Case

Institute for the Study of Diplomacy 355

Case Study

Estonia: The First Battle in the

Modern Disinformation War
Lessons for Democracies Fighting Hybrid Warfare
Jonas Heering & Heera Kamboj
Cover photo: https://www.flickr.com/photos/adam_jones/7705379620/

Cover photo: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Bronze_Soldier_-_panoramio.jpg

 Case 355

Estonia: The First Battle in the Modern Disinformation War

Lessons for Democracies Fighting Hybrid Warfare

Jonas Heering and Heera Kamboj

ISBN: 978-1-56927-028-8
Copyright © 2021 by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

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1 Lessons for Democracies Fighting Hybrid Warfare

Jonas Heering
Georgetown University

Jonas Heering is an incoming PhD student in Government, specializing in International

Relations, at Georgetown University. He received his M.A. in German and European Studies
from Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. At Georgetown, he was a Bunker Graduate
Fellow and a research assistant at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. He holds bachelor’s
degrees in Political Science and Entrepreneurial Management from Texas Christian University.

Heera Kamboj
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University

Heera Kamboj is a career member of the U.S. Foreign Service, and a 2020-2021 Rusk Fellow at
Georgetown University. She has served in Washington, D.C., Dubai, Chennai, Mexico City, and
Kabul. Heera won the 2012 Swanee Hunt Award for Advancing Women’s Role in Policy
Formulation for her work in Afghanistan. She was a recipient of the Thomas R. Pickering
Fellowship and is an alumna of the International Career Advancement Program. She is fluent in
Farsi, Dari, Spanish, and Punjabi and is a graduate of George Washington University and the
Harvard Kennedy School.

This case study was made possible (in part) by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The
statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author. The authors’ views
expressed in this case study are not necessarily those of the U.S. Government.
 Estonia: The First Battle in the Modern Disinformation War 2

Introduction

On the night of April 26, 2007, riots erupted in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia.1 Groups con-
sisting largely of ethnic Russians, who make up approximately one third of Tallinn’s population,
protested in the streets, clashed with police forces, and looted and destroyed stores.2 Two days
later, once the violence subsided, one person had died, more than 150 people were injured, and
1,000 individuals were detained.

Protesters took to the streets in response to the Estonian government’s announcement that it
would move the statue of the Bronze Soldier—a Soviet war memorial—from Tallinn’s city center
to a military cemetery in the suburbs. For ethnic Russians living in Tallinn, the Bronze Soldier
served as a symbol of supposed “Soviet liberation”; for ethnic Estonians, it was a reminder of de-
cades of Soviet oppression. The riots were fueled by false reports in Russian-language media out-
lets, which claimed that the statue, as well as several Soviet military graves, had been destroyed.
And, as the protests waned, Estonia became the target of a series of cyber attacks from Russian
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that brought down most of the country’s digital infrastructure,
from government websites to online banking systems and digital news media. The cyber attacks
lasted more than three weeks, until the Estonian government decided to essentially shut down
the internet to foreign users.3

As a target of this combination of cyber attacks and influence operations, Estonia became one
of the first victims of what has been described as a new form of Russian hybrid warfare—a core
element of which involves the dissemination of disinformation.4

Defining Disinformation

While disinformation has re-entered the common lexicon in recent years, the most common
terms used by politicians and the media are still “fake news” and misinformation. However, “fake
news” is an imprecise term often used by individuals to describe their own feelings about the
validity of a piece of information, rather than the veracity of the information itself. Misinforma-
tion is more precise and refers to false information, but not necessarily intended to cause harm.
For the study of international affairs, disinformation is a more clear-cut term because it focuses
on the originator’s or author’s intent to cause harm. Disinformation is deliberately false, an active
mischaracterization, decontextualizing, or altering of actual information to compel emotion in

1 Grassegger, Hannes, and Mikael Krogerus, “Fake news and botnets: how Russia weaponized the web,” The Guard-
ian, December 2, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/02/fake-news-botnets-how-russia-wea-
ponised-the-web-cyber-attack-estonia.
2 “Tallinn Population 2021,” World Population Review, accessed March 24, 2021, https://worldpopulationreview.
com/world-cities/tallinn-population.
3 Grassegger and Krogerus, “Fake news and botnets: how Russia weaponized the web.”
4 The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats defines “hybrid threats” as “an action conduct-
ed by state or non-state actors, whose goal is to undermine or harm a target by influencing its decision-making at
the local, regional, state or institutional level,” which combine “disinformation and interference in political debate or
elections, critical infrastructure disturbances or attacks, cyber operations, different forms of criminal activities and,
finally, an asymmetric use of military means and warfare.” See “Hybrid threats as a concept,” Hybrid CoE, https://
www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats-as-a-phenomenon/; for a discussion on Estonia as one of the first victims of
Russian hybrid warfare, see McGuiness, Damien, “How a cyber attack transformed Estonia,” BBC, April 27, 2017,
https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415.
3 Lessons for Democracies Fighting Hybrid Warfare

the intended audience. Actors, both state and non-state, that disseminate disinformation usually
have political, economic, or social motivations, or a mixture thereof.5 Disinformation is also di-
rectly related to what some refer to as Active Measures—Soviet disinformation during the Cold
War—or information operations more generally. For the purposes of this case study, we will refer
to disinformation as one part of the broader information operations toolkit.

Key Terms

Fake news - A term popularized in the 2010s, but uncommon among researchers given its
loaded usage. Fake v. True news in this context is based on whether the labeler agrees with the
information being presented.

Misinformation - Unintentionally inaccurate information, such as reporting erros.6

Disinformation - Deliberately false information, an active mischaracterization, decontextualiz-

ing, or altering of actual information to compel emotion in the intended audience.

Active measures - Soviet influence operations during the Cold War. Active Measures were
conceptualized by government bureaucracies, usually the Soviet intelligence services. They
generally include some form of disinformation, and are used for political purposes, primarily to
weaken an adversary.7

Information operations - First used by the military to refer broadly to the production of,
dissemination of, and infrastructure surrounding information. Facebook borrowed this term to
describe “deliberate and systematic attempts” to use inaccurate information to influence users.8

Influence operations - “[E]fforts to influence a target audience, whether an individual leader,

members of a decision-making group, military organizations and personnel, specific population
subgroups, or mass publics.”9

Hybrid warfare - “[A]n action conducted by state or non-state actors, whose goal is to under-
mine or harm a target by influencing its decision-making at the local, regional, state or insti-
tutional level.” Hybrid warfare can combine information operations with cyber operations or
physical attacks.10

6 Jack, Caroline, “Lexicon of Lies: Terms for Problematic Information,” Data & Society Research Institute, August
2017, https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/DataAndSociety_LexiconofLies.pdf.
7 Rid, Thomas, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 2020).
8 Jack, “Lexicon of Lies.”
9 Larson, Eric V., Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H. Schwartz,
and Catherine Quantic Thurston, “Foundations of effective influence operations: A framework for enhancing army
capabilities,” RAND Corporation, 2009, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_
MG654.pdf, 2.
10 “Hybrid threats as a concept,” Hybrid CoE.
5 Wardle, Claire, “Information Disorder: The Essential Glossary,” First Draft, July 2018, https://medium.com/1st-
draft/information-disorder-part-1-the-essential-glossary-19953c544fe3.
 Estonia: The First Battle in the Modern Disinformation War 4

Cold War Disinformation Through the 1980s

Information operations might be most familiar to readers from the 2016 U.S. presidential elec-
tion, when Russian actors with ties to the seat of government, the Kremlin, used social media in
an attempt to influence the American electorate.11 But, information operations did not start in
2016. They are as old as politics itself, but in the modern era they gained resurgence during the
Cold War through the 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union. While present-day Russia
is not the sole purveyor of disinformation, recent history from the Soviet Union helps showcase
some common influence operations tactics that are still being used today, but are now imple-
mented via social media and other new technologies.

The Cold War featured not only military confrontations but also an ideological battle between
the United States and the Soviet Union. Newly-independent, post-colonial states across the de-
veloping world, and countries trying to rebuild after World War II, found themselves in a bipolar
international system and were pressured to choose between competing economic and political
models; some adopted democratic, capitalist reforms to align with the United States and the
West, while others aligned with the Soviet Union by implementing communist and authoritarian
governance models. The United States used public diplomacy, and international broadcasters like
Radio Free Europe and Voice of America, to provide widespread access to information in closed
media environments in battleground areas.12

How to Distinguish Public Diplomacy from Propaganda and Disinformation

Both propaganda and public diplomacy involve systematic campaigns aimed at persuading
public opinion.13 Propaganda was not always a negative term, but due to Nazi propaganda
supporting genocide during World War II, it now has a pejorative connotation.14 In contrast,
public diplomacy aims to build goodwill or a positive reputation for a foreign government with
the local population.15 Public diplomacy is explicit in its attribution; whereas propaganda may
not always make clear its intent or who is behind it.

11 “Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns
and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election: Volume 2: Russia’s Use of Social Media, with Additional Views,” U.S.
Senate, October 2019, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf.
12 Cull, Nicholas J., Vasily Gatov, Peter Pomerantsev, Anne Applebaum, and Alistair Shawcross, “Soviet Subversion,
Disinformation and Propaganda: How the West Fought Against It,” London School of Economics, October 2017,
https://www.lse.ac.uk/iga/assets/documents/arena/2018/Jigsaw-Soviet-Subversion-Disinformation-and-Propagan-
da-Final-Report.pdf.
13 Jack, “Lexicon of Lies.”
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
5 Lessons for Democracies Fighting Hybrid Warfare

The Soviet Union also used overt public diplomacy initiatives, but relied heavily on influence
operations. In trying to spread the Soviet Union’s ideological revolution, and also consolidate his
own communist and authoritarian style of government, General Secretary of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin established the Department of International Informa-
tion. The Soviets relied heavily on disinformation domestically, in nascent and struggling de-
mocracies, and to discredit their adversaries in the West. In 1967, the KGB, the Soviet Union’s
foreign intelligence and security agency, expanded its Active Measures Department “A” office to
undermine the attraction of democracy, free economies, and the United States and its allies. Their
“Active Measures” found a ripe audience in some post-colonial, developing nations which were
already skeptical of Western nations.16 Department “A” was very active and provided technical
support to staff downrange by “outright and partial forgery of documents; use of rumors, insinu-
ation, altered facts, and lies; use of international and local front organizations; clandestine opera-
tion of radio stations; [and the] exploitation of a nation’s academic, political, economic and media
figures.”17

Operation Infektion: Harbinger of the Future

Operation Infektion was a particularly prominent example of influence operations. Over a decade,
the Soviet Union slowly planted and spread the rumor that the United States military created
and released AIDS into the world. Following similar previous operations, the Kremlin “shopped”
the story to sympathetic newspapers and journalists in a non-aligned country.18 In this case, the
Soviet Union successfully planted the story in 1983 in a newspaper in New Delhi, India.19 The
use of press from non-aligned countries served to provide the veneer of legitimacy and avoid
direct attribution of the source. An anonymous Indian journalist alleged that the Americans had
created AIDS in a lab in Maryland. The story percolated on the backburner until 1986, when
an East German scientist, who was born in Leningrad, proposed a hypothesis with his wife and
another scientist that the virus had come into existence at the same time as the opening of the
Maryland lab.20 The Soviets then broadcast the story on their print, radio, and TV news, resulting
in significant international coverage and damaging U.S. interests and its reputation.

Operation Infektion gained traction because the Soviets slowly planted evidence and leads needed
to provide “proof ” in third countries to undermine the United States. The Soviet Union could
then amplify these stories with deniability. The Soviets did not stop until the Reagan Administra-
tion threatened to withhold scientific cooperation with the USSR.21 In 1992, Yevgeniy Primakov,
the then Director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, officially stated that the campaign

16 Ibid.
17 “Soviet ‘Active Measures’: Forgery, Disinformation, and Political Operations,” Special Report No. 88, U.S. De-
partment of State, October 1981.
18 The Non-Aligned Movement concept was introduced in 1955, and allowed member states to remain formally
neutral during the Cold War. NAM countries did not side with the United States or the Soviet Union. See “Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM),” Nuclear Threat Initiative, https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/non-
aligned-movement-nam/.
19 Cull et al., “Soviet Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda.”
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
 Estonia: The First Battle in the Modern Disinformation War 6

was run by its predecessor organization, the KGB.22 Despite the confession, and the collapse of
the Soviet Union, Operation Infektion continued to retain salience globally; once promulgat-
ed, rumors and conspiracy theories are difficult to counteract. The rumor was attractive to begin
with due to historical distrust in developing nations and even within the United States, with its
own history of medical experimentation on unsuspecting African American victims.23 The Soviet
Union was adept at exploiting existing societal fissures in their disinformation operations and
avoided attribution through third parties.

Due to its longevity and public disclosure, Operation Infektion is among the most notable Soviet
influence operations. After a brief lull following the end of the Cold War, the Kremlin continued
to deploy similar tactics around the world. For countries immediately bordering Russia, such as
Estonia, disinformation never really vanished.

Estonia to E-stonia: Rapid Modernization Contends with Historical Grievance

Estonia has a strong ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identity. Following the illegal annexation of
Estonia in 1940 as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany, the Soviets moved
thousands of government, military, and other families to Estonia as part of Stalin’s Sovietization
campaign across the newly occupied areas of Eastern Europe. In addition, the Soviet regime de-
ported tens of thousands ethnic Estonians beyond the Urals. As a result, by 1991, when Estonia
reclaimed its independence, the ethnic Russian population in Estonia had increased from 23,000
to 475,000, a sizable proportion in a country with a total population of only 1.3 million.24

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonia tried to establish itself as a fully independent
state and looked to integrate with the West, but many ethnic Russians were left out from the
benefits of “E-stonia’s” rapid technological and economic advancement. After independence, the
Estonian government did not offer citizenship to ethnic Russians living in Estonia (except for
families and descendants of those who had lived in Estonia prior to Soviet occupation) and re-
turned land to ethnic Estonians under the government’s de-collectivization efforts.25 Until today,
fluency in Estonian is a requirement for Estonian citizenship, leaving more than 75,000 people
living in Estonia—or nearly 6 percent of Estonia’s population—stateless, as of 2019.26 Carrying a
special grey passport that labels them as “aliens,” albeit legal residents, these ethnic Russians com-

22 Grimes, Robert David, “Russian fake news is not new: Soviet Aids propaganda cost countless lives,” The Guard-
ian, June 14, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2017/jun/14/russian-fake-news-is-not-new-soviet-
aids-propaganda-cost-countless-lives.
23 Ellick, Adam and Terry Gross, “Inside The Russian Disinformation Playbook: Exploit Tension, Sow Chaos,”
NPR, November 15, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/11/15/668209008/inside-the-russian-disinformation-play-
book-exploit-tension-sow-chaos.
24 This case study uses “ethnic Russians” to refer to all those in Estonia with cultural ties to Russia and who have re-
stricted access to citizenship rights; Pomerantsev, Peter, This is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality
(New York: Public Affairs, 2019).
25 Greene, David, “Russian Minority Struggles In Post-Soviet Estonia,” NPR, August 23, 2010, https://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129333023.
26 “Number of stateless residents in Estonia drops by over 2,200 in 2018,” EER, January 3, 2019, https://news.err.
ee/891967/number-of-stateless-residents-in-estonia-drops-by-over-2-200-in-2018.
7 Lessons for Democracies Fighting Hybrid Warfare

plain of frequent discrimination. They lack the right to vote in national elections, and they have
limited access to educational and job opportunities.27 Some Estonian officials do not think that
ethnic Russians face discriminationand that they have been treated rather well in comparison to
the treatment that Estonians experienced under Soviet occupation.28 Still, this de facto segrega-
tion of ethnic Russians and Estonians created a fertile breeding ground for ethnic tensions and
ethnicity-based narratives.

These ethnic tensions also surfaced in discussions over Estonia’s historic relationship with Rus-
sia. Since World War 2, ethnic Russians and war veterans have celebrated Victory Day without
much fanfare. Most of these festivities centered around the Bronze Soldier statue in Tallinn. The
Bronze Soldier has a mixed history; the Soviets erected the statue to commemorate their “liber-
ation” of Estonia from Nazi Germany despite the fact the USSR and Germany used the Molo-
tov-Ribbentrop Pact to divide Central and Eastern Europe into their spheres of control.29

Image: The Presidential Press and Information Office, 2018 Mosccow Victory Day Parade, May 9, 2-18, Wikimedia Commons, accessed July 14, 2021, https://com-
mons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2018_Moscow_Victory_Day_Parade_29.jpg

Victory Day celebrations regained importance after Vladimir Putin’s inauguration as Russian
president in 2000. As Russia underwent the process of decommunization—dismantling the sym-
bols and remnants of its communist legacy— its national narrative began to emphasize even more
“Russia’s” World War II history and victories. According to this portrayal, Russia was the modern
and original anti-facist power that saved Europe. Connecting with, influencing,, and “protect-
ing” Russian diaspora communities in Russia’s “near abroad” became the Kremlin’s narrative, a
direct response by Putin to a supposed threat from the United States and its allies encroaching

27 Greene, “Russian Minority Struggles In Post-Soviet Estonia.”

28 Ibid.
29 Jankowicz, Nina, How to Lose the Information War: Russia, Fake News, and the Future of Conflict (London: I.B.
Tauris, 2020), p. 24.
 Estonia: The First Battle in the Modern Disinformation War 8

on its western border by accepting the Baltic nations into the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) in 2004.30 Putin famously warned at the 2007 Munich Security Conference that
NATO enlargement into the post-Soviet space would lead to instability in the region, a threat
that directly contradicts the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which reaffirmed countries’ rights to join
international organizations and alliances as it sees fit.31

Some Estonian government officials stated they observed a noticeable uptick in the use of Soviet
symbols, and commented that the Russian Embassy in Tallinn directly supported the symbols’
allure and the increased intensity in Victory Day celebrations.32 Similarly, Nashy, a nationalist
youth group funded by the Russian government, started attending the Victory Day celebra-
tions in 2005.33 This coincided with a change in narrative on Russia’s domestic and international
Russian-language media, which increasingly echoed nostalgia for its World War II glory. Russia
Today, more commonly known as RT, launched in September 2005, and according to a report
from Estonia’s Internal Security Agency (KAPO), Russian news outlets in the Baltics focused
on elevating a proud Russian identity, reducing anti-Russian sentiment, and keeping Russia’s ties
and influence in the region strong.34 Russian television stories about Estonia were not positive,
but rather exacerbated feelings of disillusion among ethnic Russians, especially those living near
Narva in northeastern Estonia on the border with Russia.

When a small faction of more extreme and strident ethnic Russians began visiting the monu-
ment in larger numbers, Estonians began to pay attention.35 As one journalist commented, the
appearance of Soviet flags near the monument made some Estonians feel that both their coun-
try’s flag and their historical suffering were being insulted.36 Press reports from the time suggest
Estonian nationalists were particularly incensed by the appearance of Soviet flags, red carnations,
and other memorabilia from the Soviet era whenever May 9, or Victory Day, approached.37
Those Estonians opposed to the Bronze Statue’s location perceived it as an affront to Estonian
suffering during World War II, and that it belied the fact thousands of Estonians were sent to
forced labor camps in Siberia during the period. Furthermore, there were no similarly situated
monuments celebrating Estonian independence in prominent, and central locations.

30 Ibid, p. 26-27.
31 Thom Shanker and Mark Landler, “Putin Says U.S. Is Undermining Global Stability,” The New York Times, Febru-
ary 11, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/world/europe/11munich.html.
32 Kaitsepolitseiamet, “Annual Review 2007,” available at https://www.kapo.ee/en/content/annual-reviews.html.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Jankowicz, p.31.
36 Ibid.
37 Mardiste, David, “Russia to Estonia: Don’t Move Our Statue,” Reuters, January 25, 2007, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-estonia-russia-statue/russia-to-estonia-dont-move-our-statue-idUSL2378719620070125.
9 Lessons for Democracies Fighting Hybrid Warfare

Image: Country Map and Locator Map, CIA World Factbook, accessed July 14, 2021, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/estonia/

Some Estonians tried to remedy this in 2004 by installing a monument in Lihula in western
Estonia to commemorate those who fought against Bolshevism and for Estonian liberation from
1940-1945.38 The memorial featured a soldier in a uniform similar to World War 2 era German
S.S. battledress. This drew condemnation from the international community, and the Estonian
government ordered the memorial’s removal. After remarks by the prime minister at the time
that Estonia did not condone glorification of totalitarianism, Lihula residents were furious. The
remarks led many to question, not without basis, why Soviet monuments remained in their
country.39

The ongoing conflict over monuments flared up during the 2006-2007 parliamentary election
season in Estonia. The Reform Party and the Fatherland League Party took on the mantle of
standing for national identity to protect against external threats. Conversely, the Centre Party
aimed to marshal the Russian minority’s support in the election. The politicization of the monu-
ments debate intensified ahead of the elections in March 2007.40

38 Smith, David J., “Woe from Stones: Commemoration, Identity Politics and Estonia’s ‘War of Monuments’,” Jour-
nal of Baltic Studies 39, no. 4 (2008), p. 424.
39 Ibid.
40 Smith, p. 425.
 Estonia: The First Battle in the Modern Disinformation War 10

Russian Tactics and Objectives

Amid rising tensions around the symbolism of the Bronze Soldier and the statue’s role as a
gathering point for Russian nationalists, the Estonian parliament voted in January 2007 to move
the statue from the center of Tallinn to a military cemetery on the outskirts of the city.41 Follow-
ing this decision, officials across the Russian government launched a coordinated disinformation
campaign that fueled tensions leading up to and in the wake of the “Bronze Night.” Russian state
television, with its audience of approximately 75 percent of Estonia’s ethnic Russian minority at
the time,42 repeatedly accused the Estonian government of being “fascists” that were seeking to
desecrate a Soviet war memorial.43 News outlets even labeled the country “eSStonia,” in reference
to the infamous Nazi S.S. death squads.44 In addition to these accusations, which played into the
historic tensions between Russia and Estonia, Russian state television networks falsely claimed
that the Estonian authorities had cut the Bronze Soldier into pieces. The networks disseminated
a doctored image that showed only the boots of the statue remaining on its platform.45 During
the protests of the Bronze Night, Russian TV outlets also falsely reported that one person who
died had been killed by the Estonian police.46 While social media was still in its infancy at the
time, Russian actors used the online comment sections of Estonian newspapers and even an
Estonian dating website to spread disinformation related to the Bronze Soldier.47 Russian media
also claimed the Estonian government controlled and manipulated Estonia’s news networks.48

In addition to spreading disinformation aimed at undermining the credibility of the Estonian

government and media (thereby delegitimizing Estonia’s counter-messaging strategies) Krem-
lin-linked actors carried out cyber attacks against a number of Estonian entities. Estonia is inter-
nationally renowned for its highly digitized society, hence its “E-stonia” nickname.49 Estonians
can vote online, file their taxes online, and the country’s entire school system has been digitized
since the late 1990s. Estonia has even declared the right to internet access a human right.50

However, this has made Estonia more vulnerable to attacks on its digital infrastructure. Following
the events of the Bronze Night, networks of linked computers—so-called “botnets”— launched a

41 Juurvee, Ivo and Mariita Mattiisen, The Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007: Revisiting an Early Case of Hybrid Conflict
(Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security, 2020), https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ICDS_
Report_The_Bronze_Soldier_Crises_of_2007_Juurvee_Mattiisen_August_2020.pdf.
42 Lucas, Edward and Peter Pomerantsev, Winning the Information War Techniques and Counter-strategies to Russian
Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis, 2016), https://
cepa.org/cepa_files/2016-CEPA-report-Winning_the_Information_War.pdf.
43 Jankowicz, p. 29.
44 Pomerantsev, p. 61.
45 See Juurvee and Mariita Mattiisen, p. 21; and Lucas and Pomerantsev, pp. 22-23.
46 Pomerantsev, p. 61.
47 Juurvee and Mattiisen, p. 21.
48 Lucas and Pomerantsev, p. 23.
49 Mansel, Tim, “How Estonia became E-stonia,” BBC, May 16, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/busi-
ness-22317297.
50 Alexander, Leigh and Matt Shore, “Internet access is now a basic human right: part 2 - Chips with Everything
tech podcast,” The Guardian, August 4, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/audio/2016/aug/04/internet-
access-human-right-2-tech-podcast.
11 Lessons for Democracies Fighting Hybrid Warfare

series of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) cyberattacks on Estonia’s internet infrastructure.51

The attacks, which have been primarily attributed to Russian actors, took down over 50 websites,
including that of Estonia’s largest bank and several online newspapers.52
Russia pursued two objectives through its disinformation campaign. Above all, the Kremlin
wanted to undermine the Estonian government’s credibility in the eyes of its Western allies.53
The “Bronze Night’”occurred just a few years after Estonia joined NATO in 2004. Russia per-
ceived Estonian NATO membership as a threat to Russian security. Operationally, the objective
of the disinformation campaign was to stoke tensions between the country’s ethnic Estonian and
ethnic Russian populations.54 By seizing on the existing historic divisions between the two ethnic
groups, Russian actors sought to create an image of an Estonian government that disadvantages
its Russian-speaking population, thereby also helping the Russian government to justify a more
aggressive foreign policy to its own citizens.

Estonian Government Response

The hybrid attacks served as an alarm bell for the Estonian government. Following the Bronze
Night and the subsequent cyber attacks, the Estonian government undertook numerous initia-
tives to defend itself. These included, first, the immediate steps of responding to the assault and
securing the country; and second, addressing the proactive, long-term societal issues undergirding
the crisis.

Immediate and defensive efforts

The Kremlin never took responsibility for the DDoS attacks, for supporting the actual protests
and upheaval near the Bronze Soldier statue, for the online disinformation campaigns, or the
erroneous news stories after the statue’s removal. Still, many Estonian officials at the time believe
the Russian government was directly involved.55

As Estonians came to terms with the physical effects of the cyber attack, the government decided
to shut down large parts of its internet infrastructure to searches or requests from foreign internet
addresses, which complicated Estonia’s ability to communicate with the world.56 However, this
enabled the state to get online banking, government services, and other e-services up and running
again within a month.57 Thereafter, the government also spent more than a decade building up its
cybersecurity and protecting itself from cyber attacks. In order to maintain and strengthen citizen
trust in democracy, Estonia invested in technology to protect its election infrastructure. While re-
nowned for its e-government, technological advancement, and cybersecurity, Estonia also focused
on the longer term struggle of integration and forging a common, positive national identity.

51 Grassegger and Krogerus, “Fake news and botnets.”

52 Juurvee and Mattiisen, The Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007.
53 Lucas and Pomerantsev, p. 21.
54 Ibid.
55 Jankowicz, p. 40.
56 “A cyber-riot,” The Economist, May 10, 2007, https://www.economist.com/europe/2007/05/10/a-cyber-riot.
57 Ibid.
 Estonia: The First Battle in the Modern Disinformation War 12

Longitudinal efforts: societal integration and identity cohesion

Education is an integral aspect of Estonia’s efforts to create an inclusive identity. To address ed-
ucational segregation, the government focused on providing opportunities for ethnic Russians in
primary, secondary, and university-level education. About 20 percent of students study in Rus-
sian-language primary and secondary schools and some Russian students do not encounter an
ethnic-Estonian student until they enter university.58 Many ethnic Russians felt higher education
opportunities were not available to them since their Estonian or English-language skills were not
sufficient.59 This educational segregation also resulted from differences in curriculum, where Rus-
sian-language teachers were educated with a different version of history from Estonian-language
teachers.60

In 1999, the Estonians attempted to counter this educational segregation by establishing Narva
Collegein the region where the majority Russian language population lives. Following the Bronze
Soldier crisis, the government brought additional initiatives to the region, such as funding and
re-locating the Integration Foundation to Narva in 2018.61 The Foundation provides Estonian
language immersion programs, with some preparing to take the language exam required for
Estonian citizenship.62 This crucial initiative allows for ethnic Russians to unlock additional job
opportunities, quality higher-education, and citizenship benefits.

The government also sought to limit the scope and influence of Russian state-sponsored media in
Estonia. The reach of Russia Today (RT) was in its infancy at the time of the Bronze Soldier cri-
sis. Since then, the Estonians have developed their own Russian-language channel called ETV+,
with an annual budget of $4.8 million.63 The channel has a public broadcasting model, featuring
local individuals, with the aim of attracting viewers through its localized focus, despite its small
budget.64 The channel aims to show the Russian identity in the Estonian context. ETV+ receives
both technical assistance and monetary support from other European countries, such as Nor-
way.65 At first, more ethnic Estonians watched ETV+ in the beginning,66 but gradually, by April
2020, ethnic Russians perceived the channel as more trustworthy than stations beamed in from
Russia.67 The government also monitors Russian-language television stations and online media
for incorrect content.68 In addition, aspiring teachers take courses on media literacy to teach stu-

58 Ibid, p. 43.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid, p. 47.
62 Integration Foundation website, accessed February 23, 2021, https://www.integratsioon.ee/en.
63 Lucas and Pomerantsev.
64 Helmus, Todd C., Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Joshua Mendelsohn, William
Marcellino, Andriy Bega, and Zev Winkelman, “Russian Social Media Influence Understanding Russian Propagan-
da in Eastern Europe,” RAND Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/
RR2200/RR2237/RAND_RR2237.pdf.
65 Lucas and Pomerantsev.
66 “New Russian channel ETV+ most popular with ethnic Estonians,” The Baltic Times, October 7, 2015, https://
www.baltictimes.com/new_russian_channel_etv__most_popular_with_ethnic_estonians/.
67 Bahovski, Erkki, “First Steps Towards the Estonian Media Space,” International Centre for Defence and Security,
April 2, 2020, https://icds.ee/en/first-steps-towards-the-estonian-media-space/#:~:text=For%20instance%2C%20
in%20January%202020,are%20very%20slow%20to%20change.
68 Wallace, Savannah, “Estonia: The First Digitally Literate Country,” The Startup Blog, July 25, 2020, https://medi-
um.com/swlh/the-first-digitally-literate-country-e9dbc1d0695.
13 Lessons for Democracies Fighting Hybrid Warfare

dents as young as kindergarteners.69 The Estonian government requires all high school students
to take a 35-hour media literacy and manipulation awareness course.70 Taken together, these and
other efforts have likely led to Estonia consistently ranking high on Open Society Institute’s
Media Literacy Index.71

Creating a positive, integrated, cultural identity is another facet of Estonia’s strategy. Estonia, in
conjunction with its neighbors, established the Baltic Culture Fund in 2018 to fund cooperation
in cultural and arts projects. The Fund builds cultural pride and highlights minority regions and
ethnicities, including Russians, to highlight they are a part of Baltic identity.72 Recent polling
suggests the above integration and cultural initiatives are having an impact with 86 percent of
ethnic Russians identifying with the Estonian state, “outranking even ethnic Estonians, among
whom 79 percent” responded similarly.73

Estonia’s varied domestic responses reflected a multi-pronged strategy of addressing both short
term and long term security threats, but it was not alone and collaborated with its Baltic neigh-
bors and other countries on defending itself and its allies from influence operations.

Fighting Disinformation in the Baltics and Beyond

The events of the Bronze Night alerted not just the Estonian government but also its Baltic
neighbors and subsequently the broader international community to the threat of disinforma-
tion and hybrid warfare. The Baltic states used their close relationship with NATO to spearhead
several international institutions that would fight disinformation, cyberattacks, and other types of
hybrid warfare.

Approximately one year after the Bronze Night, NATO established the Cooperative Cyber De-
fence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, thanks to Estonia’s initiative, its two Baltic
neighbors, and four other NATO members.74 The center serves as a hub to coordinate NATO’s
cybersecurity training and research and is known for publishing the Tallinn Manual on the In-
ternational Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. In 2014, again following an initiative by Esto-
nia, Latvia, and Lithuania, NATO opened the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
(StratCom COE) in Riga, Latvia.75 And in 2017, the EU and NATO created the The European
Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) in Helsinki, Finland, to

69 Silbak, Andra, Kadri Ugar, and Kristi Vinter, “Media and Information Literacy Policies in Estonia,” University of
Tartu, May 2013, http://ppemi.ens-cachan.fr/data/media/colloque140528/rapports/ESTONIA_2014.pdf, p. 13.
70 Bryant, Christa Case, “Cybersecurity 2020: What Estonia knows about thwarting Russians,” Christian Science
Monitor, February 4, 2020, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2020/0204/Cybersecurity-2020-What-Esto-
nia-knows-about-thwarting-Russians.
71 “2019 Media Literacy Index (Europe),” Open Society Institute Sofia, November 2019, https://osis.bg/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/11/MediaLiteracyIndex2019_-ENG.pdf.
72 Thomas, Matthew, “Baltic Bulletin: Defeating Disinformation Threats,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, Febru-
ary 19, 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/02/defeating-disinformation-threats/.
73 Jankowicz, 49.
74 “About us,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, https://ccdcoe.org/about-us/.
75 “About us,” NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-us.
 Estonia: The First Battle in the Modern Disinformation War 14

improve coordination between the two organizations in response to disinformation and other
hybrid threats.76 The three Baltic States have also increased cooperation on fighting disinforma-
tion through regional intergovernmental organizations, including the Baltic Assembly and the
Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8).77 Even regular Baltic citizens joined the fight against disinformation.
Networks of internet users took it upon themselves to fight pro-Russian trolls on Facebook and
other social media websites, earning them the nickname “Baltic Elves.”78

Yet, while Estonia’s experience with Russian information warfare in 2007 served as an initial
warning to other countries, fighting disinformation did not become an urgent issue outside the
Baltic region until several years later. It took Russia’s use of similar tactics to stir conflicts on its
periphery in subsequent years for the international community to pay attention. Both the 2008
Russo-Georgian war and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 were precipitated by protests
sparked, in part, on social media before escalating into military conflict.79 The war in eastern
Ukraine, in particular, has highlighted the damage that disinformation as a tool of hybrid warfare
can cause.80 Like in Estonia, the Kremlin relied on Russian-controlled media, ranging from tele-
vision to radio and the internet, to disseminate disinformation in Ukraine by labeling Ukrainian
soldiers as criminals and fascists.81 In one instance, a Russian TV network spread a false story that
Ukrainian uniformed personnel crucified a child in a town in eastern Ukraine, in an effort to fo-
ment resentment against the Ukrainian government.82 From the beginning of the conflict, when
the Russian government denied the presence of heavily armed Russian forces in Crimea to a vast
net of conspiracy theories surrounding Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 (with evidence pointing
to the Russian military and its proxies as the perpetrators), Kremlin-sponsored disinformation
has become a staple in the Russian invasion and ongoing occupation of Crimea as a part of its
aggression against Ukraine.83

The proliferation of disinformation also spurred the European Union into action. In March 2015,
the European Council, which convenes the leaders of all EU member states, highlighted “the
need to challenge Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns” in Ukraine.84 As a result, the Euro-

76 “Establishment,” Hybrid CoE - The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, https://
www.hybridcoe.fi/establishment/.
77 Thomas, “Baltic Bulletin: Defeating Disinformation Threats.”
78 Weiss, Michael, “The Baltic Elves Taking on Pro-Russian Trolls,” The Daily Beast, March 20, 2016, https://www.
thedailybeast.com/the-baltic-elves-taking-on-pro-russian-trolls?ref=scroll.
79 Grassegger and Krogerus, “Fake news and botnets.”
80 For more background, see Walker, Vivian S., Case 331: State Narratives in Complex Media Environments: The Case
of Ukraine (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2015).
81 Viljar Veebel, “Russian Propaganda, Disinformation, and Estonia’s Experience,” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
October 4, 2015, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/10/russian-propaganda-disinformation-and-estonias-experi-
ence/.
82 Kinstler, Linda, “How to Survive a Russian Hack: Lessons from Eastern Europe and the Baltics,” The Atlantic,
February 2, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/russia-disinformation-baltics/515301/.
83 Dougherty, Jill, “Everyone Lies: The Ukraine Conflict and Russia’s Media Transformation,” Harvard Kennedy
School Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy, July 2014, https://shorensteincenter.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2014/07/d88-dougherty.pdf.
84 “European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) – Conclusions,” European Council, March 20, 2015,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21888/european-council-conclusions-19-20-march-2015-en.pdf.
15 Lessons for Democracies Fighting Hybrid Warfare

pean External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic corps, created the East StratCom Task Force,
a strategic communications unit tasked exclusively with debunking pro-Kremlin disinformation
in Ukraine and the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood. This was followed by a series of initiatives, in-
cluding the Code of Practice on disinformation—a voluntary, self-regulatory agreement for social
media companies to address disinformation on their platforms—to the EU’s Action Plan on dis-
information, which seeks to coordinate EU efforts to counter disinformation and make European
society more resilient to its impact.85 Fighting disinformation was also one of the three priorities
of the European Democracy Action Plan, released in December 2020.86

Conclusion

From the proving grounds of Estonia and Ukraine, to increasingly routine application at home,
the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns eventually spread across the world. If the events around
the “Bronze Night” served as a warning shot of what was to come, it mostly fell on deaf ears
outside Eastern Europe. The proliferation of Russian disinformation in Ukraine elicited a great-
er international response, particularly from the European Union. But it would take another two
years after the illegal occupation of Crimea in 2014 for the United States and much of the rest
of the world to awaken to the threat that disinformation poses. Following reports of Russian
interference in the 2016 “Brexit” referendum—the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the EU—and,
most notably, the Kremlin-linked information operations to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, “disinformation” has entered the mainstream lexicon across the globe. Since then, re-
search and debates on the effects of disinformation and how to counter it have proliferated. Amid
this surging interest in disinformation, more scholars and analysts have turned to study Estonia’s
experience before, during, and after the Bronze Night to draw valuable lessons from this first
battle in the modern disinformation war.

85 “Tackling online disinformation,” European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/tack-

ling-online-disinformation.
86 “European Democracy Action Plan: making EU democracies stronger,” European Commission press release,
December 3, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2250.
 Estonia: The First Battle in the Modern Disinformation War 16

Discussion Questions

1. What makes democratic societies particularly vulnerable to disinformation? Do democra-

cies have a disadvantage in responding to these types of attacks?

2. What similarities do you see between Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election and what happened in Estonia? And what are the differences? Alternatively, feel
free to compare the case of Estonia with the impact of disinformation in a country of
your choice.

3. How has technology changed the dissemination of disinformation between 2007 and
today? Is disinformation a technological problem, a “human’”problem, or both?

4. List the 3-5 key solutions or initiatives that the Estonian government took in response to
the Bronze Soldier crisis? In your opinion, which of these solutions is the most effective
and why? Would you utilize this same approach in the United States? What challenges
do you foresee to implementing them in the United States?

5. Do you think Estonian society is “inoculated” against Russian disinformation?

6. How do you find the right balance between proactive measures to fight disinformation
(e.g. media literacy education) and reactive measures (e.g. taking down misleading posts
on social media)? What are the advantages/disadvantages of each approach?

7. How should countries address monuments linked to controversial parts of a country’s

history? Does the story of the Bronze Soldier hold any lessons for discussions around the
removal of Confederate monuments in the United States?
17 Lessons for Democracies Fighting Hybrid Warfare

Appendix

Timeline

February 1918: Estonia declares independence.

August 1939: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which establishes the
partition of most of Eastern Europe between the two powers.

June 1940: The Soviet Union occupies Estonia.

July 1941: German troops invade Estonia after Germany attacks the Soviet Union.

September 1944: The last German troops leave Tallinn and the Soviet Union reoccupies Estonia. More than
20,000 Estonians are deported under Stalin’s rule.

November 1988: Estonia issues the Estonian Sovereignty Declaration during the Singing Revolution, establishing
its de facto independence.

August 1991: Estonia regains its full independence as the Soviet Union collapses.

March 2004: All three Baltic states, including Estonia, join NATO.

May 2004: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joining the European Union.

April 2005: The Russsian government establishes the TV network Russia Today (RT).

May 9, 2006: A non-violent confrontation occurs between ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians in front of the
Bronze Soldier.

Mid-2006: A group of ethnic Russians in Estonia establish the “Night Watch’”to guard the Bronze Soldier.

January 2007: The Estonian Parliament passes the War Graves Protection Act, which places war graves under
the jurisdiction of the Estonian Ministry of Defence. The law also allowed for the later relocation of the Bronze
Soldier. The statue is first mentioned in Russian news outlets a few days later.

February 2007: Russian President Vladimir Putin delivers a speech at the annual Munich Security conference in
which he criticizes NATO expansion into the Baltics and warns that the West is undermining global stability.

April 26-29, 2007: The “Bronze Night” riots break out as the Bronze Soldier is being moved outside the city.

April 27, 2007: Estonian government websites, online newspapers, and banks, among others, are being targeted by
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) cyberattacks. The attack lasts nearly three weeks.

May 2008: The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is established in Tallinn.
 Estonia: The First Battle in the Modern Disinformation War 18

Recommended Readings and Sources

Books, reports, and articles:

● Backes, Oliver, and Andrew Swab. Cognitive Warfare The Russian Threat to Election
Integrity in the Baltic States (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, 2019).
● Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. The New Weapon of Choice: Technology and In-
formation Operations Today (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2020).
● Jankowicz, Nina. How to Lose the Information War: Russia, Fake News, and the Future of
Conflict (London: I.B. Tauris, 2020).
● Juurvee, Ivo, and Mariita Mattiisen. The Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007: Revisiting an
Early Case of Hybrid Conflict (Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security,
2020).
● Landler, Mark, and Stephen Castle. “‘No One’ Protected British Democracy From Russia,
U.K. Report Concludes.” The New York Times, June 21, 2020.
● McBrien, Tyler. “Defending the Vote: Estonia Creates a Network to Combat Disinfor-
mation, 2016-2020.” Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs,
2020.
● Pomerantsev, Peter. This is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality (New
York: Public Affairs, 2019).
● Sear, Tom. “Cyber attacks ten years on: from disruption to disinformation,” The Conversa-
tion, April 26, 2017.
● Wanless, Alicia and James Pamment. “How Do You Define a Problem Like Influence?”
Journal of Information Warfare 18, no. 3 (2019): 1-14.
● Wardle, Claire, and Hossein Derakhshan. Information Disorder: Toward an interdisci-
plinary framework for research and policymaking (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2017).
● Walker, Vivian S., Case 331: State Narratives in Complex Media Environments: The Case of
Ukraine (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2015).

Videos:
● Ellick, Adam B., and Adam Westbrook. “Operation Infektion: Russian Disinformation:
From Cold War to Kanye.” The New York Times, November 12, 2018.
● Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
“Disinformation in the Digital Age: Are Citizens Prepared?” December 1, 2020.
● Posard, Marek. “Russian Interference in the 2020 U.S. Election.” Rand Corporation,
2020.

Podcasts:
● Diplomatic Immunity. The Human Factor: Tackling Information Operations Today with
Nina Jankowicz. October, 2020.
● The Europe Desk. Russian Influence and Information Warfare. October 2019.
● The Experiment. Confronting the Legacy of Robert E. Lee. The Atlantic. March 4, 2021.