in a variety of
�
the social and cultural
ways. These include the spread of suburbanization and, therefore, of longer journeys
to work; the rise of two-ciiee"r families and their impact on the quantity and quality
factors that underpin
of parenting; and the tendency of television to privatize leisure time, misshape social
wealth creation. The
perceptions and reduce achievemendevels in children. From a contrasting social­
term has since been
democratic perspective, however, the decline of civic engagement is explained by the
used to refer to social
connectiveness,
triumph of consumer capitalism and the spread of materialist and individualist values.
as represented by
networks, norms and
An alternative view of the social capital debate suggests not that there has been a
trust that promote
decline of civic engagement or social connectedness, but that the forms these have
civic engagement. In
taken have changed. According to Inglehart (1977, 1990), such shifts are linked to
common with economic
the spread of affluence and to the growth, particularly amongst young people, of
'postmaterial' values. As new gen�-0-wn..up-si.J:ic;:e..theJ.2.@§ ��tamed,
assets, social capital can
decline or rise, usually
in advanced industrial countries at least, to economic security and material well­
through education
being, 'traaitional ideas about subjects such as sex, marriage and personal conduct
and a stress on active
citizenship. The alleged have been displaced by more 'liberal' or 'permissive' attitudes. At the same time,
decline in social capital traditional political attitudes and allegiances have een weakened and sometimes
in modern society has replaced by growing interest in issues such as feminism, nuclear disarmament,
been linked, variously, to animal rights and environmental protection. Thus party membership and electoral
the 'parenting deficit',
turnout may have declined but there has been a growth of interest in single-issue
the rise of individualism,
protest politics and campaigning groups. Post-Fordist (see p. 175) theorists argue that
such cultural changes are irresistible, because they are linked to a wholesale shift in
and the increase in
economic and political organization that is bringing about a decline in deference and
social and geographical
a rise of individualism (see p. 179).
mobility.
C u l t u re w a rs
However, concerns about the health of the political culture are not restricted to the
fear that social capital is being undermined by the trend towards individualization.
ROBERT D. PUTNAM (born 1941)
US political scientist and social commentator. Putnam's work has revived interest in civil
society and focused attention on the importance of 'social capital': the social networks
in a society that build trust and cooperation, and develop 'the "I" into the "we'". His
most influential work, Bowling Alone: The Coffopse ond Revival of AmericanCommunity
(20 0 0), used the image of a man bowling alone, rather than in a team, to illustrate
the decline of community activity and political engagement in the USA. Amongst the
causes of this decline, Putnam identifies the growing influence of television, two-career
families and longer commutes. His other works include Making Democracy Work: Civic
Traditions in Italy (1993).
Source: Martha Stewart
An additional source of disquiet has focused on the tendency, particularly in mature
democracies, towards political polarization. Consensus politics and a disposition to
compromise have, thus, often been displaced by antagonism, even hatred. Although Communitarianism
this development has been fuelled in many Western societies b a combination of Communitarianism is
stagnant and, sometimes declining living standards_ a11d risiIJg__iileq_uality, it reflects the belief that the self
a genenils"hift � th� E_O�tical focus of such societies f�m_Qie economy to ��ture. or person is constituted
Whereas the domiI1ant tendency since the 1980s has been for economic choices to through the community,
get narrower, boiling down to a choice between some version of market economics,
in the sense that
cultural choices are typically starker and offer less scope for compromise. This is
individuals are shaped
because they deal with who we are and how we define ourselves. 'Culture wars' are
by the communities
thus wars of identity. The phenomenon of political polarization around cultural issues
to which they belong
and thus owe them a
was first evident in the USA during the Reagan presidency ( 1 981-89), when the debt of respect and
growing influence of the new Christian right within the Republican Party resulted in consideration. Left-
greater prominence being given to issues such as abortion, sex education in schools, wing communitarians
homosexuality and women's rights. In response, the Democrats were increasingly hold that community
associated with liberalized attitudes on family and lifestyle questions. demands unrestricted
Culture wars have, nevertheless, gained their greatest impetus from the advance of
freedom and social
equality. Centrist
globaliz..a,tion (see p. 161) and the various changes it has set in store. This has been
communitarians hold
particularly evident in the upsurge in populism (see p. 53) in the USA and across that community
much of Europe that occurred in response to the Great Recession, which came in is grounded in
the wake of 2007-09 global crisis, and the onset of the European migration crisis reciprocal rights and
in 2015 (see p. 412). In this light, it is sometimes argued that politics has come to responsibilities. Right­
be better understood less in terms of the essentially economic left/right divide, and wing communitarians
more in terms of the culturally based 'open/cl.9.sed' divide (see p. 251). People with hold that community
'open' political attitudes �.ally. ou .glub.alization, are tolerant or wel�'"iningof requires respect for
cultural diversity, sympathize with an inclusive view of national identity, and.typically
authority and established
support liberal social n� ari,[y;;}"ij�;-By �ontrast, people w.ith ..'closed'...attitudes are
values.
susp�Qf:Orop_pQ§e, globalizaJion,.fear cultm:a ldivexsity, are drawn to.an exclusive
view of national identi.tx;.JJJ1c usually: su ];1.9. CLC.OJ.JS_eryative...s ocial.no.rms. an.d..valy_es.
l
The strength of the open/closed divide was demonstrated by the 2016 Brexit
referendum in the UK, and the deep and abiding antagonism (and sense of mutual
incomprehension) that surfaced between so-called 'Remainers' and so-called 'Leavers'.
In the analysis of Goodhart (2017), this was essentially a division between 'Anywheres'
(roughly 20 to 25 per cent of the population) and 'Somewheres' (abou,t half the
population). While Anywheres are people who have portable 'achieved' identities
based on educational and career success, making them comfortable and confident with
new places and people, Somewheres are people who are more rooted in a geographical
identity and who find the rapid changes of the modern world unsettling.
TH E MED A AN D OL TICS
Any examination of the factors that influence people's psychological orientation to
politics, whether their long-term beliefs and values (political culture) or their short­
term reaction to particular policies or problems (public opinion), must, in modern
circumstances, take account of the crucial role played by the media. The media have
been recognized as politically significant since the advent of mass literacy and the
popular press in the late nineteenth century. However, it is widely accepted that, through
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Theories of the media

Few commentators doubt the media's ability to shape political attitudes and values or,
at least, to structure political and electoral choice by influencing public perceptions
Postmaterialism is a social i zation
about the nature and importance of issues and problems, thereby. However, there is
theory that explains Political socialization
c iderable debate about the political significance of this influence. A series of rival
the nature of political is the process through
concerns and values
;-theor es offer contrasting views of the media's political impact. The most important which individuals acquire
in terms of levels of / of the are the following: political beliefs and
economic development. values, and by which
luralist model
It is loosely based on :,
..D these are transmitted
Abraham Maslow's
·5C: ominant-ideology model
0
from one generation
(1908-70) 'hierarchy u
Q_
to the next. Families
LL
of needs', which places
esteem and self ­
1� and schools are usually
viewed as 'primary'
actualization above agents of political
material or economic socialization, while the
needs. Postmaterialism l.9 workplace, peer groups
iii
assumes that conditions i::
:, Pluralism (see p. 101) highlights diversity and multiplicity generally. The pluralist and the media are
0
of material scarcity If)
model of the mass media �s the · as an id_eolog�J;21.ac.eJIU!lb!9}... viewed as 'secondary'
breed egoistical and a wide range of political views are debated an_g__discussed. While not rejecting the idea agents of political
Protesters march against Brexit in Brighton, U K, 2017. The U K's decision to leave the
acquisitive values, socialization. Interest
EU following a referendum in 2016 brought about acute tensions between so-called that the media can affect political views and sympathies, this nevertheless suggests
meaning that politics is in political socialization
'Remainers' and 'Leavers'. that their impact is essentially neutral, in that they tend to reflect the balance of forces
dominated by economic peaked during the
i-v r-.r. v O � l<?f"
within society at arge.
issues. However, in so-called 'behavioural
conditions of widespread a combination of social and technological changes, the media have become increasingly The pluralist view, neverthel � portrays the media in strongly positive terms. In revolution', as external
prosperity, individuals powerful political actors and, in some respects, more deeply enmeshed in the political ensuring an 'informed cititenry', the mass media both enhance the quality of stimuli were seen to
express more interest in process.At� developments are particularly noteworthy. First, the impact of democracy and guarantee that government power is checked. This 'watchdog' role explain (and possibly
'postmaterial' or 'quality the so-called 'primary' agents of political socialization, such as the family and social was classically demonstrated in the 1974 Washington Post investigation into the determine) political
of life' issues, typically class, has declined. Whereas once people acquired, in late childhood and adolescence Watergate scandal, which led to the resignation of Richard Nixon as US president. attitudes or behaviour.
concerned with morality, in particular, a framework of political sympathies and leanings that adult experience Some, moreover, argue that the advent of the digital media, and particularly the
politicaljustice and tended to modify or deepen, but seldom radically transformed, this has been weakened
personal fulfilment.
internet, has strengthened pluralism and political competition by giving protest
in modern society by greater social and geographical mobility, and by the spread of , groups, including 'anti-capitalist' activists, a relatively cheap and highly effective
individualist and consumerist values. This, in turn, widens the scope for the media's means of disseminating information and organizing campaigns, as discussed later
political influence, as they are 9ie principal mechanism through which information in the chapter. However, the pluralist model suffers from significant deficiencies.
about issues and policies, and therefore political choices, is presented to the public. For example, weak and unorganized grou s are ex�luded from access to mainstream
Digital media: A Second, the development of a mass television audience from the 1950s onwards, and publishin and broadcasting�aning that .tli.�_1J1edia's ideological marketplace tends
generic term for the more recently the proliferation of channels and media output associated with digital to be � ti.Yely__narro.w_ .and_generally- pro-establishment in chara<::ter. In addition,
many different forms of media, has massively increased the media's penetration of people's everyday lives. private ownership and formal inde endence_ fi;:qm gpvernment may not be sufficient
electronic communication to guarantee the media's oppositional character in the light of the increasingly
It has been estimated that by 2021 some 1.68 billion households worldwide will
made possible through symbiotic relationship between gove nment and journalists and broadcasters.
have access to television, while half the world's population had gained access to the S1( 11� ftfvlll 1,.
digital or computer
technology. internet by 2018. These trends, moreover, are most pronounced in the developing (__,o('-'ip ) t· ·�="• l.l'....
,d ·
, ( (-00- 1 cJt)-<J\'1
p r :;,p � : �:J Mok.
world, where, in the case of the internet, access doubled (to 42 per cent) between 2010 D o m i n a n t - i d ef ogy m od e l
Social media: Forms of
and 2017. This means that the public now relies on the media more heavily than ever The dominant-ifeology model portrays the mass media as a politicl:!!.y �ativ�
electronic communication
before. Nevertheless, the relationship between the media and politics continues to be �at is ali�ed to the interests of economic and social elites, and serves to_p_IO)E2te
that facilitate social
interaction and the
surrounded by debate and disagreement. These debates focus, not least, on the nature complia� 2olitical passivity among�_!!i�_mas;�S:- InTtsMarrist version, rooted
formation of online of the political biases that operate within the traditional or mass media (see p. 204), in the larger Marxist critiqu°'e of poiitical culture (discussed earlier in the chapter)
communities through and the extent to which the way that political processes have come to be shaped or and particularly the ideas of @ramsci, �s that the media � ois
framed by the media has changed due to the shift in usage from traditional media to
� -�
ideas and maintain ca italist hegemony1 acting i tfi intere·stsof ma· or corporations
n e
the exchange of user­
generated content. digital media, and especially social media.
�s. Ownership, in other words, ultimately determines the po itical
 L V "-t r V L I I I \.., .:) POL ICAL C U LT U R E A N D T H E M E DIA 205
I
r111111/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////,r1/////////////1///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////h

and other views that the mass media disseminate, and ownership is increasingly liberal intellectuals, whose values and concerns are quite different from those
concentrated in the hands of a small number of global media conglomerates. The of the mass of the population. In its feminist version, this model highlights the
Mass media largest include Facebook, Google (Alphabet), Comcast, News Corporation, Viacom, predominance of males amongst senior journalists and broadcasters, implying that
The media comprise Disney, CBS and Bertelsmann. From this perspective, the media play an important this both explains the inadequate attention given to women's views and issues by the
those societal role in promoting globalization (see p. 161), in that their tendency to spread ideas, mass media, and accounts for the confrontational style of interviewing and political
institutions that images and values that are compatible with Western consumerism (see p. 180) helps discussion sometimes adopted by broadcasters and journalists. Although the elite­
are concerned with values model helps to explain why the range of political views expressed by the mass
to open up new markets and extend business penetration worldwide.
the production and
media is often more restricted than pluralists suggest, it also has its limitations. Chief
distribution of all One of the most influential and sophisticated versions of the dominant-ideology model
amongst these is that it fails to take full enough account of the pressures that bear
forms of knowledge, was developed by Noam Chomsky (see p. 205)r and Ed Herman in Manufacturing
upon senior media professionals; these, for example, include the views and i..nterests
information and Consent (2006), in the form of the 'propaganda model'. They identified five 'filters'
entertainment. The
of owners and commercial considerations; notabl 'r t.ing?figures.
through which news and political coverage are distorted by the structures of the
'mass' media channel media itself. These filters are as follows:
communication
towards a large and • the business interests of owner companies
undifferentiated
• a sensitivity to the views and concerns of advertisers and sponsors
audience using relatively NOAM CHOMSKY (born 1928)
advanced technology. • the sourcing of news and information from 'agents of power', such as governments
U S linguistic theorist and radical intellectual. Chomsky first achieved distinction a s a
The clearest examples and business-backed think-tanks
scholar in t h e field of linguistic studies. His Syntactic Struc tures (1957) revolutionized the
are the 'broadcast'
• 'flak' or pressure applied to journalists, including threats of legal action discipline with the theory of 'transformational grammar', which proposed that humans have
media (television and
an innate capacity to acquire language. Radicalized during the Vietnam War, Chomsky
radio) and the 'print' • an unquestioning belief in the benefits of market competition and consumer
subsequently became the leading radical critic of US foreign policy, developing his views
media (newspapers capitalism.
in an extensive range of works including American Power and the New Mandarins (1969),
and magazines).
The 'new' media New M ilitary Humanism (1999) and Hegemony and Survival (20 04). I n works such as (with
Chomsky's analysis emphasizes the degree to which the mass media can subvert
(cable and satellite Edward Herman) Manufacturing Consent ([1988] 2 0 06), he developed a radical critique of
democracy, helping, for example, to mobilize popular support in the USA for
telecommunications, the mass media and examined how popular support for imperialist aggression is m o bilized.
imperialist foreign policy goals. The dominant-ideology model is, nevertheless, also
the internet, and so Source: Getty Images/
subject to criticism. Objections to it include that it underestimates the extent to which
on) has subverted the Rick Friedman
the press and broadcasters, particularly public service broadcasters, pay attention to
notion of mass media by
dramatically increasing
progressive social, racial and development issues. Moreover, the assumption that
audience fragmentation. media output shapes political attitudes is determinist and neglects the role played by
people's own values in filtering, and possibly resisting, media messages. Ma rket m odel
The market model of the mf.s media differs from the other models, in that it dispenses
with the idea of media bia�hold�at newspapers and television reflect, rather than
E l ite-va lues model shape, the views of the general publicJ11is occurs because, regardless of the personal
The elite-values model shifts attention away from the o . ip of media views of media owners and senior professionals, private media outlets are, first and

corporations to the mechanism through which �Li�d. This
view suggests that editors, journaligs and broadcasters enjoy significant professional
independence, and that even the�10st interventionist of media moguls are able only
to set a broad political agenda, ut not to control ay-t�n­
maldng. The media's political bias (see p. 207) therefore reflects the values of groups
that are disproportionally represented amongst its senior professionals. However,
there are a number of versions of this model, depending on the characteristics that
are considered to be politically significant.
One version of the elite-values model holds that the anti-socialist and politically
conservative views of most mainstream newspapers, magazines and television
stations derive from the fact that their senior professionals are well-paid and generally
from middle-class backgrounds. A quite different version is sometimes advanced by
conservatives, who believe that the media reflect the views of university-educated,
- ----
foremost, dth- rnfit-m · mization and thus with exte di g,
market shar The media therefor eo le 'what they want: d cannot afford to
�
alienate existing or potential viewers or readers by presentmg po itical vie�oi!?:ts·wirn
which Jhey ma�ree. Such·considei·�tions m�y b< le�s pr�ssing in relation to public
service broadcasters, such as the BBC, which are more insulated from commercial and
advertiser pressures but, even here, the tyranny of 'ratings' is increasingly evident.
Nevertheless, although this model dispenses with the idea that at least the privately
owned ip.ass media should be seen as part of the political process, it helps to explain
some significant trends in political life. One of these may be growing popular
disenchantment with politics resulting from the trivialization of political coverage.
Fearful oflosing 'market share', television companies in particular have reduced their
coverage of serious political debate, and thus abandoned their responsibility for
educating and informing citizens, in favour of 'infotainment'.
 r//1////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////;H/
I mpact of the traditional media
E n h a n c i n g or t h reate n i n g d e m o c racy?
The impact that the media have on democracy is one of the most widely debated
aspects of the relationship between the media and politics. For many, the existence of
a free press is one of the key features of democratic governance. However, how do the
media act as custodians of democracy? And why have some questioned the media's
democratic credentials, even arguing that they may undermine it? The media has
traditionally been said to promote democracy in two key ways: by fostering public
debate and political engagement, and by acting as a 'public watchdog' to check abuses
of powe?: (The specific impact of social medi� pn democracy and politics more
generally is considered later in the chapter.)
The capacity to provide a civic forum in which meaningful and serious political debate
can take place is often viewed as the key democratic role of the media. The virtue of
this is that better-informed citizens with more independent and considered views will
be more politically engaged. The media are therefore agents of political education.
Indeed, the media may have largely replaced formal representative institutions, such
as assemblies, parliaments and local councils, as arenas for the dialogue, debate and
deliberation that are the very stuff of democratic politics. This has happened because
the media are, arguably, better-suited to this role than are traditional representative
bodies. In addition to offering the public perhaps its only meaningful opportunity
to watch politicians in action (through, for example, interviews with politicians
and televised assembly debates), the media provide a forum for the e;x,_tl.[.t;;ssion of a
muc�nge...0Lv.iewpgi1:its-and.. opinions-than-is-i,,0ssiE>le-withm...r,(;}pr,esentative
institutions composed only of elected politicians. Thus, academics and scientists,
business leaders and trade union bosses, and representatives of interest groups and
lobbyists of all kinds are able to express views and engage in public debate through
the mechanism of media. Not only do the media substantially widen the range of
views and opinions expressed in political debate, but they also present debate
and discussion in a way that is lively and engaging for the general public, devoid
of the formality, even stuffiness, that characterizes the exchanges that take place in
assemblies and council chambers around the world.
The 'watchdog' role of the' media is, in a sense, a subset of the political debate
argument. The role of the media, from this perspective, is to ensure that public
accountability takes place, by scrutinizing the activities of government and exposing
abuses of power. Once again, in carrying out this role the media is supplementing
and, to some extent, replacing the work of formal representative institutions. Media
professionals such as researchers, journalists and television presenters are particularly
suited to this role because they are 'outside' politics and have no interest other than
to expose incompetence, corruption, or simply muddled thinking whenever and
wherever it can be found. By contrast, if public accountability is left solely in the
Free press: Newspapers
(and, by extension, other
hands of professional politicians, it may be constrained by the fact that those who
media outlets) that are
attempt to expose ineptitude or wrongdoing wish themselves, at some stage, to hold
free from censorship and government power. This may not only taint their motives, but it may also discourage
political interference by them from criticizing processes and practices that they may wish to take advantage
government and, usually, of in the future. However, the media can only perform this role effectively if they are
are privately owned. properly independent, and not dominated by government. Democratic governance
' ///////////////////////f///////////////////////////////////////////////////h .//////////////Al
'
therefore requires either that the publicly financed media are accountable to an
independent commission, or that there is an appropriate level of competition from
'free' or privately financed media. The example of WikiLeaks nevertheless highlights Political bias
how controversial the media's 'watchdog' role can be in practice (see p. 215). Political bias refers
to political views that
However, reservations have also been expressed about the capacity of the media systematically favour
to promote effective democratic governance. TI1e first of these, as advanced by the values or interests of
dominant-ideology and elite-values theorists, is that, far from providing citizens with one group over another
a wide and balanced range of political views, the content of the media is tainted by as opposed to 'balanced'
clear political biases. Whether political bias stems from the opinions and values of or 'objective' beliefs.
editors, journalists and broadcasters, or from a more general alignment between the Bias, however, may take
interests of the media and those of economic and social elites, it is difficult to see various fo rms (McQuail,
how the media's duty to provide objective information and remain faithful to public­ 1992). Partisan bias is
explicit and deliberately
service principles can be discharged reliably and consistently in practice. Particular
promoted (newspaper
emphasis has, in this respect, been placed on the implications of media ownership,
editorials). Propaganda
and the fact that the views and interests of major corporations or powerful media
bias is deliberate but
moguls cannot but, at some level, influence media output. Insofar as the mass media
unacknowledged
affects the political agenda, this agenda is likely to be politically conservative and, at
('lazy' students or
least, compatible with the interests of dominant groups in society. 'militant' Muslims).
Unwitting bias occurs
Second, as the mass media is not subject to public accountability, it is the classic
through the use of
example of 'power without responsibility' (Curran and Seaton, 2009). However well­
seemingly professional
informed, ki10Wledgeable and stimuiating the views of journalists and broadcasters
considerations (the
may be, and however eager they may be to portray themselves as the 'voice of the
'newsworthiness' of a
people: media professionals - unlike elected politicians - 'represent' no one other story). Ideological bias
than themselves, and have no meaningful basis for claiming to articulate public operates on the basis of
opinion. Third, there are reasons for doubting the independence of the media assumptions and value
from government. All too often, a symbiotic relationship develops between media judgements that are
professionals and the political elite which constrains both the mass media's political embedded in a particular
views and their capacity to act as an effective 'watchdog'. belief system (wealth is
gained through talent
and hard work).
The me dia a n d p o l itical leaders h i p
Apart from its impact (for good or ill) on democracy, the prominence of the mass
media in an 'information age' has affected the processes of governance (see p. 74)
through the transformation of political leadership. The chief way in which the media
has transformed political leadership is through growing interest in the personal lives
and private conduct of senior political figures, at the expense of serious and 'sober'
policy and ideological debate. This, in part, stems from the media's, and particularly
television 's, obsession with image rather than issues, and with personality rather
than policies. In the UK and other parliamentary systems, it is evident in a tendency
towards the 'presidentialization: or 'Americanization', of politics (as discussed
in Chapter 13). Such trends reflect not so much conscious bias on the part of the
media, as an attempt to 'sell' politics to a mass audience that is deemed to be little
interested in issues and policies. TI1is also accounts for the tendency to treat elections
Presidentialization: A
as 'horse races', the public's attention being focused less on the policy significance growing emphasis on
of the outcome and more on who is going to win. These two tendencies invariably personal leadership, in line
coincide, turning elections into 'beauty contests' between leading politicians, each of with the role and powers
whom serves as the 'brand image' of their party. Leaders are therefore judged largely of an executive president.
 - -------------------
208 P � 7 �1 c
:=- z
O LI T s
Celebrity politics: Either
or both the cultivation
of 'celebrityhood' by
elected politicians, or
interventions by stars of
popular culture into the
political domain .
Spatial leadership: The
tendency of political
leaders to distance
themselves from their
parties and governments
by presenting themselves
as 'outsiders', or
developing their own
political stance or
ideological position.
-----------. ------------
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I C A L C U LT u R
f//1////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
on the basis of their 'televisual' skills (relaxed manner, sense of humour, ability to
demonstrate the 'popular touch', and so on), rather than their master y of political
issues and capacity for serious political debate. However, has exposing leading
politicians to the unrelenting glare of media attention merely given them celebrity
status, or has media attention affected the location of power within the governmental
system?
There can be little doubt that the advent of the 'media age' has changed the behaviour
of political leaders, as well as affected the career prospects of individual politicians.
For example, presentational factors, such as persoh�' appearance, hairstyle, dress
sense, and so on, have become more important in determining political preferment
or advancement. However, such developments have not merely changed the 'face' of
modern politics; they have reordered power relationships both within the political
executive and between the executive and the assembly. The growth of 'celebrity
politics' gives presidents, prime ministers and other par ty leaders the ability to make
personalized appeals to the voters, creating the phenomenon of spatial leadership.
This allows leaders to appeal 'over the heads' of their senior colleagues, parties and
government institutions, directly to the public. Furthermore, the messages they give,
and the policy and ideological stances they adopt, are increasingly determined by
leading politicians personally, supported, it appears, by an ever-expanding band of
public relations consultants, 'spin doctors', media managers, pollsters and publicity
directors.
One of the consequences of this is that junior politicians may have an additional
reason for deferring to their leaders: their fear of damaging their leader's image and
reputation. If the leader is damaged, especially by splits and internal criticism, all
members of his or her party or government suffer. Political power thus comes to be
structured on the basis of the publicity and media attention received by individual
politicians. The greater the media attention, the greater the political leverage.
However, media attention is far from an unqualified benefit for political leaders.
Although their triumphs and successes can be publicly trumpeted, their flaws, failings
and transgressions can also be ruthlessly exposed. Indeed, the ultimate vulnerability
of contemporary political F�aders may well be that negative media coverage may turn
them into 'electoral liabilities', encouraging their parties and colleagues to remove
them in order to 'save the party', or their own political careers.
C u l t u re of conte m pt
A fur ther way in which the media has affected governance is through its impact on
the political culture. The media is sometimes charged with having created a climate of
corrosive cynicism amongst the public, leading to growing popular disenchantment
with politics generally, and a lack of trust (see p. 466) in governments and politicians
of all complexions (Lloyd, 2004). This may, in turn, be linked to trends that have
afflicted mature democracies in par ticular, such as declining voter turnout and falling
party membership. The UK is often seen as the most advanced example of such a
media-driven 'culture of contempt; but similar tendencies are evident elsewhere;
notably, in the USA, Australia and Canada. Why has this happened? A critical stance
towards politicians in general and governments in particular is, of course, vital to the
maintenance of democratic governance. However, the distinction between legitimate
criticism and systematic and relentless negativity may, in practice, be difficult to
'=' '='"":'..,. :--::,-:=-----�--2 0 9
E AN D TH E M E D IA
�
////////////////////////////////////////////;//////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////////////////A
(
uphold. This occurs, in part, because increasingly intense commercial pressure
s have
forced the media to make their coverage of politics 'sexy' and attention-grabbin
g.
The media, after all, is a business, and this places inevitable pressure on the cov(;!
rage
of news and current affairs. Facts are absorbed progressively more quickly
into a
swirl of comment and interpretation, blurring, seemingly altogether, the distincti
on
between what happens and what it means. Similarly, routine political debate
and
policy analysis receive less and less attention, as the media focus instead 011
- or
'hype' - scandals of various kinds and allegations of incompetence, policy failure
or simple inertia. Leading politicians have, as a result, come to live in a kind
of
ongoing reality-television programme, the sole pur pose of which appears to be
to
embarrass and denigrate them at every possible turn. The public, for their part, tend
to view politicians as untrustworthy and deceitful, according them the same level
of
respect they would accord any other reality-television
programme participant. (The
implications of such developments are examined fur ther in Chapter 20.)
Po l i cy- m a ki n g in a me dia a ge
The final way in which the media has influenced governance is through its impact 011
the policy-making process. This has happened in at least two ways. The first is that, just
like everyone else in society, government is bombarded by a much greater quantity
of infor mation arriving almost immediately. Knowing too much can sometimes be
as dangerous as knowing too little. An example of this can be found in the USA's
inability to predict and prevent the September 1 1 terrorist attacks in 2001. The
problem the USA faced was not that it lacked information about al-Qaeda, its plans
and movements, but that the sheer quantity of national-security intelligence available
made effective analysis almost impossible. Moreover, as news and information
spreads around the globe at a faster pace, governments are forced to react to events
more quickly, and often before tl1ey have been fully discussed and digested. An age of
'24/7 news' inevitably becomes one of '24/7 government'. Politicians are encouraged,
even forced, to take a stance on issues simply to avoid being criticized for inertia or
inactivity, leaving little time for the analysis of policy options and their implications.
Second, greater reliance on the media means that it is often the media, and not
government, that sets the political agenda and dictates the direction of policy-making.
For example, the fact that television pictures of the Asian tsunami in December 2004
were broadcast almost immediately across the globe, creating an outpouring of public
sympathy for its victims and leading to 'unprecedented levels of private charitable
donations, forced governments around the world, within days, to make substantial
increases in the scale of their of aid and support.
Social media and politics
The revolution in communication technologies, brought about since the 1 990s,
especially, by the spread of satellite and cable television, mobile phones, the internet
and digital technology generally, has transformed the media and society, helping
to create what has been called an 'information society' or a 'network society' (as
discussed in Chapter 8). This is a process that has also occurred with remarkable
rapidity. Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Wikipedia and Google,
unknown only a few
years ago, have become par t of many people's everyday lives. But how, and to what
extent, have social media affected politics?
 /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////,W////////////////////////,P/////////////////////////////////////////////#///////..0 �////////h
f//f/

Vi a b l e e - d e mocracy ?
In its early phase, the use of new information and communications technology for
political purposes was widely seen as a progressive step, leading to an improvement
in the quality of political life, particularly by transferring power from governments
and political elites to the public at large. This was reflected in growing interest in the
DOES TH E W I D E R U S E OF D I GITAL M E DIA E N R I C H POLITICS?
It is generally accepted that new digital or computer technologies are having-a p d impact on society and politics,
but it is less clear what tfiat..impact is. Is ICT a motor for de�entralization and democrac , or may new technologies

idea of 'e-democracy'. However, e-democracy (so�etimes called 'digital democracy' d e� politics and t�reaten freedom 7

or 'cyberdemocracy') is a vague and contested term which covers a diverse range of YES NO
activities. Some of these are 'top-down' activities (initiated by government or other
public bodies) while others are 'bottom-up' ones (initiated by citizens and activists), Modernizing politics. Tech n o logical develo pment Technological 'Big Brother�µas.al.w�D
reflects an ong oing desire t o use science and i nn ovatio n developed to serve the inter� �te g_r p owerful
with a further distinction being made between those that involve a one-way flow of . 5 lN' \9-\� _
to make human existence more convenient and groups, and ICT 1sno e;;'c eption. C o ntrary to the p o pular
information from government to citizens and those involving a two-way process of
c omforta ble, and lies in po · ics a:\ w.� r image that they a re tools of liberation, mobile phones
interaction. Examples of e-democracy include the following: �
spheres of life. -voting a nd ' ·� referendums ynd the internet a ctually provide the police, security

---------
• online voting (e-voting) in elections or referendums thus en a ble citizens to express their views easily and forces, tax officials, and s o on with �cess to a massive
f(\ lr0.-1i07
c o nveniently, possibly without h a ving t o leave home. a m ount of informa tion a bout the m ovements, views
• online petitions (e-petitions) organized by governments or other bodies
Fa lling electoral turn o uts may therefore s imply be a and a ctivities of private citizens. As such, digital media
• accessing political information, news and comment via websites, blogs (basically, conseguence of the fa i lure of the democratic process provide a highly effective means of controll i ng diss ident p<1)<2Cj
a personal website), and so on t o keep up to date with how citizens in an 'inform ation behaviour and c o ntaining politi c a l opposition.
society' wish to participate in po litics. Dangers of information anarchy. Many of the new
• the use of social networking sites or interactive television to allow citizens to
Knowledge is power. New techno logies massively po l i tical spaces opened up by digita l media have been
engage in political argument and debate and, possibly, policy-making �� making possible, polluted by both the nature oft:he views tneyfea ture
• the use of mobile and smartphones and social media to organize popular protests for the first time, a truly free exchange of ide a s and views. an tfie'style of expressio n ,iliey tendto encou�e.

and demonstrations. The internet already makes a vailable to private citizens The internet provides a pl a tform for religious
specia list informatio n tha t was once only available to fundamentalists, racists, ethnic n a tio nalists and other
Advocates of the use of social media in politics typically argue that the benefits of governments. Accessing inform a tion through Wiki pedia �, who would otherw i se struggle to a ttract

Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube and other platforms is that they offer citizens and the myria d other online sources is not only almost ublic a tJ;g,n ti.on. Similarly, the blogosphere tends to

wider and easier access to information and political comment. The proliferation of instantaneous, but it a'lso exposes the public t o
diversity of v i ews, i ncluding radical a nd diss i dent ones.
websites developed, variously, by professional groups, businesses, lobbying bodies
Citizen empowerment. The great a dvantage
and think-tanks means that, for the first time, citizens and citizen groups are privy
techn o l ogies is that they ma ke possible
to a quantity and quality of information that may rival that of governments. This has
transmission of views, thereby promoting active and
generally empowered non-state actors at the expense of national governments and
eng a ged citizens � Instead of participatrng 1 n politics
traditional political elites. Non-governmental organizations (see p. 273) and interest 's imply through the act of voting every few years, citizens
groups (see p. 272) have thus become more effective in challenging the positions
can express views and opioi.g.os..o.n an.alcn.ost.c.o ntin.uous
and actions of government' and, sometimes, even displaced government as an �, through, for i nsta nce, online consulta tions on draft
authoritative source of view� and information about specialist subjects, ranging from legislation and online petitio ns. More radic a lly, digita l
the environment and global poverty to public health and civil liberties. A further :nedia may foster direct popula r pa rticipation, ma ki ng a
development has been the impact of social media on journalism. This has occurred reality of Athenian- style democracy, for so long d i smissed
in two ways. First, the rise of the blog has greatly expanded the contours of political a s im [J racti ca ble.,_J) a nt only to t ownsh i p meetings.
a rich be domin a ted by shr i ll, uncivil and op i n i on a ted v iews,
fashio ned, seemingly, by the desire to create noto ri ety.
of new New inequalities. The claim th at new technolog i es are
a two - way implic i tly egalita rian is bogus. Most obviously, a 'digita l
div ide' has opened up, ba sed on the fact that access to
new communication technologies is not universal. The
'informatio n rich' h a ve come t o dom i nate the 'informa tion
;=-- .
poor'. In the fem i n i st versi o n of this argument, computers
and technology generally have been seen to benefit men,
since they ref lect essentially male interests a nd patterns
of th ought. � a also P-CQll!.� flriva!�rl.f�S-
with new opp o rtun i t ies to adv�rJ:.i?_g, g.ener at.e..r-.co..fi_ts .§.DQ
improv��ir.. publ�'2!_ag_e .

commentary, as the growing 'blogosphere' allows writers, academics, politicians D��ii"1 activism. he broadest claim made for Impoverished, debased democracy. E-democracy, or
digita l med i a is t , in contributing to a who les a le shift 'virtual' democra cy, threatens to turn the democratic
and others to share their observations and opinions about political matters with a

in power from pol itical elites to the public at la rge, it is process i nto a series of push- button referendums while
whoever may be interested in accessing them. Second, there has been a growth in
bringing about a process of radic a l democrat ization. This citizens sit a lone in their own living rooms. This further
user-generated content, stemming from the increased willingness of private citizens,
occurs bec a use new technol o g ies are implic itly egalitarian erodes the 'public' dimension of p o lit ical particip at io n ,
sometin1es (but not necessarily) in newsworthy or politically charged situations,
(being relat i ve! chea p, eas ily accessible a n d simple t o reducing dem ocratic cit izenship to a s e t o f c o nsumer
to share their thoughts, experiences and, frequently, pictures with others via social use), a nd als fgeil itate entra lized a nd sponta ne o us cho ices, s omewh a t akin to v oting in the televis io n
E-democracy: The media. This creates a network of exchanges involving a potentially unlimited number s. oGiahic:tio�. As m odern erotest_a1oygrn.ents clearly show Big Brothe (By we a kening face-t o -face human
use of com puter­ of people. demonstrate, the use of mobi le phones and socia l intera ct ion, the danger is that people will be c o nsumed
based technologies to
deepen and enhance Social media have also been credited with having supported the development of new ��'let yi::Q_edia in p rt cul r helps to make leadership
a i a a nd formal by the ir owr.i opinions, a nd bec ome ind i fferent to th o se
)
org a niza t ion unnecessa ry, even irrelevant. of others.
cit i zens' engagement in political and social movements and increasing their effectiveness. They have thus
democra tic processes. given rise to a new style of activist politics, sometimes called the 'new politics'. The
 212 POLITICS
W/1/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////#//////////////////////////////////////////////))///////� W///////h,
key advantage of social media, from this perspective, is not just that they open up new
opportunities for political participation, but also that these forms of participation
are, by their nature, decentralized and non-hierarchical. For example, armed with
mobile and smart phones, and through the development of online communities, anti­
globalization or anti-capitalist protesters had been able to mount demonstrations and
engage in agitation and direct action. This trend first became apparent during the
so-called 'Battle of Seattle' in 1999, when s�� 50,000 activists, some communicating
via mobile phones, forced the cancellation of the opening ceremony of a World Trade
Organization meeting. The political potential of Facebook was demonstrated by its
role in facilitating the spread of pro-democracy protests in the early phase of the
2011 Arab Spring (see p. 87). Online movements have also sprung up, aiming to
give a political voice to individuals who may otherwise not be heard, with examples
including Black Lives Matter (#BlackLivesMatter), which campaigns against violence
and systemic racism towards black people, and Me Too (#MeToo), which campaigns
against sexual harassment and assault.
Social media have also attracted criticism, however. They have, for instance,
been linked to the trend towards e-democracy with the growth of a privatized
and consumerist form of citizenship (in which entitlements are stressed to the
detriment of responsibilities). How meaningful is democratic participation if it
lacks a genuinely 'public' dimension and fails to engender meaningful debate and
discussion? In this view, online political communities and forms of online political
participation will never serve the cause of democracy as well as face-to-face human
interaction alternatives. A further drawback of e-democracy is that it is based on
the assumption that new information and communication technologies are, in
themselves, progressive and liberating. In reality, technology is either liberating or
oppressive depending on who is using it, and the uses to which it is put. It is worth
remembering that the technologies that helped in the spreading and coordination
of pro-democracy demonstrations during the Arab Spring are the same ones that,
in other circumstances, have been used to spread racial or religious bigotry, or to
promote political extremism generally.
E - c a m p a i g n i n g a nd po l itica l m a rketi ng
One of the aspects of politics most clearly influenced by social media is digital
campaigning. Indeed, some argue that the advent of digital campaigning, or
e-camp aigning, is bringing about a change as significant as the shift from door-to­
door canvassing and local election meetings to what essentially became television­
orientated campaigning. Websites, emails and podcasts provide candidates and
parties with a fast and cheap means of getting their message across to a (potentially)
large audience, in the process, aiding in the recruitment of campaign volunteers
and the raising of campaign funds. E-campaigning has the advantage that it is
E-campaigning: The
particularly effective in reaching younger people, who have often been the most
use of computer-based
technologies to publicize,
difficult section of the population to engage through the use of conventional
organize, lobby and raise strategies. Furthermore, social media allow campaigns to customize their messages
funds for the selection or on the basis of selected demographics (age, educational achievement, region, and so
election of candidates for forth), by giving them access to a wealth of personal information about the people
political office. who follow them. Finally, social media are structured to allow campaigns to 'go
, = oco , ...-,-,oc o c-r ,c,- o , °" ,-. ,- ' ' ' "' ' " " = ''"" =•� r;
viral: through the use, for instance, of the 'Share' function on Facebook and the 're­
tweet' function on Twitter.
Although the internet has been used in campaigning since the mid-l 990s, particularly
in the USA, it became particularly prominent during Barack Obama's US presidential
campaigns in 2008 and 2012. Obama's team used forums and social media platforms
to build relationships, particularly with supporters, and would-be supporters, aged
18-29, also encouraging the spread of wider networks of support via the website
MyBarackObama.com. Sympathisers were also sent regular updates on Obama's policy
positions by email and text messages. Nevertheless, new technologies were certainly
not the be-all and end-all of the Obama campaigns, which also relied heavily, and
spent most money, on traditional strategies such as television advertising and poster
campaigns. However, Donald Trump's seemingly instinctive understanding of the
power of digital media, and his use of social media during the 2016 US presidential
campaign and since, has had a yet more significant impact on politics. By posting
tweets on a daily basis, often expressing controversial views, and by re-tweeting posts
with predominantly right-wing content, Trump has used Twitter not only to speak
directly to voters (without any cost), but also to set the news agenda for the day ahead.
Trump's tweets have thus, in effect, become news events in their own right.
Erosion of civi l i ty a n d centre politics
The impact of social media on politics has, nevertheless, not been restricted to
providing alternative mechanisms for carrying out established political activities
(democratic participation, campaigning, and so on), however much the nature and
effectiveness of these activities may have changed as a result. Beyond these matters,
social media may have helped to alter both the tone of political debate and its
ideological focus. In recent years, there has arguably been a tendency for political
debate to become more shrill, sometimes seemingly through a calculated attempt
to shock or, perhaps, be offensive, while there has been evidence that consensus,
and the centre ground of politics generally, are being abandoned. Although such
developments are widely seen as a consequence of trends such as the rise of populism
(see p. 53) and the resurgence of nationalism, the growing use of social media may
also have contributed. For example, the growth of blogs and news websites has drawn
new voices, and new types of voice, into the arena of political discourse. This applies,
in particular, to people whose radical views and abrasive or 'straight-talkirig' political
style probably makes them ill-suited to a career in conventional politics or journalism.
Examples of such news websites include Beitbart, often seen as a key mouthpiece for
the 'alt-right' (alternative right) in the USA, which has been closely aligned to Donald
Trump, especially through the president's former chief strategist, Steve Bannon.
In the UK, the left-wing media outlet, The Canary, was founded in 2015 with the
purpose of supporting Jeremy Corbyn's attempts to carry through a comprehensive
radicalization of the Labour Party. Other factors may also support this trend towards
polarization. These include what may be a general tendency for views expressed
online to be less civil and more politically 'raw' than views expressed in the context
of face-to-face interaction. Similarly, provoking shock and even outrage may help to
generate profit, by extending reach and so helping to boost advertising revenues. In
other words, in the internet age, it may pay to be offensive.
 r;/1/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////AW////////////////////////(/////////////////////////////////////////////I/////////////////#/////,

POST-TRUTH POLITICS?
Politics and truth
Propa ganda SOCIAL M E D IA: PURVEYO RS O F FAKE N EWS?
Propaganda is Politics has always had an uncomfortable relationship with truth. There has never
information (or been a golden age when politics and truth marched confidently hand in hand, with Events: The first recognizable social networking site was
disinformation) SixDegrees.com, founded in 1997. Based on the theory
honesty being the dominant rule of the political sphere. This is because, as politics
disseminated in a that no person is separated by more than six degrees
is inevitably concerned with the acquisition and exercise of power, it cannot but be
deliberate attempt from another (or, s pecifically, from the actor Kevin
entangled with manipulation, exaggeration, concealment and downright lies. This is
to shape opinions Bacon), this allowed its users to create profiles, invite
particularly the case when government power is largely or entirely unchecked, and tl1e
and, possibly, friends, organize groups and surf other users' profiles.
media are controlled, directly or indirectly, by government and used as a propaganda
stimulate political The world of social media subseguently expanded with
action. Propaganda
machine. The classic example of a propaganda machine was that constructed under
the launch of Friendster, Linkedln and MySpace, but it
is a pejorative term, Joseph Goebbels in Nazi Germany. The Nazis set out to 'coordinate' German society
was the launch, in 2 0 04, of Facebook that transformed
implying both untruth through an elaborate process of ideological indoctrination. For example, youth
the reach and significance of social media. Founded
or distortion, and a organizations were set up in the form of the Youth and the League of German by Mark Zuckerberg as a Harvard-only site, Facebook
(usually crude) desire Maidens; the school curriculum was entirely revised and all teachers were coerced subseguently became by far the biggest player in the Source: Getty lmages/NurPhoto
to manipulate and to join the Nazi Teachers' League; and the German Reliever Front replaced free social media world, with over 2.3 billion monthly users
control public opinion. trade unions, providing workers with recreational facilities through the 'Strength and an estimated value of at least $74 billion. Another include that the firm offered to discredit political rivals
Propaganda differs through Joy' organization. As chief propagandist of the Nazi Party, in 1933 Goebbels key platform was created in 2006 in the form of Twitter. by the use of u nderhan d tactics such as smear campaigns
from political bias in
created a new department, the Reich Ministry of Information and Propaganda, Messages on Twitter C'tweets') were originally restricted and 'honey traps'.
that it is systematic and
which inundated Germany with an unending flood of propaganda and oversaw a to 140 characters, although in 2017 this was doubled for
deliberate, whereas the Critics of Facebook and other social media platforms
programme of systematic censorship. Underlying these developments was the most languages. Both Facebook and Twitter nevertheless
latter may be partial argue that they lie at the heart of the problem of 'fake
and unintentional. A
assumption that, as Goebbels put it, 'if you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating operate as news and information networks and as social
news'. This stems from the fact that social media's focus
distinction is sometimes
it, people will eventually come to believe it'. During the Nazi period, the theory of media sites. Twitter, for example, proved to be the largest
on user-generated information means that pol iticians,
drawn between 'black' the 'big lie' was applied, not least, to the 'Final Solution', the planned extermination source of breaking news on the day of the 2016 US
political groups and political campaigns can make direct
propaganda (blatant of European Jewry. presidential election.
contact with perhaps millions of voters, unconstrained
lies), 'grey' propaganda
Constitutional and political checks on government power, including a free media Signincance: The political importance of Facebook by the 'filters' and checks that would apply in the case
(distortions and half
and electoral democracy, undoubtedly modify the disposition within politics and other social media p latforms was little recognized of traditional journalism. I n the absence of effective
truths) and 'white'
towards dishonesty and deceit, but by no means eradicate it altogether. Apart until a Aurry of allegations surfaced in 2 0 1 6, mainly mechanisms for checking facts, challenging guestionable
propaganda (the truth).
from anything else, the need to win elections means that, among politicians and related to Donald Trump's election in the USA, but also assertions and ensuring accountability and/or political

Censorship: A p.olicy or
act of control over what
can be said, written,
published or performed
in order to suppress what
is considered morally or
politically unacceptable.
Spin: The presentation of
information so as to elicit
the desired response, or
being 'economical with the
truth'.
political parties, the desire to accentuate the positive and conceal the negative is associated with the Brexit referendum in the UK. The balance, partisanship Aourishes and truth is routinely
allegations included the claim that social media platforms bent to serve the interests of a political master. This is
irresistible. Moreover, although liberal-democratic structures rule out 'official'
were widespread purveyors of 'fake news' (an accusation compounded by a business model that arguably favours
propaganda and crude ideological manipulation, governments have come to
that is also commonly levelled at the traditional media), falsehood over truth, because the often shocking or
shape the news agenda by new techniques for the control and dissemination of
that they had swayed the outcomes of elections and outrageous nature of the former tends to m·ean that
information, often described as 'news management', or 'spin'. The favourable
referendums, that they had facilitated foreign, and usually stories are shared faster and more widely, in the process
presentation of information and policies has thus become a major preoccupation
Russian, meddling in domestic politics, and that they attracting increased reven ue from advertising. However,
of governments across the globe. The art of 'spin', carried out by so-called 'spin­
had breached users' privacy on a massive scale. In April the notion that social media are inevitably purveyors
doctors', includes practices such as the control of sources of information to ensure
2 0 1 8, Zuckerberg was called before the US Congress of misinformation has also been challenged. For one
that only an official 'line' is presented, the use of unattributable briefings or 'leaks',
for a two - day grilling about these and related matters. thing, the fact that Facebook has instituted a number
and the release of information close to media deadlines to prevent checking and
This happened in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica of reforms to its practices in the wake of the Cambridge
the identification of counter-arguments. News management of this ldnd is most scandal, in which the defunct and discredited political Analytica scandal perhaps indicates that social media
advanced in the USA, where it has become commonplace for electoral strategists consultancy, which had worked on Donald Trump's can, and will, clean up its act in response to political
and campaign managers to take up senior White House posts, if their candidate presidential campaign, was accused of improperly pressure. For another, rather than usurping democracy,
wins the presidency. obtaining and passing on to its political clients personal social media's model of free, open and direct access
However, the 2016 US presidential election took news management in a more data that Facebook had harvested from up to 87 million to information from almost any source may make the
of its users. Other claims about Cambridge Analytica democratic process more robust.
controversial and radical direction. The frequency with which often-sensational
political news appeared despite having no basis in fact, and the tendency for stories
deemed to be damaging to a particular candidate or cause to simply be dismissed as

216 POLITICS
Fake news: False and
usually sensational
information disseminated
under the guise of news
reporting.
Post-truth: A condition in
which objective, evidence­
based knowledge has lost
its authority, meaning that
the distinction between
truth and lies becomes
immaterial.
Anti-intellectualism: A
stance that questions
or rejects the value of
knowledge, intelligence,
science, academics and
intellectuals generally.
Deference: An
acceptance of the views of
others, usually people who
are thought to 'know best'.
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/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /// //////: - .
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A
'fake news', gave the impression that politics had entered a 'post-truth' era. Although QU EST I O N S FO R D I SCU SSIO N ?
the growth in 'fake news' is often linked to changes in the media, and notably the
I s civic cul t ure a cause or a conseq uence of effecti
absorption of social media into everyday life (see p. 215), the advent of post-truth ve democ ratic rule?
politics can be seen as essentially a consequence of the rise of populism and of the Are the ruling ideas in every age t h e ideas of
t he ruling class?
anti-intellectualism that it typically brings in its wake. This can be observed in the How has t h e decline in social capita l been explain
ed, and wha t have been i t s implica t ions?
fact that its two clearest examples have been the election of Donald Trump in the
I s t h e erosion of tradi t ional values to be welcom
ed o r feared ?
USA and the Brexit referendum in the UK.
Why, and t o wha t exten t , is con t empora ry poli
t ics shaped by culture wars?
The drift towards anti-intellectualism 6 Which theory of t h e media is m o s t persua sive,
and why?
Populist anti-intellectualism has taken at least three forms. First, as politicians 7 Is a free press vi t al fo r democ ratic rule?
including Donald Trump and Michael Gove, one of the leaders of the 'Leave' campaign f How has t h e media change d t h e na t ure of poli
t ical leaders hip? Are leaders
strong er or
in the Brexit referendum, have put it, people have 'had enough' of experts. Respect for weake r as a result?
experts requires a level ofdeference that is no longer easily found in modern societies. Wha t d ifferen t forms does e-dem ocracy take?
All too often, experts have come to be seen as members of a derided establishment, How, and to wha t e x t en t , has digi t a l med 1'a affecte d d emocra t ·1 c part · ·
set apart from the mass of the population by the lives they lead, the language they 1c 1 pa t ion and
poli t ical campaigning?
speak and, indeed, by their very expertise. In that sense, their education is a source
What impact has social media had on t h e tone
of corruption, imbuing them with a sense of self-regard and encouraging them to of poli t ical debate ?
believe that they are somehow 'above' the mass of the population. Such a view clashes Why has politics always had an uncom fortabl e
rela t ionship wi t h t ru t h?
sharply with the conventional notion that expertise derives from a disinterested (and Do all govern ments use propag anda, or only
some?
probably public-spirited) search for knowledge. Populists, by contrast, place their How, and wi t h wha t conseq uences , has politics
en tered a 'post-t ruth' era?
faith in the opinions of the many, not of the few. This is based both on the assumption
that the (albeit untutored) instincts of the masses have a moral purity that does not
apply in the case of the elite, and the belief that 'the crowd' has greater wisdom than
either a small group or a single individual (Surowiecki, 2004).
FU RTH E R R EAD I N G
Colem an, S. and D. Freelon (eds), Handbook
_ of Digital Politics (2015) . An overview of the
Second, as populism draws much of its potency from its ability to offer simple solutions rela t1_ onsh1p be tween digi ta l informa tion, commu
nica t ion techno logies and poli t ics, wi t h
to simple problems, it offers little scope for the complexities that are an inevitable example s from around t he world.
Hall, S., J. Evans and S. N ixon, Representa on (2nd
feature of intellectual analysis. For example, during the 2016 US presidential election, _ 6 edn) (2013) . A compre hensive
explora t ion of
the key t h1nke s nd i ssues at stake 1n Cult ural
Donald Trump repeatedly stated a commitment to solve the problem of immigration � � St udi e s from one of the progeni tors of t his
area of academ ic inquiry _ .
from Mexico by building a wall that Mexico would pay for. However, he did this
Hawley , � -, Making Sense of the Alt-Right (2
without addressing 'difficult' (that is, complex) questions about, among other things, _ _ � 17). An analysis of t he ris e of t he a lt -righ t , the
fun_c� 1on of social media t here in, and of its Journe
y from th e fringes of interne t culture to the
how and exactly where the wall would be constructed, how much the wall would pol 1 t 1 cal mains _ tream.
cost, how Mexico could b'e persuaded to pay for it, and who would pay for the wall Lech el e r, S. and C H. de Vre ese, News Fra ming
Effects: Theory and Practice (2019) . An examin ation
of t he way in which
if Mexico refused to pay up. Politicians may, therefore, only be able to adopt bold, _ news fra ming can impac t on ci tizen's a tt i t udes and
politica l behaviours.
Margett � , H., P. John, S. Hale, and T. Yass e ri, Politica
confident stances on matters that deeply trouble the electorate if they either choose _ _ l Turbulence Haw Social Media Shape Collective
Action (2015) . An invest1ga t1 on of when and why
not to think too deeply about the matter in hand, or choose not to share their deeper many online collec t ive action efforts fail
wi t h atten t ion to t he rarer examples of succes s. '
thinking about the matter in hand with the electorate.
Putnam , R., Bawling � lane: The Collaps e and Revival
_ of Americ an Commu nity (2000 ). A highly
Third, populists are keenly aware that, in the age of anti-politics (see Chapter influ ent ial analysi s of t h e decline of c1v1c engage
m ent and social part icipa t ion in the USA
St reet, J., Mass Media, Politics and Democracy
20), sustained political engagement is often more likely to be achieved through (2nd edn) (2011) · A readable an d w1· d e-rangin
g
overvie · w of a I I aspec
ts of the rela t ionship between t
feelings and emotions than it is through reason and analysis. This is because the . he media and poli t ics.
W1nte rs1eck, A K. Fridkin , and P. Kenney, 'The Messag
e Ma tt ers: The Influ e nce of Fac
disenchantment that builds up in sections of the electorate that feel ignored by '.
on Eval a t1 ons of Poli t ical Messages' (2018) . An
t -Check in
� examin ation of the impac t of fac t checkin :
conventional politicians and parties makes them less susceptible to balanced debate and the import ant role of news media.
and argument and more susceptible to an appeal based on anger or hope. Populists
seek to exploit this by forging an emotional connection with disaffected (potential)
voters, and do so through the use of simple and affective slogans. Examples of this � Vi�it www.macmillanihe.com/companion/Heywood-Politics-Se to access extra resources for
include 'Make America Great Again', from Trump's 2016 election campaign, and � this chapter.
'Taking Back Control', from the Brexit referendum campaign.