Visions of Corruption Control and the Evolution of American Public Administration

Review by: Frank Anechiarico and James B. Jacobs

Public Administration Review, Vol. 54, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1994), pp. 465-473
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 Visions
Changing ofCorruption
and
Control
Corruption
Veions
ofCorupfon
Contol Theanticorruption
tualandpolitical
hasbeenanintegral
project
reform movements
partoftheintellec-
thathaveshapedAmerican feder-

and
the
Evolufion
of al,state,andlocalgovernments
anticorruption
project includes
the20thcentury.
throughout
theideology,
The
laws,regulations,
and
administrative andinter-
strategies andintra-organizational
checks,
Public
ArnencanAdniinistraton balances,andinstitutions
andpunishing official
aimedat defining,
corruption.
identifying,
Thisproject
preventing,
hasbeencumulative.
Eachnewstageoftheanticorruption project
ratchets-upthequantity
andintensityofcorruption preventionin government andincreases
Frank Hamilton
Anechiarico, College theproject's
impact on publicadministration.Theabsence ofscan-
James
B.Jacobs,
NewYork
University ofLaw
School dalsis attributed
to anticorruptionstrategies in
already place;the
occurrenceofscandalsiscitedas proof
thatadditional
anticorruption
laws,administrative andorganizational
strategies, are
prophylactics
Whathasbeentheimpact ofcorruptioncontrol on
efforts needed.
thedevelopment andoperation ofpublicadministration? In thisarticle,
wedescribe theevolution oftheanticorruption pro-
FrankAnechiarico andJames B.Jacobs describetheevolu- ject,especially
itsassumptions, andgoals.From19thcen-
ideologies,
tionofanticorruptionn overfour
project" erassincethe tury civilservice
reformerstocontemporary inspectorsgeneral,prose-
19thcentury. Eacheraischaracterized bya particular cutors, comptrollers,andloss-prevention specialists,
pursuitofthe
visionofcorruption controlandeachvision hashadafor- publicgoodhasincluded an imageofgovernmental operations free
mative onthepractice
effect ofpublicadministration and from corruption.Despite the expansion of the definitionofcorrup-
itsdevelopment as academic discipline.Theimpact
tion,multiplicationofanticorruption andintensification
strategies, of
ofthe
control techniques,
moreintervention always seemsto be required.
anticorruption
project iscumulative;eachgeneration of
Weargue thata new,panoptic visionofcorruption controlnowinflu-
reformershasaddedrulesprocedures, andinstitutions. ences
andshapes public while
administration; itcanbetraced toearli-
Mostrecently,a panopticc" visionofcorruption-proofgov- eranticorruption reforms,ithasa distinct agendaandhasa distinct
ernment haspromoted corruption
controltoa toppriority, impact ontheoperation ofAmerican government.
competingsuccessfully withothergovernmentfinctionsfor
Ourobservations aredrawn fromthelargescholarly literature
on
influence
and resources. Theverysuccessofthecontempo- corruption andfrom ourownon-going empirical researchin New
raryanticorruption projecthastriggereda powerfulrevi- York City.Because ofNewYork City'sgargantuan government, tradi-
sionist
critiquethathighlights thetensionbetween corrup- tionofmachine politics,
visibility
in themedia,andcorpsofgood
tioncontrol
andadministrative efficiency
andeffectiveness.government reformers,ithasalways beena laboratory forcorruption-
Thepanoptic vision, insomecases,hascometodominate control experiments (Anechiarico andJacobs, 1992,pp. 580-603).
thebusiness
ofgovernment; ithasalsocontributed tothe However, ourobservationsaboutNewYorkCityshould berelevantto
antibureaucraticsentiment ofthecurrent reinvention public administrationmore generally,
particularlylargestateand local
movement.
governments.
Perhapssurprisingly,
whilemunicipal corruption
hasreceived a
gooddealofattentionfrom political
scientists
andurbanspecialists,
theconnection
between anticorruption
reform andpublicadministra-
tionhasnotbeensystematically
examined. Empirical
studies
ofurban
publicadministration
hardlypointto,muchlessemphasize,theextent
to whichgovernment is organizedto preventpublicofficials
from
engaginginbribery,
embezzlement,nepotism, favoritism,
conflicts
of
interest,
andeventheappearance ofthese species
ofdishonesty.
To a
significant
extent,
theorganization,
rules,
andenergyofurban govern-
ment arefocused
onsurveilling
andcontrolling officials
rather
thanon
theproduction
ofgovernment
outputs.

Public
Administration
Review. September/October
1994
Vol.54,No.5 465

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Table1
Visions Reform
ofAnticorruption
Corruption
ControlVision Antipatronage Progressive Management
Scientific Panoptic Revisionist

Strategy Credentialandcompe- Professionalism control

External Lawenforcement Publicentrepreneurship
tencetesting (Lewis,1980)

Perceived of
control
Partisan Partisan, pathology
unprofessional InadequateorganizationalInadequatemonitoring Bureaucratic
Causesof personnel administration controls
Corruption
Problem

KeyPolicy Meritsystem Electoral

reform,
independent reorganiza- Surveillance,
Government Marketprivatization
investigation,
Prescription commissions, tionandcentralization fiscalcontrols
teulatory
apolit-
Unis~tiexpertise,
icaladministration

of
Implications Peerenforcement Enforced ofeffi-Oversight
standards and Strong
ofagencies and
investigative debureaucra-
Decentralized
forPublic norms; controls ciency
personal spanofcontrol
appropriate auditing
agencies deempha-
tizedstructures,
Administration control
sizecorruption

Weidentifyfour ofcorruption
visions pro- thehighest
antipatronage,
control: public andpublic
principles, should
servants beexemplary
management,
scientific
gressive, andpanoptic.1 We alsoconsider a citizens. Patronage wasinimicaltoeverything thereformers thought
ofthepolicies
critique
revisionist implementingthesevisions.Revi- thepublicservice shouldbe;itcorrupted themoralfibre ofgovern-
although
sionism, appearing
first era,hasbeen ment
in theProgressive anddisgraced American democracy.
in reaction
articulated
forcefully to theemergence ofthemodern The movement to endthespoilssystem3 and to createan Ameri-
panopticvision.Although thesefourvisionsofcorruption control beganin earnest duringReconstruction. As legalhis-
can civilservice
significantly theycorrespond
overlap, stagesof torianWilliamNelsonpointsout,theattackon thespoilssystem
to parallel
roughly was
American publicadministration. the
reconstructs
Thus,thisarticle of a powerfulmoral movement thatbegan with the
thesecondphase
thathastaken
discourse placeinpublic andinthelarg- abolitionof slavery
administration (Nelson,1982,p. 121). SenatorSchurz'sreflec-
overtheproblem
ersociety ofgovernmental thepossibili-tionson themoralimpetus
corruption, reform
ofcivilservice makesthispoint:
it,andthemost
tyofsolving efficacious strategies.
remedial
theDepartments
whether
The question are
at Washington
A vision,as we areusingit,is a paradigm or weltanschauung managed wellorbadly, is,inproportion to thewholeprob-
(worldview) assumptions
thatincludes aboutthenature andcontrol of questionafterall. Neither
lem,an insignificant doesthe
humanbehavior andtheroleandpotential ofgovernment institu- whether
question ourcivilservice as itoughtto
isas efficient
tions.Thevision thatnowpredominates inlargegovernments inthe be,coverthewholeground.The mostimportant pointto
UnitedStatesis panoptic.It assumes thatofficialswillsuccumb to mymindis,howcanweremove thatelementofdemoraliza-
corrupt opportunitiesand advocates comprehensive surveillance, tionwhichthenowprevailing modeofdistributing has
office
investigation, It isbuilton 100years
strategies.
andtarget-hardening intothebodypolitic
introduced (Nelson,1982,p. 121;Ban-
ofideology,rules, legaltechniques,
institutions, andreformist ideas. 1913,p. 123).
croft,
Although thepowerful setoflawenforcement techniques thatmake
upthepanoptic aredistinct
vision from anticorruption
earlier efforts, The desireto changethenatureofleadership in American govern-
theyreinforcemany ofthegoalsthatwerearticulated bytheProgres- ment centeredon what Schurz calleddemoralization,the moral debase-
sivesatthebeginningofthe20thcentury andsubsequently elaboratedmentofcharacter bypatronage. Creating a civilservicewould"make
andexpanded generations
bysuccessive ofreformers. Likeitsprede- activepoliticsoncemoreattractive tomenofself-respect andhighpatri-
cessors,thepanopticvisionhascriticalimplications forgovernment otic (Schurz,
aspirations" 1893, p. 121; Rosenbloom, 1985, p. 7).
organizationandpublicadministration. Ifanything, itsimplications JuliusBing,anotherimportant proponent of civilservicereform,
areevenmoresignificant,because itsadherentsurgea muchbroader clearly sawtheantipatronage campaign as a moralimperative.
definitionofcorruptionandmuchgreater authority forcorruption-
controlinstitutions. Atpresent,thereis no organizationsavethatofcorruption;
nosystem savethatofchaos;no testofintegritysavethatof
savethatofintrigue...we
notestofqualification
partisanship;
of
Vision
TheAntipatronage haveto dealwitha wide-spread
countryinthecollection
evil,whichdefrauds the
that
oftaxeson a scaleso gigantic
Corruption 1870-1900
Control, thecommissioners ofrevenue, andTrea-
assessors,
collectors,
suryofficers- atleastthoseofthemwhoarehonest-bow
Civilservicereformers ofthe19thcentury
in thelastquarter theirheadsinshameanddespair.We havetodealwithan
thatgovernment
believed couldbe managedforthepublicgoodby evilthatismanifesthereandthere andeverywhere (Hoogen-
rather
experts thanbypatronage, andgraft.Corruption
cronyism, boom,1961,p. 1;Bing,1868,pp.233,236).
andgraft,accordingto civilservice likeCarlSchurz
reformers and
LeonardWhite,wastheresultoftheparty-dominated, informal, The desireto transformgovernment governmental
by reforming
organization
unprofessional to personnel
According
ofurbanadministration.2 administration move-
poweredone of themostsignificant
publicservice
thereformers, of
andshowcase
shouldbetherepository mentsin the of
history Americanpublicgovernment.The that
belief

466 PublicAdministration 1994Vol.54,No.5

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 Wilsonproposed as thefirst ofpublicadminis-
Like
integrity principle
its the
predecessors,
panoptic
vision
has
critical administration
tration. Frank
Similarly, Goodnow arguedthat haddebased
politics
andlimited
itsutility.His solution
wasto separate
from
political administrative
functions
andto centralize
administration.
implicationsforpublic Ifanything,
its so thatprocedures
andrules
ofconduct might
government
bestandardized
(Good-
now,1900).Thesereforms,
inhisview,wouldmakepublic adminis-
implications
areeven
more because
significant,its
adherents
tration tothepublic
responsive interest
ratherthantothepolitical
and
interests
pecuniary ofparty
bosses.5
a much
urge broader
definition andmuch
ofcorruption
greater
authoritfor institutions.TheScientific
corruption-control Management
Vision,
1930-1970
Although
itsgoalswererootedin theProgressive
period,the1930s
a professional
civilservice
willassure
theintegrity
andcompetence
of generationofscientific
managers bureaucratic
emphasized control
over
publicemployees
hasnotdiminished thepastcentury.
during Con- moregeneral political
reforms.It considered
theProgressive
philosophy
siderthewaya recentNewYorkStateCommission on Governmentto be "outmodedandinsufficient
tomeettheproblemsofan industrial-
Integrity
expressed
itsobeisance
totheantipatronage
vision: ized,urbanizedworldpower"(Feinman,1981,p. 208). Seeingthem-
As theperceptionofpatronage selvesas engineers
ofcorruptioncontrol andarmedwiththeoriesofsci-
spreads,itreducestheattrac-
tiveness
ofcitygovernment service
as a career entificmanagement, theyapproached as a problemin the
corruption
andcanhavea
negative
long-termimpact onthequality ofpublicservice
that designoforganizations,
rather
thanas a problem
ofpoliticsormorals.
cannotbemeasured. Theexistence ofpatronage sapsincentive This visionof corruption-free
governmentgainedstrength and
formeritoriousserviceanddiminishes forsubstan-
penalties adherentsbytakingholdofthenewprofession ofpublicadministra-
dardperformance. Careeremployees canbecome demoralized tion. The "science"ofadministration
movedfromideologyto prac-
andcynicalabouttheir work. Whentheyarecommitted to tice,as publicadministration
emergedas a professional
discipline.
themissionoftheagency, theyseethatmission frustrated
by LeonardWhiteoftheUniversity ofChicago,alongwithFrankGood-
political
considerations.
Thecynicism maybeaccompanied by now,was responsibleforbringingtheprinciples
ofscientific
manage-
resentmentorresignation;in either
case,employees' senseof mentto thepublicsector(White,1948a,1948b,1954,1958).
professionalism
isdemeaned becauseitreceiveslimitedreward
or recognition. The bureaucraticreformers
embracedtheoriesof scientific
man-
Worse,employees seethemselves compro-
misedbecause agement, optimalspansof control,
perfectionofhierarchy,
and new
theyarerequired toparticipate
inthepatronage
practices auditingand accounting techniques.6Theybelievedthatgovern-
theyfindoffensive. And,inevitably,their
motivation
toopposecorruption mentintegrity would flowfromsound organization. Their basic
islessened (NewYorkStateCommission
onGovernment premisewas thatthecorrectdeployment ofadministrative
authority,
Integrity,1991,p. 542).
coupledwithcomprehensive monitoringand evaluation,
wouldpre-
After
decades
ofcivilservice theantipatronage
reform, visionhas ventcorruption
orquickly bringittolight.
become
accepted
political
wisdom
andevenconstitutional
dogma.4
Leonard
Whiteexpressed
thisscientific
management
visionasfollows:
Outofreform, moral
initsmotivation,
camereorganization,
TheProgressive
Visionof technical
andmanagerial in connotation.
Expertness,
once
assureditsplace,couldcontinuea steadydriveforbetter
Corruption
Control(1900-1930) standardsfromwithinrather thanfromwithout (White,
Thesecondstageoftheanticorruption project
is theProgressive 1948b,p. 16).
reform movement whichdatesapproximatelyfrom theturnofthe [We]notethefurther development
ofthetechnique oflarge-
centurytotheNewDeal. Although thisdisparate
movement drewon scalemanagement,especially
overheaddirection,
long-range
manymotivations, all Progressives
sharedthezealforgovernment planning,andtheeffective
coordinationofthepartsofa con-
integrity.
FortheProgressives,
thekeytorootingoutcorruptionwas stantlyexpandingmachine.Heregovernment maylearn
complete reformofthepolitical
system,notjustpersonnel policy. fromthemethods ofgreatindustrialorganizations,
where
Corruption controlwasnecessaryforgovernment efficiency
and similar
problemsexist(White,
1942,p. 597).
democraticaccountability.BystudyingEuropean administration,
scholars
likeWoodrow Wilsoncametobelieveinthepossibility Clearly,scientific
management had goalsotherthancorruption
ofa
systemofpublic
administration
independentofpartypolitics,
theroot control,specifically
organizational
efficiencyand rationality. Never-
causeofcorruption. thisvisionwasshapedbythebeliefthatadministrative
theless, integri-
tycouldbe achievedthrough
administrative
control.As adrministra-
WilsonandtheProgressive reformers
hada visionofa politicallytivetasksbecamemorecomplexin ever-larger bureaucracies, it
independent,
corruption-free
administration,
butlacked a fully
devel- becamemoredifficult to guarantee
integrity
through suchProgressive
opeddesign."Theobjectofadministrativestudyis to rescueexecu- innovationsas peerreview,
professional
ethics,
andvoteraccountabili-
tivemethods from theconfusionandcostliness
ofempirical experi- ty.As LutherGulickputit,a management visionparallelto hierarchi-
mentandsetthemuponfoundations laiddeepin stableprinciple"cal (scalar)controlwas needed. Gulickarguedforan administrative
(Link,1966,p. 370). Thegreatandsmallquestions
ofhuman gover- strategycalledexternalcontrol(Gulick,1941, p. vii-xi),whichhe
nancewouldbe answered bywedding American democracy's moral definedas investigative
evaluationofgovernment operations by spe-
superiority
to European administration's
scientific
superiority.The cializedofficialsexternalto theagencies.Gulickidentified external
resultwouldbe honest,democratic,
and scientifically
soundadmihis- controlas a central
component
ofscientific
managementin hisintro-
tration(Nelson,1982,p. 121). ductionto Harold Seidman's1941 studyof the New York City

Visions
ofCorruption
Control
andtheEvolution
ofAmerican
Public
Administration 467

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'G liC u and saw between
nocontradiction
Seidman
knowledge
translates intopower.Thelatest,
seeks
project
ruption toextend
andNewDeal engineering
anticor-
contemporary
mission
theProgressive
andtransform
politicians,
thatcontrols
intoa machine
andthe
viasurveillance
publicemployees
and
corruption efficiency.
control andstreet-level
bureaucrats,
criminal
ofexpanding
enforcement sanctions.
andadministrative
Department thatGulickheldout
(DOI), an agency
ofInvestigation InsteadoftheoristslikeWoodrow Wilson, engi-
oradministrative
as capable
ofprovidingthekindofscrutiny prac- neers
thatadministration likeWilliam Herlands, thecentral inthecontemporary
figures
ticerequired government
in orderto ensureefficient operations.fight against
corruption areprosecutors,
inspectors corruption
general,
GulickandSeidman sawnocontradiction corruption
between experts,
control vulnerability andfraud
auditors, Theiranticorrup-
specialists.
andefficiency;
indeedtheysawexternalcontrol condi- tionproject
as a necessary ambitious,
is extraordinarily having expanded
radically
tionofefficient administration.7
public thedefinition
of corruptionto appearance
include of ofinter-
conflict
tofully
est,failure discloseallfinancial misstatements
interests, onjob
unauthorized
applications, useofgovernment telephones,leaving
intopubliccon-
ThePanoptic as
LawEnforcement
Vision: workearly,accepting
withmorally
tracts
favors
taintedprivate
andentering
andgifts,
companies.
1970-Present
Administration,
Public Witheachcorruption expose, thecorruption-hunting apparatus
Twomajor events gaveanticorruption policyaddedstrength. forbothgreater
First, lobbies resources anda broader definition ofitsmis-
theWatergate scandal sparked a newroundofethics lawsandledto sion.11Theinevitable result is thatmorecorruption is uncovered.'2
additional powers andresources forprosecutors andinvestigators tar- Thus,thepanoptic visionofcorruption control feedson corruption
getingofficialcorruption. Second, crisis
thefiscal ofthemid-1 970sin scandals, andgenerates initiatives thathavea moreandmorepro-
NewYorkCityandelsewhere addedfiscalaccountability to the found impact onmunicipal government.
purview ofadministrators. Graft andbribery werenolonger an ade- Corruptioninthepanoptic vision isnolonger primarily attributed
quatedefinition ofcorruption, whichbythe1970scameto include toincompetence, absenteeism, laziness, andpartisan influence butto
fraud,waste, andabuse.In times offiscalausterity,itbecame corruptinadequate threats,
rules, andcontrols. Thispanoptic visionofcor-
towasteresources orabuseauthority.8 Thelevelofscrutiny ofman- ruption deemphasizesissues ofgovernmental accountability,'3 recruit-
agement behavior wasraisedconsiderably in orderto assesscompli- ment, andtraining.Itproceeds from a viewofpublicofficials, politi-
ancewithstringent ethicslawsandfiscal procedures. cians,managers,andrankandfilepersonnel as seekers ofcorrupt
In 1979,JohnBollens andHenry Schmandt calledfora national opportunities andofgovernment as anorganizational form thatgen-
commitment tocorruption control. erates
abundant opportunities for corruption (Marx, 1992, pp. 151-
172).Corruptionistobeexpected, andallpublicemployees aresus-
It istimethatweas a nationfaceuptothefactthatpolitical pect.NewYorkreform commissions inthelate1980sconcluded that
corruption is a problem ofmajorproportions callingforour systemic wereinadequate
strategies (GreenandFeerick, 1991;New
serious attention andfullcommitment to itsamelioration. YorkStateOrganized CrimeTaskForce,1991),andthetimehad
Up to thistimeourapproach haslackeddetermination and cometoapplythecriminal lawmodelbaseduponsurveillance, inves-
will. We haveshowntoolittleawareness ofthemagnitude punishment,
tigation, anddeterrence. Atthesametime, accounting,
andimpact ofofficialwrongdoing andtoolittle concern for anddiverse
auditing, other controls havealsoexpanded andintensi-
itssolution.... Support forremedialmeasures andtheirvig- ofinvestigation
fied.Thepriorities andprosecution nowdetermine
orousenforcement hasbeenlessthanenthusiastic, andthe ofauthority
thestructure andcontrol inadministrative agencies. The
publicanger displayed whenoutrageous
intermittently abuses kindofstructuralchanges thatmotivate, andareexpected to result
ofoffice cometo lighthasquickly declined.The failure to from,thepanopticapproach should notbeconfused withthepolitical
proceed moredecisively againstwrongdoing bygovernment reformsdemanded bytheProgressives orbytoday's advocates ofrein-
personnel mayreflect on ourparttoexam-
an unwillingness ventedgovernment. Instead, thepurpose ofadministrative reformis
ine critically thenormsthatgovernourprivate behavior todeterandprevent corruption byestablishing a system ofthorough
(Bollens andSchmandt, 1979,pp.249-250). andefficient
observation.
IftheProgressives generated moraltheory and scientificmanagers Thepanoptic visionregards publicemployees as akinto proba-
engineered controlstructure, contemporary corruption controllers tionersinthecriminal justice system. Theirroutine istobegoverned
emphasize lawenforcement The political,
strategies.9 legal,andinsti- bya comprehensive system ofadministrative/criminal laws,enforced
tutionallegaciesof pastvisionsremain,butthevisionof contempo- bylawenforcement agencies usinga fullarray ofinvestigative tools,
raryreformers is of publicadministration fraught withcorruption including covertoperations. Thissystem is to be backedbythreat
vulnerabilitythatcan onlybe addressed by comprehensive adminis- andsanctions, including jail,fines, andjobandpension forfeiture.
and law enforcement
organizational,
trative, strategies.Theyhave
adoptedor inventedtechnologies, and routinesthat
institutions, Thepanoptic visionhasledto theexpansionofanti-corruption
striveforintensivescrutinyof publicemployees.Althoughthese and
institutions and
strategies, toenhancementof the ofanti-
authority
techniquesareclearly to
successors external
controland otherearlier units
corruption and The
personnel. are
examples
following illustrative
approaches,whentakentogether, in kind ofvarious
a difference
theyconstitute components ofthecontemporary project.
anticorruption
fromearliermethods.
The newestvisionofcorruption Vulnerability
controlcallsto mindthepanoptic Corruption
Assessments
idealdescribed
byJeremy Bentham andMichel Bentham's
Foucault.10 vulnerability
Corruption arean excellent
assessments of
example
designfora prisonin whichall inmateactivity ofmodern-day
wouldbe observable howtheapparatus corruptioncontrolhasbecome
froma louveredand unobservable towerwasusedbyFoucault morepenetrating.
central SeveralagenciesofNew YorkCitygovernment
as a metaphor gazeofthemodernstate;a gazethat conductcorruption
fortheaggressive assessments,
vulnerability whichmeasurethe

468 Public Review

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Vol.54,No.5
1994

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 Performance
The
Auditing
panoptic has
vision ledtothe
expansion
of Inthepast,government accounting centered ontheverification of
expenditures. Untilthelate 1970s,comptroller auditsmostly
anti-corruption institutions and and
strategies, to involved checking invoices against appropriations andcontracts or
purchase orders.Therevolution inauditing initiated bythefederal
enhancement ofthe authority ofanti-corruptionagency General Accounting Office (GAO)focused on performance: didthe
getwhatitpaidforand,ifnot,whynot?Shortly thereafter,
thegoalexpanded toinclude prevention ofwaste, fraud, andabuse,14
unitsand personnel andthelinebetween corruption bythegovernment andcorruption
potentialfor
corruption inherent inanagency's operations andorgani- against thegovernment blurred.15
zation.The NewYorkCityComptroller's Office(Comptroller's
Directive
1, 1985),"requires headstoconduct a review ofthe According to themodern-day anticorruption project, it is no
agency
adequacyofinternal controls longer sufficientfor government auditors merely to certify that there
bySeptember 30 ofeachyearandfilean
'AgencyFinancial Statement"' was authorization for all expenditures. The comptroller's office and
IntegrityCompliance (NewYorkCity
Comptroller,1985,p. 1-1).Thelanguage ofDirective 1 states: other auditing agencies are responsiblefor assessing the strengths and
weaknesses ofeachagency's internal controlsystem. Thistaskclosely
Internal controlsaredesigned toencourage adherence to resembles theDOI's corruption vulnerabilityaudits(itisnotunusual
managerial policies.To evaluatecontrols,managers should fora particularagency, onceithascomeunder suspicion, tobeaudit-
ask,"What cangowrong with myoperation?", and"What edbytwoorthree agencies atthesametime.)
canI dotoprevent it?"...Controlsconsistofalltheproce-
duresanagency usedtosafeguard resources,provide accurate
information, andassure adherence toapplicablelaws, regula- Internal Surveillance
tionsandpolicies. A number ofagencies conduct covert observations ofmunicipal
Control systems include bothadministrative andinternal operations. TheDOI, theFBI,theNewYorkStatePolice,andthe
accounting controls. Administrativecontrolsencompass all NewYorkStateOrganized CrimeTaskForceall haveconducted
agency activities.Theirpurpose isto insure thatagency undercover operations in cityagencies, usually focusing on low-level
objectives aremeteconomically, andeffectively. employees.
efficiently Thetechniques vary, butoften include "sting" operations
Internal accounting controlsarethose related
toauthorizing inwhich investigators
poseascontractors orprivate citizensproffering
andreporting transactions.Theydealwith thereliability
of bribes (forexample, tobuilding inspectors),electronic surveillance of
accounting reportsandthesafeguarding ofassets (NewYork interactions between cityemployees andcitizens, andtheuseof
CityComptroller, 1985,p. 1-4). undercover agents andfieldassociates. Theformer areplacedtem-
porarily in thetargeted agency and the latterare "moles," regular
Thedirective goeson to discuss thecontrol environment andto agency
includeundertherubric ofinternal employees whoarerecruited to operate as long-term infor-
control theattitude ofsenior mants.In
management. TheDepartment 1990,DOI conducted one investigation for every 150 city
ofInvestigation'sCorruption Preven- employees.
tionManagement Review Bureau alsorequires annual corruptionvul-
nerability
assessments. Itthenselects specificagencies andoperations Thesetechniques andthepanoptic visionthatactivates them have
forintensiveaudits, whichmaylastformonths.Theseassessments a profound impactonadministrative operationsandculture. Itmight
include
everything from management structure tothedaily conduct of notbeanexaggeration tosaythatinsomeagencies corruption control
individual
employees, tothemeasurement oftheagency's product. is givena higher priority thangovernmental outputs suchas service
deliveryandinfrastructure maintenance. Asoneformer commissioner
Investigative
Auditing put it, "It'smore important to look honest than to getanything
done."16
Theusualpapertrails requiredbyauditguidelinesdo notalways
leadto theperpetrators ofwaste,fraud, andabuse.Government Interest in linkingthediscovery ofcrimeto morebasicpolitical
accountantshavesetasidetheir green forNagrarecordersandadministrative
eye-shades flaws inagency organization
haswaned.Thecon-
andmicrocameras.Several agencies
withauditjurisdictionin the nection between externalcontrolandbetter administration
haserod-
NewYorkCitygovernment haveadoptedthetechniquesofundercov- ed;corruption controlisnow a basicservice
competingforresources.
ersurveillanceto followthemoneypaidoutin contracts andto Forexample, after
thescandals inthethirdterm ofMayor Edward
observehowmoney is handled bypublicemployees. Theleaderin I. Koch'sadministration (1985-1989), thepanoptic visioncameto
thisnewkindofauditing is theNewYorkCitycomptroller. The dominate all areasofmunicipal administrationthatmayhavebeen
comptroller's
SpecialInvestigationsUnit(SPIN)hascity-wide juris- vulnerabletocorruption. Intheareaofcontract regulation,
many ser-
diction.
It investigates
notonlypossible fraudbycitycontractors,but vicesandgoodsthatwereprocured through "request
forproposal"
thebackground andintegrity oftheirfamilies
andassociatesJacobs wererequired toconvert to"lowest responsible
bidder"systems.This
andAnechiarico, 1992,pp.64-76). anticorruption reformcaused major disruptions
oflong-termrelation-
Another auditing
technique gaining
popularity
withanticorruption shipsbetween thecity,anditsconsultants, vendors,andcontractors.
specialists
isauditingthrough electronic (EDP). EDP Asa former
dataprocessing contractofficialtoldus:
auditsfinancial
transactionsbysophisticated
computer monitoring of TheCity thinks
itwants toensure purity
ofallcontracts,
but
operationsandexpenditures thataredesignedtocatchirregularities
or lacksthecapacitytoadminister contracts
adequately.The
suspicious
patternsofdisbursement. Although thistechnique
requires product islawyerly
bickering.TheCity hasneverbeenclear
a highdegreeofcomputer network integration,
it is alreadyin opera- onthis.Thereissomenotion ofmimicking
business,
butthe
tionin severalagencies.The goalofthemayor's OfficeofOperations balancebetween efficiency
and anti-corruption
is outof
is to put allcontract
operations
intoa single
computer network. whack.It's difficult
to do business
withtheCitywhich

VisionsofCorruption
Control
andtheEvolution
ofAmerican
PublicAdministration 469

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 doesn't
appreciate
theproblems
ofdelay.It'saninsurmount-
ableproblem.
While
noone
knows
how ifany,
much, has
corruption
TheEvolution
NewYork
ofthePanoptic
CityBuildings
Vision:A CaseStudy
Department
ofthe been there
has
prevented, been 30percent
a nearly reduction
To demonstratehowthepanoptic vision
hasbuiltupontheearlier ininspector because
ofthe
productivity ittakes
time to
visionsofsocialcontrolandcorruption controlandtakenthemto
newlevels,itisuseful
toexamine thewayinwhich theanticorruption
projecthasevolvedina particular
context:constructionregulation
in
return
tothe
office
every This
afternoon. perfectly
policy
NewYorkCity.17 Attheturn ofthecentury, hearings
heldbylegisla-
tivecommittees revealed
thatmunicipal officials
weretaking payoffs illustrates
the ofthe
abandonment ideal
ofa
Progressive
toignorebuildingandsanitationcodes.'8TheTenement HouseAct
of1901andtheNewYorkCityTenement HouseDepartment under trusted, ofpublic
corps
professional servants.
RobertDeForestand Lawrence Veillerwereclassicexamples of
antipatronagereform(DeForestandVeiller, 1903). To replacethe
In making theDepartment
investigations, doesnotlimititself
party hackswhowereserving as inspectors,DeForest hiredexperi-
encedphysiciansandpublichealth specialists
under NewYorkState totheparticular
abuseuncovered complaint.
orthespecific It
civilservicerules.The reformers claimed successin transforming treats
theindividual
irregularities ofassymptomat-
complained
ic ofbroaderunderlying
deficiencies government
inmunicipal
whathadbeentheepitome ofmachine corruptionandneglect intoa
modelofintegrityandprofessionalefficiency. andadministration.Thesuggestions
andrecommendations
containedinthese aredesigned
reports toremovethedeficien-
Thenextstage
intheevolutionofconstruction
regulation
reflected cies(NewYorkDepartment 1938,p. 14).
ofInvestigation,
withtheProgressive
reformmovement. TheearlyreportsoftheTen-
The linkagebetweencorruption effi-
controland administrative
ementHouseDepartment indicated
an effort
to develop regulatory
whichin turnlead to periodic
ciencylead to DOI investigations,
expertise.
DeForestfrequently
referred
tothegrowingbodyofknowl-
routines.The Department
andchangein supervisory of
edgeaboutthehealth
andsafetyofresidential
constructionandmain- restructuring
Buildingsinstituted controlandrouterotation.Eventhe
hierarchical
tenance.The department extendeditsobjectives
to raising
living
wording and reviewofinspection to
cardsweredesignedin response
standards
andgeneral
cityplanning.
andrecommendations.
investigations
DOI corruption
In the1930s,whencorruption itsheadin several
reared agencies
Bythe1970s,whenwell-established ofcorruption
patterns erupt-
engagedin construction housingreformers
regulation, soughtto
ed in recurrentscandals,the DOB becamea primetargetof the
implementtheteachingsofGoodnowandWhitebycentralizing
to anticorruptioncontrol.DOI agentsposingas
administration
andincorporating
theprinciples manage- panopticapproach
ofscientific
contractorsoffered to overlookviolationsor to
bribesto inspectors
ment.The Department ofHousingandBuildings, intowhichthe
expeditecode approvals.Time and againtheinspectors failedthe
TenementHouseDepartment wasmerged, wouldnolonger relyon
tests.The agencypromulgated
integrity scoresof recommendations
thecredentials
andcrusading ofcarefully
spirit selectedprofessionals.
forreorganizing
and administering theDepartment of Buildings.In
Thenewagency wasmorethantwicethesizeoftheoldoneandits
addition,thestatecomptroller and thestateOrganizedCrimeTask
mission
nowincludedslumclearance
andinspection
ofexistingstruc-
Forcepiledon evenmorerecommendations. Pursuant to therecom-
aswellasregulation
tures oftheconstruction
process.
the department
mendations, severalversionsof "double
instituted
Mayor Fiorello whomorethananyone
LaGuardia, elseimplement- check"androuterotationthatincludedvirtually of
all ofthestrategies
ed thescientific
management visioninNewYorkCity,reformed the earliergenerations
of reformers, as wellas theadditionof powerful
citycharterandpushed througha modernmunicipal administrative newtechniques.Bythe1980s,theagency wascompletely absorbedin
code.19Thecomprehensive NewYorkcodecovered suchmatters as respondingto external
criticismandattempting to preventcorruption,
theproper forresidential
procedures sewer
connections, civilservice evenattheexpenseofdecreased efficiency.
anddisputes
grievances, between contractors,
vendors, orcitizensand
The mostrecentanticorruption protocol,pursuantto a city
cityagencies.The lawandscienceofprocedure androutine was
audit,requires
comptroller's to return
all fieldinspectors to borough
designedasa checkonemployee butalsoallowed
discretion, managers
at theendoftheday,insteadofleavingforhomefrom
headquarters
andadministrators tomonitor
actively behavior
forcompliance.
site.The policyis meantto ensurethatpersonnel
theirlastinspection
To enforcetheadministrativecodeandto ensurepublicprobity,do not defraudthe cityby leavingworkearly,perhapsfillingout
in 1938,LaGuardia appointedWilliamHerlandstobeCommissioner inspectional whilesitting
reports at home. Whileno one knowshow
oftheDepartment an agency
ofInvestigation, thatwasbeginningto much,ifany,corruption therehasbeennearlya
hasbeenprevented,
roleintheanticorruption
playa central Withitsinvestigatory
project. 30 percentreduction in inspector becauseof thetimeit
productivity
andresearch andauthority
capabilities overallgovernmentagencies,takesto returnto theofficeeveryafternoon.This policyperfectly
DOI perfectly thebureaucratic
effectuated visionofexternal
control. illustrates
theabandonment idealofa trusted,
oftheProgressive pro-
DOI wasa creation ofthescientific
management ofcorruptionfessional
school corpsofpublicservants.
control.Itscentralized, andresearch
investigatory capabilities
imple-
mented visionofhonest
thebureaucratic government. Herlands,a
former chief toThomas
assistant
focused
E. Deweyinthespecial
on dishonesty,
racketeering
andneglect
Revisionist Strategy: NewPerspectives
investigations, waste,inefficiency,
ofduty. onControl andService Delivery
In a 1938 DOI report,
Herlandsexplained
howcorruption
control assessment
Althoughthereexistsno systematic of theimpactof
furthered
thegoalofefficient
administration: anticorruption on publicadministration,
reforms critics
and revision-

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1994

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 rational
choicetheorists
Both
Contemporary ineconomicsandpolitical
the law
moralYpoliticaland on efficient;
enforcementfocus
science
havegone
indeed,
evenfurther, that
asserting
ithasevenbeenargued
is
corruptionsometimes
thatthebarter
ofpolitical
forcashcanproduce
influence socialbenefit.
"bad
men, toBuchanan
"according andTullock,
inhibit
Forexample, maybeusedtoincrease
[payoffs] thequantity
government
without the
roots
reaching ofcorruption. ofusefulinformation
political
tovoters
presented
Evenpayoffs
parties.
bypoliticians
or
forpoliticians'
captured per-
istssporadically
havecalledattention
to thepossibility
ofconflict sonal
usemay permit lower
paying salaries
public thanwould
between control
corruption andefficiency.
Asearlyas 1904,Henry otherwiseberequired.
Thecostofencouraging
behavior
JonesFordrecognizedthatanticorruption
goalscouldbe incompati- generally tobeunethical
considered mustbesetagainst
any
blewithgovernmenteffectiveness
andefficiency. possible
socialbenefits
(Beck, andConnolly,
Hoskins, 1992,
p.217).
It is better
thatgovernment andsocialactivityshouldgoon
inanywaythanthattheyshouldnotgoonatall. Slackness Furthermore,pointingtothepersistenceofthemoralthemesthat
anddecayaremoredangerous toa nationthancorruption.... epitomized theProgressive erasanticorruption reforms,James
The graft system is bad,butitis betterforcitygovernment Buchanan andGordon Tullockarguethatreformerstendtoempha-
to lenditselfto theforces ofprogresseventhrough corrupt sizeethical
rulesandregulationsratherthanthelarger
structural
prob-
inducements thantotossthemanagement ofaffairs
outupon lemsthatencourage corruption. Boththemoral/political
andlaw
thegoose-common ofignorance and incapacity,
however enforcement focuson "badmen,"according to BuchananandTul-
honest.Reform which arrests
theprogressofthecommunity lock, inhibitgovernment without reachingtherootsofcorruption
willnotbe tolerated byan American city(Ford1904,pp. (BuchananandTullock, 1965,0. 281).
678,682-683). Edward
Banfield
sumsup therationalist on corrup-
perspective
Therewerea fewindications,
evenduring ofthescien- tion:
theheyday
tificmanagement
visionin thelate1950s,thattheanticorruption In governmental thecostsofpreventing
organization or
project
involved
costs: reducingcorruption
arenotbalanced thegainswitha
against
[Wagingthistypeofbattle[against becomes
corruption] a viewtofinding anoptimal
investment.
Instead
corruptionis
habitandtendstocontinue longafter
theenemyisroutedor thoughtof(whenitcomesundernotice)as somethingthat
voluntarilyretires.
Sincecivilserviceappropriations
tendto mustbe eliminated "no matterwhatthecost"(Banfield,
belimited inthefirstplace,concentrating
resources
oncom- 1985,p. 599).
batingan imaginary foemeansneglectingthedevelopment In his1993inaugural address,PresidentBillClinton spokeofthe
andexpansion ofurgently requiredorhighly
desirable
activi- needtoreinvent America,borrowing thetideofthemostrecent revi-
ties,suchas morevigorous recruiting,
personnel
researchand sioniststatement on thestructure andoperation ofpublicagencies,
training(Nigro,1959,p. 4). Reinventing Government,byDavidOsborne andTedGaebler (1992).
Sayre andKaufman recognized,intheir classicstudyofNewYork Their subtitle"How theEntrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the
Citygovernment inthe1950s,theimportance andimpact oftheanti- PublicSector, FromSchoolhouse toStatehouse, CityHalltothePen-
corruption project: tagon," signalstheboldrevisiontheyareadvocating. Writtenfora
broadaudience, ReinventingGovernment is a distillation
oftheories
Thedistrust ofpublicofficials,
employees, andpartyleaders thathavehadsomecurrency inpublicadministration andthesocial
engenders complete andexplicitrulesto makesurethatthe sciencesfora generation.Themuchdiscussed report oftheNational
boundaries oftheir jurisdiction
areunmistakably demarcated Performance ReviewheadedbyVicePresident AlbertGore,Jr.,
andthattheprocedures theyareto followareclearly laid "From RedTapetoResults: Creating a Government thatWorks Bet-
out.... Wheneachgrant ofauthority is carefully
framed to terandCostsLess,"is anadaptation ofOsborne andGaebler's work
avoidthepossibility of abuse,and thensurrounded by onthefederal government (National Performance Review, 1993).21
restrictions
untillittle
discretion
is lefttopublicofficials,
the
volume offormal rulesincreases
(Sayre andKaufman, 1965, Likemany ofthetheorists
from whomthey borrow, Osborne and
p. 110). Gaebler arguethattoomuchattention isbeingpaidtominor actsof
corruption andtothegoalofcorruption-free government. Theyask
Whilesuchrevisionist statements canbe foundthroughout the whether itis appropriate
to rolloutthehowitzer everytimecorrup-
century,itwasnotuntil very recently
thatcorruption controlhasbeen tionappears. Apparentlytheythink not.Theirfaith innewinforma-
treatedas a problem bymainstream publicadministration scholars.tiontechnologiesandentrepreneurial
Forexample, incentivesleadsthem torecom-
in ThePolitics oftheAdministrative Process,
political
sci- mendfewer corruptioncontrols.Perhaps theybelieve thata mature
entists
JamesFeslerandDonaldKettlconsider theadministrative willaccepttheinevitability
polity ofa certain degree ofcorruption.
costsof"control systems": Butthatleavesmanyquestions unanswered, including: Whatis an
Excessivecontrols candisruptconsistent administration
and "optimal" levelofcorruption?Howwillthepolitical demand fora
produce inequities.Excessive
controls multiply requirements responsetoa corruptionscandal
bemanaged?
forreview ofproposed decisions,
increaseredtape,anddelay Revisionists
haveraisedcogent
objections
to theanticorruption
action.So muchenergy canbe spentattempting to control project.However,
unlike
theantipatronage,
scientific
management,
administrative in fact,
activities, thatlittletimeormoney is andpanoptic
visions
ofcorruption
control,
therevisionist
perspective
lefttodo thejobathand.Excessive controls,therefore,
may has notaffected
thepractice
ofpublic administration.
Thusfar,the
dulladministration'sresponsiveness
to itspublic(Fesler
and revisionist
perspective
simplycritiques
rather
thansetsa policyagen-
Kettl,1991,p. 321).20
da.

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ofCorruption
Control
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Conclusion resources
project
andexpanded
toallmanagement
thelegitimate
operations.
scopeoftheanticorruption
Thus,whilethefocusofcor-
Recognizing thattheinexorableaccretion oftheanticorruption ruptioncontrol isnolonger asbroadas thesystem-wide vision ofthe
apparatus is an important dynamic ofpublicadministration, deepens Progressives, itis farmoreintensive andcomprehensive regarding its
understanding ofhowandwhylargegovernment unitsareorganizedchosen targets. Indeed, panoptic reformersareso occupiedwithcor-
andoperated. It alsoreveals
howimportant thereaction to corrup- ruption thatthey ignorethegoalsofadministrative efficiency.
tionscandals hasbeenintheevolution ofpublicadministration as a
discipline. As PeterSelfputit,"Thetensions between therequire- It is notsurprising thatthesheer magnitude andambition ofthe
ments ofresponsibility or'accountability'
andthoseofeffective execu- panoptic anticorruption project has provokeda response
revisionist
tiveaction canreasonably bedescribedas theclassicdilemma ofpublic from economists andpolitical whoinstinctually
scientists lookfor
administration" andKettl,
(Fesler 1991,p.321). costs
aswell as benefits.Previously,thecompatibilityofgovernmental
andanticorruption
efficiency controlwasrarelyquestioned. Now,a
To an extent thathasrarelybeenappreciated, theanticorruption number ofcritics pointoutthatefficiencyandcorruption control are
projecthasshaped ofurban
theevolution publicadministration espe- conflicting goals. The revisionists havenot,however, provided
andaccounts
cially, formuchofmunicipal structureandoperations.administrators a formula forcalculatingtheoptimum amount ofcor-
Thevisionofa corruption-free cityhasanimated reformersthrough-ruption control, norhavethey explainedhowa cost/benefitapproach
outthe20thcentury; eachgeneration
hascontributed itsownanticor-tocorruption thatwouldtreat somecorruption asnotworth worrying
ruption ideasandinstitutions. Theresulting anticorruption project aboutcouldbesoldtothepublic andthemedia.
hasbeencumulative; oldreformsarenotdiscarded butsupplemented
bynewer ones.
Sincethe1970s,a panoptic visionofcorruption controlheldby Frank Anechiarico andchairofthedepartment
is a professor of
prosecutors, inspectors andother
general, lawenforcement andquasi government atHamilton College.
lawenforcement personnelhastakenholdinlargegovernments, like JamesB. Jacobsis a professor anddirector oftheCenterfor
NewYorkCity's.Theirtargets includethelowest levelcityemployeesResearch inCrime andJusticeatNewYorkUniversity SchoolofLaw.
as wellas politicians andtopadministrators. Theyadvocate a total
mobilization ofgovernmental resourcesin theservice ofan enforce- Theauthors arecompleting a booktentativelytied TheAnticor-
mentoriented anticorruption
project.Theyhavemartialed significantruptionProject andItsImpacts.

Notes
wefollowed
thesevisions,
1. In identifying Kaufman's
Herbert workof30
seminal erawasan agein whichconcern
Thepost-Progressive useand
forthepractical
yearsago in whichhe identifiesthreeconflicting public
valuesthatdominate techniques
ofadministrative
application extendedbeyond ornorma-
anytheoretical
eras.
insuccessive
administration tivestandard Attention
forapplication.... turned to morenarrowtechnicalprob-
lemsratherthanbroader
concerns" 1988,p. 66).
(Stever,
In theevolution ofstateandlocalgovernments
ofthestructure inthe
element
theanticorruption
7. In isolating management,
in scientific Gulickfound
UnitedStates, a searchforan accommodation
thereis discernible ofAdminis-
supportina section
ofWoodrow Wilson's famous essay,"TheStudy
amongthree representativeness;
values(orobjectives): non-
technical,
from
tration," whichGulickquotes:
partisancompetence; andleadership.Thefirstrefersto thedemand
forelection bysome(atfirst)
ofpublicofficials andmany(later)or Allsovereignsaresuspicious oftheir ..... Howis suspicion
servants to
innovation)
all(a twentieth-century
virtually adultcitizensoverwhom beallayed byknowledge? inallrelations
Trustis strength oflifeand,
theofficials Thesecond
jurisdiction.
exercise tothedemand
refers for as itis theoffice
oftheconstitutionalreformertocreateconditionsof
having
officials trainingandexperience themforthejobs
qualifying oftheadministrative
so it is theoffice
trustfulness, organizer to fit
theydo,andtotheinsistence thattheir decisions
official andactions administrationwithconditions ofclear-cut whichwill
responsibility
be basedon technical rather
considerations
andprofessional thanon insure trustworthiness(QuotedinGulick,1941,p.vii).
partisanpoliticalpremises.The third to thedemand
refers thatthe 8. Anofficial oftheNewYorkCityDepartment ofInvestigationexplainedtousthat
actionsanddecisions becoordinated
ofofficials atsomecentral point thedepartment's ofcorruption
definition sincethe1970sincluded the"subversion
so thatgovernment programsarereasonablyconsistentandefficient offairness, andcommon
ofdistributive justice,andofequalopportunity." Under
(Kaufman, 1963,p. 34). evenacknowledged
thisdefinition, error leadingtomaldistributivewastewouldbe
Ourworkalsoparallelsa morerecent typology byWilbur Rich."CivilService corrupt.
reformers divided
have...been intothree groups: thegenteelreformers,theacademic 9. A recent historyoftheNewYorkCityDepartment ofInvestigationconcludeditis
andthefiscal
reformers, managers" (Rich,1982,p. 5). withthefight againstcorruptionthat"thedefense ofdemocracy andthestruggle
fora decentlifebeginsandcontinues"(Winslow andBurke, 1992,p. 87).
2. TheconventionalviewoftheProgressives oriented
asorganizationally ispresented by 10. In DisciplineandPunish, MichelFoucault arguedthatthepanopticons architecture
R.H.Wiebe(1967). A critique ofthisviewholdsthatwhileorganization maybe andoperation wereparadigmaticofa 19thcentury vision ofa disciplinary
society
thelegacy oftheProgressives,it is an ironicone,sincetheir method washighly inwhich monitoring,
surveillance, andcontrol wouldmakeundetected deviance a
(McCormick,
andsituational
moralistic 1981,pp.247-274). practical 1979,p. 204).However,
(Foucault,
impossibility perhaps Panop-
thefirst
3. The statement fromwhich the system getsit name, "To the victors
belong the builtbyJeremy Bentham'sbrother, wasnota prison, buta Russianfactory
ticon,
iscredited
spoils," toSenator William Marcy around 1850(Hoogenboom, 1961,p. (Zuboff,1988,pp.320-322).
6). 11. DennisF. Thompson that,
argues inlight ofthescandal surroundingtheKeating
4. In 1976,inElrodv.Burns, andin 1990,inRutan Party
v. Republican the
ofIllinois, Five,thedefinition should
ofcorruption beexpanded toinclude "mediatedcorrup-
Courtheldunconstitutional(onFirst Amendment grounds)hiring, transfer, tion"which
firing, "linkstheactsofindividual toeffects
officials on thedemocraticpro-
promotion, onpartisan
orrecall affiliationforallbuta few,topadministrativejobs. cess"(Thompson, 1993,pp.369).
5. Goodnow's viewwasthat"Assoon,however, astheadministration became some- 12. DOI TableofArrests byyear.
thiscontrol
whatcentralized, ofthepolitical parties becameunnecessary,except to 13. In TheFederalist someofthefounders argued thata plethoraofruleswasuselessat
thehighest sincethese
officers, couldcontrol morefully theactionsoftheirsubor- bestandpossibly quitedangeroustoliberty. Fortherelation offederalist
theoryto
andbeingthemselves
dinates, subject toparty control,might bringabouttheneces- urban government, seeBishandOstrom (1973).
saryharmony inthegovernmental system" (Goodnow, 1990,p. 129). 14. TheGenerally Accepted Government AuditStandard (GAGAS)issuedbyGAO
6. Onestudy ofthepost-Progressiveperiod found that"[t]hepromising development havebeenadopted byNewYorkCityandmany otherstateandlocalgovernments.
ofpublic asa profession
administration during theProgressiveerahasdissipated.... 15. Bycorruption againstthegovernment wemeanfraud perpetrated bycontractors,

472 Review
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1994
* September/October

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 vendors, benefit andother
recipients, andreceivers
clients ofgovernment services. 19.After takingtheoathofoffice,
LaGuardia turnedtofacecityhall,shookhisfist
and
16. Interview witha former NewYorkCityagency commissioner,May16,1991. announced, la cuccagna'(nomorefree
"efinita lunch).
17. Another example ofan administrativeinnovationin theNewDeal thatreflected20. Downsoffers the"LawofCounter Control:The greater theeffort madeby
Progressiveidealswastherefinement andstandardizationofrulemakinginadmin- ortop-level
sovereign tocontrol
officials ofsubordinate
thebehavior the
officials,
agencies.
istrative Theideathatthere wouldbeformal rulemakinghearingspreced- madebythose
theefforts
greater subordinatestoevadeorcounteract suchcontrol'
ed bypublished notice oftheProgressive
wasa fulfillment notionofprofessional (Downs,1967,p. 262).
governance bypolicy Administrative
specialists. rulemaking byspecial- 21. Peter
islegislation theimpact
deLeonalsocriticizes controls
ofcorruption onthefederal govern-
istsandexperts whohavebeendelegated policydiscretion
byelected This
officials. ment:
isas closetoscientific andas farfrom
administration thewardpolitician's
smoke- Weneedinitially recommendations
thetraditional
toreject thatmore
roomastheProgressives
filled mighthavedreamed possible. lawsorregulationsorinspectors
general theanswer.Indeed,
provide
18. TheTenement HouseCommittee stageda majorexhibition oftenement house ofmoreregulationsandinspectors
onecanarguethattheonlyresult
conditions inearly1900.Theexhibition, heldina buildingonFifth Avenue,con- wouldbegreatertemptation public
forthevulnerable servant (deLeon,
tained scoresofmaps and charts
and fivemodels oftenementsincludinga detailed
1993,p.223).
scalemodel ofanentire blockonthelower eastsideofManhattan.Thereactionsof
thethousands ofpeoplewhosawtheexhibit wereaninducement tothelegislature
andthegovernor to establish
theTenement HouseCommission (DeForest and
Veiller,1903).

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