Essentials of Economics 3rd Edition

Krugman Solutions Manual

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 chapter:
8
Monopoly, Oligopoly, and
Monopolistic Competition
1. Each of the following firms possesses market power. Explain its source.
a. Merck, the producer of the patented cholesterol-lowering drug Zetia
b. WaterWorks, a provider of piped water
c. Chiquita, a supplier of bananas and owner of most banana plantations
d. The Walt Disney Company, the creators of Mickey Mouse

Solution
1. a. Merck has a patent for Zetia. This is an example of a government-created barrier
to entry, which gives Merck market power.
b. There are increasing returns to scale in the provision of piped water. There is a large
fixed cost associated with building a network of water pipes to each household; the
more water delivered, the lower its average total cost becomes. This gives WaterWorks
a cost advantage over other companies, which gives WaterWorks market power.
c. Chiquita controls most banana plantations. Control over a scarce resource gives
Chiquita market power.
d. The Walt Disney Company has the copyright on animations featuring Mickey
Mouse. This is another example of a government-created barrier to entry that
gives the Walt Disney Company market power.

2. Skyscraper City has a subway system, for which a one-way fare is $1.50. There is pres-
sure on the mayor to reduce the fare by one-third, to $1.00. The mayor is dismayed,
thinking that this will mean Skyscraper City is losing one-third of its revenue from sales
of subway tickets. The mayor’s economic adviser reminds her that she is focusing only
on the price effect and ignoring the quantity effect. Explain why the mayor’s estimate of
a one-third loss of revenue is likely to be an overestimate. Illustrate with a diagram.

Solution
2. A reduction in fares from $1.50 to $1.00 will reduce the revenue on each ticket that
is currently sold by one-third; this is the price effect. But a reduction in price will
lead to more tickets being sold at the lower price of $1.00, which creates additional
revenue; this is the quantity effect. The accompanying diagram illustrates this.

Price of
ticket Price effect

$1.50
Quantity effect
1.00

D
0
Quantity of tickets

The price effect is the loss of revenue on all the currently sold tickets. The quantity
effect is the increase in revenue from increased sales as a result of the lower price.
S-119

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3. Consider an industry with the demand curve (D) and marginal cost curve (MC)
shown in the accompanying diagram. There is no fixed cost. If the industry is a
monopoly, the monopolist’s marginal revenue curve would be MR. Answer the fol-
lowing questions by naming the appropriate points or areas.

Price
A

F J N
B
G K O
C
H L R
E MC

D
I M S T Quantity
MR

a. If the industry is perfectly competitive, what will be the total quantity produced?
At what price?
b. Which area reflects consumer surplus under perfect competition?
c. If the industry is a monopoly, what quantity will the monopolist produce? Which
price will it charge?
d. Which area reflects the monopolist’s profit?
e. Which area reflects consumer surplus under monopoly?
f. Which area reflects the deadweight loss to society from monopoly?

Solution
3. a. In a perfectly competitive industry, each firm maximizes profit by producing the
quantity at which price equals marginal cost. That is, all firms together produce a
quantity S, corresponding to point R, where the marginal cost curve crosses the
demand curve. Price will be equal to marginal cost, E.
b. Consumer surplus is the area under the demand curve and above price. In part a,
we saw that the perfectly competitive price is E. Consumer surplus in perfect com-
petition is therefore the triangle ARE.
c. A monopolist produces the quantity at which marginal cost equals marginal rev-
enue, that is, quantity I. Accordingly, the monopolist charges price B, the highest
price it can charge if it wants to sell quantity I.
d. The monopolist’s profit per unit is the difference between price and the average
total cost. Since there is no fixed cost and the marginal cost is constant (each unit
costs the same to produce), the marginal cost is the same as the average total cost.
That is, profit per unit is the distance BE. Since the monopolist sells I units, its
profit is BE times I, or the rectangle BEHF.
e. Consumer surplus is the area under the demand curve and above the price. In
part c, we saw that the monopoly price is B. Consumer surplus in monopoly is
therefore the triangle AFB.
f. Deadweight loss is the surplus that would have been available (either to con-
sumers or producers) under perfect competition but that is lost when there is a
monopolist. It is the triangle FRH.

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4. Bob, Bill, Ben, and Brad Baxter have just made a documentary movie about their bas-
ketball team. They are thinking about making the movie available for download on the
Internet, and they can act as a monopolist if they choose to. Each time the movie is
downloaded, their Internet service provider charges them a fee of $4. The Baxter broth-
ers are arguing about which price to charge customers per download. The accompany-
ing table shows the demand schedule for their film.

Price of Quantity of downloads

download demanded
$10 0
8 1
6 3
4 6
2 10
0 15

a. Calculate the total revenue and the marginal revenue per download.
b. Bob is proud of the film and wants as many people as possible to download it.
Which price would he choose? How many downloads would be sold?
c. Bill wants as much total revenue as possible. Which price would he choose? How
many downloads would be sold?
d. Ben wants to maximize profit. Which price would he choose? How many down-
loads would be sold?
e. Brad wants to charge the efficient price. Which price would he choose? How
many downloads would be sold?

Solution
4. a. The accompanying table calculates total revenue (TR) and marginal revenue
(MR). Recall that marginal revenue is the additional revenue per unit of output,
that is, ΔTR/ΔQ.

Quantity of
Price of download downloads demanded TR MR
$10 0 $0
$8
8 1 8
5
6 3 18
2
4 6 24
−1
2 10 20
−4
0 15 0

b. Bob would charge $0. At that price, there would be 15 downloads, the largest
quantity they can sell.
c. Bill would charge $4. At that price, total revenue is greatest ($24). At that price,
there would be 6 downloads.

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d. Ben would charge $6. At that price, there would be 3 downloads. For any more
downloads, marginal revenue would be below marginal cost, and so further down-
loads would lose the Baxters’ money.
e. Brad would charge $4. A price equal to marginal cost is efficient. At that price,
there would be 6 downloads.

5. Jimmy has a room that overlooks, from some distance, a major league baseball stadi-
um. He decides to rent a telescope for $50.00 a week and charge his friends and
classmates to use it to peep at the game for 30 seconds. He can act as a monopolist
for renting out “peeps.” For each person who takes a 30-second peep, it costs Jimmy
$0.20 to clean the eyepiece. The accompanying table shows the information Jimmy
has gathered about the demand for the service in a given week.

Price of peep Quantity of peeps demanded

$1.20 0
1.00 100
0.90 150
0.80 200
0.70 250
0.60 300
0.50 350
0.40 400
0.30 450
0.20 500
0.10 550

a. For each price in the table, calculate the total revenue from selling peeps and the
marginal revenue per peep.
b. At what quantity will Jimmy’s profit be maximized? What price will he charge?
What will his total profit be?
c. Jimmy’s landlady complains about all the visitors coming into the building and
tells Jimmy to stop selling peeps. Jimmy discovers, however, that if he gives the
landlady $0.20 for every peep he sells, she will stop complaining. What effect does
the $0.20-per-peep bribe have on Jimmy’s marginal cost per peep? What is the
new profit-maximizing quantity of peeps? What effect does the $0.20-per-peep
bribe have on Jimmy’s total profit?

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Solution
5. a. Total revenue (TR) and marginal revenue (MR) are given in the accompanying table.

Quantity of peeps
Price of peep demanded TR MR
$1.20 0 $0
$1.00
1.00 100 100
0.70
0.90 150 135
0.50
0.80 200 160
0.30
0.70 250 175
0.10
0.60 300 180
−0.10
0.50 350 175
−0.30
0.40 400 160
−0.50
0.30 450 135
−0.70
0.20 500 100
−0.90
0.10 550 55

b. Jimmy’s profit will be maximized when he sells 250 peeps, since for the first 250
peeps his marginal revenue exceeds his marginal cost of $0.20. He will charge $0.70
per peep. His total profit is (250 × $0.70) − (250 × $0.20) − $50.00 = $75.00.
c. When Jimmy pays the landlady $0.20 per peep, his marginal cost increases to
$0.40 per peep, so the profit-maximizing quantity decreases to 200 and the profit-
maximizing price increases to $0.80. His total profit will now be (200 × $0.80) −
(200 × $0.40) − $50.00 = $30.00.

6. Suppose that De Beers is a monopolist in the market for diamonds. De Beers has five
potential customers: Raquel, Jackie, Joan, Mia, and Sophia. Each of these customers
will buy at most one diamond—and only if the price is just equal to, or lower than,
her willingness to pay. Raquel’s willingness to pay is $400; Jackie’s, $300; Joan’s,
$200; Mia’s, $100; and Sophia’s, $0. De Beers’s marginal cost per diamond is $100.
This leads to the demand schedule for diamonds shown in the accompanying table.

Price of Quantity of diamonds

diamond demanded
$500 0
400 1
300 2
200 3
100 4
0 5

a. Calculate De Beers’s total revenue and its marginal revenue. From your calcula-
tion, draw the demand curve and the marginal revenue curve.
b. Explain why De Beers faces a downward-sloping demand curve.

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c. Explain why the marginal revenue from an additional diamond sale is less than
the price of the diamond.
d. Suppose De Beers currently charges $200 for its diamonds. If it lowers the price to
$100, how large is the price effect? How large is the quantity effect?
e. Add the marginal cost curve to your diagram from part a and determine which
quantity maximizes De Beers’s profit and which price De Beers will charge.

Solution
6. a. Total revenue (TR) and marginal revenue (MR) are given in the accompanying
table.

Quantity of diamonds
Price of diamond demanded TR MR
$500 0 $0
$400
400 1 400
200
300 2 600
0
200 3 600
−200
100 4 400
−400
0 5 0

The accompanying diagram illustrates De Beers’s demand curve and marginal rev-
enue (MR) curve.

Price of
diamond
$500
400
300
200
100 MC
0 D
1 2 3 4 5
–100 MR
Quantity of diamonds

b. De Beers is the only producer of diamonds, so its demand curve is the market
demand curve. And the market demand curve slopes downward: the lower the
price, the more customers will buy diamonds.
c. If De Beers lowers the price sufficiently to sell one more diamond, it earns extra
revenue equal to the price of that one extra diamond. This is the quantity effect of
lowering the price. But there is also a price effect: lowering the price means that
De Beers also has to lower the price on all other diamonds, and that lowers its
revenue. So the marginal revenue of selling an additional diamond is less than the
price at which the additional diamond can be sold.

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d. If the price is $200, then De Beers sells to Raquel, Jackie, and Joan. If it lowers the
price to $100, it will also sell a diamond to Mia. The price effect is that De Beers
loses $100 (the amount by which it lowered the price) each from selling to
Raquel, Jackie, and Joan. So the price effect lowers De Beers’s revenue by 3 × $100 =
$300. The quantity effect is that De Beers sells one more diamond (to Mia), at
$100. So the quantity effect is to raise De Beers’s revenue by $100.
e. The marginal cost (MC) curve is constant at $100, as shown in the diagram.
Marginal revenue equals marginal cost at a quantity of 2 diamonds. So De Beers
will sell 2 diamonds at a price of $300 each.

7. Use the demand schedule for diamonds given in Problem 6. The marginal cost of
producing diamonds is constant at $100. There is no fixed cost.
a. If De Beers charges the monopoly price, how large is the individual consumer sur-
plus that each buyer experiences? Calculate total consumer surplus by summing
the individual consumer surpluses. How large is producer surplus?
Suppose that upstart Russian and Asian producers enter the market and the market
becomes perfectly competitive.
b. What is the perfectly competitive price? What quantity will be sold in this
perfectly competitive market?
c. At the competitive price and quantity, how large is the consumer surplus that each
buyer experiences? How large is total consumer surplus? How large is producer
surplus?
d. Compare your answer to part c to your answer to part a. How large is the dead-
weight loss associated with monopoly in this case?

Solution
7. a. The monopoly price is $300. At that price Raquel and Jackie buy diamonds.
Raquel’s consumer surplus is $400 − $300 = $100; Jackie’s is $300 − $300 = $0.
So total consumer surplus is $100 + $0 = $100. Producer surplus is $300 − $100 =
$200 for each diamond sold; 2 × $200 = $400.
b. In a perfectly competitive market, P = MC. That is, the perfectly competitive price
is $100, and at that price 4 diamonds will be sold—to Raquel, Jackie, Joan, and
Mia.
c. At the competitive price, Raquel’s consumer surplus is $400 − $100 = $300;
Jackie’s, $300 − $100 = $200; Joan’s, $200 − $100 = $100; and Mia’s, $100 −
$100 = $0. So total consumer surplus is $300 + $200 + $100 + $0 = $600. Since
the price is equal to marginal cost, there is no producer surplus.
d. Under perfect competition, the sum of consumer and producer surplus is $600 +
$0 = $600. Under monopoly, the sum of consumer and producer surplus is $100
+ $400 = $500. So the loss of surplus to society from monopoly—the deadweight
loss—is $600 − $500 = $100.

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8. Download Records decides to release an album by the group Mary and the Little
Lamb. It produces the album with no fixed cost, but the total cost of downloading an
album to a CD and paying Mary her royalty is $6 per album. Download Records can
act as a monopolist. Its marketing division finds that the demand schedule for the
album is as shown in the accompanying table.

Price of album Quantity of albums demanded

$22 0
20 1,000
18 2,000
16 3,000
14 4,000
12 5,000
10 6,000
8 7,000

a. Calculate the total revenue and the marginal revenue per album.
b. The marginal cost of producing each album is constant at $6. To maximize profit,
what level of output should Download Records choose, and which price should it
charge for each album?
c. Mary renegotiates her contract and now needs to be paid a higher royalty per
album. So the marginal cost rises to be constant at $14. To maximize profit, what
level of output should Download Records now choose, and which price should it
charge for each album?

Solution
8. a. Total revenue (TR) and marginal revenue per album (MR) is shown in the accom-
panying table.

Quantity of albums
Price of album demanded TR MR
$22 0 $0
$20
20 1,000 20,000
16
18 2,000 36,000
12
16 3,000 48,000
8
14 4,000 56,000
4
12 5,000 60,000
0
10 6,000 60,000
−4
8 7,000 56,000

b. If the marginal cost of each album is $6, Download Records will maximize profit
by producing 4,000 albums, since for each album up to 4,000, marginal revenue is
greater than marginal cost. For any further albums, marginal cost would exceed
marginal revenue. Producing 4,000 albums, Download Records will charge $14 for
each album.

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c. If the marginal cost of each album is $14, Download Records will maximize profit
by producing 2,000 albums, and it will charge $18 per album.

9. The accompanying diagram illustrates your local electricity company’s natural

monopoly. The diagram shows the demand curve for kilowatt-hours (kWh) of elec-
tricity, the company’s marginal revenue (MR) curve, its marginal cost (MC) curve,
and its average total cost (ATC) curve. The government wants to regulate the monop-
olist by imposing a price ceiling.

Price
of kWh
$1.30

0.80

0.50
0.40 ATC
0.30 MC
MR D
0 5 8 10 13
Quantity of kWh (thousands)

a. If the government does not regulate this monopolist, which price will it charge?
Illustrate the inefficiency this creates by shading the deadweight loss from monopoly.
b. If the government imposes a price ceiling equal to the marginal cost, $0.30, will
the monopolist make profits or lose money? Shade the area of profit (or loss) for
the monopolist. If the government does impose this price ceiling, do you think the
firm will continue to produce in the long run?
c. If the government imposes a price ceiling of $0.50, will the monopolist make a
profit, lose money, or break even?

Solution
9. a. The monopolist would choose a price of $0.80. Deadweight loss is shaded and
labeled in the accompanying figure.

Price
of kWh
$1.30
Deadweight
loss

0.80

0.50
0.40 ATC
0.30 MC
MR D
0 5 8 10 13
Quantity of kWh (thousands)

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b. If the government imposes a price ceiling of $0.30, the quantity demanded is

10,000. The monopolist will incur a loss equal to the shaded rectangle in the
accompanying figure. Since the firm is incurring a loss, in the long run it will exit
the market.

Price
of kWh
$1.30

0.80

0.50
0.40 ATC
0.30 MC
MR D
0
5 8 10 13
Quantity of kWh (thousands)

c. If the government imposes a price ceiling of $0.50, the quantity demanded is

8,000. The price equals the monopolist’s average total cost, and so the firm will
make zero profit.

10. A monopolist knows that in order to expand the quantity of output it produces from
8 to 9 units it must lower the price of its output from $2 to $1. Calculate the
quantity effect and the price effect. Use these results to calculate the monopolist’s
marginal revenue of producing the 9th unit. The marginal cost of producing the 9th
unit is positive. Is it a good idea for the monopolist to produce the 9th unit?

Solution
10. The quantity effect is $1 (the increase in total revenue from selling the 9th unit at
$1). The price effect is 8 × (−$1) = −$8 (the decrease in total revenue from having to
lower the price of 8 units by $1 each). So the marginal revenue of producing the 9th
unit is $1 − $8 = −$7. Since marginal revenue is negative, producing the 9th unit is
definitely not a good idea: it lowers revenue (since marginal revenue is negative) and
increases the total cost (since marginal cost is positive). So it will definitely lower
profit. Instead, the monopolist should produce less output.

11. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is charged with promoting
competition and challenging mergers that would likely lead to higher prices. Several
years ago, Staples and Office Depot, two of the largest office supply superstores,
announced their agreement to merge.
a. Some critics of the merger argued that, in many parts of the country, a merger
between the two companies would create a monopoly in the office supply super-
store market. Based on the FTC’s argument and its mission to challenge mergers
that would likely lead to higher prices, do you think it allowed the merger?
b. Staples and Office Depot argued that, while in some parts of the country they
might create a monopoly in the office supply superstore market, the FTC should
consider the larger market for all office supplies, which includes many smaller
stores that sell office supplies (such as grocery stores and other retailers). In that
market, Staples and Office Depot would face competition from many other, small-
er stores. If the market for all office supplies is the relevant market that the FTC
should consider, would it make the FTC more or less likely to allow the merger?

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Solution
11. a. If Staples and Office Depot create a monopoly, they will be able to reduce the
quantity of output and raise prices, which would create inefficiency in the form of
deadweight loss. Since the FTC is charged with challenging mergers that would like-
ly lead to higher prices, you should think that the FTC would not allow this merger.
And, in fact, in a court ruling in 1997, the FTC was able to prevent the merger.
b. If the relevant market is the market for all office supplies, the merger between
Staples and Office Depot would not create a monopoly, and the companies would
not be able to raise prices to the same extent. If this were the relevant market, it
would make the FTC more likely to allow the merger. This illustrates the impor-
tance of what economists call “market definition”—deciding what the correct
market is: in this example, the office supply superstore market or the market for
all office supplies.

12. The accompanying table shows the demand schedule for vitamin D. Suppose that the
marginal cost of producing vitamin D is zero.

Price of vitamin D Quantity of vitamin

(per ton) D demanded (tons)
$8 0
7 10
6 20
5 30
4 40
3 50
2 60
1 70

a. Assume that BASF is the only producer of vitamin D and acts as a monopolist. It
currently produces 40 tons of vitamin D at $4 per ton. If BASF were to produce
10 more tons, what would be the price effect for BASF? What would be the quan-
tity effect? Would BASF have an incentive to produce those 10 additional tons?
b. Now assume that Roche enters the market by also producing vitamin D and the
market is now a duopoly. BASF and Roche agree to produce 40 tons of vitamin D in
total, 20 tons each. BASF cannot be punished for deviating from the agreement with
Roche. If BASF, on its own, were to deviate from that agreement and produce 10
more tons, what would be the price effect for BASF? What would be the quantity
effect for BASF? Would BASF have an incentive to produce those 10 additional tons?

Solution
12. a. If BASF produces 10 more tons, it now produces 50 tons and the price would fall
to $3 per ton. That is, on each of the 40 tons it was already producing, it would
lose $1. So the price effect is 40 × (−$1) = −$40. Since BASF produces an addi-
tional 10 tons and sells them at $3, the quantity effect is 10 × $3 = $30. So BASF
gains $30 revenue from producing 10 additional tons, but it loses $40 revenue
from producing those 10 additional tons. Since the marginal cost is zero, addi-
tional production does not change BASF’s cost. Since BASF loses revenue, it has no
incentive to produce the 10 additional tons.

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b. If BASF produces 10 more tons, the total produced is now 50 tons and the price
would fall to $3. That is, on each of the 20 tons it was already producing, it would
lose $1. So the price effect is 20 × (−$1) = −$20. Since BASF produces an addi-
tional 10 tons and sells them at $3, the quantity effect is 10 × $3 = $30. So BASF
gains $30 revenue from producing 10 additional tons, and it loses only $20 rev-
enue, resulting in an overall increase in revenue of $10. Since the marginal cost
is zero, there is no change to BASF’s cost. Since producing the 10 additional tons
raises BASF’s revenue by $10, BASF does have an incentive to produce 10 addi-
tional tons.

13. Suppose you are an economist working for the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice. In each of the following cases you are given the task of determining wheth-
er the behavior warrants an antitrust investigation for possible illegal acts or is just an
example of undesirable, but not illegal, tacit collusion. Explain your reasoning.
a. Two companies dominate the industry for industrial lasers. Several people sit on
the boards of directors of both companies.
b. Three banks dominate the market for banking in a given state. Their profits have
been going up recently as they add new fees for customer transactions. Advertising
among the banks is fierce, and new branches are springing up in many locations.
c. The two oil companies that produce most of the petroleum for the western half
of the United States have decided to forgo building their own pipelines and to
share a common pipeline, the only means of transporting petroleum products to
that market.
d. The two major companies that dominate the market for herbal supplements have
each created a subsidiary that sells the same product as the parent company in
large quantities but with a generic name.
e. The two largest credit card companies, Passport and OmniCard, have required
all retailers who accept their cards to agree to limit their use of rival credit cards.

Solution
13. a. This warrants an antitrust investigation because it is likely that having the same
set of people sit on the two boards will facilitate cartel-like behavior.
b. This does not warrant an antitrust investigation. The intensity of advertising
and competition by location indicates that the banks are engaged in nonprice
competition.
c. This warrants an antitrust investigation. By using the same pipeline, each com-
pany can monitor how much output the other is producing. This facilitates cartel-
like behavior.
d. This does not warrant an antitrust investigation. These two companies are actively
competing, albeit by using their subsidiaries.
e. This warrants an antitrust investigation. These two companies are acting together
to shut out a rival.

14. Use the three conditions for monopolistic competition discussed in the chapter to
decide which of the following firms are likely to be operating as monopolistic com-
petitors. If they are not monopolistically competitive firms, are they monopolists,
oligopolists, or perfectly competitive firms?
a. A local band that plays for weddings, parties, and so on
b. Minute Maid, a producer of individual-serving juice boxes
c. Your local dry cleaner
d. A farmer who produces soybeans

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Solution
14. The three conditions for monopolistic competition are (1) a large number of produc-
ers, (2) differentiated products, and (3) free entry and exit.
a. There are many bands that play at weddings, parties, and so on. There are no sig-
nificant barriers to entry or exit. And products are differentiated by quality (for
instance, some bands have better musicians or better electronic equipment) or by
style (for instance, different bands play different types of music). All three condi-
tions for monopolistic competition are fulfilled.
b. The industry for individual-serving juice boxes is dominated by a few very large
firms (for example, Minute Maid, Welch’s, and Kool Aid), and there are signifi-
cant barriers to entry, in part because of the large costs (for example, advertising)
involved in gaining any market share of the national market. Products are, however,
differentiated—in some cases, the only differences are in the minds of consumers.
Because of the small number of competitors, the industry is closer to oligopoly.
c. There are a large number of dry cleaners, and each produces a product differenti-
ated by location: customers are likely to prefer to use the dry cleaner closest to
their home or workplace. Finally, there are no significant barriers to entry. This is
a monopolistically competitive market.
d. There are a large number of soybean farmers, and there is free entry and exit in
this industry. However, soybeans are not differentiated from each other—they are
a standardized product. No individual soybean farmer has market power. This
industry is therefore a perfectly competitive industry.

15. You are thinking of setting up a coffee shop. The market structure for coffee shops is
monopolistic competition. There are three Starbucks shops and two other coffee
shops very much like Starbucks in your town already. In order for you to have some
degree of market power, you may want to differentiate your coffee shop. Thinking
about the three different ways in which products can be differentiated, explain how
you would decide whether you should copy Starbucks or whether you should sell cof-
fee in a completely different way.

Solution
15. There are three ways in which you can differentiate your product: by style or type, by
location, and by quality.
If you decide to copy Starbucks both in style (for example, you copy the décor of
the shop and the service) and in quality (for example, you serve coffee made from
the same coffee beans, brewed in exactly the same way), you will still most likely dif-
ferentiate your product by location: your coffee shop will be closer for some people
than any of the other shops, and that gives you some degree of market power.
But you could further differentiate your product by style (for example, you could
serve coffee in porcelain cups brought to the table by waiters) or by quality (for exam-
ple, you could serve only organic, shade-grown coffee). All these will help you create a
differentiated product that gives you more market power—that is, the power to raise
prices. You would, of course, need to determine whether it allows you to raise prices
sufficiently to cover the cost of paying for waiters and higher-quality coffee.

EXTEND YOUR UNDERSTANDING

16. Prior to the late 1990s, the same company that generated your electricity also distribut-
ed it to you over high-voltage lines. Since then, 16 states and the District of Columbia
have begun separating the generation from the distribution of electricity, allowing
competition between electricity generators and between electricity distributors.
a. Assume that the market for electricity distribution was and remains a natural
monopoly. Use a graph to illustrate the market for electricity distribution if the
government sets price equal to average total cost.

GraddyECPS3e_Econ_CH08.indd S-131 3/20/13 1:28 PM

 S-132 CHAPTER 8 M O N O P O LY, O L I G O P O LY, A N D M O N O P O L I S T I C C O M P E T I T I O N

b. Assume that deregulation of electricity generation creates a perfectly competitive

market. Also assume that electricity generation does not exhibit the characteristics
of a natural monopoly. Use a graph to illustrate the cost curves in the long-run
equilibrium for an individual firm in this industry.

Solution
16. a. The market for electricity distribution is shown in panel (a) of the accompanying
diagram. Electricity distribution has the characteristics of a natural monopoly: the
large fixed cost of building the electric grid, combined with the low marginal cost
of routing electricity over the grid, give this industry increasing returns to scale
over the relevant output range. If the government sets the price equal to average
total cost, at PR* , the natural monopolist will produce quantity QR*. In this case,
the monopolist will make zero economic profit.
b. The cost curves of an individual electricity generator are shown in panel (b). Since
the market is perfectly competitive, in the long run, price, PC , will be equal to
minimum average total cost, and the individual generator will produce electricity
at the quantity QC , where marginal cost is just equal to the market price.

(a) Regulated Natural Monopolist (b) Perfectly Competitive Firm

Price, Price,
cost cost

MC
ATC

PC MR
PR* ATC
D
QR* Quantity QC Quantity

17. The market for olive oil in New York City is controlled by two families, the Sopranos
and the Contraltos. Both families will ruthlessly eliminate any other family that
attempts to enter the New York City olive oil market. The marginal cost of producing
olive oil is constant and equal to $40 per gallon. There is no fixed cost. The accom-
panying table gives the market demand schedule for olive oil.

Price of olive oil Quantity of olive oil

(per gallon) demanded (gallons)
$100 1,000
90 1,500
80 2,000
70 2,500
60 3,000
50 3,500
40 4,000
30 4,500
20 5,000
10 5,500

GraddyECPS3e_Econ_CH08.indd S-132 3/20/13 1:28 PM

 CHAPTER 8 M O N O P O LY, O L I G O P O LY, A N D M O N O P O L I S T I C C O M P E T I T I O N S-133

a. Suppose the Sopranos and the Contraltos form a cartel. For each of the quantities
given in the table, calculate the total revenue for their cartel and the marginal rev-
enue for each additional gallon. How many gallons of olive oil would the cartel
sell in total and at what price? The two families share the market equally (each
produces half of the total output of the cartel). How much profit does each family
make?
b. Uncle Junior, the head of the Soprano family, breaks the agreement and sells
500 more gallons of olive oil than under the cartel agreement. Assuming the
Contraltos maintain the agreement, how does this affect the price for olive oil
and the profits earned by each family?
c. Anthony Contralto, the head of the Contralto family, decides to punish Uncle
Junior by increasing his sales by 500 gallons as well. How much profit does each
family earn now?

Solution
17. a. The accompanying table shows the total revenue and the marginal revenue for the
cartel. Since a cartel acts like a monopolist, it will maximize profit by producing
up to the point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. For all gallons up to
2,000 gallons, marginal revenue is greater than marginal cost. Producing any
more would mean that marginal revenue is less than marginal cost. So the cartel
will produce 2,000 gallons and sell them at $80 each. Since the two families share
the market equally, each family has revenue of 1,000 × $80 = $80,000. The mar-
ginal cost per gallon is constant at $40, so the total cost (remember there is no
fixed cost!) of producing 1,000 gallons is $40,000. So each family makes a profit
of $80,000 − $40,000 = $40,000.

Price of olive oil Quantity of olive oil

(per gallon) demanded (gallons) Total revenue Marginal revenue
$100 1,000 $100,000
$70
90 1,500 135,000
50
80 2,000 160,000
30
70 2,500 175,000
10
60 3,000 180,000
−10
50 3,500 175,000
−30
40 4,000 160,000
−50
30 4,500 135,000
−70
20 5,000 100,000
−90
10 5,500 55,000

GraddyECPS3e_Econ_CH08.indd S-133 3/20/13 1:28 PM

 S-134 CHAPTER 8 M O N O P O LY, O L I G O P O LY, A N D M O N O P O L I S T I C C O M P E T I T I O N

b. Now the Sopranos sell 1,500 gallons and the Contraltos sell 1,000 gallons, for a
total output of 2,500 gallons. So the price falls to $70 per gallon. The Sopranos
have revenue of 1,500 × $70 = $105,000 and cost of 1,500 × $40 = $60,000.
So their profit is $105,000 − $60,000 = $45,000. The Contraltos have revenue
of 1,000 × $70 = $70,000 and cost of 1,000 × $40 = $40,000. So their profit is
$70,000 − $40,000 = $30,000.
c. If both the Contraltos and the Sopranos sell 1,500 gallons each, the total output
in this duopoly is 3,000 gallons, and the price falls to $60 per gallon. Each family
has revenue of 1,500 × $60 = $90,000 and cost of 1,500 × $40 = $60,000. So each
family’s profit is $30,000.

GraddyECPS3e_Econ_CH08.indd S-134 3/20/13 1:28 PM

Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Juhannus-iltana
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Juhannus-iltana
Laulunsekainen kansannäytelmä yhdessä näytöksessä

Author: Urho Wiljo Walakorpi

Release date: December 11, 2023 [eBook #72376]

Language: Finnish

Original publication: Hämeenlinna: Boman & Karlsson, 1904

Credits: Tapio Riikonen

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK JUHANNUS-

ILTANA ***
JUHANNUS-ILTANA

Laulunsekainen kansannäytelmä yhdessä näytöksessä

Kirj.

URHO HAAPANEN [U. W. Walakorpi]

Hämeenlinnassa, Boman & Karlssonin kustannuksella, 1904.

Henkilöt:

Heikki.
Matti.
Eero.
Kustaa.
Kerttu.
Anni.
Katri.
Niemelä.
Taneli.
Kahvi-Leena.
Poikia ja tyttöjä.
 Metsäinen paikka. Perällä järvi ja sen takana metsiä ja vuoria.

On juhannus-ilta. Kylän nuorisoa karkeloimassa.

Taasen meill' on juhannus ja taasen riemut meillä. Vuoret,

laaksot kesä kattaa kukkaseppeleillä.

Laulaa linnut metsissä

ja vuorilla ne soittaa.
Kesän hellän lempi-aika
mielen aateloittaa.

Itsemme me koristamme
heinän helpeheillä,
kesä, kesä, riemun aika
onhan myöskin meillä.

Tullos kansa karkeloihin,

murehesi heitä!
Kesä kulkee kummuilla
ja sitoo seppeleitä.

Tullos kansa leikkihimme!

Pois on talven valta!
Laulut, kesän laulelmat ne
soipi kaikkialta.

(Kuuluu viulun ääntä. Piiri hajoaa).

Kerttu: Kas! jopa viulu soi.

Heikki: Tulossa on Taneli, se riemusilmä! Onhan se jotakin että

saamme jättää tämän piirileikin ja ruveta tanssimaan. Eikö niin,
tytöt? Onhan se hauskempaa kun tämä "savikraanan" vääntäminen?

Anni: No tietysti!

Eero: Mutta kylläpä ne kenkäparat kuluvat! Lieneekö huomen

aamulla Annillakaan kengistänsä muuta jäljellä kun varret.

Anni: Eipä väliä. Onpa suutari kylässä, viedään sinne.

(Viulun ääni lähenee)

Kerttu: Kas, jopa Taneli on täällä!

Matti: Täällä hän on ja ilon ja riemun hän mukanaan on tuonut.

Tuntuupa jo elämäkin aivan toisellaiselta!

Taneli (Tulee soittaen viululla): Kas niin! Täälläpä lieneekin koossa

tämän kylän nuoret. No, no onneksi olkoon! Ja onko sitten ihme!
Onhan nyt, ellei tuo muistini aivan petä — juhannus ja juhlapäivä.

Heikki: Juhannus on, kesän kaunoisin ilta. Ja riemuita aiommekin

illan kunniaksi.

Taneli: Onneksi olkoon! Mutta minne aiotte laittaa juhannuskokon

tai ettekö laitakaan?

Matti: Laitettu on jo kokkomme tuonne kalliolle ja suuripa onkin.

Eero: Ja koska se Tanelikin on nyt noin juhlatuulella, niin

voimmehan illan hauskuudeksi ja juhannuksen kunniaksi pistää
kalliolla pikku polkaksikin — eikö niin, tytöt?

Kerttu: Niin. Mitäpä se juhannus olisikaan ilman soittoa ja tanssia!

 Anni: Ja varsinkin sellaista soittoa, kun Tanelin soitikosta lähtee;
sehän mielen korkeuksiin kohottaa.

Heikki: Mitäpä me tässä turhia haastelemme! Onhan se jo

soittajan velvollisuuskin seuraa tehdä, mukanansa kone, joka vanhat
luo nuoriksi ja särkyneet sydämet ehjiksi loihtii. Sehän kuuluu
luonnollisesti asiaan.

Taneli: No, no, älkäähän nyt! Kukapa sitä nyt tällaiselta

herrasväeltä hennoisi mitään kieltää. Minne vaan silmänsä luokin,
niin kaikkialta näkee rukoilevia silmiä ja pyytäviä katseita. Teille
seuraa olen tekevä. Soittava olen niin että mäki kaikaa ja vaarat
vaskiset va pisevat ja olenpa soittava aamuun asti.

Kerttu: No tuonhan kaiken me jo edeltäkäsin arvasimmekin.

Taneli (Raappien korvaustaan): Mutta yksi asia painaa mieltäni.

Mieli on miehellä musta ja kieli kuivinta kuivempi. Suottehan tekin
minulle hiukkasen iloa, kun minäkin teille suon?

Matti: No tietysti, jos vaan siihen antiin pystymme.

Taneli: Eipä tarvita pystymistä paljon. Annatte vaan pari tilkkasta

sydämen tippoja, mieleni murheisen lohdutukseksi. Silloin vasta voin
soittaa ja polkkia vedellä. Eikö niin, hyvä herrasväki, onhan se
oikeus ja kohtuus?

Heikki: Mutta sanoittehan eilen — ellen väärin muista — että

heitätte hiiden hinkaloon kaikki väkijuomat ja sen semmoiset ja
rupeatte todelliseksi raittiusmieheksi.

Taneli (Miettien): Sanoinko niin? No juutas! Teinpä nyt hullun

lupauksen. Olisihan tuo vähän niinkuin mieltä murheista virkistänyt.
 Heikki: Iloinen on mies, kaipaisiko iloa parempaa! Ja mitä ne
väkijuomat sitten mieltä virkistäisi? Mitäpä ne muuta tuovat, kuin
kurjuutta, tuskaa ja turmiota.

Taneli: Taitaapa se niinkin olla. Mutta hiisi vieköön, olisihan se

sentään mieltäni riemuisaksi luonut. Täytynee kai sitä sitten
kohtaloonsa tyytyä.

Niemelä (Tulee).

Taneli: No kas, onhan täällä Niemeläkin. Terve mieheen!

Niemelä: Jumal'antakoon! (Kättelevät.) Täälläpä onkin väkeä:

nuoria ja onhan täällä vanhempiakin, enemmän kuin jouluaamuna
kirkossa. — Mutta, Taneli, näytäthän kovin murheiselta, mikä on
miehelle tullu?

Taneli: Pyysinhän vaan-näiltä nuorilta pari tilkkaa sydämen tippoja,

mutta…

Niemelä: Eivätkö juuttaat antaneet?

Taneli: Eivät antaneet. Senpätähden mieleni murhei

Niemelä: Huoli pois! Ehkäpä toisella kerralla käy paremmin. — No

nuoret, joko pian aiotte panna kon palamaan?

Eero: Kohta, isäntä, kohta. Tänä iltana aiomme pitää iloa.

Niemelä: Oikein lausuttu, poika, oikein. Silloin tuleekin riemuita,

kun siihen vielä on syytä; kun vielä täydellä sydämellä riemuita voisi.
Ja sitä voi tehdä ainoastaan silloin, kun miehellä on nuoruus
rinnassaan ja suonet kaikki tulena tykkii. Pian saapuu vanhuus,
nuoruuden kevät vierii ja kylmiksi tulevat tunteet riemuja kohtaan.
Riemuitkaa, nuoret, riemuitkaa ja tauvottuanne taas alkakaa, sillä
emmehän nuoruus-ajan riemuja katumaan tule!

Kerttu: No ehkäpä tekin isäntä, vielä muutamia polkkia

pyöräytätte? Ettehän nyt vielä niin vanha ole.

Niemelä: Hm, vanhaksi alkaa käydä mies. Eipä liene minusta enää
nuorison karkeloihin.

(Panee tupakkia piippuunsa ja tarjoaa Tanelille).

Niemelä: No, Taneli, piiput suihin!

Taneli: Kiitos, kiitos. (Tekee samoin).

Niemelä:

No Taneli kai sitä taas tänä iltana nuorille vinguttelee?

Taneli: Ovathan ne minua siihen pyytäneet. Ja miksi en sitten

soittaisi, miksi en toisillekin riemua soisi! Lehdissä ovat puut, kirkas
on taivas, linnut joka lehvällä lemmestä laulaa. Mitäpä me
surisimme, mitä miettisimme? Suruihin ei ole aikaa meillä!

Eero: Siispä kannel soikoon ja vierköön virsi, niin että korvet

kumajavat ja vaarat vaskiset tulta iskevät!

Taneli: Niin laulakaamme. Täysin rinnoin laulakaamme Suomen

suloa ja suvi-illan kauneutta!

Kaikki (Laulavat):
 Honkain keskellä mökkini seisoo
Suomeni soreassa salossa.
Honkain välistä siintävä selkä
vilkkuvi koittehen valossa.
Hoi laarilaarilaa, hoi laarilaarilaa
Kaikuu mun suloinen Suomeni maa!

Omanpa henkeni ieltä ne puhuu honkain humina ja luonto

muu. Itse en sydäntän' hillitä taida, riemusta soikohon raikas
suu: hoi laarilaarilaa, hoi laarilaarilaa kaikuu mun suloinen
Suomeni maa.

Eero: Ja nyt pojat kalliolle! Kokko palamaan ennenkuin yö tulee.

Heikki: Sen teemme. Eteenpäin mars! Mutta viulu soimaan, Taneli,

niin keveämpää on kulku.

(Kaikki menevät. Taneli edellä soittaen marssia).

Katri (Tulee laulaen vastaiselta suunnalta vähän ajan kuluttua):

On tuoksussa tuomet ja luonto niin uinuvi hiljaisna. Mulla

raukalla mieli on musta ja sieluni raukea.

On kaikilla rinta se puhdas,

ja mieli on riemuinen.
Mä raukka en riemua tunne
ja tunne mä onnea en.

Joka lehvällä lemmestä linnut

ne laulavat riemuissaan,
joka rinta on nuoruutta täynnä
ja onnea, onnea vaan.
 En näitä tunne ma kurja,
mä rqukkq ja poloinen,
vain lemmettömyydessä kuljen
ja yössä mä haaveilen.

Tule lintu, sa riemukas rintaa, sä laulaja riemuinen, pois

kauaksi tuskani kanna taa vuorien korkeiden!

Kustaa (On laulun aikana tullut ja rientää nyt esiin): Etkö

todellakaan riemua tunne, kun noin surullisesii laulelet?

Katri: Kustaa! No pilvistäkö sinäkin putosil? Enpä olisi

laulanutkaan, jos tietänyt olisin, ken on mulla kuuntelijana.

Kustaa: Siis onni minulle, ettet tietänyt, sillä aamurunkoiton tavoin

valaisi laulusi sydäntäni.

Katri: Todellako! No sepä hyvä. Sinulla on kai siis jotakin

surtavaa?

Kustaa: No onhan sitä. — Mutta sinä et voi todellakaan arvata,

minkälaisen vaikutuksen laulusi teki.

Katri: Älähän nyt aina kiittele. Sehän tuntuu niin jokapäiväiseltä.

Siitä tulee sinun lakata.

Kustaa: Lakatako? Sepä tuntuu vaikealta, sillä parastahan sitä

aina kiitellään. Ja tiedänhän minä aivan hyvirn, että sinä olet parhain
tyttö koko kylässä.

Katri: No jopa nyt jotakin.

 Kustaa: Ja jos sinä edes hetkeksikin matkustaisit jonnekin pois,
niin arvaapas mitä tekisin silloin minä?

Katri: No?

Kustaa: Minä todellakin seuraisin sinua, vaikka maailman ääriin

mä seuraisin.

Katri: Ja miksi juuri minun perässäni? Ja ellenpä huolisikaan sinun

seurastasi, mitäpä tekisit silloin?

Kustaa: Et huolisikaan. Mitä vielä! Tiedänhän minä aivan hyvin,

että seurastani huolisit. — Ja sitten, Katri, olen ajatellut, arvaas
mitä?

Katri: No sanoppa!

Kustaa: Olen ajatellut, että koska meitä nyt on kaksi… (Tarttuu

hänen käteensä.) Niin, Katri, pidäthän sinä minusta?

Katri: Mutta tiedäthän sinä…

Kustaa: Niin tiedänhän minä. (Syleilee häntä.) Kas tuonne

hongikkoon, joka tuolla vuorella lepää, me majamme rakennamme.
Siellä kaksin raadamme ja kärsimme, eikö niin?

Katri: Niin, niin, siellä monta, monta vuotta onnessa elämme. Sepä
vasta tulee olemaan ihanaa.

Kustaa: Ihanaa tulee se olemaan, taivaallista, Katri!

Katri: Mutta katsohan, tuolla maantiellä tulee Kahvi-Leenakin

reppuineen. Mikäpä tuuli hänetkin tänne toi?
 Kustaa: Se iloinen sielu! Mitäpä lienee taasen eukolla
kerrottavana.

Kahvi-Leena (Tulee mytty kädessä): Siis vihdoin olen täällä. —

Päivää, Katri, niin Katrihan sinä olet, vai muistiniko pettää? Ja tuossa
toinen. No Kustaahan se onkin. Terveisiä kaupungista!

Katri: Onhan se Leenakin jälleen kotipaikkoihinsa osannut?

Leena: Olenhan minä, olenhan minä. Ei viihdy lintukaan vieraalla

maalla saatikka sitten ihminen. — No. Kuinka sitä nyt on täällä päin
voitu?

Katri: Aina vaan kuten ennenkin. Ei ole tapahtunut mitään

kummempaa. Mutta mitenkäs se Leena on itse voinut?

Leena: Herra parantakoon! Onhan se ollut väliin niin ja väliin näin.

Väliin on ollut murhetta, väliin taas iloakin. Palveluksessa olin
kaupungissa kahdessakin paikassa. Kumpikaan paikka ei nyt niin
kehuttava ollut, mutta menihän se sentään, menihän se. (Huokaisee
syvään).

Katri: Ja mikä nyt sitten päähänne pisti, että jätitte toimenne ja

lähditte tänne tallustamaan?

Leena: Mikäkö päähäni pisti? Kysytkin vielä. Sanoinhan jo, että

kaipaahan sitä lintukin kotimaitaan saatikka sitte ihminen. Tahdoin
taasen nähdä näitä järviä ja vuoria, kuunnella syntymäseutuni
honkien huminaa ja tavata entisiä tuttavia. — Mutta voi herran terttu,
miten sinustakin on tullut pitkä tyttö!

Katri: Ja onko sitte ihme? Johan pari vuotta tulee siitä kun minut
viimeksi näitte.
 Leena: Niin — pian kulkee aika. Mutta minäpä vaivainen olen tullut
tuolla kaupungissa kymmentä vuotta vanhemmaksi.

Katri: Ette ensinkään. Punoittaahan poskennekin kuin mansikat

aholla.

Leena: Ei ole minullakaan kuin oli ennen. Vanhaksi alkaa käydä jo

ihminen, enkä tiedä, millä leipänsä irti saisi.

Kustaa: No siihen tiedän kyllä keinon: teidän pitää hankkia

itsellenne kelvollinen sulhanen ja mennä vakavaan liittoon. Onhan se
elämäkin silloin vakavampaa ja hauskempaa.

Leena: Ahah, Kustaa, se entinen pilkkakirves. Enpä muistanut

sinua ollenkaan, kun tämän Katrin kanssa touhusin. Onpa sinustakin
tullut jo aika mies, uljas ja pulska. Sinun kyllä kannattaa naimaan
mennä, sillä saathan sinä morsiamia viisi joka sormelle.

Kustaa: Onpa se Leena nyt oikein antelias. Mutta ellenpä enää

tarvitsisi yhtäkään?

Leena: Ahaa, nyt minä ymmärrän. Tämä Katri on sinun

morsiamesi. No ilmankos se muotokin loistaa ja paistaa kuin
Naantalin aurinko.

Kustaa: Oikeinpa arvasitte. — Mutta teille täytyy minun myös

ruveta touhuamaan kumppania tälle elämän ohdakkeiselle -polulle.
Miekkonen vaan on se mies, joka saa teidänlaisenne emännän.

Leena: Hm. Mitäpä me vanhat sulhasista! (Valoa virtaa

näyttämölle.) Kas, jopa juhannustuletkin palavat!
 Katri: Ehkä lienee parasta mennä katsomaan, ennenkuin'
sammuu. Siellähän tekin Leena, tapaatte tuttavianne.

Leena: Mennään, mennään. (Menevät. — Nuorison lanlua

kuuluu):

Olet maamme armahin Suomenmaa ihanuuksien ihmemaa.

joka niemen notkohon, saarelmaan kodin tahtoisin nostattaa.

Kodin ympäri viljavat vainiot

kalarantoja kaunistais',
jalon kansan kuntoa laulelmat
yli aaltojen kuljettais!

Kaikk', kaikk' ylös yhtenä miehenä nyt

Suomen onnea valvomaan.
Hetken työt tuhat vuosihin vaikuttaa
isänmaahan ja maailmaan!

Taneli (Tulee laulaen):

Minäpä se olen soittoniekka ja mun on lysti olla. Hei illalla

minä laulan vaan, että mun on lysti olla!

Ystävä yksi on mulla vain,

mutta se ystävä parhain,
hei illalla minä laulan vaan,
että se mulla on parhain!

Viuluni, viuluni, soitikkoin,

kruunuihin ma en vaihda,
hei illalla minä laulan vaan,
että kruunuihin en vaihda!
 Soittaja mie olen — soitan siis!
Kaipaisinko mä muuta?
Hei illalla minä laulan vaan,
että kaipaisinko mä muuta!

Leena (On tullut laulun aikana ja tarkastellut Tanelia. Rientää

esiin):

No päivää! Vieläkö muistat sitä Mäkipään Leenaa, joka sullekin

monta kahvikuppia keitti?

Taneli: Ka Leena! No mikä tuuli sinutkin tänne toi?

Leena: Miksikäkö? kysyy jokainen, Kaipaus ja murhe, mikäs muu.

Taneli: No ethän hitossa vaan minua kaivannut?

Leena: Sinuako? No aina vähän.

Taneli: Todellako! Sepä hyvä, sillä jos minäkin toden sanon, niin
olenpa totta tosiaan vähän kaiholla muistellut sinua. Olihan se silloin
edes jotakin, kun sai kunnollista kahvia, sillä sinähän ne parhaimmat
kahvit keitit koko kylässä. Mutta näinä aikoina on se ollut vähän niin
ja näin.

Leena: Onpa se hyvä, että edes joltakin saa kiitosta töistään. —

Niin… kyllähän se ikävää oli kaupungissa.

Taneli: Onhan se ikävää tällainen kulkurielämä kaikkialla. Toistapa

se olisikin naineena miehenä!

Leena (Kielitellen): Olisihan se, olisihan se! Ei tarvitsisi minunkaan

näin pitkin kyliä renkutella. Mutta herra parantakoon! Kai sitä täytyy
lopun ikänsäkin kulkurina olla. Niin. Mitäpä sille kohtalolleen taitaa.

Taneli (Hymyillen): Mutta kuuleppas, Leena… niin eihän se niin

kummallista olisi. Onhan minulla pirtti tuolla salossa, muut tarpeet
sitten kyllä voisimme hankkia… että…

Leena (Nypistellen helmojaan ja muuten touhuavana) Että…

Taneli: Että mekin, Leena, käytäisi niinkuin samaan puulaakiin…

Leena (Paukuttaen käsiään): Mutta herranjesta! ajattelethan sinä

aivan niinkuin minäkin. Eihän minulla tuota mitään vastaan ole.

Taneli: Siis ei muuta kun kättä päälle! (Tarttuu hänen käteensä).

Leena: No kukapa sitä nyt olisi uskonut, että näin pian joutuu
tekemisiin miesten kanssa. Niinhän se on tässä maailmassa, ettei
sitä ihminen tiedä kohtaloaan.

Taneli; Ja tänä iltana pidämme kihlajaisemme, eikö niin, Leena

armas?

Leena (Taputellen häntä aika ajoin): Kuten vaan tahdot.

Taneli Ja ensi pyhänä kuulutetaan ensi kerran kirkossa ja kolmen

viikon päästä pidämme häämme.

Leena: Aivan niin, Taneli.

Leena: Aivan niin, Taneli.

Taneli: Ja sitten jätän tämän kulkurielämäni, ja muutamme

asumaan minun pieneen pirttiini. Siellä sitten kaksin puuhailemme.
Hauskaa tulee olemaan elämämme, Leena.

Leena: No arvaahan sen, no arvaahan sen!

Taneli: Ja sitten kun saamme pojan…

Leena (Kyynelissä): Ja sitten kun saamme pojan…

Taneli: Niin hän tekee työtä ja me saamme levätä.

Leena: Kukapa sitä olisi uskonut! Eihän olisi eilen voinut arvata!

(Nuorisoa tulee).

Heikki: No tännekö se soittoniekkamme on tullutkin? Ja mitä minä

näen! Niinkuin näette, pojat, on hän kihlannut Kahvi-Leenan!

Taneli: Niin todellakin. Minä teille morsiameni esittää saan.

Eero: Kas niin, Taneli, niinhän sitä miehet tekee! Saammehan tänä
iltana siis viettää kahden parin kihlajaisia, sillä niinkuin tiedän, on
myös Kustaa aviosiipan valinnut.

Kustaa: Niin… minä myös morsiameni esitän.

Taneli: Vai Kustaa ja Katri. No, Kustaa, sinä siis myös avioliiton
tärkeyden tajusit?

Kustaa: Minä tajusin sen.

Heikki: No, mitä muuta sitten, kun peli soimaan ja soitto

helisemään, sillä harvoinhan sitä tällaista juhannusta on, että vallan
kahden parin kihlajaisia vietetään.
 Taneli: Tosin tuntuu vähän oudolta olla soittoniekkana omissa
kihlajaisissaan, mutta koitetaanhan nyt sitäkin.

Kustaa: Ja onhan täällä muitakin, jotka sitä taitoa osaavat, he

saavat vingutella väli-ajoilla.

Eero: Siis kaikki hyvin. Mutta ensin laulamme laulun kihlattujen

onneksi ja juhannus-illan kunniaksi. Sehän kuuluu asiaan.

Taneli: Ja sitten soikoon viuluni niin, ett» kallio kaikaa ja maa

tärisee ja se soikoon aamuun asti!

Heikki: Ja nyt laulumme kalkukoon, korkealle kohotkoon jokaisen

rinnasta laulu Suomen suloudelle, ihanalle juhannus-illalle ja
kihlattujen onnelle!

Kalkki (laulavat):

Oi terve Pohjola Islllnune onnela, voimamme, henkemme

sinulle uhroamme!

Oi terve vapaus. sä kansain ihanuus! Eipä ken orjuuteen

voi syöstä poikiamme!

Terve, terve, terve sa Suomenmaa!

Taneli: Nyt, pojat, kalliolle! Siellä se vasta ilo alkaa! (Kaikki

menevät. Leena astuu Tanelin vierelle, Katri Kustaan. Taneli on
joukossa ensimäisena ja soittaa Porilaisten maissia).

Esirippu laskee.