Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Neoliberalism 121
Ecological Modernization Theory 126
Conclusion 131
Questions for Critical Thought 133
Suggested Readings 134
Suggested Websites 134
Afterword 215
Notes 217
Glossary 219
References 227
Index 247
Key Points
Environmental sociology examines how human and natural forces meet,
interact, and shape one another. It is a young field in sociology, however, and
many of its core ideas are still being developed and debated.
The natural sciences show us that the natural world is extremely complex,
while the social sciences tell us that the human world is equally complicated.
The human–nature relationship is therefore “doubly complex,” because our
dependence on nature is often indirect and masked by social structures,
institutions, and cultural blind spots.
The great strengths of sociology, namely its attention to culture, structure, and
power, are useful for studying environmental problems and can provide fresh
perspectives on difficult issues.
Introduction
Human beings are animals. This is a fundamental fact of life that we all
must eventually come to terms with. We are born, we have corporeal needs
and drives, we follow a more or less rigid life course from youth to old age,
and we die. In this, we are no different from any other living organism on
the planet. Everyone knows this. And yet, there is more to human exis-
tence—something special. Children are invariably jarred when they learn
that humans are also animals—in a child’s world of hard categories, we
don’t look like animals, we don’t act like animals, and animals can’t do what
we can. Although we share so much in common with other living things, it
often seems as though we belong in different categorical boxes—or what
Bruno Latour (2004: 13) calls different “houses”—with the human world
being (at best) arm’s length from or (at worst) fundamentally different from
the natural world.
This contradiction—that we are and are not separate from nature—is
one of the biggest challenges involved in thinking about the human–nature
relationship. If we think about the problem one way, there is no logical
boundary between humans and nature. Our bodies follow the same funda-
mental rules as other organisms in that we need to acquire energy, dispose
of wastes, maintain delicately calibrated internal chemistries, and pro-
tect ourselves from disease and violence. These facts are widely accepted
While the major founders of sociology did not directly address the natural
environment, some scholars argue that they did so implicitly and therefore
that sociology is not as ignorant of ecology as it first appears. Buttel (2002:
39), for instance, argues that “not only did Marx, Durkheim, and Weber incor-
porate what we might regard as ecological components in their work, they
did so from a variety of standpoints” that are still relevant today. For reasons
discussed in the main text, Durkheim is generally seen as the least ecologi-
cally aware of the three. However, Catton (2002) argues that Durkheim’s
ideas about the increasingly complex division of labour in society were
directly inspired by evolutionary theorist Charles Darwin’s notion of ecologi-
cal niches. Animals that occupy niches avoid competition with neighbouring
species, which Durkheim interpreted as proof that economic specialization
can benefi t the common good. Max Weber was more open to considering
the environment as a variable, as seen in his work comparing the econo-
mies, cultures, and social structures of ancient societies (West 1984). While
Weber never did so, Murphy (1994) applied Weber’s distinction between
formal and substantive rationality to understand why modern institutions
are so good at exploiting the environment and so poor at protecting it.
Essentially, exploitation makes sense in the short term and involves solving
small, technocratic puzzles (like how to maximize oil production and profits)
even though it leads to long-term violations of a more substantive rational-
ity (like the fact we need a clean environment in which to live).
The thinking of Karl Marx was likely the most ecologically informed
of the three. It is worth pointing out that Marx was a materialist, which
means that he sought explanations for phenomena in the real world rather
than in the world of ideas. While materialism for Marx predominantly
referred to the workings of the economy, he frequently used agricultural
and natural resource examples to illustrate his theories. Foster (1999; 2010)
argues that Marx in fact directly addressed environmental degradation as a
consequence of capitalism. Specifically, Foster uses the term “metabolic rift”
to describe Marx’s writing on high-intensity farming, which even in the nine-
teenth century required the import of fertilizer from as far away as South
America and created incentives to overuse soils (Foster 2010: 107). By treat-
ing everything as a commodity, capitalism not only alienates people from
themselves, their work, and each other, but also from nature. In any case,
Marx’s thought has had a strong influence on more recent developments in
environmental sociology—notably on the concept of the “treadmill of pro-
duction” addressed in Chapter 5.
of the twentieth century. At that time, it was popular among both soci-
ologists and geographers to speculate about how climate and landscape
affected social organization. These arguments, which were tinged with
Social Darwinistic assumptions about evolution and geographic
fitness, suggested among other things that “races” that lived in lush tropi-
cal environments had little motive to become industrious, compared to
Northern European peoples who had had to cope with harsh climates.
Hannigan (2006: 3) argues that sociologists such as Pitrim Sorokin and
anthropologists like Franz Boas reacted to these claims “by elevating cul-
ture to a primary role in individual and social development, dwarfing both
the physical environment and biological inheritance.” Rather than looking
at how the natural world shaped people, sociology would look exclusively at
how people shaped themselves. There is a lesson to be learned here as we go
forward. While biology and environment did once play a role in sociology,
it was the wrong role. Sociologists were right to reject the use of biology
and geography as the primary explanation for social phenomena. The claims
that determinists made too easily slipped towards justifications of imperial-
ism, colonialism, and racist social policies. If we are to bring questions of
environment back into sociology, we have to be careful to do it the right
way. The human world has been the near-exclusive focus of sociology for
quite some time, and most environmental sociologists would argue that this
inability to consider the natural world has hindered our discipline. At the
same time, the blind spot needs to be filled carefully. The environment and
human society need to be reconceptualized as being mutually embedded or
co-constitutive (each creating and patterning the other). The lesson from
early sociology is that we should avoid oversimplifying the human–nature
relationship even as we try to put the two back together.
Catton and Dunlap also argue that while many sociologists have
been critical of the DWW, they nonetheless have adopted “a more sophis-
ticated version” as the bedrock of their own discipline. This more
sophisticated version, adopted for the most part unconsciously, is called
the Human Exemptionalism Paradigm (HEP). In a nutshell, the HEP is the
implicit assumption that the world as we know it is solely the outcome of
human decisions. By this, Catton and Dunlap mean that most sociologists
assume that the only limits on human affairs are socially imposed, and
therefore highly flexible. Things like social inequality, poverty, and violence
exist purely because of human decisions and the (often unintended) con-
sequences of human-generated structures and systems, such as economy,
politics, language, symbols, and cultures. This illustrates how sociology is
simultaneously a critical and profoundly optimistic discipline. While soci-
ologists are trained to take a hard skeptical look at the world around us,
we tend to conceptualize that world as being exclusively human-made and
therefore infinitely transformable. The world may be imperfect, but the
world is also contingent, and therefore it can become much more fair/equal/
prosperous/just through the betterment of human-made systems. Catton
and Dunlap did not object to these goals, but rather to the assumption
that the human future was open-ended and self-determined, and therefore
oblivious to the ongoing depletion and degradation of the biosphere upon
which all human societies depend.
To remedy this, Catton and Dunlap suggest that sociology as a whole
reject the assumptions of the HEP and embrace those of the NEP. The NEP
is, at its most basic, a call to acknowledge the reality of ecological lim-
its, and to incorporate these limits into sociological theory and research
(Vaillancourt 2010: 49). Against the open-ended optimism of mainstream
sociology, Catton and Dunlap argue that political, economic, and social
variables are constrained and even shaped by society’s orientation towards
the environment. For example, consider the core sociological concept of
social class. Most sociologists see social class as one of the key divisions in
society, caused by differential access to resources and power. Sociologists
working in the Marxist or conflict theory traditions tend to look at class
divisions as reflecting different access to the means of production or
other scarce roles or skills within the production process (Wright 2006).
Those with a more Weberian view also look at how social status is created,
defended, and mobilized by different groups seeking power or advantages
over others. Both types would likely agree that the root of these inequali-
ties lies in the ability of certain groups to deny other people access to these
means, and that the road to greater equality is therefore to reform the politi-
cal and economic structures that sustain current class structures so that
more (if not all) may share in society’s bounties. This is all well and good,
but an NEP-informed sociologist would argue that these arguments ignore
the role that the environment plays in creating and maintaining social class
divisions. If we do indeed live in a finite world with real ecological limits,
then the analysis of social class needs to consider scarcity. For instance,
industrial economies produce wealth, but they also produce spectacular
amounts of waste as by-product of both production and consumption
(Murphy 1994). This waste, which takes multiple forms, has to be stored
somewhere—in the limited land, water, and air that make up the biosphere.
Both within nations and globally, we see that waste intersects with social
class. That is, wastes and waste management facilities (such as incinerators,
sewage treatment centres, and dumps) are rarely located in wealthy areas
and neighbourhoods, but rather in or near poor areas inhabited by already-
marginalized people (Cox 2004: 314). This not only potentially impacts
people’s health and well-being, but also depreciates what property they may
own, thus keeping them locked into a particular class position. Scarcity also
works in the other direction—to make the wealthy even wealthier. If we pre-
sume that a given resource is scarce and getting scarcer due to degradation
and over-use (such as fresh water in much of the world), then that resource
rises in value. As value goes up, there is incentive for individuals or com
panies to “capture” it—to purchase it or secure a licence to access it—in