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Contents
Maps • xvii
Preface • xix
Supplements • xxvii
Acknowledgments • xxxii
About the Authors • xxxvii
CHAPTER 1
North America Encounters the Atlantic World, Prehistory–1565 • 3
North America to 1500 • 4
The Three Waves of Migration • 4
Farmers, Hunters, and Gatherers • 5
The Rise and Decline of Urban Indian North America • 7
Indian North America in the Century before Contact • 10
Making an Atlantic World, 1400–1513 • 13

Western Europe in the 15th Century 13
•
Iberians, Africans, and the Creation of an Eastern Atlantic World • 15

Columbus and the First Encounter • 18
The Atlantic World Invades the Caribbean • 21
Global Passages: Cod • 24
The Atlantic World Enters North America, 1513–1565 • 26

The Fall of Mexica • 26
Invasions of North America and the Rise of Imperial Competition • 28
Religious Reformation, Imperial Rivalries, and Piracy • 31
The Founding of Florida • 34
CHAPTER 2
Colonists on the Margins, 1565–1640 • 39
Conquest Begins and Trade Expands, 1565–1607 • 40
Spain Stakes Claim to Florida • 40
New Spain into the Southwest • 42
England Enters Eastern North America • 43
Imports and a Changing Indian Northeast • 46
vii
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viii Contents
European Islands in an Algonquian Ocean, 1607–1625 • 48

Tsenacommacah and Virginia • 50
New France, New Netherland, New Indian Northeast • 52
Pilgrims and Algonquians • 53
Global Passages: Angela’s Ordeal, the Atlantic Slave Trade, and the Creation
of African North American Cultures • 54
Seeking God, Seizing Land, Reaping Conflict, 1625 to c. 1640 • 57

Missionaries and Indians in New France and New Mexico 57 •
Migration and the Expansion of Dutch and English North America • 59

Dissent in the “City upon a Hill” • 61
Colonist-Algonquian Wars • 64
CHAPTER 3
Forging Tighter Bonds, 1640–1700 • 73
Uncivil Wars, 1640–1660 • 74
Smallpox and War Plague the Great Lakes • 74
English Civil Wars and the Remaking of English America • 77
Planters and Slaves of the Caribbean • 80
Church and Indians in the Southeast and Southwest • 82
New Imperial Orders, 1660–1680 • 84

The English Colonial Empire and the Conquest of New Netherland • 84
Quebec and the Expansion of French America • 87
Chesapeake Servitude, Mainland Slavery • 88
The Creation of South Carolina • 93
Metacom and the Algonquian Battle for New England • 94
Global Passages: Global Catholicism, Indian Christianity,
and Catherine/Kateri Tekakwitha • 96
Victorious Pueblos, a New Mid-Atlantic, and “Glorious”

Revolutions, 1680 to the 1690s • 98
The Pueblo War for Independence • 98
Royal Charters for New Jersey and Pennsylvania • 100
English North America’s “Glorious” Revolutions • 103
North America’s Hundred Years’ War Begins • 104
CHAPTER 4
Accelerating the Pace of Change, c. 1690–1730 • 111
Turmoil in Indian North America • 113
Horses and Violence on the Northern Plains • 113
Spanish Missions in Texas • 115
Indians, the French, and the Making of Louisiana • 116

Contents ix
Slaving Raids, Expansion, and War in the Carolinas • 118

Iroquois Hegemony and Concessions in the Northeast • 120
Migration, Religion, and Empires • 121

The Africanization of North America 121 •
The “Naturalization” of Slavery and Racism • 125

European Immigrants and Imperial Expansion • 127
Pietism and Atlantic Protestantism • 130
Imperial Authority and Colonial Resistance • 131
Global Passages: New York, Madagascar, and Indian Ocean Piracy • 134
Laying Foundations in British North America • 135

An Industrious Revolution 136 •
A Creole Elite Pursues Gentility • 138

The Anglo-Atlantic’s Communications Revolution • 139
CHAPTER 5
Battling for Souls, Minds, and the Heart of North America,
1730–1763 • 149
Immigrants and Indians • 150
The Arrival of Immigrants in Chains • 150
The Impact of Irish and German Immigration • 155
Indian Displacement and the Rise of Sioux, Osage, and Comanche • 158
Slave Resistance and the Creation of Georgia • 161
Minds, Souls, and Wallets • 163

North Americans Engage the Enlightenment • 163
Becoming a Consumer Society • 166
Revivals and the Rise of Evangelical Christianity • 170
African, African American, and Indian Awakenings • 173
Global Passages: The Birth of Methodism • 174
North America and the French and Indian War, 1754–1763 • 176
The Struggle for the Ohio Valley • 176
The War in North America and in Europe • 177
Britain Gains Control of Eastern North America • 180
CHAPTER 6
Empire and Resistance, 1763–1776 • 191
English and Spanish Imperial Reform • 192
Transatlantic Trade as an Engine of Conflict • 193
Grenville’s Program • 194
Pontiac’s Rebellion • 196

x Contents
Bourbon Reforms • 198

The Enlightenment and Colonial Identity • 198
Stamp Act and Resistance • 199

Parliamentary Action 200
•
Protest and Repeal • 200

Empire and Authority • 202
Consumer Resistance • 203

Townshend Duties 203
•
The Non-Importation Movement • 204

Men and Women: Tea and Politics • 205
The Boston Massacre • 207
Resistance Becomes Revolution • 207

Boston Tea Party and Coercive Acts • 208
Empire, Control, and the Language of Slavery • 209
Mobilization • 210
War Begins • 210
Global Passages: Independence: Transatlantic Roots, Global Influence • 212
Declaring Independence • 212

The World’s First Declaration of Independence • 213
Spanish Imperial Consolidation • 215
Ideology and Resistance • 217
Taking Stock of Empire • 217
CHAPTER 7
A Revolutionary Nation, 1776–1789 • 223
The Revolution Takes Root • 224
Ideology and Transatlantic Politics • 224
Trying Times: War Continues • 225
Alliance with France • 228
The Structure of Authority • 228

State Governments • 229
Articles of Confederation • 230
Military Organization • 230
Diplomacy and International Finance • 231
Global Passages: International Officers in the American
Revolutionary Military • 232
Securing Independence • 234

War at Sea 234
•
War in the South • 236

Contents xi
Loyalists: Resistance and Migration • 237

Indian Warfare • 237
African Americans at War • 239
Peace and Shifting Empires • 239
Restructuring Political and Social Authority • 241

Power in the States • 242
Economic Change • 242
Women and Revolution • 243
Racial Ideology and Questioning Slavery • 244
A Federal Nation • 245

Debt and Discontent • 246
Constitutional Convention • 247
Ratification • 248
CHAPTER 8
A New Nation Facing a Revolutionary World, 1789–1815 • 257
The United States in the Age of the French Revolution • 258
The New Nation and the New Revolution • 259
The Rise of Party Tensions • 260
Neutrality and Jay’s Treaty • 261
The Popular Politics of Rebellion • 262
Indian Warfare and European Power • 263
Party Conflict Intensifies • 264

Adams in Power • 264
Quasi-War with France • 265
Alien and Sedition Acts • 267
Slave Rebellions: Saint-Domingue and Virginia • 267
The “Revolution” of 1800 and the Revolution of 1804 • 270

Jefferson Elected • 270
Democracy: Limits and Conflicts • 271
Haitian Revolution • 271
Global Passages: Revolutionary Migrations • 272
The Louisiana Purchase • 273
Trade, Conflict, Warfare • 274

Transatlantic and Caribbean Trade • 274
Mediterranean Trade: Barbary Wars • 276
Western Discontents • 277
European Wars and Commercial Sanctions • 277

xii Contents
The War of 1812 • 278

War Declared • 279
Opposition • 279
U.S. Offensives in Canada • 279
Tecumseh and Pan-Indian Resistance • 281
Naval War • 282
British Offensive • 284
The War Ends • 286
CHAPTER 9
American Peoples on the Move, 1789–1824 • 291
Exploration and Encounter • 292
Lewis and Clark Expedition • 292
Zebulon Pike • 294
Plains Indian Peoples • 295
Astor and the Fur Trade • 295
Asian Trade • 297
Shifting Borders • 299

Jeffersonian Agrarianism • 299
Northwest, Southwest, and New States • 300
The Missouri Compromise • 301
African American Migration and Colonization • 302
Spanish Expansion in California • 303
Social and Cultural Shifts • 304

Indian Acculturation • 305
Gender in Early Republican Society • 305
Literature and Popular Culture • 307
African American Culture: Slaves and Free People • 308
Roots of the Second Great Awakening • 310
Financial Expansion • 311

Banks and Panics • 311
Corporations and the Supreme Court • 313
Global Passages: Francisco de Miranda, the United States,
and Latin American Independence • 314
Politics and Hemispheric Change • 316

First Seminole War 316
•
Transcontinental (Adams–Onís) Treaty • 317

The United States and Latin American Revolutions • 318
The Monroe Doctrine • 318

Contents xiii
CHAPTER 10
Market Revolutions and the Rise of Democracy, 1789–1832 • 327
The Market System • 328
Internal and External Markets • 329
Technology: Domestic Invention and Global Appropriation • 330
Water and Steam Power • 331
Transportation and Communication • 333
Markets and Social Relationships • 335

Manufacturing and the Factory System • 335
Slavery and Markets • 337
Class • 338
Urban and Rural Life • 340
Democracy and the Public Sphere • 340

Voting and Politics 341
•
Election of 1824 • 342

John Quincy Adams • 343
Andrew Jackson, “The People,” and the Election of 1828 • 343
Jackson and the Veto • 344
Economic Opportunity and Territorial Expansion • 345

Texas Colonization • 345
Santa Fe Trail • 346
The Black Hawk War • 347
Global Passages: Whaling • 348
Expanding Markets • 350

The Legal Structures of Capitalism • 351
The Inland Empire • 351
The Industrial Revolution • 352
CHAPTER 11
New Boundaries, New Roles, 1820–1856 • 359
An Expanding Nation • 360
Andrew Jackson and the Trail of Tears • 360
Re-Peopling the West • 363
Latin American Filibustering and the Texas Independence Movement • 366
Pacific Explorations • 367
The New Challenge of Labor • 369

White Workers, Unions, and Class Consciousness • 369
Foreign-Born Workers • 372

xiv Contents
The New Middle Class • 373

The Expansion of Slavery and Slaves as Workers • 375
Global Passages: Middlemen Abroad • 376
Men and Women in Antebellum America • 379

Gender and Economic Change • 379
Ladies, Women, and Working Girls • 381
Masculinity on the Trail, in the Cities, and on the Farm • 383
Freedom for Some • 385

The Nature of Democracy in the Atlantic World • 385
The Second Party System • 387
Democracy in the South • 388
Conflicts over Slavery • 390
CHAPTER 12
Religion and Reform, 1820–1850 • 397
The Second Great Awakening • 398
Spreading the Word 398 •
Building a Christian Nation • 400

Interpreting the Message • 403
Northern Reform • 405

The Temperance Crusade • 406
The Rising Power of American Abolition • 406
Women’s Rights • 410
Making a Moral Society • 412
Southern Reform • 413

Sin, Salvation, and Honor • 414
Pro-Slavery Reform • 414
Nat Turner and Afro-Christianity • 415
Global Passages: Celebrating the Black Atlantic • 418
Southern Antislavery Reformers • 418
Challenges to the Spirit of the Age • 420

Emerson, Thoreau, and the American Soul • 421
The First Mass Culture • 422
The American Renaissance • 424
Politics as Gospel • 425

Contents xv
CHAPTER 13
A House Dividing, 1844–1860 • 433
The Expansion of America • 435
The American Invasion and Conquest of Mexico • 435
The Emergence of the New American West • 437
Global Passages: Global Gold • 438
Conestogas, Comanches, and Californios • 439
Contested Citizenship • 442

The Patterns of Migration • 442
New Immigrants and the Invention of Americanism • 444
The Know-Nothing Movement • 446
Slavery and Antebellum Life • 447

The Paradox of Slavery and Modernity • 447
The West Indies, Brazil, and the Future of Slavery • 449
Inside the Quarter • 449
The Creation of African America • 451
The Rise of the Republicans • 452

Free Soil and Free Labor 453 •
The Politics of Slave Catching • 454

Western Expansion and the Kansas–Nebraska Act • 456
Rising Sectionalism • 458
CHAPTER 14
The Civil War, 1860–1865 • 467
Secession, 1860–1861 • 468
The Secession of the Lower South • 468
Fort Sumter and the Secession of the Upper South • 470
Mobilization for War • 472
From the Ballot to the Bullet • 475
War in Earnest, 1862–1863 • 476

The North Advances 476
•
Stalemate in the East • 478

Southern and Northern Home Fronts • 480
The Struggle for European Support • 482
A New Birth of Freedom • 483

Slaves Take Flight • 483
From Confiscation to Emancipation • 484
Government Centralization in Wartime • 486

xvi Contents
The Hard War, 1863–1864 • 489

Invasion and Occupation • 489
Black Soldiers, Black Flags • 490
The Campaigns of Grant and Sherman • 491
Global Passages: Learning from the War • 492
Victory and Defeat, 1865 • 495

American Nationalism, Southern Nationalism • 495
The New Challenge of Race • 496
Environmental and Economic Scars of War • 497
The Last Best Hope of Man? • 500
CHAPTER 15
Reconstructing America, 1865–1877 • 505
The Year of Jubilee, 1865 • 506
African American Families • 507
Southern Whites and the Problem of Defeat • 509
Emancipation in Comparative Perspective • 511
Shaping Reconstruction, 1865–1868 • 512

Andrew Johnson’s Reconstruction • 512
The Fight over Reconstruction • 513
The Civil War Amendments and American Citizenship • 515
Global Passages: Irish Americans and the Fenian Struggle • 518
Congressional Reconstruction • 518
Reconstruction in the South, 1866–1876 • 521

African American Life in the Postwar South • 521
Republican Governments in the Postwar South • 525
Cotton, Merchants, and the Lien • 526
The End of Reconstruction, 1877 • 528

The Ku Klux Klan and Reconstruction Violence • 529
Northern Weariness and Northern Conservatism • 531
Legacies of Reconstruction • 535
Appendix A: Historical Documents • A-1

Appendix B: Historical Facts and Data • B-1
Glossary • G-1
Credits • C-1
Index • I-1

Maps
1.1 Trade and Selected Urbanized Indian Societies in North America,

c. 700 to c. 1450 • 9
1.2 Linguistic Map of Indian North America with Selected Indian Peoples
Included • 11
1.3 Global Trade, Africa, and the Making of the Eastern Atlantic World,
15th Century • 16
1.4 Summer Winds and Currents, Fishing Banks, and Two Early Transoceanic
Crossings of the North Atlantic • 21
1.5 The Columbian Exchange • 22
1.6 Española and Spanish Conquests in the Caribbean, 1493–1513 • 23
1.7 The Spanish and French Invade North America, 1519–1565 • 29
2.1 European Invasions of the Southwest and Southeast, 1565 to c. 1610 • 44
2.2 Trade in the Indian Northeast, c. 1580–1607 • 47
2.3 European Islands in an Algonquian Ocean, 1607–1626 • 49
2.4 Colonization of New England, 1635–1675 • 65
3.1 Iroquois Mourning Wars and the Dispersal of Great Lakes and New England
Peoples, 1648–1653 • 76
3.2 The Atlantic Slave Trade and English America, 1641–1690 • 90
3.3 Pueblo War for Independence • 99
3.4 Eastern North America, 1660 and 1700 • 102
4.1 Horses and Guns Enter the Great Plains, c. 1600 to c. 1770 • 114
4.2 War, the Indian Slave Trade, and the Dispersal of Southeastern Indian
Peoples, c. 1700–1730 • 119
4.3 The Atlantic Slave Trade, 1691–1730 • 123
4.4 The Economy of British North America, c. 1750 • 137
5.1 North America and the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1731–1775 • 153
5.2 Race, Ethnicity, and the Colonization of British North America, c. 1775 • 157
5.3 Political Map of Eastern North America, Mid-18th Century • 160
5.4 British-Atlantic Trade, c. 1750 • 167
5.5 George Whitefield’s First American Tour, 1739–1741 • 172
5.6 The Seven Years’ War in Northeastern North America, 1754–1760 • 179
5.7 Colonial Refugees and Exiles of the Seven Years’ War, 1755–1765 • 183
6.1 Ethnic Diversity • 195
6.2 North America in 1763 • 197
xvii

xviii Maps
7.1 Major Revolutionary War Battles, 1775–1778 • 226

7.2 Revolutionary War Battles in the Caribbean • 235
7.3 Major Revolutionary War Battles, 1779–1783 • 240
8.1 Migration out of Saint-Domingue/Haiti, 1793–1809 • 269
8.2 The War of 1812 • 280
9.1 Exploration and Development in North America, 1803–1810 • 299
9.2 U.S. Expansion and Slavery, 1820 • 302
9.3 African Americans as a Total Percentage of Population, 1790 • 309
9.4 Latin America and the Caribbean, c. 1830 • 319
10.1 Transportation Times Inside the United States, 1800–1830 • 334
10.2 The Antebellum Slave Economy • 339
10.3 Texas and the Santa Fe Trail, c. 1830 • 347
11.1 Indian Removals, 1830s • 363
11.2 Major Overland Trails • 365
11.3 Path of the United States Exploring Expedition, 1838–1842 • 368
12.1 New York State, 1830s • 399
12.2 Nat Turner’s Route in Southampton County, Virginia, 1831 • 417
13.1 Mexican War • 436
13.2 Territorial Organization, 1840s–1850s • 458
14.1 1860 Presidential Election, by County • 470
14.2 Major Battles and Campaigns, 1861–1862 • 479
14.3 Major Battles and Campaigns, 1863 • 494
14.4 Major Battles and Campaigns, 1864–1865 • 496
15.1 Black Population of the United States, 1880 • 508
15.2 Military Districts Established by the Reconstruction Acts, 1867 • 520
15.3 1876 Presidential Election, by State • 533

Preface
A
merican Horizons is a text for the course in American history that views the
development of America in the context of global history.
For more than 400 years, North America has been part of a global network
centered on the exchange of peoples, goods, and ideas. Human migrations—sometimes
freely, sometimes forced—have continued over the centuries, along with the evolution
of commerce in commodities as varied as tobacco, sugar, and computer chips. Europeans
and Africans came or were brought to the continent, where they met, traded with,
fought among, and intermarried with native peoples. Some of these migrants stayed,
whereas others returned to their home countries. Still others came and went periodi-
cally. This initial circulation of people across the oceans foreshadowed the continuous
movement of people, goods, and ideas that made the United States. These are the forces
that have shaped American history, both dividing and unifying the nation. American
“horizons” truly stretch beyond our nation’s borders, embracing the trading networks
established during and after the colonial era to the digital social networks connecting
people globally today.
American Horizons tells the story of the United States by exploring this exchange
on a global scale and placing it at the center of that story. By doing so, we provide a dif-
ferent perspective on the history of the United States, one that we hope broadens the
horizons of those who read our work and are ever mindful of the global forces that in-
creasingly and profoundly shape our lives. At the same time, American Horizons con-
siders those ways in which U.S. influence reshaped the lives and experiences of people
of other nations.
U.S. history is increasingly perceived, interpreted, and taught as part of a global
historical experience. The mutual influence of change—of global forces entering the
United States and of American ideas, goods, and people moving out through the
world—has been a consistent feature since the 16th century. Although most Americans
today are aware that their influence is felt abroad and are increasingly aware of the in-
fluence of events abroad on their own lives, they tend to think of these as recent develop-
ments. In fact, those earliest exchanges of beliefs and products some 500 years ago
established a pattern of interaction that continues today.
We have written a narrative that encourages readers to consider the variety of pres-
sures that spurred historical change. Some of these pressures arose within America and
some came from outside its borders. In the 1820s, the global market for whale oil shaped
labor conditions throughout New England. At the same time, the American political
system was transformed by the unique inheritance of the American Revolution and the
relative abundance of land in North America. In the 1940s and 1950s, the federal gov-
ernment designed a unique set of policies to help World War II veterans readjust to
civilian life, whereas the Civil Rights Movement unfolded within a global context of
decolonization in Africa and Asia. Topics such as these help us ask the reader to con-
sider the relationship between local and global forces that shaped American history.
xix

xx Preface
This book was conceived as an opportunity to present the nation’s history as more
than a mere sequence of events for the student to memorize. The approach of American
Horizons reflects this. Although adhering to the familiar chronological organization of
this course, our narrative style and structure provide the flexibility of shifting emphasis
from time to time to the global aspects of American history. Although the story of the
United States is always at the center of the story, that story is told through the movement
of people, goods, and ideas into, within, or out of the United States.
What qualities make the United States unique? What accounts for the diversity of
dialect and lifestyle across this country? How did the United States become a major
player on the world stage of nations? History includes many story lines that contribute
to this narrative. American Horizons is the story of where this nation came from and
how it has been shaped by its own set of shared values as well as its interaction with the
rest of the world. It recognizes that many of the significant events in American history
had causes and consequences connected to developments elsewhere and presents those
events accordingly. American Horizons depicts this intersection of story lines from
many nations that influenced, and were influenced by, the United States of America.
As readers engage the text, we encourage them to think explicitly about what makes
history. What matters? What forces or events shaped how people lived their lives?
The Development Story

The seven coauthors of this book specialize in a variety of time periods and methodologies.
Based on our research and teaching, we all share the idea that the nation’s history can best be
understood by examining how, from the colonial era forward, the American experience re-
flected the interaction of many nations, peoples, and events. We present this idea in a format
that integrates traditional narrative history with the enhanced perspective of five centuries of
global interaction.
About the Second Edition

This new edition of American Horizons is comprehensive yet concise enough for instructors
who prefer a more economical option for their students without sacrificing the primary ad-
vantages of a traditional, longer text. This has been achieved without sacrificing the kinds of
features, images, tables, maps, or figures expected in this course.

Preface xxi
A GUIDED TOUR OF AMERICAN HORIZONS
American Horizons is distinguished by three elements:

a global theme, innovative scholarship, and learning
features that encourage active learning.
A Revolutionary Nation
W
7 1776–1789
hen Benjamin Franklin arrived in Paris on December 21, 1776, thousands
turned out to catch a glimpse of him. Franklin was visiting to court French mili-
tary and diplomatic assistance for the American fight against Great Britain,
France’s traditional enemy. Franklin hoped to convince the French to support the
American Revolution because, as he declared, “‘Tis a Common observation here that our
Cause is the Cause of all Mankind; and that we are fighting for their liberty in defending
our own.” French king Louis XVI was not sure that he wanted to support the Americans
in their Revolution; nor was he, as Europe’s most absolutist king, convinced that French
“liberty” was at stake. But Franklin’s personal popularity grew so quickly by the begin-
ning of 1777 that the French government could
not ignore American diplomacy.
Franklin was the most famous American in CHAPTER 7 OUTLINE
Europe. His scientific publications had endeared
him to French aristocrats and intellectuals. The The Revolution Takes Root
> Ideology and Transatlantic
Comte de Chaumont invited Franklin to live at his
Politics
estate outside Paris, and fashionable aristocrats > Trying Times: War Continues
sought Franklin as a party guest. Franklin dressed > Alliance with France
simply and often wore a fur hat to project a
The Structure of Authority
rugged American image, and the French became > State Governments
obsessed with his appearance. Franklin’s face ap- > Articles of Confederation
peared on paintings, engravings, statues, jewelry, > Military Organization
candy boxes, dishes, and handkerchiefs. Franklin > Diplomacy and International
Finance
wrote his daughter that “your father’s face [is] as
well known as that of the moon.” Some fashion- Securing Independence
> War at Sea
able Parisians even had their hair styled in a
> War in the South
manner that imitated Franklin’s. John Adams later > Loyalists: Resistance
wrote that “There was scarcely a peasant or a citi- and Migration
zen, a valet de chambre, coachman or footman, a > Indian Warfare
lady’s chambermaid nor a scullion in the kitchen > African Americans at War
> Peace and Shifting Empires
who was not familiar with Franklin’s name.”
Restructuring Political
and Social Authority
> Power in the States
< George Washington, by Charles Willson Peale, Continued
c. 1779–1781.
223
07-Schaller-Chap07.indd 222-223 05/09/14 11:25 AM
Chapter Introductions
An Expandin
Some historian g Nation
s argue that 367
Each chapter of American Horizons begins with a

tory because Texas should
so many Ame be counted as
of the independ ricans poured the grandest
ence moveme over the bord filibuster vic-
plex. By 1835 nt. But the root er in 1835–183
, two distinct s of the Lone 6 to fight on
Texians (Eng groups in Texa Star Republi behalf
compelling story at the core of each chapter theme.

lish-speaking s, Tejanos (or c were more
colony. Texi Texans), both Spanish-speak com-
ans began the criticized Mex ing Texans)
ported it as movement for ican misrule and
well. By early Texas’s inde in its northern
retreated into 1836, pendence, but most
an old Spanish a small group of English- many Tejanos
sup-
battle lasting mission in San and Spanish-s
nearly two week Antonio calle peak ing rebe
López de329 Santa Anna, s, the Spanish d the Alamo. ls
The Market System forces, led by After a pitch
brok e into the com Pres ed
Despite this
setback, inde pound and kille ident and General Antonio
defeated the pendence forc d all the defe
main Spanish es, nder
Jacinto Rive army and capt rallying to the cry “Rememb s.
goods that r a few ured Santa Ann er the Alamo,”
tic manufactured
POPUL ATION
signed by prom months later. The victo a in fighting alon
foreign and domes families to inent Texians rs issued a Texa g the San
system allowed farm f
Africa who became such as Sam s Dec
Houston, a form laration of Independence
fueled the market se goods in- president of
they could purcha Zavala, who the new repu er Tennessee
specialize because or trade for everyt
hing served as vice blic, and prom
inent Tejanos, congressman,
ce s
Asia
built on wide pres
stead of having to produ eco- spread disconte ident. The success of the such as Lore
Global Theme . The marke t system intensified tion. Its mos nt among settl Texas independ nzo de
they needed labor pat- t immediate ers over the ence moveme
changed business and
u p
Europe
Mexico had chan failures of Span nt
nomic competition, the lives of abolished slave ges reflected a desire to
and had a profound effect on meric and thefrom
Caribbean
residing in the ry in 1829, but mimic its neig ish administra-
terns, l change, a
Latin Amm
America Texas reinstate hbor to the
States. Technologica worried thos new nation. d it and proh north.
everyone in the United exchan all
ges e Northerners The presence ibite d free blacks
, and international the exclusion eager to stop of a new slave
holding nati
government action ism. o
North
No America
of black men the spread of on
pment of market capital to the south
American Horizons and English- and women, slavery within
intensified the develo speaking com Texas containe the Union. Even
O
Oceania the republic munities cont d a diverse popu with
became part ested for pow
inclusion of of the United er over the next lation. Spanish-
rnal Markets so many new States, Protesta decade; and
Internal and Exte
seamlessly incorporates World Population
c. 1800 Catholics into nt American after
1790: 3,929,214 the coun try. s worried abou
the con- Populat ion
t the
my emerged from
U.S. 02
ion 1830: 12,860,7
The U.S. market econo and interna-
U.S. Populat Pacific Exp
regional, national, loratio ns
nection of local,
000
which grew
000
000
connections to global exchange—all of

000
One of the
000
000
000
tional networks of hallmarks of

0
000,
000,
shifts took
000,
000,
1832. Although the the

000,
their use of
the sea for war global ascendancy of west
000,
000,
between 1789 and

700,
600,
mar-
500,
labor
400,
1800 it was clear that

300,
could travel fare and trad ern European

200,
100,
place unevenly, by converged to against the

wind, used
e. The Portugu
ese, who perf
s after 1500
was
ment, and prices African coas
history throughout the kets, capita l invest t in the mid this new tech ected a ship
followed, esta -1400s. Span nology to begi that
blishing dire ish, English, n exploring
wares had only ct trading link French, and the West
been accessibl s with African Dutch explorer
the Silk Roa e via the long and then Asian peop s soon
text, including discussion

d, connectin overland rout les whose
lowed or acco g China and es across the
mpanied the the Middle Sahara or alon
vide protectio traders, alth East. Military g
n to the trad ough European expeditions
exploration ers who rem s could rarely often fol-
rarely found in other books.

consisted of ained behind. do more than
specimens on naturalists and The second pro-
voyages acro ethnographer wave of Euro
and animals ss the oceans. s who took pean
(and sometim The drafting notes and gath
beverages offer es, of people), of maps, the ered
ed evidence and the use exhibition of
of new ingr plan
European pow
ers by mak ing
of European
command of edients in food ts
In 1838, the similar expe the globe. Ame and
U.S. Nav y laun ditions. ricans emu lated
Charles Wil ched the Sout
kes, a young h Seas Explorin
tion for usin but dominee g Expedition.
g exce ring sailor (he Lieutenant
flotilla that trav ssive force against men was court-ma
rtialed after
eled 87,000 mile under the expedi-
peditions of
earlier centurie s over four year his command), comman
s, the American s of sailing (Ma ded a six-ship
mission carr p 11.3). Like
ied a bevy of European ex-
scholars—inclu
ding
11-Schaller-
Chap11.indd
367
work in the dairy

part of women’s
was a traditional ed economic activity
05/09/14 12:32
ING Making butter ingly market-orient
PM
BUTTER CHURN became an increas could use to buy
other
lantic states and butter for cash they
producing Mid-At n could sell surplus dity.
centur y. Wome tional trade commo
in the early 19th became an interna
old produc ts. Eventually, butter
househ
PM
05/09/14 12:32
0.indd 329
10-Schaller-Chap1

xxii Preface
wwaa
212 C h a p t e r 6 : empire and resistance
GLOBAL PASSAGES
Global Passages
Independence: transatlantic roots,
Global Influence
“Global Passages” boxes feature a unique
T he idea of political independence—that colonies could declare themselves to be a
state separate from the colonial power—was an innovation in world politics in 1776.
But the concept had roots in events and political philosophies that had taken shape in
Europe in prior centuries. The Declaration of Independence would also have major
global consequences, not the least in its influence on other independence movements,
story connecting America to the world.
from 1776 until the present day.
The committee of the Continental Congress given the task of drafting the motion of
independence in June 1776, led by Thomas Jefferson, was steeped in Western European
political theory and history. Jefferson was able to draw on both theory and practice in
drafting the Declaration. Statements of sovereignty and autonomy stretching back to
the Scottish Declaration of Arbroath in 1320 made it clear that self-determination could
be a major factor in international relations.
The idea that a people who held valid grievances against their ruler could declare
independence was influenced by several Enlightenment theories about what constituted
a legitimate government. Thomas Jefferson drew on the ideas in John Locke’s Second
Treatise of Government, published in 1689 during the Glorious Revolution, the culmina-
tion of almost a century of fighting over who should occupy the British throne. Jefferson
employed especially Locke’s notion that monarchs and legislative bodies derive at least
some of their authority from the consent of those who are governed, and he para-
Innovative Scholarship
phrased some of Locke’s justifications for how tyranny might force the “dissolution” of
an unjust government. Jefferson was also influenced by ideas about natural rights and
the obligations of moral necessity in essays published by Scottish judge and philosopher
Henry Home, Lord Kames, in the mid-18th century. Independence itself was a strong
component of national sovereignty as defined by Swiss legal expert Emer de Vattel in
his 1758 The Law of Nations. Jefferson may also have been influenced by 16th-century
Spanish Jesuit writings on the limits of kingship.
News of the Declaration of Independence spread unusually fast throughout Europe,
with copies appearing in newspapers and translated pamphlets in Britain, Ireland, Holland,
American Horizons is informed by the
most current scholarship available. The
DeClarInG InDepenDenCe
With the Revolutionary War well under way, the British Empire in North America
text offers multiple perspectives and view-
reached its breaking point. As the first six months of the Revolutionary War unfolded,
the Second Continental Congress began to consider the possibility of declaring
pendence from Great Britain, even though colonies had never
in
America
Nor thtried
before
Indian
inde-
113
such a bold
points on America’s past that broaden the
Turmoil
student’s understanding of America’s unique

maneuver. How would the British colonies conceive of their separation from Parliament
and the Crown? How would independent former colonies relate to the rest of the world?
Would Spanish imperial reforms be met by similar resistance?
ULATIO
N
POP
l in indi
Turmoiamerica
an A
Asia
place in history.
norTh the vast
majority u sia
Eura a
comprised dred years later,

Indians
In 1700, 212 ericans. One hun
06-Schaller-Chap06.indd
descendan
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05/09/14 12:36 PM
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numbered life in North Am ricas
vastly out ian of goods,
The Ame
T
The Story of American Indians

ed Ind usio n
that disrupt 0s and 1730. Diff lence
169 moted vio
tween the guns, pro the Oceania
horses and s east to
especia lly the Rockie e trade that
ians from slav lation c.
1700
among Ind stok ing an Indian nt and altered World Popu
ns, tine
Appalachia s across the con
0
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A Comprehensive Look at Slave Trade
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300,0
250,0
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150,0
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these dev
accelerated Indian peoples at ms into the in-
clai
neighboring nding European s along the
others and
exte er of Indian ast
Me anw hile, the pow and in the Northe
terior. ic coast imports
rn Atlant ngth and
southeaste s sapped their stre
wan ed as
and colonist
war
s began to
floo d into their lands.
ern Plains tered
The Impact and Contributions of
e north in encoun
ce on th Great Bas
Hispanics and Mexican Americans
British
d Violen Plains and pers and
horses an the northe
rn Great
came Fre
nch fur trap ed on horses.
0s, Indians of and East ian s mount ck-
In the ear
ly 170
From the
No rth
West cam
e Ind n whe Bla n
and goods. South and young ma lding stone
new peoples s. From the eet, was a riors wie
by Blackf shone war slaughtered their
ring firearm ng Cree adopted 1730, Sho
traders bea ee, a you Blackfeet)
Sau kamapp Som etim e around s” to the Wi thin a genera-
horses. “big dog e or theft. In
first saw (literally ough trad the Cree.
feet people unted on Misstutin horses thr horses to r
mo acquired introduced er hand ove
clubs and eet soon ple who n the upp
foes. Blackf estrian peo bled Blackfeet to gai
stunned fully equ e men
became a firearms
that ena
region. Cre and
tion, they pro vid ed min g the ,
Cree sfor knives
return, the ap 4.1). cial role s in tran awa y firearms, ian s to
Shoshone
(M played cru y outposts, tak ing orts to Ind that
Shoshones pan ed the imp work
Crees and n’s Bay Com acco. The Cree trad of an Indian net
s to Hudso tob rn end Plateau.
carried pelt of Brazilian-grown upied the nor the Columbia
rop es nes occ who live d on the the y fish ed for
twisted t. Shosho ian s ration as
th and wes 1700 to Ind sonal mig
their sou ting around ses into their sea shones
horses star hor slaves. Sho
funneled orated the and roots.
ians incorp and gat hered berries e in Indian to sell to Spanish Migratio
nsified trad
n, Religion
These Ind tured
ted bison, s for cap-
, and Emp
horses inte who Utes had cap ires
salmon, hun desire to acquire way station 123
Indians’ lace peo ple serv as ed at Lakes
eet par tly to rep age s in Nebraska ed up
Norther in the Gre called
n English
Blackf nee vill e end North
colonists
raided the thwest. Paw ins. SomNORTH Spanish
America
rthern Pla
ATLANT
in the Sou est and No nch and Chesapeake 3,00 IC
colonists Mexico. Fre RICA Region
AME 0 OCEAN
the Southw
1,500 EUROPE
t to New 49,00
tives from olina. Others wen GEORGIA/ 0
CAROLINAS
Car
or South
Louisiana 10,000
Gulf of
7,000
Mexico
Spanish 12:40 PM
450,500 05/09/14
Americas
Danish Brit
366 C h a p t e r 11: New Boundaries, New roles
West Indies ish 750
49,000 ari C
120,00 bb
0 ea
n
25,000 Fren
ch
Ca
rib
Dutch West Indie
90,000
s
b
96 ,5 0 0 they maintained autonomy. In other cases, the villages created out of mission lands en-
ea
SENEGAMB
n
.indd 113
IA
er-Chap04
16 ,5 0 0 SIERRA AFRICA sured local control and mutual dependency among the Hispanic residents, who retained
04-Schall LEONE
13,0 control over land and resources into the 1870s despite Americans’ efforts.
,000
00 Windward
Gold Bight of
SOUTH
660
Coast Coast Benin

PACIFIC AMERICA
3 3 3 ,0 0 0
OCEAN
Latin american Filibustering and the texas
0
,0 0
0 Bight of
BRAZIL
60 Biafra
Independence Movement
000
The Atlanti 130,
c Slave Trade,
Enslaved African
1691–1730 West
Central
As legal settlers ventured into U.S. holdings across the Mississippi, adventurers such as
s embark 540,000
and disemb
by region,
arked in the ed from Africa
Americas
Africa
John A. Quitman and Rennselaer Van Rennselaer pushed south and west into the Spanish
1691–1730 ATLANT
16,000 Numbe
r of enslave
disembarked d Africans OCEAN
IC borderlands or north into Canada. Americans launched some of these expeditions
by region embarked/
16,0 while living outside the United States, but other groups organized within the United
00
0
500
1,000 miles fro
States proper and then invaded foreign soil. Between 1800 and 1860, U.S. citizens
mS
MAP 4.3 0 500 1,000 kilomete
rs
out
h e as launched at least 19 separate expeditions into Spanish colonies or Latin American re-
The Atl t Afr
ic a
perspectiv antic Slav publics. The Spanish themselves offered mixed signals by periodically inviting Anglo
e on the e Trade,
America Atlantic 1691–1730
bet ween slave trad
e. About This map settlers who took an oath of allegiance to the Spanish government into the northern
More than 1691 and 69,0 00 ens provides
half arrived 1730, abo
ut two tim laved Afri a broad
American
reaches of their Mexico territory, even though few settlers seem to have respected these
mostly to in the 172 es as man cans land
the Caribbe 0s. But ove y as bet wee ed in Nor vows. Americans described these actions and the people who took them as filibusters,
an or Braz r 95 percen n 1641 and th
il. t went else 1690. from the Spanish filibustero and before that, the Dutch term for “freebooter.”
where in
the Americ Filibusters clearly violated the U.S. Neutrality Act of 1818, which outlawed private
as,
warfare. Yet because so many people supported the cause of American expansion,
Meanwhile
tion for ens , the expans Americans often regarded filibusters as heroes despite their frequent executions as
laved Afr ion of rice
by the 172 icans. Car cultivation spies and insurrectionaries in the countries they invaded. After tapering off in the 1840s,
0s, olin made Sou
enabled Sou the knowledge, skil a planters began to th Carolin
a a major
a new wave of filibusters pushed into Central America in the 1850s. John Quitman and
th Carolin l, and lab grow the destina- Henry Maury—a southern lawyer and sea captain—recruited men for an expedition
pounded or cro
tons of rice a to export million of thousands of rec p in the 1690s, and to liberate Cuba from the Spanish. William Walker—who invaded Mexico once and
Regional a year to s of pou ent ly arrived
prise 20 per differences shaped
rea dy it for marke nds of rice a yea Afr Nicaragua three times—became famous across America as the most successful and
cent of Vir Africans’ t. r. African icans
from differen ginians unt lives in No women infamous filibuster of the age. The following poem ran in Southern newspapers at
t par ts of il 171 0. rth Am erica. Slav the time:
other tha Chesapeak
n English the continent that e planters es did not
com-
more ens . The presen it was har bought so
laved blac ce of more d for slaves ma Success to Maury and his men
relatively k women American- to find a com ny Africans
in the Che They’ll safely cross the water
Carolina
more ens
laved men sapeake tha born slaves meant mon language
and could find n any whe that there Three cheers for Southern enterprise
colonies dur Louisiana had Afr partners
and start
re else in
Nor th Americ
were
Hurrah for General Walker
ing that dec ican majori families. a, so
meet som ade came ties by the By contras
eone who from Sen 1720s. Mo t, South Walker succeeded briefly in Nicaragua, occupying the post of “president” for several
For many spoke the egambia, st who arr
Africans, ir langua increasing ived in bot
social isol
atio North Am ge or shared their the odds tha
t they wou
h months in 1856, only to be expelled and later executed in Honduras. As the poem indi-
memories
they did not n. Colonists conside erican slavery bro ld cates, Southerners led most of the efforts in the 1850s, intending to add new slaveholding
speak or und red African ught an ear of Africa. territory to the Union. As a result, filibustering in this decade became embroiled in the
erstand Eng s dangerous ly grave
lish or Fre and brutish and profound larger sectional conflicts over slavery.
nch. As ma , par tly bec
ny as one aus e Filibusters raised a set of questions related to American expansion and power, al-
in four suc
04-Schall
cumbed though few at the time considered the issue in such systematic detail. Who acted for the
er-Chap04
.indd 123
United States? Did privately organized ventures represent the interests of the nation?
Would American expansion happen violently or peacefully? To what extent would the
residents of a place be consulted before American acquisition? Did this style of expan-
sion constitute imperialism? American leaders offered vague and shifting answers to
05/09/14
12:40 PM these questions. As filibustering demonstrated, private ventures could sometimes serve
as an advance guard for national expansion. Force and persuasion operated simultane-
ously as Americans expanded their borders.
11-Schaller-Chap11.indd 366 05/09/14 12:33 PM

Preface xxiii
The Story of Immigration and Migration
Immigrants and Indians 155

Predominant Immigrant
Groups 1775
English
The Impact of Irish and German Immigration Scots–Irish

Québec
Highland Scots
Ireland was the second largest source of immigrants to British North America between Dutch
1730 and 1775, with over half arriving after 1750 (Table 5.1). Most Irish who migrated French
German MAINE
between 1730 and 1763 were young, single, male indentured servants. Families from African
Montréal
Ulster (Northern Ireland) who paid their own way across the Atlantic dominated Irish J Jews
immigration from 1763 to the Revolution. Crop failures and slumping demand for linen S Swedes
in 1739 sparked a wave of immigration to North America over the next two years. The W Welsh
NEW
FH French Huguenots HAMPSHIRE
promise of better opportunities, particularly land ownership, led thousands more to MASSACHUSETTS
follow (Map 5.2). Albany
Boston
Most landed in Philadelphia or in New Castle, Delaware, where demand for inden- NEW YORK
FH
tured servants was high. Commercial ties linked those ports to Ireland. By 1750, Irish CONNECTICUT Newport
merchants in Philadelphia exported wheat and flour to Ireland and imported linens, flax- RHODE
seed, and servants. Most ex-servants who concluded their terms headed for Pennsylvania’s FH ISLAND
New York
and New Jersey’s frontiers, where land was cheaper. Ulsterites, later known in North FH
PENNSYLVANIA
America as Scots Irish, who had paid their own way went West immediately. After 1750, Philadelphia J NEW
W JERSEY
S S
“PALATINE BOORS” German Baltimore
printers in Pennsylvania made DELAWARE
a point of broadcasting Benjamin MARYLAND
Franklin’s insulting “Palatine VIRGINIA
Boors” comment and translating FH
Williamsburg
Richmond
it into German during charged
elections in the mid-1760s. Here
is an example from a German-
language newspaper published NORTH
in Philadelphia in 1764. CAROLINA FH
New Bern
Fayetteville
SOUTH
CAROLINA ATLANTIC
FH FH
OCEAN
J Charles Town
GEORGIA
J Savannah
FLORIDA 0 100 200 miles
0 100 200 kilometers
MAP 5.2 Race, Ethnicity, and the Colonization of British North America, c. 1775
European immigration and the Atlantic slave trade made an ethnic and racial mosaic of
colonial British North America. The colonies were even more diverse than this map suggests,
for it shows the largest group in each area, which often was not the majority. Most Scots
arrived after the Seven Years’ War.
157
05-Schaller-Chap05.indd 155 05/09/14 12:42 PM 05-Schaller-Chap05.indd 157 05/09/14 12:42 PM
Women in American History
Consumer Resistance 205
trying to buy British goods in major cities found themselves punished by angry
379 crowds; several Boston newspapers even published violators’ names on their front
erica
llum Am pages. Merchants who opposed the boycotts labeled the movement as the actions of
in Antebe
Women “the deluded multitude.” These merchants claimed that traders who subscribed to the
Men and
non-importation agreements often violated them secretly to make higher profits.
R
OF LABO
LENGE
W CHAL ization
in 1830s Men and Women: Tea and Politics
THE NE industrial
NS FOR ion and
QUESTIO urbanizat States The non-importation movement brought men and women together politically as they
STUDY of the inc
reasing the United
effects unsettle opposed imperial authority. Boycotts invested women’s everyday activities of purchasing,
were the ze and
1. What h stabili
a? ery bot preparing, and consuming commodities such as tea with political meaning. Tea drinking
0s Americ and slav
and 184 e labor” had become an important part of many white women’s social rituals by the mid-1700s,
rise of “fre
w did the
2. Ho linking American women to the British importers who traded tea from India and China
iod?
in this per to North America. From the upper classes who were drinking tea out of silver pots and
china cups around polished mahogany tea tables established genteel social standards, to
poor women who used pottery cups and prized only a few cups of the expensive beverage
per week—white women were associated with tea. As one Boston newspaper predicted
Men
nd Wo
r in November 1767, “The cost of consuming foreign tea is very expensive in this colony . . .
erica Civ il Wa
Men a belluM aM cans in the decadesofbeffamilies and genent
ore the der to lay an extensive tax on its consumption, would be very disagreeable to the Ladies.”
in ante es confronting Aminerithe size and natureadvice literature, par

s Male supporters of the non-importation movement appealed to women in speeches
ng es expres-ing open
and newspaper articles to participate in the boycotts, and several women also wrote to
nomic cha shaped by cha ng ma rket in parent and the newspapers appealing for the “Daughters of Liberty” to act. Female shopkeepers were
The eco
and were ing en. Love tur y tha n they had
bu rgeon ir chi ldr a among those who signed public pledges not to sell imported British goods, and city
produced ing on a ate to the the early 19t h cen ms—w ith
s. Draw se and rel in le kingdo
relation how to rai more attent ion useholds as litt hority of
the
hin king much ng ho ura l aut bonds that
began ret eiv ed n vie wi the nat
otion rec ther tha ognizi ng g the affect ionate women’s
sion of em generations. Ra dependents rec
Tea Tables Polished
zin an d
us
in previo ldren, and oth
er emphasi bet ween men’s pec t mahogany tea tables like this
s began es eater res
chi g—parent s, the lin rpen. Gr ” family
one became the setting for
spouse, uld the kin s new emphasi ily began to sha
they wo thi “domestic in the genteel socializing in elite
fat her as Despite the fam ers of the ce
families. iet y and all memb men’s pla American homes where
sustai ned wit hin both soc l obligations of h reg ard to wo men and women drank tea,
es tua wit
proper rol uses and the mu re libera l values displayed their fine china and
spo mo
bet ween ly lead to silver, and held conversations.
necessari
did not Although the tea and china
rld. h regard
to
public wo an ge tions wit ish con- were imported, tables like this
omic ch ilar restric abl
and econ under sim ld not sue or est rarely al-
one were often made in the
suffered
Gender the Un ited States e or hold office,
cou
rch es, and were
e law of
colonies by master furniture
women in ld not vot ir chu s. Th makers.

Nearly all rights: women cou ons of leadershi
p in the e husband ght
m abusiv any wages she mi
their pu
blic from po
siti even fro se of
divorce, per ty and sing sen
re barred cation or married, her pro d wit h an increa n. As the
tracts, we her edu n me
ess to hig t when a woma aints cla
she pect as ies
lowed acc tha al constr moral res new opportunit
ensured These leg erved the same d .
coverture e her husband ’s. des my create men in law
am als who can econo n and wo w
earn bec e individu ally as the Ameri nces bet ween me ing economy dre
as uniqu especi
women ped , and late d the differe , where the expand on—principally
elo icu rth cti
nation dev ations, states art eably in the No ld- bas ed produ Sin ce the early
situ notic use ho site s.
and new ed most from ho dedicated work the site of
es emerg class men away mic unit, k
Differenc midd le- ent at sep
arate and and econo ria l economy too
ic social s
upper- and o paid employm had been the bas and indust per classes, thi
int ld national up
farming— iod, the househo ion. As the new the mostly urban Tocqueville, the
per rod uct me. Fo r xis de 1830s
colonial ction and rep tside of the ho ins ide it. Ale on s in the
du yed rel ati
bot h pro work moved ou n sta
and wome , observed of gen
der
pai d ho me
shape, the tes
t men left United Sta
meant tha nch visitor to the 06-Schaller-Chap06.indd 205 05/09/14 12:37 PM
Fre
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DESIGN SERVICES OF
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12:33 PM
05/09/14
379
11.indd
ler-Chap
11-Schal

xxiv Preface
Learning Features
American Horizons offers vivid features to help students read, comprehend, and analyze
key information, often using innovative visual aids.
World
atlantic re
nters the o a mo
ameri
ca encou tated int n,
ick ly mu ond expeditio
Maps and Infographics

North that qu
t e r 1:
Chap Europe d the sec 1514 census of
22 hilis to ompanie t. A
a str ain of syp no women acc llingly or no h the majority
uced se , wi houg
2. It introd ng for m. Becau ua l partners had wives, alt s recognized
the
in 149 figuri n’s sex nt ish.
and dis anish me t 37 perce ny fat her m Span
ame Sp s indicates tha men. At first, ma sidered the te group
A rich graphics program explores essential themes in new ways. virulent
men bec
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promine colonists did
ist
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m suc h un ions an
wo
Taíno wo Spanish colon t marry Taíno d most colonist te and subord
sider the m
s con
a separa
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of Span
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t res ulted fro beg an to con rem ak e Españo , chick-
tha ish d to wheat
children 1530s, the Span s” (Map 1.5). y hope wever, in
izo nd, the ock. Ho poorly
But by the y called “mest settled the isla nts and livest ean diet, fared gra ins
s pla an wn
whom the anish colonist iliar
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staple not sub r cassav
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“Sp ves cau eat the
pes, oli dit y. Be had to ly than
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n Españo cassava of Ta Españ cen
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tle and tha 3 an cattle
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aller-Ch and Giovanni Caboto were the first successfully. Columbus
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dd 124 to learn how to return to Europe
the major cod fishing grounds where from the Americas. Note
cold and warm currents collided.
The Atlantic World Invades the

Caribbean
In November 1493, Columbus returned
to Española with about 1,500 men. He
05/09/14 create a colony built around a feitoria, hoped to
12:41
PM with colonists as company employees.
soon discovered that the men he had Columbus
left behind were dead. Disease had claimed
and Taínos killed the rest because they some,
had demanded gold or raped Taíno
Relations between the colonists and women.
Taínos deteriorated as Columbus lost
his men. They had come to Española control of
for gold and conquest, not a salary. In
provoked a war with most of Española’s 1495, colonists
main caciques. Columbus, who had
posed trading enslaved “cannibals” earlier pro-
for livestock to Ferdinand and Isabel
rejected, shipped over 500 Taínos to and had been
Spain to show that Española could be
Timeline in Every Chapter

justified their enslavement on the grounds profitable. He
that they had rebelled. Meanwhile, colonists
abandoned the site that Columbus chose.
In 1496, they founded Santo Domingo,
permanent European town in the Americas. the first
Columbus’s return to Española in 1493
set in motion several developments.
ensured the permanence of the “Columbian First, it
exchange,” what historians call the
ment of people, plants, animals, and move-
pathogens between the Americas and
the world. One form of exchange, sex the rest of
between European men and Taíno women,
began
01-Schaller-Chap01.indd 21
218 C h a p t e r 6 : empire and resistance Declaring Independence 219 05/09/14 12:45 PM
Timeline 1763–1776
AmericA YeAr The World

Feb Treaty of Paris ends Seven Years’ War Nov Parliament accuses Oct Boston Town Meeting urges Committees of Correspondence to form Russia and Prussia partition
newspaper publisher John 1772 Poland
May Pontiac’s Rebellion begins when Ottawa forces lay siege to Ft. Detroit
Wilkes of sedition
Oct George III forbids settlement west of Appalachian mountains 1763 Nov British reorganize
Apr Parliament passes Tea Act, seeking to bolster profits of the East India British East India Company
Company becomes a government agency
governments of Quebec,
Florida, and Grenada Dec 90,000 pounds of East India Company tea are thrown into Boston Civil War commences in Annam
Harbor at Boston Tea Party (now Vietnam)
James Otis publishes pamphlet denying British right to tax colonies Nov Jesuit order is expelled 1773 Jesuits expelled from Holy
apr Parliament revises Navigation Acts and passes Sugar Act from France Roman Empire
1764 Nov Japanese peasants riot to
apr Currency Act curtails colonial paper money May Muhammad Bey assumes
protest high taxes power in Egypt, rejoins
Mar Parliament passes Stamp Act, which taxes legal documents, printed Scotsman James Watt invents Ottoman Empire
matter, and other paper goods the steam engine Mar Parliament closes port of Boston and suspends Massachusetts May Louis XVI assumes throne
May Quartering Act requires colonists to house and pay for British troops aug Joseph II becomes Holy legislature of France
May Virginia House of Burgesses protests Stamp Act and urges other 1765 Roman Emperor, rules alongside Sep First Continental Congress meets in Philadelphia Aug Jesuit order expelled from
colonies to join his mother Maria Theresa
Oct Continental Congress forms a Continental Association to coordinate
1774 Poland
Oct Stamp Act Congress meets in Philadelphia, issues “Declaration of non-importation
Rights and Grievances” Oct Parliament passes Quebec Act
Mar Stamp Act is repealed, but Declaratory Act stresses that Parliament Ali Bey rules Egypt and declares Mar Patrick Henry delivers “Give me liberty or give me death” speech
can tax colonies in “all cases whatsoever” 1766 independence from Ottoman in Virginia House of Burgesses
Jul Treaty ends Pontiac’s Rebellion Empire
Apr Revolutionary War begins at Battles of Lexington and Concord
Mar Charles III expels Jesuits from New Spain for opposing his Bourbon Mar Charles III expels Jesuits May American forces capture Fort Ticonderoga
Reform program from Spain, Parma, and Sicily May Second Continental Congress meets in Philadelphia
Jul Parliament suspends New York legislature for disobeying Quartering Jun Congress forms Continental Army and appoints George Washington as
Act 1767 commander
Nov John Dickinson’s Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania begin to appear Jun Battle of Bunker Hill
1775
in newspapers Oct Congress forms the Continental Navy
Nov Townshend Duties tax a new range of colonial products Nov Governor of Virginia offers freedom to slaves who join against
Jan Massachusetts legislature petitions George III to protest “taxation Ghurkas conquer Nepal rebellious colonists
without representation” 1768 Encyclopedia Britannica begins Nov Richard Montgomery captures Montreal
publication Dec Richard Montgomery killed in the unsuccessful American attack on
Quebec
May Virginia House of Burgesses resolves that parliament may not tax the China forces Burma to submit
colony to its rule Jan Thomas Paine’s Common Sense is published Spain opens Buenos Aires to free
Jul Father Junípero Serra founds his first mission church at San Diego de
1769 aug Napoleon Bonaparte Mar British forces evacuate Boston trade
Alcala is born
1776
Jul 4 Congress issues Declaration of Independence, creating United States
of America
Mar Five men are killed by British soldiers in “Boston Massacre” The London Evening Post
apr Parliament withdraws all Townshend Duties except for tax on tea 1770 becomes first newspaper to
reprint parliamentary business
from the British crown and formed the United States of America. Certainly not
everyone in the British North American colonies supported independence, but the Summary
Whigs who supported the actions of the Continental Congress seemed to have the • Both the British and Spanish governments sought centralized control over their
upper hand. North American colonies following the Seven Years’ War, in part to raise revenue.
• The 1765 Stamp Act inaugurated an opposition movement in the British North American
colonies and touched off a debate over Parliament’s authority to tax the colonies.
STUdY QUeSTionS For declArinG indePendence • Between 1767 and 1770, American men and women politicized consumerism by
fighting British taxation with non-importation.
1. On what grounds did the Declaration of Independence justify separation from Britain?
• Between 1770 and 1776, British authorities cracked down on colonial resistance,
2. How did British colonial protests finally result in a revolutionary ideology by 1776? especially in Massachusetts, and touched off a revolutionary war.
00-Schaller_V1-FM.indd 24
3. How did the Spanish government consolidate control over increasing territory in North • In 1776, Congress declared independence from Great Britain and created the 24/09/14 7:57 PM
America in the mid-18th century? United States of America, and the Spanish imperial government created the
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myself. This source he identifies with God, but, as far as the
argument goes, it might equally well have been found, as by Locke,
in the original constitution of matter; all that the argument requires is
that it shall be placed in something outside the succession of
presentations themselves. On the other hand, he also argues that
since the existence of the physical world means simply the fact of its
being presented to consciousness, when its contents cease to be
present to my consciousness they must be present to that of God.
And here again the objection might be suggested, that if presence to
my own experience, while it lasts, is an adequate account of the
esse of a thing, it does not appear why I should recognise the reality
of any other experience. If I am to hold that disappearance from my
experience does not destroy the reality of anything, I must logically
also hold that its being, while I perceive it, is not exhausted by my
awareness of it. Its esse cannot be merely percipi.
The complete solution of Berkeley’s difficulty would be premature
at this point of our discussion. But we may at once point out its
principal source. It arises from his failure to take adequate account of
the purposive aspect of experience. Experience, as we have seen, is
not mere awareness of a succession of presented objects, it is
awareness of a succession determined by a controlling interest or
purpose. The order of my experiences is not something simply given
me from without, it is controlled and determined by subjective
interest from within. Berkeley, in fact, omits selective attention from
his psychological estimate of the contents of the human mind. He
forgets that it is the interests for which I take note of facts that in the
main determine which facts I shall take note of, an oversight which is
the more remarkable, since he expressly lays stress on “activity” as
the distinguishing property of “spirits.”[41] When we make good the
omission by emphasising the teleological aspect of experience, we
see at once that the radical disparity between the relation of the
supreme and the subordinate mind to the world of facts disappears. I
do not simply receive my presented facts passively in an order
determined for me from without by the supreme mind; in virtue of my
power of selective attention, on a limited scale, and very imperfectly,
I recreate the order of their succession for myself.
Again, recognition of the teleological aspect of all experience goes
far to remove the dissatisfaction which we may reasonably feel with
the other half of Berkeley’s argument. When I conceive of the “facts”
of experience as merely objects presented to my apprehension,
there seems no sufficient reason for holding that they exist except as
so presented. But the moment I think of the succession of presented
facts as itself determined by the subjective interests expressed in
selective attention, the case becomes different. The very expression
“selective attention” itself carries with it a reminder that the facts
which respond to my interests are but a selection out of a larger
whole. And my practical experience of the way in which my own
most clearly defined and conscious purposes depend for their
fulfilment upon connection with the interests and purposes of a wider
social whole possessed of an organic unity, should help me to
understand how the totality of interests and purposes determining
the selective attention of different percipients can form, as we have
held that it must, the harmonious and systematic unity of the
absolute experience. The fuller working out of this line of thought
must be left for later chapters, but it is hardly too much to say that
the teleological character which experience possesses in virtue of its
unity with feeling is the key to the idealistic interpretation of the
universe.[42]
Idealism, i.e. the doctrine that all reality is mental, as we shall have
repeated opportunities of learning, becomes unintelligible when
mental life is conceived of as a mere awareness of “given”
presentations.
§ 7. We may now, before attempting to carry out in detail our
general view of what is involved in being real, enumerate one or two
philosophical doctrines about the nature of real existence which our
conclusion as to the connection of reality with experience justifies us
in setting aside. And, first of all, we can at once see that our previous
result, if sound, proves fatal to all forms of what is commonly known
as Realism. By Realism is meant the doctrine that the fundamental
character of that which really is, as distinguished from that which is
only imagined to be, is to be found in its independence of all relation
to the experience of a subject. What exists at all, the realist holds,
exists equally whether it is experienced or not. Neither the fact of its
existence nor the kind of existence it possesses depends in any way
upon its presence to an experience. Before it was experienced at all
it had just the same kind of being that it has now you are
experiencing it, and it will still be the same when it has passed out of
experience. In a word, the circumstance that a mind—whether yours
or mine or God’s is indifferent to the argument—is aware of it as one
of the constituents of its experience, makes no difference to the
reality of the real thing; experience is what is technically called a
relation of one-sided dependence. That there may be experience at
all, and that it may have this or that character, there must be real
things of determinate character, but that there may be real things, it
is not necessary that there should be experience. This is, in brief, the
essence of the realist contention, and any philosophy which accepts
it as valid is in its spirit a realist philosophy.
As to the number and nature of the supposed independent real
things, very different views may be held and have been held by
different representatives of Realism. Thus some realists have
maintained the existence of a single ultimate reality, others of an
indefinite plurality of independent “reals.” Parmenides, with his
doctrine that the real world is a single uniform unchanging material
sphere, is an instance in the ancient, and Mr. Herbert Spencer, with
his Unknowable, an instance in the modern world of a realist of the
former or “monistic” type. The ancient atomists, and in more recent
times Leibnitz with his infinite plurality of independent and
disconnected monads, and Herbart with his world of simple “reals,”
afford the best known instances of a doctrine of pluralistic Realism.
So again, the most diverse theories have been propounded as to the
nature of the “reals.” Ancient and modern atomists have thought of
them as material, and this is perhaps the form of realistic doctrine
which appeals most readily to the ordinary imagination. But though a
materialistic metaphysician is necessarily a realist, a realist need not
be a materialist. Herbart thought of the independent “reals” as
qualitatively simple beings of a nature not capable of further
definition, Leibnitz as minds, while Agnostic philosophers of the type
of Spencer conceive their ultimate reality as a sort of neutral tertium
quid, neither mental nor material. The only point on which all the
theories agree is that the reality of that which they recognise as true
Being consists in its not depending for its existence or its character
on relation to an experience. The differences of detail as to the
number and nature of independent “reals,” though of great
importance for our complete estimate of an individual realist’s
philosophical position, do not affect our general verdict on the
tenability of the first principle of Realism.
The one point of divergence among realists which may be
considered as of more than secondary importance for our present
purpose, is the difference between what we may call Agnostic and
Dogmatic Realism. Agnostic Realism, while asserting the ultimate
dependence of our experience upon a reality which exists
independently of experience, denies that we can have any
knowledge of the nature of this independent reality. The independent
reality by which all experience is conditioned is, on this view, an
Unknowable or Thing-in-itself,[43] of which we are only logically
entitled to say that it certainly is, but that we do not in the least know
what it is. The doctrine of Agnostic Realism has probably never been
carried out by any thinker with rigid consistency, but it forms a
leading feature of the philosophy of Kant as expounded in his First
Critique, and through Kant has passed into English thought as the
foundation of the systems of Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Herbert
Spencer.[44]
Dogmatic Realism, of which Leibnitz and, at a later date, Herbart
are the most important representatives in modern philosophy, on the
contrary, while maintaining that real being is independent of
experience, at the same time holds that it is possible to have positive
knowledge not only of its existence but of its nature. In principle, both
these forms of Realism have been already excluded by the argument
of Book I. chap. 2, § 4. The supreme importance of the principle on
which the argument rests may perhaps warrant us in once more
briefly recurring to it. Our reasoning, it will be remembered, took the
form of a challenge. Produce any instance you please, we said to the
realist, whom we had not then learned to know by that name, of what
you personally regard as reality, and we will undertake to show that it
derives its reality for you from the very fact that it is not ultimately
separable from the experience of a subject. A thing is real for you,
and not merely imaginary, precisely because in some aspect of its
character it enters into and affects your own experience. Or, what is
the same thing in other words, it is real for you because it affects
favourably or otherwise some subjective interest of your own. To be
sure, the thing as it enters into your experience, as it affects your
own subjective interests, is not the thing as it is in its fulness; it only
touches your life through some one of its many sides. And this may
lead you to argue that the real thing is the unexperienced “condition”
of a modification of your experience. But then we had again to ask
what you mean by saying that facts which you do not experience are
real as “conditions” of what you do experience. And we saw that the
only meaning we could attach to the reality of the “condition” was
presence to an experience which transcends your own.
To this general argument we may add two corollaries or
supplementary considerations, which, without introducing anything
fresh, may help to make its full force more apparent.
(1) The argument, as originally presented, was concerned directly
with the that of reality, the mere fact of its existence. But we may
also state it, if we please, from the side of the what, the nature
possessed by the real. You cannot affirm any doctrine about the real
existence of anything without at the same time implying a doctrine
about its nature. Even if you say “Reality is unknowable,” you are
attributing something beyond mere independence of experience to
your reality; you are asserting that what is thus independent
possesses the further positive quality of transcending cognition. Now
what, in logic, must be your ground for attributing this rather than any
other quality to your independent reality? It can only be the fact or
supposed fact—which is indeed regularly appealed to by the
Agnostic as the foundation of his belief—that our experiences
themselves are all found to be self-contradictory. There is no ground
for taking the unknowability of Reality to be true unless you mean by
it a character which belongs not to something which stands outside
all experience, but to experience itself. The same contention applies
to any other predicate which the realist affirms as true of his ultimate
reality.
(2) Again, we may with effect present our argument in a negative
form. Try, we may say, to think of the utterly unreal, and see how you
will have to conceive it. Can you think of sheer unreality otherwise
than as that of which no mind is ever aware, of which no purpose
has ever to take account as a condition of its fulfilment? But to think
of it thus is to attribute to it, as its definition, precisely that
independence in which the realist finds the mark of ultimate reality.
And if “independence” constitutes unreality, presence to and union
with experience must be what constitutes reality.
Yet, however fatal this line of argument may be to the principle of
the realistic contention, we ought not to be satisfied with such a mere
general refutation. We must try to see what is the element of truth in
the realistic views to which they owe the plausibility they have
always possessed for minds of a certain type. In Philosophy we are
never really rid of an error until we have learned how it arises and
what modicum of truth it contains.
(1) Agnostic Realism. We may begin with Agnosticism, with which
we ought now to have no serious difficulty. Agnostic Realism, as we
have seen, is in principle a doubly self-contradictory theory. For it
combines in one breath the irreconcilable declarations that the reality
of things is unknowable and that it knows it to be so.[45] Further, as
we have just said, it makes alleged contradictions which only exist in
and for experience, its sole ground for affirming that something, of
which we can only specify that it is outside all experience,
transcends cognition. To have grasped these two points is to have
disposed of Agnosticism as a metaphysical theory.
Yet with all its defects Agnosticism still enshrines one piece of truth
which the metaphysician is peculiarly prone to forget. Of all men the
metaphysician, just because his special interest is to know
something final and certain about Reality, is the most apt to
exaggerate the amount of his certain knowledge. It is well to be
reminded that the certainty with which we may say that Reality is
experience is compatible with a very imperfect and limited theoretical
insight into experience itself. In actual life this is a far from unfamiliar
fact; the literature of common sense is full of observations to the
effect that we never really know our own hearts, that the most
difficult task of the sage is to understand himself, and so forth,—
complaints which all turn on the point that even our own limited direct
experience of our own meanings and purposes goes far beyond
what we can at any moment express in the form of reflective
knowledge. Yet it is easy, when we come to deal in Metaphysics with
the nature of ultimate Reality, to forget this, and to suppose that the
certainty with which we can say that the ultimately Real is an
experience justifies us in wholesale dogmatising about the special
character of that experience. As a protest against such exaggerated
estimates of the extent of our theoretical knowledge of the nature of
Reality, Agnosticism thus contains a germ of genuine and important
truth, and arises from a justifiable reaction against the undue
emphasising of the merely intellectual side of our experience, of
which we have already seen, and shall hereafter still more fully see,
ground to complain as a besetting weakness of the metaphysically
minded.
(2) Dogmatic Realism, that is, Realism with admittedly knowable
independent “reals,” is a much more workable doctrine, and in one of
its forms, that of the so-called “naïve realism” which supposes the
world of experienced things with all its perceived qualities to exist
independently of any relation to an experiencing subject in precisely
the same form in which we experience it, fairly represents the
ordinary views of unphilosophical “common-sense” men. Nothing
seems more obvious to “common sense” than that my perception of
a thing does not bring it out of nothing into existence, and again does
not create for it new qualities which it had not before. It is because
the thing is already there, and has already such and such a nature,
says “common sense,” that I perceive it as I do. Therefore the whole
world of perceived things must exist independently in the same form
in which they are perceived, as a condition of my perception of them.
When this view comes to be worked out as a philosophical theory,
it usually undergoes some transformation. The fact of illusion, and
the experimentally ascertained subjective differences between
individual percipients,[46] or between different states of the same
percipient, make it hard for the realist who wishes to be scientific to
maintain that all the perceived qualities of experienced things are
equally independent of the experiencing subject. Reflection usually
substitutes for the “naïve” realism of everyday life, a theory of
“scientific” realism according to which the existence and some of the
known properties of the experienced world are independent of the
experiencing subject, while others are regarded as mere secondary
effects arising from the action of an independent reality on the
subject’s consciousness. With the further differences between the
various types of scientific realism, according to the special properties
which are held to belong to things independently of the percipient
subject, we are not at present concerned.[47]
It is, of course, clear that our general argument against the
existence of any reality except as in an experience tells just as much
against “naïve” realism and its more reflective outgrowth “scientific”
realism as against Agnosticism. But the very plausibility and wide
diffusion of realistic views of this type make it all the more necessary
to reinforce our contention by showing what the truth Realism
contains is, and just where it diverges from truth into fallacy. Nor is it
specially difficult to do this. The important elements of truth
contained in Realism seem to be in the main two. (i) It is certain that
a thing may be real without being consciously present as a
distinguishable aspect in my experience. Things do not begin to exist
when I begin to be aware of them, or cease to exist when I cease to
be aware of them. And again, the fact that I make mistakes and am
subject to illusion shows that the qualities of things are not
necessarily in reality what I take them to be. (2) Further, as is shown
by the fact of my imperfect understanding of my own feelings and
purposes, something may actually be an integral part of my own life
as an experiencing subject without my clearly and consciously
recognising it as such when I reflect on the contents of my
experience.
But precisely how much do these two considerations prove? All
that is established by the first is the point on which we have already
insisted, that it is not my experience which constitutes Reality; and
all that is established by the second, that experience, as we have
already repeatedly seen, is not merely cognitive. But the admission
of both these positions brings us not one step nearer the conclusion
which the realist draws from them, that real existence is independent
of all experience. Because it is easy to show that the reality of a
thing does not depend on its being explicitly recognised by any one
finite percipient or any aggregate of finite percipients, and again, that
there is more in any experience of finite percipients than those
percipients know, the realist thinks he may infer that there are
realities which would still be real though they entered into no
experience at all. But there is really no logical connection whatever
between the premisses of this inference and the conclusion which is
drawn from them.
This may be made clearer by a couple of examples. Take, to begin
with, the case of the mental life of my fellow human beings. And, to
state the case in the form in which it appears most favourable to the
realist conclusion, let us imagine an Alexander Selkirk stranded on a
barren rock in the midst of the ocean. The hopes and fears of our
Selkirk are independent of my knowledge of them just as completely
and in just the same sense in which the existence and conformation
of the rock on which he is stranded are so. I and all other inhabitants
of the earth may be just as ignorant of Selkirk’s existence and of
what is passing in his mind as we are of the existence and geological
structure of his rock. And again, what Selkirk explicitly cognises of
his own inner life may bear as small a proportion to the whole as
what he explicitly cognises of the properties of his rock to the whole
nature of the rock. Yet all this in no wise shows that Selkirk’s hopes
and fears and the rest of his mental life are not experience or have a
reality “independent of experience.” Hopes and fears which are not
experience, not psychical matter of fact, would indeed be a
contradiction in set terms. And what the argument fails to prove of
Selkirk’s mental life, it fails, for the same reason, to prove of Selkirk’s
rock.
We may pass from the case of the mental life of a fellow-man to
the case of unperceived physical reality. A recent realist philosopher,
Mr. L. T. Hobhouse, has brought forward as a clear instance of an
independent physical reality, the case of a railway train just emerging
from a tunnel. I do not perceive the train, he says, until it issues from
the tunnel, but it was just as real while it was running through the
tunnel. Its reality is therefore independent of the question whether it
is perceived or not. But, in the first place, the argument requires that
the train shall be empty; it must be a runaway train without driver,
guard, or passengers, if the conditions presumed in the premisses
are to be fulfilled. And, in the second place, we may retort that even
an empty runaway train must have been despatched from
somewhere by somebody. It must stand in some relation to the
general scheme of purposes and interests expressed in our system
of railway traffic, and it is precisely this connection, with a scheme of
purposes and interests, which makes the runaway train a reality and
not a mere fiction of an ingenious philosopher’s imagination. If Mr.
Hobhouse’s argument proves the independent reality of the train in
the tunnel, it ought equally to prove, and does equally prove, the
independent existence of Selkirk’s fluctuations from hope to despair
and back again on his isolated rock. And precisely because it proves
both conclusions equally, the sort of independence it establishes
cannot be independence of experience. Like all realist arguments, it
turns on the identification of experience with the cognitive aspect of
experience, an identification too often suggested by the language of
the “idealists” themselves.[48]
§ 8. The persistent vitality of Realism is due to its protest against
the fallacies of an opposing theory which has of late especially found
favour with some distinguished students of natural science, and
which we may conveniently call Subjectivism.[49] Realism, as we saw,
started from the true premisses, that there are real facts of which my
experience does not make me explicitly aware, and that my cognition
even of my own experience is incomplete, and argued to the false
conclusion that there are therefore realities independent of any
experience. Subjectivism reasons in the opposite way. It asserts truly
that there is no reality outside experience, and then falsely
concludes that I can know of no reality except my own cognitive
states. Its favourite formula are expressions such as, “We know only
the modifications of our own consciousness,” “All we know is our
own perceptions,” “Nothing exists but states of consciousness.”
These formulæ are not all obviously identical in meaning, but the
exponents of Subjectivism seem to use them without any conscious
distinction, and we shall probably do the theory no injustice if we
criticise it on the assumption that the expressions are meant to be of
identical signification.
Now it is clear that the logical consequences of the subjectivist
doctrine are so subversive of all the practical assumptions upon
which daily life is based, that they should require the most stringent
proof before we give our assent to them. If Subjectivism is true, it
follows immediately that not merely the “whole choir of heaven and
furniture of earth,” but the whole of humanity, so far as I have any
knowledge of its existence, is a mere subjective affection of my own
“consciousness,” or, as the scientific subjectivist usually, for some
not very obvious reason, prefers to say, of my own brain. Every
argument which the subjectivist can produce to show that “things”
are, for my knowledge at any rate, “modifications of my own
consciousness,” applies to the case of my fellow-men with as much
force as to the case of the inorganic world. The logical inference
from the subjectivist’s premisses, an inference which he is rarely or
never willing to draw, would be that he is himself the sole real being
in a world of phantoms, not one of which can with any certainty be
said to correspond to a real object. And conversely, any valid ground
for recognising the existence of my fellow-men as more than “states
of my own consciousness,” must equally afford ground for admitting
the reality, in the same general sense, of the rest of the world of
things familiar to us from the experiences of everyday life.[50] For if
any one of the things composing the world of practical life has a
reality which is not dependent upon its presence to my particular
experience, then there is the same reason for believing that every
other such thing has a like reality, unless there happen to be special
grounds for regarding the perception to which it is present as an
hallucination.
We must not, however, simply dismiss the subjectivist theory in
this summary way. We must examine the doctrine in detail
sufficiently to discover where the fallacy comes in, how it arises, and
what modicum of sound philosophic insight it may possibly contain.
To take these three points in logical order—
(a) The current arguments for Subjectivism are often so stated as
to confuse together two quite distinct positions. When it is said that
what we perceive is “our own subjective states,” the meaning
intended may be either that there is, at least so far as I am able to
know, no real existence in the universe except that of my “states of
consciousness”; or again, that there are such realities, but that the
properties which I perceive do not belong to them in their own nature
but are only subjective effects of their action upon my
“consciousness,” or, if you prefer to speak in physiological language
upon my nervous system. Now, many of the arguments commonly
urged by the subjectivist would at most only prove the second
conclusion, in which the subjectivist agrees to a large extent with the
scientific realist. Thus it is an ignoratio elenchi to reason as if the
facts of hallucination, illusion, and discrepancy between the reports
of different percipients or different sense-organs of the same
percipient gave any support to the special doctrine of Subjectivism.
These facts, which, as we have seen, are equally appealed to by
scientific realists, prove no more than that we do not always perceive
the world of things as it is, and as it must be thought of if we would
think truly,—in other words, that there is such a thing as error.
Now the problem “How is it possible for us to think or perceive
falsely?” is, as the student of Greek philosophy knows, both difficult
and important. But the existence of error in no way shows that the
things which I perceive are “states of my own consciousness”; on the
contrary, error is harder to explain on the subjectivist theory than on
any other. For if what I perceive has some kind of existence distinct
from the mere fact of my perceiving it, there is at least a possibility of
understanding how the reality and my perception of it may be
discrepant; but if the existence of a thing is only another name for
the fact that I perceive it, it seems impossible that I should perceive
anything except as it is. On the subjectivist theory, as Plato showed
in the Theaetetus, every percipient being ought, at every moment of
his existence, to be infallible.
We may confine our attention, then, to the grounds which the
subjectivist alleges for the former conclusion, that nothing can be
known to exist except my own “states of consciousness,” and may
dismiss the whole problem of erroneous perception as irrelevant to
the question. Now the general argument for Subjectivism, however
differently it may be stated by different writers, consists, in principle,
of a single allegation. It is alleged as a fact in the Psychology of
cognition, that things are immediately perceived by us as
modifications of our own sensibility, or “states of our own
consciousness,” and that it is therefore impossible to get behind this
ultimate condition of all perception. Against this psychological
doctrine we have to urge (1) that it is in flagrant contradiction with the
certain facts of actual life; and (2) that, as a doctrine in Psychology, it
is demonstrably false.
(1) There are certain realities, admitted by the subjectivist himself,
which are manifestly not “states of my consciousness,” and of which
I yet, as the subjectivist himself admits, have a genuine though
imperfect knowledge; such realities are, e.g., the ends and purposes
of my fellow-men, and again many of my own ends and purposes. It
is allowed on all hands that I can know not only the fact of the
existence of other men, but also, to some extent at least, the
character of their various purposes and interests. This is involved, for
instance, in the simple fact that when I read a letter it is normally
possible for me to understand the writer’s meaning. It is equally
involved in the fact that I can know the truth of any ordinary historical
matter of fact, e.g., the date of the great fire of London. Neither the
date of the fire of London nor the meaning of my correspondent’s
sentences is a “state of my consciousness” in any intelligible sense
of the words, yet both are typical instances of the kind of facts of
which our ordinary knowledge of the world of everyday life and
practice wholly consists. And what is true of facts relating to the
deeds and purposes of others is equally true of my own deeds and
purposes. The facts which make up my own life cannot, without
violence to language, be reduced to “states of my consciousness.”
For instance, I may know that I have a certain temperament or
disposition, e.g., that I am irascible by temperament or of a
sentimental disposition; but though my knowing these truths about
myself may in a sense be called a state of my consciousness, the
truths themselves cannot be called “states of my consciousness”
without a serious logical fallacy of equivocal middle term.
(2) This will be made clearer by a consideration of the
psychological principle invoked by the subjectivist. What the
subjectivist means when he says that in perception I am aware only
of the states, or subjective modifications, of my own consciousness,
is that the object of which each perceptive state is aware is simply
itself as a perceptive state; the perception perceives itself and
nothing else. E.g., when I say I see red, what I am really aware of is
that I am in a state of perceiving red; when I say I hear a noise, what
I am aware of is that I am in a state of hearing a noise, and so
universally. Now this is so far from being a truth, that it is absolutely
and demonstrably false. We may, in fact, definitely lay it down that
the one thing of which no one, except the introspective psychologist,
is ever aware is his own perceptive state in the act of perceiving, and
that, even in the case of the psychologist who sets himself purposely
to study his own states, no perceptive state ever perceives itself.
What I am aware of when I look at a red surface is not “myself-as-
perceiving-red,” but the splash of red colour itself. When I see a
man, I do not perceive “myself-as-seeing-a-man,” but I perceive the
other man. So when I take a resolution to act in a certain way or
realise that I am in a certain mood, what I am directly aware of is not
“myself-as-forming-the-resolution” or “myself-as-in-the-mood,” but
the resolution or the mood. Even when, as an introspective
psychologist, I sit down to study the formation of resolutions or the
peculiarities of emotional moods by reflection on my own experience,
the state in which I study the formation of a resolution or the nature
of a mood is not itself the state of resolving or of experiencing the
mood in question. We cannot too strongly insist that, if by “self-
consciousness” is meant a cognitive state which is its own object,
there is no such thing, and it is a psychological impossibility that
there should be any such thing, as self-consciousness. No cognitive
state ever has itself for its own object. Every cognitive state has for
its object something other than itself.[51]
Even where I make an assertion about my subjective condition, as
when I say “I know I am very angry,” the state of knowing about my
feeling is as distinct from the feeling itself as the state of knowing
that I see red is from the red colour that I see. What the subjectivist
does is to confuse the two. Because the act of knowing is itself a
state of the knowing subject, and because in some cases the
knowledge may again have reference to some other state of the
same subject, he infers that what I know at any moment is my own
subjective condition in the act of knowing. In other and more
technical words, he confuses the cognitive act or state with its own
object. To what absurd results this confusion would lead him, if he
were logical in the inferences he makes from it, we have already
seen. We can now see that psychologically the confusion is a double
one. (1) The subjectivist confuses experience with mere awareness
of a presented content. He ignores the presence of the true
“subjective” factor of selective attention throughout experience, and
is thus led to forget that all experiences imply an element which is in
the experiencing mind but not presented to it. (2) And in confining his
attention to the presentational aspect of experience, he goes on to
confound the presented content with the fact of its presentation. As
against this second confusion it is essential to a true theory of
knowledge to emphasise three points of distinction between the
presented content or object of a cognitive state and the state itself,
considered as a process in the history of an experiencing subject. (1)
The cognitive state is never its own object, it refers to or cognises an
object distinct from its own existence as a psychical occurrence. This
is the truth which Realism distorts into the doctrine that the object of
knowledge must have a reality of “independent of” experience. (2)
The object of knowledge is never created by the occurrence of the
psychical state in which a particular percipient becomes aware of its
existence. This is just as true of so-called “merely ideal” objects as of
physical things. The properties of the natural logarithms or of the
circular functions in trigonometry are just as independent of my
knowledge of them as the qualities of the trees and animals I should
see if I turned from my writing desk and looked out at the window. (3)
The object of knowledge has always a character of which only a
fragment is ever presented to my perception or reflection in any
cognitive state. Every cognitive state refers to or stands for a great
deal more than it directly means to me.
(3) The origin of the subjectivist fallacy, as has been brilliantly
shown by Avenarius,[52] is to be found in the “intrasubjective
intercourse” of a plurality of percipients capable of communicating
their experience to each other. So long as I am dealing solely with
myself as an experiencing being and my relation to my own
environment, there is no possibility of a subjectivist interpretation. In
my own direct experience I have to do neither with “mental states”
nor with mere “objects of cognition,” but with things which in various
ways by their interference assist or hinder the accomplishment of my
various purposes, and of which I have therefore to take note, so as
to adapt my ways of reaching my ends to their ways of behaviour.
Hence the “natural” view of the world, for a single experiencing
being, would be that of “naïve realism,” to which the things forming
my environment are real in precisely the same sense in which I am
real myself. But as soon as I have to take account of the experiences
of other percipients, there arises an inevitable fallacy which leads to
philosophical consequences of the gravest kind. Starting with the
assumption that the things I perceive are the real things, I feel a
difficulty as to how the same things can be perceived by the other
percipients around me. E.g., if the sun I see is the real sun, what
about the sun seen by some one else? Instead of finding the true
explanation, that all the percipients are in relation to a common
environment which is independent of its presence to any one
percipient’s experience, I very naturally fall into the mistake of
thinking the things perceived by other men to be “ideas” or
“percepts” of the real things perceived by me. These perceptual
copies of the real things I, for obvious reasons, locate somewhere
“in” the organisms of my fellow-percipients. Then I go on to interpret
my own experience in terms of the theory I originally devised to meet
the case of my fellow-men, and infer that what I myself perceive is a
set of “percepts” or “ideas” produced “in” my organism by a reality
“outside” all experience. And it is then an easy step to the final
conclusion that, inasmuch as all known and knowable things are
mere “ideas in some one’s head,” nothing else exists. Subjectivism is
thus the last step in the development of the fallacy which begins with
what Avenarius calls “introjection.” Just as we learned that the
existence of our fellow-men is the cardinal fact of experience which
affords the most immediate refutation of the subjectivist theory, so
the original source of the subjectivist fallacy is failure to recognise
their experience as being on the same level of reality as our own.
(4) We need not say much on the element of truth which
Subjectivism preserves in a distorted form. We have seen that, as
against Realism, Subjectivism is right in maintaining the indissoluble
unity of real being with experience, though it twists this truth into an
absurdity by first identifying experience with my own limited and
imperfect experience and then giving a false psychological
interpretation of the nature of that experience itself. How a reality can
be independent of presentation in my experience and yet be in its
very nature dependent upon experience for its existence and
character, has already been sufficiently illustrated. But we may
perhaps say that even in the identification of experience with my own
experience there is an underlying substratum of genuine philosophic
truth. For, as we have more than once insisted, there is manifestly a
great deal more in my own experience than what is at any time
present as the object of conscious cognition. Or, as Mr. Bradley is
fond of putting it, there is always more in my mind than before it. I
am never fully aware at any moment even of the full nature of my
own purposes and feelings. This is why the deceitfulness of my own
heart has become a common-place of religious self-examination as
well as of worldly wisdom.
Again, every increase of insight into our own real feelings and
purposes involves increased insight into the feelings and purposes of
the other feeling beings with whom we stand in the various relations
of social intercourse.[53] Hence it might fairly be contended that fully
to know your own meaning, fully to understand what you want, would
imply complete insight into the structure of the whole world of reality,
—in fact, that self-knowledge and knowledge of the universe must
ultimately be the same thing. The systematic unity of the whole world
of experience may be so complete that there is nothing in it
anywhere which does not correspond to some element in the
experience of every one of its members. Each member may, like the
monads of Leibnitz, represent the whole system though at very
different levels of coherency and from very different points of view.
But such a conception, though it would concede to Subjectivism that
whatever forms a part of the system of real being somehow falls
within my individual experience, would take as the foundation of its
assertion that very distinction between what is implicitly present in
my experience and what is explicitly before it which Subjectivism
consistently ignores. Whether the doctrine as thus re-stated can be
affirmed as more than a fascinating possibility, we shall be better
able to judge when we have discussed in our next chapter the
systematic unity of Reality.
Consult further:—F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, chaps.
13, 14; T. Case, Physical Realism, pt. 1; L. T. Hobhouse, The Theory
of Knowledge, pt. 3, chap. 3, The Conception of External Reality; H.
Lotze, Metaphysic, bk. i. chap. 7 (pp. 207-231 of vol. i. in Eng.
trans.); J. S. Mackenzie, Outlines of Metaphysics, bk. i. chap. 3,
Theories of Metaphysics; J. Royce, The World and the Individual,
First Series (Lecture on the First Conception of Being).
31. See, in particular, Royce, The World and the Individual,

Second Series, Lecture 1, for a telling elaboration of this thought. I
should note that I do not myself use the term “existence,” as is
sometimes done, with special restriction to the sense of presence as
a sensible event at a particular point of space and time. When so
used, it is, of course, much narrower in scope than the term “Being.”
32. Compare the brilliant but not altogether convincing argument
of Professor James, in The Will to Believe.
33. See the whole treatment of question of feeling in Dr. Stout’s
Manual of Psychology. I do not, of course, mean that “consciousness
of activity” successful or thwarted as a fact precedes and conditions
pleasure-pain. On the contrary, it is a familiar fact of experience that
we often learn what our purposes are for the first time by the pain
which attends their defeat. E.g., a man may first realise that he is,
and has been, in love by his pain at his mistress’s preference of a
rival suitor. And nothing seems more certain than that many
pleasures are quite independent of “actual conation,” as Plato long
ago recognised.
I must take this opportunity to guard once for all against some
plausible misconceptions. (a) When I speak of feeling as “purposive”
or “teleological,” I do not mean to make what, to my own mind, would
be the monstrous assumption, that it necessarily presupposes
conscious anticipation of its guiding end or purpose. All that I mean
is that the processes of conscious life are as a matter of fact only
intelligible with reference to the results in which they culminate and
which they serve to maintain; or again, that they all involve the kind
of continuity of interest which belong to attention. (b) If attentive
interest is not necessarily actual conation, actual conscious effort,
still less is it necessarily actual will. For me, as for Mr. Bradley (see
his article in Mind for October 1902), where there is no ideal
anticipation of the result of a process there is neither actual desire
nor actual will. And since I cannot see that all attention implies ideal
anticpation, I certainly could not agree with Prof. Royce that ultimate
Reality is simply the “internal meaning of an idea.”
My own meaning will be made clearer by reference to the
illustration given at the beginning of this note. A man first realises
that he has been in love because he feels pained at a rival’s
success. So far as this is so, I should say, there has been no actual
conation, and a fortiori, no actual will or desire. But—and this is my
point—he would not feel the pain unless the success of the rival
thwarted the successful issue of a specific psychophysical tendency
of an essentially forward-reaching or teleological kind. The failure
may for the first time make him aware of the presence of the
tendency, but it must previously have been there as a condition of its
own failure.
34. This qualification has to be added to avoid prejudging the very
difficult question whether “position” itself is “relative” or “absolute.”
Fortunately our argument is independent of the determination of the
problem. Even if there should be differences between points as
“absolute” as the difference between red and blue, our contention
would retain its force.
35. For otherwise the facts which lay outside the purposes or
interests of the Absolute would be “foreign” facts “given” from without
and not in systematic harmony with its experience as a whole. The
complete systematic unity of all facts would thus fall outside what
was to be, ex hypothesi, an all-containing experience. Q.E.A.
36. For further reflections upon the unsatisfactoriness of such a
conception of the Absolute as the “union of Thought and Will,” see
Bk. IV. chap. 6, § 1, where it is shown that knowledge and will alike,
as actual knowledge and actual will, belong only to finite beings.
37. I.e. if will be taken strictly to mean an actual volition, love and a
“will to love” cannot co-exist; if we take will improperly to mean a
“standing” interest of purpose, the case is different.
38. The student of the history of Philosophy will be reminded of the
grounds on which Spinoza objects to ascribe “intellect” and “will” in
the proper sense of the terms to his God, as well as of the
“knowledge of the third or intuitive kind” and the “infinite intellectual
love” of God for Himself which are so prominent in the fifth part of the
Ethics. Similar considerations have sometimes led to a preference
for the term “organic” rather than “purposive” or “teleological,” as
expressive of the ultimate unity of experience. The word “organic,”
however, might suggest biological conceptions of growth,
dependence on an external environment, etc., which would be out of
place. But the student may compare with what has been said of the
“purposive” character of individuality Spinoza’s conception of the
being of a thing as a conatus in suo esse perseverandi.
39. For a full examination of the relation between reality and
scientific symbolism, consult Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, part
1. The more clearly it is realised that scientific hypotheses are
essentially a system of mathematical symbolism, the more
impossible it becomes to suppose that they deal directly with the
concrete nature of things.
40. In Principles of Human Knowledge, §§ 70-75, Berkeley indeed
seems on the very verge of denying that God Himself “perceives” the
“ideas” which by His action He excites in us. But at § 139 we find
that a “spirit” means “that which perceives ideas, and wills and
reasons about them,” and in the third Dialogue it is expressly stated
that sensible things are “perceived by God” [Works, Edit. in Bohn’s
Libraries, vol. i. p. 368]. In fact, from the psychological standpoint of
Berkeleian sensationalism, to deny God’s possession of “ideas” (i.e.
sense-contents) would have been tantamount to denying His
spirituality.
41. Unfortunately Berkeley, like so many philosophers, thought of
“activity” as primarily an external relation between a “cause” and the
material on which it “works.” This is probably why he failed to realise
the “active” character of the perceptual process.
42. The reader will do well to compare with the whole of the
foregoing section the treatment of perception as essentially
teleological in Dr. Stout’s Manual of Psychology,3 bk. iii. pt. 1, chap.
2.
I need hardly observe that recognition of the fundamental
significance of purpose and selection for mental life does not of itself
entail the adoption of “voluntarist” views in Psychology. What is
fundamental for real mental life may perfectly well admit of analysis
into hypothetical simpler elements for the purpose of the
psychologist. Thus the admission that all mental life is teleological
and selective need not involve the adoption of such metaphysical
theories of activity as are adversely criticised by Mr. Bradley in his

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(Original PDF) American Horizons: U.S.

History in a Global Context, Volume I:

Making an Atlantic World, 1400–1513 • 13

Iberians, Africans, and the Creation of an Eastern Atlantic World • 15

The Atlantic World Enters North America, 1513–1565 • 26

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European Islands in an Algonquian Ocean, 1607–1625 • 48

Seeking God, Seizing Land, Reaping Conflict, 1625 to c. 1640 • 57

Migration and the Expansion of Dutch and English North America • 59

New Imperial Orders, 1660–1680 • 84

Victorious Pueblos, a New Mid-Atlantic, and “Glorious”

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Slaving Raids, Expansion, and War in the Carolinas • 118

Migration, Religion, and Empires • 121

The “Naturalization” of Slavery and Racism • 125

Laying Foundations in British North America • 135

A Creole Elite Pursues Gentility • 138

Minds, Souls, and Wallets • 163

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Bourbon Reforms • 198

Stamp Act and Resistance • 199

Protest and Repeal • 200

Consumer Resistance • 203

The Non-Importation Movement • 204

Resistance Becomes Revolution • 207

Declaring Independence • 212

The Structure of Authority • 228

Securing Independence • 234

War in the South • 236

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Loyalists: Resistance and Migration • 237

Restructuring Political and Social Authority • 241

A Federal Nation • 245

Party Conflict Intensifies • 264

The “Revolution” of 1800 and the Revolution of 1804 • 270

Trade, Conflict, Warfare • 274

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The War of 1812 • 278

Shifting Borders • 299

Social and Cultural Shifts • 304

Financial Expansion • 311

Politics and Hemispheric Change • 316

Transcontinental (Adams–Onís) Treaty • 317

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Markets and Social Relationships • 335

Democracy and the Public Sphere • 340

Election of 1824 • 342

Economic Opportunity and Territorial Expansion • 345

Expanding Markets • 350

The New Challenge of Labor • 369

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The New Middle Class • 373

Men and Women in Antebellum America • 379

Freedom for Some • 385

Building a Christian Nation • 400

Northern Reform • 405

Southern Reform • 413

Challenges to the Spirit of the Age • 420

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Contested Citizenship • 442

Slavery and Antebellum Life • 447

The Rise of the Republicans • 452

The Politics of Slave Catching • 454