DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM

DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN

PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO: 45A – 32 – 04/2014

PENDAKWA RAYA

LAWAN

KAMARUL SYAZWAN KUMARESAN BIN ABDULLAH

(NO. KP: 750503-07-5737)

HUJAHAN SKELETAL PIHAK PENDAKWAAN

DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN

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Dengan izin Yang Arif,

A. PENDAHULUAN

Di dalam kes ini, pertuduhan terhadap OKT di dalam kes ini

adalah seperti berikut:

Pertuduhan Pertama (P3):

“Bahawa kamu pada 14 September 2013 jam lebih kurang 12.10

pagi bertempat di kawasan tempat letak kereta, Restoren Jejantas
Sg Buloh, Lebuhraya PLUS dari arah Utara ke Selatan, Petaling
Jaya, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul
Ehsan telah memperedar dadah berbahaya iaitu sejumlah berat
44.4 GRAM HEROIN DAN 18 GRAM
MONOACETYLMORPHINES. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah
melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 39B (1) (a) Akta
Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 39B
(2) Akta yang sama.”

Pertuduhan Kedua (P4):

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 “Bahawa kamu pada 14 September 2013 jam lebih kurang 12.10
pagi bertempat di kawasan tempat letak kereta, Restoren Jejantas
Sg Buloh, Lebuhraya PLUS dari arah Utara ke Selatan, Petaling
Jaya, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul
Ehsan telah memiliki dadah berbahaya iaitu sejumlah berat 10.88
GRAM METHAMPHETAMINE. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah
melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah
Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 39A(1)
Akta yang sama.”

B. FAKTA KES PENDAKWAAN

Secara ringkasnya, pada 14 September 2013 jam lebih kurang 7.30

malam, OKT telah bertolak dari rumah beliau di Jelutong, Pulau Pinang

menuju ke Kuala Lumpur dengan menaiki kereta Nissan Grand Livina

bernombor pendaftaran PJT 5770 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai kereta

tersebut). Kereta ini kepunyaan kakak ipar OKT iaitu SP5 yang telah

dipinjam pada hari tersebut bagi tujuan ke Kuala Lumpur.

Turut bersama-sama OKT adalah SP3 (Daniel Zidane-Biras OKT),

SP4 (Rozaini Bt Said Ibrahim-Adik Ipar OKT/isteri SP3), SP7 (Safiyah

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Bt Said Ibrahim-Isteri OKT) dan seorang anak lelaki OKT. OKT

bertindak sebagai pemandu kereta tersebut manakala SP3 berada di

bahagian hadapan sebelah pemandu manakala SP4, SP7 dan anak beliau

duduk di bahagian penumpang belakang kereta tersebut.

Dari Jelutong mereka singgah di R&R Tapah untuk makan sekejap

sebelum menyambung perjalanan. Semasa semua penumpang kereta ini

sedang tidur, OKT telah singgah ke kawasan Restoran Jejantas Sungai

Buloh (kawasan tempat kejadian) di mana SP6 (ASP Mohd Husni-

Pengadu) bersama pegawai dan anggotanya kemudiannya telah

melakukan serbuan dan seterusnya menjumpai barang kes dadah (yang

menjadi subject matter pertuduhan di dalam kes ini) dari alas kaki

tempat duduk penumpang hadapan, iaitu di antara bawah kerusi dan alas

kaki kereta tersebut.

C. ELEMEN YANG PERLU DIBUKTIKAN

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 Untuk membuktikan pertuduhan terhadap OKT, pihak pendakwaan
perlu membuktikan elemen-elemen berikut:

a) Dadah tersebut adalah dadah berbahaya seperti yang

tersenarai dalam Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dengan berat
bersih seperti dalam pertuduhan;

b) Dadah tersebut berada dalam milikan OKT; dan

c) OKT telah melakukan perbuatan memperedarkan dadah

tersebut.

D. PEMBUKTIAN ELEMEN (a)

Elemen (a) telah berjaya dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan

melalui keterangan Puan Suhana Binti Ismail (SP2) yang merupakan
Ahli Kimia yang melakukan analisa terhadap barang kes dadah tersebut.
SP2 mengesahkan barang kes dadah tersebut merupakan dadah jenis
Heroin sejumlah berat 44.4 gram dan Monoacetylmorphine

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sejumlah berat 18.0 gram. SP2 turut menjelaskan bahawa dadah jenis
Heroin dan Monoacetylmorphine adalah dadah berbahaya sebagaimana
yang disenaraikan di dalam Jadual Pertama Akta Dadah Berbahaya
1952. Laporan Kimia berkenaan dengan analisa yang dibuat oleh SP2 ini
juga telah dikemukakan sebagai P13.

Adalah dihujahkan juga, identiti barang kes dadah TIDAK

menjadi isu di dalam kes ini. Ini adalah kerana rantaian keterangan
berkenaan barang kes dadah di dalam kes ini tidak pernah terputus.
Tambahan pula SP6 (Pengadu) dan SP8 (Pegawai Penyiasat Kes) telah
membuat penandaan yang baik dan sempurna pada setiap barang kes
yang dirampas serta menyatakannya dengan detail dan terperinci di
dalam dokumen-dokumen berkaitan seperti borang bongkar (P32) dan
borang serah menyerah (P33).

E. PEMBUKTIAN ELEMEN (b)

Untuk mengupas isu ini adalah penting untuk kita memahami

apakah sebenarnya yang dimaksudkan oleh ‘possession’? Perbahasan

mengenai maksud yang tepat mengenai isu ini telah pun dibuat seawal

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tahun 1956 melalui kes Leow Ngee Lim v R (1956) 22 MLJ 28 dan kes

Chan Pean Leon v PP (1956) 22 MLJ 237.

Di dalam kes Chan Pean Leon v PP (1956) 22 MLJ 237 ,

Thomson J telah memutuskan pada muka surat 239 bahawa;

“possession itself as regards the criminal law is described as follows in

Stephen’s Digest (9th Ed) p304:

A movable thing is said to be in possession of a person when he is

situated with respect to it that he has he power to deal with it as owner

to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are

such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need. To

put it otherwise, there is a physical element and mental element which

must both be present before possession is made out. The accused must

not only be situated that he can deal with the thing as if it belonged to

him, for example have it in his pocket or have it lying in front of him on

a table. It must als be shown that he had the intention of dealing with it

as if it belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so, in other

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words, that he had some animus possidendi. Intention is a matter of fact

which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can

only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances.

Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a

question of fact in each individual case. If a watch is in my pocket then

in the absence of anything else the inference will be clear that I intend to

deal with it as if it is were my own and accordingly I am in possession of

it. On the other hand, it ot is lying on a table in a room in which I am

but which is also frequently used by other people then the mere fact that

I am in physical proximity to it does not give rise to the inference that I

intend to deal with it as if it belonged to me. There must be some

evidence that I am doing or having done something with it that shows

such an intention. Or it must be clear that the circumstances in which it

is found show such an intention. It may be found in a locked room to

which I hold the key or it may be found in a drawer mixed up with my

own belongings or it may be found, as occured in recent case, in a box

under my bed. The possible circumstances cannot be set out

exhaustively and it is impossible to lay down any generul rule on this

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point. But there must be something in the evidence to satisfy the court

that the person who is physically in a position to deal with the thing as

his own had the intention of doing so.

Di dalam kes Leow Nghee Lim v R (1956) 22 MLJ 28 Taylor J

telah menyatakan bahawa “probably the most helpful definition of

possession is the relation of a person to a thing over which he may at

his pleasure exercise such control as the character of the thing admits,

to the exclusion of other persons. This definition does not express, but

it does imply that the meaning of the word includes some element of

knowledge”

Taylor J juga telah menyatakan “A man must know of the

existence of a chattel and have some idea of its whereabouts before he

can exercise any control over it. The word possession therefore implies

some knowledge but not necessarily full or exact knowledge”

Sementara itu dalam kes PP v Abdul Rahman Akif [2007] 4 CLJ

337, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah merujuk kepada kes Tan Ah Tee &
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Anor v PP [1980] 1 MLJ 49 mengenai isu ‘possession’ di mana Wee

Chong Jin CJ telah memutuskan bahawa,

“Even if there were no statutory presumptions available to the

prosecution, once the prosecution had proved the fact of physical

control or possession of the plastic bag and the circumstances in which

this was acquired by and remained with the second appellant, the trial

judges would be justified in finding she had possession of the contents

of the plastic bag within the meaning of the Act unless she gave an

explanation of the physical fact which the trial judges accepted or

which raised a doubted in the minds that she had possession of the

contents within the meaning of the Act.”

Di dalam kes PP v Denish Madhavan [2009] 2 CLJ 209,

Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa:

Before proceeding to consider the reasons for the Court of

Appeal's decision, we will say a few words about "exclusive" possession.

It is inappropriate to speak of possession of an article in criminal law

as exclusive possession. One is either in possession or not in

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possession, although one could be in possession jointly with another

or others. To say that the prosecution of a drug case fails because

there has been no proof of exclusive possession is apt to convey the

wrong impression that it is only in cases where possession is entirely

with one person, - that is, "exclusive" - that a conviction is possible.

When the learned trial judge said "The accused sought to negative the

proof of exclusive possession...", we take it that he meant no more than

that the respondent sought to show that he was not in possession of the

drugs because he had no knowledge of their existence and that the drugs

could have been placed in his bags by some other person or persons.

Oleh itu, secara ringkasnya ‘possession’ membawa maksud adanya

kuasa untuk ‘deal with and to exclude others’, dan juga pengetahuan

mengenai barang tersebut.

Pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan bahawa OKT sememangnya

mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan terhadap barang kes dadah tersebut

berdasarkan perkara-perkara yang berikut:

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 i. OKT sememangnya mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan terhadap

kereta tersebut sejak mula-mula dipinjam dari SP5.

ii. SP5 sebagai pemilik kereta tersebut mengesahkan kereta tersebut

adalah digunakan oleh ahli keluarganya termasuk OKT. Walau

bagaimanapun, SP5 menjelaskan ahli keluarganya akan meminta

kebenaran dan/atau memaklumkan kepadanya terlebih dahulu

sebelum meminjam kereta beliau. SP7 juga mengesahkan OKT

sememangnya ada meminjam/menggunakan kereta SP5 sebelum

hari kejadian.

iii. OKT telah meminjam kereta tersebut dari SP4 pada hari kejadian

13.09.2013 melalui isterinya SP7.

iv. SP5 dan SP7 mengesahkan telah menggunakan kereta tersebut

untuk pergi dan balik kerja pada 13.09.2013 iaitu sebelum

dipinjam oleh OKT. SP5 yang duduk di bahagian penumpang

hadapan mengesahkan tidak pernah nampak bungkusan yang

mengandungi barang kes dadah tersebut semasa pergi dan balik

kerja pada 13.09.2013.

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 v. Sedangkan SP6 dan SP8 menjelaskan barang kes tersebut

sememangnya boleh dilihat sekiranya menunduk sedikit.

vi. SP7 mengesahkan selepas balik kerja pada 13.09.2013, OKT ada

call bagitahu dia guna kereta dan nak pergi jauh balik lambat. SP7

insist nak ikut sama & OKT setuju.

vii. SP3 dan SP7 mengesahkan, sewaktu mereka turun, OKT sudah

berada di dalam kereta. Adalah dihujahkan pada ketika sebelum

SP3, SP7, SP4 dan anak lelaki OKT masuk ke dalam kereta, OKT

sememangnya sudah berada di dalam kereta tersebut. Di sini

wujud situasi untuk menunjukkan OKT berpeluang untuk

meletakkan bungkusan yang mengandungi barang kes dadah

tersebut (evidence of opportunity to commit the crime).

viii. Kesemua orang yang dikatakan mempunyai akses kepada kereta

tersebut telah pun dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan,

termasuklah mereka yang turut bersama-sama dengan OKT

sewaktu kejadian (SP3, SP4, SP5 dan SP7). Kesemua mereka

menafikan tahu/pernah melihat kedua-dua bungkusan yang

mengandungi barang kes dadah tersebut sebelum kejadian.

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ix. Setakat ini, kesemua keterangan saksi-saksi ini tidak di cabar oleh

pembelaan. Pembelaan juga tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa

mencabar/mencadangkan kepada saksi-saksi ini tentang wujudnya

individu lain yang menggunakan kereta tersebut.

x. Malah, sekiranya ada cadangan tentang isu ini, adalah dihujahkan

pada peringkat ini cadangan tersebut masih lagi kekal bersifat

cadangan semata-mata dan bukannya keterangan. Rujuk kes Mirza

Murtala v PP [2010] 4 CLJ 150. :

With regard to this we are conscious of the trite principle of

law that suggestions made to the prosecution’s witnesses at the

prosecution’s stage by the defence are not evidence and remains

mere suggestions – see PP v. Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim (No.

3) [1999] 2 MLJ 121 approving Emperor v. Karimuddi Sheikh

AIR [1932] Cal 373. Hence, we are of the view that what was put

to the witness SP6 was just a proposition unsupported by evidence

and successfully refuted by the prosecution.

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 Bagi membuktikan elemen PENGETAHUAN pula, pohon dirujuk

berkenaan perkara-perkara berikut yang boleh menunjukka OKT

mempunyai pengetahuan terhadap barang kes dadah yang dijumpai

tersebut:

a) Cara bagaimana barang kes dadah disembunyikan di dalam kes

ini; dibungkus dengan kertas surat khabar dan dimasukkan ke

dalam beg plastik berwarna hitam & dibungkus dengan kertas

surat khabar dan diletakkan di dalam bekas kertas/polesterine

makanan dan di masukkan ke dalam beg plastik warna merah

(seolah-olah makanan bungkus).

b) Kedua-dua beg plastik yang mengandungi barang kes ini juga

diletakkan dibahagian pelapik kaki berhampiran kerusi

bahagian penumpang.

c) Dalam masa yang sama, OKT telah mengajak SP3 ikut sama ke

Kuala Lumpur kononnya atas alasan untuk tolong pandu

kereta disebabkan OKT tidak mempunyai lesen memandu.

Sedangkan sepanjang masa dalam perjalanan tersebut OKT

yang memandu kereta tersebut. Apabila SP3 tanya OKT untuk

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 pandu kereta tersebut selepas mereka berhenti di R&R Tapah,

OKT insist untuk sambung memandu. Ternyata, OKT telah

memperalatkan SP3 semata-mata untuk mengaburi pihak

berkuasa berkenaan dengan barang kes dadah tersebut.

d) SP3 dalam keterangannya menjelaskan pada jam lebih kurang 3

atau 4 petang, semasa beliau sedang bekerja, OKT telah

menelepon beliau mengajaknya ke Kuala Lumpur untuk

menziarahi keluarga OKT. Manakala SP7 pula menjelaskan

selepas balik dari kerja OKT menelepon beliau beritahu guna

kereta tersebut dan hendak pergi jauh dan pulang agak lambat.

Setelah SP7 insist nak ikut dan mencadangkan untuk pergi lihat

anak saudara yang baru lahir barulah OKT setuju untuk

benarkan. Kenapa perlu OKT berbohong / berdolak dalih

terhadap SP3 dan SP7?

Pohon untuk rujuk kepada kes Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2008] 4

CLJ 764

Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan bahawa:

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 “It is true that mens rea possession is an element of the

offence of trafficking. But it is an element like the mental

element in other crimes which cannot be established by direct

evidence save in a case where an accused expressly admits the

commission of the offence. It has, like the mens rea in other

offences, to be established by circumstantial evidence. In other

words it is an ingredient that is to be inferred from the totality of

the circumstances of a particular individual case. We can here do

no better than to quote f rom the jud gment of Lord Diplock in

Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 LNS 181; [1981] 1

MLJ 64, at p. 69:

‘Proof of the purpose for which an act is done, where such

purpose is a necessary ingredient of the offence with which an

accused is charged, presents a problem with which criminal courts

are very familiar. Generally, in the absence of an expressed

admission by the accused, the purpose with which he did an act is

a matter of inference from what he did. Thus, in the case of an

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 accused caught in the act of conveying from one place to another

controlled drugs in a quantity much larger than is likely to be

needed for his own consumption the inference that he was

transporting them for the purpose of trafficking in them would, in

the absence of any plausible explanation by him, be irresistible -

even if there were no statutory presumption such as is contained in

section 15 of the Drugs Act.’.

Turning to the facts of the present instance, we agree with

the learned trial judge that the method employed to bring the

drugs in question from Thailand into Malaysia was done in a

most cunning fashion to escape detection by the authorities. The

method employed to convey or transport a drug may sometimes

furnish evidence of knowledge. For example, an attempt to

carefully conceal a drug may indicate an intention to avoid

detection and thereby point to knowledge. Of course it all

depends on the facts of each individual case.”.

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 Pohon juga untuk rujuk kes Zulfikar bin Mustaffah v. PP [2001]

1 SLR 633 Mahkamah Rayuan Singapura menyatakan di muka surat

639 seperti berikut:

“21. For the e lement of ‘possesion’ (within the meaning of s. 17

of the Misuse of Drugs Act) to be established, it must not only be

shown that the accused had physical control of the drugs at the

relevant time; the prosecution must also prove that the accused

possessed the requisite knowledge as to the contents of what he

was carrying: see Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner

[1969] 2 AC 256; Tan Ah Tee & Anor v. PP [1978] 1 LNS 193;

[1978-1979] SLR 211; [1980] 1 MLJ 49.

In the course of the appeal before us, counsel for the

appellant relied heavily on the fact that the contents of the

bundles were securely wrapped in newspapers and could not be

identified. We were accordingly invited to draw the inference that

the appellant had no knowledge of the contents of the bundles.

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 22. We were unable to accede to this request. While the fact that

the contents of the bundles were hidden from view may have

been relevant in determining whether the requisite knowledge

was absent, this factor should still not be given too much weight.

Otherwise, drug peddlers could escape liability simply by

ensuring that any drugs coming into their possession are first

securely sealed in opaque wrappings. Rather, the court must

appraise the entire facts of the case to see if the accused’s claim to

ignorance is credible. As Yong Pung How CJ remarked in PP v.

Hla Win [1995] 2 SLR 424 (at p. 438):

In the end, the finding of the mental state of knowledge, or the

rebuttal of it, is an inference to be drawn by a trial judge from all

the facts and circumstances of the particular case, giving due

weight to the credibility of the witnesses.”.

Pembelaan juga mungkin menghujahkan berdasarkan keterangan

yang ada di dalam kes ini tidak ada keterangan yang menunjukkan

conduct ataupun kelakuan OKT yang hanya kelihatan biasa sahaja(tidak

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kelihatan takut, cuba melarikan diri dsb) ketika ditahan. Adalah

dihujahkan tanpa keterangan mengenai conduct OKT ini pun ianya tidak

bermakna OKT tidak mengetahui kewujudan barang kes dadah tersebut.

Pohon rujuk kes Teh Hock Leong v. PP [2010] 1 MLJ 741,

Mahkamah Persekutuan, antara lainnya, membuat pemerhatian tentang

pengetahuan dari sudut perlakuan (“conduct”) seperti berikut:

“First, he contended that the High Court and t he Court of

Appeal had failed to consider the contemporaneous conduct of the

appellant in not trying to escape or putting up a struggle with the

police when confronted by PW5 and his men or attempting to

disassociate or discard the backpack containing the dangerous

drugs. Such conduct , if considered by the courts below, could

infer that the appellant had no knowledge of the said drugs in the

backpack. It is our view that in order to draw a favourable

inference from the appellant’s contemporaneous conduct, his

action or inaction must be examined in the light of the situation at

the material time ... And, if the appellant were to attempt to throw

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 away or disassociate himself with the backpack during this entire

duration described it would evidently be noticeable. Of course,

since the drugs were so cunningly concealed, there could be no

necessity to take such drastic actions which may attract instant

suspicion. So against these circumstances, the appellant ’s docile

conduct throughout the period described could not have inferred

an absence of knowledge of the said drugs.”.

Di dalam kes Tan Ong Keong v PP Criminal Appeal No. B-05-

20-2010, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:

It was submitted that the learned Judicial Commissioner had

erred in finding that the Appellant had knowledge of the contents

of the bag P9. The facts relied upon in support of this submission

were the three facts that it was the Appellant who (i) pulled the

bag P9 to SP2, (ii) asked SP2 if the bag had to be scanned, and

(iii) had not attempted to run away when proscribed substance

was found. It was further submitted that the Appellant should be

given the benefit of the doubt of the more favourable inference.

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 It is trite that knowledge, a mental element, is not capable of

proof by direct evidence. Knowledge is therefore inferred from

other facts. The question before us is whether these facts, in all the

circumstances of this case, leaves either a gap in the prosecution

case or a reasonable doubt as to the Appellant's knowledge of the

existence of the substance in the bag and the nature of it as a

proscribed substance.

We accept the submission that the facts relied upon can give

rise to the inference that he had no knowledge of the presence of

the proscribed substance in the bag or its nature as a proscribed

substance. We recognise, however, that except in the case of the

clearest and most direct proof of guilt, almost all other

combination of facts are always capable, at the same time, of an

inference of guilt as well as of innocence. To put it another way,

it is always possible to structure an interpretation or inference

consistent with innocence. But if in every case an accused is

acquitted simply because it is possible to construct such an

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 interpretation or inference, the law cannot be enforced. Indeed,

not only will the law become impossible to be enforced, but the

courts will be viewed as being naive and gullible. Although this

might be much appreciated by accused persons, the Courts will

cease to be respected by the general public who expect the Courts

to exercise at least some modicum of wisdom. The balance

between, on the one hand, justice, fairness and protection of the

public, and on the other, avoidance of the possibility of convicting

an innocent person is articulated in the distinction between a

shadow of a doubt and a reasonable doubt.

Pohon juga untuk rujuk kes Syed Ali Syed Abdul Hamid & Anor

[1982] CLJ (Rep) 340.

Justeru, berdasarkan hujahan-hujahan di atas, pihak pendakwaan

telah berjaya membuktikan elemen pemilikan (control, custody &

knowledge) berdasarkan keteragan-keterangan langsung serta inferens

yang kuat tanpa perlu bergantung kepada anggapan di bawah seksyen 37

(d) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952.

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PEMBUKTIAN ELEMEN (c)

Memandangkan pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan

elemen pemilikan secara keterangan langsung dan inferens yang kuat
tanpa perlu bergantung kepada anggapan di bawah seksyen 37(d) Akta
Dadah Berbahaya, maka untuk membuktikan elemen pengedaran ini,
pihak pendakwaan boleh menggunapakai anggapan di bawah seksyen
37(da)(xvi) yang menyatakan bahawa;

(da) any person who is found in possession of-

(i) 15 grammes or more in weight of heroin;

(ii) 15 grammes or more in weight of monoacetylmorphines;

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 (iiia) a total of 15 grammes or more in weight of heroin,
morphine and monoacetylmorphines or a total of 15 grammes or
more in weight of any two of the said dangerous drugs;

otherwise than in accordance with the authority of this Act or

any other written law, shall be presumed, until the contrary is
proved, to be trafficking in the said drug;

Dalam kes ini, berat bersih barang kes yang disahkan oleh SP2

adalah Heroin sejumlah berat 44.4 gram dan Monoacetylmorphine

sejumlah berat 18.0 gram. Jika digabungkan akan memberikan

sejumlah 62.4 gram campuran Heroin dan Monoacetylmorphine,

suatu jumlah yang melebihi 4 kali ganda daripada jumlah yang

dinyatakan di dalam peruntukkan 37(da)(iiia) di atas, maka OKT boleh

lah dianggap memperedarkan dadah berbahaya tersebut sehingga di

buktikan sebaliknya.

Pihak pendakwaan juga memohon untuk menghujahkan bahawa

terdapat keterangan langsung di dalam kes ini yang menunjukkan OKT

melakukan perbuatan pengedaran sebagaimana yang ditakrifkan di

bawah seksyen 2 ADB 1952.

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 Maksud pengedaran di bawah seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya

1952 ialah; “Pengedaran dadah” termasuklah melakukan salah satu

daripada perbuatan-perbuatan ini, iaitu mengilang, mengimport,

mengeksport, menyimpan, menyorok, membeli, menjual, menerima,

menyetor, mengendalikan, mengangkut, membawa, menghantar,

mengirim, berusaha mendapatkannya, membekal atau mengedar sesuatu

dadah berbahaya”.

Mahkamah Agong di dalam kes Teh Geok Hock v PP (1989) 3

MLJ p 162 , Hashim Yeop A. Sani CJ telah memutuskan dimuka surat

163 seperti berikut;-

“ True, the definition in the Act sounds artificial and not

according to the ordinary meaning of the word ‘trafficking’ which is

normally understood to mean to trade in, buy or sell, any commodity,

albeit often with sinister implication. See also the Shorter Oxford

English Dictionary. The definition of ‘trafficking’ in the Act is wide

and includes not only buying and selling, but also carrying,

concealing dan keeping.”

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 Rujuk kes PP v. Atisheshan Singaram [2010] 1 LNS 463,

Mahkamah menyatakan;

“iii. Whether the accused was trafficking in dangerous drugs.

I am making a positive finding of fact that the accused was trafficking

20,689.5 grams of the dangerous drug ketamine as defined under

Section 2 of the DDA 1952 on the 26th of April 2008 when he was

arrested at the airport. In arriving at this finding, I am relying on the

same factual analysis to which I have based my finding to establish that

the accused was the person who was carrying the dangerous drugs in

exhibit P16 from New Delhi to Singapore on the 25 th of July 2008 and

from Singapore to Kuala Lumpur on the 26th of July 2008 via Singapore

Airlines flights number SQ 407 and SQ 108 and that the accused had the

knowledge that exhibit P16 contained the dangerous drugs. the facts to

which I have enumerated in the above passages establish that the

accused was not merely in passive possession or merely holding

exhibit P16. the accused was carrying exhibit P16 ie, moving exhibit

P16 from New Delhi to Kuala Lumpur via air travel. this act of the

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accused amounts to trafficking as defined by Section 2 of the DDA

1952. In PP v. Hairul Din bin Zainal Abidin [2001] 6 MLJ 146 at 154-

155 His Lordship Augustine Paul J (as he then was) held that - "this

overlooks the fact that an act of trafficking contemplated by s. 2 of the

Act may involve possession. thus where a person is carrying dangerous

drugs in a container the act of carrying the container containing the

dangerous drugs constitutes trafficking within the meaning of s. 2 of the

Act, this involves proof of the facts that the person was carrying the

container and that he knew that the container contained dangerous

drugs. the act of carrying the container is the actus reus that constitutes

'trafficking' within the meaning of s. 2 of the Act. this must be proved by

direct evidence as there are no presumptions in s. 37 of the Act to

facilitate proof of that fact. In order to prove mens rea there must be

evidence to show that the person knew what he was carrying."

His Lordship further held at pages 156-157 that "To 'carry' something

also goes one step beyond 'holding' as it involves the further element of

moving it. the 'holding' of something is therefore the first step towards

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'carrying' or 'keeping' it As 'carrying' and 'keeping' involve further acts

beyond 'holding' it is my view that the holding of dangerous drugs does

not amount to 'carrying' or 'keeping' them and is also not within the

context of acts that constitute trafficking as defined in s. 2 of the Act so

as to extend the definition to enable the inclusion of 'holding' within its

ambit. I pause to add that the act of 'holding' can progress into

'carrying' or 'keeping' dependent on additional steps taken on the facts

of a particular case. In that event it will constitute 'trafficking' within the

meaning of s. 2 of the Act."

Pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan bahawa tindakan OKT yang

membawa (carrying) dadah tersebut dari Jelutong, Pulau Pinang,

singgah di R&R Tapah dan seterusnya di Restoran Jejambat Sungai

Buloh dengan menggunakan kereta tersebut adalah terjumlah kepada

perbuatan pengedaran secara langsung sebagaimana yang didefinisikan

di bawah seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952.

Pihak pendakwaan juga menghujahkan bukan setakat

membawa, menyorok atau menyimpan dadah berbahaya berkenaan

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bermaksud OKT, merupakan seorang pengedar tetapi, ‘whether he is a

trafficker in those circumstances depend on the facts and circumstances

of the given case, including the quantity of the drugs and any

transaction the accused proposed to enter into’ rujukan kepada kes

Mohamad Yazri Minhat v Public Prosecutor [2003] 2 CLJ 65 p 75

Pihak pendakwaan juga menghujahkan bahawa memandangkan

jumlah dadah yang dibawa oleh OKT adalah satu jumlah yang besar

iaitu Heroin sejumlah berat 44.4 gram dan Monoacetylmorphine

sejumlah berat 18.0 gram. (Jika digabungkan akan memberikan

sejumlah 62.4 gram campuran Heroin dan Monoacetylmorphine) maka

‘irresistble inference’ yang boleh dibuat ialah OKT membawa dadah

tersebut untuk tujuan pengedaran.

Yang Arif, adalah dihujahkan bahawa semakin banyak dan

semakin berat dadah berbahaya yang dimiliki, semakin kuat ‘inference’

yang boleh dibuat bahawa seseorang itu mengedar dadah berbahaya

tersebut. Ini diputuskan dalam kes Ong Ah Chuan v PP [1981] 1

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MLJ /s 64 yang telah diterima pakai oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes

Mohamed Yazri Minhat v PP [2003] 2 CLJ 65;

‘proof of the purpose for which an act is done, where such purpose is a

necessary ingredient of the offence with which an accused is charged,

presents a problem with which criminal courts are very familiar.

Generally, in the absence of an express admission by the accused, the

purpose with which he did an act is a matter of inference from what

he did. Thus, in the case of an accused caught in the act of conveying

from one place to another controlled drugs in quantity much larger than

is likely to be needed for his own consumption the inference that he was

transporting them for the purpose of trafficking in them would, in absent

of any plausible explanation by him, be irresistible –even if there were

no statuory presumption such as is contained in section 15 of the Drugs

Act”.

As a matter of common sense the larger the quantity of drugs involved

the stronger the inference that they were not intended for the personal

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consumption of the person carrying them, and the more convincing

the evidence needed to rebut it.”

Pohon juga rujuk kes PP v Ouseng Sama –Ae (2008) 1 CLJ 337

di m/s 343, Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan;

[5] Now apply that approach here. The accused came from some other

place to the house in question. He brought exh. P18 along with him. The

drug found in the bag exh. P18 – almost 2 kg of cannabis – was far in

excess of what may be needed for personal consumption. In the absence

of any explanation from the accused it is a fair inference the drug was

obviously intended for some person, known or unknown to the accused.

Or, to borrow the more elegant words of Lord Diplock in Ong Ah

Chuan, it is a fair inference that the accused’s purpose here was “to

part with possession of the drug or any portion of it to some other

person whether already known to him or a potential purchaser whom he

hopes to find.”

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 Tambahan pula, di dalam kes ini, tidak ada keterangan kangsung

‘to suggest’ bahawa dadah berbahaya tersebut adalah untuk kegunaan

OKT sendiri.

Adalah hujahan pihak pendakwaan bahawa berdasarkan kepada

cara dadah tersebut di bawa dan disembunyikan dan jumlah dadah yang

banyak maka Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini boleh membuat ‘irresistble

inference’ berdasarkan kepada ‘common sense approach’ bahawa OKT

sememangnya berniat untuk mengedarkan dadah berbahaya tersebut.

i. PEMBUKTIAN PERTUDUHAN KEDUA

Keterangan SP2 (Ahli Kimia) juga mengesahkan barang kes

tersebut juga mengandungi Methamphetamines sejumlah berat

10.88 gram. SP2 juga mengesahkan Methamphetamine adalah

dadah berbahaya sebagaimana yang disenaraikan di dalam Jadual

Pertama Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952.

Bagi keterangan mengenai pemilikan dadah jenis

methamphetamine ini, pihak pendakwaan memohon untuk

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 menggunapakai hujahan yang sama seperti di atas memandangkan

ianya dijumpai dari bungkusan yang sama yang dijumpai di tempat

yang sama.

j. PENUTUP

Berdasarkan kepada keterangan-keterangan yang ada, saya dengan

rendah diri menghujahkan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah pun

mengasaskan satu kes prima facie terhadap OKT seperti kehendak

Seksyen 180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Justeru itu, saya memohon

kepada Mahkamah yang mulia ini supaya memerintahkan OKT untuk

membela diri terhadap kedua-dua pertuduhan.

Sekian, terima kasih.

Bertarikh 2 Jun 2015

Hujahan bertulis disediakan oleh:

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 MUHAMAD ASYRAF BIN MD KAMAL
TIMBALAN PENDAKWA RAYA
SELANGOR

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