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The Burmese ways to socialism

a b
Maureen Aung‐Thwin & Thant Myint‐U
a
New York, USA
b
Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies,
Baltimore, MD, USA
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To cite this article: Maureen Aung‐Thwin & Thant Myint‐U (1992): The Burmese ways to socialism,
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 Third World Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1992

The Burmese ways to socialism

MAUREEN AUNG-THWIN & THANT MYINT-U

The death knell for Burmese socialism tolled an entire year before Tiananmen
Square burned and the Berlin Wall crumbled, but few outside Burma heard it.
Television news teams were not present to record the extraordinary events
surrounding Burma's democracy movement in summer 1988. A year after the
massive demonstrations against their government, the Burmese electorate rejected
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socialism and military rule. Candidates who even appeared to be connected to the
discredited Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) were routed. Twenty-one
million voters gave an overwhelming mandate to the political party led by Aung
San Suu Kyi, 46, although the nervous junta had placed her under solitary house
arrest. That did not stop the Nobel Committee from conferring its prestigious Peace
Prize for 1991 on her, and by doing so remind the world of the unfinished struggle
for democracy in Burma. Nevertheless, the Nobel laureate, who is the daughter
of Burma's revered national hero, General Aung San, remains under house arrest
and the military firmly in control.
Burma's failure to achieve a viable post-independent socialist state has as much
to do with the ideological and structural constraints inherent in the system as with
Burmese history, culture and personality of the head of government. This paper
examines socialism as espoused by two dissimilar post-independent leaders—U Nu
and General Ne Win—and the means through which each chose to implement his
particular version of Utopia.
Discarding colonial rule for socialism was for Burma more than just a reaction
to a foreign exploitative system. Burmese nationalism was deeply rooted in
socialism, as British journalist Martin Smith states in his excellent book: 'Burma
since independence, is, after all, that rarity, a country in which successive govern-
ments have been regarded as left wing, but in which the principal political opposi-
tion has come from the left'.1
Many have noted the natural affinity of Buddhist notions of egalitarianism,
redemption through social action and a healthy ambivalence to capital accumula-
tion with such socialist ideals as equitable distribution of wealth in a classless society.
Socialism and Burmese Buddhism further enjoyed the illusion of being closely
linked, for only Buddhist terminology was available to explain Marxist philosophy
to the general populace. Years before socialism was officially sanctioned, however,
Burmese society had already evolved in a significantly 'socialist' manner. Colonial
Britain's Commissioner Charles Crosthwaite, with only some exaggeration,
complained of the challenge of colonising a country '. . . where one man is as
good as another, where there are no landlords, no hereditary aristocracy and no
tribal chiefs . . .' 2

Maureen Aung-Thwin is a freelance journalist based in New York, USA, and Thant Myint-U is at the Johns
Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, Baltimore, MD, USA.

67
 MAUREEN AUNG-THWIN & THANT MYINT-U

In practice, if not always in theory, Burma's own imperial system, abolished

by the British in 1885, has been one of partial power-sharing. The largest racial
group represented by the Burman3 kings did not directly control the 'minority'
peoples, such as the Karens, Shan, Kachin, Mons and Arakanese. The always fragile
balance of power between the Burmans and their independent-minded fellow
compatriots was displaced by a classic colonial system that administered the former
center separately from the frontier areas, which were left both physically and
politically on the periphery.
British rule made Burma vulnerable economically as well as politically. The
traditional village and agriculture-based economy, especially that of lower Burma,
became irreversibly linked to the colonial (hence global) financial and trading
system. In addition, the tremendous infusion of immigrant labour and investment
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capital from Indian and overseas Chinese sources rekindled an innate Burmese
fear of foreigners. Rangoon became an overseas suburb of Madras, and the average
Burmese citizen no longer felt at home in his own house.
By the 1920s and 1930s peasants and urban intellectuals were united in their
common frustrations with British rule. It took another decade, including several
years of wartime occupation by the imperial Japanese army, before independence
was finally established in 1948. The wartime emergence of the heavily politicised
Burma National Army and affiliated organisations, such as the nationalist Anti-
Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL), made impossible a post-war transfer
of power to the same middle-class elites that had dominated colonial politics. New
players emerged, all were cloaked in nationalist—and inevitably socialist—rhetoric.
As a result of all the new players and new tensions, the fragile Union of Burma
at its birth was almost torn apart by a series of communal wars and armed
insurrections, some of which continue to haunt the nation today. General Aung
San, the founder of the modern Burmese army, who brokered both Burma's
independence from Britain and negotiated the country's first constitution—and who
should have guided the inchoate nation at its most vulnerable hour—was assassinated
on the eve of assuming power. Two years earlier, however, Aung San had expelled
the hard-line communists from the AFPFL coalition, thus insuring the socialists,
one of many groups competing to fill the vacuum, a major role in any new
government.
Both U Nu and General Ne Win, who disagreed about almost everything else,
looked to socialism to help solve the problems of the country. A Buddhist politician-
monk, U Nu picked up Aung San's reins and formed the first post-independence
government. Ne Win, his ruthless and mercurial successor, secured power via
a coup in 1962. U Nu depended on his deep Buddhist faith to cope with the
headaches of national integration and economic progress within a federalist union.
In contrast, the General opted for a xenophobic solution called 'The Burmese Way
to Socialism', a highly centralised path to official autarky led by a single party
and backed by a well-equipped and loyal military. Each leader aspired in his own
way to rebuild a politically and economically viable Burmese socialist state without
needless dependence on the outside world. Both failed.
It is a tribute to Burma's great natural wealth and her resilient populace that
it took socialism so long to fail. Once one of world's naturally 'richest', Burma
in 1987 became a 'least developed country', officially on a par with Bangladesh
68
 THE BURMESE WAYS TO SOCIALISM

and Chad. Burma's inability—or refusal— to flow less rigid models of economic
development set her apart from almost every country in a region filled with incipient
Nies—newly industrialising countries—and near NICS. Indeed, even now Burma
is still known as "the world's richest basket case".
Though Burma's experiments with socialism laid the groundwork for the current
economic and related political impasse, any new government of Burma is unlikely
to rush headlong into capitalism. The future development of Burma's political
economy must be considered in the light of what inspired her initial deviation from
conventional development strategies. Rangoon was clearly never destined to be
a Bangkok.
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Buddhist socialism
U Nu epitomised the perfect symbiosis of Buddhism and socialism. Born in 1906
in the small town of Wakema in the Irrawaddy Delta, he was, like so many of
the post-war leaders of Burma, educated in English language schools and at Rangoon
University. And like other young, educated nationalists, U Nu was drawn to global
intellectual trends that also came to dominate Burmese political thought in the 1930s
and 1940s. He shared with his peers a strong desire to be independent and wrest
Burma's economy back from foreigners, especially Indians and Chinese, and to
modernise along the lines of model welfare states of the period such as the USSR—
but justified through traditional Buddhist rationalisation.
U Nu and other AFPFL leaders had hoped that independence would mean rapid
industrialisation, a vast expansion of social services, and the end of land alienation.
Having already nationalised former British companies and introduced sweeping
land reform, U Nu believed that the Burmese government, freed from foreign
control, would continue to play the primary role in bringing about more changes.
In 1952 U Nu laid down the Pyidawtha (translated loosely as 'Happy Land') Plan,
an optimistic and ambitious strategy that promised, among other things, 'one
automobile for every family in Burma'.4 On paper at least, Burma was headed
for a socialist paradise.
The reality of Pyidawtha however, was less happy than planned. Fundamental
constraints doomed U Nu's good intentions from the start: factionalism among
the AFPFL and the various groups within the reigning political coalition; rebellious
compatriots; the physically devastated post-war nation; and, perhaps most important,
his inability to reconcile his own Buddhist aspirations with the practical needs of
the modern state he led. In 1950, for example, at the first signs of a slight easing
of internal political pressure, U Nu went off to meditate, exhorting his aides: 'Do
not send for me, even if the whole country is enveloped in flames. If there are
fires, you must put them out yourselves'.5
Traditional Burmese concepts of authority were directed towards the individual
rather than an institution. (In earlier days it was the king himself, not kingship,
that motivated loyalties). Strong belief in karma, or fate, also helps explain the
'we-must-deserve-this-ruler' attitude still held by many Burmese. Of the two models
of authority often used to describe Burmese kingship, U Nu can be likened to a
modern version of the classical Burmese 'scholar-king', who defends and glorifies
the dharma, or Buddhist teachings, whereas the 'conqueror king' exemplified by
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 MAUREEN AUNG-THWIN & THANT MYINT-U

General Ne Win, the military administrator, derives merit from heroic deed and
action.6 (It is worth noting that in Rangoon today, the 'retired' General Ne Win
reportedly spends much of his time meditating—and getting ready for his next life.)
U Nu, 'Mr Tender' in Burmese, ultimately could not deal with the rougher aspects
of day-to-day politics and politicians. The AFPFL had developed in the last days
of the war into a coalition of nationalist forces, primarily communists, socialists
and the Burma National Army (BNA) led by General Aung San. Following the
expulsion of the communists and the loss of Aung San's charismatic leadership,
the dominant socialists increasingly depended on support from other groups. The
armed forces, the far left opposition in parliament, the Burmese business community,
foreign governments (bearing aid) and even ethnic minority leaders often made
conflicting claims upon U Nu and his associates.
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Presaging a strategy of the military government that followed a decade later,

the AFPFL tried to strengthen its position by using its control over the bureaucracy
to develop a wide-reaching system of political support. The U Nu government
established mass-based organisations, such as the All Burma Peasants Association
and the All Burma Trade Unions Organisation. The patron-client network
cultivated by the political leadership inevitably led to abuses of power, especially
in the appointment of government personnel. At a time of increased government
intervention in the economy, many well-educated civil servants lost their positions
to those whose credentials were confined to past involvement in nationalist politics
or personal connections with prominent members of the AFPFL.
The physical destruction and economic disruption of the country caused by the
Second World War severely stretched the ability of Burma's new government to
manage an ambitious planned economy. Political scientist Robert Taylor writes
that, 'Ironically, the abandonment of the professed laissez faire of the colonial
state for the planned economy of the socialist state coincided with the collapse
of the state power necessary for economic management'.7 Further weakening the
state, numerous rebellions broke out around the country following independence.
U Nu and the AFPFL were just one of many equally strong and well-armed groups
competing for control of the state. The Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the
Karen National Union (KNU), whose armed forces at one point after independence
occupied nearly half the country, seriously threatened U Nu's ability to run the
country at all.
The failure of the AFPFL'S socialist policies were most clearly reflected throughout
its tenure in the very slow rates of economic growth, though Burma was at the
time not far out of line with other recovering post-war nations in the region. Despite
the government's interventionist economic policies, much of the agricultural sector
of the Burmese economy remained in non-Burmese hands. The central govern-
ment managed to take a more active role in capital-intensive industries formerly
dominated by foreign interests, but Burma's economy by the early 1960s had barely
reached pre-war levels. Remote areas disrupted by the war did not completely
recover throughout the entire civilian period. In hindsight the economy seemed
to do well only in relation to its near-destruction under military rule.
Nevertheless, the U Nu government did make sincere attempts to improve the
living standard of ordinary people by expanding education and health care. Hundreds
of rural health clinics were established and concerted efforts made to fight malaria,
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 THE BURMESE WAYS TO SOCIALISM

tuberculosis and other diseases. At the same time the government sponsored huge
increases in school enrolment. In addition, the free education provided by the
sangha, the Buddhist monk hood, flourished under the devout prime minister,
placing the country among the world's most highly literate.
By 1955, it was clear that the government would not achieve the unrealistic
economic goals it had set for the country within the context of Buddhist socialism,
and U Nu began to look toward the private sector and foreign investment to
guarantee sustained economic growth. He confessed, 'From practical experience
I no longer like to see the government's finger in all sorts of economic pies'. He
made the slightly heretical suggestion that the management of the economy 'should
not be entrusted solely to those who are only interested in getting salaries . . .
[but] to those who have profit motives'. 8 U Nu and the AFPFL began publicly to
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modify their initial ideas of socialism, so that it no longer necessarily identified

with government ownership and operation of the means of production. At the same
time, U Nu believed popular support for democratic government was an important
source of legitimacy and strength for his regime, that 'democratic socialism' would
keep 'dictatorial communism' at bay.9
Entrenched bureaucratic interests closely tied to the AFPFL leadership, however,
were not eager to allow competition from private businesses still owned to a large
degree by ethnic Indians and Chinese. Each new crisis only drove U Nu to seek
solace in Buddhism. With the growing bankruptcy of socialist solutions for Burma's
economic and social problems, Buddhism for Burma's leader was a counterweight
against the perceived threat of communism as well as a personally rewarding means
of increasing his government's popularity.
The foundation stones to the military's version of socialism were laid by U Nu
and his bickering AFPFL colleagues who, by 1958, had split into two factions, raising
the threat of civil war. Soon thereafter, General Ne Win, the army chief, was
actually invited by U Nu to form a caretaker government, one widely considered,
at the time at least, honest and efficient.
In 1960, Ne Win's caretaker regime held free elections. U Nu's faction handily
won a landslide victory largely by promoting Buddhism as a necessary bulwark
against communism. By 1961 U Nu had made Buddhism the state religion, which
became '. . . a substitute for, rather than an evidence of, the country's progress
in economic development and social welfare'.10
Establishing Buddhism as a state religion, however, furthered the Burmanisation
of the country and revived latent communal tensions between the mostly Burman
Buddhist majority and many non-Buddhist minority groups. State Buddhism also
precipitated the creation of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which was led
by mostly Christian officers and soon became the most formidable of the several
rebel armies fighting the central government. Meanwhile, U Nu, always religious,
became fanatically so. Ne Win and the Tatmadaw, Burma's defence forces, who
had hoped that U Nu's AFPFL faction would lose the 1960 elections, watched
helplessly as the Buddhist premier enthusiastically continued to rule in his own
erratic way. He propitiated nats, powerful spirits held in awe by most Burmese,
and supervised the building of 60 000 sand pagodas on the beach, to deflect
perceived threats to the Union. To the increasing alarm of the Tatmadaw, U Nu
even contemplated revising the country's federal structure. In justifying the 1962
71
 MAUREEN AUNG-THWIN & THANT MYINT-U

coup d'état by Ne Win and the Revolutionary Council, a spokesman listed economic,
religious and political crises, 'with the issue of federalism as the most important
reason for the coup'. 11

Military socialism
The Revolutionary Council charged that parliamentary democracy 'not only failed
to serve our socialist development but also due to its very defects, weaknesses
and loopholes . . . lost sight of and deviated from the socialist aims'.12
The council took credit for having '. . . rescued the Union, not a moment too
soon . . .', 13 and quickly established the Burma Socialist Programme Party to
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implement its goals. The BSPP was the first to articulate what it considered a national
ideology, in a collectively written document called The System of Correlation of
Man and His Environment, which included predictable lofty socialist aspirations
in the requisite jargon.
The military socialism of General Ne Win, a powerful army commander and
until his ascension not widely known by the public, initially represented after U Nu
a needed show of national unity and an immediate hope for efficient change. General
Ne Win and the Tatmadaw moreover reacted to U Nu's religiosity by instantly
'undoing' Buddhism as a state religion. Next, the Ne Win regime dismantled U Nu's
economic reforms and halted what it felt were dangerously friendly overtures to
restless ethnic groups. The Tatmadaw defined economic goals in political and social
terms broadly acceptable to the majority Burman society, and by so doing
'eliminated' the ideological opposition insofar as that is possible'.14
As U Nu sought grassroots legitimacy by establishing mass-based support, so
too did Ne Win, by converting the BSPP from an elite party into a mass organisation
and the Tatmadaw leadership into titular civilians. Like his predecessor, Ne Win
also took on the attributes of a minlaung, or charismatic saviour king. Specifically,
he yearned to be considered the nation's fourth Great Unifier in Burmese
history.15 Interestingly, in his twilight years Ne Win has become even more
superstitious and religious. To increase his merit he has built an elaborate pagoda
befitting a Burmese king.
Military socialism was a means of finally regaining Burman control of the
economy for good. The regime's idea of socialism included nationalisation of some
15 000 private firms, the establishment of a massive public sector represented by
state corporations called SEES (State Economic Enterprises), forcing approximately
200 000 Indian nationals who controlled a large part of the economy to leave the
country. Anti-Chinese riots erupted in the mid-1960s during the mainland's Cultural
Revolution, which then provided a handy 'anti-communist' justification for purging
local Chinese entrepreneurs.
Tatmadaw-controlled socialism was at times surprisingly pragmatic. Less than
a decade after it took over, the military government admitted failure in achieving
its economic objectives. The junta, like U Nu after a similar epiphany during his
tenure, decided to open up the economy and reassess the nation's priorities. The
Revolutionary Council, which had been ruling by decree (as, incidentally, is the
current SLORC or State Law & Order Restoration Council) wrote a new constitution
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 THE BURMESE WAYS TO SOCIALISM

in 1974. An ambitious 20-year plan encouraged the development of agriculture

and natural resources, opening the way to multilateral and bilateral aid, 'mutually
beneficial' economic enterprises between foreign investors and the Burmese govern-
ment. In 1970 Burma had a foreign debt of a meagre $25 million. Within a few
years eager international lenders had boosted this figure to $500 million. Burma
might be socialist, but it was run by a stable dictatorship that paid its bills promptly:
an excellent credit risk. In fact, most of Burma's current debt of just under $5
billion was obtained without conditions—it was considered rather a privilege to
lend to such a country.
The Burmese economy expanded in the 1970s as a result of the reorientation
of the economy and the increase in foreign assistance. David I. Steinberg, a close
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observer of the Burmese economy, remarks: 'Although statistics in Burma can

often be considered whimsical at best, and even though Ne Win himself noted
years later that the data had been inflated, there was real growth'.16
The revaluations of major currencies and fluctuations in international commodity
markets hurt the Burmese economy, but the country generally fared better under
Burmese socialism than many less well-endowed developing nations whose govern-
ments followed purer and more orthodox—and inflexible—Marxist strategies. In
Burma's case, military socialism even can be credited for transforming, albeit
inadvertently, blasé locals accustomed to letting foreigners run the economy into
a nationwide corps of hard nosed capitalists. Under Ne Win, the unofficial 'black
market' in which everyone from farmers to cabinet ministers participated may have
accounted for as much as 80% of the national economy. Trading of practically
any commodity was possible. Financially strapped Burmese citizens still exchange
their overvalued currency, or kyat, for US dollars and British pounds through
intricate, informal and super-efficient currency networks. An ordinary Burmese
citizen without access to hard currency and flush with kyat can hook up with a
broker, usually a Sino or Indo Burmese entrepreneur who finds someone with a
pound or dollar account abroad wanting to send kyats home at a terrific exchange
rate without having to go through slower official channels.
The military government wisely had in place other societal safety valves. Since
the 1970s Burmese citizens have been able to travel abroad for work in exchange
for remitting a mere 10% of declared wages, for which there was a fairly low
required minimum. Merchant seamen who serve on government-owned shipping
vessels are permitted to bring back, among other items, a four-wheel vehicle that
is either sold immediately for a handsome profit or put to work as a much needed
hire car that guarantees the owner a nice regular income.
These superficial, but effective palliates kept overt urban dissent to a minimum,
while Ne Win also placated the peasantry by increasing the regulated price for
rice and other staples. The elite—the party and military faithful—were kept in line
through special shops and trips abroad that enabled them to replenish barterable
goods. It is probably safe to assume that the Burmese tolerance for the govern-
ment's patchwork economic strategy could have lasted indefinitely had not the
very inequities officially condemned by military socialism flourished under its
banner. After enjoying an open class structure, easy upward mobility and an income
distribution as equitable as anywhere in non-communist Asia, Burma under Ne
Win faced a growing income disparity. Also prevalent was a class antagonism
73
 MAUREEN AUNG-THWIN & THANT MYINT-U

between the military/party elite and the rest of the populace, and a rural—urban
dichotomy where once none existed.
In summer 1988 simmering frustration with the system resulted in an
unprecedented public display of anger directed at the Tatmadaw. The massive pro-
democracy demonstrations were extinguished by a massacre of thousands of innocent
civilians by the leaders of a sui-coup,i7 in which Ne Win cronies General Saw
Maung and Khin Nyunt nominally replaced him. Ne Win himself triggered the
uproar. As early as 1987 he called for sweeping decontrol of rice and basic foodstuff,
and a few days after calmly announced his regime's third surprise demonetisation
of currency in circulation and the first without compensation.
In hindsight, it appears that the Old Man, as he is called by many Burmese,
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may have been trying to turn a new leaf. At the height of the violent student unrest
in the spring of 1988, the General abruptly resigned his leadership post and suggested
that the country try a multi-party system, much to the horror of some of his
associates. After two years and the spilling of much blood, elections to put in place
such a system were held: The results indicated that the people preferred the
Tatmadaw out of politics. Ne Win, early on the road to socialism reportedly once
admitted to a friend that 'even the Buddha makes mistakes'.

Conclusion
The events of 1988 have inexorably changed the form, but possibly not the
philosophical roots, of the Burmese political economy. Indeed, some Burma scholars
have suggested that Ne Win's coup of 1962 brought the country closer to its
traditions and should be regarded as the real point of independence from foreign
exploitation. The officially recognised date of Burmese independence, 1948, it
is argued, celebrates non-indigenous principles of nationhood written into the
country's Constitution by foreign-educated elite.18 The military may have given
up socialism, but not its role as self-proclaimed protectors of national unity—and
more lately, law and order. The soldiers currently hold hostage not only Aung
San Suu Kyi, who has become the symbol of 1988 and the fight for democracy,
but the entire country. Precisely when and how Burma will resolve the current
impasse is difficult to predict, for never have the political, cultural and personal
stakes been so high nor the showdown so public.
Interestingly, Burma faced similar challenges in 1948 and 1962 to those in the
early 1990s—a devastated economy, ethnic rebellions, and a host of frustrated
political activists. But solutions may be even more difficult today. Decades of armed
conflict have reinforced the cultural differences between the Burman-led military
and the still rebellious ethnic groups. An unexpected and sometimes uneasy alliance,
however, has been forged between mainly Burman student dissidents and their
ethnic rebel hosts whom the youngsters have been brought up to fear.
The prospects for a full economic recovery are also mixed. Burma's crippled
economy again faces the spectre of foreign domination—this time from the region.
At the first signs of a crack in the usually closed Burmese economy, even before
the political turmoil had subsided, Thailand rushed in to 'help' its neighbour. Having

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 THE BURMESE WAYS TO SOCIALISM

stripped Thailand's natural resources and deeply in need of raw materials to sustain
the country's industrial boom, Thai businessmen, many of them linked to military
interests, regard Burma's reservoir of untapped riches as an unexpected boon. The
industrialised countries in the region are already eyeing Burma with similar designs.
A genuine opening up of Burma's economy will also see the return of overseas
Chinese and Indians with their now-global networks. Japan, having played a
significant role in Burma's post-war economy is already competing with South
Korea and China, whose trade with Burma is an estimated $1 billion.
Burma has never been very predictable. Even as socialism wanes throughout
the world and dictators tumble one by one, Burma will handle the inevitable demise
of both in its own way and at its own pace. The only thing that is predictable:
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the solution will have a definite Burmese flavour.

Notes

The term 'Burma' is used instead of 'Myanmar', for familiarity and because the latter is merely another way
of saying Burma in Burmese.
1
M Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, London: Zed Press, 1991, p 48.
2
C Crosthwaite, The Pacification of Burma, London: 1912, p 22.
3
'Burman' describes the race; 'Burmese' includes all inhabitants of Burma.
4
R Butwell, Nu of Burma, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963, p 113.
5
U Nu, U Nu Saturday's Son, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975, p 195.
6
I A Wiant & D I Steinberg, paper given at Workshop on Development and the Military, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, Singapore, 2 0 - 2 2 August, 1987, p 4.
7
R H Taylor, The State in Burma, London: C Hurst, 1987, p 250.
8
Butwell, Nu of Burma, p 117-118.
9
Thant Myint-U, interview with U Nu, Rangoon, March 1987.
10
D E Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, 1965, p 235 & 269.
11
The Guardian, Rangoon, 8 March, 1962.
12
The Burmese Way to Socialism, Rangoon: Revolutionary Council, 30 April, 1962, p 4.
13
Directorate of Information, The Constitution of the BSPP: Rangoon, 4 July, 1962.
14
Wiant & Steinberg, p 27.
15
Ibid, p 4.
16
D I Steinberg, 'Japanese economic assistance to Burma: aid in the 'Tarenagashi' manner? Paper presented
at East-West Center, University of Hawaii, 4 - 6 June, 1990, p 9.
17
J F Guyot, 'Burma in 1988: perestroika with a military face', in Southeast Asia in 1989, Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989, p 121.
18
M Aung-Thwin, 'Burma's myth of independence', in Independent Burma at Forty Years, ed, Josef Silverstein,
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1989.

75