Psychological Bulletin Copyright 1986 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

1986, Vol. 99, No. 2, 229-246 Wro-2°09/86/$00.75

Affect and Memory: A Review

Paul H. Blaney
University of Miami

This article provides a critical review of the empirical literature on the role of depression and elation
in biasing mnemonic processing. Two classes of effects—state dependence and mood congruence—
are examined. The latter, which involves the enhanced encoding and/or retrieval of material the
aifective valence of which is congruent with ongoing mood, is the more extensively researched of the
two and is thus the focus of much of the present review. Though the support for claims of such a
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phenomenon is impressive in its size, consistency, and diversity, a number of questions remain. These
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

include whether such effects are linked to mood states per se, and the possible role that such effects
may play in the development of persistent depression.

As part of an increased awareness of the role of contextual
and personal variables in memory processes, researchers in recent
years have resumed an exploration begun but largely abandoned
several decades ago of the possible role that affective states such
as elation and depression may have on what is remembered. In
this article 1 provide a critical review of the recent research on
that topic and discuss the possible relevance of what has emerged
from this research for an understanding of pathological depres-
sion.
There are two basic phenomena to be considered: state de-
pendence and mood congruence. State dependence implies that
what one remembers during a given mood is determined in part
by what one learned (or focused on) when previously in that
mood; the affective valence of the material is irrelevant. Mood
congruence assumes that some material, by virtue of its affectively
valenced content, is more likely to be stored and/or recalled when
one is in a particular mood; concordance between mood at ex-
posure and mood at recall is not required or relevant. Much of
this article comprises a critical review of the research literatures
relevant to these phenomena.
The dominant theoretical perspective dealing with the body
of research reviewed is network theory, and it is discussed in one
form or another in each of the major theoretical reviews available
(Bower, 1981; Bower & Cohen, 1982; M. S. Clark & Isen, 1982;
Gilligan & Bower, 1984; Ingram, 1984b; Isen, 1984; Teasdale,
1983a, 1983b). The essence of the perspective is conveyed by
excerpts from Bower's (1981) statement of it:
The semantic-network approach supposes that each distinct emotion
. . . has a specific node or unit in memory that collects together
many other aspects of the emotion that are connected to it by as-
sociative pointers.. . . Each emotion unit is also linked with prop-
ositions describing events from one's life during which that emotion
The impetus for this article arose in part from discussions with Ronald
Ganellen, whom I thank for his stimulating comments and careful review
of an earlier draft. I also thank Lane Baggett and several anonymous
reviewers for their comments on prior drafts.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paul
H. Blaney, Department of Psychology, University of Miami, Box 248185,
Coral Gables, Florida 33124.
was aroused. . . . These emotion nodes can be activated by many
stimuli—by physiological or symbolic verbal means. When activated
above a threshold, the emotion unit transmits excitation to those
nodes that produce the pattern of autonomic arousal and expressive
behavior commonly assigned to that emotion.. . . Activation of an
emotion node also spreads activation throughout the memory struc-
tures to which it is connected, creating subthreshold excitation at
those event nodes.. . . Thus. . . excitation [of] the sadness node
. . . will maintain activation of that emotion and thus influence
later memories retrieved, (p, 135)
Bower (1981) stated his model in a fashion that favors the
preeminence of state-dependent effects (and, when discussing
mood congruence, focused on mood at input), but it appears
that with minor modification it would work with mood congru-
ence, including mood at retrieval, presumed to be the basic pro-
cess. A key assumption of this point of view is that the relevant
effects represent automatic (noneffortful, unmotivated) infor-
mation processing events. Among theories of affect, network the-
ory fits most closely with Tomkins's (1980) view of affect as
amplification. In Tomkins's view, the affect of distress amp-
lifies "by simulating maintained level of (aversive) stimulation"
(p. 148) and by amplifying responses that the stimulation evokes,
including "retrieved memories" and "constructed thoughts"
(p. 153).
Ingram (1984b) has suggested that network theory is quite
compatible with a depth-of-processing model such as has guided
much recent research on self-schemas in depression (e.g., Ham-
men, Miklowitz, & Dyck, in press; Kuiper & Derry, 1982). Al-
though this may be so, a distinction can be made between the
mnemonic effects of mood per se and the mnemonic effects of
cognitive structures associated with mood (self-image; self-sche-
mata, preoccupation with failure, etc.). As is evident in the review
that follows, this distinction between mood effects and cognitive
priming effects, though some (e.g., Kavanagh & Bower, 1985)
may doubt its importance, is of recurrent relevance in the in-
terpretation of the existing empirical literature.
In this review, I focus on the substantial literature that has
emerged in the past decade. Note, however, that some recent
findings are not terribly different from those reported in studies
as early as 1917. (See Bousfield's, 1950, review for a summary
of early research.)

229
 230 PAUL H. BLANEY
State-Dependent Recall
Although the literature demonstrating state dependence in-
volving drug-induced states is considerable—even cigarette
smoking appears to induce a state distinctive enough to influence
recall (Peters & McGee, 1982)—there are. few relevant studies
involving elated or depressed mood per se.
Only one study capitalized on naturally occurring mood shifts
(Weingartner, Miller, & Murphy, 1977). Subjects were manic-
depressive inpatients, monitored repeatedly at 4-day intervals.
They were asked to generate word associations on one day and
regenerate them 4 days later. Degree of success at this task was
found to be associated with degree of mood change during the
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interval. Although this is consistent with a state-dependent effect,
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the likelihood that associative responses varied with mood state
introduces the possibility that mood congruence accounted for
some or all of the effect. Moreover, it is possible that the affective
states of manic-depressive disorder are biologically more dis-
tinctive than is typical of equally intense nonbipolar affective
states, such that the distinctiveness that might contribute to state
dependence may not be tied to mood per se.
There have also been attempts to show mood-state dependent
effects in adults by means of mood manipulations. In one study
(Leight & Ellis, 1981, Study 2), subjects were exposed to a list-
learning task involving nonsense consonant-vowel-consonant
trigram doublets (e.g., BONKID), then tested for recall and rec-
ognition 24 hr later when in a concordant or discordant mood
state. Mood (depression vs. neutral) was manipulated by the
Velten,(1968) task, in which subjects arc asked to read sentences
entailing a mood state and to produce that mood. Although there
were eight instances in which state dependence could have
emerged, it did so in only one of them (impairment of recognition
in one of two presentational modes, depressed mood during
learning, neutral mood during recognition). Given the lack of
an a priori reason for expecting the numerous instances of neg-
ative findings, this study is most appropriately viewed as detract-
ing from, rather than supporting, claims of state dependence.
In another, Mecklenbrauker and Hager (1984) crossed Velten
elation and depression inductions at exposure and retrieval. Their
findings were largely supportive of state dependence, though this
effect was much more evident for elation-exposure than for
depression-exposure subjects. In both this study and in that re-
ported by Leight and Ellis (1981), because inductions during
exposure and recall or recognition were identical, any support
for state dependence that emerged is questionable, given that
effects could be attributed to similarities in cognitive content as
opposed to mood per se.
In yet another study (Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978),
hypnotized individuals were asked to generate happy or sad
moods by imagining a scene from one's life in which one had
experienced that emotion. Again a list-learning task was used,
involving meaningful words in this case. Memory was assessed
as number of words recalled only. No state dependent recall effects
were found when recall of a single word list was tested either
immediately (Study 1) or 1 day later (Study 2). However, in Study
3, state dependence was rather clearly evident on a within-session
recall task in which interference was involved. Specifically, sub-
jects who had learned two lists—one while happy, the other while
sad—had more success (when one of these moods was reinsti-
gated) recalling the list learned in the concordant mood than in
the discordant mood. When subjects were asked to reinstigate
an already-experienced mood, they were specifically told to
imagine a different happy or sad scene from the one they had
previously used; to the extent that subjects complied with this
request, the misgiving mentioned above with respect to those
studies using Velten inductions—the possible confounding of
mood concordance with induction content concordance—was
thus avoided. On the other hand, one cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that moods experienced during a hypnotic state have a
distinctive quality not present in nonhypnotic moods, such that
these results cannot be generalized.
Five studies concur with Bower et al.'s (1978, Studies 1 and
2) failure to show mood-state dependence in a noninterference
recall paradigm. Specifically Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp (1978,
Study 2), using within-session word list recall with mood ma-
nipulated by winning or losing at a computer game, failed to
demonstrate state dependence of recall. Bower, Gilligan, and
Monteiro (1981, Study 3) reported a similar failure when ex-
amining selective recall of narrative material with subjects ex-
periencing mood inductions via hypnosis. Schare, Lisman, and
Spear (1984, Studies 1 and 2), using Velten depression and neutral
inductions, reported two failures to show state-dependent effects
on word list recall. In addition, Brown and Taylor (1985), using
two different inductions, provided data indicating a failure to
show state dependence in within-session incidental recall of trait
words; this absence of an effect was demonstrated statistically
for words presented initially in a non-self-referencc set, and the
effect was apparently absent for words presented in a self-refer-
ence set as well.
An unpublished study described by Gilligan and Bower (1984)
evidently used an interference paradigm in assessing mood (happy
vs. angry) state dependence on recognition performance, with
entirely negative results. Similarly, Schare et al. (1984, Study 3)
reported an absence of state dependence effects on cued recall
in an interference paradigm (Velten depression and elation in-
ductions). However, the results of that same study clearly dem-
onstrated state dependence in free recall. Although this constitutes
a strong conceptual replication of the findings from Bower et
al.'s (1978) Study 3, Bower and Mayer (1985) and Wetzler (1985)
have recently reported nonreplications where free recall was at
stake. Finally, Gage and Safer (1985) have reported mood state
dependence for face recognition in an interference paradigm,
though only when stimuli were presented to the right hemisphere.
The foregoing studies have used adult subjects. Bartlett and
associates have studied mood-state dependence in children and
have demonstrated the effect with a noninterference paradigm
(Bartlett & Santrock, 1977) and with an interference paradigm
(Bartlett, Burleson, & Santrock, 1982, Study 2). However, they
have also reported a failure using the interference paradigm
(Bartlett et al., 1982, Study 1) and have noted that the successful
demonstrations pertained more clearly to happy than to sad
mood conditions. In addition, Nasby and Yando (1982, Study
1), also studying children, have reported a failure using a non-
interference paradigm.
In sum, the findings regarding affective state-dependent recall
are mixed in adult and in childhood studies. In studies of adults,
most existing support comes from studies in which the effect is
either questionable (Weingartner et al., 1977) or an isolated find-
 AFFECT AND MEMORY
ing (Bower etal., 1978; Leight& Ellis, 1981;Schareetal., 1984).
The one effect that has been replicated in adults (Bower et al.,
1978, Study 3; Schare et al., 1984, Study 3) involves free recall
in an interference context, suggesting that mood-state cues prevail
only when meaning cues are vague or equivocal (Isen, 1984),
but this phenomenon does not appear to be robust (Bower &
Mayer, 1985; Wetzler, 1985). Even this effect, when evident, might
be obtainable only when exposure and recall moods are induced
by procedures that are somewhat similar to one another.
Mood Congruence
Mood congruence implies that the efficiency of mnemonic
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processing is biased by the congruence between an existing mood
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and the affective tone of the material involved. Because in most
cases such affective tone is assumed to be normative, in research
on mood congruence one merely compares the memory behavior
of persons who differ in mood state with respect to the affective
valence of the material involved. The assignment of subjects to
groups may take an individual difference approach (involving,
for instance, the diagnosis of depression) or a mood manipulation
approach. Note that, although research on state dependence re-
quires that subjects experience more than one mood during the
course of the study, research on mood congruence does not,
because the affective tone being considered is presumed to be
preexisting and normative.
Individual Differences
I include here studies of individuals labeled "depressed" or
"nondepressed" on the basis of clinical diagnosis or a self-report
inventory. Studies vary in whether clinical or "normal" popu-
lations are used and in the index of memory used. In most cases,
the researcher exposed subjects to standard material, then probed
for the memory of it afterward. Indexes of memory include recall
accuracy, recognition accuracy, and speed of recall, always as a
function of the positivity versus negativity of the material. (In
some cases, what the subject must recall is the percentage of
positive vs. negative outcomes, in which case the subject's one
estimate serves as the sole dependent variable.) Note that, if one
is interested specifically in information processing and memory,
one must largely ignore studies of depressed versus nondepressed
differences with regard to (a) the pleasantness of memories of
real-world past events in subjects' lives (e.g., Fogarty & Hemsley,
1983; Lloyd & Lishman, 1975; Mayo, 1983; Stone, 1981), be-
cause such events may objectively differ between groups; (b) dif-
ferences in free associations (e.g., Bousfield, 1950; Mayer & Vo-
lanth, 1985), which may similarly be event-related; (c) judgments
of the goodness or adequacy of one's behavior or other events
(e.g., Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980; portions of
Gotlib, 1983), because these judgments may differ between groups
as a function of the harshness of judgmental criteria used;1 (d)
estimates of the frequency of affectively laden real-world occur-
rences (e.g., Kuiper & MacDonald, 1983; Mayer & Volanth,
1985), because the objective experience base from which such
estimates derive may differ between groups; and (e) recall of pos-
itive versus negative material when this appears to be confounded
with subject-controlled length of exposure to that material (Derry
& Kuiper, 1981; Frith et al., 1983; Hammen & Zupan, 1984;
Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Sanft, & Doren, 1985; Lishman, 1972; Slife,
231
Miura, Thompson, Shapiro, & Gallagher, 1984; Zuroff, 1980;
Zuroff, Colussy, & Wielgus, 1983).2 Even with these rather strin-
gent restrictions, a number of recent studies remain to be de-
scribed.
One class of relevant studies consists of those in which subjects
experienced a series of successes and failures, and their recol-
lections regarding that series were ascertained. The relevance of
such research arises from the presumption that failure is depres-
sion-congruent. Of the eight studies using this approach, five
(Buchwald, 1977; Craighead, Hickey, & DeMonbreun, 1979;
Dobson & Shaw, 1981; Nelson & Craighead, 1977; Wener &
Rehm, 1975) used nonclinical student samples, sorted into de-
pressed and nondepressed subgroups on the basis of self-report
inventory responses. The remaining three (DeMonbreun &
Craighead, 1977; Gotlib, 1981, 1983) used patients with de-
pressive diagnoses, compared with psychiatric and nonpsychiatric
controls. In most cases, the researcher controlled the success rate
by providing predetermined feedback; the Gotlib (1981, 1983)
studies are exceptions, in that feedback was veridical and success
levels varied freely.
In most cases, a clear pattern of underestimates of success
percentage among depressives (relative to controls) was evident.
The exceptions to this are as follows. Buchwald (1977) reported
the effect among women, but not among men. THe fact that
other studies did show the effect in all-male (DeMonbreun &
Craighead, 1977) or mixed-gender (Dobson & Shaw, 1981) sam-
ples suggests that the effect is not, however, limited to women.
Somewhat more consistent is the finding that depressed/non-
depressed differences in success percentage estimates do not ap-
pear under conditions in which success levels are rather low
(Craighead et al., 1979; Nelson & Craighead, 1977). Evidently
this particular mood-congruent bias pertains only to contexts in
which the overall feedback is positive.
The question of whether the effect involves bias at retrieval
was addressed by DeMonbreun and Craighead (1977), who
monitored distortion immediately after feedback (as well as after
the whole task). Only the posttask recall responses showed evi-
dence of a mood-congruent bias, suggesting that the effect is not
dependent on biasing effects occurring at input (see also Craig-
head etal., 1979).
Johnson, Petzel, Hartney, and Morgan (1983) have reported
a study in which the dependent variable was based on subjects'
ability to recall the content of tasks on which they had been
successful versus unsuccessful (i.e., completed vs. uncompleted
tasks). Subjects were depressed and nondepressed undergradu-
ates. Task completion was in fact under the control of the ex-
perimenter, so all subjects had identical success/failure experi-
ence. As expected, failure tasks were recalled more often by de-
pressed than nondepressed subjects, and success tasks were recal-
led more frequently by nondepressed than depressed subjects.
1
Indeed, some researchers (e.g. Averill, DeWitt, & Zimmer, 1978) have
viewed subjects' evaluations of experienced stimuli as measures of emo-
tional state.
2
Judgments of whether the subject or the researcher really controlled
exposure duration are on occasion regrettably subjective, even intuitive,
in some cases because of inadequacies in the description of procedures.
In several cases, authors' mentioning that presentation was audiotaped
was the primary basis for the judgment.
 232 PAUL H. BLANEY
In all of the foregoing studies, the affective quality of the ma-
terial to be recalled was introduced by way of success/failure.
Apparently, the materials were otherwise neutral. The following
studies relied instead on the intrinsic affective quality of the ma-
terial to be recalled.
Specifically, there are a number of studies in which subjects
were presented with a series of words or phrases that varied
normatively on some dimension of positivity/negativity, such as
rated pleasantness. Some used nonclinical subjects whose self-
reports indicated varying levels of depression (Finkel, Glass, &
Merluzzi, 1982; Gotlib & MeCann, 1984, Study 1; Hammen et
al., in press; Ingram, Smith, & Brehm, 1983; Kuiper & Derry,
1982; Kuiper, Olinger, Derry, & Shaw, 1985; Mathews & Bradley,
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1983; Pietromonaco & Markus, 1985) or related variables (Matlin
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& Gawron, 1979). Others used patient samples of diagnosed
depressives and controls (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Breslow,
Kocsis, & Belkin, 1981; Dunbar & Lishman, 1984; McDowall,
1984, Study 1; Post, Lobitz, & Gasparikova-Krasnec, 1980). All
of the studies except Gotlib and McCann's and Pietromonaco
and Markus's provided some evidence of an underrecall (or rec-
ognition; Dunbar & Lishman, 1984) of positive material and/or
overrecall of negative material among depressed individuals
compared with controls.3 In the Finkel et al. (1982) study, in
which the material to be recalled consisted of positive or negative
self-statements, there was no difference when most statements
were negative; when the preponderance of statements were pos-
itive, depressives recalled being exposed to fewer positive ones
than did controls. This pattern is reminiscent of the finding noted
above from the DeMonbreun and Craighead (1977) study.
Several of the foregoing studies incorporated exposure set as
a variable in their designs (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Hammen
et al., in press; Ingram et al., 1983; Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Kuiper
et al., 1985; McDowall, 1984, Study 1). In all but McDowall's
study there was a self-reference set condition, in which subjects
were asked to focus on the stimulus material's applicability to
themselves, compared with at least one other exposure set (e.g.,
structural set, familiar other set). The results of these studies are
rather consistent in suggesting that mood-congruence effects are
obtainable only under self-reference set. Moreover, in one of the
few studies lacking any mood-congruence effect (Gotlib &
MeCann, 1984, Study 1), the exposure set was one that likely
discouraged self-referenced processing (subject's task involved
color naming). Among those studies that did manifest a mood-
congruence effect but in which exposure set was not varied, in
two (Finkel et al., 1982; Post et al., 1980) the procedure probably
encouraged subjects to process the stimuli with a self-referencing
bent. Although in the remaining ones (Breslow et al., 1981; Dun-
bar & Lishman, 1984; Matlin & Gawron, 1979) there was nothing
in the procedure that would discourage self-reference processing,
the fact that it was not explicitly called for in these studies suggests
that a self-referenced set during exposure is not an absolute pre-
requisite for mood-congruent memory effects. Consistent with
this, in McDowall's (1984) Study 1, although mood congruence
was not evident when an exposure set that would appear to have
discouraged self-referencing was used, it was present when a set
that neither encouraged nor discouraged it was used. It thus ap-
pears clear that mood-congruence effects are impossible or dif-
ficult to demonstrate when stimulus exposure occurs under sets
that are explicitly antithetical to self-referencing.
Three other studies deserve mention in this section. The first
two (D. M. Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Dicner, Larson, & Emmons,
1984) are especially interesting by virtue of the fact that the to-
be-remembered material had to do with actual life experiences.
It was noted earlier that depressed or nondepressed differences
in memories of life experiences are usually not amenable to clear
interpretation (because there may be veridical differences between
groups). Diener et al. (1984) avoided that ambiguity by having
their subjects (undergraduates high vs. low on self-rated well
being) rate their daily experiences over a 3-month period; con-
gruent recall bias (i.e., differences in retrospective estimates of
the frequencies of positive and negative experiences) was obtained
even taking the contemporaneous reports as the base against
which the recall estimates were judged. D. M. Clark and Teasdale
(1982) avoided the ambiguity by using within-subject compar-
isons. Specifically, depressed patients were tested on two closely
spaced occasions,4 with depth of depression differing between
the two occasions, presumably as a result of diurnal variations.
The hedonic tone of events remembered while more depressed
was compared with those remembered while less depressed. Re-
sults were clear in showing fewer happy and more unhappy
memories on the more depressed occasion, with the reverse pat-
tern when less depressed.5 Moreover, whereas these findings re-
lated to subjects' judgments of the hedonic tone of events when
they occurred, ratings of current hedonic tone ("How you feel
about it looking back on it now?") were also influenced by mood.
Accordingly, D. M. Clark and Teasdale (1982, p. 93) concluded
that "mood has two separate effects: It influences the selection
of emotional material for entry into consciousness and it also
affects how pleasing or upsetting that material will be, once it
has entered consciousness."
At the beginning of this section, I noted that a number of
studies would not be reviewed because of problematic design
features in them. In most cases, including those studies would
not materially change the conclusions that can be drawn from
those reviewed. The final article I describe is an exception, in
that it reports replicated failures to demonstrate mood congru-
ence. Specifically, Hasher, Rose, et al. (1985), studying under-
graduates designated as depressed versus nondepressed on the
basis of self-report, were unable to demonstrate any congruence
of recall selectivity for thematic material within a narrative, even
though they examined a variety of experimental variations in
which this might occur (varied time lapsed from exposure to
recall; incidental vs. intentional recall; exposure under enhanced
3
A study by Hettena and Ballif (1981), is sometimes cited as comprising
a failure to demonstrate mood congruence, but the small numbers of
subjects and of stimuli, coupled with the failure to present relevant de-
scriptive or inferential statistics, suggest that these results do not merit
attention.
" If conclusions are to be viewed as clearly relevant to memory bias,
the intertest interval must be brief indeed. For instance, the similar within-
subject findings reported by Fogarty and Hemsley (1983) are excluded
from this review because the intertest interval they used was as much as
6 weeks, long enough for the subject's veridical experience base to have
changed substantially.
5
Latencies for memories were also reported here and in a number of
other studies involving retrieval. When, as in this case, the experimenter
has relinquished all control over the hedonic quality that the subject is
to generate, the meaning of latency data is unclear, and such findings
will not be recounted.
 AFFECT AND MEMORY
self-focusing set). Although, strictly speaking, these findings could
be ruled irrelevant to the question of mood-congruent memory,
it would probably be unwise to do so, because the basis for that
claim of irrelevance—the fact that the subject controlled exposure
duration for positive and negative material—would appear to
represent a confounding variable more likely to produce a spu-
rious mood-congruent recall result than to obscure a veridical
one. The meaning of these results has been the topic of consid-
erable discussion (see Ellis, 1985; Hasher, Zacks, Rose, & Doren,
1985; Isen, 1985; Mayer & Bower, 1985). Ellis (1985), for instance,
has suggested that the lack of a mood-congruence effect is due
to Hasher et al.'s use of subclinically depressed normal subjects
and/or to their use of thematically interdependent narrative ma-
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terial. Either of these suggestions is plausible, as there are other
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instances of failues to show mood congruence in subclinical
samples (e.g., Pietromomaco & Markus, 1985), and as there are
other instances of failures to show mood congruence with positive
and negative material embedded in a connected narrative (cf.
Mecklenbrauker & Hager, 1984).
This exception, it should be emphasized, is an exception. The
mood-congruence findings described thus far—involving natu-
rally occuring mood-relevant states—are numerous and have
been obtained across varied tasks, indices of memory access,
stimuli, and subject samples. At present it appears most reason-
able to treat mood congruence as a demonstrated correlate of
noninduced differences in depression.
There are limitations to the strategy of using an individual
difference approach. One is that, because exposure and recall
both occur in the same state, it is usually not known whether
the implied selectivity occurs at exposure or at recall. Some,
though not all, induction studies avoid this confound. Another
arises from the fact that diagnosed and assessed depressive states
are complex, therefore rendering it particularly unclear whether
it is their mood component that is involved in the mood-con-
gruent findings.
That is, depression may be viewed as entailing the chronic
priming of specific cognitive themes, mood state aside. The usual
presence of negative self-image in depression seems relevant here.
Indeed, Rychlak, Carlsen, and Dunning (1974, Study 1) reported
findings that parallel the mood-congruence findings, using pos-
itive versus negative self-concept rather than depressive status as
the sorting variable. Somewhat consistent is the finding (Bradley
& Mathews, 1983; Hammen et al., in press; Ingram et al., 1983);
that the mood-congruence effect may be obtainable only under
self-referent conditions. More striking still are Martin, Ward,
and Clark's (1983) data indicating that neuroticism has an impact
on recall of negative trait words (self-referenced only) and that
this relation is independent of self-reported depression. In any
case, if one assumes that mood inductions do not influence self-
image (or neuroticism, etc.), then mood inductions provide a
more pure way of assessing the role of mood on memory than
do individual difference approaches. This assumption may be
more plausible with respect to some inductions—those that ap-
pear to avoid cognitive priming—than to others, as is noted in
the discussion of the induction studies reviewed next.
Mood Induction Studies
Samples for these studies are rather uniform, consisting usually
of normal undergraduates, but the array of tasks and memory
variables shows the same diversity as seen in the studies reviewed
233
above, and there are a number of quite distinct mood manipu-
lation techniques. Note that in these studies, as with D. M. Clark
and Teasdale's (1982) and Diener et al.'s (1984) studies but not
with others reviewed in the prior section, subjects' recollections
of real-life events can be considered. That is, because subjects
are assigned randomly to mood induction conditions, any ten-
dency for, say, depressed subjects to recall more past adversity
presumably is the result of selectivity in recall rather than of
group differences in the objective incidence of adverse experi-
ences. The situation is parallel with respect to studies of the
affective quality of free or structured associations; comparisons
between diagnosed depressives and controls would be ambiguous
by virtue of possible historical differences underlying any asso-
ciative differences that emerged, but this is not the case when
the states are induced.
Again as with individual difference studies, however, results
that concern subjects' ratings or global judgments of experience
(e.g., M. S. Clark, Milberg, & Ross, 1983, Study 3; portions of
Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984; Isen et al., 1978, Study 1; Ka-
vanagh & Bower, 1985; Procidano & Heller, 1983, Study 2; por-
tions of Wright & Mischel, 1982) are not discussed, because it
is unclear whether differences that emerge are due to differences
in memories per se or to differences in the judgmental standards
applied, which may themselves be mood-sensitive (cf. Carson &
Adams, 1980; Isen & Shalker, 1982).
The situation with respect to the extent of experimenter control
during exposure is more complex. I noted earlier that, in indi-
vidual difference studies, unless exposure durations are controlled
by the experimenter, it is not possible to distinguish effects related
to mnemonic bias from effects related to differences in the
amount of time subjects spend examining various stimuli during
exposure. In induction studies, failure to control exposure du-
ration incurs this difficulty for some analyses but not for others.
It is a potential problem when (a) exposure and recall mood
states are confounded in the design (e.g., Ingram, 1984a; Natale
& Hantas, 1982), or (b) the focus is on congruence between ma-
terial recalled and exposure mood (e.g., Bower et al., 1981, Stud-
ies 1, 5, and parts of Study 3; parts of Mecklenbrauker & Hager,
1984). It is not a potential problem when the focus is on con-
gruence between material recalled and recall mood (assuming
that exposure and recall mood are not confounded), because in
this case there is no reason to believe that subjects' recall mood
state would bias their stimulus-examination behavior during ex-
posure (which, of course, occurred first, often prior to entry into
the study, as when real-life memories are being recalled). As in
other cases, findings that are rendered ambiguous for procedural
reasons are largely ignored.
Most of the relevant studies are outlined in Table 1. Those
few that are not (Gage & Safer, 1985; Ingram et al., 1983; Isen,
Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985; McFarland & Ross, 1982;
Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1976; Wyer & Frey, 1983) were omit-
ted because they entailed idiosyncracies that render them difficult
to report in this form; those that hold some unique interest are
described in context in the text that follows. Similarly, some of
the articles cited in the Table are not abstracted fully there; ad-
ditional important findings are noted at various points below.
Some that are ambiguous or redundant are not mentioned in
either the table or the text. Missing from Table 1 are also several
unpublished studies described by Gilligan and Bower (1984) or
by Mayer and Bower (1985).
 234
Table 1
Induction Studies Relevant to Mood-Congruent Memory
Study
Bower, Gilligan, & Monteiro
(1981, Studies 1-5)
Bower & Mayer (1985)
Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan
(1978; Studies 1-3)
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Brown & Taylor (198 5)
D. M. Clark & Teasdale
(1985, Study 1)
D. M. Clark, Teasdale,
Broadbent, & Martin (1983)
M.S. Clark & Waddell (1983)
Coleman (1975)
Forgas, Bower, & Krantz (1984)
Gerrig& Bower (1982)
Gotlib & McCann
(1984, Study 2)
Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp
(1978, Study 2)
Laird, Wagener, Halal, &
Szegda( 1982; Studies
land 2)
Madigan & Bollenbach
(1982, Studies la, Ib, and 2)
Mathews & Bradley (1983)
PAUL H. BLANEY
Induction and design
Hypnosis; EL vs. DEP; various
designs
Hypnosis; EL vs. DEP at
exposure crossed with EL vs.
DEP at recall
Hypnosis; EL vs. DEP; within-
subject
Velten and memory elicitation;
EL vs. DEP at exposure
crossed with EL vs. DEP at
recall
Music; EL vs. DEP; between-
subjects
Music; EL vs. DEP; between-
subjects
Success vs. failure vs. NEUT;
between-subjects
Velten; EL, DEP, and control;
between-subjects
Hypnosis; EL vs. DEP;
between-subjects
Hypnosis; EL vs. anger;
between-subjects
Velten; EL, NEUT, and DEP;
between-subjects
Success vs. failure at exposure
crossed with success vs.
failure at recall
Posturing; Study 1, anger vs.
EL; Study 2, fear vs. anger
vs. DEP; within-subject
Velten; between-subjects; Study
la: EL, NEUT, and DEP;
Studies Ib and 2: EL and
DEP
Velten with music; NEUT vs.
DEP; within-subject
Dependent variable(s)
Recall of positive vs. negative
elements in narrative story
(Studies 1-5)
Estimates of frequency of positive
vs. negative elements (Study 3)
Recall of positive vs. negative
words
Frequency of positive vs. negative
word recall
Order of positive vs. negative word
recall
Recall of words differing in
positivity
Recall of words differing in
positivity
Latency of word/nonword
discrimination of positive vs.
negative words
Subsequent word recall
Positivity of subjects' reports of
likely thoughts in 3 hypothetical
situations
Positivity of free associations
Amount recalled with regard to
prior stressful vs. comfortable
Tachistoscopic recognition
threshold as a function of word
positivity
Recall of adjectives varying in
affective tone
Recall of positive, negative, and
NEUT trait words
Recall of affectively toned
sentences
Studies la and Ib: positivity of
personal memories; Study 2:
positivity of free associations
Positivity of personal memories
Results
Congruence with exposure
mood, not recall mood
Congruence with recall mood,
not exposure mood
Congruence with exposure
mood, not recall mood
No difference with regard to
mood at recall
In 2 of 3 studies, subjects
recalled congruent prior to
noncongruent words
EL subjects recalled less
negative material than DEP
subjects
Among men, no mood-
congruence effects; among
women, EL subjects recalled
more pleasant than
unpleasant words; reverse in
DEP subjects
No interaction between mood
and word type
EL subjects recalled more
negative than positive words;
reverse trend in DEP subjects
In 2 of 3 situations, success-
induction thoughts more
positive than NEUT
condition; no failure-NEUT
difference
EL subjects' associations were
more positive than DEP
subjects'; neither differed
significantly from controls
DEP subjects recalled more
about stressful experiences;
EL subjects recalled more
with regard to comfortable
experiences
No differential impact of mood
on threshold as a function of
word positivity
No significant difference
No difference in recall of
negative words; no effect of
induction at exposure;
success at recall resulted in
more positive words recalled
For subjects for whom the
manipulation worked, recall
was mood congruent
Studies la and Ib: EL
condition memories more
pleasant than DEP; Study la:
neither differed significantly
from NEUT condition;
Study 2: EL subjects recalled
more pleasant memories
than DEP subjects
DEP more negative than
NEUT
 AFFECT AND MEMORY 235

Table 1 (continued)

Study Induction and design Dependent variable(s) Results

Mecklenbrauker & Hager
(1984)
Nasby&Yando(1982)
Natale&Hantas(1982)
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Velten; EL and DEP at
exposure crossed with EL
and DEP at recall
Memory elicitation; EL, NEUT,
and DEP at exposure crossed
with EL, NEUT, and DEP at
recall
Velten with hypnosis; DEP, EL,
and NEUT; between-subjects
Recall of positive vs. negative
elements in a narrative story
Recall of adjectives varying in
positivity
Affective tone of personal
memories
No evidence of mood
congruence
DEP induction at exposure
(only) differed from NEUT;
EL induction at exposure
and recall differed from
NEUT
EL subjects recalled more
positive and fewer negative
memories than did NEUT

and DEP subjects

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Postman & Brown (1952)
Riskind (1983, Studies 1 and 2)
Riskind, Rholes, & Eggers
(1982, extended report)
Siegel, Johnson, & Sarason
(1979)
Snyder & White (1982, Studies
land 2)
Teasdale & Fogarty (1979)
Teasdale & Russell (1983)
Teasdale & Spencer (1984)
Tfeasdale& Taylor (1981)
Teasdale, Taylor, & Fogarty
(1980)
Wright & Mischel
(1982, Study 1)
Success vs. failure vs. NEUT;
between-subjects
Posturing; EL vs. DEP; within-
subject
Modified Velten; EL vs. DEP;
between-subjects
Velten; EL, NEUT, and DEP;
between-subjects
Velten; EL vs. DEP; between-
subjects
Velten; EL vs. DEP; within-
subject
Modified Velten; EL vs. DEP;
between-subjects
Music; EL vs. DEP; between-
subjects
Modified Velten; EL vs. DEP;
within-subject
Velten; EL vs. DEP; within-
subject
Memory elicitation; EL, DEP,
and NEUT; between-subjects
Brightness recognition threshold of
success, failure, and NEUT
words
Recall latencies for positive vs.
negative personal memories
Latencies in generating positive vs.
negative personal memories
Positive and negative recent events
marked on checklist
Positivity of recent life experiences
recalled (Study 1) or checked off
(Study 2)
Latencies in generating positive vs.
negative personal memories
Recall of positive and negative trait
words
Recall estimates of frequency of
successes at prior task
Positivity of memories
Positivity of memories
Recall estimates of number of
successes at a prior task
Failure subjects had lowest
failure word thresholds;
success subjects had lowest
success word thresholds
Significant or near-significant
mood-congruent effects
Mood-congruent difference
between positive vs. negative
memory latencies
No significant difference
EL subjects reported more
happy and fewer sad
experiences than DEP
subjects
EL subjects has shorter
latencies for positive
memories than DEP
subjects; no difference
between groups for negative
memories
EL subjects recalled more
positive than negative words;
reverse for DEP subjects
EL subjects gave higher
estimates than DEP subjects
Mood-congruent differences for
happy and unhappy
memories
Mood-congruent differences for
positive and (to a lesser
degree) negative memories
When veridical success was
high, DEP subjects gave
lower estimates than EL and
NEUT subjects; when
success levels were low, EL
subjects gave higher estimates
than did NEUT and DEP
subjects

Note. EL = elation. DEP = depression. NEUT = neutral. As used in the results column, they refer to the induction condition, not necessarily to
subjects' actual mood state. See text for descriptions of the inductions. Unless otherwise specified, the induction was used during both exposure and
recall or during recall only. All studies used adults (usually undergraduates) with the exception of Nasby and Yando (1982), who used fifth graders.

As is evident in Table 1, six kinds of induction have been used
in relevant studies. Three of them—Velten, hypnosis, and suc-
cess/failure—have been described above, in the context of their
use in research on state dependence. The remaining three require
description here. In "music," as the name suggests, the subject
listens to a musical recording deemed to have strong affective
impact. In "memory elicitation," the subject is asked to achieve
the desired mood by dwelling on appropriate personal experiences
in his or her past. In "posturing," the subject's face (and, some-
times, his or her body) is positioned by the researcher to conform
to the desired mood (e.g., a happy facial expression). Music and
poturing seem least likely to result in cognitive priming, though
some variations of the Velten procedure may minimize it too
(cf. Teasdale & Taylor, 1981).
As is evident in the results column of Table 1, among the 29
articles reported (representing an even larger number of studies),
 236 PAUL H. BLANEY
only one study reported results indicative of a mood-mcongruent
bias in recall (D. M. Clark et al., 1983), a finding that is discussed
in a subsequent section. Three articles (Gotlib & McCann, 1984;
Study 2; Mecklenbrauker & Hager, 1984; Siegel et al., 1979);
reported no significant differences; none can be viewed as casting
much doubt on the replicability of the basic phenomenon. In
the case of Mecklenbrauker and Hager (1984), the failure seems
likely to reflect the fragility of the effect when the stimuli are
presented in narrative form, such that positive and negative ele-
ments are interconnected; the only induction finding supportive
of mood congruence with such stimuli (Bower et al., 1981, ex-
posure mood-congruence results) was compromised by subjects'
control over exposure duration, and mood congruence appears
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difficult to demonstrate with such stimuli in individual difference
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research (cf. Hasher, Rose, et al., 1985). Neither Gotlib and
McCann (1984, Study 2) nor Siegel et al. (1979) provide results
that are truly negative regarding the existence of mood-congru-
ence effects, because each set of findings included nonsignificant
patterns consistent with mood congruence. In the case of Gotlib
and McCann (1984, Study 2), the fact that the exposure pro-
cedure they used probably discourages self-referenced processing
may also have accounted for the absence of a strong effect.
This last explanation is, of course, the same offered to account
for the absence of a mood-congruent effect in Gotlib and
McCann's (1984, Study 1) individual difference study. In that
context, the credibility of that explanation was enhanced by the
existence of several studies suggesting that self-referencing may
be a prerequisite for mood congruence to emerge. In the case of
induction studies. Brown and Taylor (1985) addressed this issue
directly (by incorporating the crossing of presence or absence of
self-referencing with elation or depression during exposure and
recall in the design); though complete analyses are not reported,
it appears that congruence with exposure set mood occurred
only under a self-referencing set. In addition, Ingram et al. (1983)
showed a similar effect of self-referencing among nondepressed
subjects (exposure and recall moods were confounded).
Although no induction has been reported in which the effects
of neutral-mood exposure set on mood-congruent recall has been
reported, the recent study by D. M. Clark and Teasdale (1985;
Study 1) may be relevant. Using a non-self-referencing exposure
set, they showed a mood-congruent recall that was apparently
stronger when the positive and negative words to be recalled were
positive and negative personal descriptors as opposed to abstract
nouns. Moreover, D. M. Clark and Teasdale's (1985) positive
finding appeared only in female subjects, and in a subsequent
study (Study 2) they demonstrated that the words on which the
women were likely to show mood congruence were also words
that women are much more likely than men to use in everyday
contexts. This suggests that what is a prerequisite for mood con-
gruence is not self-referencing set per se but rather some ability
of the stimuli (however presented) to contact the subject's cus-
tomary evaluative construct system. Self-referencing may be one
way of enhancing this.
Two additional failures to show mood-congruent effects in
Table 1 arose with respect to input-processing rather than mne-
monic variables (D. M. Clark et al., 1983; Gerrig & Bower, 1982).
The only successful demonstration of mood congruence in input
processing (Postman & Brown, 1952) appears explainable on the
basis of the content-priming (rather than affective) impact of the
induction; both the induction and the task stimuli dealt with
success or failure.
Thus there appear to be two reasons not to view bias at input
as the source of mood-congruent recall findings: the absence of
effects in the Gerrig and Bower (1982) and D. M. Clark et al.
(1983) studies, and the presence in Table 1 of recall mood-con-
gruence effects in instances in which exposure mood was not
varied (e.g., D. M. Clark & Teasdale, 1985; Forgas et al., 1984;
Laird et al., 1982; Teasdale & Russell, 1983) and even of one
study (Isen et al., 1978) in which exposure mood was varied and
had no effect. On the other hand, there are studies in which both
exposure and recall mood were varied and in which the results
indicate mood-congruent effects involving both exposure and
recall (Nasby & Yando, 1982) or exposure but not recall (Bower
et al., 1981; Bower & Mayer, 1985; Brown & Taylor, 1985).
Though this remains an unresolved issue, it should be noted that
an examination of tabular material provided by Bower et al. and
by Brown and Taylor raises the possibility that recall mood con-
gruence would have been evident if different analyses had been
executed or sample sizes enlarged. (The relevant means in the
Bower and Mayer study are not reported.) Note also that subjects
in the Bower et al. studies (but not in Bower & Mayer's, Brown
& Taylor's, or Nasby & Yando's studies) apparently controlled
exposure duration, so differential recall effects associated with
exposure mood in Bower et al.'s research may not be specifically
mnemonic in nature.
The D. M. Clark and Teasdale (1985, Study 1) finding that
mood congruence appeared demonstrable only in women raises
some interesting questions. As noted above, those authors at-
tributed their finding to the fact that the stimuli used were more
common in women's than in men's personal usage. If this is so,
are there affectively valenced stimuli that are common in men's
usage? If so, can mood congruence be demonstrated with such
stimuli among men? Although a number of studies in Table 1
in which mood congruence was reported used mixed gender
samples, gender was not a variable in any except Clark and Teas-
dale's study, so the possibility that the many mood-congruence
effects noted therein reflect the behavior of female subjects only
cannot be fully ruled out. The only showing of mood congruence
in a male sample was DeMonbreun and Craighead's (1977) in-
dividual difference study, described in the previous section. Gen-
der effects obviously require further research.
Snyder and White's (1982) Study 2 findings deserve special
note for their methodological implications. In that study, there
was an induced mood-congruent effect on subject's responses on
a checklist of recent personal events experienced. This raises
concerns regarding the literature on depressed persons' partici-
pation in pleasant and unpleasant activities (e.g., Lewinsohn,
Youngren, & Grosscup, 1979), which typically relies on self-re-
port. Stone (1981) has argued cogently that retrospective distor-
tion of events due to depression is especially likely when open-
ended reports are used, but Snyder and White's Study 2 results
suggest that the checklist format does not completely eliminate
such distortion. Procidano and Heller (1983, Study 2) have pre-
sented findings that raise similar misgivings regarding the liter-
ature on social support and depression.
If mood change is responsible for changes in the bias in recall,
one would anticipate that the extent of mood-congruent recall
would be associated significantly and exclusively with the extent
 AFFECT AND MEMORY
of mood change. This has been checked in a few of the studies
in Table 1, by including in the design the assessment of prein-
duction as well as postinduction memory bias data (Mathews &
Bradley, 1983; Riskind, 1983;Riskindetal., 1982). Results have
been consistently and unexpectedly negative. Somewhat similarly,
Gilligan and Bower (1984) have summarized unpublished find-
ings suggesting that the extent of mood congruence is unrelated
to the intensity of the induced mood. Two possibilities for such
findings deserve mention. One is that some kind of threshold
effect is operating—that mood-congruent memory requires a
particular mood strength, beyond which there is no further in-
crement in the effect. The other is that the crucial impact of the
i inductions is not on mood but on some other variable. One
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version of this latter possibility was referred to above as involving
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"priming," that is, that the content of the induction lowers the
threshold for access to particularly thematic material, and was
used in the suggestion that Postman and Brown's (1952) findings
may have been due to the similarity between the content of the
induction and the content of the to-be-remembered material.
The question of what the real impact of the mood inductions is
is covered in a subsequent section.
State Dependence Versus Mood Congruence
Thus far I have presented designs and analysis as if they clearly
address the phenomenon of state dependence or the phenomenon
of mood congruence. The question that must be asked is whether
the implied distinctiveness of these two phenomena withstands
close scrutiny. In particular, could one be seen as subsuming the
other?
In this vein, I noted in an earlier section that Weingartner et
al.'s (1977) results—indicating that subjects experiencing strong
mood shifts were better able to regenerate associations first gen-
erated in same as opposed to different mood—could be seen as
reflecting either mood congruence or state dependence. That is,
the enhanced ability of subjects to recall what they generated
when last in a given mood was (a) because what was congruent
with that mood at first exposure was still congruent with it at
subsequent exposure, or (b) because return to that mood helped
remind subjects of the material they were thinking of when last
in that mood, irrespective of content.
The very same ambiguity arises for a number of the studies
reported in Table 1, however, such that evidence ostensibly sup-
porting mood congruence can he viewed as reflecting state de-
pendence. For instance, Teasdale et al. (1980) reported that
memories of past life events were somewhat congruent with af-
fective state during recall. Although this might reflect mood con-
gruence, it could also be that subjects were simply remembering
events that had occurred when they were previously in the given
mood—that is, the happy memories subjects generated while
happy were memories of events that had occurred while the per-
son was happy (state dependence). In short, in the absence of
control over or monitoring of a person's mood history during
past experience with stimuli, one cannot rule out a possible role
for state dependence. This line of reasoning is obvious with regard
to findings such as Teasdale et al.'s (1980), but it could probably
be made to account for most or all other finds that ostensibly
support mood congruence as well.
237
In short, although stimuli in state dependence studies may be
affectively neutral and although stimuli in mood congruence may,
in principle, have been experienced by the individual only during
neutral moods, the first of these two stipulations is sometimes
violated, and the latter of them often—perhaps always—is in
the research arena. It is even more likely that they are violated
in uncontrolled contexts (i.e., real-life situations).
Two reports of ostensible mood-congruence effects have in-
cluded'arguments to the effect that state dependence cannot ac-
count for the findings presented. Madlgan and Bollenbach (1982)
have suggested that their findings of differences in the hedonic
tone of word associations as a function of affective state (Study
2) could not be state-dependent effects because word associations
rely on semantic memory whereas state dependence is a function
of episodic memory. This argument, although not trivial, is less
than conclusive, however, because it would be difficult to rule
out an "episodic" component in word-association behavior. Sec-
ond, Laird et al. (1982) suggested that state dependence could
not account for their own Study 2 results, because they ostensibly
held mood state constant during initial exposure to the affectively
valenced stimuli. This too is reasonable but not conclusive, be-
cause it is possible that—even though facial expression was kept
constant—the affectively toned material did result in some mood
fluctuations during exposure.
There are two additional lines of reasoning one could use in
advocating the separate existence of mood congruence. First, if
mood-state dependence can be shown (and it cannot always; see
Bower & Mayer, 1985; Wetzler, 1985) the successful demonstra-
tions are usually limited to interference contexts (Bower et al.,
1978; Schare et al., 1984); the mood-congruence literature has,
however, used paradigms lacking an apparent interference com-
ponent, except insofar as interference is an inherent aspect of
free-field memory experience. Second, if one relies on state de-
pendence as an explanation for mood congruence, there is still
the question of how any state got there originally. It appears
logically necessary to posit a link between particular classes of
events and/or appraisals and particular classes of moods. If, then,
the hedonic tone of events is somehow causally linked with
moods, it seems plausible that there could be a link between
moods and hedonic tone of memories, hence mood congruence.
What seems clear is that there exist either mood-congruence
effects or state dependence effects disguised as such, the former
being the more likely of the two. The findings regarding these
effects are the subject of the following comments. For conve-
nience, I refer to them simply as mood-congruence findings.
Mood Congruence: Asymmetry of Effect
Given the stereotype of the depressed person as full of negative
thoughts, it would make the most intuitive sense if a strong swing
toward unpleasant content were associated with depression in
the studies reported. This was not exactly what happened in
most studies reviewed. For instance, the actual mean for hap-
piness ratings of memories generated by depression-induction
subjects in Teasdale and Taylor (1981) is —0.12 on a scale of — 3
to +3. Although this mean is significantly lower than the mean
for those given by elation subjects, it suggests in more absolute
terms that the memories were rather neutral or balanced. This,
however, must be seen in light of the fact that the depression
 238 PAUL H. BLANEY
inductions themselves may not have succeeded in generating
much depression. For instance, in Teasdale and Taylor (1981)
the actual mean despondency rating generated by depression-
induction subjects was 48.4 on a scale of 0-100. Such data, cou-
pled with the typical absence of neutral or no-induction controls
and with evidence of the weakness of the Velten depression in-
duction (cf. Henderson & Lohr, 1982), suggest that a large portion
of the mood-congruence data may be relevant to elation but not
to depressive affect, much less to clinical depression.
The related studies on clinically diagnosed depressives clearly
provide the desired relevance, but they too fail to portray as
much negativity as might be expected. For instance, even when
at the more depressed of their levels within the diurnal cycle,
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D. M. Clark and Teasdale's (1982) depressed inpatients recalled
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experiences having a mean unhappiness rating of a mere —0.34
on a scale of —3 to +3.
One is tempted to conclude that the selectivity of depression
really involves a drift away from positivity toward neutrality.
This would probably be premature given the existence of evidence
of distortion of a truly negative sort (e.g., Gotlib, 1981, 1983)
and in the absence of a metric for knowing how negative some-
thing has to be before it is "really" negative. Moreover, what
may be crucial is whether there is at least one truly unhappy
memory, a consideration that is obscured in means of ratings
(R. Ganellen, personal communication, July 16, 1984).
There are also, however, repeated instances of an asymmetry
in depressive selectivity in the mood-congruence literature, one
in which pleasant material appears more affected than does un-
pleasant, including the following: DeMonbreun and Craighead's
(1977) and Finkel et al.'s (1982) finding that only when the stim-
ulus frequency balance is rather positive is it distorted by de-
pressives; Breslow et al.'s (1981) finding that depressives show a
deficit in recall of positive themes only; Isen et al.'s (1978, Study
2) and Nasby and Yando's (1982, Study 1) finding that induced
depression results in a deficit in recall of pleasant words only;
Teasdale and Fogarty's (1979) finding that mood inductions result
in differences in recall latencies for pleasant memories only;
Teasdale et al.'s (1980) finding that mood inductions result in
differences that were significant for positive memories only; and
Natale and Hantas's (1982) finding that a depression induction
reduced positive but did not increase negative memories. Note
that this list includes studies involving diagnosed clinical depres-
sion.
The meaning of this pattern is unclear, but there are two other
literatures with which it appears somewhat consistent. The first
is that indicating that in normals there is a tendency for memory
and perception to be normatively biased in the positive direction.
Matlin and Slang (1978) have reviewed the literature on this and,
from the viewpoint of memory research, the most interesting
finding they cite is an unpublished one by Matlin and Underbill
indicating that normals rehearse pleasant more than unpleasant
words in a recall task. The second is the literature on self-judg-
ment responses (e.g., Lewinsohn et al., 1980; Rozensky, Rehm,
Pry, & Roth, 1977) indicating the same tendency for normals'
performance to be positively biased and depressives' relatively
neutral, as noted in the memory literature. As Isen (1984) has
noted, some instances of asymmetry may reflect the presence of
affect-reducing control efforts in the case of depression but not
elation; this class of effects is discussed in a later section.
Mood Congruence: Might It Be Motivated?
A commonly verbalized and perhaps universally accepted as-
sumption is that mood-congruent recall is an automatic, nonef-
fortful, unmotivated phenomenon. Although this may be an ap-
pealing and reasonable point of view, it has not been assessed
directly. There are several lines of reasoning that call this as-
sumption into question, and they are addressed in this section.
For the most part, each one of them applies to only a subset of
the studies in which mood congruence has been demonstrated,
but taken together they raise major questions about the phenom-
enon.
Congruence in the service of esteem repair. Here the line of
reasoning pertains to overrecall of negative material among de-
pressed individuals. The suggestion is that subjects recall the
material because they have focused on it in order to rebut or
neutralize it.
There is one induction study—not recounted in Table 1 be-
cause of its unique characteristics—that seems best interpreted
in this fashion. Specifically, Wyer and Frey (1983) used a success
or failure manipulation, after which subjects were exposed to
material that, rather than being intrinsically positive or negative,
dealt with the credibility of the test on which the success or
failure feedback had been based. Subjects were presented with
a series of pro- and antitest arguments, and their incidental recall
for these arguments was assessed. These assessments indicated
that failure subjects had better recall for pro-test arguments than
did success subjects. This recall pattern can be viewed as mood
congruent. However, the researchers also considered the impact
of the success or failure manipulation on subjects' views regarding
such tests. Feedback indicating poor performance increased sub-
jects' disparagement of the reliability and validity of such tests,
as would be expected if subjects were seeking a self-protective
external attribution for their failure. That is, this derogation of
the test would appear to reflect an antidepressive process. The
presence of both a mnemonic mood-congruence effect and an
apparent antidepressive effect in the same group may indicate
that the memory effect, although ostensibly automatic and mood-
perpetuating, instead resulted from subjects having focused
heavily on self-derogatory information in order to counter it.
It would require some strained reasoning, of course, to account
for all demonstrations of mood congruence in ways that parallel
the line of reasoning just offered. In particular, it is hard to imag-
ine that happy subjects would focus on happy materials in order
to rebut that happiness; mood congruence is, after all, most
clearly evident with elation. On the other hand, the foregoing
line of reasoning does appear plausible for one situation in which
mood-congruent recall effects appear particularly strong: when
the stimuli are personally evaluative adjectives, presented with
a self-referencing set to individuals assessed or diagnosed as de-
pressed.
Congruence in the service of self-improvement. Somewhat
similar to the foregoing is the suggestion that some individuals
may focus on negative personally relevant material as part of an
attempt to identify and overcome their own weaknesses. Cooney
and Zeichner (1985) used this reasoning in accounting for data
indicating that Type A individuals show a negative recall bias.
Research dealing more directly with the relevance of this rea-
soning to mood-congruent recall is lacking.
 AFFECT AND MEMORY
Congruence in the service of self-verification. In a much earlier
section I noted that subjects diagnosed/assessed as depressed in-
evitably differ from one another in a number of respects other
than current mood state, most notably in self-image. There is a
growing literature (cf. Swann, 1983) indicating that there may
be motivational forces fostering the confirmation and mainte-
nance of a stable self-image, even when that self-image is negative.
Such forces could certainly underlie some instances of ostensible
mood-congruent bias.
Evidence indicating that self-image was more important than
mood per se in fostering congruence would he consistent with
this possibility (though by no means conclusively supportive of
it). The findings of Kuiper et al.'s (1985) study are of interest in
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this context. They found that mood-congruence effects were not
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evident in depressed persons who lacked a depressive cognitive
style. The somewhat parallel results of Martin et al. (1983) with
neuroticism have been cited in a previous section. The relations
between cognitive style or neuroticism and self-image are unclear
but probably close.
On the other hand, two studies indicate that intraindividual
changes in mood are accompanied by apparent changes in affect-
relevant memory (D. M. Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Hammen et
al., in press). If one assumes that self-image is stable, these studies
cast doubt on the view that all ostensible mood congruence is
self-image related and thus potentially fostered by self-verification
motives. The numerous induction-based demonstrations of
mood-congruent memory may also be seen as undercutting this
line of reasoning, but as is noted next, these induction studies
have their own sources of ambiguity.
Congruence as subject compliance. Here the concern is that
incidental aspects of common mood inductions may instill tem-
porary motivational forces that set the stage for ostensible mood-
congruence findings.
Specifically, a major problem with induction studies using the
Velten, hypnotic, musical, and memory elicitation procedures
arises from the fact that these inductions typically entail the ex-
plicit instruction to the subject that he or she try to feel the
specified mood. Such instructions may be the equivalent of saying
to the subject: "Even though when faced with depressive affect
you typically let it decay or act to counteract it, this time do
what it takes to keep the depression going." This concern is not,
incidentally, to be confused with the prosaic "demand charac-
teristics" issue discussed effectively by Gilligan and Bower (1984;
see also D. M. Clark, 1983), which has to do with whether or
not induced moods are real. Instead, the point is that, granted
that a given mood state has been successfully induced,6 subjects'
may be behaving as they do because of the mood only or in part
because of the instruction to adopt and maintain that mood.
The major implication of all of this is that subjects in mood-
congruent memory studies using these inductions may well have
seen their participation in the recall task as providing an oppor-
tunity for them to bias their behavior in a way that helped them
comply with the experimenter's "feel-the-mood" instructions,
with the mood-congruent results arising in part from this com-
pliance.7 Somewhat supportive of this line of reasoning is the
consistent absence of mood-congruent findings in studies using
these inductions with respect to the initial processing of affectively
laden stimulus input (D. M. Clark et al., 1983; Gerrig & Bower,
1982; Gotlib & McCann, 1984, Study 2 latency data). It appears
239
likely that the paradigms used in these studies did not provide
subjects with an opportunity to enhance the mood state as re-
quested by the experimenter, or, if they did, that the dependent
variables were not sensitive to subjects' efforts to comply with
the request; this would account for the absence of mood-con-
gruent results in these studies.
Apparent means of escape from this ambiguity would be to
rely on inductions that do not involve requests that the subject
feel a given mood. Success or failure and posturing inductions
typically do not do so, so evidence of mood congruence that
arises from them cannot be seen as arising from compliance
motivations. However, both of these inductions have problems
of their own. In the case of success or failure, the problem arises
from the likelihood (noted in an earlier section) that the induction
may prime specific cognitive contents. In the case of posturing,
the induction may set forth a separate motivational process, as
indicated in the next section.
Mood congruence as misattribution. Here the concern is that
placing an individual in an affectively linked postural position
provides him or her with internal cues indicating the presence
of an affective state without also providing a sufficiently salient
explanation for those cues. If one assumes that such unexplained
cues set forth a motivated search for data that might provide an
attribution for those cues, quite possibly there would then be a
selective attention to stimuli congruent with the to-be-explained
mood cues.
Indeed, research has appeared that suggests that memory may
be biased by such "misattributional" processes. Specifically,
Schwarz and Clore (1983) have reported two studies in which
they varied both positive and negative mood and the availability
of an explanation for that mood. Results indicated that under-
graduates in whom a relatively negative mood state was induced
used contextual cues in a fashion that apparently mitigated or
exaggerated the effect of that mood state on judgments of general
happiness and life satisfaction, depending on which cues were
readily available. No comparable effect of contextual cues was
evident for positive mood states, presumably because such states
are expected and hence require no explanation. In short, mood
cues that lack a salient explanation may instigate a search for an
explanation, and what ensues may result in a mood-congruent
bias. This may he what accounts for Laird et al.'s (1982) and
Riskind's (1983) mood-congruent results using posturing ma-
nipulations, and it involves a process that is motivated rather
than essentially mnemonic and automatic.
Comment. The gist of the foregoing subsections is that few
if any mood-congruence findings give results that are totally un-
ambiguous; each research approach has some feature that renders
results emerging from it somewhat less clear than first impressions
would suggest. Although it may seem unlikely that enough of
6
The evidence of Snyder and White's (1982, Study 3) research suggests
that this proviso is essential, that is, that mood change is necessary, even
if not sufficient. In that study, "feel the mood" instructions were followed
by an innocuous "induction," and no evidence of mood congruence en-
sued.
7
Isen (1984) raised this possibility regarding hypnotic inductions but
did not note its possible relevance to Velten, memory elicitation, and
musical inductions.
 240 PAUL H. BLANEY
these alternative explanations are correct such that mood-con-
gruent findings never reflect an automatic process, the standard
of due scientific caution entails the requirement that these various
explanations receive further empirical consideration in the future.
A Cause of Depression?
Whatever the specific nature of mood-based mnemonic con-
gruence, it seems clear that its relevance to clinical depression
is that it may reflect a phenomenon that, when active, contributes
to the perpetuation or exaggeration of existing mood states. Even
if depression results only in a screening out of positive material,
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this would likely result in a shift in the balance toward negative
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material, which in turn might foster depression even in a non-
depressed person. It seems likely that mnemonic selectivity occurs
in depressed persons and that it contributes to the vicious cycle
of deepening depression. Virtually every author cited thus far
has alluded to such a possibility, and this line of reasoning has
received an elaborated statement in Ingram's (1984b) recent
theoretical article.
However, the weakness with mood congruence alone as an
explanation for the cause of depression is that it tends to explain
too much. That is, the prediction is that, once one starts to drift
away from a neutral mood, there is an inexorable force hindering
a return to "normal" mood, drawing one farther and farther in
the aberrant direction (at least in the absence of a countervailing
external event powerful enough to pierce through the veil of
selectivity). To be satisfactory, a model must provide some way
of accounting for (a) the fact that most persons would probably
be judged as being in a relatively neutral mood at most times,
and (b) the fact that most mood states, including even the most
severe of clinical depressions, are not permanent. That is, in its
most straightforward form, the selective-memory model accounts
for only a subset of affective changes and, in particular, fails to
account for the fact that dysphoric states are usually time limited.
Two variables seem to have some obvious potential in ac-
counting for the dilemma. The first is the severity of the affective
state, with more extreme states presumably having the greater
potential for self-perpetuation. The most relevant findings on
induced (Gilligan & Bower, 1984) and clinical (Bradley & Ma-
thews, 1983) depression fail to support this view—affective ex-
tremity was not associated with extent of mnemonic bias—but
it bears continued consideration nonetheless.
The second involves individual difference variables related to
depression, for example, cognitive styles labeled "depressogenic"
in related literatures. Teasdale and Russell (1983) have suggested
that whether or not the vicious cycle of "depression —> negative
cognitions —* depression, and so on" does, in fact, occur is "de-
termined by the types of cognitions that become accessible once
the person is depressed" (p. 170). Ingram (1984b) has similarly
implicated preexisting differences in self-concept, and, though
she couched it in different terms, Alper (1948) had much earlier
made a comparable suggestion. This appeal to preexisting in-
dividual differences may add a needed subtlety to the basic notion
of mood-congruence effects fostering mood perpetuation, but
there are two reasons not to rest too much hope on it, at least
without modification or elaboration. First, there are disconfirm-
ing results from one relevant study. Specifically, Kuiper et al.
(1985) considered the recall performance of undergraduates cat-
egorized with respect not only to depression level but also to
vulnerability, assessed in terms of a measure of depressogenic
attributional style. If individual differences in cognitive style were
crucial, one might expect that nondepressed individuals having
a depressogenic style might show the same memory bias shown
by depressives, but this result was not obtained. The second rea-
son is purely logical, rather than empirical. The problem becomes
evident when one observes that the mood-congruence effect is
apparently normative in the laboratory, whereas in the real world,
entrenched depression is fortunately a thoroughly nonnormative
consequence of negative affective states. That is, if depressive
mood congruence can be demonstrated in "normal" individuals,
and if one assumes that mood-congruence effects require a par-
ticular cognitive predisposition, then one must assume that most
normals have the cognitive predisposition. Instead, normal in-
dividuals appear to be able to recover from most occurrences of
even intense negative mood states.
There is an additional aspect of Ingram's (1984b) variant of
network theory that may be crucial in providing the answer:
Ingram has suggested that mood-congruent mnemonic rever-
berations are subject to natural decay under normal circum-
stances. Positing such a decay allows one to accept that mood
congruence immediately after mood induction is normative while
also acknowledging that the depressogenic effects of such mood
induction are not. Because Ingram also posited a role for indi-
vidual differences in the persistence of mood-congruent rever-
berations, his model appears to have the potential for accounting
both for the prevalence of mood-congruent memory and for the
fact that mood states are usually, but not universally, brief. How-
ever, he presented no data addressing either the proposed nor-
mative decay of mood-congruent reverberation or the role that
individual differences play in preventing the decay from occurring
in some persons.
Indeed, no research directly addressing these issues has evi-
dently been done, though there are findings of indirect relevance.
Specifically, there is evidence that the affective consequences of
mood manipulations are normatively quite brief (Frost & Green,
1982;Isen&Gorgoglione, 1983;Ranieri&Zeiss, 1984)andthat
individual differences (though not necessarily those suggested by
Ingram) influence the magnitude of mood-induction effects (e.g.,
Baucom & Danker-Brown, 1979; Richardson & Taylor, 1982).
Weiss, Glazer, Pohorecky, Bailey, and Schneider (1979) have
noted that even in animal studies, where analogue-depression
inductions are more severe than is permissible with humans, the
resulting depressoid states are ephemeral. D. M. Clark et al.'s
(1983) failure to obtain induced mood congruence in incidental
learning (see Table 1) may be of relevance given that their research
procedure dictated an unusual delay between the induction and
the recall task. That is, that delay may have permitted the pre-
dicted decay to occur.
In fact, however, there was more than a mere failure to show
mood-congruent recall in D. M. Clark et al. (1983): there was a
reversal, a significant mood-z'ncongruent effect. This suggests not
so much a passive decay process as some kind of active regulating
process, one that might effect a kind of overshoot. Though Clark
et al.'s reversal may not be replicable, it should perhaps come as
no surprise if it is, because a number of writers (e.g., Bower,
1981; M. S. Clark & Isen, 1982; Ingram, 1984b) have suggested
 AFFECT AND MEMORY
that runaway (ostensibly automatic) mood-congruent reverber-
ations may normatively be halted by controlled, purposive efforts.
Somewhat similarly, Solomon (1980) has suggested that depar-
tures from an affective set point initiate an opponent process,
the action of which routinely results in a temporary overshoot
in the direction opposite to the original deflection.8
Note that these two explanations for the normative subsidence
of mood-congruent reverberations—decay and control—are not
mutually exclusive. Ingram (1984b) has suggested a role for in-
dividual differences in each, with control becoming important
when decay fails. The evidence relevant to controlled processes
is reviewed next.
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Antidepressive Controlled-Memory Functions
The aspect of network theory that is most relevant to the notion
of antidepressive processes arises from the distinction between
automatic and controlled (or effortful; cf. Hasher & Zacks, 1979)
processes in memory (e.g., Bower, 1981; M. S. Clark & Isen,
1982). Mood-influenced selective recall is said to be automatic,
and efforts to overcome the distorting effects of this selectivity
are said to be controlled. That is, lasting depression would be
expected to occur when controlled processes fail to undo the
automatic tendency of dysphoric mood to perpetuate and/or
magnify itself. As noted previously, the automaticity of mood-
congruent forces is presumption rather than fact, and in this
section I accept that presumption as a point of departure for
discussion.
A strong confirmation of the claim that self-control techniques
are crucial in overcoming negative mood perpetuation would
require a comparison between dysphoric persons who soon get
better with those who do not on variables having to do with
controlled processes (e.g., rehearsal, organizational processes),
with the prediction that the two groups would show differences
as a function of the affective valence of the material to be re-
membered. For instance, one might expect that persons on a
depressive decline would rehearse positive material less and/or
negative material more than would equally depressed persons
who prove to be on the mend. Cross-sectional comparisons be-
tween depressed and nondepressed persons on such variables
would be useful, though less definitive, because some of the de-
pressed persons might be engaged in a soon-to-be-successful
controlled process.
Nothing of this sort—prospective or cross-sectional—appears
to have been reported in the memory literature per se. Those
studies that have looked at controlled-memory variables as a
function of depression (e.g., Calev & Erwin, 1985; Davis, 1979;
Davis & Unruh, 1980,1981; Ellis, Thomas, & Rodriguez, 1984;
Hasher&Zacks, 1979, Study 4; lavecchia cfe Hasher, 1978;Leight
& Ellis, 1981; Russell & Beekhuis, 1976; Weingartner, Cohen,
Murphy, Martello, & Gerdt, 1981) have not considered the af-
fective valence of material being learned. Conversely, the literature
reviewed above on mood congruence in memory that did consider
affective valence did not include dependent variables of presumed
relevance only to controlled processes.
There exist several studies that, though not involving tradi-
tional memory variables, did include findings of relevance to the
notion of active rehearsal. Roth and Rehm (1980) reported a
study in which depressed inpatients chose significantly more often
241
to examine instances of their personal failures than did psychi-
atric controls. This may be a very overt manifestation of a failure
to counteract automatic mood-perpetuating forces.9 Hammen
(1977), however, failed to obtain a comparable difference in a
comparison of depressed versus nondepressed undergraduates
(categorized on the basis of self-report), and Gasparikova-Krasnec
and Post (1984) failed to show any interaction between depressive
status in undergraduates and desire for positive versus negative
feedback (assessed in terms of number of tokens spent by subjects
to receive that feedback). More consistent with Roth and Rehm's
findings are McDowall's (1984, Study 2) results indicating that
mood-congruence effects are absent when depressed subjects are
coerced to attend fully to pleasant and unpleasant stimuli.
In related induction research, Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss
(1973) failed to find a difference between depression-induction
and neutral-condition subjects in time spent on complementary
versus uncomplementary information (though elation-induction
subjects spent more time with the positive material than both
other groups and depression induction may not have been suc-
cessful in inducing depression). Bower (1983) reported an un-
published study by Kelley in which depression- and elation-in-
duction subjects were asked to look through a series of pictures,
some of sad scenes and some of happy ones. The elation-induction
subjects spent more time with the happy pictures than the sad
ones, whereas the reverse was true for the depressed subjects.
Finally, using two different mood inductions, Sutherland,
Newman, and Rachman (1982) showed that subjects who were
asked to think an "intrusive" thought (e.g., a very sad memory),
then to remove the thought from awareness, took longer to do
so in depressed conditions than in elation conditions; no differ-
ence was noted between groups with regard to the removal of
neutral thoughts. The lack of neutral mood conditions makes it
impossible to know if the effects shown by Kelley (Bower, 1983)
and by Sutherland et al. (1982) involve depression, elation, or
both.
Note that to the extent that there are mood-congruent findings
with regard to the effects of inductions on rehearsal-related vari-
ables, this makes it difficult to claim that rehearsal-related pro-
cesses operate in a way that is distinct from mood-congruent
"automatic" processes in memory. If rehearsal is an effortful
control process, such findings would suggest that control pro-
cesses too are normatively mood congruent, such that it would
be difficult to say that such processes curb mood-perpetuating
effects. Accordingly, it would thus be more difficult to claim that
control processes have any role in preventing the vicious de-
pressive cycle from occurring, because such processes would seem
to be integral to that very cycle. Given the inconclusive nature
of the existing induction studies with respect to the impact of
depressive affect, however, this remains speculative.
8
The results of the only existing attempt to show that postinduction
decline in depression reflects an opponant process (Ranieri & Zeiss, 1984)
are unclear, for reasons that are instructive regarding the great difficulties
in assessing the predictions of opponent process theory in such contexts
(see Ranieri & Zeiss's discussion).
9
This finding is as expected on the basis of the notion, alluded to in
an earlier section, that depression involves purposive efforts to verify a
negative self-image.
 242 PAUL H. BLANEY
Note also that even when an individual is successful in using
a strategy of thinking pleasant thoughts (even though his or her
dysphoric mood tended to draw his or her thoughts elsewhere),
this might not have the desired antidepressive effect because there
is evidence that mood, apart from influencing what is remem-
bered, may color affectively what is remembered (D. M. Clark
& Teasdale, 1982). This may account in part for why merely
directing depressed persons' thoughts to pleasant memories is of
limited therapeutic value (Teasdale, 1978) and, similarly, directing
nondepressed persons' attention to unpleasant aspects of their
lives is not necessarily depressing (O'Hara & Rehm, 1979).
More generally, given the lack of research addressing the role
of controlled memory processes in the shortening of depression,
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it is premature to assume that these processes will provide the
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answer as postulated. Another possibility is apparent, namely
that whatever controlled processes are involved are unrelated or
indirectly related to mnemonic functions. Depression is not ex-
clusively a disorder of information processing, and it may be that
persons overcome the distorting effects of the mood-memory
link by regulatory processes that implicate other aspects of
depression-related phenomena. The current literatures that
probably are most relevant to such regulatory processes are (a)
survey research on ideal or normative ways of coping with stress
and depression (e.g., Coyne, Aldwin, & Lazarus, 1981; Doerfler
& Richards, 1983; Kleinke, Staneski, & Mason, 1982; Mitchell
& Hodson, 1983; Parker & Brown, 1982; Rippere, 1977), (b)
research in the attributional tradition (for extensive but discor-
dant reviews, see Coyne & Gotlib, 1983, and Peterson & Selig-
man, 1984), and (c) research stimulated by Rehm's (1977) self-
control model of depression (see Rehm, 1982, for a review).
These literatures are not of direct-enough relevance to this
article to deserve further discussion, with the following exception.
One of the components of Rehm's (1977) theory is the claim
that depression is due in part to defective "self-monitoring," that
is, negatively biased memory and attention. Much of the research
relevant to self-monitoring has already been reviewed in prior
sections of this article. Somewhat ironically, those studies that
ostensibly assessed the memory aspect of self-monitoring (e.g.,
DeMonbreun & Craighead, 1977) qualify operationally as rele-
vant to the question of mood-congruent memory and were ac-
cordingly reviewed in that context above. There is potential for
confusion regarding these studies and the phenomena they rep-
resent, arising from the fact that Rehm (1977) and others have
used the "control" idiom to discuss phenomena that Bower (1981)
and others would presumably refer to as automatic. Compound-
ing the potential for confusion is the fact that cognitively oriented
psychopathologists (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) have
long used terms like "automatic thoughts" to refer to the defective
routinized control strategies used by depressed persons. These
issues may seem merely semantic, but there is at least one respect
in which something substantive at stake.
Specifically, if one assumes that self-monitoring is a common
antidepressive mechanism among normals, one could predict
that inducing depression in normals might instigate an effortful
mood-incongruent, antidepressive monitoring process. However,
the induction studies described in Table 1, though done on pre-
sumed normals, usually showed mood congruence and (with the
exception of D. M. Clark et al., 1983) certainly lacked direct
evidence of mood incongruence. Moreover, some of these in-
duction studies (Bower et al., 1981, Study 3; Teasdale & Spence,
1984; Wright & Mischel, 1982) used memory variables of direct
relevance to the notion of self-monitoring as it has been opera-
tionalized in the literature inspired by Rehm's (1977) theory.
Research on nonmnemonic variables has also shown mood con-
gruence where incongruence might be predicted by self-control
theory. Specifically, Jones and Thelen (1978) have shown that
depression inductions instigate an increase in self-critical behavior
in normals.
Two lines of reasoning may shed some light on the puzzling
absence of mood-incongruent effects in normals. First, one can
interpret the presence of an asymmetry discussed in an earlier
section—that induced depression-congruence effects in normals
seem weaker and less reliable than elation effects—as evidence
that depression-congruence effects are, in fact, mitigated by an-
tidepressive control efforts (Isen, 1984). Second, even if one ac-
cepts the presence of unmitigated depression-congruence effects
as an immediate automatic response to a depression induction,
it may be that normal subjects mount antidepressive control ef-
forts subsequently, perhaps on ascertaining that usual mood-
decay functions are failing and that their depression seems to be
persisting. Brief laboratory studies would not reveal such a pro-
cess.
More broadly, the needs for future research include an im-
proved technology for distinguishing effortful from automatic
processes in memory. The roles that these two classes of effects
play are not likely to be clear if reliance continues to be placed
on assessments at a single postinduction period. Rather, some
ebbing and flowing of effects is possible, and repeated monitoring
of both mnemonic bias and of affect may be necessary. Adding
to the complexity of such attempts are (a) the likely presence of
individual differences in duration and sequencing of such effects;
(b) the possibility that some instances of depression-congruent
effects may be controlled and motivated; (c) the fact that the
severity of affective state may be a crucial variable, limiting the
usefulness of findings based on laboratory inductions in helping
us understand the effects of severe real-world adversity; and (d)
the need to distinguish effects that are predicated on affective
states per se from those related to variables that are correlated
with the presence of those states. The value of such research to
an understanding of depression is likely to be maximized by a
view in which mood-congruent memory effects—whether au-
tomatic or controlled—are seen in the context of the larger array
of depression-perpetuating and regulating processes of which they
are instances.
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Received March 25, 1985
Revision received August 30, 1985 •