Unveiling Embedded Risks in Integrated Project Delivery

Qiuwen Ma, Ph.D. 1; Shan Li, Ph.D. 2; and Sai On Cheung, Ph.D., M.ASCE 3

Abstract: Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) is an innovative procurement approach through which the client, designer, and contractor work
together under one contract as a team. While an integrated team is expected to be able to create extra value for the project, this practice may
bring new risks if not all team members are committed. The slow uptake of IPD may possibly be due to the insufficient understanding of the
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risks involved, especially those hidden risks associated with inappropriate integration practice. This study identifies critical risks in IPD
projects, and investigates if risk criticality can be alleviated by having previous or future partnership between IPD partners. By collecting
the views of construction professionals on the level of criticality of general risks and IPD-specific risks, it is found that (1) most highly critical
IPD project risks are borne from multidisciplinary teams of poor integration quality, inaccurate target costs, or unreasonable cost estimates;
and (2) having future cooperation intent can significantly alleviate the criticality of certain IPD risks, whereas no effect of previous partnership
was found on risk criticality. This study contributes to a growing body of knowledge on IPD by providing insight into the effect of new and
general risks on IPD project outcomes in particular and clarifying the role of previous/future partnership in risk management. This study
suggests active involvement of client and contractors in the design of IPD and signals future cooperation intent to IPD partners during the
project process. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0002212. © 2021 American Society of Civil Engineers.
Author keywords: Integrated project delivery (IPD); Critical risks; IPD projects; Previous/future partnership.

Introduction
Integrated project delivery (IPD) is structured to meet the chal-
lenges of managing complex projects faced with a high level of
uncertainty (Walker and Rowlinson 2019; Thomsen et al. 2009).
IPD was proposed by the American Institute of Architecture (AIA
and AIA California Council 2007) and is based on the belief that
bonding among key participants can incentivize genuine collabo-
ration for their common goal in the project (Mesa et al. 2019). IPD
is different from traditional procurement methods in terms of team
organization and contractual arrangements (Laurent and Leicht
2019; Abdirad and Dossick 2019; El-adaway et al. 2017). In re-
gards to team organization, in addition to the owner and their de-
sign team, the general contractor, supplier, and subcontractors are
also engaged at the early design stage (Ashcraft 2011a; Franz et al.
2017). Therefore, all the key parties collaborate and make decisions
collectively on the design and construction for the fulfilment of
project objectives. With respect to the contractual arrangement,
a multiparty contract is utilized to align the participants’ interests
(Pishdad-Bozorgi and Srivastava 2018; Allison et al. 2018). With
an IPD-based approach, the risk and reward sharing mechanism,
liability waiver, accounting transparency, compensation method,
and collective decision-making procedure are clearly stated in the
contract (Ashcraft 2011b). The characteristics of IPD have made
1 munication behaviors, and reduced decision quality (Manata et al.
Dept. of Architecture and Civil Engineering, City Univ. of Hong Kong,
83, Tat Chee Rd., Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong (corresponding author).
Email: qiuwen.ma@my.cityu.edu.hk
2
Assistant Professor, Dept. of Architecture and Civil Engineering, City
Univ. of Hong Kong, 83, Tat Chee Rd., Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong. Email:
aliceshanli0202@gmail.com
3
Professor, Dept. of Architecture and Civil Engineering, City Univ. of
Hong Kong, 83, Tat Chee Rd., Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong. ORCID: https://
orcid.org/0000-0002-8470-5192. Email: SaiOn.Cheung@cityu.edu.hk
Note. This manuscript was submitted on June 4, 2021; approved on
September 13, 2021; published online on October 25, 2021. Discussion
period open until March 25, 2022; separate discussions must be submitted
for individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Construction
Engineering and Management, © ASCE, ISSN 0733-9364.
this approach very appealing. For example, IPD has been applied
to many US complex healthcare projects (Lichtig 2005; Ballard
2011). In Canada, IPD has also been adopted in some commercial
buildings (Cheng 2016). In Australia and the United Kingdom, IPD
has been used widely for infrastructure projects including railway,
highways, and bridges (Department of Infrastructure and Regional
Development 2015).
IPD has been suggested to alleviate the risks of cost and schedule
overruns that happen commonly in construction projects. It is envis-
aged that by leveraging the integrated efforts of the key participants
and aligning their interests with those of the project (Whang et al.
2019), there will be less conflict with the project decisions being
made for the common goal. Specifically, the benefits of IPD have
been identified as savings in time and cost, improvement in co-
ordination and communication, and reliability in meeting owners’
expectations (Choi et al. 2019; Hamzeh et al. 2019; Cheng 2012,
2016; Mesa et al. 2019, 2016). Moreover, while integrated practices
can increase the chance of improving project outcomes, at the same
time new risks have been found in some IPD projects (Su et al.
2021; Cheng 2016). For example, unfair sharing of risk and reward
may result in the resistance of project participants to enter into the
multiparty contract (Ashcraft 2011b; Cheng 2016). In addition, it
has been demonstrated that insufficient commitments of IPD team
members are directly associated with goal misalignment, poor com-
2021), consequently increasing the likelihood of project failure.
Additionally, this type of risk is IPD-specific. The surfacing of
new risks has dampened the adoption of IPD (Whang et al. 2019;
Kent and Becerik-Gerber 2010). Some practitioners even aban-
doned the IPD method during the project duration (Paik et al. 2017)
because of the occurrence of unpredictable risks and lack of coping
strategies. Moreover, the failed IPD projects can lead to as severe
ramifications as the failed projects using traditional methods
wherein these firms lost all of their profit (Ballard et al. 2015). These
happenings accentuated the importance of identifying IPD-related
risks. Most IPD-related research glosses over the embedded risks
in IPD projects, despite their importance.

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 Believing that pre-existing relationships can work as a means to
effectively manage risks (Pellicer et al. 2016), IPD practitioners have
relied heavily on their previous work to select their business partners
(Paik et al. 2017; Cheng 2016; Koolwijk et al. 2018; Cohen
2010). Cheng (2016) reported the positive effect of previous dealings
on building cohesive teams, especially on enhancing understanding
and promoting trust (Pishdad-Bozorgi and Beliveau 2016;
Pishdad-Bozorgi 2017). Ultimately, when cooperation is enhanced,
the criticality of integration specific risks can thereby be alleviated.
In this regard, some IPD managers have actively tracked the ac-
tivities of participants to assess if they are suitable for future co-
operation (Cheng 2016). By the same token, realizing the benefits
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from being selected for future cooperation, the other participants
may make extra efforts to minimize the loss caused by risk occurrence
and achieve the pre-established project goals (Manu et al. 2015;
Cheng 2016). Some interorganizational studies also suggested that
future cooperation intent can effectively encourage cooperative
behavior and reduce risks embedded in the projects (Kurzban
et al. 2015; Barclay and Willer 2007; Heide and Miner 1992). How-
ever, there is still a dearth of empirical evidence showing that having
previous partnership or future cooperation intent can alleviate the risk
criticality in IPD projects. Therefore, two interesting questions arise:
1. What are the critical risks in IPD projects?
2. Can previous partnership or future cooperation intent between
IPD partners effectively alleviate risk criticality in IPD projects?
To answer these research questions, the US was selected to re-
present the IPD context to ascertain how these risk factors impact
project performance, and whether previous/future partnership has
an impact on the risk criticality. IPD was firstly coined in US proj-
ects (Matthews and Howell 2005; Lahdenperä 2012). A good num-
ber of IPD projects have been reported to be completed successfully
(Cheng 2016, 2012). The US construction industry was therefore
selected for this study.
The findings of this study contribute theoretically to the body of
knowledge in IPD by identifying the critical risks of IPD imple-
mentation. The effects of previous/future partnership between IPD
partners on risk criticality can also be clarified. Practically, a good
understanding of project risks in IPD contexts can help project par-
ticipants develop appropriate approaches to manage project risks
and improve project outcomes, thereby easing their resistance and
encouraging them to adopt IPD. Moreover, it is helpful for IPD
practitioners to select the suitable partners if the effects of previous/
future partnership are clarified.
The report of the study is organized as follows. First, the rel-
evant literature is reviewed and hypotheses are further developed.
Second, the description of methodology and statistical results are
presented. Third, discussions of the results and managerial impli-
cations are provided. The final sections present the limitations and
draw the conclusions.
Literature Review
IPD is a method of project delivery distinguished by a contractual
arrangement among a minimum of the owner, constructor, and de-
sign professional that aligns the business interests of all parties
(AIA and AIA California Council 2007).
A remarkably distinguishable trait of IPD is the use of a multi-
party contract (Lahdenperä 2012). Even though industry practi-
tioners are encouraged to use multiparty contracts, it is not easy
to switch to a new contract because it requires a lot of changes,
both technical and behavioral (Ebrahimi and Dowlatabadi 2019;
Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber 2011; Aldossari et al. 2020), to
move away from the existing contract forms. To deal with the
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technical and behavioral challenges, IPD requires the project team
members to be fully committed to achieve the project objectives
(Whang et al. 2019; Choi et al. 2019). However, mere IPD imple-
mentation does not guarantee the dedicated commitment of all team
members (Durdyev et al. 2019). In fact, some project participants
may be inclined to defend the value of the conventional work pro-
cedures and resist taking the new responsibilities in the integrated
project (Cohen 2010). In this regard, different levels of commit-
ment of team members can be expected. Accordingly, goal mis-
alignment, poor communication, reduced decision quality and
increased conflicts can occur (Manata et al. 2021; Son and Rojas
2011). These challenges can be identified as particular integration
risks (Das and Teng 1996, 2001a), and will inevitably negatively
affect the IPD project performance (Whang et al. 2019). In fact,
when the team members are not fully committed to overcoming the
technical and behavioral challenges faced in an integrated project,
the likelihood of project risk occurrences will increase and further
affect project performance (Su et al. 2021). Therefore, to effectively
cope with integration-related risks and improve project perfor-
mance, further investigation is needed to identify and evaluate proj-
ect risks in the IPD context.
Risk Identification and Evaluation
The Project Management Institute (PMI) (2001) defines risk as an un-
certain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative
effect on the attainment of project objectives. According to the Asso-
ciation for Project Management (APM) (2005), risk is an uncertain
event or set of circumstances that, should it occur, will have an effect
on the achievement of the project’s objectives. It can be seen that both
definitions emphasized uncertainties associated with the relevant con-
sequences. Kerzner and Kerzner (2017) summarized that risk has two
main elements: a probability and impact of the risk event.
Risk identification (Flanagan 1993; Fidan et al. 2011) involves
finding the particular risk items, and then categorizing them into
different groups. There are various ways to categorize construction
project risks. Some researchers identified the risk categories accord-
ing to the project stages. For example, Thomas et al. (2003) clas-
sified the project risks into four categories, including risks in the
development phase, risks in the construction phase, risks in the op-
eration phase, and risks in the project life cycle. The project risks
have also been categorized according to the effect of risks or risk
factors on project outcomes. Zou et al. (2007) categorized risks ac-
cording to their impact on project objectives, including cost-related
risks, time-related risks, quality-related risks, environment-related
risks, and safety-related risks. Street et al. (2011) stated that the risks
can be caused by technical mistakes, or procedural mistakes,
e.g., poor team performance. Consistently, Das and Teng (1996)
noted that there are two kinds of risks of using strategic alliance,
i.e., relational risks and performance risks. Relational risk refers to
the probability and consequences that a partner firm does not com-
mit itself to alliance, while performance risk is the factor that may
influence the achievement provide the partners cooperate fully.
Risk evaluation refers to the analysis of the potential impact as
well as the probability of risks in a qualitative and quantitative man-
ner (Chapman 2001). Typically, risk is evaluated according to two
measures: the likelihood of risk occurrence, and its impact on the
project (Chapman 2001). In addition, some researchers also refer
criticality of risk to the combination of the likelihood of occurrence
and impact of risk on the project for risk evaluation (Wang et al.
2000; Kuchta 2001). Accordingly, risks that are evaluated to have
the highest level of criticality are the priority for risk mitigation
strategies (Chan et al. 2011).
J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
 Risk Factors in IPD Projects integration (Pellicer et al. 2016), foster innovation climate (Paik et al.
2017), boost commitment of team members (Cheng 2016), ulti-
According to the literature review presented earlier, IPD risks are
mately reduce project risks, and consequently increase the likelihood
classified into new risks and general risks with reference to the risk
of IPD project success (Whang et al. 2019; Aldossari et al. 2020).
categorization adapted from Das and Teng (1996, 2001a, b) be-
Consistently, some researchers have demonstrated the positive effect
cause that study was based on alliance, which also requires high
of pre-existing relationships on fostering cooperation (Wang et al.
level of cooperation and coordination among project stakeholders.
2017), and reducing project risks in other integration contexts,
New risks, similar to the relational risks in the research of Das
e.g., alliancing and partnering (Davis and Love 2011). Moreover,
and Teng (1996, 2001a, b), refer to the risks caused by ineffi-
some theorists have analyzed the positive effects of previous partner-
cient integrated practice or insufficient commitment to the project,
ships. From the perspective of transaction cost economics, the pre-
e.g., poor communication among project participants and unfair
vious partnership is likely to exert a positive effect on transaction
sharing of the risk pool. General risks, like the performance risks
efficiency (Arino and Reuer 2004) because former interactions pro-
in the aforementioned studies, refer to the risks that may occur in
vide opportunities for the participants to learn the idiosyncrasies of
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the project regardless of which procurement approach is applied by

their partners and expectedly reduce the transaction cost of the
the project participants, e.g., inclement weather and unforeseeable
present and future projects. The enhanced mutual understanding
ground conditions. The detailed IPD risks, risk categorization, and
and trust can also help project participants conform to their partners’
the pertinent references are listed in Table 2.
expectations and motivate them to make real commitments (Wang
In regard to new risks, poor communication and coordination,
et al. 2017; Pishdad-Bozorgi and Beliveau 2016). Increased trans-
unfair sharing of risk and reward, resistance to integration ideas,
action efficiency and dedicated commitments can increase team
and insufficient project participants’ integration experience are the
resilience in risk management. Therefore, the following hypothesis
typical risk factors. Chan et al. (2010) identified the risks of using
is developed:
target cost contracts, including poor communication among project
Hypothesis 1: previous partnerships between IPD project team
participants, poor coordination, and unreasonable target cost. In
members will have a positive effect on alleviating risk criticality.
addition, Cheng (2016) found that in some IPD projects it is diffi-
Moreover, to incentivize team members, some IPD owners
cult to make the final agreement on the sharing mechanism among
promised future cooperation if cooperative behavior is practiced
project participants. Because of the potential risks of unfair sharing
(Cheng 2016). Indeed, willingness to cooperate is an important cri-
of risk and reward, some project participants were resistant to enter
terion to select IPD project partners (Cheng 2016). From the per-
into the risk/reward sharing system. Moreover, due to the possible
spective of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, when the agents can
mistakes made by project participants, like design deficiency and
reward or punish their partners in anticipated interactions, it is more
inaccurate cost estimate, the risk pool may be used excessively and
likely that their partners will cooperate, rather than defect (Kendall
may further lead to cost overrun (Cheng 2012). Insufficient client
et al. 2007). Particularly, when the IPD participants’ cooperative act
involvement in the design process and insufficient and late contrac-
can affect partner choice, they would behave more cooperatively to
tor involvement in the building design process are also the potential
increase the likelihood of being selected (Heide and Miner 1992),
risks because the intensified design needs the collaboration of
especially when the benefit resulting from the future business co-
all the key parties from the early design stage (Cheng 2012,
operation is important to them. This can also be explained from the
2016; Thomsen et al. 2009). Additional time may be used for
perspective of competitive altruism. If more cooperative agents are
decision-making due to a great number of project participants being
preferable as future business partners, then market forces can create
involved in the consensus decision-making process. In addition to
competition among agents to be more cooperative and committed
additional decision-making time, additional governance cost may
than others in order to gain the future cooperation opportunities
be caused by the conflicting decisions and longer decision process.
(Kurzban et al. 2015; Barclay and Willer 2007). This competition
As for developing the multiparty contract, the time and cost for
can increase cooperation above the level that is caused by the agent
legal advice on drafting the multiparty contract can be additions
simply attempting to be cooperative (Barclay and Willer 2007).
to the total project expenses (Cheng 2016). Moreover, some re-
This increased cooperation level can reinforce the team integration
searchers added that insufficient BIM capabilities and insufficient
that can reduce the integration-specific risks (Manata et al. 2021;
integration capability are IPD-specific risks (Sive 2009; Rekola
Franz et al. 2017). Therefore, both the analytic outcomes of iterated
et al. 2010; Azhar 2011).
prisoner’s dilemma and competitive altruism provide a powerful
Regarding the general risks in the IPD context, the risks of
theoretical basis for expecting that the future cooperation intent
unforeseeable ground conditions, inclement weather, force ma-
can work as an effective means of risk management. Therefore,
jeure, adverse legal environment for integrated practices, change in
the following hypothesis is developed:
government regulations, inflation, environmental hazards, and delay
Hypothesis 2: future cooperation intent between IPD proj-
in work due to third parties should be considered when assessing the
ect team members will have a positive effect on alleviating risk
risks of adopting IPD practices (Kangari 1995; El-Sayegh 2008;
criticality.
Charoenngam and Yeh 1999). In addition, the constructability of
design, design changes, delayed construction work, additional con-
struction cost, and delayed government approvals are potential risks Research Methodology
in IPD projects (Cheng 2012, 2016; Cohen 2010).
The study aims to explore the criticality level of risk factors on IPD
Role of Business Relationship in Risk Management project performances along with identifying the effect of previous/
future partnership on IPD risk criticality. The research methodol-
It is interesting to note that most of the IPD project managers prefer ogy consists of three main stages, as shown in Fig. 1.
to select the firms who had previous cooperation with them as their
business partners (Cheng 2016, 2012). This is because they believed
Stage A: Literature Review
that procuring a team with previous partnerships can enhance mutual
understanding (Cheng 2016), develop interpartner trust (Pishdad- Stage A of this study comprised performing a comprehen-
Bozorgi and Beliveau 2016; Pishdad-Bozorgi 2017), increase team sive review of the IPD-related literatures, risk identification, and

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 Stage A: Literature Review interview, one interviewee suggested adding “late contractor in-
volvement in the design process” to the risk list based on her IPD
Literature review of project experience. Certain improvements were also made to the question-
Literature review of risk risks in IPD context naires per the advice and suggestions made by the interviewees.
identification and evaluation -38 integration specific risks
The improved questionnaire has three sections. Section 1 gath-
-15 general risks
ers background information of the respondents and their involved
IPD projects, such as the project type, project contractual agree-
Literature review of role of business relationship in affecting risk ment type, years of respondent’s work experience, IPD experience,
criticality
-Hypothesis 1: Previous partnership will have a positive effect on
company size, as well as the job title. Section 2 solicits evaluations
alleviating risk criticality in IPD context; on the criticality level of IPD project risks, given their effect on
-Hypothesis 2: Future cooperation intent will have a positive project outcomes, including cost, schedule, and quality. The criti-
effect on alleviating risk criticality in IPD context. cality level is measured based on a 1–7 Likert scale where 1 = very
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low, 4 = moderate, and 7 = very high. Section 3 involves questions

that revolve around the past and future partnerships with their IPD
Stage B: Data Collection partners. The response to these questions has three alternatives:
(1) yes, we had previous partnership/we have future cooperation
Pilot Study: intent; (2) no, we did not have a previous partnership/we do not
-Checking and improving the questionnaire survey have future cooperation intent; and (3) not sure. The respondents
-5 professionals who had involved in IPD projects were requested to provide data with reference to one recent IPD
project in which they had been involved.
Questionnaire Survey: When distributing the survey, probability sampling was applied
- Lean Construction Group in US in this study because it enables each unit of the population to have
- 39 valid responses
an equal chance of being selected independent of any other event
(Fink 2003). Specifically, the members of the US Lean Construc-
tion Institute (LCI) were targeted, because they are the advocates
Stage C: Data Analysis and pioneer adopters of IPD. Moreover, it is ideal if all ineligible
cases are excluded. Because the LCI groups include those who have
Examine normality assumption not handled IPD projects before, the questionnaire clearly stated
that only those who had been involved IPD projects should fill
Identify significantly critical Descriptive analysis of out the questionnaire. Thus the population comprised industry pro-
risks by conducting t-test or previous/future partnership: fessionals who had been involved in IPD projects.
Wilcoxon signed rank test: -79% had previous The survey was filled out online from October 2018 to March
-9 ‘Highly Critical’ risks partnership, 21% did not 2019. The email invitations containing a hyperlink to the survey
-24 ‘Critical’ risks -90% intended to have future
website (SurveyMonkey) were sent to about 300 potential respond-
- 20 ‘Not Critical’ risks partnership, 10% not sure
ents in the US. After delivering the online survey, three measures
were taken to raise the response rate: (1) physical correspondence
Determine if partnerships affect risk criticality by conducting t- including a cover letter (containing a QR code for the online survey)
test or MWW test: and survey content in paper form was sent to each of the potential
-Previous partnership has no significant effect on the criticality respondents in November 2018; (2) a Christmas card stamped with
of any risk Hong Kong landmarks was also included in each envelope as a per-
-Future partnership intent can significantly lessen the criticality sonalized greeting; and (3) reminders were sent to the potential
of one ‘Highly Critical’ risk and seven ‘Critical’ risks.
respondents via email once every month after delivering the sur-
vey. These continuous endeavors made during the survey delivery,
Fig. 1. Research methodology. i.e., the multiple modes for survey delivery, personalized greetings
and follow-up contacts, have proven to be effective in increasing
response rates (Fan and Yan 2010; Sheehan 2001; Petrovčič et al.
2016).
evaluation methods; the effect of partnerships on risk criticality to After about six months, 39 valid feedback points were collected.
identify the critical risk factors in IPD projects; and to further pro- The response rate of 13% is relatively low, despite all the efforts
pose the hypotheses that previous/future partnerships can affect risk made to improve it. This low response rate may be primarily attrib-
criticality. Part of the outputs of Stage A were used to develop the uted to the limited number of completed IPD cases (Cheng 2016).
data collection questionnaire. Moreover, some risk factors arising from using the new contractual
form containing a multiple risk/reward sharing mechanism, were
included in the survey (e.g., NR25, disagreement on sharing mech-
Stage B: Data Collection anism among project participants). The restrictions on the IPD proj-
In Stage B, in order to check and improve its accuracy, the ques- ects that used a multiple risk/reward sharing mechanism may be
tionnaire survey was piloted with construction professionals who the other reason for the low response rate. Third, the questionnaire
had direct IPD experience. During the pilot study, interviews and length may also account for the low response rate. The question-
correspondence with experienced IPD practitioners were performed. naire used in this study consisted of 1,229 words, which exceeded
The interviewees were selected by the researchers’ personal net- the threshold of approximately 1,000 words (Jepson et al. 2005).
works. Five IPD experts (including one senior project manager, Fourth, the foreign research affiliation may also influence the re-
one architectural consultant, one BIM manager, and two senior sponse rate, because some email spam filters may specifically block
engineers) participated. The main purpose was to check if the foreign unsolicited senders. In addition, the low response rate may
questionnaire covered the risk factors in IPD projects. During the be attributed to unsuccessful survey delivery. Successful delivery

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 requires the email address to be valid and up-to-date (Fan and Yan
2010). Even though the physical mail was supplemented with email
invitations, the mail was delivered to the respondent’s company
mailing address, which has to be up-to-date to successfully reach
out to them. Besides, construction professionals are usually tied up
with a hectic schedule and voluminous emails and as a result they
may have missed the survey email (Saleh and Bista 2017). Thus,
invalid email address, incorrect physical address, or lack of time
were additional reasons for the low response rate.
Stage C: Data Analysis
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Stage C aimed at identifying the critical IPD risk factors and validate
the hypotheses on the effect of previous/future partnership on risk
criticality. To determine risk criticality against project outcomes, the
criticality indexes (CI) for individual risk j was calculated (Wang
et al. 2000), as follows:
7n1 þ 6n2 þ 5n3 þ 4n4 þ 3n5 þ 2n6 þ n7
CI j ¼ P7
i¼1 ni
where n1 ; n2 ; n3 ; n4 ; n5 ; n6 and n7 = number of respondents with
the answers respectively (where 7 = very high criticality, 6 = high
criticality, 5 = slightly high criticality, 4 = moderate criticality, 3 =
slightly low criticality, 2 = low criticality, and 1 = very low critical-
ity). The ranking of risk factors in Table 2 was assessed according to
the CI values of the individual risks.
To further highlight the criticality, these risk factors were or-
ganized into three levels, i.e., highly critical, critical, and not critical.
Specifically, a one-sample t-test or one-sample Wilcoxon signed
rank test was utilized to identify highly critical and critical IPD risks.
When identifying the highly critical risk, the test value was set at 5,
and the significance level was set at 95%. When p < 0.05, it is con-
sidered that there is a significant agreement that this IPD risk factor
has highly critical impact on IPD project outcomes. When identify-
ing the critical risks, the test value was set at 4, and the significance
level was set at 95%. When p < 0.05, it is considered that there is a
significant agreement that that IPD risk factor has critical impact on
IPD project outcomes. Otherwise, the risk factor is considered not
critical.
In addition, to identify if having previous partnerships or future
cooperation intent impacts the risk criticality, the two-sample t-test
or Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon (MWW) test was conducted. In this
analysis, the independent variable was the previous partnership/
future cooperation intent, and the dependent variables were each
of the 53 risk factors. For each dependent variable, the null hy-
pothesis was that the risk criticality between the two groups, with
or without previous partnership/future cooperation intent, was the
same. The alternative hypothesis was that risk criticality between
two groups was different. The significance level was set at 95%.
When p < 0.05, it is considered that there is a significant difference
of risk criticality between two groups with or without previous
partnership/future cooperation intent.
It should be noted that normality of the data set was thoroughly
examined by applying the Shapiro-Wilk test when determining
which statistical test was most suitable for each risk variable. If
the normality assumption was met, the parametric statistical test,
i.e., one-sample and two-sample t-test would be applied; otherwise,
the nonparametric tests, i.e., Wilcoxon signed rank test and MWW
test would be utilized.
Moreover, the comparative boxplots were created to visually
show the different distribution trends of criticality for highly critical
risks between two groups with/without previous partnership or
future cooperation intent, as shown in Figs. 2 and 3 respectively.
© ASCE
J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2022, 148(1): 04021180
A boxplot is a nonparametric summary of data that can visually
display the sample maximum, upper quartile, median, lower quar-
tile, and minimum values to provide an effective descriptive analy-
sis of the data distribution.
Results
Profiles of Respondents
Table 1 summarizes the profiles of the respondents. As for job title,
consultant, contractor/subcontractor, and client comprise a signifi-
cant percentage, totaling about 97% of all US respondents. These
three roles are key project participants. Therefore, the research
provides a good representation of reliable inputs by the targeted
respondents. Most respondents have more than 10 years’ work ex-
perience and the majority of them (about 77%) have more than
20 years’ work experience. This suggests that the respondents are
able to offer professional views on project risks in IPD projects.
Table 1 also presents the size of the workforce in each respondent’s
company. The number of workers is spread across various company
size ranges, with about 90% of respondents’ companies having more
than 50 staff members. This reflects a higher representation of
medium and large companies.
Moreover, the responses were based on one recently completed
IPD project that they have been involved in. Table 1 illustrates the
types of projects in which the respondents were involved. More
than 60% of respondents reported that they engaged in healthcare
projects using IPD, followed by infrastructure projects (12.821%).
It can be observed that the respondents preferred to use the IPD
method for healthcare projects.
Critical Risks in IPD Projects
A taxonomy of 33 potential risks was identified to be significantly
critical for IPD projects by conducting a t-test or Wilcoxon signed
rank test, as shown in Table 2. Moreover, according to the statistical
test results, nine risks were identified to be highly critical and 24
risks were assessed to be critical.
Among the nine highly critical risk factors in IPD projects, in-
sufficient client involvement throughout the design process (NR1)
was found to be the most critical, with a CI value of 6.308. Indeed,
many IPD practitioners claimed active and continuous client in-
volvement has been one of the most critical success elements of
IPD because the client can provide ongoing feedback to identify
specific project requirements and prioritize the items that have
the highest value (Cheng 2012, 2016). The second and third highly
critical risks to escalate project outcomes were poor communica-
tion (NR2) and lack of mutual trust among project participants
(NR3). The statistical analysis returned the CI values of 6.205 and
6.103 for NR2 and NR3 respectively. Consistently, the signifi-
cance of mutual trust and open, honest, and direct communication
among all IPD participants has been pointed out by AIA and AIA
California Council (2007). The next highly critical factors were
poor leadership of the multidisciplinary team (NR4) with a CI value
of 6.000, and poor coordination to organize project participants to
complete tasks (NR5) with the CI value of 5.974. These findings
highlight the fact that the sustained leadership of the multidis-
ciplinary team is required to organize the interdisciplinary cluster
groups and ensure that the IPD principles are adhered to (Laurent
and Leicht 2019; Cheng 2012; Thomsen et al. 2009).
The next four highly critical risk factors include insufficient con-
tractor involvement throughout the building design stage (NR6),
late contractor involvement in the design process (NR7), unreason-
able target cost (NR8), and inaccurate cost estimate (NR9). The CI
04021180-5 J. Constr. Eng. Manage.
 7 7 7

Risk criticality (NR3)

Risk criticality (NR1)

Risk criticality (NR2)

6 6 6
5 5 5
4 4 4
3 3 3
2 2 2

(a) With PP Without PP (b) With PP Without PP (c) With PP Without PP

7 7 7
Risk criticality (NR4)

Risk criticality (NR6)

Risk criticality (NR5)
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6 6 6
5 5 5
4 4 4
3 3 3
2 2 2
(d) With PP Without PP (e) With PP Without PP (f) With PP Without PP

7 7 7
Risk criticality (NR7)

Risk criticality (NR8)

Risk criticality (NR9)

6 6 6

5 5 5

4 4 4

3 3 3

2 2 2
(g) With PP Without PP (h) With PP Without PP (i) With PP Without PP

Fig. 2. Comparative boxplots for the criticality of nine highly critical risks between two groups with or without previous partnerships: (a) insufficient
client involvement throughout design process (NR1); (b) poor communication among project participants (NR2); (c) lack of mutual trust among
participants (NR3); (d) poor leadership of multidisciplinary team (NR4); (e) poor coordination to organize project participants to complete tasks
(NR5); (f) insufficient contractor involvement (NR6); (g) late contractor involvement in the design process (NR7); (h) unreasonable target cost (NR8);
and (i) inaccurate cost estimate (NR9).

values of these risk factors range from 5.641 to 5.897. The results
are consistent with Mosey’s (2009) observations that early and suf-
ficient contractor involvement can create greater opportunities for
cost reduction, extra value creation, improvement of project perfor-
mances, and flexibility to incorporate changes. It also reflects that
conducting the cost estimate accurately and setting a target cost rea-
sonably is the key to reinforce the intrinsic motivation of the par-
ticipants who join the risk/reward sharing mechanism (Elghaish
et al. 2020; Darrington 2010).
In addition, regarding the critical risks, there are 7 critical gen-
eral risks and 17 critical new risks. The CI values of these critical
risks range from 4.385 to 5.333. Concerning the critical new risks,
most of them are related to inconsistent decisions or opinions
(e.g., NR10, NR12), resistance to conform to the new work pro-
cedure (e.g., NR11, NR13, NR15, NR17, NR18, NR19), or insuf-
ficient capability and experience to perform integration practices
(e.g., NR14, NR16, NR20, NR23). Moreover, the results presented
in Table 2 suggest that the critical general risks in IPD projects in-
cluded design changes (GR1), delay of construction phase (GR2),
government approvals (GR5), design phase (GR6), payments (GR7),
and unavailability (GR3) and inefficiency (GR4) of labor. Expect-
edly these risks are the most common risks regardless of the procure-
ment method.
Business Relationship with IPD Partners
The survey results revealed that around 80% of the respondents had
previous cooperation experience with their IPD partners before they
engaged in this IPD project, and around 90% respondents had fu-
ture cooperation intent with their IPD partners, as shown in Table 3.
Indeed, a lot of owners have heavily relied on the previous partner-
ships for the selection of IPD partners (Cheng 2016, 2012; Elghaish
et al. 2020). Moreover, in some IPD projects, some owners have
actively tracked their partners’ work to evaluate their future partner-
ship (Cheng 2016). If the other parties’ work is considered to be
satisfactory, further contracts will be awarded to them.
Correlation between Previous/Future Partnerships and
Risk Perceptions
The second objective of this study is to investigate the effect of
previous/future partnerships (independent variable) on the criti-
cality of IPD risks (dependent variables). With respect to previous
partnership, the application of the MWW test returned the p-values
above 0.05 for all critical risk variables, as shown in Table 4. The
boxplots for nine highly critical risk factors are presented in Fig. 2.
It is therefore concluded that there is no significant difference of
risk criticality between two groups (with versus without previous

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 7 7 7

Risk criticality (NR2)

Risk criticality (NR3)

Risk criticality (NR1)
6 6
6
5 5
5
4 4
4
3 3
3 2 2
2 1 1

(a) With FCI Not sure (b) With FCI Not sure (c) With FCI Not sure

7 7 7

Risk criticality (NR5)

Risk criticality (NR4)

Risk criticality (NR6)

6
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6 6
5
5 5
4
4 4
3
3 3
2
1 2 2

(d) With FCI Not sure (e) With FCI Not sure (f) With FCI Not sure

7 7 7
Risk criticality (NR7)

Risk criticality (NR8)

Risk criticality (NR9)

6 6 6
5 5 5
4 4 4
3 3 3
2 2 2
(g) With FCI Not sure (h) With FCI Not sure (i) With FCI Not sure

Fig. 3. Comparative boxplots for criticality of nine highly critical risks between two groups with or without future cooperation intent (FCI):
(a) insufficient client involvement throughout design process (NR1); (b) poor communication among project participants (NR2); (c) lack of mutual
trust among participants (NR3); (d) poor leadership of multidisciplinary team (NR4); (e) poor coordination to organize project participants to com-
plete tasks (NR5); (f) insufficient contractor involvement (NR6); (g) late contractor involvement in the design process (NR7); (h) unreasonable target
cost (NR8); and (i) inaccurate cost estimate (NR9).

partnership). It is expected that procuring teams with previous part-
nerships can foster a good collaboration climate (Paik et al. 2017;
Whang et al. 2019; Aldossari et al. 2020) and increase the like-
lihood of project success (Pellicer et al. 2016). Although IPD
participants have high initial expectations of the procuring team
with previous partnerships, surprisingly, previous partnerships were
found to have no significant effect on the risk criticality.
Future cooperation intent has been found to have certain effects
on reducing risk criticality. Out of nine highly critical risks, one
risk (NR3, lack of mutual trust) showed significant difference be-
tween two groups (having future cooperation intent versus not sure;
see Table 4). Out of 24 critical risks, there were seven critical risks
(i.e., NR10, NR14, NR16, GR2, NR19, GR4, and NR22) showing
significant differences between two groups. The specific distribu-
tion trends of the criticality of nine highly critical risk factors be-
tween two groups are presented in the boxplots in Fig. 3.
The application of the MWW test to the highly critical risk of
lack of mutual trust among participants (NR3) returned a p-value of
0.00, concluding that the risk criticality perception of lacked mutual
trust significantly differs between two groups (having future co-
operation intent versus not sure about future cooperation). The
mean ranks was 18.69 for the group with future cooperation intent
compared to 31.50 for those without future cooperation intent, sug-
gesting that having future cooperation intent can effectively lessen
the risk criticality of lacked mutual trust. The lower CI value of
NR3 for the group with future cooperation intent can further rein-
force this finding.
The MWW test, when applied to seven critical risks [i.e., lack of
consensus on project pertinent decisions (NR10), insufficient con-
tractors’ capability to perform integrated practices (NR14), insuf-
ficient subcontractors’ capability to perform integrated practices
(NR16), ill-defined responsibilities for respective participants to
deliver integrated practices (NR19), project participants’ resistance
to take extra/new responsibilities in the integrated project (NR22),
delay in construction phase (GR2), and low productivity of labor
(GR4)], all returned p-values less than 0.05 (see Table 4), implying
significant differences of these risk criticality perceptions between
two groups (having future cooperation intent versus not sure about
future cooperation). Moreover, taking a closer look at the mean
ranks of these risks, the mean ranks for the group with future co-
operation intent were less than the mean ranks for the group who
were not sure about future cooperation, implying that having future
cooperation intent can effectively alleviate the risk criticality of
these seven critical risks. Consistently, the CI values of these seven
critical risks were lower for the group with future cooperation intent
compared to the group who were not sure about future cooperation.
However, examining the criticality perceptions of other critical
risks did not provide statistically significant differences between
two groups (having future cooperation intent versus not sure about
future cooperation; see Table 4).

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 Table 1. Profiles collaborative environment that is conducive to managing IPD spe-
Percentage cific risks (Elghaish et al. 2020; Pishdad-Bozorgi 2017; Pellicer
Description Frequency (%) et al. 2016). Previous partnership has become an important cri-
terion when considering partner choice (Cheng 2016, 2012;
Job title
Client 10 25.64 Elghaish et al. 2020), which is also affirmed by the results shown
General contractor 13 33.33 in Table 3. However, in contrast to earlier studies, no significant
Subcontractor 3 7.69 difference of risk criticality was found in this study between the
Architectural consultant 7 17.95 groups with or without previous partnership. One likely explanation
Quantity surveying consultant 0 0.00 is that previous partnership may affect initial expectations (Cheng
Engineering consultant 3 7.69 2016; Pellicer et al. 2016) but does not have a commensurate impact
Project management consultant 3 7.69 on subsequent project performance. Actually, this concurs with the
Supplier 0 0.00 studies on alliance that found that previous relationships cannot
Work experience
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induce cooperative behavior in subsequent projects (Saxton 1997).

1–5 years 1 2.57
6–10 years 0 0.00
It is possible that further study of the type and degree of previous
11–20 years 8 20.51 partnership would better illuminate the effect of previous part-
>20 years 30 76.92 nerships on risk criticality. Still, this study suggests that although
Size of company’s workforce IPD participants may prefer to work with previous partners, prior
<50 4 10.26 partnership does not play a significant role in the reduction of risk
50–99 1 2.56 criticality.
100–199 10 25.64 Significantly, future cooperation intent plays an effective role in
200–499 7 17.95 reducing criticality of certain risks, given that 8 out of 33 critical
>500 17 43.59 risks (including one highly critical risk and seven critical risk) were
Types of construction facilities undertaken
rated less critical by the respondents who had future cooperation
Infrastructure 5 12.82
Healthcare 25 64.10 intent. Specifically, the criticality of the highly critical risk of lacked
Residential 2 5.13 mutual trust (NR3) was diminished by future cooperation intent.
Educational 2 5.13 Turning to iterated games, it can be easily imagined that when the
Commercial 1 2.56 agents know that their partners have the opportunities to retaliate
Office 3 7.69 their proactive behavior or reward their cooperative act, it is more
Others 1 2.56 likely that they will behave cooperatively. Meanwhile, rational part-
Contractual agreements ners also understand that the opportunities to punish or reward
Multiparty contract 37 94.88 other participants can work as a powerful tool to defend cooperative
Design and build contract with fixed price 1 2.56
behavior, leading to increased trust. Moreover, the critical risks
Construction management at-risk contract 1 2.56
with guaranteed maximum price pertaining to incapability of contractors (NR14), subcontractors
(NR16) to perform integration practices, resistance to taking new
responsibilities (NR22) and ill-defined responsibility (NR19), and
low productivity of labor (GR4) are alleviated by future coopera-
Discussion and Practical Implications tion intent. Because future cooperation opportunities signify fu-
ture profits, it can motivate contractors and subcontractors to be
This study has identified the critical risks that can affect the viabil- wholeheartedly involved in a project (Cheng 2016), proactively take
ity of IPD projects. Specifically, the survey results revealed 33 risks new responsibilities, and incentivize additional efforts (Barclay and
that can significantly affect the IPD project outcomes, including 9 Willer 2007). In essence, these findings echo observations made by
highly critical risks and 24 critical risks. Among the nine highly Heide and Miner (1992), who argued that future partnership can
critical risks in the IPD projects, three risks relate to insufficient significantly affect cooperation enhancement. According to the re-
involvement of key parties, two risks relate to potential cost esti- sults, it is suggested that certain IPD risks can be mitigated by sig-
mates issues, two risks cause poor leadership, and two risks lead to naling future cooperation intent.
poor group cohesion (i.e., lack of trust and ineffective communi- Therefore, this study has provided an optimism with regard
cation). It is obvious that most of these risks are related to the poor to alleviating risk criticality via past/future partnership. When co-
integration quality of the multidisciplinary team. These findings operation can be enhanced by anticipated future cooperation rather
echo previous studies conducted by Leicht’s research group (Franz than pre-existing relationship, the chances of enhanced cooperation
et al. 2017; Laurent and Leicht 2019) that the multidisciplinary can be improved more readily (Heide and Miner 1992), because
team building requires sufficient involvement of key participants investment in time is required to develop the pre-existing interpart-
from the earliest stages of projects, a sustained leadership who ner relationship whereas this is not required for future cooperation.
can play a good role of facilitation in their IPD projects, and suffi- It should be noted that participants may show deceptive cooperative
cient communication and mutual trust as the essential element of behavior to increase the chance of being selected for future business
group cohesion. Moreover, the evidence we found points to earlier cooperation (Barclay and Willer 2007). Still, this finding suggests
views from Ashcraft (2012) and Ballard et al. (2015) that target cost that future cooperative intent can work as an effective strategy to
should be carefully and reasonably set to challenge the team mem- reduce the criticality of certain risks in IPD projects.
bers but not demotivate them. Therefore, to manage risks in IPD
projects, it is encouraged to improve the integration quality of the
multidisciplinary team and set reasonably challenging target costs. Limitations and Future Research
The results also revealed that the criticality of some risks are
impacted by future cooperation intent whereas no risk criticality As a result of the limited IPD projects in the US, the sample size in
is affected by previous partnerships. Previous studies have pointed this study (i.e., 39 valid responses) was not large, and the response
out the positive effect of previous partnership on establishing a rate of 13% was relatively low, despite dedicated efforts to increase

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 Table 2. Criticality of risks that occur in an IPD context
Rank Code Risk factors in IPD context References CI Criticality level (CL)
1 NR1 Insufficient client involvement throughout design process Cheng (2012, 2016) 6.308 Highly critical
2 NR2 Poor communication among project participants Cohen (2010) and Cheng (2012) 6.205 Highly critical
3 NR3 Lack of mutual trust among project participants Cohen (2010), Cheng (2012), and 6.103 Highly critical
Ey et al. (2014)
4 NR4 Poor leadership of multidisciplinary team Cheng (2012, 2016) 6.000 Highly critical
5 NR5 Poor coordination to organize project participants to Cheng (2016) 5.974 Highly critical
complete tasks
6 NR6 Insufficient contractor involvement throughout building Cheng (2012, 2016) 5.897 Highly critical
design stage
7 NR7 Late contractor involvement in design process Cheng (2012, 2016) 5.795 Highly critical
8 NR8 Unreasonable target cost (e.g., too high or too low Broome and Perry (2002) and Cheng 5.641 Highly critical
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contract price) (2016)

8 NR9 Inaccurate cost estimate Cheng (2016) 5.641 Highly critical
10 NR10 Lack of consensus on project pertinent decisions Cheng (2016) 5.333 Critical
11 NR11 Project participants’ resistance to share losses Cheng (2016) 5.282 Critical
12 NR12 Inconsistent opinion on project goals among participants Cheng (2016) 5.256 Critical
13 NR13 Resistance to form a risk pool of money by retaining a sum Cheng (2016) 5.231 Critical
of project participants’ profit
13 NR14 Insufficient contractors’ capability to perform integrated Cheng (2012) 5.231 Critical
practices
15 NR15 Less ongoing financial updates throughout the project Cheng (2016) 5.154 Critical
16 GR1 Design changes throughout the construction phase Kangari (1995) and El-Sayegh (2008) 5.103 Critical
16 NR16 Insufficient subcontractors’ capability to perform Cheng (2012) 5.103 Critical
integrated practices
18 NR17 Unavailability of colocated multidisciplinary design team Cheng (2016) 5.000 Critical
18 GR2 Delay in construction phase Charoenngam and Yeh (1999) 5.000 Critical
20 NR18 Project participants’ resistance to enter into a single Cheng (2016) 4.974 Critical
multiparty contract
21 NR19 Ill-defined responsibilities for respective participants to Cheng (2012) 4.872 Critical
deliver integrated practices
21 GR3 Unavailability of skilled labor Kangari (1995), Charoenngam and 4.872 Critical
Yeh (1999), and El-Sayegh (2008)
23 GR4 Low productivity of labor Kangari (1995), El-Sayegh (2008), and 4.821 Critical
Charoenngam and Yeh (1999)
23 NR20 Lack of experience in multidisciplinary collaboration Cheng (2012) 4.821 Critical
25 GR5 Delay in obtaining government approvals El-Sayegh (2008) 4.744 Critical
26 GR6 Delay in design phase Cheng (2012, 2016) 4.718 Critical
26 NR21 Dispute over revising target cost after design changes Chan et al. (2010) 4.718 Critical
26 NR22 Client and other project participants’ resistance to take Cheng (2016) 4.718 Critical
extra/new responsibilities in the integrated project
29 NR23 Insufficient BIM capabilities Sive (2009) and Rezgui et al. (2013) 4.667 Critical
30 GR7 Client’s delayed payment to other project participants Kangari (1995), Charoenngam and 4.564 Critical
Yeh (1999), and El-Sayegh (2008)
30 NR24 Lack of experience in risk and reward sharing mechanism Cheng (2016) 4.564 Critical
32 NR25 Disagreement on sharing mechanism among project Cheng (2016) 4.538 Not critical
participants
33 NR26 Client’s resistance to pay additional design fees Cheng (2012) and Ey et al. (2014) 4.513 Critical
34 NR27 Lack of experience of adopting whole life cycle idea Cheng (2012) 4.385 Critical
in project
34 GR8 Low productivity of construction equipment Kangari (1995) and Charoenngam and 4.385 Not critical
Yeh (1999)
36 GR9 Constructability issues in design Cheng (2012) 4.359 Not critical
37 NR28 Additional time used for decision making Cheng (2016) 4.333 Not critical
37 GR10 Unavailability of specialized construction equipment Kangari (1995) and Charoenngam and 4.333 Not critical
Yeh (1999)
37 GR11 Design deficiency Kangari (1995), Charoenngam and 4.333 Not critical
Yeh (1999), El-Sayegh (2008), and
Cheng (2012)
40 GR12 Unforeseeable ground conditions Kangari (1995) and Charoenngam and 4.179 Not critical
Yeh (1999)
41 NR29 Unfair sharing of risk/reward Cheng (2016) 4.154 Not critical
41 NR30 Additional design consultant fee paying for extra design Cheng (2016) 4.154 Not critical
works when conducting integrated design
43 NR31 Adverse legal environment for integrated practices Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber (2011) and 4.128 Not critical
Ey et al. (2014)
44 NR32 Iterative design changes throughout the design phase Kangari (1995), El-Sayegh (2008), and 4.000 Not critical
Cheng (2012)

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 Table 2. (Continued.)
Rank Code Risk factors in IPD context References CI Criticality level (CL)
45 NR33 Cash-flow risks due to that payment on profit part is Cheng (2016) 3.974 Not critical
retained in risk pool
46 GR13 Change in government regulations Kangari (1995) and El-Sayegh (2008) 3.872 Not critical
47 NR34 Disproportionate amount of money to be put in the risk Cheng (2016) 3.846 Not critical
pool for other project participants
48 GR14 Inclement weather El-Sayegh (2008) 3.769 Not critical
49 NR35 Additional governance cost Cheng (2016) 3.615 Not critical
49 NR36 Additional time used to develop multiparty contract Cheng (2016) 3.615 Not critical
51 NR37 Additional time used in modelling process Rezgui et al. (2013) and Ey et al. (2014) 3.564 Not critical
51 GR15 Force majeure Kangari (1995) and El-Sayegh (2008) 3.564 Not critical
53 NR38 Additional cost to be paid for legal advice on drafting Cheng (2016) 3.179 Not critical
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multiparty contract
Note: Risk coded with NR refers to new risk; and risk coded with GR refers to general risk.

Table 3. Business relationship with the IPD project partners

Frequency
Description Yes No Not sure
Does your company/team have previous cooperation experience with the project partners involved in this project? 31 (79.49%) 8 (20.51%) 0
In the future, will your company/team continue to cooperate with the project partners involved in this project? 35 (89.74%) 0 4 (10.26%)

Table 4. Effect of previous/future partnership on criticality of IPD risks

Previous partnership (PP) Future cooperation intent (FCI)
Measure of center Measure of center
CL Code With PP Without PP Significance With FCI Not sure Significance
a a a a
Highly critical NR1 6.323 6.250 0.483 6.286 6.500 0.772
NR2 6.129a 6.500a 0.505 6.143a 6.750a 0.212
NR3 6.097a 6.125a 0.695 6.000a (18.69a) 7.000a (31.50a) 0.031*
NR4 6.032a 5.875a 0.441 5.943 6.500 0.249
NR5 6.065a 5.625a 0.328 5.886a 6.750a 0.074
NR6 5.871a 6.000a 0.932 5.886a 6.000a 0.982
NR7 5.774a 5.875a 0.932 5.771a 6.000a 0.841
NR8 5.710a 5.375a 0.421 5.543a 6.500a 0.083
NR9 5.710a 5.375a 0.328 5.657a 5.500a 0.806
Critical NR10 5.355a 5.250a 0.959 5.171a (18.59b) 6.750a (32.38b) 0.017*
NR11 5.419a 4.750a 0.222 5.200a 6.000a 0.289
NR12 5.226a 5.375a 0.670 5.114a 6.500a 0.074
NR13 5.290a 5.000a 0.401 5.171a 5.750a 0.488
NR14 5.194a 5.375a 0.878 5.029a(18.40b) 7.000a(34.00b) 0.006*
NR15 5.097a 5.375a 0.621 5.086a 5.750a 0.333
GR1 5.032a 5.375a 0.597 5.057a 5.500a 0.433
NR16 5.097a 5.125a 0.772 4.943a (18.74b) 6.500a(31.00b) 0.041*
NR17 5.065a 4.750a 0.878 4.971a 5.250a 0.772
GR2 4.903a 5.375a 0.573 4.829a (18.63b) 6.500a (32.00b) 0.024*
NR18 5.000a 4.875a 0.905 4.914a 5.500a 0.488
NR19 5.065a 4.125a 0.311 4.657a (18.50b) 6.750a (33.13b) 0.010*
GR3 4.742a 5.375a 0.328 4.771a 5.750a 0.230
GR4 4.774a 5.000a 0.527 4.657a (18.74b) 6.250a (31.00b) 0.041*
NR20 5.065a 3.875a 0.057 4.714a 5.750a 0.249
GR5 4.484a 5.750a 0.021 4.629a 5.750a 0.179
GR6 4.548a 5.375a 0.079 4.629a 5.500a 0.230
NR21 4.774a 4.500a 0.695 4.714a 4.750a 0.841
NR22 4.645a 5.000a 0.382 4.543a (18.76b) 6.250a (30.88b) 0.041*
NR23 4.645a 4.750a 0.550 4.600a 5.250a 0.433
GR7 4.484a 4.875a 0.441 4.486a 5.250a 0.311
NR24 4.613a 4.375a 0.959 4.429a 5.750a 0.102
NR26 4.613a 4.125a 0.421 4.371a 5.750a 0.066
NR27 4.355a 4.500a 0.573 4.343a 4.750a 0.488
Note: *Median difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
a
CI value.
b
Mean ranks.

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 it. While a higher response rate is desirable, this study has come
comparatively close to other survey research that have focused on
IPD projects (e.g., Franz et al. 2017). However, the low response
rate still poses the possibility of missing certain subgroups of the
population because they may have declined to participate in the
survey. The findings of this research therefore have to be taken with
a caveat. With the risk categories and the methodology as a refer-
ence, this study can be replicated in the future so that a more com-
prehensive insight can be provided. Additionally, further studies
may also investigate the joint effect of risks on IPD project out-
comes, taking into account the interrelations between risk factors.
A quantitative assessment of the collective impacts of these risks
can be another study focus. More specifically, examining the fre-
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quency and extendedness of future partnership on cooperation en-
hancement and risk reduction can also contribute to the practice
of IPD.
Conclusion
This study identified the critical risk factors that can affect the suc-
cess of IPD projects. The roles of past and future partnerships in
risk management were also explored. The findings suggest that the
highly critical IPD risks in the US construction industry are mainly
caused by poor integration of a multidisciplinary team, unreason-
able target costs, and inaccurate cost estimates. Moreover, surpris-
ingly, the findings of this study depart from the conventional views
that past partnerships are effective means to manage project risks.
On the other hand, future partnerships have been found to play an
effective role in reducing the criticality of certain risks in IPD proj-
ects, i.e., a lack of mutual trust among participants (NR3), lack
of consensus on project pertinent decisions (NR10), insufficient
contractors’ capability to perform integrated practices (NR14), in-
sufficient subcontractors’ capability to perform integrated practices
(NR16), ill-defined responsibilities for respective participants to
deliver integrated practices (NR19), project participants’ resistance
to take extra/new responsibilities in the integrated project (NR22),
delay in the construction phase (GR2), and low productivity of
labor (GR4).
As for theoretical contributions, this study has elucidated the
effect of IPD-specific risks as well as general risks on IPD project
outcomes. This will enable a comprehensive analysis to provide
effective and efficient strategies for risk management in IPD proj-
ects. Instead of expecting IPD methods to automatically improve
team integration quality, this study encourages project participants
to take a more active role in team building in earlier project phases.
The active involvement of client and contractors in the design pro-
cess, a sustained leadership with cross-disciplinary expertise, and
good facilitation skills are fundamental to IPD success. Moreover,
IPD project participants can signal future cooperation intent to their
partners to effectively engender cooperation and make their team
more resilient to project risks.
Data Availability Statement
All data generated or analyzed during the study is included in the
published paper.
Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the supports provided by Hong Kong
General Research Fund (9041988). The authors would further like
to thank the survey participants for taking their time to share their
© ASCE 04021180-11
J. Constr. Eng. Manage., 2022, 148(1): 04021180
valuable experience in this study. This work could not have been
possible without their engagement. Also, special thanks are owed to
Mr. David Umstot of Umstot Project and Facilities Solutions, LLC,
for his assistance with the data collection.
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