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U f a CAUSES, ORIGINS, AND LESSONS OF T H E ^ <

GOV ERNM E.M
VIETNAM WAR
Storage iy if c 'N iQ ' '=
APR fi 1973
T H E L-tfc :r'x - a R Y
K AN SA S S I Alb - U N IV E R SI TY

H E A R IN G S
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FORE IGN RELATI ONS

UNITE D STATES SENATE
NIN ETY -SE CON D CONG RESS
SECOND SESSI ON

CA US ES , O RI G IN S, AN D LE SS O N S O F T H E
V IE TN AM W AR

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P ri n te d f o r t h e us e of th e C om m itt ee o n F or ei gn R el at io ns
CAUSES, ORIGINS, AND LESSONS OF THE
VIETNAM WAR

H E A R IN G S
BEFORE TH E

COMMITTEE ON FOR EIGN RELA TIONS

UN ITE D STATES SENA TE
NIN ETY -SE CON D CONGR ESS
SECOND SESSIO N
ON

CAUSES, ORIG INS, AND LESSONS OF TH E

VIETNAM WAR

MAY 9, 10, AND 11, 1972

P r in te d f o r t h e u se o f th e C o m m it te e on F o re ig n R e la ti o n s

U.S. GOVE RNME NT PRIN TIN G OFFIC E

83-605 WASH INGTO N : 1973

F o r sa le by th e S u p er in te n d en t of D oc um en ts , U.S . G ov er nm en t P ri n ti n g Office,
W as hi ng to n, D.C. 20 40 2 - P ri ce $2 .35 do m es tic p o st p a id or $2. 00 GP O B oo ks to re
St oc k N um be r 52 70 -0 17 13
 COMMITTEE ON FORE IGN RELATIO NS
J. W. FU LBRIGH T, Arkansas, Ch air ma n
JOH N SPARKMA N, Ala bam a GEORG E D. AIK EN, Ver mon t
MI KE MA NSF IEL D, Mo nta na CL IFF OR D P. CASE, New Je rse y
FRA NK CHUR CH, Ida ho JOH N SHERM AN COOP ER, Ken tuck y
STUA RT SYMINGTON, Miss ouri JACOB K. JA VIT S, New York
CLA IBOR NE PE LL , Rhod e Isl an d HUG H SCOTT, Pe nn sy lva nia
GALE W. McGE E, Wyom ing JAM ES B. PEAR SON , Ka nsa s
EDMUN D S. M USK IE, Main e CHA RLES H. PERCY , Ill ino is
WIL LIA M B. SPONG, J b., Vir gin ia
Cab l Ma bc t , Ch ief of St af f
A b t h u b M. K u h l , Ch ief Cle rk

( II)
 CONTENTS
Page
a Pre fac e _________________________________________________________ v
’ Sta tem ent s b y :
Gelb, Leslie II.,Brook ings I ns tit ut io n____________________________ 2
Thomson, Jam es C., Jr. , Ha rv ar d Un ive rsit y______________________ 13
Schles inger, Ar thu r M., Jr. , City Uni vers ity of New York _________ 59
J Chomsky, Noam, Ma ssac hus etts In sti tu te of Techn ology___________ 80
White , Fr an k M., for me r maj or, Office of Str ate gic Se rvi ce s; form er
repo rter , Time mag azin e_____________________________________ 145
Moffat, Abbot Low, for me r chief, Divis ion of Sou the ast A sian Affairs,
Dep artm ent of St at e________________________________________ 1G1
Ins ert ion s for the re co rd :
Pre par ed sta tem ent of Leslie II. Gelb_________________________ 8
Pre par ed sta tem ent of Ar thu r Schlesin ger, J r ____________________ 71
Pre par ed sta tem ent of Noam Chomsky__________________________ S9
Char les de Gaulle on Viet nam _________________________________ 130
TV inte rvie w wit h Pre sid en t Nixon of Jul y 1, 1970______________ 134
Fr an k Wh ite’s dis patc h to Life maga zine desc ribin g experi ences in
Vietnam , 1945-46____________________________________________ 154
Pre par ed sta tem en t of Abbot Low Moffat ________________________ 172
Ap pen dix :
“The Ess enti al Do min o: Ameri can Poli tics and Vie tnam ,” arti cle by
Leslie II. Gelb. Fore ign Affairs , April 1972_____________________ 207
“Vi etn am : The System Work ed,” art icl e by Leslie H. Gelb, Forei gn
Policy, summ er 1971________________________________________ 225
Docum ents rel ati ng to OSS act ivi ty in Fre nch In do ch in a:
Intr odu ctio n _________________________________________ 241
I. The “Dee r” Mission to Viet Minh He adq uar ter s, July- Sep­
tember , 1945:
Le tte r of ins truc tion to Majo r Thomas , May 16, 1945___ 243
“Deer ” Rep ort No. 1, Ju ly 17, 1945__________________ 244
“Dee r” Rep ort, Ju ly 20, 1945______________________ 248
Rep ort on “Dee r” Mission—Maj. A. K. Thoma s, Septem­
ber. 17. 1945____________________________________ 251
The Viet Minh Pa rty o r L eague—Maj. A. K. Thom as___ 265
* Pic tur es from the “De er” Mission __________________ 273
II . “Det achm ent 404” : Missi on t o Saigon :
Opera tion “Em ban km ent” (mem orand um from Maj. P ete r
Dew ey), Augu st 25, 1945_________________________ 281
4 Chronologic al lis t of dat es for Mission “Em ban kme nt”
(mem orand um from Maj. He rbe rt Blu ech el), Septem­
ber 17, 1945____________________________________ 282
Pol itic al aim s and philos ophy of the Viet Minh Govern­
men t of Fren ch Indo-C hina, and th ei r at tit ud e tow ard
Ame rican s (me mora ndum from Capt. He rbe rt Blue­
che l), Septe mber 30, 1945________________________ 283
Commen ts on rep ort s publis hed by the Allied Control
Commission, Saigon, conc erning the eve nts of Septem ­
ber 26,1945 (me mora ndum by Capt. He rbe rt Blue chel ),
Septem ber 30, 1945_____________________________ 285
Affidavit by Capt. He rbe rt Bluechel rel ati ng to t he dea th
of Maj. Pe ter De wey, October 13, 1945_____________ 286
Affidavit by Capt. Fr an k Whi te rel ati ng to the dea th
of Maj. Pe ter Dewey, October 13, 1945_____________ 292
(nr)
 IV

Appendix—Co ntinue d
Docum ents rel ati ng to OSS a ctiv ity in Fren ch Indo chin a—Continue d
II. “Det achm ent 404” : Mission to Saigon—Continu ed
Inve stig atio n of dea th of Maj. Pe ter Dewey (memo­
rand um by Maj. F. N. Small wit h ma p), October 25, P a 8®
1945 _________________________________________ 296
II I. Secre t Intelli gence Bran ch (S.I .) rep orts and docume nts
rel ati ng to the Viet Minh :
Calling card of Vo Nguyen Giap with not e____________ 301
Appeal by Ho Chi Minh to “Fellow Count rymen ,” Sep­
tember 5, 1945___________________________________ 302
Inte rvie w wit h Bao Dai, form er emper or of Annam,
September 19, 1945______________________________ 303
Inte rvie w wit h Prin ce Souphanouv ong of Laos, Septem­
ber 19, 1945_____________________________________ 304
Inte rvie w wit h Ho Chi Minh, September 19, 1945______ 305
Rep ort on the Prov isio nal Government, F.I.C., Septem ­
ber 20, 1945_____________________________________ 307
Poli tical info rma tion (fro m Sw ift) , October 17, 1945___ 311
IV. 'Stra tegic Service Uni t “intellig ence diss emi nati on” rep ort s
from Fren ch Indo chin a______________________________ 327
Mili tary an d politi cal infor mati on, Feb rua ry 28, 1946___ 328
Polit ical infor mati on, March 4, 1946_________________ 330
Mili tary infor mati on, March 6, 1946_________________ 331
Fren ch and Chinese cla shes, March 6, 1946___________ 332
Polit ical infor mati on, March 17, 1946________________ 333
Politi cal infor mati on, March 17, 18, 1946_____________ 334
Fren ch troops ente r Hano i, March 18, 1946___________ 335
Pol itica l and mi lita ry infor mati on, March 19, 1946_____ 336
Politi cal and economic infor mati on, March 20, 1946___ 337
Polit ical info rma tion —North Ind o-China, March 20,1946 - 338
1946___________________________________________ 338
Mili tary and politic al infor mati on, March 22, 1946_____ 339
Polit ical infor mati on, March 24, 1946________________ 340
 PREFAC E

F ebruary 1973.
D ur in g th re e day s of he ari ng s in Ma y 1972, th e Fo re ig n Re lat ion s
Co mm itte e he ar d tes tim on y de scr ibi ng the or ig in an d evo lut ion of
Am eri can inv olv em ent i n Vi etn am . A pp ea rin g as witn esse s bef ore th e
Com mit tee we re Messr s. Lesl ie Gelb, Ja m es C. Tho mso n, Noa m Cho m­
sky , A rt h u r Sc hle sin ger , J r. , Ab bot Low Mof fat, an d F ra n k W hit e.
In tes tim ony cov eri ng th e ye ars 1945-72, each ma n sh are d wi th the
com mit tee his pa rt ic ul ar exp erie nce s an d ext ens ive kno wle dge in an
eff ort t o po rt ra y a fu ll pi ctu re of th e Vi etn am conflict .
O f pa rt ic ul ar i nte re st was t he d es cri pti on by fo rm er Office of S tr a­
teg ic Ser vice (O SS ) Officer F ra n k W hi te of t he co nve rsa tion s h e h eld
wi th II o Chi Mi nh im me dia tel y af te r W or ld W ar I I , an d th e ex ten t
of co nta ct H o an d th e Vi et M mh ha d wi th ot he r OS S officers. As a
re su lt of Mr. W hi te 's tes tim ony, I requ est ed th e int ell ige nce rep or ts
de ta ili ng the se ea rly con tact s. W it h th e ass ista nce of th e Na tio na l
Arc hiv es, th e Fo re ig n Re lat ion s Com mit tee ha s rec ent ly secure d the
dec lass ificatio n an d relea se of a sele ction o f t hese d ocu men ts. Th ey a re
bei ng made publi c fo r t he fi rst tim e in th e ap pe nd ix of th is pr in t. N ec­
ess ary deletio ns hav e been ma de fo r se cu rit y reas ons an d are no ted in
th e te xt w her eve r a pp ro pr ia te .
Th e Co mm itte e dec ided at its me eti ng in exec utiv e sessio n on
Fe br ua ry 6 th at t hes e he ar in gs w ith t he p rev iou sly cl assif ied m ater ia l
sho uld be pub lish ed.
J . W. F ulbri ght , Cha irm an.
(V)
 CAUSES, ORIGIN S, AND LESSONS OF THE VIETNAM
WAR

TU ES DA Y, MA Y 9, 1972

U nited S tates S ena te ,

C ommit tee on F oreign R elatio ns ,
W as hin gto n, D.G.
Th e com mit tee met , pu rs ua nt to noti ce, at 10 a.m., in roo m 4221,
New Se na te Office Bu ild in g, Se na to r J . W. F ulb ri ght (c ha ir m an ),
pre sid ing .
P re se n t: Se na tor s F ul br ig ht , Mu skie , Aik en a nd Pe rcy .
Th e C ha irm an . The com mit tee will come to ord er.

O P E N IN G ST A T E M E N T

The U ni te d St at es t od ay h as 68,000 tro op s sta tio ne d in So ut h V ie t­

nam , w ith a n ad di tio na l 52,000 men on s hip s o ffshore, 37,000 Adr Fo rce
per son nel in ne ig hb or in g Th ai la nd an d 10,000 on Gu am . Th e ar ri va l
of t he six th ai rc ra ft ca rr ie r sta tio ne d off V ietn am br in gs th e nu mb er
of c om bat a ir cr af t to 1,000. O n some day s in pa st weeks the se ai rc ra ft
hav e flown as ma ny as 1,000 so rtie s. As of A pr il 29 of th is y ea r, ove r
55,861 Ame ric ans ha ve los t th ei r li ves i n I nd oc hin a.
Th is wee k’s he ar in gs on th e cause s, ori gin s an d lessons of t he V ie t­
na m wa r, whi le hi sto ric al in em phasi s, ca nnot overl ook th e fa ct th a t
th e Un ite d St ates c ontin ues to be dee ply in volv ed in th is trag ic w ar in
Vie tna m.
Th e que stio ns we will ad dre ss in the se he ari ng s ar e: W hy ar e we
fig hti ng in Vi etn am ? Ho w di d we ge t th er e ? W ha t wer e th e rea son s
fo r th e in iti al U.S . com mi tm ent ? Ha ve thes e reas ons ch ang ed, an d if
so, why do we p er si st ?
Th e U ni te d St at es ha s been ac tiv ely inv olv ed in Vi etn am fo r well
ove r a dec ade al th ou gh th e roo ts of th a t inv olv em ent str etc h bac k as
fa r as t he S eco nd W or ld W ar . By rev iew ing the hi sto ry o f t he dee pen ­
in g U.S . inv olv em en t in In do ch in a, we ho pe th is in qu iry wi ll yie ld
lesson s f rom w hic h p re se nt a nd f ut ur e pol icy m igh t be nefit.
W it hi n th e go ve rnm en t an d th e sch ola rly com mu nity , a nu mb er of
ex pla na tio ns of U. S. policy in Vi etn am hav e dev elop ed du ring th e
pa st yea rs. In t he nex t few d ay s o f he ar in gs we will con sid er a v ar ie ty
of views a nd pe rsp ect ive s on th e w ar.
By ap pl yi ng the se al te rn at iv e cr iti ca l per spe ctiv es to th e hi sto ry
of U. S. policy in V iet na m , we ma y ar ri ve a t a b ett er u nd er st an di ng of
th e causes, ori gin s a nd esc ala tio n of the wa r.
A rece nt, ve ry im po rt an t co nt rib ut io n to th a t un de rs ta nd in g was
th e decl assi fica tion an d pu bli ca tio n of “U ni te d St ate s-V iet na m Re la-
(1)
 2

tio ns , 1945-196 7,” po pu larly kn ow n as the “P en tago n Pa pe rs .” Th is

co mp ila tio n of doc um ent s an d ana lys es shed s li gh t on mu ch of th e
official th in ki ng be hin d cr iti ca l deci sion s tak en in the war .
To c on tri bu te to a b et te r un de rs ta nd in g o f th ese de cisio ns, t he C om­
m itt ee on Fo re ig n Re lat ion s ha s un de rta ke n its own sta ff stu die s of
im po rt an t tu rn in g p oin ts in th e wa r. Th e firs t stu dy , “V iet nam Com ­
mi tm en ts, 1961,” de al t w ith t he c rit ical de cisio ns m ade d ur in g the first
ye ar o f t he K en ne dy A dm in ist ra tio n.
Th e secon d stu dy , “T he U ni te d St ate s an d Vi et na m ; 1944-1947,”
exa mi ned in de tai l Am eri can at tit ud es to wa rd Ho Ch i M inh du ring
an d a ft er the Sec ond W or ld W ar .
A th ir d s tud y on ne go tia tio ns rem ain s class ified a t th e insi sten ce of
th e D ep ar tm en t of Sta te.
Tw o m ore stud ies, one o n th e e ven ts le ad in g u p t o th e D iem co up a nd
th e ot he r on U.S . bomb ing poli cies, are in th e proc ess of bei ng com­
ple ted . In pr ep ar in g thes e stu die s, th e com mit tee staf f ha s rel ied
he av ily on th e Pe nt ag on hi sto ry . De spi te ou r requ ests to se vera l e xecu ­
tiv e age ncie s f or a dd iti on al d oc um ent ati on, thes e hav e been d eni ed us.
IN V IT A T IO N S TO T E S T IF Y

Th is w eek’s he ari ng s on th e or igi ns o f t he w ar a re a co nti nu ati on o f

th e eff ort t o adv anc e th e dia log ue ove r an d fu rt h er u nd er st an di ng o f
th e U. S. role in th e Vi etn am wa r. To b rin g a br oa d spe ctr um of pe r­
spe ctiv es to be ar on th e causes , o rig in s an d lesson s o f the w ar, th e c om­
m itt ee ha s inv ite d di sti ng uis he d sch ola rs an d fo rm er go ve rnm en tal
officials to tes tif y. Th e com mit tee was pa rt ic ul ar ly anx iou s to ob tai n
th e bene fit o f th e e xpe rien ce of officials wh o ha d been ac tu ally inv olv ed
in ea rly dec isio nm aki ng on the wa r. U nf or tu na te ly , th e hi gh -r an ki ng
officials who were i nv ite d to ap pe ar e ith er r efu se d to te st ify or bac ked
ou t at th e l as t m ome nt. On ly fo rm er Se cr eta ry of S ta te De an Ru sk ha s
in di ca te d t h at he m ig ht be abl e to ap pe ar , bu t a t a la te r da te.

today’s witness es

As ou r firs t wit nes s we ar e fo rtu na te to hav e Dr . Les lie Gelb fro m

Br oo kin gs In st it ut io n who served as th e Ch ai rm an of th e Vi etn am
Tas k Fo rce i n th e D ep ar tm en t of Def ense wh ich pr ep ar ed t he P en ta ­
go n hi sto ry of th e wa r. H e wil l be foll owe d by Pr of es so r Ja me s C.
Th om son , Jr ., fro m H ar var d U ni ve rsi ty, who ser ved i n th e St at e De ­
pa rt m en t an d on th e W hi te Ho use sta ff du ri ng th e Ke nn ed y an d
Jo hn so n ad mi nis tra tio ns .
D r. Gelb , we ar e ve ry plea sed to hav e you. Sinc e th e he ari ng s were
set, o f c ours e, t he re ha ve been some s ign ific ant cha nge s in th e s itu ati on .
W he th er o r n ot you wis h to c omm ent on those , o f cours e, is up t o you ,
bu t we wou ld be ve ry ple ase d now i f yo u w ould pr ese nt y ou r tes tim ony .
STATEMEN T OF LES LIE H. GELB, BROOKINGS INSTI TUT ION
M r. G elb. Mr. Ch ai rm an , I am hon ore d by yo ur co mm itte e’s in vi ta ­
tio n to pr ese nt te sti mo ny on th e su bje ct of Vi etn am .
W ha t is re ally on my m ind is th e Pr es id en t’s spe ech la st n ig ht an d
th e a ctio ns t h at wi ll flow f ro m it.
 3

T believe my testimo ny is rele vant to tha t speech and those actions,

hut I would be glad to comment fur the r on the P resi den t’s speech later
in my testimony.
The purpose of your hearing s is h istory , but with respect to Viet ­
nam the past and the pre sent are irrevocably in terlocked.
The mi nd-numbi ng sameness of the war and the ove rwhelming fact
tha t this war is not yet history compel us to be contempo rary hist orians
with all the attend ant risks.
Mr. C hairman, with your permission, I would like to severely sum-
marize my stateme nt and ask t ha t it be e ntered in the record in its
entirety.
The Chairman. Yes, indeed; it will all be entered and you may
proceed.
'• Mr. Gelb. My testimony will deal with (1) the past , specifically, the
causes of United States involvement in the war, and (2) the present,
specifically the lessons of the past th at bea r on today.
Wars are supposed to tell us about ourselves. Are we a wise and ju st
Nation? Or are we foolish and aggressive, merciless or humane, well-
led or misled, v ital or decadent, ho peful or hopeless? Nations in war
and afte r w ar, win or lose, try to scratch away a t the past e or glue or
trad ition s or values th at held the ir societies toge ther and see of what
they are made. It is arguable wheth er a society should indu lge in such
self-scrutiny. Societies are, as E dmu nd Burke wrote, “ delicate, in tri ­
cate wholes” tha t are more easily damaged than improved when sub ­
jected to the glare of Grand Inquisitors .
But in the case of our own society and the war in Vietnam, too many
people are seeking answers and are entitle d to them, and many are
only too eag er to fill in the blanks. The families and frien ds of those
who were killed a nd wounded will want to know whether i t was worth
it afte r all. Intelle ctuals will want to know “Why Vietn am?” Men
seeking and holdin g political office will demand to know who was
responsible.
The answers to these questions will themselves become political facts
and forces shap ing the Unite d State s’ role in the world and our lives
at home for years to come.
* OF FE RE D E X PL A N A T IO N S OF TJ.S . IN V O L V E M E N T I N V IE T N A M

Central to this inqui ry is the issue of causes of U.S. i nvolvement in

Vietnam. I have fou nd ei ght discernible expl anations advanced in the
* Vietnam litera ture. Different author s combine these explanatio ns in
various ways, but I will keep them separate fo r the purpose of analysis.
I will then sketch my own position.
Let me ju st list . Mr. Chairman, the e ight different exp lanations t ha t
have been offered: (1) the arr ogance of p ower; (2) bureau cratic poli­
tics; (3) our domestic polit ical s ituatio n a nd for ces; (4) imper ialism;
(5) the explana tion of men m aking har d choices pr agm atica lly; (6)
balance of power politics, talk of honor and keeping commitments,
credibilit y of ou r commitme nts; (7) the slippery slope thesis, t hat we
got into the war in Vietnam throu gh excessive optimism and ina d­
vertence; and (8) I think , most impo rtantl y, the explana tion tha t we
got into Vietnam prin cipa lly to stop communism.
 4
HO W AND W IT H W HA T EXP ECT AT ION S UN IT ED STATE S BEC AME INVOLVED

As of th is po in t i n m y o wn rese arch . I a dva nce th re e pro po sit ion s to

ex pla in how an d wi th w ha t exp ect atio ns th e Un ite d St ate s became
inv olv ed in th is w a r:
Fi rs t, th e U. S. ’s inv olve men t in Vie tna m is no t ma inl y or mos tly
a sto ry of ste p by step , in ad ve rte nt desc ent int o unfor ese en qu ick ­
san d. I t is pr im ar ily a sto ry of wh y U.S . lea der s con side red th at
it was vi tal no t to lose Vie tna m by forc e to comm unism . O ur l ead ers
beli eved Vi etn am to be vi ta l no t fo r its elf b ut fo r wh at t he y th ou gh t
its loss wou ld m ean i nte rn ati on all y a nd dom estic ally . P rev iou s in volv e­
me nt mad e fu rt he r invo lvem ent mor e una voida ble a nd , t o th is e xte nt,
com mit men ts were inh eri ted . B ut jud gm en ts of Vi etn am ’s vita lness,
be gin nin g wit h the Ko rea n war , were sufficient in them selv es to set
th e cou rse f or escala tion.
Secon d, ou r Pre sid en ts were nev er ac tua lly seek ing a m ili ta ry vic­
to ry in Vie tnam . In my opi nio n, the y were doing onl y wh at the y
th ou gh t was min ima lly nece ssary a t e ach sta ge t o k eep In do ch ina , a nd
la te r So uth Vie tnam , out of Co mm unist han ds. In a way , th is mad e
ou r poli cy a fun ctio nal equ iva len t of esc alat ion an d a fun cti on al
equ iva len t of se eking v icto ry.
Th is for ced ou r P re sid en ts t o be bra kem en, to do less t ha n tho se w ho
were ur gi ng m ili ta ry vic tor y an d to rej ect pro pos als fo r dis eng age ­
men t. I t also me ant th at ou r Pr es id en ts wa nte d a ne go tia ted set tle ­
ment. wi tho ut fu lly rea liz ing —th ou gh rea liz ing mor e th an th ei r
cri tics —th at a civil wa r can not be end ed by po liti cal compromis e.
Th ird , o ur Pr esi de nts an d most of th ei r l ieu ten an ts w ere not del ude d
by op tim ist ic rep or ts of pro gre ss an d did no t proc eed on th e basi s of
wis hfu l th in ki ng a bou t wi nn ing a m ili ta ry vic tor y in So uth Vie tnam .
Th ey reco gniz ed th at t he s tep s t he y were ta ki ng w ere not ade qua te to
win th e wa r an d th at unles s Ha no i rel ent ed, the y wou ld hav e to do
more an d m ore.
Th ei r st ra te gy was to per sev ere in th e hope th at th ei r will to con­
tin ue , i f no t th e pr ac tic al effects o f t he ir ac tions , w oul d cau se th e Com ­
mu nis ts to rele nt.
W ith yo ur p erm issio n, M r. Ch air ma n, I w ould l ike to en ter i nto th e
rec ord of m y tes tim ony th e art icl e in whic h I de veloped thes e p rop osi ­
tio ns an d e xpa nd on th ese pro pos itio ns.
Th e C hair man . Yes, wi th ou t obje ctio n, it will be so done. (See
ap pe nd ix. )
PR ES IDE NT NI XO N’S JU ST IF IC A TI O N FOR CO NT IN UA TIO N OF WAR

Mr. G elb. Pr es id en t N ixon m ay no lon ger be d evo ted to sim ple an ti ­

com mun ism as the ma in reas on fo r pu rsu in g th e Vie tna m war . Il is
ad mi nis tra tio n has done mu ch to rid t he p ubl ic deb ate o f the old cold
wa r cliches. Th e Pr es id en t’s l as t two speeches, how ever , in whi ch he
fre qu en tly invo ked th e “C om mu nis t” th re at , does rai se susp icio ns
ab ou t cha nges in his th in ki ng . Nev erth eles s, Pr es id en t Nix on has fo r
the most p ar t just ifie d co nti nu ati on of the wa r alo ng t wo lin es : firs t,
he says t h at i t is cr uci al to ou r f ore ign p olic y an d, second, he say s t h at
los ing w ould l ead to a n ig ht m ar e of rec rim ina tio n at hom e u nd er m in ­
ing pol itic al su pp or t f or U.S. in ter es t ab roa d.
 5

CENTRAL TASK BEFORE CO MMITT EE

From my vant age point the central task before t his committee is to
evaluate the Pres iden t’s rati onales on th eir merits , o f course, but also
agains t the lessons we should have learned from 25 years of war in
Vietnam.
LESSONS WE SHOULD HAVE LEARNED

Lesson one concerns the Saigon government and milit ary forces.
They always get b etter, but they never ge t good enough. The curre nt
North Vietnamese offensive, whatever the immediate results, shows
once again tha t the Saigon forces can not defend themselves w ithout
massive American assistance. Regardl ess of w hat can be said about th e
improvement and braver y of the Saigon forces, one simple fact ob­
scures all the rest—a N orth Vietnamese force of some 100,000-plus men
are fighting and beatin g a 1 million-plus South Vietnamese armed
force backed up by about 800 tactical air sorties per day. Something is
wrong somewhere. Somethin g always has been wrong.
The lesson is tha t m ilita ry power witho ut p olitica l cohesiveness and
supp ort is an empty shell. With out the legitimacy, witho ut politica l
legitimacy in a government and the quest for it in South Vietnam
seems never ending, the S aigon regime perp etual ly will requ ire Am er­
ican support.
Lesson two concerns the Hanoi government. While annual hints
and pre dictions have it th at the N orth Vietnamese are about to expire,
the ir will to fig ht seems undim inished and they keep coming back. It
is n ot necessary to glori fy Hanoi to face this fact. The bru tali ty of
Hano i's methods of war fare have matched, if not exceeded, Sa igon’s,
but something for them always has gone rig ht somewhere.
The lesson, I believe, is t ha t time and determ ination are on the side
of the elemental tide of nationali sm and t ha t th e lea dership in H anoi,
for h istorica l reasons, always has symbolized thi s basic pol itical force.
Lesson three comes back to the n atur e of th e w ar itself. The war in
Vietnam was and is a civil war and a w ar for nationa l independence,
in my opinion. The central question of who shall rule Vietnam would
have been settle d on just these terms long ago ha d it not been for the
interve ntion of outside powers. The reason, I think , is tha t the war
will never end as long as outside powers keep it going. This goes for
Russia and China as well as for the Unite d States. But the Unite d
States has a par ticu lar responsibil ity for prolon ging this war. We
must face the t rag ic a nd bru tal fact and p roba bility th at more Vietna­
mese will die by t he continua tion of th e presen t war tha n will die, in
my opinion, from the bloodletting following its conclusion.
We can attr ibu te grea t principl es to our involvement in Vietnam
but these prin ciples can mean only continu ing de ath to th e Vietnamese
and in the end the strugg le will be resolved as it began, by the Vie tna­
mese themselves.
A four th lesson rel ated to the others concerns bombing and, I be­
lieve, min ing of ports. The lesson is t ha t more bombing and mining
will bring nei ther victor y nor peace.
More bombing and mining in North Vietnam will, in time, some­
what curt ail Ha noi ’s pre sent offensive in the south but at the risk of
once again settin g back U.S. relations with Russia and China and at
the price of countless civilian lives.
 6
More bombing in South Vietnam will impede Han oi’s offensive at
the expense of killin g and making refugees out of hundred s of t hou­
sands of people.
What , then, is the purpose of such senseless slaug hter ?
A fifth lesson concerns domestic dissent. Many people who par tici ­
pate d in the efforts of the last 7 years to change our policy say
th at they thin k they were was ting the ir time. I do not agree. The ir
opposition and th e potent ial t hre at o f g reate r public opposition was a
constant fact or in the deliberations of American policymakers over
the years.
The lesson is th at dissenters may not have been powe rful but they
were not powerless. Responsible criticism often centered in these cham­
bers. played an im porta nt an d honorable role in prev enting worse out­
rages from takin g place.
A sixth and final lesson stemming from the others concerns dealing
with dilemmas and ending the war.
DIL EM MA S PRE SEN TED TO UN IT ED STATES BY VI ET NA M

Given the constant goal of a non-Communist south Vietnam since

the Korean war, Vietnam has presented the Unite d States with
dilemmas.
At first our leaders realized there was no chance of defeat ing the
Vietmin h unless France grant ed independence to Vietnam, but tha t
if Franc e gr ante d independence to Vietnam she would no t remain and
fight the war. So we could n ot win with Franc e and we could not win
without her. Then our leaders recognized tha t Diem was hopelessly
losing th e supp ort of the people but, at the same time, t hat he repre ­
sented the only hope of futur e political stab ility. So we could not win
with Diem and we could not win withou t him. L ater, o ur leaders came
to th e view tha t t he Saigon regime could not survive w ithout massive
American involvement and th at the North Vietnamese effort seemed
able to survive despite our efforts. So, again, the war cannot be won
with the Uni ted St ates nor witho ut the Unite d States.
REASO NS GIV EN FOR PE RS IST IN G QU EST ION ED

In full knowledge of these dilemmas, o ur leaders persisted never­

theless. Eac h successor group of le aders thoug ht tha t they might ju st
succeed where their predecessors had failed , or at least tha t they would
prevent defeat. Our leaders plowed on for the range of reasons di s­
cussed earl ier in th is paper .
Fo r many years, u ntil the American people saw the policy was no t
working and began d oubting the word of thei r elected officials, these
reasons found a generous reception. It is not difficult to underst and
why proposals for U.S. disengagement fell on deaf ears. People be­
lieved in th is war for a very long time , but this is a different time a nd
we have, I think , a new and more sensible lens through which to view
the war.
The old rationale s about nations fal ling like dominoes to communism
and our own Nation fallin g int o the pit of McCarthyism no longer, in
my judgment, can stan d close scrutiny . Extrem ists looking fo r scape­
goats will try to cause trouble but every indication is tha t the American
 7
people wa nt out of this war. Nor should U .S. withdr awal from Viet­
nam presage a retur n to popu lar isolationism. If c ontinu ing commit­
ments elsewhere in the world are honest ly ex plained and seem reason­
able to the American people, they have a proven rec ord of being will­
ing to be ar inte rnatio nal burdens.
As fo r th e fate of Vietnam be ing cen tral to th e c redibi lity and suc­
cesses of all ILS. foreign policy, as Pres ident Nixon has often sug­
gested, this is a h ighly questionable proposition . W hat wisdom is there
tha t causes Presid ent Nixon to link what he calls the “dig nity of t he
< office of the Preside ncy” to the fate of the Saigon forces? Who still
believes tha t any of our allies expect us to fight indefinitely? IIow
many o f o ur allies were worried enough about the fate of Vietnam to
make a meaningfu l contribut ion to its defense ? I f an ything , the domino
theory may now be true in reverse, tha t is, if we continue the war,
this act alone migh t je opardize the g rowing purs uit of common int er­
ests between Washing ton and Pekin g and Moscow and might und er­
mine American political suppo rt for a continuing U.S. security role
in the world.
It would be bette r to find some magic diplomatic formula tha t could
reconcile all parti es in Vietnam in a free and democratic process. No
civil war has been settled by polit ical compromise. Ev ery presid ent—
even Presiden t Nixon’s generous terms when measured by the stan dard
of na tion-to- nation negotiations cannot resolve the hatred s a nd stakes
of a civil war. Civil warr ing parties will not ris k t heir lives and thei r
lifelong aspirat ions in the throw of some electoral dice. Elections
require tru st a nd a common loyalty. These are precisely the ingr edients
which are missing in a civil war.
At this point in his tory, th e issue of moralit y as between th e Ha noi
and Saigon regimes is not a c learcut matter. The refugees a re fleeing
south, n ot north. But when they get south th ey develop no l oyalty to
Saigon. I t is not easy now to declaim whether H anoi or S aigon is ri ght
about who should rule South Vietnam. But I do believe tha t the Unite d
States is not the keeper of Vietnamese moralit y and tha t it is wrong for
our Natio n to pe rpetu ate this war.
WH AT PENTAGON PAPERS DO AND DO NOT TELE US
>
The Penta gon papers, the matt er specifically before thi s committee,
tell the s tory of how the executive branch of our governm ent p erpet u­
ated the Vietnam war. They do not tell us about the role of the Con-
gress, the news media, the political climate in our country and our
values, or the reactions of oth er nations. Nor do the Pentag on papers
answer the question o f what kind of na tion are we, the question which
I posed at t he beginni ng of th is presentation. We may well have th is
answer in the c oming weeks.
ONLY WAY TO RESOLVE VIETN AM DILEMMA

The only way, in my jud gment, to resolve the Vietnam dilemma is

for the United S tates to set a date certa in fo r the complete withd rawal
of our land, sea and air forces from the Indoc hina th eate r in ret urn for
our prisoners of war. We must also st and ready to provide refu se for
those desiring to leave So uth \ ietnam. This is not a good alter nativ e—
 8

the one I am proposing. There are costs tha t we cannot ru n away from,
but i t is better than persistin g in an endless, hopeless and tragic war.
Tha nk you, Mr. Chairman.
(Mr. Gelb’s prepared statement fol lows :)
Statement oe Leslie H. Gelb on Vietnam : Causes of the War and Lessons
Learned
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored by your
committee's invitatio n to presen t testimony on the subject of Vietnam. The pur­
pose of your hearings is history, but with respect to Vietnam, the past and the
present are irrevocably interlocked. The mind-numbing sameness of the war and
the overwhelming fac t t hat thi s w ar is not yet history, compel us to be contempo­
rar y histor ians with all the a tten dant risks.
My testimony will deal with (1) the past, specifically the causes of U.S. in­
volvement in th e war, and (2) the present, specifically the lessons of the pa st th at
bear on today.
Wars are supposed to tell us abou t ourselves. Are we a wise a nd jus t nation?
Or are we foolish and aggressive? Merciless or humane? Well led or mislead?
Vital or decadent? Hopeful or hopeless? Nations in war and aft er war, win or
lose, try to scratch away at the paste or glue or tradit ions or values tha t held
thei r societies together and see of w hat they are made. I t is arguable whe ther a
society should indulge in such self-scrutiny. Societies are, as Edmund Burke
wrote, “delicate, in trica te wholes” th at are more easily damaged than improved
when subjected to the glare of Gr and Inquis itors.
But in the case of ou r own society and the war in Vietnam, too many people
are seeking an swers and are entitled to them, and many are only too eager to
fill in the blanks. The families and friends of those who were killed and
wounded will want to know whether it was worth it afte r all? Intelle ctuals will
want to know “why Vietnam”? Men seeking and holding political office will
demand to know who was responsible? The answers to these questions will
themselves become political facts and forces, shaping the United States role
in the world and our lives at home for years to come.
I . C A U SE S OF T H E W AR : T H E RA NG E OF EX PL A N A TI O N S

Central to this inquiry is the issue of causes of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

I have found eight discernible exp lanations advanced in t he Vietnam literatu re.
Different autho rs combine these explanations in various ways, but I will keep
them separ ate for the purpose of analysis. I will, then, sketch by own position.
1. The arrogrance of power
This view holds t ha t a driving force in American envelopment in Vietnam was
the fact tha t we were a nation of enormous power and like comparable nations
in history, we would seek to use thi s power at every opportunity. To have power
Is to want to employ it, is to be corrupt ed by it. The ar rogance derives from the
belief tha t to have power is to be able to do anything. Power invokes rig ht and
justifies itself. Vietnam was there, a challenge to this power and an opportunity
for its exercise, and no task was beyond accomplishment.
There can be no doubt about this stra in in the behavior of other g reat powers
and in the American character. But this is not a universal law. Great powers, and
especially the United States have demonstra ted self-restr aint. The arrogance
of power, I think, had more to do with our persisting in the war than with
our initial involvement. It always was difficult for our leaders back in Wash­
ington and for operatives in the field to believe tha t American resources and
ingenuity could not devise some way to overcome the adversary.
2. Bureaucratic politics
There are two, not mutually exclusive, approaches within this view. One
has it tha t national security bureau crats (the professionals who make up the
military services, civilian Defense, AID, State, and the CIA) are afflicted with
the curse of machismo, the need to asse rt and prove manhood and toughness.
Career advancement and acceptability within the bureaucracy depended on
showing tha t you were not afra id to propose the use of force. The other ap-
proach has it tha t bureau crats purposefully misled thei r superio rs about the
situa tion in Vietnam and carefully constructed policy altern ative s so as to cir­
cumscribe their superiors, those forcing furth er involvement in Vietnam.
The machismo phenomenon is not unknown in t he bureaucracy. It was difficult,
if not damaging, to careers to appea r conciliatory or “soft”. Similarly, the con­
striction of options is a well-known bureau cratic device. But, I think, these ap­
proaches unduly emphasize the degree to which the Preside nt a nd his immediate
advisers were trapped by the bureaucr ats. The Presid ent was always in a posi­
tion to ask for new options or to exclude certai n others. The role of the
bureaucracy was much more central to shaping the p rograms or the means used
to fight the war than the key decisions to make the commitments in the first
place.
5. Domestic politics
This view is quite complicated, and auth ors argue thei r case on several dif­
ferent levels. The vari ants are if you were responsible for losing Vietnam
to communism, you woul d: (a) lose the next election and lose the White House
in par ticu lar; (b) jeopardize your domestic leg islative program, your influence
in general, by having to defend yourself constantly again st political at ta ck ;
(c) invite the retur n of a McCarthyite right-wing r eacti on; and (d) risk under­
mining domestic support for a continuing U.S. role abroad, in t urn, risking dan­
gerous probes by Ru ssia and China.
There can be no doubt, despite the lack of supporting evidence in the Pent a­
gon Papers, about the importance of domestic political considerations in both the
initial commitment to and the subsequent increase in our Vietnam involvement.
Officials are reluct ant, for obvious reasons, to put these considerations down in
writing, and scholars t herefore lear n too li ttle about them. I t should also be noted
tha t domestic political factor s played a key pa rt in sha ping the manner in which
the war was fought—no re serve call-ups, cer tain limitation s on tyombing ta rge t­
ting, paying for the war , and the like.
Imperialism
This explanatio n is a varient of the domestic politics explanation. Proponents
of this view argue tha t special inter est groups maneuvered the United States
into t he war. Their goal was to cap ture export markets a nd nat ura l resources at
public expense for priva te economic gain.
The evidence put forw ard to support t his “devil theory” has not been persuasive.
Certain groups do gain economically from wars, but the ir power to drive our
political system into war tends to be exaggerated and over-dramatized.
5. Men making hard choices pragmatically
This is the view t ha t our leaders over the years were not men who were in­
spired by any part icul ar ideology, but were pragm atists weighing th e evidence
and looking at each problem on its merits. According to this perspective, our
leaders knew they were facing tough choices, and their decisions always were
close ones. But having decided 51 to 49 to go ahead, they tried to sell and imple­
ment their policies one hundred percent.
This view cannot be dismissed out-of-hand. Most of our leaders, and especially
our Presidents, occupied c entri st political positions. But Vietnam is a case, I be­
lieve, where practi cal politicians allowed an anti-communist world view to get
the best of them.
6. Balance of power politics
Intimat ely related to the pr agmatic explanatio ns is the conception which often
accompanies pragmatism —the desire to maintai n some perceived balance-of-
power among nations. The principal considerations in pursuing this goal we re:
seeing t ha t “the illegal use of force” is not allowed to succeed, honoring commit­
ments, and keeping credibility with allies and potential adversaries. The under­
lying judgment was th at failu re to stop aggression in one place would tempt
others to aggress in ever more dangerous places.
These represent the words and argumen ts most commonly and persuasively
used in the executive branch, the Congress, and elsewhere. They seemed common-
sensical and pruden tial. Most Americans were prepared to s tretch the ir meaning
to Vietnam. No doubt many believed these arguments on t heir own merits , but in
most cases, I think, the broader tenet of anti-communism made them convincing.
 10
7. The slippery slope
Tied to the pragmatic approach, the conception of balance of power and the
arrogance of power, is the explanation which holds that United States involve­
ment in Vietnam is the story of the slippery slope. According to this view, \ iet-
nam was not always critical to U.S. nationa l security ; it became so over the
years as each succeeding admin istratio n piled commitment on commitment. Each
admin istrat ion sort of slid furt her into t he Vietnam quagmire, not really under­
standin g the depth of the problems in Vietnam and convinced t ha t it could win.
The catchwords of this view are optimism and inadvertence.
While this explanation undoubtedly fits certai n individuals and certain
periods of time, it is, by itself, a fundamen tal distortion of the Vietnam experi­
ence. From the Korean War, state d American objectives for Vietnam were con­
tinuously high and absolute. U.S. involvement, not U.S. objectives, increased
over time. Moreover, to scrutinize the range of official public stat ements a nd the
privat e memos as revealed in the Pentagon Papers makes it difficult to argue
tha t our leade rs were deceived by the enormity of the Vietnam tas k before them.
It was not necessary for our leaders to believe they were going to win. It was
sufficient for them to believe tha t they could not afford to lose Vietnam to
communism.
8. Anti-Communism
The analys ts who offer this explanation hold tha t anti-communism was the
central and all-pervasive fact of U.S. foreign policy from a t least 1947 until the
end of the sixties. After World War II, an ideology whose very existence seemed
to threat en basic American values had combined with the nation al force of first
Russia and then China. This combination of ideology and power brought our
leaders to see the world in “we-they” terms and to insist tha t peace was in­
divisible. Going well beyond balance of power considerations, every piece of
terri tory became critical, and every beseiged nation, a potential domino. Com­
munism came to be seen as an infection to be qu arantin ed rath er than a force
to be judiciously and appropriatel y balanced. Vietnam, in parti cular , became
the cockpit of confrontation between th e ‘‘Free World” a nd Tot alit aria nis m; it
was where the action was for 20 years.
In my opinion, simple anti-communism was the principal reason for United
States involvement i n Vietnam. It is not the whole story, but it is the biggest
part.
As of this point in my own research, I advance three propositions to explain
why, how, and with what expectations the United States became involved in the
Vietnam war.
First, U.S. involvement in Vietnam is not mainly or mostly a story of step by
step, inadv ertent descent into unforeseen quicksand. It is primaril y a story of
why U.S. leaders considered th at it was vital not to lose Vietnam by force to
Communism. Our leaders believed Vietnam to be vita l not for itself, but fo r what
they thought its “loss” would mean internat ionally and domestically. Previous
involvement made furth er involvement more unavoidable, and, to this extent,
commitments were inherited. But judgments of Vietnam’s “vitalness”—begin­
ning with the Korean War—were sufficient in themselves to set the course for
escalation.
Second, o ur Presidents were never actually seeking a militar y victory in Viet­
nam. They were doing only what they t hought was minimally necessary at each
stage to keep Indochina, and lat er South Vietnam, out of Communist hands.
This forced our Presidents to be brakemen, to do less th an those who were urg­
ing military victory and to reject proposals for disengagement. It also meant
tha t our Preside nts wanted a negotiated settlement without fully realizing
(though realizing more th an their critics) tha t a civil war cannot be ended by
political compromise.
Third, our Presidents and most of thei r lieuten ants were not deluded by opti­
mistic reports of progress and did not proceed on the basis of wishful thinking
about winning a military victory in South Vietnam. They recognized tha t the
steps they were taking were not adequate to win the war and t hat unless Hanoi
relented, they would have to do more an d more. Their strategy was to persevere
in hope tha t their will to continue— if n ot th e pra ctical effects of th eir ac tions—
would cause the Communists to relent.
With your permission. Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record
of my testimony the artic le in which I develop these propositions.
 11
II . LE SSO NS LEARN ED
Pre sid ent Nixon ma y no long er be devoted to sim ple anti-c
reaso n for pur sui ng the Vietna m war. His ad mi nis tra tio n ommuni sm as the mai n
the public deba te of the old cold wa r cliches. The Pre sid enthas 's
done much to rid
speech
however, in which he freq uen tly invoked the “comm unist” th re at ofdoes Apr il 30,
suspicion s abo ut his chang e of think ing. Never theles s, Pre sid ent Nixon rai se
the most pa rt, just ified con tinu atio n of the wa r along two lin es: first, thhas, for
rig ht way out of Vietna m is cruc ial to our chang ing role in the world, at “th e
peace in the world ” ; and second th at losing would produc and the
recr imi nat ion ” at home, underm inin g polit ical supp ort for U.S. e a “nig htm are of
From my v ant age point, the cen tra l tas k before thi s int ere sts abro ad.
the Pre sid ent 's rati onale s on th eir merits, of course, butCommit
also ag
tee is to eva lua te
we shou ld hav e l earn ed from twenty-fiv e y ear s of w ar in Vietnam.ain st the lessons
Lesson one con cerns th e Saigon Governm ent and mi lita
get bette r, but they neve r get good enough. The cu rrerynt forces. They alw ays
offensive, wha teve r the imm edia te resu lts, shows once aga inNort th
h Vietn ames e
at the Saigon
forces cann ot defend thems elves wit hou t mass ive Americ an assi stan
gard less of wh at can be said abo ut the impro vemen t and ce. Re­
brav
forces, one simple fac t obscure s all the res t—a Nort h Vietnam ese force ery of th e Saigon
100,000 men is figh ting an d b eatin g a 1 mill ion p lus South Vietnam ese a rmyof some
up by abou t 800 tac tic al ai r sort ies per day. Someth ing bac ked
Someth ing alw ays has been wrong. is wrong somewher e.
The lesson is th at mi lita ry power wit hou t polit ical
is an empty shell. Amer icans can have gr ea t sym path ycohesive for
ness an d supp ort
mu nis t South Vietna mese who do not wa nt to be ruled by thethecommu many non-com­
these gr oups neve r h ave been able to submerg e th eir own differen ce intonists. Yet,
unified purpos e and ga the r supp ort from the pea san t masses. Most rece a single,
Thie u regime has gain ed in sta bili ty but not in legitima cy. Wi ntly, the
imacy, and the que st fo r i t se ems nev er-ending, the Saigon regime tho ut th is legi t­
pe rpe tual ly will
req uire Ameri can su ppor t.
Lesson two concerns th e H anoi Government . W hile ann ual hi nts an d pred ictio
hav e it th at the Nort h Vietna mese are abou t to expire, th eir will to fight ns
undim inish ed and they keep coming back. It is not nece ssary to glori fy seems
to face thi s fact. The br uta lit y of Han oi's method s of wa rfa re hav e matche Hanoi
not exceeded, Saigon's. And cert ainly , Hano i has received d, if
from the So viet Union and C hina —althoug h only a fra ctio n massi ve doses of aid
Sta tes ha s give n to Saigon. But s omethi ng h as gone rig ht forofthem the aid the U nited
some where.
The lesson is, I believe, th at t ime and. dete rmi nati on are on t he side
men tal tide of nati ona lism , and th at the lead ersh ip in Hano i alw ays ofhas t he ele­
bolized th is b asic polit ical force. To be sure , the efficiency. But efficient au sym­
iani sm is not the prin cip al reaso n for Ha noi ’s success. In the pas t, dicth or ita r­
regime s have fall en und er fa r less pre ssu re tha n has been absorbe d by tat ori al
The only sat isf act ory exp lana tion is th at at lea st for its Hanoi.
sub sta nti al min ority in South Vietnam, Hano i sti ll sta ndsown people and for a
for nati ona lism and
independenc e.
Lesson thr ee comes b ack to the na tur e of the wa r itself. The wa r in Vietnam
was and is a civil wa r and a wa r for n atio nal ind ependence . The cen tra l
o f who shall rul e Vietn am would have been settle d on j us
question
t these term s long ago
had i t not been fo r the in terv ent ion o f o utsid e powers. Wheneve
side or the oth er in thi s conliict was in dang er of losing, an outsir de one Vietna mese
power would
step in to red res s the balance . When Fra nce and the United Sta tes incr ease d
th eir efforts, Ru ssia an d C hina would f ollow suit .
The lesson, I thin k, is th at the war neve r will end as long as outs ide powers
keep it going. Thi s goes for Russ ia and China as well as the
the United Sta tes has a pa rti cu lar respo nsibi lity for prolonginUnited Stat es. But
g thi s war. Ther e
can be litt le doub t who would have won in 1945 or 1954 or 19G5 h ad the Unite d
Sta tes res tric ted its role or stay ed out. The re is, I feel, litt
win today. This, in tur n, gives the Unite d Sta tes an add itiolenaldoubt who would
res ponsibil ity—
stan din g rea dy to provi de asylum to all those South Vietnam ese
th eir lives would be e nda nger ed by a Nor th Vietnam ese victory. Bu twho believe
before thi s
poin t is reache d, we mu st face the trag ic and bru tal prob abili ty th at more Viet­
namese will die by the con tinu atio n of the pres ent wa r tha n will die in a blood­
lett ing followin g its conclusion.
We can at tri bu te gr ea t princ iples to our involvem ent in Vietn am—sto
communism, pre ven ting fall ing dominoes, seeing th at aggres sion does pping
ceed, p rote ctin g the fab ric of U.S. f oreign policy at home not suc­
and abro ad. But these
83- G0 5— 7:
 12
prin ciple s can mean only conti nuin g dea th to the Vietname se. In the end, the
stru ggl e wil l be resolved, as it began, by the Vietnam ese them selves.
A fo urt h lesson, rela ted to the othe rs, concerns bombing. In April 1954, Pre si­
den t Eisen howe r, backed by all the mi lita ry chiefs e xcep t the Cha irma n, decided
th at U.S. bombing could nei the r save Dienb ienphu nor tu rn the tid e of bat tle
ag ain st the Vietm inh nor make the Vietm inh cease and desist. Over the years,
our lead ers have lost sigh t of the basic soundn ess of thi s decision. Bombing has
not br oken Ha noi ’s will, and the re is no sign th at it could. Bombing does impose
cer tai n lim itat ion s on th e movement of men and supplies, but not to low e nough
levels to pre ven t Han oi’s ca rryi ng out its stra teg y. Tac tica l bombing is supposed
to be q uite effective aga ins t conve ntiona l force oper ation s and it can be decisive
in pa ric ula r batt les, but it has not prev ente d Han oi in the las t mont hs from
brin gin g down tank s, truck s, and heavy art ill ery into the South, an d it cann ot i*
ultim atel y do th e job of gro und forces.
The lesson is th at more bombing will brin g nei the r victo ry nor peace. More
bombing in Nort h Vietnam would, in time, some what cu rta il Ha noi’s offensive
in the South, but at the risk of once aga in set tin g back Unit ed Sta tes rela tion s
with Rus sia and China and at the price of coun tless civilia n lives. More bombing If
in South Vietnam will impede Han oi’s offensive at the expense of killi ng and
mak ing refuge es out of hun dred s of tho usa nds of pea sant s. Wh at, then , is the
purpo se of such sensele ss sla ugh ter?
A fift h lesson concerns domesti c disse nt. Many people who pa rtic ipa ted in the
effor ts of th e las t seven ye ars to c hang e our policy say th at th ey thi nk they were
was ting th eir time. I do n ot agree. Th eir opposition, and the pot enti al th re at of
gr ea te r public opposition, was a con sta nt fac tor in the deli bera tion s of Ameri ­
can po licy-ma kers du ring the las t two Adm inist ratio ns.
The lesson is th at diss ente rs may no t have been powerf ul, but they were not
powerless. Responsible critic ism, often cente red in thes e chamb ers, played an
imp orta nt and honora ble role in prev enti ng worse outr ages from tak ing place
A sixt h and final lesson stem ming from the othe rs concerns dealin g with
dilem mas and ending th e war . Given the con stan t goal of a noncom munist South
Vietnam since the Korea n War , Vietn am has pres ente d the Unite d Sta tes with
a dilemma. At first, our lead ers reali zed th at the re was no chance of defe ating
the Vietmi nh unless Fra nce g ran ted indepen dence to Vietnam , but th at i f Fran ce
gra nte d independenc e, she would not rem ain and fight the war. So, we could
not win with Fra nce and we cou ld not win wit hou t h er. Then, our le ade rs recog­
nized th at Die m was hopeless ly losing t he supp ort of the people, bu t a t the same
time, th at h e repre sente d the only hope of fut ure p olitic al stab ility . So, we could
not win with Diem and we could not win wit hou t him. Lat er, our lead ers came
to the view th at the Saigon regime could not survi ve with out massiv e U.S. in­
volvement , and th at the Nor th Vietna mese effort seemed able to survi ve despite
U.S. effo rts. So ag ain, the w ar could n ot be won with the Un ited Sta tes nor w ith ­
out the U nited State s.
In full knowledge of thes e dilemmas , our lead ers per sist ed never theles s. Each
success or group of lead ers thou ght th at they migh t ju st succeed where the ir
prede cesso rs had failed —or at l east, th at th ey would prev ent defea t. Our leade rs
plowed on for the rang e of reaso ns discussed ear lie r in thi s paper. For many
yea rs (un til the Americ an people saw the policy was not worki ng and began
dou btin g the word of th eir elected officials), these reaso ns found a generous
recepti on. It is not difficult t o un der sta nd why propo sals for U.S. dis engage ment
fell on dea f ears. But thi s is a diffe rent time, and we have, I think , new and r
more sensibl e lenses thro ugh which to view the war.
The old rati ona les abou t nat ion s fall ing like dom inoes to communism and our
own nati on fall ing into the pit of McCarth.vism no longer can stan d close
scru tiny. Ex trem ists looking for scape goats will try to make troubl e, but every
indi cati on is th at the Americ an people wan t out of thi s war. Nor should U.S.
wit hdr aw al from Vietna m p resag e a ret ur n to p opu lar isolatio nism. If Continuing
comm itmen ts elsewhe re in the w orld ar e hones tly explai ned and seem r eason able
to the Americ an people, t hey have a prove n recor d o f bein g w illing to b ear in te r­
nat ion al burden s. As f or the fat e of Vietn am being cent ral to the credi bility and
successes of all U.S. foreig n policy, as Pre sid ent Nixon has suggested so often,
thi s is an improb able proposit ion. Wh at wisdom is ther e th at causes Pre sid ent
Nixon to link the “dign ity of the office of the Presi denc y” to the fat e of the
Saigon forces ? Who still believes th at any of our allie s expect us to fight in­
defin itely ? How many of our alli es were worrie d enough abo ut the fat e of
 Vietnam to make a meaningful contribution to its defense? If anything, the
domino theory may now be tru e in reverse. T hat is, i f we continue the war, this
act alone might jeopardize the growing pursu it of common inter ests between
Washington and Peking and Moscow and might undermine American political
support for a continuing U.S. security role in the world.
It would be bette r to find some magic diplomatic formula tha t could reconcile
all partie s in a free and democratic process. But the pursu it of such a magic
formula in the Vietnam civil war is a dangerous illusion. No civil war has been
settled by political compromise. Even Preside nt Nixon’s generous terms when
measured by the stan dard of nation-to-nation negotiations cannot resolve the
hatre ds and stakes of a civil war. Civil warri ng partie s will not risk their lives
and their life-long aspira tions in the throw of some electoral dice. Elections re­
quire trus t and a common loyalty. These ar e precisely the i ngredients which ar e
missing in a civil war.
At this point in his tory, the issue of moral ity as between the Hanoi and Saigon
regimes is not a clear-cut matter . The refugees are fleeing South, not North.
But when they get South, they develop no loyalty to Saigon. It is not easy
now to declaim w hether Hanoi or Saigon is right about who should rule South
Vietnam. But I do believe tha t the United S tates is not the keeper of Vietnamese
morality and tha t it is w’rong for the United States to p erpetua te this war.
The Pentagon Pai>ers, the matt er specifically before this Committee, tell the
story of how the executive branch of our government perpetua ted the Vietnam
war. They do n ot tell us about the role of the Congress, the news media, the polit­
ical cl imate in our country and our values, or the reactions of other nations. Nor
do the Pentagon Papers answer the question of what kind of nation are we—
the question which I posed at the beginning of this presentation. We may well
have this a nswer in t he coming weeks.
The only way, in my judgment, to resolve the Vietnam dilemma is for the
United States to set a date certain fo r th e complete with drawa l of our land, sea,
and air forces in retur n for our prisoners of w ar. We must also stand ready to
provide refuge for those desiring to leave South Vietnam. This is not a good
alternat ive. There are costs t ha t we cannot run away from. B ut i t is be tter than
persisting in an endless, hopeless, and tragi c war.
The Chairman. Tha nk you, I )r. Gelb. I can assure you it is only
a coincidence tha t you were scheduled for this very morning, but I
thin k wh at you have ha d to say could not have been more app ropri ate
to the circumstances with which we are confronted today.
We have Profe ssor Thomson who has arrived . I thin k perha ps so
tha t we can question both of you, would you sit where you are, Dr.
Gelb, and, Mr. Thomson, would you come up and give your statem ent ?
Then we will proceed to questions.
While he is se ttling down, Dr. Gelb, the re is one question that keeps
recur ring there : You assert so positively, and I agree, tha t this is a
civil war. Th at is a basic assumption th at the Government of the
United States has neve r accepted. The y have always rejected the idea
that this is a civil war. I believe we will pursue that later.
Profess or Thomson, we are very g lad t o have you th is morning.
STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR JAMES C. THOMSON, JR ., HARVA RD
UNI VER SITY
Mr. T homson. Mr. Chairman , I am very glad to be here. I thin k
you will find a certain overlap between my thoug hts and those of my
friend and colleague, Mr. Gelb.
I am very grate ful to testify here before your distinguish ed com­
mittee, sir. on the orig ins and the lessons of the Ind ochina war. I must
add. however, tha t I am frank ly astounded to be doing so while th at
war continues in yet a new phase of escalated American involvement in
 14
th is fif th mo nth of t he y ea r 1972. H ad I been tol d, as a St at e D ep ar t­
me nt official 10 yea rs ago o r as a Na tio na l Se cu rit y Cou ncil s taff me m­
be r 7 ye ars ago, th at th e Un ite d St ate s wou ld sti ll be a A ietn am wa r
par ti ci pa nt i n 1972, I wou ld hav e b een u tte rly in cre dul ous . M ost of my
coll eagu es wou ld hav e been equ ally disb elie ving .
All of us— pol icy ma ker s, leg isl ato rs, an d citi zen s alik e— hav e been
exp ose d by now to more da ta , doc ume nts, ex ho rta tio ns , an d pr ea ch ­
me nts abo ut th is wa r th an on an y oth er unr esol ved cri sis in ou r his ­
to ry . Le t me tr y, th ere fo re , to sum ma riz e very brie fly my own views
on th e m at te r.
SU M M A R Y OF W IT N E S S ’ V IE W S ON U .S . IN V O LV EM EN T

One , Am eri can pa rti ci pa tio n in Vie tna m ho sti lit ies is a ste p th at
cou ld hav e an d sho uld hav e been avo ided . Once beg un, it sho uld an d
cou ld hav e been end ed at sev eral jun ctu res . To day , th is week, is only
th e m ost rece nt o f such jun ctu res .
Two , th e Vie tna m reg ion , an A sia n c oloni al ap pe nd ag e, w as a reg ion
gove rne d so b adl y by its F re nc h colo nial ru ler s fro m th e l at e 19th cen ­
tu ry th ro ug h 1940 th at Vie tnam ese na tio na lis m an d Vie tna me se com­
mu nism la rg ely coalesc ed d ur in g th e s tru gg le ag ain st firs t F ra nc e, t he n
Ja pa n, an d the n Fr an ce ag ain . As a res ul t of such coalescen ce, such
fus ion , th e lea de rsh ip of th e Vie tna me se rev olu tio n fo r ind epe nde nce
an d na tio nh oo d had lar ge ly fa lle n un de r th e co ntr ol of lon g-i nd ige ­
nous Vie tnam ese Co mm uni sts b y th e m id- an d la te-1 940 ’s. IIo Chi M inh
was the Geo rge W ash ing ton of Vi etn am , wh ate ve r we ma y th in k of
his pol itic s, th ou gh , lik e Geo rge W as hi ng to n, he ha d to str ug gl e
ag ain st loy ali st pr o- Eu ro pe an e lem ents wi th in th e bu rea uc rac y, arm y
an d i nte lli ge nt sia .
Th ree , Vi etn am was, fu rt her a colo nial reg ion in whi ch th e Fr en ch
so d ela yed an d bungled t he o pp or tu ni tie s fo r post-19 45 gr ac efu l w ith ­
dr aw al th at t he y were ev en tua lly fo rce d o ut by II o Ch i Min h a nd Ge n­
era l Gi ap in 1954 u nd er f ai rl y ign om ini ous c ircu mst anc es. Mo reov er—
a sad ly im po rta nt po in t fo r ou r na tio n—t he y were for ced out at a
tim e whe n the Un ite d St ate s ha d been sud den ly tra um at iz ed by the
cold w ar in Eu rop e, th e so-c alle d loss of Ch ina an d th en th e Ko rea n
war .
A fo ur th p o in t: Ag ains t th is ba ck dro p, Am eri ca' s pro gre ssiv e in ­
vol vem ent wen t th ro ug h sev era l ver y sep ara te stag es. F ir st W as hi ng ­
ton acqu iesce d in th e Fr en ch r et ur n to In do ch in a an d t he n fina nced the
Fr en ch w ar th ere la rg ely f or re aso ns t h at ha d no th in g a t a ll to do w ith
As ia, bu t, ra th er , a s M r. Ac.heson an d oth ers have r eve aled , as t he pr ice
req uir ed to win Fr en ch pa rti ci pa tio n in We st Eu ro pe an defe nse a r­
ran gem ent s. Bv 1951 t h at pri ce to taled n ea rly $4 bil lion . B ut w ith t he
Com mu nis t vic tor y in Ch ina , W as hi ng to n dev elop ed a secon d ra ti on ­
ale, nam ely , resista nce to wh at was wr on gly per ceiv ed as mo nolith ic
in te rn at io na l com mun ism— Pe ki ng an d Ha no i as mere cre atio ns an d
pu pp et s of Moscow. Suc h a fa lse p erc ept ion was inte nsif ied by the o ut ­
br ea k of the Ko rea n wa r and C hi na ’s eve ntu al en try int o th at wa r as
Ge ne ral M ac A rth ur m arc hed t o t he Y alu Ri ve r an d th e Chin ese fr on ­
tie r. Fr om th is poi nt on. W as hi ng to n saw Ch ine se- dir ect ed com mun ism
sp ill in g ou t all over As ia, an d Vi etn am becam e merely one br eak in
the dik e.
 15
A fifth po in t: lienee , Washi ngton ’s fur the r blunde r of disasso­
ciating the Unit ed States from the 1954 Geneva Accords and gra d­
ually moving in to replace the French and help upset those accords,
all on the false assumption of communism’s monolithic natu re and
China ’s e xpansionist aims. We took such moves despite the pate ntly
special n ature and force of Vietnamese nati onal communism, a gra d­
ually esc alating commitment on our p art to an historica l, political, and
logistical swamp t ha t any grea t power should have known enough to
avoid.
V A sixth general po in t: Hence, furt her, the compounding of these
initia l blunders throu gh escalatory interven tion by two Adm inist ra­
tions in an unfinished Vietnamese civil war from 1961 onward, while
prete nding a ll along tha t it was not a civil war. In conjunction with
v these moves, po licymakers sought to explain such involvement to the
American people by developing a public description of what was a t
stake in Vietnam tha t bore little relevance to realit y but created, de
facto, a new re ality throu gh what one mig ht call rhetorical esc alatio n;
in other words, Vietnam became of supreme importance largely be­
cause we said it was of supreme importanc e.
A final po in t: None of this , I would add, was the re sult of crimin al
or malevolent men, eith er in Washing ton or necessarily in Southeast
Asia. Most of it was t he result of ignorance, shortsightedness, fear,
frus trat ion, and fatigue , and the like, thou gh ignorance, sho rtsigh ted­
ness, fear, fru strat ion, and fatigu e can, in fact, lead to and have lead to
criminal consequences.
R E JO IN D E R OF S U F F E R IN G I F U N IT E D ST AT ES H A D N O T IN TE R V E N ED

Let me deal at once •with one obvious rejoind er to the preceding cap-
sulized account. Viet nam obviously confron ted American policymak­
ers with a sit uation where, if Washing ton had not intervened, a good
many innocent anti-Communists would have suffered in the course of
civil wa r and revolution. But even if i t were arg ued th at we should be
in the business of rescuing oppressed peoples from thei r compatrio ts
on a worldwide basis—a dubious proposition , I would suggest—I
would say tha t infinitely more suffering has been inflicted and con-
* tinues to be inflicted today on people in both Vietnams and in Laos
and Cambodia by our interven tion than would have occurred if we
had n’t intervened. Those who have warne d for years of the i mpendin g
bloodbath must face the grim reality of the daily bloodbath we have
* imposed on Indochina . Here, indeed, is one of the most strik ing cases
in modern histor y of a cure far worse than the disease.
R E JO IN D E R OF DO M IN O T H EO R Y

As f or tha t other recurr ent rejoinder, the so-called domino theor y,

such s implistic formulat ions are m ainly a cover for sloppy thinki ng.
As anyone who knows tha t nati on’s tort ured histo ry must see, Vietnam
is a special and peculiar mix of ing redients—unique, not general, and
certainly not a “test case.” Wha t happens th ere tells us not hing very
useful about the futu re anywhere else. Moreover, the consequences of
Communist success there must therefor e be examined with special care
and precision; and such examin ation indicates t ha t i t would not have
 16
ramifications of real significance beyond the three Indochi na states
already affected, except, of course, f or the commonplace of what one
might call the “ripp le” effect—which is a far c ry from the vision of
falli ng dominoes.
I am convinced, however, t ha t dominoism does contai n one impo r­
tan t kernel of rea lity ; for as I review the reco rd of our In dochina i n­
volvement, I detect—as Daniel Ellsb erg has put it—one crucial
domino, a nd perhaps the only one, tha t seems t o have obsessed each
American Presid ent since Air. Trum an, namely, the Admin istrati on
in power in Washington. By this I mean th at each Pres iden t has
sensed a lesson from the Democrats’ so-called loss o f China in 1949
and their defeat at the polls in 1952, and has concluded th at the loss
of S outh Vietnam to Communism will brin g about hi s own Ad minis­
trat ion ’s downfall a t the next general election.
AL TER NA TIV ES OFFE RED AT EVE RT STAGE

One has hea rd from men in high positions at each stage of this con­
vulsive trage dy tha t no constructive altern ative to escalation was
offered o r available. The fact of the m atter, however, is t ha t at every
stage alterna tives have been offered, both from inside and outside the
Government. All of them were allegedly u npalat able a t the time since
they all r an the risk of a Communist takeover in So uth Vietnam . Yet
all of them were proved progressively more palatabl e in retrospect
once the oppor tunity was missed. There were thing s we could and
should have done a year ago, 2 year s ago, 3, 5, 10 years ago, th at are
substan tially hard er to do today, except perhaps tha t the American
people may at last be learn ing. They were proposed at the time and
they were rejected at each stage because the sh ort-term price of doing
them seemed infinitely highe r than the short-ter m price of no t doing
them and continui ng instead on the same course. But the long-term
price of no t doing them t urn s out, of course, to be compounded daily
and even hour ly.
AD MI SS ION OF ERROR AND FA IL UR E RECO MME NDE D

How, now, can we end the Indochin a war ?

In my view, the answer is f airl y si mple: by try ing the one th ing we
have not tri ed—hone sty; specifically, by having the greatness to a dmit
national error, the i ntelligence to act on th at admission, and the com­
passion to do it quickly.
To put the matt er bluntly, in some wa rs there is simply no subs ti­
tute for failure. It is hig h tim e to face the long evident tr ut h t ha t our
South Vietnamese clients are the lo sing faction of a revol utionary civil
war, could not have lasted the past decade witho ut us, a nd tod ay will
not last a week wit hout our constant aerial and naval bombardment
of th eir adversaries and thei r own people. There may be way-stations,
even fair ly endu ring ones, to the ultim ate outcome of Communist
domination in the south—for instance, a coalition government. But
a cold calculation of Vietnamese interests, as well as ours, s hould p er­
suade us to acquiesce in th at ultima te outcome, if necessary.
Wh at we so desperately have needed is something no P resid ent has
had the courage to face and to tell the American people—th at Viet-
 17

nam was los t to Vie tna me se na tio na l com mu nism ma ny ye ars ag o by

th e Fr en ch , by Am eri can s, bu t mo stly by Vi etn am ese ; th a t no th in g
sh or t of pe rp et ua l w ar m ig ht ret rie ve th a t loss (a nd at w ha t c o s t! ) ;
th a t th e loss doe sn’t m at te r in ter ms of Am eri ca n sec uri ty in ter es ts
an d ind eed ha s ne ve r m at te re d ; an d th a t an adm ission of er ro r an d
fa ilu re th at br in gs peac e to a sh at te re d reg ion is fa r fro m “n atio na l
hu m ili at io n, ” as Mr. Ni xon once cal led it, b ut is, ra th er , th e fir st ste p
to w ar d na tio na l reg en era tio n, an ac t o f tr ue n atio na l cou rage .
W ha t wou ld be th e re su lts of s uch a mes sage fro m th e Pr es ide nc y ?

WARNIN GS OF RIG HTW ING BACKLASH AND NEOISOL ATIONISM

We ha ve been w arn ed f or as l on g a s I ser ved in go ve rnm en t a nd now

by t hos e in th e pr es en t ad m in ist ra tio n, o f th e righ tw in g bac kla sh, t he
new los s-o f-C hin a wi tch hu nt th at wo uld foll ow such a move. We
hav e been wa rn ed of t he h ea dlo ng fl ig ht i nt o iso lati oni sm o r neo iso la­
tio nis m th at wo uld ens ure . A re the se rea l d an ge rs ?
Th e firs t, a bac kla sh, seems pro ba ble in some fo rm in th e wake of
vi rt ua ll y an y outc ome sh or t of vic tor y. I t i s sim ply a fa ct o f lif e, th e
ine sca pab le p ric e o pen soc ieties mu st pa y fo r r ig ht in g a m aj or an d pr o­
lon ged wro ng. B ut it is also ve ry cle arl y con tai na ble in th e pr ese nt
ins tan ce, th an ks lar ge ly to th e ov erw he lm ing ag en da of th in gs to be
don e a t h ome a nd e lsew here in th e w orl d, th an ks als o to th e m edia th at
ha ve br ou gh t th is wa r's in sa ni ty int o ev ery liv ing roo m, t ha nk s, ho pe ­
fu lly , as well, to eff ectiv e ex ecu tive lea de rsh ip.
As f or th e s econd d an ge r, i sol atio nis m, it s eems to me h ig hl y im pr ob ­
able . We hav e been overin ves ted , ove rco mm itte d, overe xte nd ed in
pa rt s of th e wo rld , an d pa rt ic ul ar ly in E as t As ia, ove r th e pa st 20
y e a rs ; i nde ed, th e so-c alle d Nix on do ctr ine wise ly ack now ledg es th a t
fac t. B ut disi nv est me nt in one ar ea a nd p ull ba ck in A sia ca nno t in th is
da y an d age me an an yt hi ng li ke w ha t t hos e who gre w up i n th e 1920’s
an d 1930’s so much fe ar. W e a re s im ply too gl ob all y i nvo lve d—t hr ou gh
com mu nic atio ns, tec hnolo gy, tr ad e, tr av el , ec onom ic in ves tm en t, di pl o­
ma cy an d, of cour se, ou r spe cial sta tu s as a nu cle ar pow er—to re tu rn
to an yt hi ng rese mb lin g th e d rea m o f F or tre ss Am eric a.

WHA T OFFERED FORMULA CAN DO

Thi s is no t to sug ges t th a t th e fo rm ul a I offer he re wi ll ha ve easy

consequenc es, fo r th er e is, of cours e, no easy way ou t of ou r pr es en t
So ut he as t A sia n cris is. B ut i t can, u nd er t he r ig ht le ad ers hip , m ove us
gr ad ua lly to w ar d som eth ing new an d so me thi ng pre cio us— a te m pe r­
in g of o ur n at io na l gr an di os ity , an end t o ou r spe cia l sense of be nev o­
lenc e as a na tio n, a n eros ion o f t he u gly q ua lit ie s t h a t acc om pan y s uch
overw ean ing c onfide nce, in clu din g excess ive fe ar of loss or fa ilu re . I t
can l ead , in tim e, to wa rd a new na tio na l m at ur it y, a sense th at w e a re
on ly one o f m an y an d t h a t we ca nn ot t ra ns fo rm th e w orl d by ours elve s.
A nd it ca n l ea d in th e proce ss, to a new deg ree o f can do r in ou r go v­
ern m en t’s rela tio ns wi th it s ow n cit izen s a nd a n ew d egr ee o f r esp ect by
th e citi zen s fo r th ei r gov ern me nt. W e ca n t he re by be gin to clea nse o ur ­
selve s of th e w ar ’s mo st de bi lit at in g poi son —coll ecti ve dec ept ion an d
na tio na l se lf-d ece pti on.
 IS

CREATING COMMISSION TO REFLECT ON WAR RECOMMENDED

I believ e th at one gr ea t ste p tow ard such he alt h, Mr . Ch air ma n,

woul d be th e cre ati on o f a blu e-ri bbo n, b ip ar tis an n ati on al comm ission
to reflec t upo n th is qu art er- ce ntu ry tra ge dy an d to dis til l its lessons
fo r th e f utu re . I hav e in mi nd t he cre ati on by th e Pr es id en t or, if neces ­
sar y, bv th e Cong ress, of a na tio na l c omm ission on the causes , co ndu ct,
an d conseque nces of the Ind oc hin a war . Suc h a pro posal is no t new,
bu t it does seem to me m ore im pe rat ive t ha n eve r th at we m ake eve ry
effort to move from rec rim ina tio n to refle ction an d un de rst an din g. I
wou ld ho pe t ha t suc h a com missio n wou ld be gi ven access to all a rchi ves
pe rta in in g to the wa r, not mer ely the Pe nt ag on stu dy bu t all oth ers
as well, and woul d tak e tes tim ony fro m eve ry level of pa rti ci pa nt .
I woul d sugg est th at it be giv en a sub sta nti al per iod of tim e fo r its
un de rta kin g—p erh ap s 2 or 3 ye ars —an d I wo uld hope th at its ul tim ate
fu nd ing s m igh t no t m erel y poi nt the f inge r of g ui lt, wh ere ap pr op ria te ,
at all levels of th e dec isio nm aking an d wa r-w ag ing p roce ss but, mi gh t
also recom mend a ge ner al amn esty fo r all —fo r Pr es id en ts, th ei r civ il­
ian adv iser s and th ei r m ili ta ry officials fro m ge ne ral s dow n th ro ug h
the ran ks, and also fo r those whose co nscience s ca used the m to choose
jai l or to flee th e co un try ra th er t ha n serve in th e Vi etn am war .

pre sid ent ’s MAT 8 STATEMEN T COMPOUNDS TRAGEDY

Mr. Ch air ma n. T liste ned to Pr es id en t Nix on on the tele visi on las t

nig ht, an d I he ar d t rag ed y co mpo unde d.
Fac ed wi th the fa ilu re of so-ca lled Vi etn am iza tio n, th e fa ilu re of
neg otia tion s an d the fa ilu re of rhe tor ica l an d m ili ta ry det err enc e, he
con fro nte d now the p red ict abl e an d t he v ery l on g p red ict ed , a r ene wal
of the Vie tnam ese rev olu tio na ry wa r un de r th e lea de rsh ip of No rth
Ve itn am ’s men wit h a cause , a nd th e i mp en din g co llap se o f w ill am ong
Sou th Vie tnam ese who hav e l itt le o r no cau se. An d wh at ha s h e d one ?
li e has decre ed two vit al U.S . stak es in Vie tna m, th e one en tir ely
phony, an d the o the r u nac hiev able . H e t ell s us th at our 60,000 re sid ua l
Am eric an tro op s are th rea ten ed —an d wh at be tte r way to resolve th e
prob lem , one m igh t ask, th an t o wi th dr aw t hem ? An d he tel ls us th at
the 17 mi llion So uth Viet nam ese are i n da ng er o f b ein g t ak en o ver by
comm unism , a d ist inc t p oss ibil ity and ev entu al pr ob ab ili ty fo r th e p as t
20 ye ars. Fu rth er m or e, he has r eele vat ed th is p iti fu l confl ict t o su pe r­
pow er an d globa l levels o f p ote nti al de str uc tio n b y im pos ing an u nd e­
cla red b lock ade on N or th Vie tna m an d b y mo vin g i nto d ire ct co nfr on ­
tatio n wi th th e Sov iet Un ion . Fi na lly , he does thes e thi ng s, he tel ls
us. b ecause no lon ger is mer ely th e Pr esi de nc y at s take , as h e h ad sai d
last mo nth, b ut ou r ho no r is at stak e. He asks us, in closin g, fo r “the
same s up po rt y ou ha ve alw ays g ive n y our P re sid en t.”
Mr. Ch air ma n, the P re sid en t’s pa th is th e pa th o f n ati on al ins an ity .
The invo catio n of nat ion al honor ove r pa th et ica lly mi sju dge d sta kes
has been tri ed befo re. Th e inv oca tion of su pp or t fo r the Pr esi de nc y
has been tri ed befo re. The consci ous inv oca tion of su per powe r col li­
sion has h ere tof ore been ca ref ull y avoi ded bv pro ud b ut pr ud en t men.
Bu t nat ion al ho no r is not wha t bele agu ered Pr es id en ts define it to be ;
it is gr ea ter and more end uri ng. An d bli nd su pp ort fo r Pr es id en ts is
at the v ery tap ro ot o f ou r co nti nu ing In do ch in a cal am ity . As fo r c on-
 19
scious inv oca tion of su pe rpo we r coll isio n, th at is a cou rse to ta lly un ­
jus tifi ed b y the s take s, by the h ist or y, a nd by t he iss ue its elf .

TWO ES SE NT IA L STE PS TOWARD REA L PEAC E

Once ag ain a Pr es id en t has sta te d th e choic es fal sel y. I f th is Pr es i­

de nt ge nuine ly wa nts peac e, if he ge nu ine ly seeks th e relea se of ou r
pri son ers , if he is ge nu ine ly con cer ned ab ou t ou r GO,000 re m ain in g
tro ops, an d if he ge nu ine ly car es ab ou t the fa te of 17 mi llio n So uth
¥ Vie tna me se, he mu st tak e two lon g ess ent ial ste ps t ow ar d rea l pe ac e:
the fir st, pro posed 6 ye ar s ago by th e lat e Ro be rt Ke nnedy , an offe r
at lon g las t to agr ee to th e fo rm at io n of a co ali tio n go ve rnm en t in
So ut h V ie tn am ; an d th e seco nd, pro posed re pe ate dl y by mem bers of
\ th is Con gre ss, th e cle ar an d fina l se tti ng o f a de ad lin e fo r to ta l w ith ­
dr aw al of all Am eri can for ces fro m In do ch ina .
On ly the n can the peo ple of In do ch in a beg in to be rel iev ed of the
ni gh tm ar e we hav e he lpe d infl ict up on th em ; an d onl y th en can the
peo ple of Am eric a em erg e fro m th ei r own fa r less er nig htm are .
T hat conc lude s my sta tem en t, M r. C ha irm an .
Th e C ha irm an . Th an k y ou v ery muc h, M r. T hom son .

COM ME ND AT ION OF W IT NE SS

I t is a ve ry cle ar s tat em en t o f th e s itu at io n i n w hic h we are in volv ed.

I t is ve ry difficult to kno w wh at to do t o c han ge the P re si de nt ’s pr ese nt
pro posal s. I t is di fficult to know whe re to beg in. Mu ch of w ha t b oth o f
you gentlfemen hav e sai d we hav e discu ssed. Bo th of you br ou gh t it
to ge th er in a ve ry con cise a nd luc id m ann er.

COLLE CTIVE IN CA PA BI LI TY OF CO NF ES SIN G ERROR

I t ha s alw ays puz zle d me wh y a com mu nit y such as th e U ni te d

St at es is i nca pab le of a co nfes sion o f er ro r, wh ere as, eve ryo ne m ak in g
up th at com mu nity is no t at all re lu ct an t to c onfe ss er ro r. I t is a p sy ­
cho logi cal pro blem th at co mp lete ly baffles me.
As sch olars, why is th at ? Ca n you offe r an ex pl an at io n of wh y col­
lec tiv ely we seem i nca pab le o f it ?
Mr. T homso n. I wou ld ha ve to ha ve de ep er in si gh t int o th e Am er ­
ica n na tio na l ch ar ac te r to giv e you an an sw er to th at .
I t hi nk as peo ple we ar e fa ir ly muc h like o th er n ati on s, bu t I t hi nk
th at in ou r sel f-im age a s a na tio n, am ong n ati on s, we a re no t li ke ot he r
nat ion s. We ha ve fro m th e be gi nn in g of tim e, ha d a sense of o ur ow n
spec ial mis sion , ou r own sp ecial be nevo lence —“ a ci ty b ui lt up on a h ill ,”
as o ne fac tio n wou ld call it, fr om t he ea rli es t d ays , o r as Je ffe rso n h im ­
sel f sa id, a “ rev olu tio n i nte nd ed f or all m an ki nd .”
Now, th is gets you fa ir ly up -ti gl it in te rm s of e xte rn al loo k an d be­
ha vio r. We hav e wh at th e Chi nes e wou ld call an excessi ve sense of
face.
Th e C ha irm an . Thi s isn ’t pe cu lia r to us. T he Ch inese h ad t ha t same
th ou gh t an d sti ll ha ve it : do n’t t he y? Th ey w ere the M idd le Ki ng do m
an d all th e res t were ba rb ar ia ns . I t i s not pe cu lia r th at we th in k well
of ours elve s. Ne arl y all na tio ns , esp ecia lly po we rfu l na tio ns , ha ve ;
ha ve n’t th ey ?
 20

Mr. T homs on . We are a l ot yo un ge r a nd th ey h ave be en in the busi ­

ness f or a lon ge r tim e.
Th e C ha irm an . Mr . Gelb ?
Mr. G f.lb. Mr. Ch air ma n, I hav e a sli gh tly di ffe ren t sl an t on thi s
an sw er t ha n my colle ague , M r. T hom son .
I th in k th e reas on wh y ou r lea der s h ave n ot a dm itt ed e rr or on V iet-
nam is becau se the y th in k the y ar e rig ht . I do n’t belie ve fo r one mo­
me nt th at Pr es id en t Nix on is b ein g a po lit ica l op po rtun is t ab ou t th is
wa r. I th in k, m uch more da ngero usl y, he belie ves in w ha t he is d oing .
H e re ally sees th a t t he f all o f V iet na m will l ead to th e c olla pse of U.S .
fo re ig n pol icy ab roa d, th e un de rm in ing of po lit ica l su pp or t of th at
pol icy at home. Wh en he says th a t it wou ld be eas ier fo r him to an ­
nou nce wi th dr aw al, I th in k he is sho win g a rec og nit ion of th e fa ct
th at m ost A me ric ans want him to wi th dr aw , b ut he is a ss er tin g h is own
ju dg m en t a bou t the “v ita lne ss” o f V iet na m ag ain st, I th in k, th e w ill of
ma ny Mem bers o f Con gres s a nd t he m aj or ity o f t he A me ric an people.
NO CONSULTATION W IT H SENATE ABOUT PRESI DENT ’S DECISION

Th e C hai rm an . I t is r at he r c urio us. In th is ins tan ce y es ter da y, so f a r

as I kno w, n o m ember o f th e Se na te was c onsul ted in an y r esp ect ab out
th e pr es id en t’s deci sion. I ca n’t sp ea k fo r the Hou se. We were t ol d of
it at 8 :00 o’clock l as t ni gh t in a ve ry b rie f sta teme nt j us t pr io r to his
ann oun cem ent . I t is a ve ry un us ua l wa y fo r a co un try wh ich pr o­
fesses to be a d emo crac y to co nduct its aff airs .
Th ere is s till th e puz zle of w ha t to do ab out it becau se ev ery evidence
th a t has come to my at te nt io n is th a t the Am eri can peo ple feel thi s
ou gh t to be ter m in ate d an d te rm in at ed soon.

PURPOSE OF COMMISSION

Mr. Tho ms on, yo u d on ’t mean y ou r i dea of a c omm issio n t h at wo uld

stu dy 2 o r 3 y ea rs as a co nt rib ut io n to th e en din g of th e w a r; do y ou ?
I t is to overc ome th e alle ged evil effects of the en din g of th e wa r, I
assum e ?
Mr. T homso n. T hat is cor rec t, to tr y to de fuse th e issue an d t o d raw
lesson s f rom t he issue.
Th e C hai rm an . I t c oul d n ot co ntr ibu te------
Mr. T homson . I t c ould n ot co nt rib ut e to an en din g of th e wa r—u n­
less th e w ar is sti ll go ing o n 5 y ea rs fro m n ow, in wni ch case its f ind­
ing s m ig ht hel p. I tr us t we w on’t be in th at s itu ati on .

DIFFIC ULTY OF ADJ UST ING TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES

Th e C ha irm an . Of cours e, th e occ urre nce s of las t ni gh t hav e ob­

vio usl y up set a ll of us, I s upp ose, a nd o ur id eas o f how th is c om mit tee
stu dy was to proce ed. It is a lit tle diffic ult fo r me to ad ju st to thes e
new c ircu ms tan ces so qui ckly . Al l of us are st ru gg lin g, i nc lu din g my ­
sel f. an d ot he r mem bers o f the Sen ate . W e hav e ha d two o r t hr ee c au­
cuses w ith in the l as t few day s, an d th er e is an ot he r o ne fo r t hi s af te r­
noo n, t o c onsid er t hi s v ery que stio n of w ha t can be done to p ers ua de our
ad m in is trat io n to move in a dif fer en t dir ect ion . In view o f the speec h
la st ni gh t, I sup pose , I can th in k o f n ot hi ng to do.
 21
VALUE OF PROPOSED WITHDRAW AL COUPLED W ITH CEASEFIRE

Do eit her of you gentlemen have any suggestion, u nder presen t ci r­

cumstances, of what might contribute to a signific ant move ? Do you
feel the re is an y value whatever in the proposal, which he seemed to
make, of a withd rawal in 4 months coupled with a ceasefire? The
ceasefire has always been unacceptable to t he Vietnamese. Both of you
have studied thi s mat ter at great lengt h.
It has been my un dersta nding , in view of th eir experience, p articu-
v larly in 1954 at Geneva, tha t the y will not accept a milit ary ceasefire
and will no t stop the mi litar y activities p rio r to a political agreement
on the futu re of Vietnam.
Do you agree with th at or not, or would you discuss that?
V Mr. Gelb. Th at accords with my judgment, Mr. Ch airman.
I thin k every indica tion we have from the past is tha t the lead ers in
Hanoi re gard a ceasefire as an indicatio n th at the y have achieved their
goals rath er th an as a means of achieving th eir goals. There are several
reasons which they have presented for op position to a ceasefire. One is
tha t in th e area of a ceasefire where Saig on forces have control, the ir
cadres, the ir s upporte rs, would come unde r grave thr eat from t he S ai­
gon Government.
Second, they don't want to lose the milit ary initia tive tha t comes
from an offensive. A nd, finally, and most i mpor tantly in the curren t
context, from t hei r poi nt of view they see Saigon forces as unrave ling ;
and to declare or accept a ceasefire at this point in time would run
again st the ir m ilita ry interests in tha t reg ard.
RESPO NSIBI LITY OF CONGRESS BETWEE N NOW AND ELECTION

You made an other point, Mr. Cha irman, t ha t I would like briefly to
respond to. I am und er no illusio n th at Presid ent Nixon would accept
the kin d of propo sals th at J im Thomson and I have been talkin g about
this morning and the members of th e Senate h ave been talk ing about
for years. He wouldn’t; he will persist in t his course. I f there is any
chance of ending this before the next election, I think it can only be
ended here in the Congress. Congressmen and Senators have f or years,
M in my judgment , hidden behind the Presi dent on the Vietnam war.
They go along wi th wh atever he was saying an d doing. He knew bes t;
he h ad all of t he facts. If i t went wrong, it would be his fault. Bu t I
thin k as in many occasions in th e past, if the w ar continues, i t will be
* as much the responsi bility of Congressmen and Senators who did not
oppose the Pres iden t as it is the responsibility of the Pres ident.
Mr. T homson. I would hea rtily endorse what Mr. Gelb just said, Mr.
Chairman. The Pr eside nt asked us las t nigh t to su pport the Pre sident.
I thin k a high er oblig ation is to s uppor t the well-being of the co untry,
and here the people can h elp, but the Congress has the majo r responsi ­
bility between now an d election day.
ACCEPT ABILITY OF CEASEFIRE TO HA NO I SECONDARY

Mr. Gelb. One f urt he r poi nt on ceasefire, sir : One can’t be categori­
cal about what Hanoi will do or will not do. We can ’t g et inside th eir
minds and we know very little about how they operate, what the ir
 22
politic al processes are. It is possible t hat if in th e course of the next
few weeks North Vietnamese forces captur ed Hue, and Kontum, a
ceasefire m ight be acceptable to the m; we can't know. But the thin g
th at concerns me very deeply is tha t ceasefire is anothe r one of those
reeds, a nother one of those straws, tha t reasonable men in this coun­
try —reasonable men grasp at to say, “Let ’s go a little longer; let’s
see if the P residen t can do it this time.” I don ’t th ink we should hing e
our involvement in thi s war or a lack of interest in this war—our more
imp orta nt interests are elsewhere—on whe ther or not Hanoi is goin g
to accept a ceasefire. Th at has got to be a second ma tter to a definition *
of where our own interests really lie.
AREA OF AP PL IC AT IO N OF PROPOSED WI TH DR AW AL
J/
Mr. T homson. I would add tha t Mr. Nixon's exit afte r 4 months
applies, according t o his language, only to Vietnam. He did not say
withdr awal of forces from Indochina. l ie said from Vietnam.
Mr. Gelb. I think he did say from Indochina.
Mr. T homson. My impression is to the contr ary, but we can check
it out.
The Chairman. I th ink it was; he said Vietnam. I don’t believe he
said Indochina, but we can check that .
FAVORABLE RE PL Y FRO M HA NO I NO T LI KE LY

Do eithe r of you think tha t the offer o f a milit ary ceasefire and
retu rn of our POW ’s in retu rn for withdra wal of 4 months is likely
to be received favorably? You do not thin k th at this is likely to induce
a favorable reply from Hanoi ?
Mr. Gelb. Jud gin g from the ir responses to similar kinds of offers
in the past, I would say no.
PO SS IB ILI TY OF UN IT ED STATES AND RU SS IAN AG REE ME NT

The Chairman. Wh at would be your response to the thou ght tha t

the speech is a genuine offer to get out in 4 months, if the Russians will
intercede to spare them, we will say, what can be called a defeat or
a humiliati on? Is t here any lan guage and is th ere a nythi ng to suggest «r
to you tha t the re has been some kin d of agreement between ou r Gov­
ernmen t and the Russians with regard to that ?
Mr. G elb. I would say there is an indication th at there is no agree­
ment. At the conclusion of Presid ent Nixon’s speech last night , he *
issued a direct warnin g to the Soviet Union and ha d H enry Kissinger
in his most recent secret tri p to Moscow been able to gain Russian
acquiescence or passiveness in tha t policy. I don’t thin k th e Presid ent
would have gone so fa r o ut of his way to try to put the Soviet Unio n
in th e v ery box, p rio r to this summit meeting, which he h imself says
he would never tolerate . He is ask ing them to accept the humiliat ion
which he believes that the Unite d States never could.
DI ST IN CT IO N CO NC ER NIN G ST OP PIN G ACTS OF FORCE AND WI TH DR AW AL

The C hairman. F or the record, accordin g to the morning p aper, his

wording was: “and once the intern ationa lly supervised ceasefire has
begun, we will stop all acts of force throu ghout Indochina.
 23
“At tha t time we will proceed with a complete w ithdra wal of all
American forces from Vietnam wi thin 4 months.”
So there is a distinctio n here. H e will stop the acts of force, which,
I assume, will include the bombing in La os and it does not say w ith­
draw our forces. Perh aps it is on the basis th at we have no Americans
other than the very few advisers in Cambodia and those who super ­
vise or tra in and look af ter the a rmy in Laos. I don’t know wh at the
curre nt figures are. A t one time we had about 1,000 in Laos sort of giv­
ing logistic suppor t and directio n to the Vang Pao army.
QU ES TIO N OF AG RE EM EN T OR AC QU IES CE NC E FRO M MOSCOW ILL USO RY

Mr. G elb. Mr. C hairma n, ju st one fur the r word on this.

The C hairman. Yes.
Mr. Gelb. Your question about whether Pres ident Nixon has any
agreement or acquiescence from Moscow in this curre nt war—this is
again one of those reeds and str aws t ha t one hears ban died about, p ar­
ticul arly in this city of W ashingt on, to give the Presi dent more time.
“He mus t have something up his sleeve. He must have an ace up th er e;
he is going to play it. Let ’s n ot criticiz e; let’s give him a few more
months to play th at ace.” There has never been such an ace be fore ; it
is anothe r one of those illusions th at make us persis t in this war.
EN COU RAG ING DIS ASS OCI ATI ON FRO M ACT ION S W IT H IN AD MI NI ST RA TIO N
SUGGESTE D

Mr. T homson. Mr. Chairma n, you asked what could be done, and we
tossed the ball back int o the laps of th e Congress. I do have one fur the r
suggestion.
The Chairman. I was go ing to come back to tha t, but go ahead.
Wh at is it?
Mr. T homson. And I propose it with some h esitation, as one who
tarr ied in government for a c onsiderable period of t ime afte r escala­
tion in the belief tha t if one stayed in government one could keep
worse thing s from happenin g.
My suggestion is t hat an e ffort be made, since this feels very much
like a one-man decision, to encourage men o f conscience within this
Admin istrati on to dep art from the Admin istrati on as would happen
in any parli ame ntary government elsewhere, to break ranks, to leave
the government, to give th eir message to the people. I thi nk tha t with
this kind of disassociation of men of conscience from actions of this
sort could to some degree act as a brake against a besieged Presiden t. I t
could have other effects as well, and tha t is why I propose it with some
trepi datio n—also because so many of us did not do it in the pas t; but
perhaps current incumbents should learn from the past.
The Chairman. Isn 't tha t practice much more common in a par lia ­
mentary system than in our system? The people in impo rtant posi­
tions in th e par liame ntary system are usually men with politic al power
of thei r own, t ha t is, members of the House of Lo rds ; whereas, it is
not true under our Government. The much more impo rtant relat ion­
ship t here is tha t the House of Commons can do something abo ut a nv
government.
 24
W HA T CONGRESS CAN DO

I was going to come back to what t he Congress can do.

We have, as yon know, pend ing the so-called Case-Church amend­
ment which is very similar to the McGovern-IIatfiel d amendment,
and the motion by the Senator from Mississippi to strike tha t pro­
posal from the pending a uthoriz ation bill. There has been a grea t deal
of discussion about what to do about it. We passed the Mansfield
amendment, to which you referre d, a nd which was wholly ineffective.
The P resid ent simply dismissed it by sa ying it is not his policy and he
would not be governed by it. So you come down to what the Congress
can do. Tt has passed th at amendment which was an expression of
policy. The present amendment says cut off the funds afte r De­
cember 31.
There is very little p robab ility, I would say, of t ha t a ctually being
enacted into law even thoug h the Senate passed it. The bill would
be vetoed, I assume, if th e P resid ent really believed what he said last
nigh t and it would be a miracle if we could get two-th irds of both
Houses for any such proposal as that .
Aren’t we really reduced to an appeal to public opinion and thereby
as a political leader the Pres iden t would respond to it in the near
futur e? Even if we passed such an amendment as you mentioned, an d
it became th e law, i t would be a long time before it took effect. As a
matt er of fact, there are so many arms in t he pipel ine, so much armed
stren gth now deployed in the area tha t as lon g as th e armed forces
obey orders. I don’t know what the Congress can do.
We h ave all thou ght about this a t great length. We have all made
speeches; we voted for various restrict ions. I proposed, an d th ere was
enacted, a restric tion upon the use of foreign troops in Laos. They
have evaded t hat. By calling them volunteers and by semantic trick ­
ery, the restricti ons ar e evaded. They can invent new names for bomb­
ing; thev call i t protective reaction strikes as if the y were something
different. I t is a gre at dilemma to the Congress, although, I am bound
to say th at t he Congress as a whole has not yet, except in the Mansfield
amendment and tha t was a most re luctan t compromise in conference,
evidenced a clear majo rity direct ly contra ry to this or the preceding
Pres iden t’s views. In most of the contests of stre ngth and votes we
have had, those of us who opposed th e war have been on the losing
side by a few votes. We have n ever ha d a cl ear ma jority except in th e
Mansfield a mendment which is only an expression of policy.
I would like to know wha t do you thin k the Congress can do ?W hat
do you recommend that the Congress do ?
Air. Gelb. I would say pass Church-Case. I would expect in the
case t he Congress did, the Pr eside nt would veto the bill in which case
I would again suspect th at your judgm ent is righ t tha t it would be
nearly impossible to get the two-t hirds to override. But I thin k that
act by the Congress, Congress’ expression of its own major ity will,
would be an impor tant political force in the c ountry a nd would br ing
the issue of ending the war down to the next Presid entia l election.
I would h ate to see it go on t ha t long. There is no need fo r it, But if
tha t is the case, then I thin k the central issue of tha t next election
must be whether or not the Unite d States will set a date certain foi
getti ng out of V ietnam, and th at will be th e pub lic’s decision.
 The Chairman. Ts that your view ?
Mr. T homson. I would certainl y endorse what Mr. Gelb says. You
do not stop the killin g in the war, as the Presi dent put it last nigh t,
by c uttin g off arms to only one side. If you genuinely want to stop
the killing, you cut off arms to both sides, and tha t involves cu tting
off a pprop riatio ns on this side if the Presid ent himself will n ot cease
the pipel ine flow.
Tha t is a kind of symmetry th at makes sense, al though obviously
the Presi dent would no t buy it. I t strikes me tha t if, as you say, Mr.
Chairman , public op inion needs to be brough t to bear on this matte r,
public opinion can and should be expressed throug h the Congress in
enacting such le gislation with a degree of urgency tha t never existed
prio r to last n ight.
The Chairman. Th at is the only vehicle, of course, tha t we have
immediately before us, which is the Case-Church amendment, and
whether or not it would be used, I do not know.
EF FE CT OF PR ES ID EN T'S ST AT EM EN T ON PROS PECT S FOR MOSCOW M EE TI NG

Wha t would y our judgm ent be as to the effect of the statement la st

nigh t upon the prospects for the meeting in Moscow to proceed on
schedule ?
Mr. G elb. We are involved in a guessing game here, perha ps, with
less, perhap s with as much knowledge, as the Admin istrati on, but
one calculation, I think , tha t is impo rtant, it will be very difficult,
if not impossible, for the Soviet Union, to mount such force in the
Vietnam thea ter of operations to challenge the quarantin e. If tha t
judgm ent is correct, th e Soviet Union will then have to th ink of other
ways in which it can compensate for this act in order n ot to put itself
in a position of weakness before the summit, a position of weakness
which Presi dent Nixon himself says he cannot tolerate.
I doubt tha t the Soviet Union would stir up crises in the Middle
East and Berlin , but I would no t be su rprised if there were a battle
ragin g in the Kremli n now to call off th e su mmit meeting.
You remember, Mr. Chairma n, tha t back in 1968 when th e Soviet
Union had invaded Czechoslovakia we ha d arms control talks sched­
uled with them. We called those arms control talks off. I t is an int er­
esting p recedent.
The Chairman. D o you have a comment on that, Mr. Thomson?
Mr. T homson. I would be very surprise d if the summit meeting
took place. I thin k one would have to recalculate the Soviet Union ’s
worldwide outlook and interests. I thin k it could only take place if
there were a tit- for -ta t expression on t heir p art between now and the
time of th e summit, which is not a p leasant phenomenon to look f or­
ward to.
EF FEC T OF AN NO UN CE D PROGRAM ON SU PP LI ES TO NO RT H VI ET NA M

The Chairman. Are either of you gentlemen fam iliar with the
problem of logistics and supplies? Do you th ink the announced pro ­
gram will be effective in preven ting substan tial supplies gett ing into
North Vietnam from either China or Russia? Are there any alte rna ­
tive ways ? Wh at do you think about it ?
 26
Mr. Gelb. From my past experience I can make some generaliz a­
tions about it, but they will lack th e certain specificity and currency
obviously.
I would guess th at a qu arantin e not only of Haip hong but also of
all dozen or so major and relatively large ports on the North Viet­
nam east coast could be pr etty well effective. It would be difficult to
get boats of any size, ships of any size, throug h tha t quarantin e.
The Pres ident also announced—tha t does not mean some cannot get
throug h, in smaller cra ft—the Pres ident also announced tha t he lias
authori zed th e bombing of rail links from China.
Now, on the basis of studies tha t were done in the Pentag on in th e
past, it was estimated tha t even if you bombed those links you would
only reduce throug h-pu t from China into North Vietnam by about
50 percent. I have no independent judgme nt on that . I am just rep eat­
ing. Th at means th at if an air strike agains t a r ailway is effective, it
only ta kes the equivalent o f several horn's to fully repa ir or to repa ir
tha t rail link sufficiently to allow trai ns to proceed on it the next
night.
There will be, of course—there are, of course, roads and t rucks and
there are, of course, men and their backs, and the North Vietnamese
have carrie d on under more adverse circumstances than the situation
they are now facing.
It is very d oubtful, in my un tutore d j udgment, t hat th is qua rantin e
can have an effect on the battles immediately in progress in South
Vie tnam ; how much of an effect th e whole campaign tha t Pres ident
Nixon has authorized will have in the coming months remains to be
seen. But I doubt very much tha t it will be sufficient to get North
Vietnam to dro p it s aspi rations in this war.
The C hairman. Do you have any comment on tha t poi nt ?
Air. T homson. No ; t ha t is not an area with which I am famil iar.
SOV IET POW ER TO PE RS UA DE NO RT H VI ET NA M

The Chairman. The implied assumption behind this policy of

blockade would seem to be that the Soviets have the power to persuade
North Vietnam to relent or to behave. F rom your study of the past
and the Penta gon papers, what do you thin k of that ? Is there any
historical evidence tha t North Vietnam can be c ontrolled by advice
from Moscow ?
Mr. G elb. I don’t thin k there is evidence that they can be controlled
by Moscow. I thin k we have learned something ourselves o f about
how difficult it is to control client stat es and we have often fo und ou r­
selves in the position of the ta il wagging the dog. Bu t it is true, so far
as we know, tha t at the 1954 Geneva conference and again in the
Geneva conference on Laos in 1962, th at the Soviet Union and China
did play some p art in getti ng Hanoi to back off. Whet her they could
do the same now, your guess is as good as mine.
The Chairman. There is the fur ther , very difficult question of
whether they would be inclined to use the ir influence even if they
had it. Do you see anyt hing in this proposal tha t would incline the
Russians to use whatever influence they had to accept a cease-fire?
Mr. G elb. I f humiliation is the way to get the Soviet Union to t wist
Han oi’s arms, then Presid ent Nixon’s proposals will be successful.
 27
Mr. T homson. It does strike me, Mr. Chairm an, tha t the North
Vietnamese have demonstra ted for 25 years, going on 28, the ir deter ­
mination to go on with the ir unfinished revolution and unresolved
civil war, nationa l unification and the like, throu gh thick and thin,
periodically bending very slight ly as they did at t he Geneva and Laos
conferences. And because of the ir bendin g at the 1954 Geneva Con­
ference, I migh t add, when they s ettled for hal f a loa f with th e expec­
tatio n of receiving the o ther h alf 2 years la ter, because of their experi­
ence with tha t move, and its unf ortu nate consequences from the ir
to vantage point, I thin k they are much less prone to be pushed around
by th eir allies a ny more tha n they are pushed around by th eir adver­
saries. These are very determined people wit h a stron g sense of mission
and they have proved the ir determ ination and the ir sense of mission
v for a quar ter of a century.
CONDITIONS UNDER W HI CH CH INE SE WOULD INTER VENE

The C hairman. Do you foresee, Mr. Thomson, any conditions under

which the Chinese would intervene in the wa r?
Mr. T homson. It was my experience in government, and I see no
reason to modify our position then, th at th e one trip wire t ha t would
brin g China into a w ar in which it did not want to intervene, where
its presence was not desired by i ts ally, would be any clear and p resent
thr eat to th e regime in Nort h Vietn am. I n o ther words, any sign of an
effort to overthro w and displace th at basically frien dly regime by
a hostile force on Chin a’s borders. So China would come i n only to
protec t Chinese fr onti ers and security.
EFF ECT OF FALL OF KON TUM AND HU E

The Chairman. One last question before I call on my colleagues:

Wha t would you foresee bein g the resul t of the fall of Kontum and
Hue? Do you th ink th at would have a very significant effect upon the
morale and sp irit of the Sout h Vietnamese armies?
Mr. T homson. I myself would thin k the answer was yes. R eports
out of Saigon indicate th at the unfreez ing of Vietnamese politics,
v which have been frozen solid by the heavy American presence, plus
the lid of the Thieu regime, would take place as it becomes more
clear tha t the Thieu regime is in trouble.
There are elements in South Vietnam, as we have always known,
* tha t are neut ralist , anti-T hieu, pro-Communist and the like, many
different kinds of tendencies th at have had to remain very silent during
these years of deep freeze. As they begin to see the wind blowing in a
different direction, they mig ht well emerge and you might even get
some restlessness with in the armed forces of South Vietnam itself
toward th e top.
The Chairman. D o you have an y comment on t ha t before I pass to
my colleagues ?
Mr. Gf.lb. Pres iden t Thieu himself has said tha t H ue and Kontum
are o f criti cal importanc e to the p olitical and m ilita ry v iabili ty of his
country.

83-605 —73------3
 28
DIFFER ENCE IN NEGOTIATIONS IF GENERAL MI N il REPLACED PRESIDENT
TH IE U

The C hairman. Do you thin k if he were replaced by General Minh,

it would make any difference ?
Mr. Gelb. Make any difference in negotiations?
The C hairman. Yes.
Mr. G elb. Quite possibly. The North Vietnamese, as you know, have
insisted, so f ar as we know pu blicly, on the removal only o f Pr esident
Thieu p rior to th e election process. I f they are serious about th at, the
exchange of power from T hieu to Minh could be a removal of a stum ­
bling block.
The C hairman. Sen ator Muskie ?
Senator Muskie. I assume a lot of gr ound has a lready been covered
this morning.
The C hairman. They were very excellent statements, I must say.
Senator Muskie. There are certain key questions I would like to ask,
and I apologize i f th ey d uplicate ground already covered.
RUSSIAN OPTIONS IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDE NT'S INIT IATI VE

Fi rs t of all, what do you see as the Russians’ option in response to the

Pre side nt’s initiat ive ?
Mr. Gelb. Well, I can see a Russian Presid ent Nixon gettin g up an d
saying he ha s three optio ns: immediate unilat eral humil iating ret reat
on the one hand, an all-out nuclear war on the other hand, and the thir d
course of p ersistin g in cold war relations, dropp ing the summit meet­
ing and going back to where we were, as Presid ent Nixon so apt ly p ut
it, to t he dar k ages.
Senator Muskie. W ith respect to the immediate milit ary or naval
problem t ha t the Russians now face—the m ining—what do you see as
the possible tactical options th at the Russians have ?
Mr. G elb. I th ink they have very few, if any, t actica l options in the
thea ter of op erations. The Unite d States mainta ins an enormous con­
ventional force supe riority in the area, sea power, air power, and it is
doubt ful—I could be wr ong a nd I wouldn’t want to risk this kind of
situatio n in the first place—but I think i t is doub tful tha t the Soviet
Union would try to challenge th at milit ary superi ority in Vietnam
itself.
But if I could expand on tha t, Senator Muskie, the thi ng t hat tr ou­
bles me about this is tha t the Presid ent of th e Unite d State s would put
everythi ng at risk. I don ’t know, nor does anyone know, whether it will
work or whe ther it won’t work in the sense of effectively shutting off a
good deal of supplies coming into the cou ntry ; but the point is, he is
willing to risk a SA LT agreement, he is willing to risk growing r ela­
tions with the Chinese, in purs uit of some intere st in Vietnam tha t I
thin k most Am ericans have long come to discard as nonsensical and
morally wrong.
Senator Muskie. I share t ha t view, but I wondered wheth er there is
an a lternat e route of su pply available to the Russians th at could effec­
tively suppl ant this route, i f indeed they accept the mining operation
and accept the conclusion th at they cannot or do not want to challenge
th at operation to m aintain t ha t route of supply. Is an ove rland route
effectively available to them ?
 29
Mr. G elb. There still would be fou r ro utes availab le to them, Sena­
tor : One, they could brin g equipme nt in by small c raf t into ports and
beaches. Secondly, even if we effectively inter dict the rail lines, t hat,
according to studies th at have been done in the past, would reduce
throu gh-pu t, ra il th rough -put, only by about 50 percen t; the r ail lines
can be repair ed in several hours.
Thir d, you can brin g supplies in throu gh by truc k and road.
I ourth, they can carry it on the ir backs as they have often done
in the past.
president’s conditions for lifting mining
Senator M uskie. D o you regar d th e Pre side nt’s conditions f or lif t­
ing the mining as a softening of his peace terms ?
Mr. Gelb. I t is a varia tion of his previous proposal. I don't think
it is a softenin g because lie did in other part s of his speech re fer to
his previous proposals as if they were s till curr ent in this proposal.
Jim —Mr. Thomson—may have something to add to that.
Mr. T homson. I did not detect a major softening. I detected a
shuffling; there was the significant suggestion tha t afte r 4 months we
will w ithdraw American forces from Vietnam. He does not say Indo ­
china.
Senator M uskie . hat is the significance of tha t difference in your
judgment?
Mr. T homson. Well, it involves the possibility of keeping large
forces off the coast, in Laos and Cambodia and, of course, in Thai land,
from here to eternity.
Senato r M uskie. Well, do you regard the lack of withdra wal of all
forces coupled with the new language, “all acts of force,” as meanin g
the withd rawal of a ir power and n aval power as well as ground com­
bat forces?
Mr. T homson. Su bsiding of t he violence, of acts of violence, is not
the same th ing as with draw ing the instrum ents of violence. I would
be unt rustin g, were I on the other side, as to how long t his subsiding
would be in order, and what new moves m ight be taken once one had
laid down one’s arms, more or less.
Senator Muskie. But if the other side were willing to inte rpre t
tha t new language as meaning the possibility of withdra wal of the
instrum ents of air power as well as the use of air power, and the
instrumen ts o f na val power as well as the use of naval power?
Mr. T homson. From all of the region? Tha t would be a step for ­
ward, a m ajor-----
Senato r Muskie. Wou ld you regard tha t as a sufficient additiona l i n­
ducement as to offer some encouragement tha t the other side might
respond positively to the conditions the Presid ent laid down last
nigh t ?
Mr. T homson. I find tha t very har d to guess.
Mr. Gelb. The major difference, if it is a difference, is Presid ent
Nixon’s s tateme nt tha t he wmuld end acts of force throu ghou t Ind o­
china. I n the past he has limit ed th at t o Vietnam. I don’t thi nk, in my
judgment, tha t this would be sufficient to get North Vietnam to ac­
cept Presid ent Nixon’s other proposals, which still call for mutual
withdra wal of forces, an d an electoral process which th e N orth Viet­
namese have no t chosen to risk in the p ast, and I doubt would choose
to risk in the present.
 30
Senator Muskie. I s it fair to summarize your reaction in t his way:
tha t the Pres ident ’s initiat ive last nigh t represents more stick than
carro t ?
Mr. G elb. Absolutely.
P O S S IB IL IT Y OF AC CE PT AN CE OF W IT H D R A W A L DAT E FO R PO W RE TU RN

Senator Muskie. Wha t is your assessment of the possibility that

North Vietnam, the other side, would accept the proposal of a with­
drawal date conditioned only upon the retur n of prisoners at this
stage ?
Mr. Geer. Here, again, as I mentioned to Senato r Fulb righ t, we
know very little about the workings of the Hanoi le ade rshi p; they have
publicly said th at they would not accept the simple proposal of settin g
a date and retur ning our prisoners. They have publicly said tha t they
also want a coalition government excluding Presid ent Tliieu. They
also want a political settlement. I don't know w hether tha t is—tha t
proposal and tha t statement—is a reaction to our own unacceptable
milit ary solutions to the problem or a real reflection of how they would
like to see the war negot iated, th e end of the war negotiated.
My guess is that there is a difference between making a proposal and
accepting a proposal. I t might well be difficult for Hano i’s leadership
to coalesce around the solution of seeing a date certa in and return ing
our prisoners than it is for them to accept th at proposal if we were
to offer it. We never have; so we don’t know. Presid ent Nixon has
made it a ppear in a number of his addresses—he has made tha t simple
proposal, endin g of ou r direct involvement by a cer tain date in retu rn
for prisoners, but he never has. T here have always been one, two, or
five clinkers to it.
IM P A C T OF P R E SI D E N T ’S DE CI SI O N ON NE G O TI A TI O N S

Senator Muskie. W hat effect, if any, would you say t he Pres ident ’s
decision of la st night may have upon the possibility of th e oth er side
accepting such a proposal ?
In other words, what has been the impact of last nig ht’s events
upon our negotiat ing position in Pari s, and the negot iating position
of the Saigon Government in Paris ?
Mr. G eer. There is a study in the Pentagon pa pers, Se nator Muskie,
done by the CIA called th e “Will to Resist.” It was a s tudy done in
1966 and again in 1967. It was the agency’s views of the effectiveness of
U.S. strateg ic bombing in North Vietnam. They concluded t hat not
only was bombing ineffective in bringi ng Hanoi around to accepting
the Uni ted States’ position, but, on the contrary , it increased their will
to resist. I see nothing in the events of the la st 4 years, 5 years, then, to
believe that t hat judgment would be any different today.
Senator M uskie. Is it your conclusion, then, tha t th e events of last
night have diminished the prospect for a negotiated settlement and
early end to the war ?
Mr. Gelb. I think it can only prolong the war, sir.
Senato r Muskie. Is tha t your view ?
 31
Mr. T homson. Tha t would be my judgment , Senator Muskie. It
seems to me tha t w hat the Presid ent did l ast ni ght was to put no gre at
addition al pressure on Hanoi other than pressures Hanoi has lived
with, experienced, o r u nder whose shadow it has persisted. It has put
intense new pressures, pressures in terms of a possible humilia tion, on
the Soviet Union.
We have no reason to believe tha t the Soviet Union can call the shots
in Hanoi, so I see no forwa rd progress and I see a good deal of back­
ward progress in terms of rhetoric and, of course, in terms of an es­
calated thre at of a global natur e rath er than regional containment of
the conflict.
PO SS IBI LIT Y OF US IN G AIR POWE R AG AIN ST SOVIET SH IP PI N G

Senator Muskie. The Presid ent also spoke of his new policy as
including th e i nterdic tion of all movements, I take it—land, sea, and
air supplies—into N orth Vietnam. Does this mean, in your judgment,
an increase in th e possibil ity th at we will use air power against Soviet
shippi ng if it should u ndertake , with the aid of minesweepers, to move
across the mine barrie r ?
Mr. G elb. Well, the Presid ent did say th at he would not only mine
the various harbors but also would take action to interd ict ships tha t
entered Vietnam, North Vietnam ter rito rial waters.
Now. wheth er he would open fire on them, I don’t know, but I don’t
want to see th e Un ited States in a position where we are risking th at.
I see no conceivable objective in V ietnam th at is worth t hat cost.
Senator Muskie. I agree with th at judgment, b ut Ambassador Rush
this morning left open the answer to tha t question as to what would
happen if the Russians were to seek to sweep the mines and move
throu gh the minefield with sweeps and presumably with shipp ing;
he lef t open tha t question and presumably it is open in your mind as
well ?
Mr. Gelb. Ye s; it is.
Senator Muskie. Would you agree with tha t, Professo r Thomson?
Mr. Thomson. I would agree with that.
The Chairman. Senato r Aiken ?
GENEV A ACCORDS OF 19 5 4

Senator A iken . I know, Mr. Thomson, you mentioned the Geneva

Accords throug h 1954. Are you sure of that d ate ?
Mr. T homson. I beg your pardon, sir ?
Senator Aike n . The reference to the Geneva Accords in 1954 ?
Mr. T homson. Yes, sir.
Senator A ike n . Are you sure of that date ?
Mr. T homson. Yes, sir.
Senator A ike n . Wha t happened in 1962 ?
Mr. Thomson. In 1962 there was a Laos conference.
Senator A ike n . Wh at is that ?
Mr. T homson. T he Geneva agreements on Laos in 1962; th ere were
agreements on Indoc hina in 1954.
 32
Se na to r A ik e n . The re were ref eren ces, an d y ou s tat e t hat th e U ni ted
St ate s w ould ha ve no th in g t o do w ith th e G enev a A cco rds in 1954?
Mr . T hom son . T ha t is r ig h t; Am bas sad or W al te r Bede ll Sm ith w as
in str uc te d no t t o sign t he acc ord s b ut to iss ue a s ep ara te U ni te d St ate s
an d So uth Vi etn am sta tem en t in di ca tin g th at we wou ld seek no t to
ups et t hos e ac cord s. We d id not sign th e a gree men ts.
Mr . G elb. Th e So uth Vie tnam ese Go ver nm ent , in my reco llec tion ,
did no t m ake any ple dge to ho nor th e a cco rds ; we d id.
Se na tor M us ki e . No co un try sign ed th e ac cord s in 1954?
Mr. G elb. T ha t is tec hnica lly ri g h t; th e onl y th in g th at was sign ed
was th e m ili ta ry a rra ng em en ts betw een the Fr en ch an d the Vie tmi nh.
Se na to r A ik en . By re fe rr in g to Gen eva Acc ord s of 1954, y ou are
re ally re fe rr in g to the Gen eva con fere nce whi ch ad op ted w ha t mi gh t
hav e been call ed t he A cc or ds ; is th a t r ig ht ?
Mr. T homson . Th at is r ig ht , sir.
SERVICE PERF ORME D BY IN TE RN AT IO NA L CONTR OL CO MM ISS ION

Se na tor A ik en . I belie ve th e In te rn at io na l Co ntr ol Com miss ion was

set u p a t t h at tim e ?
Mr. T homson . That is cor rec t.
Se na tor A ik en . C an you con sid er th at the IC C pe rfo rm ed a va lu ­
able s ervic e?
Mr. T homson . A t va rio us ju nc tu res it pe rfo rm ed wh at we c all sor t
of a w ind ow pan e typ e of ser vice, n am ely , i t was som eth ing th at m igh t
be bus ted th ro ug h and i t was an obser ver mi ssion. I t ce rta in ly d id not
pe rfo rm to an y d egre e th e s ervic e th a t w as i nte nded.

ICC PUR POS E

Se na tor A ik en . W ha t w as th e p urp ose of the IC C ?

Mr. T homso n. T he IC C pu rpo se? Th e Co ntr ol Com miss ion was to
keep viole nce from br ea ki ng out , to pa tro l the agr eem ent s in th e two
pa rts o f Vi etn am an d La os a nd Ca mb odia .
Mr. G elb. I t was to effect the m ili ta ry arr an ge me nts , Se na tor , and
ver y in ter es tin gl y most o f t he viol ati ons o f t he ar ran ge me nts r ep ort ed
by the IC C were v iol atio ns bv the S ou th Vie tnam ese G ove rnm ent , n ot
the No rth Vie tnam ese G ove rnm ent .
Se na tor A ik en . Th e IC C me mb ers hip was made up of a mem ber
from Po lan d, In di a, and Ca na da . Ha ve y ou talk ed wi th any of t hose
peop le who were mem bers a t th at t im e?
Mr. G elb. No. but I hav e rea d th e rec ord of th e IC C pro cee ding s
ove r t he y ear s, sir.
Se na to r A ik en . Th e reco rd was pr ep ar ed b y the m aj or ity mem bers
of I nd ia an d Po lan d. 1 hop e you rea liz e t ha t?
Air. G ei .b. Di ffe ren t rec om me nda tion s were pr ep are d by dif fer ent
memb ers. Som etim es t hey w ere un an im ou s; ma ny time s t he y were not.
Se na tor A ik en . W ha t was th e IC C sup pos ed to do abo ut refu gee s?
We re the y sup pos ed to help the ref uge es who des ired to leave No rth
Vi etn am an d whom the Un ite d St at es hel ped at a la te r da te in spi te
of th e oppositi on of Ha no i? W as the IC C sup pos ed to he lp the
ref ugees ?
Mr. G elb. Th ey were sup pos ed to assis t refu gee s, bu t the y ha d no
fac ili tie s at th ei r d ispo sal to di re ctl y he lp them .
 33
Hanoi's refusal to let refugees call on icc
Senator Aiken . Do you know tha t the Hanoi Government would
not let one sin gle refugee come ne ar the ICC for assistance? Do you
realize th at ?
Mr. G elb. W ell over a million people left what was called the Zone
of North Vietnam to come south afte r the conclusion o f the Geneva
Conference.
Senator Aike n . B ut do you know of any refugee tha t was permit ted
to call on the IC C f or assistance?
Mr. G elb. I can’t say wheth er i t was specifically on t he ICC, but I
do know well over a million refugees moved from north to south.
HANOI government’s RE FU SA L OF FOOD TO N O N S Y M P A T II IZ E R S

Senato r Aiken . Did you know the Hanoi Government refused to

permit food to be delivered to those people who they felt were not in
sympathy with thei r government?
Air. Gelb. I wouldn’t doubt tha t for a moment, sir, and as I said
in my statement, I don’t th ink tha t the Hanoi Government has per­
formed any more morally or less brutally th an the Saigon Government.
D IF FE R E N C E OF O P IN IO N CO N C ER N IN G V IE T N A M E SE EL EC TI O N S

Senato r A ike n . Y ou do realize th at afte r the Geneva conference or

the Accords, i f you persis t in calling it tha t, had been signed by all
but the United States and the South Vietnamese, it was signed by
North Vietnam unde r the name of the Viet Minh, who later became the
Hanoi Government? Do you realize th at the next day the re was some
statement issued which was not signed by anybody to the effect th at it
was supposed to be a te mpora ry ar rangement and tha t elections would
be held? Did n’t the U nited States agree th at elections could be held for
the people of both No rth a nd South Vie tnam? You must know that.
Air. G elb. Yes. sir, althoug h the language is somewhat ambiguous.
Senator Aiken . Do you know what the difference of opinion was?
Air. Gelb. With respect to what, Senator Aiken ?
Senator A ike n . I might enligh ten you by saying that Nor th Vietnam
insisted tha t the elections be held under the auspices of the ICC. The
United States held tha t th e elections should be held under the Un ited
Nations’ auspices. Th at was the difference of opinion at th at time, and
tha t was why no elections were held. The United States refused to sign
the conference rep ort because they held t hat the country should not be
divided.
IS VIET NAM ONE COUNTRY OR TWO?

In the la st 2 months, I would say, North Vietnam has been insisting

there is only one country. Do you regard tha t as one c ountry or two
countries ?
Air. Gelb. I reg ard it as one country, sir, and the mi litary provisions
tha t were signed between the Frenc h and the Viet Afinh in 1954 did not
provide f or two countries. It provided for two m ilitar y zones in which
the armies of each side would regroup.
Senator A ike n . You rega rd it as one country now ?
Air. Gelb. I do.
 34
Senat or Aiken . Then why does every Communist nation in the
world rega rd it as two countries—North Vietnam and South Viet­
nam—and have formal relationsh ips wi th w hat they claim is the gov­
ernment of two countries. They do n ot recognize the government in
Saigon as being a legitimate government, but they do have formal
relations hips with two countries ; isn’t tha t correct ?
Mr. Gelb. Tha t is correct, sir.
Senato r A iken . Then you differ with the oth er 20 or so Communist
countries ?
Mr. Gelb. I have often differed with the Communist countries.
[Laug hter.]
Senator Aiken . Th at mig ht be a good idea. Some of them are pr etty
active.
HA NO I PEA CE TER MS

As I understan d it, Hanoi has submitted terms on which they will

agree to peace over there. There are seven phases of those terms. As I
unders tand it, the United States refuses to accept two of the m: One,
the ouster of the Saigon Government. Do you agree that we should oust
tha t withou t delay ?
Air. Gelb. I do not, sir.
Senator A iken . You do not ?
Air. Gelb. I do not.
Senator A iken . The other term is th at we shall d isarm the 17 m il­
lion South Vietnamese people. Do you agree with that ?
Air. Gelb. I do not.
president’s peace proposals
Senator Aiken . You do not.
Do you agree with the peace terms or provisions on which we would
get completely out of there, which were enunciated by Presiden t Nixon
last nig ht?
Air. G elb. Preside nt Nixon said tha t complete wi thdraw al-----
Senato r Aiken . You have read his speech ?
Air. Gelb (con tinuin g). In 4 months. Yes, I have.
Senator Aiken . Y ou have read his entire statemen t ?
Air. Gelb. Yes, sir. Depending upon South-----
Senator A iken . Did you read his proposals fo r peace in Indochin a ?
Air. Gelb. Yes, sir. I have.
Senator Aiken . I would like to re ad i t into the record because there
might be someone here who has not heard it.
Fir st, all Ame rican p riso ners of w ar mus t be re turne d.
Second, the re mus t be an inte rna tio nal ly superv ised ceasefire thro ugho ut Indo­
china.
Once prison ers of wa r a re released , once th e in tern atio nal ly superv ised ceasefire
has begun, we will stop all a cts of force t hrou ghout I ndoc hina * * *
not Vietn am, In dochina—
“* * * and at th at time we will proceed with a complete wit hdr aw al of all
Amer ican forces fr om Vietn am w ithi n 4 mo nths.
Now, th ese term s ar e generous term s. They are term s which would not requi re
sur ren der a nd hum iliati on on t he pa rt of anybody. They would p erm it t he United
Sta tes to wit hdr aw with honor. They would end the killing. They would bring
our POWs home. They would allow n egot iatio ns on a p olitic al settl eme nt b etween
the Vietnam ese themselves. They would perm it all the natio ns which have suf ­
fered in th is long w ar * * *
 35
Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, Sou th Vietnam—
* * * to tu rn a t le a st to th e u rg en t w or ks of h ea li n g an d of pe ace . Th ey de se rv e
im m ed ia te a cc ep ta nc e by N or th V iet na m .
Would you agree t ha t those are favorable terms or not? If not, in
what way are they undesirable ?
Mr. Gelb. Weil, I thin k by stand ards of negotiations between na­
tion states, those are generous terms. But this is n ot a war between
nation states. I t is, in my judgment, a civil war and the kind of terms
tha t are acceptable in wars among g reat powers don’t hold for civil
wars.
Go back and look at the experience of how civil wars have been
concluded—our own, the one in China, Greece, Malaya, the Ph ili p­
pines—they cannot rea ch agre ement in these wars for a political com­
promise because there is no tru st, no loyalty, no confidence in the elec­
toral process. These wars are tra gical ly settled by force of arms and by
whichever side is able to gain the most loy alty of the people.
Presid ent Nixon's proposals still don't go to tha t central fact. His
proposals still trea t this war as i f it is some sort of outpou ring of a
monolithic Communist thr ea t; tha t is why I don't thin k it is nego­
tiable.
COM MUNI ST THRE AT IN VIETNAM

Senator A iken . You don’t consider th ere is any Communist th rea t

anyw ay; do you ?
Mr. Gelb. Excuse me ?
Senator Aiken . Y ou don't consider there is any Communist thr eat,
but what about-----
Mr. Gelb. I n Vie tnam ?
Senator A iken . In Vietnam.
Mr. Gelb. That threate ns U.S. nationa l interest in Vietnam—yes,
sir.
NORTH VIETNAM ESE DEMANDED DISARMAM ENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM ESE

Senator Aiken . But you do not favor then the North Vietnamese
demand that we disarm the 17 million South Vietnamese ?
Mr. Gelb. No, I do not, sir.
Senator A iken . Y ou don’t?
Mr. Gelb. I think i f we were to set a date for the withd rawal of all
American forces and carry t hat ou t, t hat th ere would be a process of
political accommodation ta king place among the South Vietnamese, a
natura l process t ha t could lead to the ultimate conclusion of the war.
Senator Aiken . But you do know that tha t is the one term out of two
which the Communists insist upon our accepting as a condition for any
furt her discussion of the other five points ?
Mr. Gelb. Th at is thei r publicly announced barga ining position;
yes, sir.
president' s proposals and mansfield’s proposals

Senator Aiken . Yes, indeed. Let me see. You would consider the
Presid ent’s proposal for peace worthless and unworkable?
Mr. Gelb. T consider them worthless a nd unworkable, yes, I do for
the ending of this Vietnam war.
 36
Senator A iken . Y ou have the same opinio n on the Pres iden t’s pro ­
posals last nig ht. Would you give th at to the Mansfield -Byrd amend­
ment which is now before the Senate ?
Mr. G elb. I agreed with th e old Mansfield amendment, Senato r.
Senator A iken . Do you see any difference between t he Pres iden t’s
proposals and the latest Mansfield proposal?
Mr. Gelb. I do. There is no call, so f ar as I unders tand, at least in
the Church-Case bill, for a cease-fire and a cease-fire is a provision-----
Senator Aiken . You mean th e Mansfield amendment does not re­
quire a cease-fire?
Mr. Gelb. Does it? Perha ps I am not as fam iliar with it as I
thought.
Senator Aike n . I t looks to me like a clear case of high jacki ng the
Mansfield amendment, and it seems very reasonable.
N O R T H V IE T N A M E SE T A K IN G OF QU A N G TR I

Do you feel tha t the United States escalated the w ar a month ago
and intensified i t when the troops fr om th e nort h came down and took
Quan gtri and are now outside Hue? Do you think tha t we escalated
that war a t that time ?
Mr. Gelb. Not at tha t par ticu lar point in time. no.
Senator A ike n . Do you thi nk Russia was involved in any way?
Mr. Gelb. The Soviet Union is a s upplier to the North Vietnamese
Government just as we are a supp lier to the So uth Vietnamese Govern­
ment.
Senator A iken . You would n’t say th at it was a di versionary tac tic
on the pa rt of Russia, would you, to get all attention concentrated ovo”
on that side of the world rathe r than the Middle Eas t ?
Air. Gelb. I wouldn’t think so, in my judgment.
SECURITY IN TI IE MIDDLE EAST

Senator Aike n . D o you thin k the Middle Eas t is pe rfectly secure ?

Mr. Gelb. No, I do not at all.
Senato r A tken. No.
Air. Gelb. But it is another situation.
Senator Aike n . I wouldn’t say either-----
Air. G elb. But it is another situation , Se nator Aiken, and no matter
what t he outcome in Vietnam, it seems to me, we have actions tha t we
can take in our national interes t in th e Aliddle E ast and elsewhere to
insure ou r interest s, th at the fate of those areas o f the world is not de­
pendent on an outcome in Vietnam.
EFFEC T OF MI NI NG TI IE COAST

Senato r A iken . I am losing my time. I still say, fra nkly, t hat I don't
thin k tha t the mining of the coast is going to have any immediate effect
on the battle th at is going on over the re now. I f North Vietnam with­
draws and tr ies another offensive in a year or two, it might have some
effect, but not righ t now. other than being pa rt of the war of nerves
or the cold war which is going on.

I
 37
RUS SIA SUGGESTED AS C H IE F CU LP RIT

But I do believe tha t Russia is the princip al culp rit here because
they evidently have been plann ing this invasion over t here for a year
or two. I am very suspicious tha t it is diversionary.
Why did Russia sail nuclear submarines where th ey were sure we
would see them if it wasn' t to bother us ?
SHO ULD PR ES IDE NT GO TO MOSCOW

Do you think that the Preside nt should go to Moscow ?

Mr. Gelb. Do I thin k he should go? Yes, I would like to see him
go.
Senator Aiken . I thin k he is going unless the Russians themselves
tell him not to come, and tha t is that.
Mr. T homson. Se nator Aiken, may I comment very briefly ?
Senato r Aiken . Yes.
PREV IOU S PROPOS AL BY SENA TOR A IK EN

Mr. T homson. I ju st wan t to endorse the answers tha t Mr. Gelb gave
to your questions, and I would like to say, sir, that it struck me that one
of th e wisest proposals made for the solution to th is wa r was made by
you und er a previous A dminis tration , namely, th at we declare victory
and go home.
Now, what struck me last nigh t was th at the Preside nt did pre­
cisely the opposite of what you so wisely urged a while ago. He de­
clared im pending hum iliation and said we will stay.
Senator Aiken . May I ask why it is tha t none of you fellows showed
the sligh test in clination to help me when I trie d to get Pr esident Jo hn­
son to withdr aw and why it has been only in the last 2 years tha t a
great many people have shown much interest in ou r g etting out over
there ?
Air. T homson. A lot of us were prayi ng fo r you.
Senator A iken . Why is tha t ? H ard ly an y of you would raise a hand
to help me at tha t time.
Air. Gelb. Senator, I agreed with your proposal at the time you
made it.
Senator A iken . Yes, I say some did, bu t the assistance was not over­
whelming by any means. It was not-----
[ Laugh ter.]
Senator A iken (conti nuing ). V ery generous un til about 2 years ago
when everybody said we have a war over there.
TROOP WI TH DR AW AL S

Do you app rove of t he withdr awing of 90 percent o f the troops we

had in South Vie tnam ?
Air. T homson. I would approve of withd rawin g them all. Ninety
percent is not quite enough.
Senator A iken . We were on t he way; we would have withdra wn
them all by July were it not for the new offensive.
 38
Mr. T homson. Had we withdra wn them all. the Presid ent would
not have the pretext of 60.000 troops whose lives were in danger.
Senat or A iken . L ast night there were only 60.000 troops re maining
and 3 years ago in the sprin g of 1969 there were 543,500,1 think. Th ere
has been a general withdrawal from S outheast Asia. I agree with you
tha t Asia should look afte r some of these things themselves, and,
finally, China is go ing to show some int erest here in not promoting
war.
Th at is all.
The Chairman. Sena tor P ercy ?
Senat or P ercy. Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome Dr. Gelb
back to the Hill. Dr. Gelb, T didn ’t realize when you left us in the
sprin g of 1967 th at Daniel Ellsbe rg would make you famous. We a re
glad to have you back here today.
And. Professor Thomson, we are happy to welcome you back to
Washington. I should say we are happy to welcome Sena tor Muskie
back to Washington, also.
I would like to review the Pres iden t’s p roposals made last night,
the three options he said were available to h im : fir st, w ithd raw al; sec­
ond. negotiations, and third, milita ry action.
T IM E TO HA VE EN DE D U .S . IN V O LV EM EN T

T was told last year bv a high level spokesman for the Admi nistra tion
tha t T or anyone who voted for the McGovern-Hatfield end-the-war
amendment or the Mansfield amendme nt to end the wa r would rue the
day tha t we had cast our votes for them. T cast my votes for them
feeling we should have ended our involvement the end of last vear, tha t
we had the possibility of d oing it at tha t time, an d t hat if Vietnami-
zation was going to work—if they were going to hack it on thei r own—
tha t was the time to do it.
How would you view t hat in perspective now. 12 months later or so,
whether or not tha t would have been the time to have really made a
determined effort to ge t out, Dr. Gelb ?
Mr. Gelb. Well, I thin k the rig ht time to have gotten out was or
were the many occasions prior , 2 years ago, but tha t is hind sight, not
foresight at all.
Most Americans agreed with the aims and goals o f this war until
qui^e late in the war, suppo rted the Pr esidents.
By March, 1968. T th ink most had come to the clear rea lization tha t
there was something wrong somewhere and I thin k at tha t point in
time the decision should have been made to total ly disengage U.S.
forces. Tf we were rig ht in 1968, it was rig ht 2 years ago and it is rig ht
today. The argume nt tha t we can’t get out now because the South
Vietnamese are finally being tested seems to me the final absurdit y
of the positions the Admin istration s have offered over the years.
I t is precisely in orde r to let them test themselves that we said we were
in there for all these years.
DE SI RA BH .IT Y OF E N D -T II E -W A R A M E N D M E N T T H IS YE AR

Senat or P ercy. As I under stand your testimony, you feel tha t an

end-the-w ar amendment sometime this year would be desirable, aimed
 39

at, say, a termin al point the end of this year. T he pre sent withd rawal
rate, which is no t drama tic—the Pre sid ent s present withd rawa l rate
is 10,000 a month, about ha lf w hat it has been, but still 10,000 a month
—would pet us out by November 30; so the December 31 date is no t
really drastic. Is tha t correct?
Mr. T homson. T he chairman asked us ea rlier what could be done,
and we both very strongly affirmed our suppo rt for such an end-the-
war amendment. This is one place where action can take place, and
it is more imperat ive than it ever was. I t was impera tive 2 years ago,
10 years ago, and it mig ht as well happen now.
AC TIV ITI ES AND LOCA TION OF RE M AI NI NG U. S. FORCES

Senato r P ercy. W hat are the men essentially doin g now, the 00,000
or so tha t we have left? Six thousand we know are security forces,
fighting forces providing backup security fo r the other 54,000, roughly.
Are the other s essentially advising the So uth Vietnamese forces or a re
they engaged in the decisions as to which equipment will be shipped
back to the U.S. and which will be left for the South Vietnamese?
Wha t a re those forces doing rig ht now an d where are the y located?
Mr. Gelb. Well, they are located throug hout the country and they
are perfo rmin g a variety of functions. They are still giving milit ary
advice to units engaged in combat. Some are providin g security fo r our
own forces. Othe rs are engaged in the universal process of staff opera­
tions, and yet others, and I think the bulk, are involved i n logistical
operations. I was to ld by many of our milit ary officers coming back
over the years th at it was always necessary fo r the U nited States m ili­
tar y to be involved in logistical operations, in d rivin g truc ks, because
if we didn 't drive tru cks from the docks to the battlefield and the South
Vietnamese did, the supplies would never get there.
SAF ETY OF U. S. FORCES

Senator P ercy. I would like both of you to comment about the safety
of American forces. None of us question the duty and responsibilit y
of the Preside nt to provide for the ir safety. Takin g into account the
present North Vietnamese offensive waged on three front s, can you
give us you r ins ight as to the level of safety those men have and what,
if you were advising the Presid ent, you would advise w ith respect to
the safety of those forces, and what he should do in connection wit h
proposals for withdr awal, say, by the end of this year ?
Mr. Gelb. Well, I am not nearly fam iliar enough with the actual
tactical battlefield situation s to have any judgme nt on t hat. My only
judgme nt would be th at they would be safer if they were not there.
Mr. T homson. I would certainly sup port th e last sentence. I t str ikes
me tha t the determi nation to remove them fast, a d eterminat ion tha t
can be cre dibly communicated to the other side, is a communication
tha t would be welcomed by the other side. They have no intere st in
inflicting th at kind of “hu miliat ion” on us. Th ey know precisely what
a commander-in-chief owes to his forces, and the wisest action we
could ta ke with rega rd to those troops would be to remove them at
once, informing the other side of our intent to do so.
 40

LOGIS TICS OF ST EP PI NG T P WI TH DR AW AL

Se na to r P ercy. N ow, f ro m th e sta nd po in t of w ith dr aw in g the m, i f

we dec ided t o ste p np th e ra te to 20,000 o r 30,000 a mo nth , th a t woul d
pr ese nt no log ist ica l pro ble m fro m th e sta nd po in t of w ith dr aw in g
the m by ai r or sea. We hav e p len ty o f n av al vessels t he re. W ou ld th ere
be a ny 'pr ob lem in w ith dr aw in g thos e forc es if we m ake th e deci sion to
ste p up t he w ith dra wa l ?
Mr. G elb. S en ato r, th er e was a stu dy done i n th e Pe nt ag on ju st be­
for e I le ft , whe n we h ad , as you kno w, ove r 500,000 m en in Vi etn am ,
wi th a ll th ei r equ ipm ent , t h a t all of th ese fo rces w ith t hei r equ ipm en t
cou ld b e p ul led o ut in ab ou t 6 to 9 mo nth s. So if nece ssa ry we ca n pe r­
for m th a t ki nd o f fea t.
Se na to r P ercy. Ho w ma ny forc es were y ou ta lk in g ab ou t ?
Mr . G elb. Ov er 500,000.
Se na to r P ercy. So 6 to 9 mo nth s was th e tim e sp an f or th at . Th er e­
for e, we c ould wi th dr aw o ur e xis tin g forc es, an d do so on a bas is th at
wo uld n’t l ook like a ro ute. W e d o h av e to t ak e int o acc oun t th e de mo r­
ali zin g effect th is m igh t ha ve o n th e So ut h Vie tnamese, bu t ce rta in ly
th ey h ave been on noti ce, s ince fo r t hr ee a nd a h al f y ea rs we ha ve been
wi th dr aw in g. Tw o or 3 ye ars ago, in conv ers atio ns w ith the So uth Vi et ­
name se amb ass ado r, I a ske d, “I s th er e an v que stio n in y ou r mi nd t h at
th e pol icy decis ion ha s been ma de by t hi s co un try to g et o ut an d you
are go ing to be on yo ur ow n? ” An d I wa s to ld th er e w as no do ub t in his
mi nd t he y wer e going to h av e to be on th ei r own. So th ey hav e ha d a
lon g a dva nce noti ce.
I f we dec ided to ge t tho se forc es ou t in a rea son abl y sh or t spa n of
tim e—ta ki ng in to acc oun t lo gist ics , w ha t th ey a re d oin g a nd th e d uti es
th ey m ig ht be pe rfo rm in g—you th in k t he y cou ld be wi th dr aw n i n how
sh or t a s pa n o f ti me , or w ha t w ould be t he lon ges t sp an o f t im e th a t we
cou ld rea so na bly ex pec t t he P en ta go n to ge t t hem o ut?
Mr . G elb. I am no log ist ica l e xp er t a nd th e figu re I ga ve you be fore
was one I m ere ly r ep ea ted , bu t i f t h at is a ny wh ere nea r tr ue , th ey coul d
ha ve take n ou t ove r 500,000 men in 6 to 9 mo nth s, th en ce rta in ly
one cou ld w ith dr aw 60,000 me n wi th in 4 mo nth s, bu t I rep ea t, th a t is
th e ju dg m en t o f o ther s.

PO SS IB ILI TY OF BLOODBAT H

Se na to r P ercy. Th e Pr es id en t me nti oned la st ni gh t th at , af te r an

agr eem ent , a ll ou r men co uld be o ut, lock , sto ck a nd ba rre l, i n 120 days.
Fr om th e st an dp oi nt o f t he w ith dr aw al op tio n av ail ab le to t he P re si ­
de nt, t he Pr es id en t an d th e Na tio na l Se cu rit y Cou ncil o bvio usly h ave
giv en ve ry ca ref ul co nsi der ati on to th e 17 mi llio n So ut h Vie tnam ese.
No on e w an ts a b loo dba th, an d T su ppo se it is a q ues tion as to how yo u
ge t th e blo od bat h, wh eth er i t comes o n th e g ro un d o r w he the r f rom th e
air . Ce rta in ly i t is j us t a s bl ood y w hen th er e is v ery in ten siv e b om bin g
an d f igh tin g in a co un try . Bu t f rom h ist or ica l p ers pec tive , fro m ev ery ­
th in g you ha ve seen in th e stu dy an d pr ep ar at io n of th e pa pe rs now
kno wn as t he Pe nt ag on Pa pe rs , w ha t is th e p ro sp ec t if we do w ith dr aw
in 120 day s? W ha t woul d lit er al ly ha pp en in th at c ou ntr y m ili ta rily
an d po lit ica lly fro m th e st an dp oi nt of th e effect on thos e 17 mil lion
peo ple ? W ou ld you en visi on a bl oo db ath ?
 41
Mr . G elb. Se na tor , I th in k we hav e a cle ar ob lig ati on to pro vid e
re fu ge fo r all So ut h Vie tna me se who wa nt to leave th e co un try an d I
th in k we hav e a cle ar ob lig ati on to ma ke th at a seriou s pol icy whe re
we p urs ue th e line of a ctio n t h at I am su ggest ing .
I hav e no ide a, rea lly , how m an y peo ple wou ld wa nt t o seek re fu ge
un de r t ha t so rt of arr an ge m en t. I h ave no doub t in m y m ind th a t th er e
wou ld be blo od let tin g. Th is is, as T hav e tir ele ssl y rep ea ted , a civi l
w ar an d t he re is no esc ap ing some o f th at .
Bu t two th in gs seem pa ra m ou nt in my own m in d: Fi rs t, th at we
are not the kee per of Vi etn am ese m or al ity and , second , th e gro ss
ju dg m en t th a t th e pr ob ab ili ty is ve ry hi gh th at we will kill more
peo ple, mo re Vie tna me se, by co nt in uin g th is wa r, esp eci ally w ith th e
ex pa nd ed bo mb ing op era tio ns of th e la st few mo nth s, th an wi ll die
in an y s ubs equ ent blo odbat h.
Air. T homs on . S en ato r, I ha ve he ar d th e fe ar of the blo od ba th in ­
voked now fo r 7 or 8 ye ars sinc e I ser ved on th e Na tio na l Se cu rit y
Cou ncil staf f, an d du ri ng tho se 7 or 8 y ea rs we hav e kil led inf ini tel y
mor e peo ple on bo th sides , inf ini tel y mor e th an an y acc om mod atio n
or e nd in g of t he c ivil w ar w oul d invo lve. I t str ike s me th e blo od ba th
da ng er ha s to be pu t in th e co nte xt of th e da ily blo od ba th we hav e
infl icte d on th re e cou ntri es.
Se na to r P ercy. T he re is pr ob ab ly no t an y do ub t th at the obje ctiv e
of th ei r v eng ean ce wou ld b e tho se w ho h ave closel y id en tifi ed an d asso­
cia ted them sel ves wi th the Sa igo n Gov ern me nt. Th ey hav e alr ea dy
m ur de re d 17.000, 18,000, 20,000 vil lag e chi efs and local officials. Th ey
hav e tr ie d sy ste ma tic all y to in tim id at e the m, t o tr y t o ge t t hem n ot to
ho ld office, a nd it is lit er al ly m ur de r, m ur de r in wa r.
LI KE LIH OO D OF BLOODBAT H OF IN NO CE NT S

Fr om yo ur own kno wle dge of th ei r m en talit y, how th ey op era te,

how sever e wo uld you an tic ip at e th ei r rea cti on s wo uld be ag ai ns t
the inn oce nt, tho se who are no t re al ly asso ciat ed w ith th e eff ort bu t
who are th e pe asa nts , th e wom en, th e ch ild ren , who me ver i t ma y be?
W ha t wou ld be th e lik eli hood of a blo od ba th of inn oce nts ? W e ge t
visi ons of 17 mi llio n peop le be ing sla ug ht er ed ; th at is one extrem e.
Th e ot he r ext rem e wou ld be th a t th ey wou ld wa lk in an d say, “A ll is
fo rg ot te n; no th in g is going to ha pp en , no tri al s, no th in g; ju st go on
as you wer e.” T ha t is an ext rem e also no t l ike ly to occu r. W ha t wou ld
most lik ely h ap pe n ?
Mr . T homs on . I m ig ht po in t ou t in ans we r, Se na to r Pe rcy , th at
du ring the 20-o dd ye ars of th is civil confl ict, bef ore it beca me so
hea vil y esc ala ted an d bef ore Vie tna me se po liti cs were fro zen in th e
sou th by a he av y m ili ta ry gove rnm en t an d a he av y Am eri can pr es ­
ence, acc om mo dat ion was th e no rm , acc om mod atio n was th e norm
am ong po lit ica l elem ents , an d am ong ap oli tic al elem ents —an d the
hea vy pr op or tio n of the pe as an try , the po pu latio n of th e co un try , is
fa ir ly ap oli tic al. W ha t the y ha ve sou ght is ref ug e fro m dr op pi ng
bombs o r shot bulle ts, an d such peo ple will acco mm oda te to wh ate ve r
the new re al ity ma y be.
Those at the ve ry top who ha ve ide ntif ied the mse lves to ta lly as
officehold ers an d the like will c er tai nl y seek safe h ave n, ref ug e, as Mr .
 42

Gel b ri gh tl y ass erts we sho uld pr ov ide them . Ma ny in betw een will
mak e t he k in d of a ccom mod atio ns th at h ave so of ten b een seen wi thi n
So uth ea st A sia n soc iety o ver these yea rs.
Mr. G elb . Se na tor Pe rcy , coul d I ju st ad d a p os tsc rip t t o th at ?
The p eop le who live i n th e are a we c all In do ch in a ar e ma rve lou s at
ma ki ng acco mm oda tion s.
We al l k now th at So uvann a P ho um a, th e Pr im e M in ist er of th e gov ­
ern me nt th a t we su pp ort , has ha d a ta ci t ar ra ng em en t fo r ye ars wit h
the N or th Vie tnam ese Go ver nm ent no t to go af te r an d ha ra ss No rth
Vi etn am ese for ces on the H o Chi M inh T ra il, f orce s th at w ere com ing
dow n t he tr ai l to k ill Am eri can so ldie rs. I f th ey ca n mak e t h at k in d of
con ven ien t ag ree me nt, I th in k t he ir po ssib ilit ies are lim itle ss.

E FF EC TI V EN ES S OF SO U T H V IE T N A M E SE A IR FO RC E

Se na tor P ercy. T he imp res sio n is lef t th at eve n w hen we ge t o ut th at

we will ha ve to con tinu e the bomb ing fo r an in ter mi na bl e pe rio d of
tim e an d th at to no t con tin ue th at bom bin g wou ld leave th e So uth
Vie tnamese arm y expo sed an d wi tho ut su pp ort . Ye t, as I que stio ned
Se cre tar y L ai rd as to the ex ten t an d size an d pow er an d reso urce s of
th e So uth Vie tnames e ai r forc e—i t is ha rd ly lim ite d to P ip er Cubs
an d leafle ts—h is tes tim on y rev eal ed th at the So uth Vie tna me se A ir
Fo rce i s one of t he most fo rm ida ble in th e wo rld tod ay , th at it ha s a
th ou san d fig hte rs and bom bers , 500 big per son nel ca rr ie r hel ico pte rs,
an d 40,000 tra in ed airme n. An d t he N or th Vi etna mes e ha ve n ev er flown
exc ept in m ayb e one ins tan ce ove r So ut h V ie tn am ; so the So ut h Vi et ­
namese h ave abs olut e a ir sup rem acy in t he south .
I f we d id w ith dr aw on an o rd er ly ba sis over a per iod o f 120, 150,180
da ys fro m now, an d we dec ided to sto p bom bin g, wh at is yo ur own
fee lin g as to th e effecti veness and th e bac kup and su pp or t th a t woul d
be pr ov ide d by th e So uth Vie tna me se ai r forc e its elf ? W ou ld we be
lea vin g th em help less ?
Mr. G elb . I f we wou ld be lea vi ng the m help less , th er e is no th ing
we can do to be he lp fu l to the m.
To my kno wle dge , th e sta tis tic s wh ich you hav e cit ed are corr ect.
Th e So uth Vie tnam ese A ir For ce, like th e So uth Vie tnamese Army ,
is one of th e lar ge st in th e wo rld ; in p ro po rti on t o po pu lat ion i t is t he
lar ge st. I f th is ki nd of ar me d forc e in num ber s a nd in q ua lit y o f eq uip ­
me nt ca n’t ha ck it, one wo nde rs wh eth er the y eve r will . Som eth ing
ha s alw ays gone wr on g w ith the m, th ou gh , an d I th in k it ha s less
to do wi th th ei r num ber s an d qu al ity of equ ipm en t we pro vid e them
an d mor e to do wi th th ei r po lit ica l sit ua tio n an d th e qu al ity of
th ei r le ad er sh ip in the field— th in gs th at we c an ’t sol ve.
Mr . T homso n. S en ato r Pe rc y, I ask ed a fo rm er h ig h St at e D ep ar t­
me nt official a mo nth ago as th is offen sive beg an, a ma n rec ent ly re ­
tir ed , w ha t he wou ld do at th a t ju nc tu re ; an d he sai d th at if he
wer e t he P re si de nt , he wou ld com ma nde er eve ry piece of fly ing eq uip ­
me nt an d eve ry bo at he pos sibl y cou ld an d fly ove r to Vi etn am mem ­
ber s of th e media . Mem bers of the Con gre ss, mem bers of c ivic gro ups
an d th e lik e an d tak e the m all ove r th e co un try an d show the m wh at
we ha ve pr ov ide d ove r t he pa st 10, 15 ye ars i n the way of equ ipm ent ,
mon ey, tre as ur e, an d th e like , t o t hes e peo ple so t h at th ey w oul d know
fin ally th a t we ha d done ev er yt hi ng we coul d an d th at if in fac t
th e So uth Vi etn am ese coll aps ed, it was no t o ur doin g.
 43
E FF E C T OF BO M BI N G ON N O R T H V IE T N A M E SE A ND A LL IE S

Senator P ercy. I have one more question on the withd rawal option
of the Pres iden t’s speech last night , and I should really ask it of a
psychologist rath er than scholars in y our field. I have long felt as an
amate ur with some little knowledge of human nature , but not a
scholarly knowledge, th at th e bombing in th e no rth—while destroy ing
some supplies, some fuel depots, and so fort h—what good it did
for our side was more tha n compensated by the North Vietnamese
reaction to resist the ir enemy from the sky, and tha t it did more
t o solidify the north and cause them to wage this war with an inten ­
sity a nd ha tred they mi ght not otherwise have had, an d also gave cause
for the ir allies in Easte rn Europe and China to supp ort them with
everythi ng they were asked to provide.
W IT H D R A W A L A ND SO U T H V IE T N A M E S E LO YA LT Y AN D W IL L TO RE SI ST

From the stand point of the morale and fighting spir it of the peo­
ple in the South, to which we have tried to contribut e for over a dec­
ade, if they now have th at will, is thi s as good a ti me as any to decide
whether anyt hing we could do in the next 3 or 4 o r 5 years would
make the people more loyal to the Saigon Government, to give them
the will to resist and fight, or to weigh the alterna tives and maybe
simply decide th at they can't make it on the ir own? Will we, p ulling
out, make the big difference?
Mr. Gelb. Well, you know there are some Vietnam experts and
many people know much more about Vietnam itself than I do, b ut
there a re some Vie tnam experts who have argued over the years t hat
the only way to get those forces in South Vietnam who do oppose the
takeover from the north , to assert themselves to coalesce, to gain a
common loyalty, tha t the only way to do this is to withdra w the
American presence. Our stayi ng there certainly never has done this.
SE NA TO R A I K E N ’S C O M M E N T CO M M EN DE D

Senat or P ercy. I n concluding questioning on th is option, I would

say I suppor ted the comment of Senator Aiken on withdra wal. I
thou ght it was endowed with grea t wisdom, and I hope he reitera tes
it and sticks to i t now as he d id a few years ago. If it was true the n, it
may be t rue now, and I would hope tha t our policy would be based
very strong ly on a steady course of total withdrawa l at the earliest
and most rapi d possible rate.
From t he stand poin t of the n egotiations option, I would like to ask
just a few questions, and then yield to my colleagues and come back
later.
P O S S IB IL IT Y OF E N D IN G W AR BY N E G O TI A TI O N S

But, to get start ed on t ha t end of the second option the Presi dent
actually worked with, our negotiations with the North Vietnamese
actually began as far back as Ju ne 1964 wit h the Seaborn missions to
Hanoi.
The Pentag on papers and subsequent events showed tha t duri ng
this entire 8-year perio d bot h sides rea lly soug ht mi litar y v ictory and
put littl e fa ith i n negotiations.
83 -6 05 — 73-
 44
Did negotiations ever have a real possibility of ending the war anti,
if so, when in your jud gment?
Mr. Gelb. I make a distinction, Senator P ercy, between a political
settlement and a militar y settlement. I n my ju dgment a politica l set­
tlement between Diem. Kahn, Ky, Th ieu, group s th at have controlled
South V ietnam under U.S. auspices, political accommodation between
them and the North Vietnamese has never been feasible, th at if we
were to step aside and allow other groups to find thei r own level,
political level, tha t possibly th ere were grounds for such an agree­
ment. But in the absence of that, we could do the only thin g at our
disposal and the only thin g in our interest, namely, to step aside from
the conflict itself, withdraw our forces from direct involvement, and
let the political and militar y processes of the civil war work their
way out.
EFF EC T OF U. S. BOM BIN G ON NEG OTI ATIO NS

Senator P ercy. Was the U.S. bombing of North Vietna m an im pedi­

ment to negotiations or did it in effect drive them to the barga ining
table, a nd was it the barga ining chip tha t we were to use to get them
finally and eventually to the bargainin g table ?
Mr. Gelb. I doubt tha t very much. It is true, as you know, tha t
many of our leaders over the years said tha t they thoug ht of the
bombing as a bargain ing chip for negotia tions; but the bombing really
became the stumblin g block to g etting negotiations starte d because all
those negotia tions which you cite from the Seaborn mission in 1964,
until the beginning of what are called substantive negotiations in
October, 1968, were about whether or n ot and under what conditions
to stop the bombing, not about how to settle the war.
Mr. T homson. Furthe rmore , the bombing itself, Senator Percy,
had multiple and changing rationales, and one of th e curren t ratio n­
ales is to stiffen the spine o f the south—which h as very little to do
with either breakin g the will of the north or bringi ng them to the
bargai ning table.
OP PO RT UN ITY FOR AD MI NIS TR AT IO N TO RESPOND TO QU EST ION S

Senator P ercy. Mr. Chairm an, will members of the Administr ation
be given an oppor tunity to respond to some of these same questions
in this set of hearings, because I am aski ng the same questions I would
be as king them, no different at all. And they a re not loaded questions;
they are the kind of questions I thin k we need objective answers to
and we need it on both sides of the question.
The C hairman. Senator, they are always welcome. The Secretary
of State has been invited, I guess, innumerable times. He has been
a very busy man and has not seen fit to come, but he has a s tanding
invitat ion to come at any time.
If you wish. I will issue a special invita tion to him to come. Our
trouble is not his finding a forum, it is gettin g him to come before
this committee. As you know. Mr. Kissinger has declined to come.
Senator P ercy. The Presid ent havin g called the Secretary back on
an emergency basis would be justification for saying tha t lie himself
personally could not appear, but if the Admini stration would like to
have someone here durin g the course of the next few days or next
 45
week, a per son of th ei r own sele ctio n who cou ld be a spo kes ma n fo r
the A dm in ist ra tio n, wou ld th at op po rtu ni ty be offer ed to the m?
I he C hai rm an . O f cours e it wou ld. AYe have i nv ite d Mr . Ki ss in ge r
inn um era ble time s. He ref use d to come on th e gro un ds o f. I gues s, ex­
ecu tive pr ivi leg e. He refu ses to come. W e also , I ma y say , in vit ed pe ople
who were fo rm er ly inv olv ed in thi s. We inv ite d Mr. W ill iam Bu nd y.
He dec line d to come. I sta ted all th is at t he be gin nin g of th e he ari ng .
I t is in th e rec ord . We hav e in vit ed tho se who were pa rtic ip an ts in
the stu dy . Th e he ar in g was no t, as th e Se na to r know s, set to disc uss
las t ni ght’s st ate me nt. Th is he ar in g has been set fo r 2 m onth s. I t was
pu rel y c oin cid ent al t h at it too k pl ace th is m orn in g a ft er the Pr es id en t’s
speech. I di dn ’t kno w t he P re si de nt was g oi ng to m ake t he spee ch un til
4 o’clock ye ste rd ay a fte rno on .

EF FE CT OF PR ES EN T U. S. M IL IT AR Y ACT ION S ON PA RTI ES INVOLVE D

Se na to r P ercy, I ha nk you. I f th e b om bin g d id no t d riv e th em to t he

tab le, an d di d no t enc our age ne go tia tio ns , th en I wou ld like to ask
abo ut the m in in g of H ai ph on g an d th e inte nsi ve bomb ing of ra il line s
an d so f or th .
F rom the s ta nd po in t o f th e pa rti es inv olve d, i s th is act ion no w be ing
un de rta ke n by th e U.S . m ili ta ry lik ely to dri ve the m to mor e rea lis tic
neg oti ati on s an d mor e fa vo rab le co ns ide rat ion of t he Pr es id en t’s p ro ­
posa ls, or less co nsi der ati on, an d wil l it c ause Pe ki ng an d Moscow to
pu t mor e or le ss pre ssu re on the m to seek a n eg oti ate d se ttle me nt ? Dr.
Th om son ?
Mr. T homson . W e t rie d to cov er t h a t sub jec t to some d egre e e arl ier .
O ur o wn view, at l eas t mine , is t h at t hi s new e sca lati on up n or th wil l,
in fac t, stif fen th ei r spin e, giv e t he m a new wi ll to live, a new wil l to
res ist, a new wi ll to achi eve ul tim ate success. I t str ike s me th at the y
hav e a lw ays kn ow n f rom th e b eg inn in g of tim e th at th ey liv e th er e a nd
we d on ’t, an d th a t ev en tua lly w e w ill go ho m e; an d even bac k i n ea rly
19G5 whe n peo ple wer e dis cus sin g the po ssi bil ity of a bomb ing t ra ck ,
it wa s su ggest ed by wis er m en who kn ew Vi etn am th at even i f b omb ed
back int o th e sto ne age, th e N or th Vie tnames e wou ld w ith rel uct anc e
pe rm it th e de str uc tio n of wh at th ey ha d bu ilt ove r th e last 10 y ear s,
re tr ea t bac k int o th e bus h, an d re ap pe ar once we ha d gon e home— as
we w oul d ev ent ual ly.
As fo r p res sur es fro m Pe ki ng a nd Moscow , it st rik es me t ha t, as M r.
Gelb p ut it e ar lie r, we a re t ry in g to do to t he Ru ssi ans w ha t M r. Nix on
tel ls us we face , nam ely , hu m ili ate the m th ro ug h a ki nd of an u lt i­
ma tum in to p ut ti ng pre ssu re on H an oi. I t is ver y har d to ju dg e w he the r
Moscow or Pe ki ng ha ve eve r been abl e to con tro l H an oi ; th ey hav e
been able to giv e adv ice, to g ive a id ; b ut u lti m at ely sma ll, de ter mi ne d
allie s are ve ry ind ep en de nt peo ple. I t w ould seem to me t h at one con ­
sequenc e of las t nig ht’s s peec h ma y well be th e fo rci ng t og ethe r eve r
so s lig ht ly of Pe ki ng a nd Moscow in fu rt he r su pp or t of H an oi.
LIK EL IHO OD OF HAN OI*S BE ING RE SPO NSI VE TO PR ES ID EN T’S PROPOS ALS

Se na tor P ercy. Se na to r A ike n h as rea d i nto th e r eco rd th e p rop osa ls

made by th e Pr es id en t l as t n ig ht wh ich I wo uld look u pon a s ge ner ous ,
bu t cou pled wi th th e deci sion s in th e m ili ta ry are a, is th er e any rea l
 46

lik eli hood, k nowi ng w ha t we k now a bou t H an oi, th at th ey a re goi ng to

be respon siv e to th at peac e offer as a basi s fo r ne go tia tio ns so lon g as
th is es cal ate d m ili ta ry ac tio n ac com pan ies i t ?
Mr. G elb. S en ato r, i f I were an a na ly st in Ha no i, an d were a ssigned
to do a sta ff pa pe r on wh eth er or no t my go ve rnm en t ou gh t to acc ept
Pr es id en t Ni xon’s p rop osa ls, I th in k I cou ld wr ite a ve ry per sua siv e
pa pe r t h a t t he y ou gh t to . Ba sic all y, t ho ug h, my a rg um en t wou ld come
to res t o n c hea ting . L et ’s si gn on t he dott ed li ne, ge t th e Am eri can s o ut
of th er e an d th en v iol ate th e agr eem ent . T h at is so rt of th e al te rn at iv e
th e P re sid en t i s gi vin g t hem .
I f yo u pl an on th at ki nd of de al, th en th e pr op osa l is se nsibl e. Bu t I
th in k it com es dow n to vie win g t hi s th ro ug h th ei r own spe cial eyes as
bes t we can b ecause the y are t he o th er c on tes tan t i n th is w ar an d the y
hav e a lo ng hi sto ry of be ing lef t i n t he lur ch by ag ree me nts w ith m ajo r
pow ers, a nd t he y are un do ub ted ly gu n shy. T he th ou gh t of th ei r lea d­
ers, t he sam e lea der s wh o w ere t he re 15 and 20 ye ars ago, ac cep tin g th is
ki nd of a pro posal seems less th an cr edi ble to me.
E FF E C T OF M IL IT A R Y ES CA LA TI ON ON GE TT IN G BA CK l ’OW ’s

Se na to r P ercy. Th e Pr es id en t ha s pu t h ig h em pha sis o n t he p ris on ­

ers of wa r. He me nti oned in his speec h la st ni gh t th at , of his con di­
tion s, f irs t o f a ll A me ric an pr iso ne rs o f w ar mu st be re tu rn ed , a nd the n
he cou pled it wi th once pr iso ne rs of wa r are rele ased, once th e in te r­
na tio na lly su per vis ed cease- fire ha s beg un, we will cease all acts of
forc e th ro ug ho ut In do ch in a an d wi th dr aw Am eri can forc es wi thi n 4
mo nths . He is dee ply c onc erne d ab ou t th e pr iso ne rs of w ar an d those
mis sin g i n a ctio n. W e a ll are.
W ha t is y ou r fee lin g as to th e ef fect of the m ili ta ry e sca lati on on the
chan ces of ge tti ng bac k o ur men he ld pr iso ne r ?
Mr . T homso n. I wou ld sug ges t it ha s been hu rt. I t s tri ke s me th at
th er e ar e t wo po int s to be mad e a bo ut th e p ris on ers of w a r: T he fir st is
th a t t he y are th e one m ajor chip , th e on e piece o f le ver age wh ich Ha no i
ha s vis -a- vis W ash ing ton , an d Ha no i is n ot go ing to g ive i t up u nt il it
is su re we ar e going t o ta ke ce rta in fu nd am en tal moves to ge t out t o­
ta lly . Th ey are no t go ing to tr u st us un til we m ake tho se moves and
th ey a re no t g oin g to g ive u p t he c hip u nt il we m ake thos e m oves. I t is
th e no rm in a ll wars t h a t I k now of , to exc hang e p ris on ers of w ar af te r
th e set tle me nt, n ot as a p rec on di tio n to the s ettl em ent .

W IIA T COULD WE HAV E EXP ECT ED FROM NE GO TIA TIO NS ?

Se na to r P ercy. I mu st say th at I s til l h ope th ere can be some n eg oti ­

ate d set tle me nt, be cause it is t he o nly way to end a ll of th e war. W hen
the Pr es id en t ann oun ced his new pro posal s in Oct obe r 1970, I in tro­
duc ed a reso luti on su pp or tin g the m an d it was un an im ously acc epte d,
so th e Se nat e fo r t he f irst tim e r ea lly ba cked th e Pr es id en t. Tho se w ere
rea lis tic , flex ible t erm s w hich wer e th e ba sis f or neg oti ati on s, no t in a ny
way a tak e-i t-o r-l ea ve -it ofl'er. Th e Pr es id en t mad e th at ve ry clear .
Sh or tly th er ea ft er I vis ite d th e chi efs of sta te of nin e cou ntries —a t
Dr. Ki ss in ge r’s su gge stio n—n ati on s wh ich m ig ht hav e some leverag e
wi th Pe ki ng , Ha no i o r Moscow , to as k th em to h elp get acr oss t hat these
ne go tia tin g te rm s w ere fle xible, reas ona ble and rea l istic.
 47
Wh at could we r ealistically have expected from negotiations?
Mr. G elb. Well, my own way of looking a t it is that we can’t expect
too much in terms of an overall settlement. Tha t would involve our
takin g a direct hand in overthrowin g the present government of Saigon
and I would n’t like to see our country do tha t and I th ink i t is unneces­
sary to do that.
I thin k the very act of American withdr awal would unseat these
people because they have no supp ort tha t goes much beyond our
presence.
Mr. T homson. So t he end product of negotiation late r on would be
a for m of coalition government in the south, my guess would be.
Mr. Gelb. It would be part of the na tural process.
Mr. T homson. It would be accomplished throug h osmosis and proc­
ess rat her than impos ition by the U.S.
Senato r P ercy. But you do feel if it h ad been possible to present at
some time frame in t he past some sort of coalition government—and
we would have been willing to have seen tha t happen—th at we could
have had some degree of success in negotiations and an end to the war?
Mr. Gelb. Then we would have had some responsibility f or th at coa­
lition go vernment because we would have been pa rt of its creation, and
I thin k tha t this is the ir business, not our business. I would like to see
them form thei r own coalitions th rough th eir own processes.
Senato r P ercy. Mr. Chairm an, I have a few’ more questions on option
No. 2 and then I would like to get into option No. 3, which is the one
the Pres ident selected. But I would like to yield back to you.
The C hairman. T hank you very much, because we do have a caucus
afte r a bit and I will then tur n it over to you.
PROVISIONAL MILI TAR Y DEMARCATION LIN E

Because this keeps recu rring , I want to re ad one parag raph from the
Geneva Accords into the record because members seem to forget it.
This is t he final dec laration of th e Geneva Convention, Ju ly 21, 1954,
and section 6 rea ds:
The Conference recognizes tha t the essential purpose of the agreement rel at­
ing to Vietnam is to settle milit ary questions with a view to ending hostilities
and tha t the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way
be interpr eted as c onstituti ng a political or t err itor ial boundary. The Conference
expresses its conviction tha t the execution of the provisions s et out in the pres­
ent declaratio n and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the
necessary basis for th e achievement in the near f utur e of a political settlement in
Vietnam.
Then, of course, there are the provisions in the agreement of the
Cessation of Hostilit ies in Vietnam on J uly 20, 1954, which was p ri­
marily the milit ary settlement of the war between the French and
Vietnamese. I quote p art of article 1. T his is merely to identif y it for
purposes of people who wish to pursue it :
The provisional milit ary demarcation line is fixed as shown on the map at ­
tached. So it refers to that. There was no question about the intention of all
the people in Geneva except the United States tha t it wasn’t two countries.
AVIIAT IS AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN WRONG

I refe r again, at the risk of seeming to belabor a m atte r because I

thin k it is f undamen tal. Dr. Gelb, to your thesis, which I thin k needs
 48

em pha sis. ou v ery fo rce ful ly rep eat it in yo ur st at em en t: “So me thi ng

is wrong somew here. So me thi ng alw ays lias heen wr on g.” You have
tou che d on thi s, but I th in k it is well since we arc rev iew ing t he pas t
whic h was rea lly t he pu rpo se of th is he ari ng . It is th e in tru sio n of the
Pr es id en t s sp eech th at has o ccasio ned its disc ussio n, not th at T obje ct
to it bu t it is a coinci dence. Cou ld you ela bo rat e a bit on wh at it is
th at was wron g. You emp hasi ze it so cle arl y the re, an d in the next
pa ra gr ap h you say. “W ith ou t th is leg itim acy , an d the que st for it
seems n eve r-e ndi ng, th e S aig on reg ime pe rp et ua lly wi ll req uir e Am eri ­
can su pp or t.”
I th in k fo r the en lig hte nm en t of th e com mitt ee, you ou gh t to ela b­
or ate on it bec ause you ha d som eth ing mo re in mi nd t ha n thos e wor ds
tod ay.
Mr. G elb. Ye s, sir. Vi etn am alw ays ha sn 't been one co un try . I t has
been div ide d by con que rers in th e pa st. It was div ide d int o ad mi nis ­
tr at iv e reg ion s by the Fr en ch . At th e be gin nin g of W or ld W ar I I , as
is well kno wn, a gro up ca lli ng them selv es the Vi et Mi nh came int o
being to dr ive ou t the Fr en ch an d th e Ja pa ne se , an d to cre ate a na ­
tio na l sta te, a sing le na tio na l sta te. All evid ence po in ts to th e fa ct
th at mos t Vie tnam ese su pp or te d the Vi et Min h. Th ere were no t th at
ma ny col lab ora tor s. I t was a str on g na tio na l mov eme nt, a mov emen t
th at , in t he ju dg me nt of ev ery sc ho lar I k now, ev ery hi sto ria n I kn ow,
of Vie tna m, w ould h ave i n the n at ur al c ourse o f e ven ts come t o pow er
in all of Vie tnam . Th is doe sn’t mea n th ey wer e wi th ou t opp osit ion .
No po lit ica l gro up in an y co un try is wi th ou t opp osi tio n. T hat isn ’t
the issue. Th e po int i s it was a mov eme nt to est abl ish th ei r own coun ­
tr y fr ee fro m for eig n d om ina tio n.
I f you look at the Pe nt ag on pa pe rs you will see th a t in 1947 and
1948 o ur own int ell ige nce com mu nity and ou r spe cia lis ts in th e St ate
D ep ar tm en t r ecog nize d t hi s, an d the y co uld n't f ind any d ire ct li nk s o r
str in gs b ein g pulle d on Ho Ch i Mi nh fro m Moscow. Th ey ques tion ed
in a memo to the Se cr et ar y of St at e at th at tim e, De an Aches on,
wh eth er th er e was an y in tim at e conn ectio n at a ll bey ond t he fa ct t h at
TTo Chi Min h in ad di tio n to be ing a na tio na l was also a Com mun ist.
The C hairman. Acheson concluded he was, tho ugh; didn ’t he?
Mr . G elb. We ll, it i s n ot c lea r t h a t h e c onc lude d h e w as, bu t I th in k
he con clud ed fo r rea son s ha vi ng l itt le to do wit h Vi etn am its elf , th at
the U. S. ou gh t to he lp th e Fr en ch , wh eth er Ho Ch i Mi nh was con­
tro lle d fro m Moscow or not , an d I th in k we know , mo vin g a jum p
fu rt he r in his tor y, th at t he Pr es id en t of t he Un ite d St ate s Dw igh t D.
Ei sen ho we r belie ved th a t Ho Ch i Mi nh ha d th e su pp or t of the ove r­
wh elm ing m ajor ity o f th e Vie tnames e peop le, some 80 per cen t, not all,
bu t wh at Pr es id en t of th e Un ite d St ate s cou ld com man d 80 p erc ent ?
I t ha s been a lo ng tim e.
Th er e hav e been gro up s in op po sit ion t o Vi et Mi nh, g ro up s of va ri ­
ous c ha rac ter , some de pe nd ing ver y d ire ctl y on the U ni te d Sta tes , some
o f re all y ind igen ous q ua lit y. Th ese g rou ps h ave n eve r be en able to g et
them selv es tog eth er. I t seems th a t th ei r commo n confli cts are gr ea ter
th an th ei r commo n int ere sts , an d so in the na tu ra l cours e of event s,
wi th the rep ressive an d I th in k obvi ousl y rep ress ive reg im e of Diem ,
the V iet Minh. fo rces beg an to ga in pow er a ga in an d on ce V iet na m was
in da ng er of bei ng lost to t hes e forc es, the U.S . beg an to ste p in ver y
 49
heavily ; hut all th rough th is process you see contending forces withi n
a nation seeking independence and seeking to settle thei r question of
who shall be the government of the ir own country, and you see at
the same time outside powers coming in to tip the scales one way or
another, succeeding because they were lar ge powers, in perpe tuatin g
the war but never endin g it. T thi nk tha t is what was behind my state­
ment, sir.
COO PER AV ION I N RE SC U IN G U .S . PI LO TS AN D F IG H T IN G JA P A N E S E

The C hairman. Y ou have refreshed my memory on one other point,

on which pe rhaps you are informed. Was it correct tha t about 1944 or
1945 American officers, specifically, I believe, a Colonel Gallaghe r,
cooperated with ITo Chi Minh in the rescue of American pilots and
fighting the Japan ese in N orth Vietnam? Do you remember something
about th at?
Mr. G elb. Yes, there was cooperation when the U.S. OSS (Office of
Strat egic Services) teams and Viet Minh—the extent of that is not
clear.
The Chairman. It seems to me I recall in one of Berna rd Fa ll’s
books tha t our own OSS recommended Ho Chi Minh very highly to
our own people as the most effective man to combat the Japane se d ur­
ing t ha t period in th e lat ter days of the war, when ITo Chi Minh was
released from prison, I believe, in China. He came down there. I am not
exactly clear on the time, but we will go into this later.
BA CK GR OU ND OF M EM BE RS O F P R E S E N T SO U T H V IE T N A M E SE
G O VE RN M EN T

Arisin g out of one of Senator Perc y’s questions, I meant to ask also
about the present government of South Vietnam. Was General Kv a
member of the French Air Force durin g the war between 1946 and
1954 ? Do you remember ? Do either one of you know ?
Mr. Gelb. I just can’t remember. I t hink so.
Mr. T homson. I can't remember.
I'he C hairman. Where d id General Ky learn to fly an airplane? Did
we train him or did the French ?
Mr. Gelb. I believe the French, but I am not certain.
The Chairman. Do you know whether General Thieu was a n ort h­
erner or a sou therner ?
Mr. G elb. I believe he was-----
The C hairman. By b irth?
Mr. Gelb. I believe both Ky and Thieu were northerners.
The Chairman. Were they not both members o f the French Air
Force or the Frenc h A rmy? Armed Forces? You don't know?
Mr. Gelb. T o the best of my recollection; yes.
W AS former president diem a colonial governor?
The C hairman. Was former Presi dent Diem a colonial governor
before the war ?Do you know that ?
Mr. Gelb. I believe he was, sir.
 50
H O C H I M I N H ’s PL E A D IN G CA US E OF IN D E P E N D E N T V IE T N A M

Th e C ha irm an . Y ou men tion ed Mr . Ho Chi M inh be gi nn in g th is

proce ss in W or ld W ar I I. I seem to h av e rea d th at as ea rly a s th e V er ­
sail les con fere nce he ap pe are d an d p lea de d th e ca use o f an in de pe nd en t
Vie tna m. Do y ou know a ny th in g a bout t ha t?
Mr. G elb . W ha t yo u say is co rre ct, s ir.
Th e C ha irm an . I t is co rre ct ?
Mr . G elb. He sou gh t to get an aud ienc e, I bel iev e; it was den ied
him .
Th e C hai rm an . He was th at ea rly , pl ea di ng the cause of an ind e­
pe nd en t V ie tn am ; is th at ri gh t ?
Mr. G elb. Yes, s ir.
Mr. T homson . Th at is cor rec t.

FE UD AL T Y P E of U N IT Y I N V IE T N A M

Th e C hai rm an . Y ou me nti oned th e gove rnm en t fro m tim e to tim e

ha d been div ide d. I mean , th ere were th e th re e pr in ci pa l pro vin ces o f
Vie tna m. D id i t or did i t not have a t leas t a feu da l t yp e o f u ni ty un de r
an em pe ro r? W as th ere an em pe ro r who was ge ne ral ly re fe rre d to as
the e mp ero r of Vi etn am ?
Mr. G elb. Bao Dai was con side red the em pe ror of Vi etn am .
Th e C ha irm an . H er ed ita ry em pe ro r; is th at cor rec t?
Mr. G elb. I beli eve so.
Mr. T homson . Tec hnica lly , he w as E m pe ro r o f An nam .
Th e C hai rma n . W ha t?
Mr. T homson . Em pe ro r o f A nn am , B ao Dai. B ut g oin g b ack i n hi s­
to ry th er e was a unif ied em pir e, a Vie tna me se em pir e, bu il t on the
Chi nese Co nfu cia n model.

A S S U M P T IO N T H IS IS NO T A C IV IL WA R

Th e C ha irm an . T ha t was my imp res sio n. Th ere were th re e lar ge

pro vinc es, bu t the y con side red them selv es p ar t of Vi etn am . Th e only
reas on I me nti oned it is wi th ref ere nce to th is fu nd am en tal ass um p­
tio n wh ich rec urs in th is an d pr ev iou s A dm in is tra tio n’s sta tem en ts
th at thi s is no t a c ivil wa r. I t re lat es to yo ur ve ry str on g s tat em en t t h at
th is is a civil wa r. th at it i sn ’t a w ar b etwe en two in de pe nd en t na tio n
sta tes an d neve r has been. I s t h at no t yo ur pos itio n ?
Mr. G elb. Yes, i t is, sir .
Mr. T homson . T ha t ha s been one of ou r gr ea tes t stu m bl ing blocks
becaus e m en in gov ern me nt hav e in fa ct bel ieve d, h ave them selv es con­
sid ere d t h at i t was no t a civ il wa r whe n a ll alo ng it ha s bee n v ery cle ar
to a ll p ar ti ci pa nt s an d to all sch ola rs t h at it is a civ il w ar.
V IE T N A M E SE U N IT Y W H IL E F IG H T IN G F R E N C H

Th e C ha irm an . O rig in al ly it wa s a colo nial wa r. I t was th e Vi et

M inh fig ht ing the F re n ch ; was n’t it ?
Mr. T homso n. T hat is c orr ect .
Th e C ha irm an . An d at th at tim e, exc ept fo r the Fr en ch force s,
th er e was gr ea t un ity , even th ou gh , as Dr . Gelb ha s sai d, th ey were
no t una nim ous. B ut I belie ve in Ei sen ho we r’s book, “M an da te for
 51
( hange, ” he says if the election h ad been he ld duri ng the fighting,
Ho Chi Min h would have received 80 percent of the votes. This does
relate, I think , to the way you look at it, but our Government has
misrepresented this in its rhetoric all along for many years, but it is
rath er essential.
UN IQU EN ESS OF U.S . SUPPORT OF COLONIAL POWER

Do you recall any other case in the history of the Unit ed States
where i t took th e side of the colonial power to assist i t to retai n con­
trol of a colony ?
Mr. T homson. I t doesn’t come to mind, but I might j ust point out
tha t there was an anomaly, Senato r Fulb righ t, tha t grew sadly out
of the death of Pres iden t Roosevelt, because otherwise in Southeast
Asia we elected to u rge our allies, our w artime allies, to divest them­
selves of the ir colonial holdings. The plan of Presi dent Roosevelt
had been at one stage of the war to p ut Indoch ina un der i nterna tional
trusteeship. He felt very strongly th at the Fren ch should not come
back and he was suppo rted by the Fa r Eas t Division in the State
Departm ent.
With the Pre side nt’s death, however, in Ap ril 1945, power shifted
within the Depa rtmen t of State —this is bei ng brough t out by docu­
ments now being published—power s hifted t o the Europe an Bureau,
and those who felt th at our relations with Franc e must be para ­
mount prevailed in the advice t ha t was given to Presid ent Truman.
And it was as a result of th is b ureaucra tic power shift , basically, tha t
we did supp ort the Frenc h retur n and then, in due course, financed
the French war.
The Chairman. Y ou know of no similar instance in which this
country has suppor ted a colonial power in such fashion, do you ?
Mr. T homson. It doesn’t come to mind.
The C hairman. It doesn’t come to my mind, either. It ought to come
to your mind if it occurred since you are an historian .
Mr. T homson. I am searching my mind, sir.
The Chairman. We haven ’t had tha t long a h ist ory ; I can’t thi nk
of any case.
Mr. T homson. We did supp ort the Government of P akis tan against
a government in Bangladesh , but it is a fair ly recent phenomenon.
The Chairman. I am not sure you are correct in saving tha t is a
colonial holding. They were created once at the same time as p art of
India . I don’t thin k it was ever commonly regard ed as a colony.
Mr. T homson. Only by the Bengalis.
The Chairman. Only by th e Bengalis is correct. But Vie tnam was
not considered a colony only by the Vietnamese. I t had been acknowl­
edged as a colony by everybody for 75 or 80 years or so; had n't it?
Mr. T homson. I thin k tha t is correct.
The Chairman. I don’t thin k tha t is an analagous situation. Be­
sides tha t, wha t did we do for the Pakis tanis, if you wish to make a
case for it, ot her tha n to ti lt the rhetoric a little ? We had alr eady given
them the a rms before that . We did noth ing very specific at tha t pa r­
ticul ar time.
Air. T homson. Th at is correct.
The Chairman. Whereas, we did a grea t d eal in this case.
 52
ACCEPTANCE OF POLITICAL MIS JUDG MEN T OR ERROR

This is a unique instance and it is anothe r reason why I thin k your

theory tha t the acceptance of a political misjudgme nt o r e rror is the
righ t way. i f you are ever going to cleanse t heir minds of the afflic­
tions t hat have grown up t hrough these wars. I see no thing wrong or
immoral about th at. This is wnat I starte d ou t asking. I don’t unde r­
stand why a country, just as an individual, can’t accept the idea th at
they could be wrong in a political judgment. There is nothin g im­
moral about that. It goes back to the same period in which we took
also a peculiar attitud e toward the indigenous forces in China ; did
we not. Mr. Gelb? I mean, this is about the same time we were making
up our minds in a slightly different case. China was not quite a colony
althou gh it had been chewed up and treate d like a colony by many
of the European countries. Each got part s of it. But we were unduly
influenced by an obsession with ideological matters dur ing t hat period;
were we not ?
Mr. T homson. Our intervention in the Chinese civil war was suffi­
ciently halfhe arted to win us the enmity of both sides eventually.
The Chairman. Yes, and was equally unsucessful, I mean.
Mr. T homson. It was highly unsuccessful. For tunat ely, we did not
press it as fa r as we have been encouraged to press i t in Vietnam. And
to some degree I am afr aid i t was the memory of Chi na’s loss and the
consequences thereof in this country tha t forced one president after
another to han g on in Vietnam.
The C hairman. Yes.
was president's statement admission of failure of vietnamization ?

Let's see. T was left a question by Mr. Muskie.

Mr. Muskie says he has to go to the floor. li e asks, do you feel th at
last nig ht’s statement by the Presi dent was, among o ther things, an
admission tha t Vietnamizat ion was a failure?
Mr. T homson. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Gelb. I would say at least it was an admission th at he didn’t
want to take the chance and see.
WII AT HAVE NORTH VIETNAM ESE OR RUSSIANS DONE?

The C hairman. This is anothe r question he left here. What is it

that the North Vietnamese have done to the United States or tha t
the Russians have done or tha t either have done, th at would ju stify
the actions tha t we are taking?
Mr. T homson. It strikes me, sir, tha t the North Vietnamese have
proved a determina tion to survive and prevail and that , in itself, has
caused the American P residen ts to feel impend ing h umiliatio n at hi s
doorstep; tha t is all th ey have done. And anothe r kind of leader from
a different vantage point could have construed t ha t reality in differ­
ent terms.
The Chairman. D o you have any comment on th at, Mr. Gelb?
Mr. Gelb. I agree with it, sir.
 53
RA TI ON AL E FO R 19 65 BO M BI NG

The C hairman. Mr. Gelb, I believe you were there at the time. Could
you tell us what the rational e was for the bombing tha t began in
Febru ary of 1965?
Mr. G elb. I was not in the executive branch of Government at t ha t
time.
The C hairman. Were you, Mr. Thomson ?
Mr. T homson. I was in the executive branch a t the time, sir, and the
rationale, as I remember, was multi ple, as I have suggested. It was
originally to break their will, but with the bombing of the Pleiku
barracks in the first week of Febr uary, an additio nal incentive was,
as I have suggested, to stiffen Saigon's spine. So it began with dual
aims: to break the will of the north and to stiffen the spine of the
south, but eventually there was added to it the hope of inducing the
north into some kind of a conference sit uation—though by t he way
the negotia tory options were phrased at the time, in retrospect, it seems
tha t tha t conference would have been one in which to receive thei r
surrender.
Mr. Gelb. It was also a means of restr icting the flow of supplies
of men from north to south.
Mr. T homson. Correct. The fur the r rationale was to try to c ut the
infiltra tion routes.
R A TI O N A LE FO R 1 9 6 4 S T R IK E ON C IT Y OF V IN H

The C hairman. Wha t was the rationale fo r the strike on, I believe,
the city of Vinh on August 4,1964? Do either one of you know? That,
I believe, was the first overt, su bstantia l str ike. Are eithe r one of you
fami liar with th at inciden t?
Mr. T homson. I don’t have clear recollection of that.
Mr. G elb. Are you ta lkin g about th e Tonkin Gulf incident?
The Chairman. There was an alleged second incid ent on August 7.
What T am asking you is, insofar as you deduct or have found out
from the papers or your personal experience, what was the real rea­
son fo r tha t strike, not th e alleged reason?
Mr. G elb. Well, if we look at the papers, and I can’t say th is from
my own firsthand experience, but i f we look at th e papers, I think our
leaders were trying to send Hanoi a message.
Mr. T homson. T he p hrasin g was “to show them we mean business,”
whatever tha t means.
The Chairman. I s tha t what the papers indicate ?
Mr. Gf.lb. Yes, sir.
The. Chairman. I t was to send them a message. We hear th at phrase
in curre nt political statements around the country, tryi ng to send
Washington a message. Some of them are succeeding pret ty well up
to a point, but the message has not gotten through yet.
Mr. T homson. One finds, Mr. Chairman -----
The C hairman. I wondered if you h ad stu died it. You know what I
am talking about, Mr. Thomson : don’t you ?
Mr. T homson. I am not entirely on the track.
 54

Th e C hairm an . T he re hav e been thr ee o r fo ur b ooks w ritte n abo ut

th is inc ide nt. Th e lat es t one I hav e seen is Mr. A us tin ’s, of the New
Yo rk Time s. I t prov es pr ett y conc lusi vely —I sup pos e th at dep end s
upon a lot of ot her thi ng s, o ne’s own ex peri ence a nd ba ck gro un d—t hat
the alleg ed i nci den t d id n' t occur.
Mr. T homson. I can s peak blu nt ly to t ha t po int .
The C hair man . Tha t is w hat I am ask ing you abo ut.
Mr. T homson. I was in the W hit e Hous e. Th e NS C staf f a t the ti me
and some of my colleag ues ind ica ted ver y cle arl y th at th er e was no
cred ible eviden ce th at the second inc ide nt ha d, in fac t, eve r taken
place. I t was jud ged , ho weve r, to be use ful non ethe less , to sho w, a s th e
pa pe rs reg ula rly ' p ut it, ou r will or ou r resol ve, reg ard les s of the ab ­
sence of a c lea r casus belli.
The C hair man . An d th is was in te rp re te d to mea n if we show ed th e
will the n the No rth Viet nam ese wou ld su rre nd er. I mea n, bei ng faced
wit h su ch ov erw helm ing powe r, th ey wo uld stop . I s t h at re all y t he way
the y were th in ki ng ?
Mr. T homson. “W ould be br ou gh t to th ei r kne es” was the phras e
th at w as used.
The C hairm an . A nd, in effect, be wi lli ng t o set tle it on ou r te rm s;
is th at corre ct ? I s th at a fa ir sum ma ry ?
Mr. T homson. Th at was the hope, yes.
Th e C hairm an . S o, ag ain , th at was ra th er a seri ous mis take in
jud gm ent , to o; wasn’t it ?
Mr. T homson. It was, sir.
Th e C hairm an . Se na tor P er cy s ays he wou ld l ike to a sk a few more
questio ns. I am goi ng to hav e to leave in 5 mi nutes because I have a
caucu s comin g up, b ut you proce ed if you like .
Se na tor P ercy. T ha nk you, sir. I wil l keep m y que stio ns sh or t and
possi bly wi th br ief answ ers we c an cover all the are as th a t I have in
min d a t t hi s tim e.
KE Y ISSU ES DIV IDIN G TWO SIDES

W ha t do you see as th e key issues th at now div ide t he tw o sides and

on whic h agr eem ent mu st be rea che d befo re a set tle me nt can be made
on a neg oti ate d basi s ?
Mr. T homson. Well , th e ke y u lti ma te issue is who c ont rol s th e so uth.
Se na tor P ercy. I s wh at ?
Mr. T homson. W ho sha ll con trol th e sou th, and t h at is an issue on
which ne ith er side will give way so fa r.
Se na tor P ercy. S o th at you are ta ki ng a ve ry dim outl ook fo r a
neg oti ate d sett lem ent?
Mr. T homson . Wel l, 'when I say w hich sid e co ntrols th e sou th, the re
is b uil t into t hat p hr as in g a con cept o f tim eta ble . One ha s he ard o ver
recent yea rs from hig h levels o f even th is ad mi nis tra tio n th e th ou gh t
of a dece nt int erv al, an i nte rva l betwe en a se ttle me nt t h at ha s t he look
of non def eat , an d t he act ual p ass ing of co ntro l in th e so uth to t he Com ­
mun ists. It soun ds cyni cal and it ma y well be hy po cri tic al, bu t the re
are thos e in polic y pos itio ns who ge ne ral ly believ e th at the crea tion
o f a decen t int erv al mu st be i tem 1 on ou r a gen da becaus e w ith ou t suc h
an int erv al between the sett lem ent and , let us say, the c omm uniz atio n
of the s out h, the a dm ini str ati on woul d run int o s evere tro ub le at home
 55

an d abr oad . I t ma y be co rre ct in its asse ssm ent of th e hom e-si de con­
sequenc es, a lth ou gh I d ou bt i t ; bu t I t h in k it is v ery u nl ike ly th a t it is
cor rec t in its asse ssm ent of wo rld -w ide conseq uence s.
EXTENT o r NORT H VIETN AMESE NEGOTIA TIONS FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS
PURPOSES

Se na tor P ercy. T o wh at ex ten t do you th in k th e ne go tia tio ns hav e

been ca rri ed on by th e N or th Vi etn am ese sim ply fo r th e pu rp os e of
pub lic rel ati on s?
* Mr. T homso n. I th in k all pa rti es to i nte ns e ne go tia tio ns str ess a p ub ­
lic rel ati on s asp ect of th e ne go tia tio ns , wh ich is th e ex ter na l look at
th e process . One i s t ry in g to d ru m u p su pp or t, tr y in g to lo ok cre dib le.
Th er e is at t he he ar t of th e m at te r th e ho pe fo r a ha pp y ou tcom e; so
* I wou ld say th a t “p ub lic re lat io ns ” wo uld ov er sim pl ify H an oi ’s
in ten t.
JASON STUDY GROUP CONCLUSION CONCE RNING BLOCKADING NORT H
VIETN AM

Se na tor P ercy. I )r. Gelb , if I can tu rn t o th e th ir d al te rn at iv e, the

one th at th e Pr es id en t is pu rs ui ng , an In st it ute of De fen se An aly ses
stu dy th at was inc lud ed in one ver sio n of the Pe nt ag on pa pe rs con ­
clu ded th at bl oc ka din g N or th Vi etn am wo uld no t wor k. W ou ld you
ca re to com men t on t h a t ?
Mr. G elb. T h at was th e con clus ion of w ha t was cal led th e Ja so n
St ud y Gr oup. Th ey , as you know, no t on ly loo ked at th e blo cka de
alone bu t also at an a ll- ou t bo mb ing c am pa ign at th e sam e t im e an d I
th in k the con clus ions wh ich th ey cam e to are sim ila r to th e ones I
offe r abo ut th e po te nt ia l effect of Pr es id en t Ni xo n’s cu rre nt acti ons .
Se na tor P ercy. We wer e bo mb ing ve ry close to th e Ch in a bo rd er
bac k in th e Jo hn so n ad m in ist ra tio n, an d th at inv olv ed ve ry gra ve
risk .

TIM E SPAN IN MOVING NORTH VIETNA MESE SUPP LIES SOUTH

Th e avow ed pu rpo se of t ry in g no w to eng age i n th is ne w e sca lati on

, is to de fen d a nd pr ot ec t ou r A me ric an force s.
Ho w lon g wo uld it ta ke sup pli es or di na rily , if no t in te rd ic te d as
th ey came in fro m Ch in a by ra il, or kno cke d ou t as th ey pas sed
th ro ug h N or th Vi etn am , un de r con dit ion s t od ay t o rea ch for ces u sin g
» the m ag ai ns t A m eri ca n fo rces ?
Mr . G elb. T h at is how lo ng wo uld i t ta ke i f t he y cou ld no t be mov ed
by ra il ?
Se na to r P ercy. I f th ey di d sli p th ro ug h un de r pr es en t con dit ion s,
how lon g wo uld it tak e tho se sup pli es to ev en tua lly rea ch forc es of
N or th Vi etn am us ing tho se sup plie s, am mu nit ion , an d ta n k fue l
ag ai ns t th e r em ai ni ng Am eri ca n forc es ?
Mr. G elb . I do n’t kno w if I am co mp ete nt to giv e th at pa rt ic ul ar
ju dg me nt, sir. I do kno w th a t fro m alm ost 1966, 1967, an d 1968, v ar i­
ous tim es un de r Pr es id en t Jo hn so n, au th or it y was gr an te d to str ik e
ev er yt hin g th at mov ed, tru ck s an d tra in s, an d un de r tho se cir cu m­
sta nce s in 1968 at t he he ig ht of the bom bin g, th e N or th Vi etn am ese were
st ill a ble to move a n eno rmo us am ount of su pp lie s d ow n i nto th e s out h.
 56

Tha t is the only basis of comparison that I have.

Senator P ercy. But if they are subjected to intensive bombing as
they are now. what is th e time span? Can you get down th ere in 30
days? Or does it take 6 months f or fuel and ammunition to move all
the way down the country ?
Mr. Gelb. Well, under battle conditions from the north ern border
down into the south, i t certainly would t ake more th an 10 days and
clearly less than 6 months. The exact ti me would depend on how many
trucks they had available, whether they traveled at nigh t or during
the day, factors such as that.
1 9 6 5 CO NC ER N OVER PO SS IB LE C H IN E S E IN T E R V E N T IO N

Senator P ercy. P rofessor Thomson, the Penta gon Pape rs also indi­
cated tha t in 1965 the Preside nt’s advisers feared a massive bombing of
North Vietnam would bri ng Chinese intervention. Was th at judgment
a sound judgme nt at th e time?
Air. T homson. We had within the Government at the time, Senator
Percy, some very talented kinds of watchers, part icula rly Allen
Whiti ng, who h ad done a remarkable book on Chinese interventio n
in the Korean war, and such men as Whit ing felt tha t the tripw ire
that would brin g China in would be, as I suggested earlie r, any U.S.
move th at looked as i f it might displace an d ove rthrow th e regime in
North Vietnam, the established state in North Vietnam, and thereby
endanger Chinese borders.
It was also feared, however, th at bombing close to China ’s borde r
and t he doctrine of hot p ursu it m ight bring us in to a situa tion where
Mi G’s were stationed across the border on Chinese fields, and Ameri­
can forces would feel compelled to cross that border.
By and large, I thin k the concern over possible Chinese intervention
was appro priate , and I thin k by and large tha t although we came
fairl y close, we played that partic ular game with prudence.
E FF E C T OF LA TE ST AC TI ON S ON P R E S ID E N T ’S C H IN A PO LI CY

Senator P ercy. From the stand point of our relationship with China,
the P reside nt has enunciated a very clear policy of neg otiation rath er
than co nfrontation, and he has gone to extraordin ary efforts to fu rthe r
this objective.
Will Peking be responsive to tourism, to c ultural exchanges? There
have been fair ly large groups which have left from Mexico recently.
Another group went and came back w ith glowing re ports about how
well they had been received, but so fa r as I know—other than the
Pres iden t’s trip , the businessmen, the Scott-Mansfield tr ip and a few
tourists —there has been no fur the r word from Peking.
Wh at effect do you thi nk th is lat est action by the Pres ident is likely
to have on moving us slowly, gradually , cautiously, toward furt her ne­
gotiation r athe r than confront ation?
Mr. T homson. Well. I migh t point out tha t withou t much publicity,
small groups of Americans are fair ly regula rly travel ing to China
these days—student groups, Chinese-American scholars and the like.
The dean of China studies in t his country. John Fairb ank, is dep art­
ing with his wife for 2 months in C hina t his week, which is something
of a b reakthrou gh. By and large, though, there is no open faucet for
travel or trad e between China and the United States ; and P eking, I am
sure, will tend to keep a very tigh t hand on the closed faucet or the
slim trickle of travele rs and trader s. It is quite clear tha t Peki ng’s
pride, Peki ng’s own sense of its worth as an ally, is engaged in the
troubles we are inflicting on Nort h Vietnam.
It is f urt her c lear that Peking regards t rade and travel and nego­
tiations on all such issues as matte rs tha t will be held up until we
shape up, so to speak, from their vant age point. So I can see nothing
but roadblocks to fur the r progress on the Washin gton-Pe king nego-
tiator y fron t as a result o f the moves the Presid ent made last night.
PRO SPEC T FOR NE GO TIA TIO NS W IT H SOVIET U N IO N

Senator P ercy. I)r. Gelb, would you care to comment on the pros­
pects for n egotiatio ns on very key, impor tant areas of mutual interest
with the Soviet Union a nd wha t this will do? Is this going to have any
effect? Will it have an adverse effect? Will it have a positive effect?
Mr. G elb. I can' t believe it will have a positive effect. I know there
are many who believe tha t the only way to deal with the Soviet Union
is wi th a bludgeon and a sword, but it has not been clear to me th at
tha t approa ch has proved very successful. I t hink both nations over the
last couple of years have indicated a g reate r willingness to talk to each
other about common interests, even tho ugh conflicting, really conflict­
ing interests do exist.
I can’t help but believe th at by pus hing the Soviet Union into this
box, a box which the Presid ent himself feels is ridden with humili ation,
can do nothin g except injure relations between us and the Soviet
Union.
Senator, may I ask a question of my colleague ?
Senator P ercy. Y ou certainly can.
president’s saying nothing about china in speech

Mr. Gelb. The Pres ident gave so much attentio n to the Soviet Union
at th e end of his speech; he said nothing about China. How would you
explain tha t?
Mr. T homson. Well, I am convinced tha t the master planners in
the White House assume t hat P ekin g’s greatest sense of thre at comes
from those nearly 1 million Soviet troops along China ’s 4,500-mile
fron tier with the Soviet Union and from the saber rattl ers in the
Kremlin.
Clearly, Mr. Nixon does not want to jeopardize his relations with
China, but he does feel quite obviously th at he can go fair ly far in
twi tting Moscow without bringin g a th rea t to be ar on Peking.
My f ear, however, is tha t t hey may very much ov erplay and over­
estimate Pek ing’s tolerance of o ur actions in Southeast Asia and Pe­
king’s obsession with the Soviet Union.
Senator P ercy. Your testimony has been extremely help ful and
though t-provoki ng for us.
 58

tomorro w’s wit ne sse s

The se h ea rin gs wi ll now be rec essed un til 10 o’clock to mo rro w m or n­

ing. O ur witn esse s tom orr ow on th e same sub jec t wil l be Pr of es so r
Sc hle sin ge r of Ci ty Un iv er sit y of New Yo rk an d Pr of es so r Cho msk y
of M IT .
INVIT ATIO N TO ADMINIS TRATION WITNES SES

I w ould a sk t he staf f o f th e c om mit tee to ind ica te to th e A dm in is tra­

tio n th e sug ges tion th a t I hav e ma de an d th e in vi ta tio n of t he ch ai r­
ma n fo r any A dm in ist ra tio n witn esse s who w oul d li ke to ap pe ar in the
cours e of th ese h ea rin gs, so th at we m ay hav e as bal anc ed a pi ctu re a s
we c an pos sibl y have. I ap pre cia te th e ch ai rm an ’s w illi ngnes s to hav e
th at done.
(W he reu po n, at 1 :10 p.m. , t he h ea rin g was ad jou rn ed , to recon vene
at 10 a.m., W edn esd ay, Ma y 10 ,1972 .)
 CAUSES, OR IGI NS , AND LESS ONS OF TH E VIETN AM
WAR

W E D N E S D A Y , M A Y 10 , 19 72

U nited S tates S enate ,

C ommi ttee on F oreign R elatio ns ,
Wa sh ing ton , D .C.
Th e c omm ittee me t, p ur su an t to not ice, a t 10 a.m., in roo m 4221, New
Se na te Office Bui ld in g, Se na to r J . W . F ulb ri g h t (c ha irm an ) pr esi din g.
Pr es en t: Se na tor s Fu lb ri gh t, Sy mi ng ton , Pe ll, Ja vi ts , an d Pe rcy .
Th e C ha irm an . Th e co mm itte e wil l co me to o rde r.
O P E N IN G S TA T E M E N T

To da y we ar e c on tin uin g t he hea rin gs on th e c auses, ori gin s, an d l es­

sons of th e Vi etn am wa r. Beca use of th e Pr es id en t’s Mo nday ni gh t
mess age to th e co un try , ye ste rd ay ’s he ar in gs de al t to a gr ea t ex ten t
w ith cu rr en t U.S . act ion s in Vi etn am . Su ch a tre nd in th e disc ussi on
was to be exp ecte d, giv en th e fa ct th a t pr es en t policy in In do ch in a
rep res en ts a fa ir ly c onsis ten t co nti nu ati on o f ou r ea rli er p olici es. F o r
ins tan ce, m any o f th e or igi na l rat ion ale s fo r in ter ve nt io n rem ain w ith
us, how eve r im pla usi ble t he y ma y seem to d a y ; a nd , of cours e, th e un ­
lea rn ed lessons of th e Vi etn am exp erie nce con tin ue to ha un t us. We
wi ll, th er ef or e, con tin ue i n a hi sto ric al vei n to a dd res s t he qu esti on of
how we becam e inv olv ed in V iet na m, b ea rin g in m ind t he d ire ct rel e­
vanc e of s uch an ap pr oa ch t o cu rre nt p olic y.
We ar e fo rtun at e ind eed to ha ve wi th us to da y two witn esse s who
ha ve dev oted con sid era ble stu dy to th e field of Vi etn am polic y.
O ur fi rst wi tnes s w ill be P ro fe ss or A rt h u r Sc hle sin ger , J r. , fro m th e
Ci ty U ni ve rsi ty o f New Yo rk , w ho was fo rm er ly a n aid e to P re sid en ts
Ke nn ed y an d Jo hn so n. H e wil l b e fo llow ed by Pr of es so r N oam Cho m­
sky o f M IT , au th or of n um ero us sch ola rly w ork s i n t hi s fi eld.
Gen tlem en, we ar e ve ry ple ase d th a t you h ave been wi lli ng t o come
here . Th e coin cide nce of yo ur ap pe ara nc e w ith th e dev elo pm ent s in
Vi etn am onl y ad ds, I th in k, gr ea te r in te re st to yo ur t est im ony .
Dr . Sc hle sin ger , w ill yo u b egi n, plea se ?

STA TEM ENT 0E PRO FES SOR AR TH UR M. SCH LES ING ER, JR .,
CI TY UN IV ER SI TY OF N EW YORK
Mr . S chle singe r. T ha nk you, Mr . C ha irm an .
Th e C ha irm an . Yo ur en tir e sta tem en t wi ll be pu t in th e rec ord as
w rit te n an d you ma y do as you plea se—c om me nt on it o r rea d it.
(59)

S3 -6 05 — 73- -o
 60
Mr. S chles inger . I will s um ma rize p ort ion s an d rea d portio ns. T he
sta tem en t i s to o lo ng f or a ful l rea din g.
As an hi sto ria n, I wa nt first to com men d th e com mit tee fo r un de r­
ta ki ng th is com plex an d difficult inq uir y. I am sur e th a t fu tu re hi s­
to ria ns w ill be m ystif ied when , l ookin g b ack a t the 1950’s a nd 1960’s—
even th e e ar ly 1970’s—they t ry to fig ure o ut wh at led success ive A me r­
ica n Pr es id en ts to supp ose th at ou r na tio na l in ter es t an d sec uri ty
were so v ita lly in volv ed in the f at e o f a sma ll co un try on the m ain lan d
of So uth ea ste rn Asia as t o ju st ify t he blood, d est ruc tio n, atr oc ity and
ago ny fo r whi ch Am eri can poli cy ha s been resp ons ible . I hav e no
doub t th a t thes e he ari ngs, an d an y conc lusio ns the com mit tee may
dra w, wil l pro vid e m ate ria l of ine sti ma ble i mp ort an ce fo r sch ola rs in
ge ne rat ion s to come.
Le t me also s ay at the s ta rt t h at t he re is , in my jud gm en t, no sing le
ans we r to ou r prob lem. What . T will end eav or to do is dis en tan gle
wh at seem to one hi sto ria n sig nif ica nt th re ad s of th ou gh t an d polic y
th at l ed us to so g ha stl y a cu lm ina tio n in So uth ea ste rn Asi a. L im ita ­
tio ns of tim e will oblig e me to ma ke my po int s quick ly an d cri sp ly
but , I hop e, wi tho ut un due ove rsim plif ica tion . I mu st ad d th at I am
conscio us th at T my sel f at ea rli er tim es hav e sh are d some of the ill u­
sions I wil l disc uss to da y. I onl y wis h th at I ha d un de rst oo d ea rli er
wh at T t hi nk I un de rst an d no w ; an d T ce rta in ly d o n ot seek t o e xem pt
my sel f fro m a sha re, how eve r tr iv ia l, of per son al res po ns ibi lity fo r
going alo ng wi th dir ec tio ns of pol icy whose im pli ca tio ns di d no t be­
come e vid en t to me un til th e sum me r o f 1965.
U. S. CON VIC TIO NS ABOU T POSTW AR ROLE

Th e U ni te d St ate s e nte red th e po stw ar w orl d wi th two l ea din g con­

vic tio ns ab ou t its fu tu re wo rld ro le : th e con vict ion th at th e Un ite d
St ate s ha d an ob lig ati on to cre ate an d de fen d a glob al str uc tu re of
peace an d th e con vict ion th at th e U ni te d St ate s ha d a dem oc rat izi ng
mis sion to th e wor ld. The se wer e pe rfe ctl y ho norab le conv ictio ns.
Ho we ver , th e pre ssu res an d te m pta tio ns of th e postwar- sit ua tio n led
to the ca ta str op hi c ove rext ens ion an d mi sap pli ca tio n of va lid pr in ci ­
ples , a proc ess th at cu lm ina ted ho rr ib ly in th e In do ch in a tra ge dy .
PR IN CI PL E OF COLLE CTIVE SEC UR ITY

Le t us look firs t at th e pr in ci pl e of colle ctive sec uri ty. Th e for eig n

poli cy of t he U .S. since th e Sec ond W or ld W ar h as bee n in th e ha nd s
of the ge ne rat ion whi ch came of age betw een 1914, th e st a rt of the
F ir st W or ld W ar , an d 1953, the end of th e Ko rea n wa r. Eve ry gen ­
er at io n is th e pr iso ne r of its o wn ex pe rie nc e; an d fo r th is g en era tio n
th e cr iti ca l in te rn at io na l exp erie nce was th e def ens e of th e peace
syste m ag ai ns t one or an ot he r agg res siv e pow er. Pea ce, it was said ,
was in di vi sib le; app eas em ent wo uld onl y enc our age agg res sio n. A g­
gre ssio n any wh ere , if unc heck ed an d un pu nis he d, wou ld th re at en t he
ind epe nde nce o f nat ion s e ver yw her e. Th e pre ser va tio n of peace , th er e­
for e, re qu ire d the ree sta bli shm ent of th e peace sy stem th ro ug h collec­
tiv e act ion a ga in st agg res sio n b y t he w orl d com mu nity .
Th is w as the v iew of th e wo rld e nvi sag ed by Wo odr ow Wi lso n, the
view im pl ied by the Sti ms on do ctr ine , th e view su bs tant iated by the
 failu re of appeasement at Munich, the view argued by Pres iden t
Roosevelt du ring the Second W orld War , the view reasserted in the
Trum an doctrine, the view doggedly reaffirmed by Pres ident Johnson
in the 1960's and, indeed, the view expressed by Presid ent Nixon in
the last couple of weeks.
I know tha t to the you ng discussion of inte rnatio nal affairs in these
formalistic terms seems so unreal tha t they presume this language
must be a mask for other and unavowed motives. But it would be, I
think , a mistake not to recognize t hat, especially for the generation
tha t grew up u nder the shadow of Hit ler, th ese words have meaning.
Nor, I trust , will we as a nation abandon the objective of collective
security.
Yet, as we consider Vietnam, we see th at something obviously
went wrong w ith the appl icatio n of th e doctrine. Some would date the
beginning of th e degeneratio n o f the collective security idea with the
Truma n doctrine of 1947. In a sense, this was so, though I would
emphasize “in a sense” because the inflation in the Truma n period
was in words rath er than in deeds. While Presid ent Trum an d eclared
tha t “it must be the policy of the U nited States to suppo rt free peoples
who are resisting attem pted subjugatio n by arm ed minorities or out­
side pressure,” Trum an himself was selective in the employment of
this drastic propos ition. H e d id not himself construe it i n a crusadin g
way, apply ing it neithe r to Easte rn Europ e nor to China as it was
applied to Greece and Turkey. Moreover, Truma n, afte r carry ing
throu gh the gr eatest demobilization in history in 1945-46, kept defense
spending ther eaft er under tig ht control. I n 1947-50, natio nal security
expenditure s av eraged only $13 billion a y ear. By 1949 the Arm y was
down to 10 active divisions. This was hard ly th e m ilita ry po sture o f a
state bent on estab lishing a world empire. The Korean war changed
all that , and in the fifties the Unite d State s Government began to
live up to the rhetoric of the Truman doctrine.
COLL ECTIV E SE CU RIT Y IDEA LOST LI M IT AT IO NS

The origina l collective security idea h ad been th at clearcut acts of

aggression by m ajor states required collective interv ention to restore
an equilibrium of power. In the fifties this idea lost its limitations.
It was subtly transf ormed into the doctrine tha t almost any form of
foreign trouble, whether caused by large or small states, whether or
not the elements of a balance of power situa tion existed, wheth er t he
trouble was external or inter nal in origin, required interventio n, if
necessary, by Americ a alone.
Secretar y of State Dulles carried thi s gene ralization to the point of
absurd ity and danger, makin g it a systematic policy to overcommit
American power and prestig e all around the world.
The success of communism anywhere, Dulles f elt, would put in ques­
tion the will and power of the Unite d States everywhere. It was in
this mood that , hav ing supp orted th e Fren ch in Indochin a in the years
afte r 1948, we began to replace the Frenc h aft er 1954. The National
Security Council had alread y in early 1952 declared t hat “Communist
domination, by w hatever means, of a ll So utheast A sia would seriously
endanger in the s hort ter m, and criticall y en danger in th e longer term,
U.S. security in terests.”
 62
The reason for this, in the NSC view, was what would later be
termed the domino effect: “th e loss of an y single co untry would prob­
ably lead to relatively swift submission . . . by the remaini ng coun­
tries of this group.” This remained the perspective in which the
American Government saw Vietnam.
If i t was har d to arg ue t ha t t he thre at presented by the Viet Cong
and IIo Chi Minh was comparable to the thre at presented by Hitl er
in th e t hirtie s, o ur Government responded by inflatin g the thre at and
contending tha t our adversaries in Vietnam actually constituted the
spearhead of a planned Chinese system of expansion in East Asia. This
was the NSC view in the early fifties.
Preside nt Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs tha t th e conflict—
began gradually, with Chinese intervention, to assume its true complexion of a
struggle between Communism and non-Communist forces ra the r tha n one between
a colonial power and colonists who were inten t on atta ining independence.
By 1967 Vice President Hu mphre y could cry :
The thr eat to world peace is militant, aggressive Asian Communism, with its
headqu arters in Peking, China. The aggression of North Vietnam is but t he most
curre nt and immediate action of milit ant Asian countries.
As he left the White House, P resid ent Eisenhower told Pres iden t­
elect Kennedy tha t if the Unit ed States could not persuade other
nations to join in saving Laos from Communism, then it should be
ready “as a last desperate hope, to intervene unil atera lly.” This f urth er
notion, the notion t hat America, as the p eculiar and appointe d g uard ­
ian of world peace, was entitled to act milit arily on its own, repre­
sented the final and f ata l perversion of the original doctr ine of collec­
tive security.
Soon Pres iden t K ennedy was sa ying in his inaug ural address tha t
Americans—
shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend,
oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty.
Fou r years later, P reside nt Johnso n sa id :
History and our own achievements have thru st upon us the principal respon­
sibility for protection of freedom on earth.
By now a useful and limit ed idea h ad been corrupted by messianism
and America was assuming a role as judge, jury , and executioner fo r
all mankin d.
In this messianic spir it, we abandoned any realistic assessment of
our stakes in Southeastern Asia. Nothing is more distressing in the
Pentag on Pape rs than the app aren t failu re of any adminis tration,
including the present one, to recalculate the exact natu re of our in­
terest in Indochina, to consider what, in hard fact, the consequences
would be for the Unite d States of the communization of Vietnam.
In retrospect, one can only feel tha t, if the containment of China
were a problem, a strong Communist Vietnam would offer more ef­
fective resistance to Chinese pressures t han any of the shoddy regimes
we have sponsored in Saigon.
DEM OCR ATIZ ING MI SSI ON

Le t’s look now at the democratizing mission. The messianic compo­

nen t in American foreign policy was compounded by the idea of
 63

America’s regenerative mission to suffering mankind. Like collective

security, this was in its ori ginal form a valuable idea. Bu t in its orig­
inal form the Amer ican mission was to reform the world by the Amer­
ican example, not by Americans moving into other countries and
setting thing s s traig ht.
Then the experience of milit ary occupation a fter the second Wo rld
Wa r and especially, I think, the occupation of Jap an began to
strengt hen American confidence in our tale nt for nation building. We
soon supposed th at we had not only the power but the wisdom to enter
alien cultures and reconstru ct them according to our own st andard s
and values. Thus, Vice Pres iden t Hu mphre y spoke in 1966 about “re­
alizin g the dream of the Great Society in the great area of Asia,
not jus t here at home.” He ad ded :
We ought to he excited abo ut thi s challen ge because here is where we can
put to work some of our idea s of how a—natio n buildin g, of new concepts of
educa tion, developm ent of local governm ent, the impro vement of the heal th
sta nd ard s of people and rea lly the achie vemen t and the fulfillm ent of social
justi ce.
This was authentic language of American social reform. But it also
represented the fata l perversion of a sound idea. It beguiled us into
what may be called sentimental imperialism, the belief t ha t we knew
better than other people did what was good for them. In this process
the limited policy of helping other s t o help themselves grew into the
unlimited policy o f imposing our own preferences on ot hers; so tha t
if the Vietnamese would not out of respect for our superior wisdom
do wh at we tho ught was good for them, we were determin ed to make
them do it out of obedience to our s uperior strengt h. The army major ,
stand ing in the rubble of Ben Tre, summed up the ultimate logic of
American messiani sm: “It became necessary to destroy the town to
save it.”
ABSOLUTIST ANTI-COMMUNISM
Anothe r factor th at contrib uted to the propen sity toward messian-
ism was the rise of absolutist anti-communism. The delusion tha t
America was the appo inted protecto r of wo rld freedom received ad di­
tional impetus from the contention th at w orld freedom was threatened
by th e ambitions of the centralized movement of world communism.
I^et me be quite clear on this. The communism of the forties, which
for purposes of precision we should call Stalinism , was not only a
cruel and ugly tyra nny in Soviet Russia but was also a relatively
coordinated in terna tiona l movement. Anti-St alinis m would seem to me
a moral necessity f or any believer in democracy. And in the forties
Stalinism was a perfectl y genuine thre at in Europe, not in the sense
tha t the Red Army was likely to invade the west but in the sense t hat,
given the economic and social disorgani zation of Western Europe,
Communist partie s might well have come to power in countries like
France and Italy .
But practic al resistance to Stalinism was soon enveloped by the
view tha t Communism was a changeless, u nalterable , monolithic doc­
trine of total discipline and total evil. This absolutist view led to the
conclusion tha t every Communist part y or state by definition must
forever be the obedient instrum ent of the Soviet Union. It led Dean
Rusk as an Assi stant Secretar y of State in 1951 to call the Communist
 64
regime in Pekin g “a colonial Russian government, a Slavic Manchukuo
on a large r scale.” I t led to the illusion t hat guer rilla wars could not
just be local insurrect ions in which local lead ership responded to local
grievances but must rath er represent “wars of national liberat ion”
organized by Moscow to test t he will of the United States. Once again
a rational idea underw ent fatal expansion and perversion.
Moreover, though the reality of a centralized world Communist
movement hardly outlived Stalin himself, indeed had begun to crumble
some years before St alin ’s death, th e American government continued
for many years to operate in terms of the old stereotype. When I
served in the Kennedy Admin istrati on in the early sixties, I used to
implore the State Departm ent to stop g oing on about th e Sino-Soviet
bloc when it was abundantl y evident tha t the Sino-Soviet bloc had
ceased to exist, i f indeed it ever existed. Yet people today—in some of
his speeches, President Nixon himself—still talk about communism as
i f it were some sort of undifferenti ated, centralized th rea t to the Unite d
States.
In the contemporary age of polycentrism, there is no longer any
such t hing as world Communism. A Communist takeover no longer
means the autom atic extention of Russian or of Chinese power. Ev ery
Communist government, every Communist part y, has been set free
to respond to its own natio nal concerns and to pursue its own national
interests. Divergin g nat ional interests have proved to be more power­
ful than common ideologies. A nd this, of course, greatly transfo rms
the nature of the problem tha t Communist movements present to
American security. Our failu re to recognize the rise of polycentrism
caused us to misconceive the cha racter of a local conflict in Indoc hina,
to inflate, its importance, to misrepresent the degree of American
interest in its outcome and to enter tha t war with a ferocity out of
all propor tion to its actual consequence for our national security.
Absolutist anti-Communism had another effect which should be
noted he re : I t led to the p urgin g from our government of those officials
who best understood the phenomena of Asian Communism. A leading
member of the Kennedy and Johnson Admini stration s recently re­
marked to me th at one reason the U.S. Government performed with
so much more intelligence d urin g t he Cuban missile crisis than it did
duri ng the Indochina war was t ha t in the case of the missile crisis
it had the benefit of the counsel of men like Ambassadors Thompson,
Bohlen and Harr iman who knew the Soviet Union and could give
sound advice about its probable purposes and reactions.
In the case of the Fa r East, we h ad no equivalent ex perts on China
and the Government consequently operated on the basis of theories
which we know to have been wildly exaggerated. Ila d not John
Foste r Dulles drummed our China experts out of the Foreign Service—
and this committee recently h ad the opport unity to see what able and
patrio tic men they are—I cannot believe th at we would have pursued
the same policy of arrogance and blunder tha t got us so deep into
Vietnam.
IN S T IT U T IO N A L M E S S IA N IS M

Inst ituti onal messianism : Ideas t end to become embodied in ins titu­
tions ; and the instituti ons often survive long afte r the ideas have
become obsolete. I n the fifties the absolutist anti-Communi st philoso-
 65
phy took root in a group of governmental agencies—the S tate De par t­
ment, purged by Dulles of active dis sente rs; the Defense D epa rtm ent;
the National Security Council; the Central Intelligence Agency—all
of which developed vested institu tional interests in the theory of
milit arily expansionist world Communism. The cold war conferred
power, a pprop riatio ns and public influence on these agencies and by
the nat ural laws of bureaucracies the ir concern for the care and feeding
of the cold war inevitably solidified.
PROCESS OF BUR EAU CRA TIC AGG RAN DIZ EM ENT

The success of CIA clandestine operations in the fifties in Ira n,

Guatemala, Egy pt, and Laos, doubtless fed the American Govern­
ment’s convictions both of its a bility and its rig ht to decide the destiny
of other nations. I would s uggest tha t the very language of the cold
war bureaucracies—a brisk, technocratic patois, well designed to c on­
ceal the human implications of nationa l actions—contributed to the
dehumanizatio n of American policy and laid a spuriously antiseptic
pati na over the horribl e thing s we began to do in Vietnam.
This process of bureau cratic aggrandiz ement began to give the ex­
ecutive branch of Government delusions of grandeur. Pers uaded o f its
own exclusive g rasp of these arcane matters , protected by a secrecy
system to which it alone held the key, it incre asingly regarded the N a­
tion ’s foreign policy as its own priva te prerogative.
I have no doubt t ha t h istoria ns and political scientists who h ad ar ­
gued uncritical versions of the theory of t he strong presidency—and
here I must certain ly include myself—contribu ted to these delusions;
and I cannot escape the impression tha t Congress during most of these
years amiably acquiesced in the situation almost with relief at the
avoidance of responsibility.
When one reads the Penta gon papers, one notes tha t Congress
seemed to exist in the minds of t he executive branch prim arily as an
irri tat ing and obtuse organism to be cajoled and hoodwinked when it
could not be ignored. The notion th at bette r consu ltation might have
produced bet ter policy did not seem to occur to our leaders. Yet, on the
record, th e Senate Committee on Foreig n Relations has shown a good
deal more wisdom ab out the Indochina Wa r over the last hal f dozen
years than the Nat ional Sec urity Council.
ROLE OF MI LI TA RY ES TA BL IS HM EN T IN IN DO CH IN A

Gf all the bureacracies, I would guess the one th at played the l arg ­
est role, a t least in t he la ter stages, in th e intensification of our role in
Indochina , was the mili tary establishment. Histor ically, this milit ary
influence over foreign policy was something of a novelty. B ut the Sec­
ond World Wa r had brough t a gr eat milit ary establi shment into ex ist­
ence, the cold war made it permanen t, and over the last generation this
establishment h as had excessive a nd dangerous weight in our councils
of state.
For many years the milit ary have absorbed th e largest portion of
the Federa l budget. Defense cont racts have enlisted large sections of
the business community in the m ilita ry effort. Congress, until recently,
has given the milit ary nearly everythi ng it wanted. Our mili tary
 66

lea de rs hav e conn ed bot h the exec utiv e and leg isla tiv e bra nch es of
Go ver nm ent into bu ild in g eno rmo us ins tal lat ion s, inc rea sin gly irre le ­
va nt in the missi le age, all ove r t he wo rld —an d hav e ins iste d th at , as
the pri ce we mu st pay , we mu st do no th in g to offend such spe ndi d
dem ocr atic cou ntri es as Greece, Po rtu ga l, Br az il an d So uth Af ric a.
Th ey hav e oppo sed agr eem ent s des ign ed to slow up th e arm s race.
Th ey for ev er dem and new sy stem s of offense an d defen se. Th ey invoke
the em otio ns of v iri lit y an d p at rio tis m to r ein for ce th ei r i mp ort un itie s.
Th e fo rw ar d role of th e m ili ta ry ha s been s tri ki ng ly ev ide nt in Vi et­
nam . Fi rs t, t he y succeede d in def ini ng the pr oblem i n t he te rm s sta ted
by Ge ner al W hee ler in Nov emb er 1962:
It is fashi onab le in some q ua rte rs to say th at t he problem s in Sou thea st Asia
are prim aril y politica l and economic. I do n ot agree. The essence of t he problem
in Vietnam is milit ary.
Once u nlea sed, th e m ili ta ry m ach ine est abl ish ed its ow n mom entu m.
Th e in sti tu tio na l pre ssu re fo r fu rt he r esc ala tio n, th e in sti tu tio na l de­
sir e to tr y ou t wea pons, tac tic s a nd pe rson nel , th e i ns tit ut io na l capa cit y
fo r sel f-de lusi on, de mo ns tra ted mo st rec en tly by Ge ner al Ab ram s,
abo ut th e pro spe cts f or m ili ta ry succes s a nd th e e xiste nce of t hat li gh t
at the end of t he tun ne l—a ll t hi s c ar rie d us fu rt he r an d f urt her into the
qua gm ire.
Le t me add , th ou gh , th at th e m ili ta ry do no t ine vit ab ly cont rol
Am eri can polic y. T he y a re p rof ess ion al men t ry in g t o do a pro fessio nal
job an d ma kin g ex act ly th e arg um en ts th e na tu re of th ei r pro fessio n
req uires. The ir p res sur e is of ten eff ective i n am orp hous sit ua tio ns a nd
wi th irr eso lut e lead ers. Bu t it is fool ish to be su rp ris ed bv the advice
the y give or to b lame t he m f or it . I t is fa r more t o th e po in t to blam e
th e ci vil ian lea der s wh o ta ke th ei r ad vice.
Let me ad d, too, th a t I a m no t ta lk in g abo ut the s o-ca lled mi lit ary -
in du st rial comp lex. Th is fo rm ul at io n imp lies th at th e m ili ta ry are
no th in g m ore t ha n stoog es o f A me ric an cap ita lis m. O nly an old Le ni n­
ist lik e Pr es id en t E ise nhow er c oul d believ e th at . I am ta lk in g a bou t th e
m ili ta ry as a qui te ind ep en de nt fa ct or in the fo rm ati on of poli cy, a
forc e in its ow n ri ght op er at in g acc ord ing to i ts own in te rn al im pe ra­
tive s an d no t at the bi dd in g of Am eri can busin ess, whi ch ha d nev er
been dee ply com mit ted to the I nd oc hi na w ar an d in rec ent ye ars ha s, I
belie ve, t ur ne d pr ed om in an tly a ga in st it.

EC O N O M IC IM P E R IA L IS M ?

Eco nom ic im per ial ism ?I n th is co nnec tion I sho uld pe rh ap s m enti on
a thesi s pr opo sed in s ome ac cou nts o f ou r in vol vem ent in Vi etn am —the
the sis t h at t he Ind oc hi na wa r was th e re su lt of th e que st of Am eric an
ca pit ali sm fo r wor ld heg emo ny.
I t is tru e th at Am eri can over seas inv est me nts hav e gro wn re m ar k­
abl y in th e po stw ar pe rio d, fro m $8.4 bil lio n in 1945 to $78 bill ion in
1970. I t is, of course , h ar d to con ten d th at Am eri ca wen t int o Vie tna m
to ga in m ark ets or pr ote ct inv est me nts in a co un try wh ere we hav e h ad
lit tl e of eit he r. In de ed , we hav e sp en t mor e mon ey on th at wa r th an
Am eri can b usines s c ould ho pe to ge t o ut of Vi etn am i n a c ent ury . Bu t
th e mo re sop his tic ate d exp one nts of th e econom ic ar gu m en t offer a
ki nd of dom ino the sis of th ei r own. Th ey say th at , because de fea t
in Vi etn am would jeo pa rd ize Am eri can ma rke ts an d inv estm ents
throug hout the Thi rd Wo rld, the economic necessities of an expand ing
capit alist order have compelled the American Government to embark
on a course of ruthless counterrevolution.
Close analysis of the figures shows, however, tha t the dependence
of American ca pitalism on the underdeveloped world, in terms eit her
of trad e or of investment, is very limited indeed. Two thirds of Ameri­
can exports go to industrial ized rath er than to developing countries.
Sales to the Thi rd World amount to about 3 percen t of our annual
national output. As for American investment in the Thi rd World,
this represents a declining fraction of our total foreign investmen t:
35 percent in I960 and only 28 percent in 1970.
Of Thir d World investment, 40 percent is in petroleum. I f this is
excluded, only about one-sixth of American overseas investment is in
developing nations, and few American businessmen today seem inte r­
ested in increasing t he proportion . I nso far as the futur e of American
capitalism depends on th e outside world, it depends on markets and
investments in other industrial ized countries and not on what may
happen in the Thi rd World.
Nor can it be said th at the prosecution of the Indochina war was
necessary for domestic prosperity . Quite the contrary. The economic
consequences of Vietnam have been inflation, balance of payments
trouble and a pervad ing distortion of the economy. Nor need the
termina tion of the war mean depression a t home. At the end of the
Second World War, between 1945 and 1946, governmental purchases
of goods and services declined fr om $83 billion to $31 billion, a sum
equal to almost one-quarter of the gross na tional product. If our econ­
omy could absorb a decline of such magnitude then it could easily
absorb a decline in war spending of a bout 2 percen t of gross national
produ ct today.
It must be added tha t the Pentag on pa pers, so far as I know, record
no instances of business in tervention in American Vietnam policy and
tha t any discussion among governmental officials of an American
economic i nterest in south eastern Asia was gla ncing a nd p erfunctor y.
Inso far as our government confronted the question of the American
interest, it saw tha t interest as political, strategi c and symbolic, not
economic.
POSTW AR AM ER ICA N IM PE RI AL IM PU LS E

To sum up, I would suggest tha t the postwar American imperial

impulse, which came to its terrib le culmination in Indochina , arose
from a number of pressures and tempta tions—pressures and t emp ta­
tions exerted by th e vacuums of power create d by the Second World
Wa r; by the misapplica tion o f a valid b elief in the necessity of cr eat­
ing an in ternatio nal structu re in which the Un ited Sta tes would accept
her full global responsibilitie s; by the grandiose overextension of
America’s mission to up lift suffering ma nkind ; by the re formist fait h
in the American capacity to instru ct and rebuild other nation s; by
the quite real menace of Sta linis t communis m; by the counterideology
of anti-communism, p ersisti ng in rigid and absolutist for m long afte r
the circumstances tha t had produced it had begun to change; and by
the instituti onaliza tion of th e cold war, especially in t he increasingly
influential m ilitar y establishment.
 68

TJ.S. INV OL VE ME NT IN VI ET NA M NO T INE VIT AB LE

The fur the r question arises: did these diverse factors render our
involvement in Vietnam inevitable? Were these forces shapin g our
policy so powerful tha t any Admin istrati on in Washing ton would
have been compelled to pursue t he course tha t was, in fact, pursued ?
My answer t o that is no. The Indochina traged y was, in my judg- I
ment, the consequence of national illusions and delusions, not of na­
tional necessities. The road to disaster had many turnings.
We could, fo r example, have followed the policy recommended be­
fore his de ath by P residen t Roosevelt a nd opposed the restorati on of R
French rule in In dochina. We could have responded to the appeals of
Ho Chi Minh in 1945-46. Given the urgencies in cited by the Korean
war, some measure of American involvement in supp orting the Fr ench
in the early ’50s was probably h ard to avoid, nor was the provision of »
economic assistance to South Vietnam afte r 1954 a necessary cause of
subsequent disaster.
VIE TN AM PO LIC Y OF KE NN ED Y AD MI NIS TR AT IO N

I do not regard its Vietnam policy as one of the Ke nnedy adminis­

trat ion ’s finest hours. In retrospect, it is clear t hat we a ll overreacted
to Khrushch ev’s truculent speech of Jan uar y 1961. This was the speech
predic ting the victory of Communism through “wars of nat ional lib­
eration in the Thir d World, the speech to which the Kennedy in­
augura l was essentially an answer.
It would now appe ar tha t K hrushchev was engaged in a complicated
maneuver w’ith regard to Ch ina ; but Washington , unaware of the
depth of th e Sino-Soviet s plit at the time, inte rprete d t he speech as a
challenge to the West. The feeling in Washingto n then was tha t the
nuclear standoff excluded the possibility of nuclea r war, th at the west­
ern response in Korea had reduced the chance of limited war, and tha t
if a solution could only be found for guerril la war, a futur e of peace
might be assured.
There t hus arose the counterinsurgency mystique, an interestin g but
dangerous idea and one which Americans were not qualified by history
or tem perament to ca rry through . At the same time, the sh ift in mili­
tary strate gy from pre dominan t reliance on nuclear weapons to flexible *
response and the consequent diversification of our Armed Forces,
though intended to reduce the risk of nuc lear war, had the ironic effect
of making possible marginal ven tures like Vietnam.
I do not recall, though, any cockiness or relish in the Kennedy White *
House about gett ing involved in Vietnam. There was enough else to do
in those years. Moreover, it mu st be remembered th at Presiden t Ken­
nedy's decision to send in advisers at the end of 1961 was in par t a
tradeoff to the national-securi ty bureaucracy for its sullen acceptance
of the Kennedy policy of ne utraliz ing Laos. Kennedy rejected the rec­
ommendations of the Taylor-Rostow re port f or American armed in ter­
vention in 1961. Inde ed, less than 100 Americans were killed in combat
in Vietnam d uring the enti re Kennedy presidency. On the o ther ha nd,
he did acquiesce in 1962 in the definition of the Vietnam problem as
prim arily militar y, a definition which, it should be added, govern-
 69

me nta l officials lik e Av ere ll H ar ri m an an d Ro ge r Hi lsm an v igo rou sly

opposed .
I t seems to me fa ir ly fru itl es s to spe cul ate wh at wou ld hav e
ha pp en ed ha d Pr es id en t Ke nn ed y live d. I t is imp ossib le to pr ed ic t
wh at dea d pr es id en ts wou ld do ab ou t sit ua tio ns t hat t ak e a new for m
af te r th ei r d e a th ; i t is ha rd eno ugh to pr ed ic t wh at liv in g pre sid en ts
wil l do ab ou t suc h si tua tio ns . I sup pos e th e sa fe st g uess a s to w hat Jo hn
Ke nn ed y’s line w oul d ha ve been i s to look a t th e li ne t ak en by h is b ro th ­
ers a ft er his dea th.
Th ere can be no que stio n th a t Pr es id en t Ke nn ed y ha d the ca pa cit y
to ref use esca lati on, li e show ed th at at the tim e of the Ba y of Pi gs
an d ag ain at the t im e of t he Cu ba n miss ile cris is. I know , too , t hat h is
memo ry of V iet nam u nd er Fr en ch r ule m ade him fee l th ere were li mi ts
bey ond wh ich one cou ld e xp an d a wh ite m ili ta ry pre senc e w ith ou t u ni t­
ing the ene rgie s of local na tio na lis m ag ai ns t the in tru de r. I find it
ha rd , Go d know s, fo belie ve th a t Vi etn am wou ld hav e alt ere d his p ru ­
de nt an d rat io na l ha bit s in th e use of p owe r. Bu t the qu esti on of wh at
he w ould hav e do ne h ad he li ved re ma ins in solu ble.
I hav e some rem ar ks ab ou t the Jo hn so n ad m in ist ra tio n and abo ut
th e com men t th at the sys tem wo rke d in Vi etn am bu t, in th e int ere st
of tim e, I will leav e th a t fo r th e pr in te d rec ord an d sim ply sum up
my view s abo ut th e que stio n wh eth er or not th e “sy ste m” work ed.

POLITICAL BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON FAILED

In my view, th e syst em, t hat is, t he po liti ca l bu re au cr atic sy stem in
W as hi ng to n, fa ile d dis ma lly . It fai led to pro vid e an y sys tem atic an d
seriou s asse ssm ent of Am eri can stak es in Vie tna m. It fai led in th e
po liti ca l and m ili ta ry t ac tic s it p rod uce d. It fai led i n its est im ate and
fore cas t of th e ch ar ac te r o f t he p rob lem a nd th e ma gn itu de o f t he d if ­
ficu lty. I t f ail ed to fore see th e acu te in sta bi lit y of th e Diem regi me, or
the fiasco of the str at eg ic h am le t pr og ram o r t he a tta ck s on the B ud d­
hi sts in 1963, o r th e fu ti li ty of the bom bin g poli cy, or the fa ilu re of
se arc h-a nd -de str oy t act ics , o r th e cap aci ty of the ene my ye ar af te r y ea r
to rep len ish his l osses an d e nla rg e h is eff ort.
I t was wr on g in bel iev ing th at the So uth Vie tnam ese un de r Die m
ha d the w ill to de fen d its elf , t hat U .S. p res sur e c ould int rod uce r efo rm
int o t he r ig id m ind s o f Sa igo n m an da rin s t hat i f we po unded lo ng an d
ha rd en oug h th e ot he r sid e w oul d cr y “ unc le.”
I t was te rr ib ly wr on g in re ga rd in g Ha no i an d the V iet C ong as t he
sp ea rh ea d of Chi nes e agg res sio n. Th e syste m coul d no t even fores ee
dev elo pm ent s wi th in th e Sa igo n regi me itse lf. As the Pe nta go n stu dy
says ,
The shi fts of loyalt ies, coups, rebellions and ma jor change s of public figures
often caug ht the embassy by surp rise . It had no effecti ve system, eith er thro ugh
over t or cov ert co ntact s, f or finding out w hat was goin g on.
Th e syst em, in sh or t, did no t offer pre sid en ts in tel lig en t or use ful
couns el an d it rei nf orc ed an d com pou nde d illus ion. In my jud gm en t,
the Vie tnames e ad ve ntu re was ma rke d much mor e by ign ora nce , mis-
ju dg me nt, m ud dle a nd , to be fr an k, s tu pi di ty t ha n it was by efficiency,
fo re sig ht , a warene ss, an d cal cul ati on.
 70
LESS ONS OF VIE TN AM

What arc the lessons of Vietnam? To sum up very quickly, (1) tha t
everyth ing in the world is not of equal im portance to us. F or nearly
a decade we have given too large a share o f our atte ntion and resources
to a marginal problem on the mainl and of Asia while our position has
steadily deterior ated in parts o f the world far more vit al to our na­
tional security.
(2) Tha t we cannot do everythin g in the world. Vietnam should
teach us tha t in the last h alf of the 20th century armed w hite men can­
not decide the destiny of countries in the Thir d World. Let us hope
tha t it will forever chasten what your chairman has well termed the
“arrogance of power.”
(3) Tha t we cannot be the permanen t gua rant or of stabil ity in a
world of turbulence and change. We must reconcile ourselves to an
age of local revolution and local war in which many terrib le things
will take place th at the United States simply lacks the power to pre­
vent or the wisdom to cure.
(4) Tha t all problems in the world are not milita ry problems and
tha t milit ary force is not usually the most effective form of n ational
power. So long as we continue to define world problems in milita ry
terms, so long will we strengthe n the influence of our own milita ry
establishment and plunge the nation into fur the r milit ary interve n­
tion. We should underta ke milit ary intervention only (a) when the
national security of the United States is directly and indisputed ly
involved; (b) when th e people whom we think we are su pporti ng di s­
play a capa city for resistance themselves; and (c) when, in addition,
there are reasonable prospects for success—all conditions rejected and
trampled upon by those who made American m ilita ry policy for Vi et­
nam.
(5) Tha t if we must fight, we must rigorously maintain a due and
rational proport ion between our means and our ends. I do not much
like the wholesale distrib ution of moral judgm ents in the realm of for ­
eign policy, bu t I have no d oubt tha t the Indochin a war became an
immoral war when we began to violate the principle of propor tion­
ality, when we began to regar d technology as a sub stitute for policy,
when th e means employed and the destruction wrought grew out of
any defensible relationsh ip to the interests involved and the ends
sought. We will have to live wi th the horro r of Vie tnam for the rest
of our lives.
(6) Finall y, that, forei gn policy is not the private prope rty of the
Executive Branch of government. The Preside nt must stop making
decisions of war and peace without effective consultation with the
American Congress. li e must stop withholdi ng information about
American action a nd policy essential to wise and informed judgment
by the Congress and the electorate. Congress must partic ipate, as in
recent years it has sadly failed to partic ipate, in the control both of
foreign policy and of the government’s secrecy system.
Perh aps the lessons of Vietnam can best be summed up in the state ­
ment tha t Presi dent Kennedy made in November 1961, a statement
which, in my belief, expressed his t rue views on t his matt er far more
accurately than the grand iloquen t rhetoric of the inaugural address,
whe n h e s ai d;
 71
We must face t he fact tha t the United States is n either omnipotent nor omni­
scient—that we are only Gpercen t of the world’s population—that we cannot im­
pose our will upon t he other 94 percent of mankind—th at we cannot right every
wrong or reverse each adversity—and that, therefore, there cannot he an Ameri­
can solution to every world problem.
Than k you.
(Dr. Sc hlesinger’s prepa red statem ent follows:)
P repared Statemen t of Arthu r S ciil esin ger , J r., on th e Origin s of th e
Vietn am W ar
My name is Arth ur Schlesinger, Jr. I have been since 19GG Albert Schweitzer
Professor of the Humanities at the City University of New York. From 19G1 to
19G4 I served as Special A ssistan t to Presiden t Kennedy and, briefly, to Pres i­
dent Johnson. Though I have had other stretches of government service, I am
primari ly a write r and historian.
As an historian, I want first to commend the Committee for undertaki ng this
complex an d difficult inquiry. I am sure tha t futu re histori ans will be mystified
when, looking back at the 1950s and 1960s (even the early 1970s), they try to
figure out what led successive American Pre sidents to suppose t hat ou r nat ional
inter est and security were so vit ally involved in the fate of a small country on
the mainland of Southeast Asia as to justi fy the blood, destruction, atrocity
and agony for which American policy has been responsible. I have no doubt t hat
these hearings—and any conclusions the Committee may draw—will provide
mate rial of inestimable importance for scholars in generations to come.
Let me also say at the sta rt tha t there is, in my judgment, no single answer
to our problem. What I will endeavor to do is disentangle what seem to one
histor ian significant threa ds of thought and policy tha t led us to so ghastly
a culmination in Southeast Asia. Limitations of time will oblige me to make
my points quickly and crisply but, I hope, without undue oversimplification.
I must add tha t I am conscious th at I myself at e arlie r times have shared some
of the illusions I will discuss today. I only wish tha t I had understood earli er
what I think I understa nd now; and I certainly do no t seek to exempt myself
from a share, however trivial, of personal responsibility for going along with
directions of policy whose implications did not become evident to me un til the
summer of 1965.
At the end of the Second World War, the tradi tiona l equilibrium of world
power was in disarr ay. In the wake of war there emerged great vacuums of
power—in Europe, in Asia, in Africa. At the same time, the war left only two
nations with the capacity to fill those vacuums of power—America and Russia.
Each came out of t he war with milit ary strength, political and ideological self-
confidence and the hab its of global assessment and global action.
The United States entered the post-war world with two leading convictions
about its futur e world role: the conviction tha t the United States had an
obligation to create and defend a global struc ture of peace; and the conviction
tha t the United States had a democratizing mission to the world. These were
perfectly honorable convictions. However, the pressures and temptation s of the
postwar situation led to the catastr ophic overextension and misapplication of
valid principles—a process tha t culminated horribly in the Indochina tragedy.
COLLEC TIVE SEC URI TY

The foreign policy of the United States since the Second World War has been
in the hands of the generation which came of age between 1914, the sta rt of
the Fir st World War, and 1953, t he end of th e Korean War. Every gene ration is
the prisoner of its own expe rience ; and for this generation the critical inte r­
national experience was the defense of the peace system agains t one or another
aggressive power. Peace, it was said, was indivisible; appeasement would only
encourage aggression ; aggression anywhere, if unchecked and unpunished, would
threa ten the independence of nations everywhere. The preservat ion of peace
therefore required the re-establishment of the peace system through collective
action aga inst aggression by the world community.
This was the view of the world envisaged by Woodrow Wilson, the view
implied by the Stimson Doctrine, the view subst antiate d by the failur e of ap-
 2

peasement at Munich, the view ar gued by Pr esiden t Roosevelt during the Second
World War, the view reasserte d in the Truma n Doctrine, the view doggedly
reaffirmed by Presiden t Johnson in the sixties and, indeed, the view expressed
by Preside nt Nixon in recent days as he explained his re-escalation of ai r at tacks
on North Vietnam. The United S tates, he said, was “destined” to play a “great
role” in “helping to build a new stru cture of peace.” The North Vietnamese
offensive was “a cl ear case of naked and unprovoked aggression across an inte r­
national border.” If it succeeds, “other countries will be encouraged to do ex ­
actly the samething—in the Mideast, in Europe, and in other interna tional
danger spots. . . . If Communist aggression fails, it will discourage others
to do [from doing?] the same th ing.”
I know t ha t to the young discussion of intern ation al affairs in these formal­
istic terms seems so unreal tha t they presume this language mus t be a mask for
other and unavowed motives. But it would be, I think, a mistake not to recognize
that, especially for the generation tha t grew up under the shadow of Hitler,
these words have meaning. Nor, I trust, will we as a nation abandon the objec­
tive of collective security.
Yet, as we consider Vietnam, we see th at something obviously went wrong
with the application of the doctrine. Some would d ate the beginning of the de­
generation of the collective security idea with the Truman Doctrine of 1947. In
a sense this was so, though I would emphasize “in a sense” because th e inflation
in the Truman period was in words r ath er than in deeds. While Preside nt Tru ­
man declared tha t “it must be the policy of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugatio n by armed minorities or outside
pressure,” Truman himself was selective in the employment of this drastic
proposition. He did not himself construe it in a crusading way, applying it
neither to Eastern Europe nor to China as it was applied to Greece and Turkey. 1
Moreover, Truman, afte r carr ying through the greate st demobilization in history
in 1945-46, kept defense spending under tight control. In 1947-50 national-
security expenditures averaged only $13 billion a year. By 1949 the Army was
down to ten active divisions. This was hardly the milita ry posture of a state
bent on establishing a world empire.
The Korean War changed all that, and in the fifties the United S tates govern­
ment began to live up to the rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine. The original col­
lective security idea had been tha t clearcut acts of aggression by m ajor states
required collective intervention to r estore an equilibrium of power. In the fifties
this idea lost its limitations. It was subtly transform ed into the doctrine tha t
almost any form of foreign trouble, whether caused by large or small states,
whether or not the elements of a balance-of-power si tuation existed, whether th e
trouble was e xternal or infe rnal in origin, required intervention, if necessary, by
America alone. Where P resident Truma n at first applied his Doctrine sparingly,
events, especially Korea, began to generalize it. Secretary of State Dulles car­
ried this generalization to the point of absurdi ty and danger, making it a sys­
tematic policy to overcommit American power a nd prestige all around the world.
Assuming th at the Soviet Union would exploit sit uations of local mil itary weak­
ness everyw'here, Dulles concluded th at aggression could be restrai ned only if
such situat ions were shored up at every point by visible mi litary force. He sought
to do this by setting up NATO-like alliances in the Third World. And he charged
this idea with a righteous moralism th at encouraged the American people to
construe political questions in ethical terms, local questions in global terms and
relativ e questions in absolute terms.
The success of communism anywhere, Dulles felt, would p ut in question the
will and power of the United States everywhere. I t was in this mood that , having
supported the French in Indochina in the years afte r 1948, we began to replace
the French afte r 1954. The National Security Council h ad already in ea rly 1952
declared tha t “communist domination, by whateve r means, of all Southeast Asia
would seriously endanger in t he sh ort term, a nd c ritically endanger in t he longer
term, United States security intere sts.” The reason for this, in the NSC view,
was what would later be termed the domino effect : “the loss of any single coun­
try would probably lead to relatively swift submission . . . by the remaining
1 Indeed, the rece nt Nixon-Chou En-Lai communique, in pronounc ing Form osa a pa rt of
mai nlan d China, did not go so f ar as the Tru man stat em ent of Jan uar y 1950 w hich added
th at the United Stat es would remai n ne utr al even if the Chinese Communi sts sought to
take th e i slan d by force.
 73
countries of this group.” This remained the perspective in which tlie American
government saw Vietnam. As Presiden t Eisenhower summed up the situat ion
on April 4, 1959, “The loss of South Vietnam would set in motion a crumbling
process t hat could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us. . . . We reach
the inescapable conclusion tha t our own nation al interests demand some help
from us in sustaini ng in Vietnam the morale, the economic progress, and the
military streng th necessary to its continued existence in freedom.”
If it was hard to argue tha t the thre at presented by the Viet Cong and Ho
Chi Minh was comparable to the thre at presented by H itler in the thirties , our
government responded by inflating the th rea t and contending th at our adversar ies
in Vietnam actually constitute d the spearhead of a planned Chinese system of
expansion in East Asia. This was the NSC view in the early fifties. Preside nt
Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs tha t the conflict “began gradually, with Chin­
ese intervention, to assume its true complexion of a struggle between Commu­
nism and non-Communists forces rath er than one between a colonial power
and colonists who were intent on attai ning independence.” By 19G7 Vice Presi ­
dent Humphrey could cr y: “The thr eat to world peace is milit ant aggres­
sive Asian communism, with its headq uarters in Peking, China. . . . The aggr es­
sion of North Vietnam is but the most cu rren t and immediate a ction of mil itant
Asian communism.”
As he left the White House, Preside nt Eisenhower told President-elect Ken­
nedy th at, if the United States could not persuade other nations to join in sa v­
ing Laos from communism, then it should be ready “as a last desperate hope, to
intervene unilat erally .” This furt her notion—the notion tha t America, as the
peculiar and appointed g uardia n of world peace, was entitled to act mi litarily on
its own—represented the final and fata l perversion of the original doctrine of
collective security. Soon Presiden t Kennedy was saying in his inaugura l address
tha t Americans “shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, sup­
port any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of
liberty.” Four years late r Preside nt Johnson said, “History and our own achieve­
ments have thr ust upon us the principal responsibility for prot ection of freedom
on ea rth.” By now a useful and limited idea had been corrupted by messianism,
and America was assuming a role as judge, j ury and executioner for all mankind.
In this messianic spirit , we abandoned any realisti c assessment of our stakes in
Southeast Asia. Nothing is more distressi ng in the Pentagon Papers than the
appare nt failu re of any administ ration, including the present one, to recalculate
the exact natu re of our interes t in Indochina—to consider what, in hard fact,
the consequences would be fo r the United States of the communization of Viet­
nam. In retrospect, one can only feel that, if the containment of China were a
problem, a strong communist Vietnam would offer more effective resistance to
Chinese pressures than any of the shoddy regimes we have sponsored in Saigon.
T H E DEM OCRA TIZIN G M ISS IO N

The messianic component in American foreign policy was compounded by the

idea of America’s regenerative mission to suffering mankind. Like collective
security, this was in its original form a valuable idea. But in its original form
the American mission was to reform the world by the American example, not
by Americans moving into other countries and setting things straigh t.
Then the experience of military occupation af ter the Second World War, and
especially, I think, the occupation of Japa n began to strengthen American con­
fidence in our talent for “nation-building.” We soon supposed tha t we had not
only the power but the wisdom to enter alien cultures and reconstru ct them
according to our own stan dard s and values. Thus Vice Pres ident Humphrey spoke
in 19GG about “realizing the dream of the Great Society in the grea t area of
Asia, not jus t here at home.” He added, “We ought to be excited about this
challenge, because here is where we can put to work some of our ideas of how
a—nation building, of new concepts of education, development of local govern­
ment, the improvement of th e health stand ards of people, and really the achieve­
ment and th e fulfillment of social justice.”
This was t he authe ntic language of American social reform. B ut i t also r epre­
sented the fata l perversion of a sound idea. It beguiled us into what may be
called sentimental imperialism—the belief tha t we know bette r than other
people did what was good for them. In this process the limited policy of help­
ing others to help themselves grew into the unlimited policy of imposing our
 74
own pref eren ces on oth ers ; to tha t, if the Vietnam ese would not out of respect
for our sup erio r wisdom do w hat we tho ugh t was good fo r them, we were det er­
mined to make them do it out of obedience to our supe rior stre ngt h. The Army
ma jor stan din g in the rubble of Ben T re summed up the u ltim ate logic of Ameri­
can messi anism : “It became necess ary to destroy the town to save it. ”

A B SO LU TI ST A N TI -C O M M U N IS T

The delusio n th at America was the appoi nted pro tect or of world freedom re­
ceived a ddi tio nal impe tus from the c onviction th at w orld freedom w as thre aten ed
by the ambi tions of the cent raliz ed movement of world communism. Let me be
quite clea r on this. The communism of the fort ies—whi ch for purpo ses of pre ­
cision we sho uld call Stali nism —was n ot only a c ruel and ugly tyra nny in Soviet
Rus sia but was also a rela tive ly coor dina ted int ern ati onal movement. Anti-
Stalin ism would seem to me a mora l necessi ty for any believer in democracy.
And in the fort ies Stalin ism was a perf ectly genuine th re at in Euro pe—not in
the sense th at the Red Army was likely to i nvad e the west, but in the sense tha t,
given the economic and social diso rgan izati on of Wes tern Europe , Communist
par tie s migh t well have come to power in coun tries like Fra nce and Ital y.
But pra ctic al resis tanc e to Stal inism w as soon enveloped by t he view th at com­
munism was a changeless, una ltera ble, monolith ic d octri ne of t ota l discipli ne and
tot al evil. This abso luti st view led to the c onclusion th at e very commu nist par ty
or sta te by definition mus t forev er be the obedien t ins tru me nt of the Soviet
Union. It led Dean Rusk as an Ass ista nt Secr etary of Sta te in 1951 to call the
commu nist regime in Peki ng “a colonial Rus sian gover nment —a Slavic Man-
chukuo on a lar ger sc ale.” It led to the illusio n t ha t gue rril la wa rs could n ot j us t
be local insu rrec tion s in whic h lo cal lead ersh ip respond ed to local grievan ces but
must ra th er repr esen t “wa rs of nat ion al lib era tio n” organiz ed by Moscow to
“tes t the will” of the United State s. Once ag ain a rat ion al idea unde rwen t fat al
expa nsion and perversi on.
Moreover, thou gh th e re ali ty of a ce ntra lize d wo rld com munist movement ha rdly
outlived Stali n himse lf—indeed, had begun to crumble some yea rs before Stal in's
dea th—the Americ an govern ment conti nued for many yea rs to ope rate in terms
of the old stereoty pe. When I served in the Kennedy adm ini str ati on in the early
sixties , I used to implo re the Sta te Dep artm ent to stop going on abou t the
“Sino-Sovi et bloc” when it was abu nda ntly evide nt th at the Sino-Soviet bloc
had ceased to exist, if indeed it ever existe d. Yet people today —in some of his
speeches, Pre side nt Nixon himse lf—stil l tal k abou t communism as if it were
some sor t of undiffer entia ted, cen trali zed th re at to the United State s.
In the contem porary age of p olycent rism, the re is no longer any such thing as
“world communis m.” A commu nist take over no longer means the auto mat ic ex­
tensio n of Rus sian or of Chinese power. Every commu nist governm ent, every
commu nist par ty, has been set free to respond to its own nat ion al concerns and
to pur sue i ts own nat ion al inte rest s. Diverg ing nat ion al inte res ts have proved to
be more power ful tha n common ideologies. And this, of course, grea tly tra ns ­
form s t he n atu re of th e pr oblem th at c ommun ist movements pres ent to American
secur ity. Our fail ure to recognize the rise of polyce ntrism caused us to miscon­
ceive the cha rac ter of a local conflict in Indoch ina, to inflate its importance , to
mis repr esen t the degree of Americ an int ere st in its outcome and to ent er th at
wa r wit h a feroc ity out of all prop ortio n to its act ual consequence for our
nat ion al securi ty.
Abs oluti st anti-c onnnunism had an oth er effect which should be noted he re : it
led to the purgi ng from our govern ment of those officials who best underst ood
the penomena of Asian communism. A leadi ng member of the Kennedy and
John son adm ini stra tio ns recen tly rem ark ed to me th at one reaso n the United
Sta tes gover nmen t perfo rmed wit h so much more intelli gence dur ing the Cuban
missile cris is tha n it did dur ing the Indo chin a wa r was th at in the case of t he
missile cris is it had the benefit of the counsel of men like Ambas sadors Thomp­
son. Bohlen and Ha rrim an who k new the Soviet Union and could give sound ad ­
vice abo ut its probabl e purpo ses and react ions. In the case of the Fa r East, we
had no equi vale nt exp erts on China, and the governm ent conseque ntly opera ted
on the ba sis of th eorie s w hich we now' know to hav e been w ildly exagg erated . H ad
not Joh n Fos ter D ulles drumm ed our C hina expe rts out of t he Forei gn Service—
and thi s Committe e recen tly bad the opp ortu nity to see w hat able and pat riot ic
men they are —I cann ot believe th at we would have purs ued the same policy of
arro gan ce and blun der th at got us so deep into Vietnam.
 id

IN S T IT U T IO N A L M E S S IA N IS M

Id ea s ten d to becom e emb odie d in in st it ut io ns ; an d th e in st itu tio ns oft en

su rv ive long af te r th e ide as ha ve become obso lete . In th e fif tie s th e ab so lu tis t
an ti- co mm un ist phi los oph y too k ro ot in a gro up of go ve rn me nt age nci es— the
S ta te D ep ar tm en t, pu rg ed by Du lle s of ac tiv e dis se nte rs, the Def ens e D ep ar t­
me nt, th e Na tio na l Se cu rit y Coun cil, th e Ce nt ra l In tel lig en ce Agenc y—al l of
wh ich dev elop ed ve ste d in st itu tio na l in te re st s in th e the ory of m ili ta ril y ex pa n­
sio ni st wo rld com mun ism . Th e Cold W ar co nf err ed pow er, ap pr op ria tio ns an d
pub lic infl uen ce on the se ag en cie s; an d, by the na tu ra l la ws of bu rea uc rac ies ,
th ei r con cer ns fo r th e ca re an d fee din g of th e Cold W ar ine vit ab ly solid ified.
Th e suc ces s of CIA cl an de sti ne op era tio ns in the fift ies— in Ir an , Gu ate ma la,
Egy pt, Lao s—d ou btl es s fed th e Am eri can go ve rn me nt’s con vic tion bot h of it s
ab ili ty an d it s ri gh t to dec ide th e de sti ny of ot he r na tio ns . I wou ld sug ge st th at
th e ver y lan gu ag e of the Cold W ar bu re au cr ac ies —a br isk te ch no cr ati c pat ois ,
wel l des ign ed to conc eal th e hu ma n im pli ca tio ns o f n at io na l ac tio ns —co nt rib ute d
to th e de hu m an iza tio n of Am eric an polic y an d lai d a spu rio us ly an tis ep tic p at in a
over th e h or rib le th in gs we beg an to do in I nd och ina .
Th is pro ces s o f b ur ea uc ra tic ag gr an diz em en t beg an to g ive th e e xe cut ive b ran ch
of go ver nm en t del usi ons of gr an de ur . Pe rs ua de d of it s own exc lus ive gr as p of
the se ar ca ne m at te rs , pr ote cte d by a sec rec y sys tem to wh ich it alo ne held the
key, it inc rea sin gly reg ard ed th e na tio n’s for eig n poli cy as its own pr iv at e pr e­
rog ati ve. I ha ve no dou bt th a t hi st or ia ns a nd po liti ca l sc ie nt ist s who ha d arg ue d
un cr iti ca l ve rsi on s of th e the or y of th e str on g Pre sid en cy —an d he re I mu st
ce rta in ly inc lud e mys elf— co nt rib ute d to the se de lu sio ns ; an d I ca nn ot esca pe
th e imp res sio n th a t Con gres s du ri ng mo st of the se ye ar s am iab ly acq uie sce d
in th e sit ua tio n alm ost w ith re lie f a t th e av oid an ce of res po nsi bil ity . Wh en one
re ad s the Pe nta go n Pa pe rs, one no tes t h a t Con gres s seem ed to ex ist in th e min ds
of th e exe cut ive br an ch pr im ar ily as an ir ri ta ti n g an d ob tus e or gan ism to be
ca jol ed an d hoo dw ink ed wh en it cou ld no t be igno red . Th e notion th a t be tte r
co ns ul ta tio n mi gh t ha ve pro duc ed be tte r polic y did no t seem to occ ur to out-
lea de rs. Yet, on th e r eco rd, t he S en ate Co mm itte e o n Fo rei gn R ela tio ns h as sh own
a good dea l mo re wis dom ab ou t th e Ind oc hin a W ar ov er the la st ha lf dozen
ye ar s th an th e Na tio na l Se cur ity Co unci l.
Of all th e bu rea uc rac ies , I wo uld gue ss th e one th a t pla ye d the la rg es t role,
a t le as t in th e la te r sta ges , in th e int en sif ica tio n of ou r rol e in In do ch ina wa s
th e m ili ta ry es tab lis hm en t. H ist or ic al ly th is m ili ta ry infl uen ce over for eig n
polic y wa s som eth ing of a nov elty . B ut th e Secon d Wo rld W ar ha d br ou gh t a
gr ea t m ili ta ry es tab lis hm en t in to exi ste nce , th e Cold W ar ma de it pe rm an en t,
an d ove r th e la st ge ne rat ion th is es tab lis hm en t ha s ha d exc ess ive an d da ng er ­
ous we igh t in ou r cou nci ls of st at e. F or ma ny ye ar s th e m ili ta ry ha ve abs orb ed
the la rg es t po rti on of th e fe de ra l bud get . De fen se co nt ra ct s ha ve en lis ted lar ge
se cti on s of th e bu sin ess com mu nit y in the m ili ta ry effo rt. Cong ress, un til re ­
cen tly , ha s give n th e m ili ta ry ne ar ly ev er yth ing it wa nte d. Ou r m ili ta ry lea de rs
ha ve c onne d bo th th e exe cut ive a nd l eg isl ati ve b ran ch es of g overn me nt int o buil d-
» ing eno rm ous in st al la tio ns , inc re asi ng ly ir re le va nt in th e mi ssi le age, all ove r
th e wo rld (a nd ha ve in sis ted th at , as th e pr ice w e m us t pay. we m us t do no thi ng
to offend suc h spl en did dem oc rat ic co un tri es as Greece. Po rtu ga l. Br az il and
So uth A fr ic a) . Th ey ha ve oppo sed ag re em en ts des igne d to slow up th e race .
The y fo re ve r de ma nd new sys tem s of offen se an d defe nse. Th ey invo ke th e emo-
* tio ns o f v iri lit y an d pa tri ot ism to re inf or ce th ei r im po rtu nit ies .
Th e fo rw ar d ro le of th e m ili ta ry ha s been str ik in gl y ev ide nt in Vie tna m.
F ir st th ey suc ceed ed in def inin g th e pro blem in th e te rm s st at ed by Gen era l
W he ele r in Nov emb er 1962: “I t is fas hio na ble in some qu ar te rs to say th at the
pro ble ms in So ut he as t Asi a ar e pr im ar ily po liti ca l an d econom ic. . . . T do no t
agr ee. Th e ess enc e of th e pro ble m in Vie tna m is m ili ta ry .” Once un lea she d, the
m ili ta ry ma chi ne es tab lis he d it s own mom ent um . Th e in st itu tio na l pr es su re fo r
fu rt h e r esc ala tio n, th e in st itu tio na l de sir e to tr y ou t wea pon s, ta ct ic s and pe r­
sonn el, th e in st itu tio na l ca pa cit y fo r self -de lusi on, de m on str ate d mo st rec ent ly
by Gen eral Ab ram s, ab ou t th e pr osp ect s fo r m ili ta ry succ ess an d th e exi ste nce
of th a t lig ht a t th e end of th e tu nn el —all th is ca rr ie d us fu rt h er an d fu rt her
in to th e qua gm ire .
Le t me ad d, tho ugh , th a t th e m ili ta ry do no t ine vit ab ly con trol Am eric an
policy . Th ey a re pro fes sio na l men try in g to do a pro fes sio nal job and ma kin g
ex ac tly th e' ar gu m en ts th e na tu re of th ei r pro fes sio n req uir es. Th ei r pl ea su re is
oft en effe ctiv e in am orp ho us sit ua tio ns an d w ith irr es ol ut e lea de rs. B ut it is

83-605—73----- 0
 76

fo ol is h to be su rp ri se d by th e ad vi ce th ey gi ve or to bl am e th em fo r it. I t is fa r
m or e to th e po in t to bl am e th e ci vi li an le ad e rs wh o ta k e th e ir ad vic e.
L et me ad d too th a t I am no t ta lk in g ab ou t th e so -c all ed “m il it a ry -i n d u st ri a l
co m pl ex .” T hi s fo rm ul at io n im pl ie s th a t th e m il it a ry a re n o th in g mo re th an
sto og es of A m er ic an ca pi ta li sm . On ly an old L en in is t lik e P re si d e n t E is en ho w er
co uld be lie ve th a t. I am ta lk in g ab o ut th e m il it a ry a s a q ui te in de pe nd en t fa c to r
in th e fo rm at io n of po lic y, a fo rc e in it s ow n ri g h t o p er at in g ac co rd in g to it s
ow n in te rn a l im pe ra ti ve s an d no t a t th e bi dd in g of A m er ic an bu si ne ss , wh ich
ha d ne ve r bee n de ep ly co m m itt ed to th e In do ch in a w a r an d in re ce nt y ea rs ha s,
I be lie ve , tu rn e d pr ed om in an tl y a g a in st i t.
EC ON OM IC IM P E R IA L IS M ?

In th is co nn ec tio n, I sh ou ld p er ha p s m en tio n a th es is pr op os ed in som e ac ­

co un ts of ou r in vo lv em en t in V ie tn am : th e th es is th a t th e In d o ch in a w ar w as th e
re su lt o f th e qu es t o f A m er ic an c ap it al is m f or w or ld h eg em on y.
I t is tr u e th a t A m er ic an ov er se as in ve st m en ts ha ve gr ow n re m ar k ab ly in th e
p o st w ar pe rio d— fr om $8.4 bi lli on in 1945 to $78 bi lli on in 1970. I t is, of co urs e,
h a rd to co nt en d th a t A m er ic a w en t in to V ie tn am to g ai n m a rk e ts or pr ot ec t in ­
ve st m en ts in a co un tr y w he re w e h av e h ad li tt le of ei th er . In de ed , we ha ve sp en t
m or e mo ne y on th a t w ar t h a n A m er ic an bu si ne ss c ou ld ho pe t o ge t o u t of V ie tn am
in a ce nt ur y. B u t th e m or e so p hi st ic at ed ex po ne nt s of th e eco no mi c ar gu m en t
off er a ki nd of do mi no th es is of th e ir ow n. Th ey sa y th a t, be ca us e d ef ea t in V ie t­
na m w ou ld je op ar di ze A m er ic an m a rk e ts an d in ve st m en ts th ro u g h o u t th e T h ir d
W or ld , th e eco nom ic ne ce ss iti es of a n ex pa nd in g c a p it a li st o rd er ha ve com pe lle d
th e A m er ic an go ve rn m en t to em b ar k on a co ur se of ru th le ss co un te r- re vo lu tio n.
Clo se an al y si s of th e fig ur es sh ow s, ho w ev er , th a t th e de pe nd en ce o f A m er ic an
ca pi ta li sm on th e un de rd ev el op ed w or ld , in t e rm s e it h e r of t ra d e o r of i nv es tm en t,
is ve ry li m it ed i nd ee d. T w o- tli ir ds o f A m er ic an e xp or ts go t o in d u st ri al iz ed ra th e r
th an to de ve lo pi ng c o u nt ri es ; s al es to t h e T h ir d W or ld am ou nt to a bo ut 3 pe r ce nt
of ou r an n u al n at io n al o ut pu t. As fo r A m er ic an in ve st m en t in th e T h ir d W orl d,
th is re pr es en ts a de cl in in g fr a c ti o n o f o ur t ot al fo re ig n in ve st m en t— 35 pe r ce nt i n
1960 an d on ly 28 pe r ce nt in 1970. Of T h ir d W or ld in ve st m en t, 40 pe r ce nt is in
p e tr o le u m : if th is is ex clu de d, on ly ab o ut on e- si xt h of A m er ic an ov er se as in ve st ­
m en t is in de ve lo pi ng na ti on s, an d fe w A m er ic an bu si ne ss m en see m in te re st ed in
in cr ea si ng th e pr op or tio n. In so f a r a s th e f u tu re o f A m er ic an ca p it al is m de pe nd s
on th e ou ts id e wo rld , it de pe nd s on m a rk e ts an d in ve st m en ts in o th e r in d u s tr ia l­
ize d co unt ri es a nd n ot on w h at m ay h ap pe n in t he T h ir d W or ld .
N or ca n it be sa id th a t th e pr os ec ut io n o f th e In do ch in a w a r w as ne ce ss ar y fo r
do m et ic pr os pe ri ty . Q ui te th e c o n tr a r y : th e eco no mi c co ns eq ue nc es of V ie tn am
ha ve be en in fla tio n, ba la nc e- of -p ay m en ts tr o u b le an d a p er v ad in g d is to rt io n of
th e eco nom y. N or ne ed th e te rm in a ti o n of th e w a r m ea n de pr es si on a t hom e. At
th e en d of th e Sec ond W old W ar , be tw ee n 1945 an d 1946, go ve rn m en t pu rc ha se s
of go od s an d se rv ic es d ec lin ed f ro m $83 b ill io n to $31 bi lli on , a su m e qu al to a lm os t
o ne -o ua rt er of th e gr os s n at io n al pr od uc t. I f o ur eco no my co ul d ab so rb a de cli ne
of su ch m ag ni tu de th en , it co uld ea si ly ab so rb a de cli ne in w a r sp en di ng o f ab ou t
2 per ce nt of gr os s n a ti o n a l p ro d u ct to da y.
I t m us t be a dd ed th a t th e P en ta go n P ap er s, so fa r as I kn ow , re co rd no i n st an ce
of bu si ne ss in te rv en ti o n in A m er ic an V ie tn am po lic y an d th a t an v di sc us si on
am on g go ve rn m en t off icia ls of an A m er ic an eco no ini c in te re st in S ou th ea st As ia
w as gl an ci ng an d pe rf un ct or y. In so f a r a s ou r go ve rn m en t co nf ro nt ed th e qu es ­
ti on of th e A m er ic an in te re st , it sa w th a t in te re st as po lit ic al , st ra te g ic an d
sym bo lic , no t eco nom ic.
To sum up, I wo uld su gg es t th a t th e p os t- w ar A m er ic an i m pe ri al im pu lse , w hi ch
ca m e to it s te rr ib le cu lm in at io n in In do ch in a, ar os e fro m a nu m be r of p re ss u re s
an d te m p ta ti o n s—p re ss u re s an d te m p ta ti o n s ex er te d by th e va cu um s of po w er
cr ea te d by th e Se con d W or ld W a r; by th e m is ap pl ic at io n of a va lid be lie f in th e
ne ce ss ity of c re a ti n g a n in te rn a ti o n a l st ru c tu re i n w hi ch th e U ni te d S ta te s wo ul d
ac ce pt h er fu ll glo ba l re sp o n si b il it ie s: by th e gr an di os e ov er -e xt en si on of A m er ­
ic a ’s m is si on to u p li ft su ff er in g m an ki nd : by th e r ef o rm is t fa it h in th e A m er ic an
c a p ac it y t o in s tr u c t an d re bu il d o th e r n a ti o n s : by t h e q ui te re al m en ac e of S ta li n ­
is t co m m uni sm ; by th e co un te ri de ol og y o f an ti- co m m un is m , p er si st in g in ri g id
an d a b so lu ti st fo rm lo ng a ft e r th e ci rc um st an ce s th a t ha d pr od uc ed it b ad be gu n
to c h an g e: an d by th e in st it u ti o n a li z a ti o n of th e Co ld W ar , es pe ci all y in th e in ­
cr ea si ng ly in fl ue nt ia l m il it a ry es ta bl is hm en t.
 7

T he fu rt h e r qu es ti on a r i s e s : did th es e div er se fa c to rs re nder o u r in vo lv em en t

in V ie tn am in ev it ab le ? W er e th es e fo rc es sh ap in g o ur po lic y so po w er fu l th a t an y
a d m in is tr a ti o n in W as hi ng to n wo uld ha ve be en co mp ell ed to purs ue th e co ur se
th a t wa s, in fa ct , pur su ed ? My an sw er to th a t is no. T he In do ch in a tr ag ed y wa s,
in my ju dg m en t, th e co ns eq ue nc e of n a ti o n a l il lu si on s an d de lu si on s, no t of n a ­
ti on al ne ce ss iti es . T he ro ad to d is a st e r h a d m an y tu rn in gs.
We co uld , fo r ex am pl e, hav e fo llo we d th e po lic y rec om me nd ed be fo re hi s dea th
by P re si d e n t R oo se ve lt an d oppo sed th e re st o ra ti o n of F re nc h ru le in In do ch in a.
W e co ul d ha ve re sp on de d to th e ap pea ls of II o Ch i M in h in 194 5-46 . Gi ve n th e
ur ge nc ie s in ci te d by th e K or ea n W ar , so me m ea su re of A m er ic an in vo lv em en t in
su pp or tin g th e F re n ch in th e ea rl y fi ft ie s w as pr ob ab ly h a rd to a v o id ; no r w as
th e pr ov is io n of ec on om ic a ss is ta n ce to So ut h V ie tn am a ft e r 1954 a ne ce ss ar y
ca us e of su bs eq ue nt d is as te r.
I do no t re ga rd it s V ie tn am polic y a s on e of t he K en ne dy a d m in is tr a ti o n ’s fin es t
ho ur s. In re tr os pe ct , it is c le a r th a t w e a ll ov er re ac te d to K hr us ch ev ’s tr u cu le n t
sp ee ch of J a n u a ry 1961. T h is w as th e sp ee ch p re dic ti ng th e vi ct or y of c om m un ism
th ro ug h “ w ar s of n a ti o n a l li b er at io n " in th e T h ir d W or ld —t h e sp ee ch to w hi ch
th e K en ne dy in a u g u ra l w as es se nt ia ll y a n an sw er . I t wo uld no w a p p ea r th a t
K hr us hc he v w as en ga ge d in a co m pl ic at ed m an eu ve r w ith re g ar d to Ch in a ; bu t
W as hi ng to n, u n a w a re o f t h e d ep th of t h e S in o- So vi et sp li t a t th e t im e, in te rp re te d
th e spe ec h h a s a ch al le ng e to th e w es t. T he fe el in g in W as hi ng to n th en w as th a t
th e nu cl ea r st an d- of f ex cl ud ed th e p os si bi li ty of n uc le a r w a r ; t h a t th e w es te rn re ­
sp on se in K or ea had re du ce d th e ch an ce of li m it ed w a r ; an d th a t, if a so lu tio n
co ul d on ly be fo un d fo r g u e rr il la w ar , a fu tu re of pe ac e m ig ht be as su re d. T he re
th u s ar os e th e c ou nt er in su rg en cy m y st iq u e—a n in te re st in g b ut da ng er ou s ide a an d
on e wh ich A m er ic an s w er e not qu al ifi ed by hi st or y or te m p er am en t to c a rr y
th ro ug h. A t th e sa m e tim e, th e s h if t in m il it a ry st ra te g y fro m pr ed om in an t re ­
lia nc e on n u cl ea r w ea po ns t o ‘flex ibl e re sp on se ’ a n d th e co ns eq ue nt di ve rs if ic at io n
of ou r ar m ed fo rc es , th ou gh in te nd ed to re du ce th e ri sk of nucl ea r w ar , ha d th e
ir on ic ef fe ct of m ak in g po ss ib le m ar gin al v en tu re s l ik e V iet na m .
I do no t re ca ll, th ou gh , an y co ck in es s or re li sh in th e K en ne dy W hi te H ou se
ab ou t g et ti n g in vo lv ed in V iet na m . T h er e w as en ou gh els e to do in th os e ye ar s.
Mo re ov er, it m us t be re m em be re d th a t P re si d e n t K en ne dy ’s de cis io n to se nd in
“a d v is e rs ” a t th e en d of 1961 w as in p a rt a tr ad e- of f to th e n at io n al -s ec u ri ty
b ure au cr ac y fo r it s su lle n ac ce pt an ce of th e K en ne dy po lic y of n e u tr a li z in g
La os , K en ne dy re je ct ed th e re co m m en da ti on s of th e T ay lo r- R os to w re p o rt fo r
A m er ic an ar m ed in te rv en ti o n in 1961. In de ed , le ss th a n 100 A m er ic an w er e ki lle d
in co m ba t in V ie tn am d u ri ng th e e n ti re K en ne dy Pr es id en cy . On th e o th e r ha nd ,
he di d ac qu ie sc e in 1962 in th e de fin iti on of th e V ie tn am pr ob le m as p ri m a ri ly
m il it a ry —a de fin iti on wh ich , it sh ou ld be ad de d, go ve rn m en t off icia ls li ke A ve re ll
H a rr im a n an d R og er H il sm an vi go ro us ly oppo sed .
I t see ms to me fa ir ly fr u it le ss to sp ec ul at e w h a t wo uld h av e ha pp en ed had
P re si d en t K en ne dy liv ed . I t is im po ss ib le to pr ed ic t w h a t de ad P re si d e n ts wo uld
do ab ou t si tu at io n s th a t ta k e a ne w fo rm a ft e r th e ir de at h ; it is h a rd en ou gh
to p re d ic t w h a t li vi ng P re si d e n ts wi ll do ab out su ch si tu at io ns. I su pp os e th e
saf est , gu es s as to w h a t Jo h n K en ne dy ’s wo uld ha ve be en is to loo k a t th e lin e
ta k en by hi s b ro th e rs a ft e r h is de at h. T her e ca n he no qu es tio n th a t P re si d e n t
K en ne dy ha d th e ca pac it y to re fu se es ca la ti on . H e sh ow ed th a t a t th e ti m e of
th e B ay of P ig s an d ag ai n a t th e ti m e of th e Cu ba m is si le cr is is . I kn ow too
th a t hi s m em or y of V ie tn am u nde r F re n ch ru le m ad e him fee l th e re w er e li m it s
be yo nd w hi ch on e co ul d ex pa nd a w hi te m il it a ry pr es en ce w it h o u t u n it in g th e
en er gi es of loc al n at io n al is m a g a in st th e in tr u d e r. I find it h a rd to be lie ve th a t
V ie tn am wo ul d ha ve a lt e re d h is p ru d e n t an d ra ti o n a l h a b it s in th e us e of
po we r. B u t th e qu es ti on of w hat he wo uld ha ve do ne had he liv ed re m ai ns
in so lu ah le .
Th e m os t d is a st ro u s st ep w as th e de cis io n in 1965 to se nd A m er ic an bo m be rs
to N or th V ie tn am an d A m er ic an co m ba t tr oo ps in to So ut h V ie tn am . Di d pr ev io us
ev en ts le av e P re si d e n t Jo hn so n no a lt e rn a ti v e h u t to A m er ic an iz e th e V ie tn am
w ar ? I do no t th in k th a t h is to ry is so m et ic ul ou sl y de te rm in ed . I be lie ve th a t
P re si d en t Jo hn so n ge nu in el y th oug ht —t ho ug h, in my be lie f, m is ta ken ly — th a t
th e fu tu re of w or ld pe ac e w as ho un d up w it h A m er ic an su cc es s in V ie tn a m : in
ad dit io n he fo un d it in co nc ei va bl e th a t, if A m er ic an po w er an d tec hn ol og y w er e
ap pl ie d, th e pr ob le m co ul d not. he sol ve d. N or wo uld I u n d e re st im a te his be li ef
th a t fa il u re in V ie tn am m ig ht le ad to a da ng er ou s poli ti ca l bac kla sh in A m er ic a :
hi s ge ne ra ti on ha d too vi vi d me mo ry of th e ca m pa ig n a g a in st t h e T ru m an ad m in ­
is tr a ti o n fo r ha vi ng "l ost ” Ch in a. B u t I do n o t be lie ve th a t an y o th e r gr ou p in
office in W as hi ng to n a t th a t tim e wo ul d he in el uc ta bl y co m pe lle d to do w ha t
th e Jo hn so n a d m in is tr a ti o n di d— an y m or e th a n a n o th e r a d m in is tr a ti o n in
W as hi ng to n to da y wo uld he in el uc ta bl y co mp ell ed to th e ir ra ti o n a l co ur se
re ce nt ly an no un ce d by P re si d en t N ix on .
L et me de al br ief ly w ith th e co nt en ti on s su bm it te d by a st u te ob se rv er s th a t in
som e se ns e th e sy ste m — th a t is, ou r po li ti co -b ur ea uc ra ti c sy st em —“ w or ke d” in
th e de ve lo pm en t of A m er ic an pol icy in V iet na m . T h is co nt en ti on has bee n ba se d
on th re e pr op os iti on s.
Th e fi rs t is th a t we co uld no t af fo rd to los e in V ie tn am be ca us e of da ng er ou s
re pe rc us si on s, bo th in te rn a ti o n a l an d do m es tic . T hi s w as , it se em s to me, a ge n­
er al moo d ra th e r th a n an ab so lu te po in t. P re si d en t T ru m an th o u g h t th a t no t
los ing in V ie tn am w as w or th th e 40 per ce nt co st of th e w ar th e U ni te d S ta te s
w as pa yi ng by 1951. P re si de nt E is en ho w er th oug ht it w or th th e 80 per ce nt co st
of 1954 pl us th e $20 0 m ill io n per y ea r of m il it ar y ai d fro m 1955 to 1901. P re si den t
K en ne dy th o u g h t it w or th fu rt h e r a id pl us th e se nd in g of 16,000 ad vi se rs . B ut
I am su re th a t if th es e P re si d en ts h ad an ti c ip a te d th a t th e ev en tu al co st wo uld
be 540,000 A m er ic an tro op s in V ie tn am , $30 bi lli on a ye ar , ex te ns iv e des tr uct io n
an d sl a u g h te r an d th en , in th e en d, m il it a ry st al em at e, th ey w ou ld no t ha ve
th ou gh t th e ga m e to be w o rt h th e ca nd le . T he qu es ti on of “n ot af fo rd in g to lo se ”
is no t an ab so lu te q u e st io n ; it is su re ly re la ti v e to th e co st s of p re ve nti ng suc h
loss .
T hi s le ad s to th e sec on d pr op os iti on —th a t ou r P re si d en ts w er e ne ve r ac tu al ly
se ek in g a m il it ar y vi ct or y hut a lw ay s w an te d a neg ot ia te d se tt le m en t. I am
co nst ra in ed to do ub t th is . In No ve m be r 1961, fo r ex am pl e, th e re w er e 15,000
V iet Co ng a g a in st 250.00 0 tr oo ps of th e Sa ig on go ve rn m en t. I t m ig ht we ll ha ve
see me d re as on ab le — an d in de ed di d see m re as on ab le — to su pp os e th a t AR VN ,
sti ff en ed by A m er ic an w ea po ns an d ad vis er s, co uld de al w ith th is sm al l an d
ra gg ed op po sit io n. A ft er al l, th e J o in t C hi ef s of S ta ff to ld P re si d e n t Ke nn ed y
in th e au tu m n of 1961 th a t 40.000 A m er ic an tro op s co uld cle an up th e Vi et Co ng :
an d th a t, if th er e w er e N o rt h V ie tn am es e pl us Ch in es e in te rv en ti on, 128,000
m or e A m er ic an tr oo ps co uld ta k e ca re of th at .
In 1965, wh en we be ga n th e A m er ic an iz at io n of th e w ar , P re sd e n t Jo hn so n,
I am su re , co uld n o t co nc eiv e th a t, if we po un de d N or th V ie tn am lo ng en ou gh ,
th er e wo uld no t be a b re a k in g -p o in t; th a t, if th e g re a te st po w er in th e wo rld
ap nl ie d it se ll f, we co uld no t nai l th e co on sk in to th e w all . Up ti ll ve ry re ce nt ly ,
an d p e rh ap s ev en now , th e m il it a ry h av e con ce ive d th e w ar to he w in na bl e, in
th e se ns e of as su ri n g th e su rv iv al of a no n- co m m un is t re gi m e in Sa igo n. As fo r
a ne go ti at ed se tt le m en t, th is w as n o t an is su e fo r th e fi rs t th re e P re si den ts
in v o lv ed ; an d th e la s t tw o ha ve no t so ug ht a ne go ti at ed se tt le m en t ex ce pt on
te rm s th a t wo uld , in eff ec t, a ss u re th e su rv iv al of th e Sa ig on go ve rn m en t—
te rm s th a t th e o th e r sid e w ou ld be ho un d a s a dus ty an sw er a ft e r a ge ne ra ti on of
st ru gg le .
T he th ir d pr op os iti on is th a t our P re si d e n ts w er e not de lu de d by op tim is m an d
di d no t ex pe ct m il it ar y su cc es s. T hi s qu es tio n to ok di ff er en t sh ap es in di ff er en t
ad m in is tr a ti o n s. F o r a go od de al of th e tim e, bo th P re si d e n ts E is en ho w er an d
K en ne dy su pp os ed th a t AR VN co ul d ho ld it s ow n, an d P re si d e n t Jo hn so n ce r­
ta in ly ex pe ct ed su cc es s in 196 5-6 6. M r. Gel b him se lf h as w ri tt en , “B y mo st co n­
ve nt io na l st a n d a rd s— th e si ze an d fir ep ow er of fr ie nd ly V ie tn am es e fo rc es , th e
nu m be r of h am le ts pa cif ied , th e nu m ber of ‘fr e e e le ct io ns ’ be in g he ld , th e nu m be r
of C om m un is ts ki lle d, an d so fo rt h —r ea so nab le me n co uld an d di d th in k in ca u­
ti ou sl y op ti m is ti c te rm s. ” C er ta in ly e ac h P re si d e n t w as of fe red pe ss im is tic a dv ice ,
es pe ci al ly by th e CIA , but h e w as al so of fe red ple nt y of op ti m is ti c ad vi ce too.
T he re co rd sh ow s pe ss im ism an d op tim is m so ho pe les sly in te rm in gl ed th a t an y
P re si d e n t co ul d d ra w al m os t an y co nc lu si on s hi s te m pe ra m en t an d in te lli ge nc e
en jo in ed h im t o dr aw .
In my vie w th e “s ys te m ” fa il ed di sm al ly . I t fa il ed to pr ov id e an y sy st em at ic
a n d se ri ou s as se ss m en t of A m er ic an st a k e s in V iet na m . I t fa il ed in th e po lit ic al
an d m il it a ry ta c ti c s it pr od uc ed . I t fa il e d in it s es ti m at e an d fo re ca st of th e
c h a ra c te r of th e pro ble m an d th e m ag nit ude of th e dif ficu lty . I t fa il ed to fo re se e
th e a c u te in st a b il it y of th e Di em re gi m e, or th e fias co of th e st ra te g ic ham le t
pr og ra m , o r th e a tt a c k s on th e B u d d h is ts in 1963, o r th e fu ti li ty of th e bo mb ing
po lic y, or th e fa il u re of se ar ch -a nd -d es tr oy ta ct ic s, or th e ca pa ci ty of th e en em y,
y e a r a ft e r ye ar , to re pl en is h his lo ss es a n d en la rg e hi s ef fo rt. I t w as w ro ng in
 believing tha t the South Vietnamese under Diem had the will to defend its el f;
tha t United States pre ssure could introduc e reform into the rigid minds of Saigon
ma nda rins ; that, if we pounded long and hard enough, t he other side would cry
uncle. It was terri bly wrong in regarding Hanoi and Viet Cong as the spe arhead
of Chinese aggression. The system could not even foresee developments within the
Saigon regime itself. As the Pentagon study says, “The shif ts of loyalties, coups,
rebellions, and major changes of public figures, often caught the Embassy by su r­
prise. It had no effective system, eit her through overt or covert contacts, for find­
ing out wha t was going on.”
The system, in short, did not offer President s int elligent or useful co unsel; and
it reinforced and compounded illusion. In my judgment, the Vietnam ad venture
was marked much more by ignorance, misjudgment, muddle an d (to be f rank )
stupidit y than it was by efficiency, foresight, awareness and calculation.
What are the lessons of Vietnam?
(1) That everything in the world is not of equal importance to us. F or nearly
a decade we have given too large a share of our atte ntion and resources to a m ar­
ginal problem on the mainland of Asia while our position has steadily deteriorate d
in pa rts of the world fa r more vit al to o ur natio nal security.
(2) That we cannot do e verythi ng in the world. Vietnam should teach us tha t
in the last half of the 20tli centu ry a rmed whi te men cannot decide the destiny of
countries in the Thir d World. Let us hope th at it will forever chasten what your
chairman has well termed the “arro gance of power.”
(3) That we cannot he the permanent guarantor o f sta bility in a world of t ur­
bulence and change. We must reconcile ourselves to an age of local revolution and
local war in which many terri ble things will take place t ha t the United States
simply lacks the power to prevent or the wisdom to cure.
(4) That all problems in the world are not milit ary problems, and that m ilitary
force is not usually the most effective f orm of national power. So long as we con­
tinue to define world problems in milita ry terms, so long will we strengthen the
influence of our own mi litary establishmen t and plunge th e nation into fur the r
milita ry intervention. We should un dertake militar y i ntervention only (a) when
the national security of th e United States is direct ly and indisputably involved;
(b) when the people whom we thing we a re supporting display a capacity for
resistance themselves; and (c) when, in addition, there are reasonable prospects
for success—all conditions rejec ted and trampled upon by those who made Ameri­
can mi litary policy for Vietnam.
(5) That, if we must fight, we must rigorously maintai n a due and rational
proportion between our m eans and our ends. I do not much like t he wholesale d is­
tributi on of moral judgm ents in the realm of for eign p olicy; but I have no doubt
tha t the Indochina war became an immoral war when we began to violate the
principle of proportionality, when we began to re gard technology as a substit ute
for policy, when the means employed and the destructi on wrought grew out of any
defensible relationship to the inte rests involved and the ends sought. We will have
to live with the horror of Vietnam for t he rest of our lives.
(0) That foreign policy is not the priv ate prope rty of the exec utiv e branch of
government. The Pres ident must stop making decisions of war and peace without
effective consultation with the American Congress. He must stop withholding in­
formation about American action and policy essenti al to wise and informed judg­
ment by the Congress an d the e lectorate. Congress must particip ate, as in recent
years it has sadly failed to p articip ate, in t he control both of foreign policy and
of the government’s secrecy system.
Perhaps the lessons of Vietnam can best be summed up in the statem ent tha t
President Kennedy made in November 1961—a statemen t which, in my belief,
expressed his true views on this matt er far more ac curately than the grandilo ­
quent rheto ric of the in augura l ad dress :
“We must face the fact tha t the United States is neither omnipotent nor om­
niscient—that we ar e only six per cent of the world’s population—that we can­
not impose our will upon the other ninety-four per cent of mankind—that we
cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity —and tha t therefore there
cannot be an American solution to every world problem.”
The C hairman. Than k you. Dr. Schlesinger. T hat is a very percep­
tive and a very intere sting statement. We will return to questions on
it when we hear from Dr. Chomsky.
Dr. Chomsky, would you like to give us your stateme nt at this time ?
 80
STA TEM ENT OE NOAM CHOMSKY, FE R R A R I P. WA RD PROF ESSO R
OF LIN GU IST ICS , MASSA CHUSE TTS IN ST IT UT E OF TECHNOLO GY
Mr. C hom sky . We ll, my sta tem en t is also much too Io n" to rea d,
I am af ra id , an d I will jus t th ere fo re me nti on a few of th e ma in
po int s a nd, i f I m ay, I woul d also l ike to comm ent on some o f th e ev ents
th at have tak en plac e since I sub mi tte d th is sta tem en t las t week,
whi ch I th in k are very omin ous and rel ate to a nu mb er of the po int s
th at I m ade in the sta tem ent .

U .S . PO LI CY OF IM PO SI N G N O N -C O M M U N IS T RE G IM E ON V IE T N A M

Tn Se pte mb er 1948, the St at e De pa rtm en t issue d a pol icy s tat em en t

in whi ch it defin ed a dile mm a th at fac ed U.S . pol icymaker s. Th e U.S .
lon g-term obje ctiv e was to eli mi nat e Co mm uni st influ ence in In do ­
chi na to the m axi mu m ex ten t poss ible an d br in g In do ch in a wi th in the
wes tern orb it. Bu t the sta tem en t re po rte d th at the Co mm unists ha d
ca ptu re d con trol of the na tio na lis t mo vem ent, t ha t Ho C hi Mi nh was
the s tro ng est an d pe rha ps t he a ble st figu re in In do ch ina , an d th a t any
sug gest ed solu tion whic h excl ude s him is an exp ed ien t of un ce rta in
outcome . He nce a di lemm a.
Th e C ha irm an . W as t h at 1948 ?
Mr . C hom sky . Se pte mb er 1948. I t was in th is con tex t th at Dean
Ache son on Ma y 10, 1949, cab led to Am eri can officials in Sa igo n an d
P ar is th at “no effo rt sho uld be sp ar ed ” to assu re th e success of the
Bao Da i go ver nm ent , since t he re ap pe are d to be “no ot he r a lte rn at iv e
to e sta bli sh me nt Com mie pa tt er n V iet na m .”
He fu rt her u rg ed t h at t hi s gov ern me nt sho uld be “ tr ul y re pr es en ta ­
tiv e even to ex ten t in clu di ng ou tst an di ng non- Com mie lea der s now
su pp or tin g Ho .” Tn ot he r wor ds, he ha d fo rm ula ted wh at ha s eve r
since b een th e Am eri can pol icy of im po sin g a n on- Co mm unist r egim e
on V iet na m— la te r S outh Vie tna m.
ITe also sai d in Ma y 1949, t h at th e Un ite d St ate s sho uld reco gnize
the Fre nc h-i mp os ed gov ern me nt as soon as circ um stan ces pe rm it.
Th is dil em ma ha s alw ays rem ain ed. Th e U ni te d St ate s has been
com mit ted to a n on- Co mm uni st V iet na m, by ab out 1960 a n on- Com mu ­
nis t So uth Vi etn am , but th e wes tern imp ose d regi mes were nev er able
to com pete po liti ca lly wi th th e Vie t Mi nh an d th en wi th the NL F.

V IE T CON G CA PT UR ED N A T IO N A L IS T M O VE M EN T

Les lie Gel b sum ma rize s th e sit ua tio n at the ver y end of the per iod
cove red in th e Pe nt ag on Pa pe rs in alm ost the same wo rds as tho se of
th e St at e De pa rtm en t pol icy sta tem en t of 1948. He says t h at t he V iet
Co ng hav e c ap tu re d t he na tio na lis t m ove ment a nd th at the go ver nm ent
of Vi etn am is in effect a gov ern me nt of Fr en ch co lla bo rat ors , whi ch
is ou ite acc ura te.
One can tak e n ati onal int elli gen ce est ima tes fr om th e F re nc h per iod ,
fo r exa mpl e, 195,3. and int erc ha ng e the m wi th only a few cha nges of
nam es wi th th e ra th er de sp airin g re po rt of Am eri can pac ificatio n
ex pe rts o n, say, Dec embe r 31, 1967. I give ref eren ces i n my sta tem ent .
 81
STRATEG Y OF A N N IH IL A T IO N UN DE RT AK EN BY U. S. FORCES

There are a num ber o f consequences to this dilemma. The first con­
sequence is the strat egy of annihi lation t hat was und ertaken by U.S.
forces, in a sense, out of m ilitar y necessity—that is, there was no othe r
way to eliminate a powerful p olitical force.
It is impo rtan t to bear in min d th at the main thr ust of the American
milit ary effort has always been agains t South Vietnam, specifically
against t he r ura l society of South Vietnam. Were we capable of apply ­
ing to ourselves th e stand ards we r ight ly apply to others, we would
say the United States h as been at war with South Vietnam, in effect.
It was necessary to destroy the society, the rur al society, in which the
Communist-led revolution was rooted.
It was necessary, as pacification adviser Robert Komer once said,
to “gr ind t he enemy down by sheer weight and mass,” bearin g in mind
tha t the enemy was in effect the rur al population of South Vietnam.
This dilemma is t he root cause of those m ilitar y measures th at have
caused such revulsion in the Unite d States and abroad—the crop de­
struct ion; the delibera te refugee generation, as suggested bv Mr.
Komer; the Phoenix prog ram ; the destruction of v illages; the whole
panoply of horr ors th at you are all fam iliar with.
This politic al weakness of the American-imposed regime was always
quite clearly understood by e xperts in and out of governments. Ber­
nard Fall pointed out about 10 years ago that—
It ta ke s all th e tec hn ica l prof icie ncy our sys tem can pro vid e to ma ke up fo r
(he w oef ul l ac k of p op ul ar s up po rt an d po lit ica l sav vy of mo st of th e reg ime s th a t
th e W est h as th us f a r sou gh t t o p rop up.
The Americans, he said, are now coming to appreci ate t his in So uth
Vietnam.
Perha ps a more inte restin g example is an internal memorandum by
Joh n Paul Vann who was Field Operatio ns Coordina tor of the U.S.
Operations Mission at the time and has been for many years a c hief
American adviser in so-called “pacification.”
GO VE RN ME NT OF VIE TN AM IIA S NO POP ULA R PO LIT ICA L BASE

In this 1965 memorandum Vann states th at the government of Vie t­

nam has no popul ar political base, tha t it is oriented toward the ex­
ploitation of the r ural and lower class urba n population, tha t it is in
effect a continua tion of the French colonial system, tha t there is a
social revolution underway largely identified with the National
Liberati on Fron t. And he went on to speak a pproving ly of t his social
revolution. From these observations, which I believe were quite accu­
rate, he drew th e conclusion tha t the U.S. must t ake over an d impose
a non-Communist regime.
One could add many other sources in and out of the Pentago n
Papers. Time being short, T will not,
The fa ct of the ma tter is, the “Government of V ietnam” was never
able to compete politicall y. It always recognized th is: American ad­
visers always understood this. If we look at its composition we can
see why i t cannot compete p olitically today. Thieu, Ivy a nd Khiem,
 82

like most of the ARVN top command, served with the French in the
battle against the independence of th eir own country. This is in effect
a Q uisling regime: it is a regime of the wealthy and the corr upt: no
one will fight for it. The ARVN collapse last week is a good example.
U .S . O PP O SI TI O N TO PO LI T IC A L S E T T L E M E N T

A fur ther consequence of the dilemma noted in 1948 is that the

United States has always opposed a political settlement in South
Vietnam, or in Vietnam altogether.
The Communist strategy, as clearly specified in the Pentagon Pape rs
record bv American intelligence and many others, has always been in
South Vietnam a strategy of neutralism, a coalition regime with Com­
munist partic ipatio n in which they felt quite confident they could
come out on top—perhaps correctly. The U.S. has always regarded this
as a trap , ju st as the State Departmen t in 1961 described the all V iet­
nam elections provision of the Geneva Accords as a “well-laid tra p”
that the U.S.-backed regime was able to evade.
Communist partici pation , it was always assumed, would lead to a
Communist takeover. The reason, often unspoken, sometimes said ex­
plicitly. is, of course, the political strengt h of the National Liberation
Fro nt as opposed to the western-imposed regimes.
Jus t today, May 10,1 notice in the newspapers that He nry Kissinger,
with characteristic clarity, has made in effect exactly the same point
in a news conference yesterday. He said, according to the correspond­
ent’s report, that the formation of what in effect, if not name, would
b e a coalition government in Saigon was proposed by the other side,
then following it, a ceasefire, then negotiatio ns to give a final political
solution, with the Provisiona l Revolutionary Government.
Quoting Mr. Kis sing er:
“T h a t is w ha t we ha ve re je ct ed . T h a t is w h at we ca ll th e im po sit io n, u n de r
th e th in n e st ve ne er of a C om m un ist go ve rn m en t . . . T h a t is th e on ly is su e on
w hi ch n eg ot ia ti on s ha ve b ro ke n do wn .
Assuming the quotes to be accurate, th is is simply a very clear and
explicit statement of the refusal of political accommodation which
has always been a main feature of American policy, for perfectly
obvious reasons.
In November. 1964. Ambassador Maxwell Taylo r argued that even
if we could e stablish an effective regime in Saigon, to attai n Amer­
ican objectives, i t would not suffice to “drive the DRV (Democratic
Republic of Vietnam) out of its reinforc ing role.” Rather , he said,
we will not succeed unless we also “ obtain it s cooperation in bringing
an end to the Viet Cong insurgency.” We must, he said, “persuade
or force the DRV to stop its aid to the Viet Cong and to use its dir ec­
tive powers to make the Viet Cong desist . . .”
If we replace the phrase “DRV ” by the phrase “US SR” in tha t
statement, you have in effect the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy of today.
PA RA LL EL B E TW EE N 1965 AN D 1972

In 1965 the indigenous National Liberation Fro nt had won: ther e­

fore. the United States shifted to a large r war. It undertook the
bombing of all the Vietnam, prima rily South Vietnam. It invaded
 83
So uth V iet nam to d est roy th e force s o f th e Na tio na l Li be rat ion F ro nt .
It s effor t, ac co rdi ng to Am bas sad or Ta yl or an d many oth ers , was to
tr y to forc e th e DR V to mak e the Vi et Con g desi st. In ste ad , as we
know , we dre w th e D RV in to the wa r. W ell , th at was 1965.
In 1972 th er e was a rem ark ab le pa ra lle l. Ag ain , the enem y, in thi s
case—a ft er the 7 ye ars of Am eri can inv asi on— the DR V an d the
PR G , th e “ ene my, ” ha s a pp ar en tly wo n once a ga in an d Nix on is a ga in
sh if ti ng to a sti ll br oa de r, glo bal co nf ro nt at io n in whic h he hopes
to pre va il. li e wa nts th e U.S .S. R. to sto p su pp or tin g the DR V and
a th e PR G , to coo per ate wi th him to imp ose ce rta in co ns tra int s on the
DR V, as Mr. Ki ss ing er sug ges ted ye ste rd ay , to pe rm it him in sho rt
to a chiev e his obje ctiv e of a non -C om mu nis t So uth Vie tna m, th e U.S .
obj ect ive since the 1940’s; an d it ap pe ar s th at he is wi llin g to risk
, nu cle ar wa r to ach ieve th is goal.
W he the r the U.S .S. R. an d Ch ina will coo per ate or wh eth er the y
will res pond as th e DR V did in 1965, I. of cours e, can not pre dic t.
No r can one pr ed ict wh eth er an ot he r U.S . Ad m in ist ra tio n will in ­
ten sif y the de str uc tio n of In do ch in a wi th in t he con tex t of a wide ned,
he igh ten ed c on fro nt atio n, as was th e case i n 1965.

CO NS EQ UE NC ES OF PO LI T IC A L W E A K N ES S OF U .S . PO SI TI O N IN V IE T N A M

Th e tr ea t of nu cle ar wa r ha s alw ays been inh ere nt in the logic of

the A me ric an pos itio n in V ietn am . T he po liti ca l w eakn ess o f th e A me r­
ica n-im pos ed regi mes for ced us co nti nu all y to wid en and int en sif y
the confl ict wi th ris ks th at were alw ays ap pre cia ted .
To giv e a few exa mpl es, on Nov emb er 8, 1964, in the mi dst of the
pl an ni ng fo r th e esc ala tio n of the fol low ing Fe br ua ry , a NS C (N a­
tio na l Se cu rity Cou nci l) wo rki ng gr ou p con clud ed th at the com mi t­
me nt to m aint ai n a non -Co mm unist So ut h Vi etn am woul d invol ve
hi gh ris k of a m ajo r conf lict in Asi a, alm ost ine vit ab ly lea din g to a
Ko rea -sca le gr ou nd act ion an d pos sibl y the use by th e Un ite d St ate s
of nucle ar weap ons.
Ab ou t a ye ar lat er , Dec emb er 1965, th e int elli gen ce com mu nity es­
tim at ed at alm ost 50-50 the pr ob ab ili ty th at Ch ina wou ld inte rve ne
if t he wa r was sig nif ica ntl y esca late d. I t r ecom men ded bom bin g e sca-
f lat ion , wi th th e exc ept ion of St at e’s IN R. Th e int erv en tio n of Ch ina
was alw ays un de rst oo d as th e tr ig ge r fo r nucle ar war . Of cours e,
I do n't know wh at is ha pp en in g now bu t I wou ld sup pos e th at in te l­
ligen ce is es tim at in g th e ris k of nu cle ar wa r tod ay as bei ng sub sta n-
► tia l, exa ctly as it did du ri ng t he miss ile cri sis o f 1962 whe re the risk s
of n uc lea r w ar, a cco rdi ng to r ep or ts by Th eod ore S oren sen a nd othe rs,
were e stim ate d a s bei ng a th ir d to a h alf .
Ev en if th e pr ese nt sit ua tio n stab iliz es sh or t of an in ter na tio na l
wa r, we will be d riv en to t he sam e co nf ro nt ati on ag ain an d a ga in. De an
Acheson p oin ted ou t ye ars ago, in 1950, th at th e Fr en ch m ust overco me
th e opp osi tio n of th e ind ige nou s po pu lat ion . Litt le h as cha ng ed since
the n, ap ar t fro m the leve l o f d est ruc tio n an d t he da ng er of gr ea t powe r
conflict.
Th ere a re fu rt her con sequen ces of the po liti ca l weakn ess of th e U.S .
positi on in Vi etn am . On e is th e lon g an d de pre ssi ng rec ord of deceit .
Dea n Ache son was for ced to tr y to pr ese nt the Vi et Mi nh as ag gre s­
sors, as age nts of an inte i na tio na l con spi rac y, an d to clai m th at the
 84
French and the Bao Dai regime were defending the terr itori al integ­
rity of Indochina.
In one form or another, we have been hearin g the same kind of
story ever since. I need not review the sorry record. Some detail s are
in my s tatement, including examples of what I take to be some very
serious misrepresentations before this committee with regar d to DRV
troops in South Vietnam.
A fur the r consequence o f the weakness o f the American political
position has been the contempt for American legal obligations and,
again, I give a series of examples thro ugh the 1950’s and 1960's in my
statement and I will omit them in th e interest of time.
PO SI TI O N S I N DE BA TE OVER W AR

To a large extent, the debate over the war counterposes the opti­
mists, who believe tha t with persistence we can win, to the pessimists,
who ar gue t hat the U.S. cannot, at reasonable cost, guarante e the rule
of the regime of its choice in South Vietnam. This opposition between
the optimists and the pessimists appears as well in the first of the
Nixon-Kissinger papers released by th e Washington Post a few days
ago. The optimists felt tha t we could win in 8.3 years from early 1968;
and the pessimists felt tha t it would take, I believe, 13.4 years to beat
the Vietnamese into submission.
There is a t hird position which, unfortun ately, is bare ly represented
in policy making so far as the do cumentary record indicates, namely,
tha t the U.S. executive should abide by the supreme law of the land
and r efrai n from forceful intervention in the interna l affairs of others.
OB LI GA TI ON S OF U .S . U N D E R U .N . CH AR TE R

It appears that successive administratio ns believed that Vietnam was

the victim of a Kremlin-dire cted conspiracy in 1949 and 1950, tha t
there was aggression from the north a decade later, and so on. They
had the legal author ity to express these beliefs and to appeal to the
Security Council of the U.N. to determine the existence of a t hrea t to
peace. Th at th ey did not do so is self-explanatory. Inte rnal documents
now make it evident they never intended to live up to the obligations
of the U.S. under the U.N. charter.
The U.S. executive had no auth ority to back French colonialism,
to impose a te rrorist ic regime, or even a benevolent democracy, on the
South Vietnamese, to engage in clandestine war throu ghout Indo ­
china, or to carry out a fullscale invasion of South Vietnam in 1965,
demolishing the peasant society, or to wipe out the Plai n of J ars and
much of rural Cambodia under President Nixon, or to bomb Ha i­
phong, or to carry out any of the ot her actions th at have led to mass
revulsion in t his country and throug hout much of the world.
Ila d the U.S. executive been strict ly bound by its legal obligations,
which, in my opinion, do express reasonable principles of interna tional
behavior, we would never have found ourselves in the Indochina war.
U .S . P U R S U IT OF PE RC EI VE D S E L F -I N T E R E S T

Well, I would like to make a few comments on the question of why

the U.S. became so deeply engaged in this war, parti cula rly in the
earlie r period.
 85
I think tha t by 1965, as Jo hn McNaughton once said at tha t time,
the question becomes academic; we were there. Period. We had to win.
But in the early period the documentary record now availa ble in the
Pentagon papers, partic ularly books 8 thr ough 10 of the Government
edition of the Pentago n papers, presents a fairl y explicit, rath er de­
tailed account of rati onal, i f cynical, pu rsuit of perceived self-interest.
The s traig ht forwa rd major argumen t, c ontinually reiterate d, is th at
the United States has strategic and economic interests in Southeast
Asia th at must be secure d; holding Indochina is essential f or securing
these interes ts; therefore, we must hold Indochina.
A critical consideration throu ghou t—this, incidentally, runs
through out the midsixties—was J apa n, which will eventually accom­
modate to the “Soviet bloc” if Southeas t Asia is lost.
In effect, then, the United States would have lost the Pacific phase
of World Wa r II , which was fought, in part , to p revent Jap an from
constructin g a closed “co-prosperity sphere” in Asia from which the
United State s would be excluded. The theoretical fram ework for these
considerations was th e so-called domino theory which was formulat ed
quite clearly before the Korean war, as was the decision to suppo rt
French colonialism.
DO MIN O TH EO RY AND “ IDEOLOGIC AL EX PA NS IO N”

It is fashionable today to deride the domino theory, but in fact it

contains an impo rtant kernel of plausibili ty, perhaps trut h. National
independence and revolutionary social change, if successful, may very
well be contagious. The danger is what W alt Rostow, w ritin g in 1955,
called the “ideological thre at,” specifically, “the possibility tha t the
Chinese Communists can prove to Asians by progress in China tha t
the Communist methods are better and faster t han democratic m eth­
ods”—An American Policy in Asia, page 7.
Simila r fears were expressed by the Stat e Dep artment and the J oin t
Chiefs of Staff in 1959—Government edition of the Pentago n papers,
X, 1198, 1213, 1226. State t herefo re urged tha t the United States do
what it can to reta rd the economic progress of th e Communist Asian
states, a decision which, I believe, is quite remarkable in its cruelty.
A similar concern for Chinese “ideological expansion” was expressed
in the planning for escalation in the fall of 1964. F ear was expressed
tha t the rot would spread over mainland Southeast Asia, and tha t
Thail and—always “the second line of defense” ever since the deep
American involvement there star ting in 1948—that it would accom­
modate to Communist China “even without any marked milit ary move
by Communist Ch ina.” The “rot ” in these cases is surely the ideologi­
cal threat. It was, I assume, not expected tha t IIo Chi Minh would sail
to Indonesia, let alone Hawaii. Recall tha t in this period there was
much talk of a competition between the Chinese and the Ind ian models
of development. In this context, fear of Chinese “ideological expan­
sion” gave substance to the domino theory, quite apa rt from a ny spec­
ulation about Chinese aggression or about Kremlin-di rected conspira ­
cies carried out by the Viet Minh, as expressed in the Na tional Security
Council statements and elsewhere in the late forties.
It is i nterestin g tha t the domino theo ry was never seriously chal­
lenged in the available record, though its more f antasti c formulat ions
were discounted. Ra ther, there was debate about ti ming and probabil-
 86
itv. The reason, I take it, is tha t strip ped of fantasies, the doctrine was
not implausible. Successful social and economic development in a un i­
fied Vietnam, Communist-led on the Chinese model, mi ght well have
posed a “thre at” to other developing countries, in tha t peasant-based
revoluti onary movements wi thin them might have been led to follow
this model instead of relying on the indust rial powers and adap ting
thei r patt ern of de velopment to the needs a nd interests of the indus ­
tri al powers. This might very well have led to Japan ese moves to
accommodate in some fashion to the closed societies of Ea st Asia, with
a possible impact on India, ultimate ly even the Middle East, as t he
domino theory pos tula ted: not by invasion, which was most unlikely,
but by “ ideological ex pansion,” which was not so improbable.
VIETNA M TEST CASE IN KEN NED Y PERIOD

In the Kennedy period, Vietnam was elevated to the s tatus of a test

case and, I th ink it is fa ir to say, a degree of h ysteria was introduced
into planning. But, nevertheless, the ra tional core of policymaking re­
mained. Developing nati ons must be taug ht a lesson : they must ob­
serve the rules and not undertake national liberati on on the do-it-yo ur­
self Chinese model, with mass mobilization of the population and a
focus on internal needs and resources.
U.S. INTER PRETA TION OF U.S. MOTIVES

The documentation for th e pr e-Kennedy period, I th ink, gives very

substanti al suppo rt t o th is U.S. inter preta tion of U.S. motives. I will
cite one case: NSC 48/1, December, 1949. It warned tha t Southeast
Asia “is the ta rget of a coord inated offensive directed by the Kr emlin ”
this is stated, is now clear. (We know from ot her records in the Pen ta­
gon Pape rs that, they couldn’t produce a particl e of evidence for it.)
The indus trial plan t of Jap an and such str ategic materials as I ndo ­
nesian oil must be denied to the “Sta linist bloc,” which might other­
wise a ttai n global dominance; they must be ke pt in the western orbit .
Jap an is the crucial prize in E ast Asia. Communist pressure on Jap an
will mount, because of proxim ity, the indigenous Japa nese Communist
movement which might be able to exploit cultur al factors and
economic hards hip, and “the p otential of Communist Chin a as a source
of raw materials v ital to Jap an and a market for its goods.” Jap an re­
quires Asian food, raw material s, and market s; the United States
should encourage “a considerable increase in southern Asiastic food
and raw material exports” to avoid “prepo nderan t dependence on
Chinese sources.” Analogous considerations hold of India . Fu rth er­
more these ma rkets and sources of raw m aterials should be developed
for U.S. purposes. “Some kind of regional association . . . among the
non-Communist countries of Asia might become an impor tant means
of developing a favorable atmosphere for such trade among ourselves
and with oth er pa rts of the worl d.”
The general lines of thi s analysis pe rsist in the following years. As
Joh n F. Kennedy once sai d in 1956, V ietnam is “the keystone to the
arch, the finger in the dike,” terminology quite characteris tic of tha t
period. li e also spoke of th e po litical liberty of S outh Vietnam which
was such an inspira tion to other peoples in Asia and other peoples of
the world, also in terms characteristic of that period.

I
 87

DIST ING UIS HIN G BETWEEN TWO KIN DS OF ANT I-CO MM UNI SM

I t is oft en arg ue d th at U.S . in ter ve nt io n was mo tiv ate d by bl ind

ant i-C om mu nis m an d ot he r err or s. I t is nec essa ry, how ever , to di s­
tin gu ish betw een two ki nd s o f “ an ti-C om mu nis m. ”
Op po sit ion to ind ige no us m ovem ents i n As ia th at m ig ht pu rsu e th e
Chin ese mode l of dev elo pm ent —th is ca nn ot pr op er ly be call ed bl ind
an ti- Co mm un ism ; ra th er , it is qu ite ra tio na l im pe ria lis m whic h seeks
to pr ev en t an y ni bb lin g awa y at a rea s th at p rov ide t he wes tern i nd us ­
tr ia l pow ers an d Ja p an wi th fre e access to ma rke ts, raw m ate ria ls, a
che ap lab or forc e, the po ssi bil ity fo r ex po rt of po llu tio n an d op po r­
tu nit ies fo r inve stm ent .
Fr om th e lat e fo rti es thes e were ve ry ex pli cit un de rst an di ng s an d
» poli cies in Na tio na l Se cu rit y Cou ncil an d ot he r ana lyse s an d the y re ­
ma in so thr ou gh ou t.
On the oth er ha nd , say , as in NS C 4 8 /1 of 194 9, the refe ren ce to a
co ord ina ted offen sive dir ec ted b v the Kr em lin ag ain st So uth ea st As ia,
wit h th e V iet M inh as its ag ent , is in dee d b lin d an ti- Co mm un ism ; th at
is to say, pu re ide olo gy bey ond th e rea ch of evide nce bu t ext rem ely
use ful as a pr op ag an da device to ra lly dom esti c su pp or t fo r m ili ta ry
int erv en tio n ag ai ns t ind ige nous Co mm unist- led mov emen ts. The Ru s­
sia ns beh ave no dif fer en tly whe n th ey inv ad e Cze chos lova kia. Th ey
sta te— fo r all I kno w even belie ve—t h at the y are doing so to pr ote ct
the Czec h peo ple fro m th e ma ch ina tio ns o f W all St re et , th e CI A , an d
th e W est Ge rm an agg ress ors. In fac t, the y are s eek ing to pres erv e the
Ru ssi an em pir e fr om eros ion fro m wi thi n.
Th e rec ord mak es cle ar th at t he U ni te d St ate s did n ot e nt er th e I n ­
doc hin a w ar be caus e it h ad disc ove red the Vi et Mi nh t o be Ru ssi an or
Chin ese age nts . N or di d i t rep ea ted ly esc ala te t hi s w ar becau se i t f ou nd
th at th e N L F was a p up pe t o f th e N or th —C hin a, o r Moscow . Q uit e th e
oppos ite was tru e. F ir st came the int er ve nt ion , fo r en tir el y dif fer ent
reas ons , and th en th e effo rt to est ab lis h th e dep end enc e an d con tro l
th at was req uir ed fo r pr op ag an da pur poses an d also, I pre sum e, fo r
th e se lf-i ma ge o f th e p olic ym ake rs.
I t is, af te r all, p syc holog ica lly m uch ea sie r to d est roy a ge nts of C hi ­
nese agg res sio n t ha n tho se who h ad ca pt ur ed th e n at io na lis t m ovem ent
i of Vie tna m.
One f orm o f a nti -C om mu nis m mo tiv ate d U .S. i nt er ve nt ion : nam ely ,
opp osi tio n to ind ige no us Co mm unist- led mov eme nts, un de r th e as­
sum pti on s o f th e dom ino the ory .
* A secon d fo rm of an ti-C om mu nis m was inv oke d to ju st if y th e in ­
ter ve nti on , pu bli cly an d in te rn al ly : fe ar of a Kr em lin -d ire cte d con­
sp ira cy or C hine se agg res sio n—a s f a r as we kno w, t he figm ent of i m ag ­
ina tio n.
Mu ch th e same ha s been tr ue els ew he re: fo r exa mp le, in Gree ce in
the m id fo rti es an d i n th e C ari bbean , re pe ate dly .

FAILU RE TO RELATE VIETNA M POLICY TO DEVELOPMENTS ELSEW HERE

A seriou s de fec t of th e Pe nt ag on stu dy , in he re nt in Se cr etary Mc­

N am ar a’s gu ide lin es, is its fa ilu re t o rel ate U .S. pol icy in Vi etn am to
dev elop men ts else whe re, even in So ut he as t Asi a. H ad th e hi sto ria ns
been able to s pre ad a som ewh at w ide r n et, th ey wo uld ha ve disc ove red,
 88
for example, tha t the domino theory was expressed by Secretary of
State Marshal l with regard to Greece in 1947; in th is case, the Middle
East ern countries, not Ja pan and Indonesia, were the far the r dominoes
tha t concerned him. They would also have discovered in trigu ing simi­
laritie s between U.S. intervention in Indochina and in Korea from
1945-1950. They might have noted tha t th e U.S. escalation of clandes­
tine activities in Vietnam and Laos in late 1903 and 1964 appar ently
coincided with a similar escalation of attacks on Cambodia by the
Khmer Serei, traine d and equipped by the U.S. Special Forces and
the CIA.
They would have observed tha t from 1948 the Unite d States was
deeply involved in Thai affairs, suppo rting a corru pt and at times sav­
age milit ary dictat orship, at first und er a J apanes e collaborator.
They would have determined, in short, tha t the Unite d States has
not been a confused victim of events, but an active agent, pursui ng
policies t ha t fell within a rath er coherent global str ate gy : to carve
out and stabilize a system of open societies, societies in which, in
parti cula r, U.S. capital can op erate more or less freely. Though this
is f ar from the sole operative factor in U.S. policy, sti ll it is surely
the beginning of wisdom to recognize its crucial role.
LESS ON OF PEN TAG ON HIS TO RY

At one crucial point in the plann ing to escalate the war in 1964,
William Bundy raised the question whether it would be possible to
carry ou t the prefe rred escalatory option “under the klieg l ights of a
democracy.” I think he is quite righ t to raise this question, t hough
not exactly for the reasons he gave. Secrecy and deceit a re essential
components of aggression. The visibility of th e American war of a n­
nihilat ion in South Vietnam was undobtedly a factor in tu rnin g much
of the populat ion to protes t and resistance, much to the credit of Amer­
ican society. The social costs of empire, in a healthy democracy, would
impede imperial planners. But a system of centralized power, in­
sulated from public scrutiny and operat ing in secret, possessing vast
means of destruction and hampered by few constr aints will n atura lly
tend to commit aggression and atrocities. Tha t is th e prima ry lesson
of the Pentag on his tory, to my mind, althou gh I th ink we hard ly need
this valuable and illum inatin g record to establish the fact.
Wha t is worse, I th ink very little has changed. Even many opponents
of tlie war pretend to themselves tha t others are to blame for the catas­
troph e of Vietnam. In a stron g editorial statement against the war,
the New York Times last Su nday s tat es:
This is not to say th at Americans , includ ing the politi cal and mili tary com­
mand s and the GI’s themselves, did not origi nally conceive th eir role quit e
hones tly as th at of libe rato rs and allie s in the c ause of f ree do m; but such idea l­
istic motives had litt le chance to prev ail aga inst local lead ers skilled in the ar t
of man ipul ating th eir foreign prote ctors . May 7,1972.
Once again we have the image of the American political leadership,
noble and virtuous, bewildered and victimized, but not responsible,
never responsible for what i t has done. The c orruption of the inte llect
and th e moral cowardice revealed by such statements defy comment.
Whet her the U .S. will withdr aw from V ietnam short of tr ue geno­
cide and perhap s even the serious thr eat of interna tional wa r is, I am
afrai d, an open question. There is, un fortun ately, sufficient reason to
suppose tha t t he same grim story will be reenacted elsewhere.
(Dr. Chomsky's prepa red s tatement follow s:)
P repared Statem ent of N oam C hom sky on th e Origin s of th e Vietn am W ar
Reviewing the record of American interve ntion in Indochina, one cannot fail
to be struck by the continuity of basic assumptions through successive admin­
istratio ns. Never has there been the slightest deviation from th e principle t hat a
non-Communist regime must be imposed and defended, regardles s of popular
sentiment. The scope of the principle was narrowed when it was conceded, by
about I960, tha t North Vietnam was irretrie vably “lost”. Otherwise, the prin­
ciple has been maintai ned without equivocation. Given thi s principle, the stren gth
of the Vietnamese resistance, the militar y power available to the United States
and the lack of effective con straints, one can deduce with precision the strate gy
of annihilati on th at was gradually undertaken.
On May 10, 1949 Dean Acheson informed U.S. officials in Saigon and Pari s t hat
“no effffort [should] be sp ared” to assu re the success of the Bao Dai government,
since there appeared to be “no other altern ative to est abl ishm ent ] Commie
patte rn Vietnam”. lie furt her urged tha t this government should be “truly
represent ative even to extent including outstandin g non-Commie leaders now
supporting Ho”. A State Departm ent policy stateme nt of the preceding Sep­
tember had noted tha t the Communists under Ho Chi Minh had “captur[ed ]
control of the nation alist movement”, thus impeding the “long-term objective”
of the United States, “to eliminate so far as possible Communist influence in
Indochina”. We a re unable to suggest any practicable solution to the French, the
report continued, “as we are all too well aware of the unpleasan t f act tha t Com­
munist Ho Chi Minh is the strongest and perhaps the ablest figure in Indochina
and tha t any suggested solution which excludes him is an expedient of uncertai n
outcome.” But to Acheson, Ho’s popularity and ability were of no gr eater moment
than his natio nalis t cre den tials : "Question whether Ho as much natio nalist as
Commie is irrelevan t.”
In May 1967, J ohn McNaughton presented a memorandum which the Pentagon
historia n takes to imply a significant modification of policy tow ards a more lim­
ited and conciliatory stance. The Saigon government, he urged, should be moved
“to reach an accommodation with the non-Communist South Vietnamese who a re
under the VC b anner ; to accept them as members of an opposition political party,
and, if necessary, to accept their individual particip ation in the nationa l gov­
ernment . . .” (Gravel Edition, Pentagon Papers, vol. IV, p. 489). E xactly Ache-
son’s proposal of 18 years earlier, restrict ed now to South Vietnam.
In a summary of the situati on aft er the Tet offensive of 1968, the director of
the Pentagon Study asks w hether the U.S. can “overcome the appare nt fact tha t
the Viet Cong have ‘captur ed’ the Vietnamese natio nalist movement while the
GVN has become the refuge of Vietnamese who were allied with the French in the
battle agains t the independence of their nati on?” (ii, 414). His question expressed
the dilemma of the State Department 20 years before, and properly so. The bi-
ogrophies of Tliieu, Ky and Khiem ind icate the continuity of p olicy ; all served
with the French forces, a s did most of the top ARVN officers. “Studies of peas­
ant attit udes conducted in recent years have demonstrated tha t for many, the
struggle which began in 1945 agains t colonialism continued uninterrup ted th rough­
out Diem's regime : in 1954, the foes of nationalists were transform ed from Fran ce
and Bao Dai, to Diem and the U.S. . . . but the issues at stake never changed”
(I, 295). Correspondingly, the Pentagon considered its problem to be to “deter
the Viet Cong (fo rmerly called Viet M inh)”—May, 1959. The Tliieu regime today
has a power base remarka bly like Diem’s, and subst antia l segments of the urban
intelligentsi a—“the people who count,” as Ambassador Lodge once put it (II,
738)—now speak out aga inst U.S. intervention.
An NIE of June, 1953 discussed the gloomy prospects for the “Vietnamese
government” given “the failu re of Vietnamese to rally to [i t] ”, the fact tha t the
population assist the Viet Minh more than the French, the inability of “the
Vietnam leadersh ip” to mobilize popular energy and resources, and so on (I,
391f). With hardly more than a change of names, th is analysis might be in ter­
changed with the despairing report from MACCORDS on December 31, 1967,
deploring the corruption of t he GVN, the ever-widening gap between t he people
and the GVN, and its growing weakness. With these words, th e record of U.S.-
GVN relations ends (II, 406-7).
 90
One may, perhaps, argue tha t the popular mood counts fo r less than in earlier
years, now tha t the U.S. has succeeded, partia lly at least, in “grinding the enemy
down by sheer weight a nd mass” (Robert Kom er; 11, 5(5 ), and now tha t North
Vietnamese forces have increasingly been drawn into the war, as a direct and
always anticipa ted consequence of American escalation, so tha t the American
war against the rur al society of South Vietnam now increasingly takes on some­
thing of the aspect of a regional conflict, as had been alleged in Administr a­
tion propaganda—quite falsely—many years ea rlier.
The Pr esiden t state s tha t “The Communists have fa iled in t heir efforts to win
over the people of South Vietnam politically” (April 26, 1972). That is quite
true, lie did not add, however, tha t these efforts were blocked by American
force. Because the Communists appeared capable of gaining a political victory,
the Diem regime could not tolera te democratic struc tures in 1954 (as Joseph
Buttinger, for one, has pointed out) and was forced to resort to violence and
repre ssion; U.S. troops were introduce d in support of combat operations in the
early 1960's; furt her escalation was planned in 1964; the U.S. sought to avoid
“premature negotiations” until the enemy had been destroyed by force; all of
Vietnam was subjected to massive bombardment, and the South, to a direct
American invasion, in early 1965. The programs of deliberate refugee genera­
tion (as advocated explicitly by Robert Komer; IV, 441), t he destruction of the
rura l society, t he Phoenix program of assas sinatio n and terr or—all were un der­
taken to overcome the “clear and growing lack of legitimacy of the GVN”, a
constant refra in in the documentary record, and to prevent a Communist polit­
ical victory. The refusal to accept a political accommodation in the South today
derives from the same consideration. It m ust be emphasized t ha t this is the cen­
tra l issue standing in the way of a negotiated settlement, as it has been
throughout.
On Janu ary 6, 1965 William Bundy wrote tha t “the situatio n in Vietnam is
now likely to come ap art more rapidly than we had anticipa ted in November . . .
the most likely form of coming apa rt would be a government of key groups
start ing to negotiate covertly w ith the Liberation front or Hanoi,” soon asking
“tha t we get out”. The preceding August, Ambassador Taylor had explained
Communist str ate gy : “to seek a political settlement favorable to the Commu­
nists”, passing through neutralis m to “the technique of a coalition government”
(II I, 531). Intelligence concurred, estimating tha t “it was the Communist in­
tention to seek victory through a ‘neut ralis t coalition’ rath er than by force of
arms ” (II I, 207; a naly st). The President, in March, 1964, ha d warned Ambassa­
dor Lodge to “knock . . . down the idea of n eutrali zation wherever it rears its
ugly head”. Neutralism, as Ambassador Taylor noted, “appeared to mean throw ­
ing the intern al political situatio n open a nd thus inviting Communist partic ipa­
tion” (II I, 675), for obvious reasons an intolerable prospect.
The dilemma noted in 1948 was never resolved. The politica l weakness of the
U.S.-imposed regimes—Quisling regimes, in effect—forced t he U.S. to take over
the w ar an d ultima tely to devasta te the rur al society. On occasion, it was difficult
even to obtain formal GVN author ization for U.S. escalation. At one crucial
moment, the new program of escalation of February , 1965 was received “with
enthusiasm ” by Ambassador Taylor, who then “explained the difficulties he faced
in obtaining authent ic GVN concurrence ‘in the condition of virtu al non-govern­
ment’ which existed in Saigon at th at moment” ( II I, 323).
The problem was always unders tood by experts on the scene. John Paul Vann,
USOM Field Operations Coordinator, circulate d a repor t in 1965 based on the
premise tha t a social revolution was in process in South Vietnam “primarily
identified with the National Liberation Fro nt” and tha t “a popular political
base for the Government of South Vietnam does not now ex ist”. The U.S. must
therefore ta ke over. In the early 1960’s Bernard F all w rot e:
Why is it tha t we must use top-notch elite forces, the cream of the crop of
American, British, French, or Au stralia n commando and special warfar e sch ools;
armed with the very best t ha t advanced technology can prov ide; to de feat Viet-
Minh Algerians, or Malady “CT’s” [Chinese terror ists] , almost none of whom can
lay claim to simila r expert traini ng and only in the r are st of cases to eq uality in
fire power?
The answer is very simple: It takes all the technical proficiency our system
can provide to make up for the woeful lack of popular support and political savvy
of most of t he regimes tha t th e W est has t hus far sought to prop up. The Ameri-
 91
ca ns who ar e now fig htin g in So uth Vie t-N am ha ve come to ap pr ec ia te th is fa ct
ou t of firs t-h an d exp erie nce . (S tr ee t W ith ou t Jo y, 1964, p. 372.)
A dec ade la te r, the sam e an al ys is hold s. Th er e is ev er y rea so n to sup pos e th a t
it w ill c ont inu e to app ly in th e f ut ur e, an d no t on ly in So ut he as t As ia.
Th e m ajo r pr em ise of th e Am eri can in te rv en tio n ha s al w ay s bee n th a t we
m us t “bu ild a na ti on ” in th e So uth to co un te r th e Co mm uni st Vie tna me se, who
seem ed to be alo ne in th ei r ab ili ty to mob iliz e th e po pu lat ion . Th e ene my ha s
fou nd “a da ng ero usl y cle ver st ra te gy fo r lic kin g th e Un ite d St at es ”, th e di re ct or
of Sys tem s An aly sis wa rn ed . “U nles s we reco gni ze an d co un te r it now, th a t
st ra te gy may become al l too po pu lar in th e fu tu re ” (IV , 46 6). Th e st ra te gy wa s
to wag e a w ar of na tio na l lib er at io n bas ed on th e as pi ra tio ns of th e Vi etn am ese
pe as an ts fo r inde pen den ce an d soc ial jus tic e.
Th e ou tsi de pow er wa s ne ve r abl e to com pete. Th e U.S. cou ld ma im an d kill ,
dr ive pe as an ts fro m th ei r home s, de str oy th e co un try sid e an d org ani zed soc ial
life, bu t no t “bu ild a na ti on ” in the app rov ed imag e. We h ad ta ke n on a soci ety
th a t wa s sim ply no t fit fo r dom ina tio n. Th ere fo re, it ha d to be des tro yed . Th is
wa s wo rse th an a crim e, it wa s a blu nde r, as th e re al ist ic ex pe rts now sob erly
exp lai n.
Am eric an am ba ssa do rs pro pos ed th a t the U.S. sho uld infl uen ce th e GVN to
ad op t a pro gra m “to give th e new gov ern me nt an ide al ist ic ap pe al or phi los oph y
wh ich wil l com pete w ith th a t dec lar ed by th e VC” (B un ke r, Aug ust, 1967 ; II ,
40 3), or to “S at ur at e the min ds of the peop le w ith some soc iall y con scio us and
at tr ac ti ve ideolo gy, wh ich is sus cep tib le of bei ng ca rr ie d ou t” (L od ge ; mid-1964,
II , 530 ). Someho w, th es e con cep ts nev er suc cee ded in ove rco min g th e “i de ali sti c
ap pe al ” of th e N LF in r u ra l Vien am.
Fa ili ng to sa tu ra te th e min ds of th e peop le w ith a suff icie ntly at tr ac ti v e ide ol­
ogy, the Ad m in ist ra tio n tu rn ed to th e ea sie r ta sk of sa tu ra ti ng th e co un try w ith
tro op s an d bomb s an d de fo lia nts . A St at e De pa rtm en t pa pe r obs erv ed th a t “S at ­
ur at io n bom bing by ar ti ll er y an d ai rs tr ik es . . . is an ac cep ted t ac tic , and th er e is
pro bab ly no pro vin ce wh er e th is ta ct ic ha s not been wid ely em plo yed ” (en d of
1966; IV, 39S). Th e only obj ect ion rai se d is th a t it mi gh t be mor e*p rof itab le to
pla ce gr ea te r em ph asi s on wi nn ing s up po rt fo r th e Saig on regim e. T ha t U.S. for ce
sho uld be dev ote d to wi nn ing su pp or t fo r its cre ati on , th e Saig on regi me, ap ­
pa re nt ly seem ed no mo re str an ge to the au th or of th is st at em en t th an th at the
U.S. sho uld be con du cti ng s at ur at io n bom bing o f al l pro vin ces in So uth Vie tna m.
Th e ma in th ru st of th e Am eri can w ar ha s been ag ai ns t the p op ula tio n of So uth
Vie tna m, fro m th e ea rly 1960’s, an d wi th a va st in cr ea se in 1965 w hen a vi rt ua l
occ upy ing ar my wa s depl oyed an d th e “bas ic st ra te gy of pu ni tiv e bom bing ” wa s
in iti at ed in the So uth (W est mo rel an d. Ma rch , 1965; II I, 464 ). It is re ve ali ng to
inv es tig at e th e dec isio n to un de rta ke th e ma ssi ve ai r at ta ck on Sou th Vie tna m.
“It ta ke s tim e to m ak e ha rd dec isio ns, ” Mc Na ugh ton w ro te : “I t took us alm ost
a ye ar to ma ke th e dec isio n to bomb No rth Vi etn am ” (IV , 48) . Th e deci sion is
stu di ed in pa in sta ki ng de tai l. L itt le is sai d, how ever , ab ou t the deci sion to bomb
So uth Vie tna m a t mor e th an tr ip le the in te ns ity by 1966. Th is wa s the fu nd am en ­
ta l poli cy dec isio n of ea rly 1965. As B er na rd Fa ll poi nte d out no t long af te r,
‘ w ha t cha nge d th e ch ar ac te r of th e Vie tna m w ar wa s no t th e dec isio n to bomb
No rth Vi etn am ; no t th e dec isio n to use Am eric an gro un d tro op s in sou th Vie t­
nam ; bu t th e dec isio n to wa ge un lim ite d ae ri al w ar fa re ins ide th e co un try at
the pr ice of lit er al ly po un din g th e plac e to bi ts ”. Bu t of th is deci sion , we lea rn
ver y lit tle in th e Pe nta go n his to ry , an d only a few sc at te re d re m ar ks ind ica te
th e effe cts of t he bom bing.
Th e co nt ra st bet we en th e at te nt io n give n to th e bom bin g of the No rth and
th e fa r mo re de st ru ct iv e bom bing in So uth Vie tna m is sti ll mo re re m ar ka bl e in
th e lig ht of th e fa ct th a t So uth Vie tnam , fro m ea rl y 1965, w as su bje cte d not only
to un pre ced ent ed ae ri al at ta ck bu t also to ar ti ll er y bo mb ard me nt wh ich ma y
well hav e been even mo re de str uc tiv e. In Ja nu ar y, 1966 Se cr et ar y Mc Na ma ra in ­
tro du ce d int o Co ngr ess ion al tes tim on y pa rt s of a “M oti vat ion an d Mo rale s tu dy ”,
st ill oth erw ise sec ret , wh ich ind ica ted th a t ar ti ll er y bo mb ard me nt ma y be even
mor e effe ctiv e th an a ir at ta ck in ca usi ng vil lag ers “to move wh ere the y will be
sa fe fro m suc h at ta c k s” , ‘reg ar dl es s of th ei r at ti tu d e to th e GVN” (S en at e Arm ed
Ser vice s and A pp ro pr iat ion s Com mit tee He ari ng s, Ja nu ar y, 1966) . Th e s tud y wa s
op tim isti c, con clu din g th a t suc h me tho ds wou ld hel p dr y up th e po pu lar sea in
wh ich th e gu er ill as swim . In la te r yea rs, W est mo rel and an d oth er s we re to
po int to th e de ni al of re cr ui ts f rom po pu lat ed ar ea s in the So uth as th e cau se for
in fil tra tio n of re gu la r No rth Vi etn am ese tr oop s, fir st conf irme d on a sm all sca le in
la te A pril , 1965.
S 3 -6 0 5 — 73
 92
The reason why the bombing of the North was given such meticulous atten ­
tion, while the far greate r attack on the South was undertak en as a matte r of
course, seems clear enough. The bombing of North Vietnam was highly visible,
very costly to the United States and extremely dangerous, with a constant and
perceived thre at of general war. The fa r more savage attac k on the South was
merely destroying the rur al society, and therefore—so the documentary record
indicates—did not merit the attention of the planners in Washington.
The moral level of planning is strik ingly revealed by this contrast. It is furth er
illust rated on the rare occasions when some qualms are expressed about the
bombing. When B-52 bombing began in mid-1965, William Bundy noted one and
only one problem : “we look silly and arouse critici sm if these [B-52 raids] do not
show significant results” (IV, G12). If th e B-52 raids do show significant results,
we may tu rn out to be mass murde rers, since in the n ature of the case, there can
be at best parti al information about the t arget s of these weapons of mass terro r
and destr uction ; but tha t appears to be no problem at all. W ithin a few months,
B-52 raids were reported by Bernard Fall and others in the populous Mekong
Delta, with devastatin g effects on the civilian society, a patt ern repeated else­
where in South Vietnam, and recently, in the North as well.
There is, to my knowledge, no record of any hesitation about the use of an y
militar y tactic except on grounds of the potential cost to the decisionmakers and
the int erests they represent.
The concern for law is ful ly comparable. The supreme law of the land clearly
prohibits the thre at or use of force in interna tional affairs, except in the case of
collective self-defense a gainst armed attack . The record shows plainly tha t tha t
American use of force agai nst the population of South Vietnam alwa ys preceded
anything attri butab le to the DRV and was always vastly great er in scale—putting
aside the question whether the DRV was entitled to come to the aid of th e South­
ern NLF a fte r the di smantling of the Geneva Accords by the U.S. and the regime
it institu ted in t he South, aft er the extensi ve use of te rror by t his regime, which
fa r exceeded the subsequent counter-violence of the indigenous resistance.
In fact, the Administration never reg arded itself as bound by the law. To cite
one case, immediately af ter the Geneva Agreements, the NSC adopted NSC 5429/2
(August 20,1954), which recommended covert operations and other pressures and
prepa ration fo r direct use of U.S. mi litary force in the event of “local Communist
subversion or rebellion not co nstitutinff armed attack " (my emphasi s), including
use of U.S. m ilitary force “against the extern al source of such subversion or re­
bellion (including Communist China if d etermined to be the sour ce)”. The recom­
mendation tha t force be used in the absence of armed attac k is in clear and
explicit violation of law. Fur the r recommendations were: “Conduct covert opera­
tions on a large and effective scale” throu ghout Indochina, in parti cular , to “Ex­
ploit availab le means to make more difficult the control by the Viet Minh of North
Vietnam”, to defeat Communist subversion and influence, to maintai n non-Com-
munist governments elsewhere in Indochina, and “to preven t a Communist victory
through all-Vietnam elections”. These proposals not only express an open con­
tempt for solemn trea ty obligations (the U.N. Charte r in par ticu lar) , but also
indicate a cle ar commitment to sub vert th e Geneva Accords. I might add tha t the
contents of this document and the events of the nex few yea rs are, in my opinion,
presented quite inadequately in the Pentagon Papers history.
In a parod y of the law, planners repeatedl y insisted tha t “After, but only after,
we have established a cle ar p atter n of pre ssure” could peaceful means be consid­
ered (William Bundy, August 11,1964). The Pentagon historia n notes t hat Pre si­
dent Johnson’s “ini tiativ e” of April 7, 1965, “was in accord w ith the ‘pressures
policy’ ration ale tha t had been worked out in November, 1964, which held tha t
U.S. rea diness to negotiate was not to be surfaced until a fter a series of ai r strikes
had been carried out agains t import ant target s in North Vietnam” (II I, 356).
“Significantly”, the peace ini tiative was preceded by intensive bombing. Repeat­
edly in subsequent years, apparen t negotiations opportunities were undercut by
sudden escalation of bombing (IV, 135, 205). The Pentagon histo rian regards this
as “inadve rtent ” or “u nfortu nate coincidence”. It is possible, however, th at each
incident i s an example of the “pressures policy”, the general policy of application
of force prio r to efforts tow ards peaceful s ettlement of disputes, in exp licit con­
tradic tion to the law. Cf. U.N. Charte r, Articles 2, 33, 39.
The “pressures policy” rationa le was inevitable, given the commitment to a
“non-communist regime” and the re alization t ha t a settlem ent based on indigenous
political forces would probably not achieve this objective. The political weakness
 93
of the U.S.-imposed regimes led to the strate gy of ann ihilation, out of “milita ry
necessity” ; it also led to reliance on force in advance of and in place of t he peace­
ful means prescribed by law.
The essence of the U.S. government position is revealed by public stateme nts
explaining the concept of “aggression”. Consider, for example, the fair ly typical
remarks of Adlai Stevenson before the U.N. Security Council, May 21, 1964 (I II ,
715-6). He observed tha t “the point is the same in Vietnam today as it was in
Greece in 1947.” In both cases the U.S. was defending a free people from “in terna l
aggression”. What is “intern al aggression”? It is “aggression” by a mass-based
indigenous movement agains t a government protected by foreign power, where the
“intern al aggression” has the kind of outside support tha t few wars of liberatio n
have lacked (the American revolution, to cit e one case). In the case of Greece, as
of Vietnam, the Administr ation has insisted tha t the “interna l aggressors ” were
merely agents of a global conspiracy directed by Moscow or “Peiping”, in both
cases, in defiance of a vailable evidence, though even if it were true, U.S. inte r­
vention would no t have been permissible without Security Council author ization.
As noted, the Government in effect conceded tha t the intervention was illegiti­
mate, by insistin g upon its a uthor ity to inter vene in the case of local subversion
and aggression not constit uting armed att ack, th at is, “inte rnal aggression”.
The JCS in February, 1955, foresaw three basic forms in which aggression in
Southeast Asia can occur: a) Overt armed attac k from outside of the area, b)
Overt a rmed atta ck from within the area of each of t he sovereign st ates, c) Ag­
gression other th an armed, i.e., political warfare, or subversion.
The concept of overt armed a ttac k from within a sovereign stat e is Ambassador
Stevenson’s “interna l aggression”. In defining “political warf are” as a form of
aggression, the Join t Chiefs reveal tha t they comprehend with precision and
insight the funda mental position of the U.S. executive.
Many o ther examples can be given, from the Pentagon history, to illus trate the
same concept of “interna l aggression”. Indigenous forces are carryin g out “in­
terna l aggression” ag ainst regimes chosen to rule by foreign force, and protected
from their own population by this foreign force (allegedly acting in “collective
self-defense” again st this “aggression”). Ultimately, force is draw n into the con­
flict in support of the indigenous rebellion, and we hea r cries from Washington
about the perfidy of the Nortli Vietnamese aggr essors and their allies. To cite
only the most obvious case, consider the talks of “North Vietnamese aggression”
today, aggression tha t is taking place in area s t hat were invaded an d occupied by
the American m ilitary seven years earlier, and devastat ed in American militar y
operations. I need not spell out the facts, which hav e been described in ample
detail else where.
The Pentagon Papers provide evidence of a criminal conspiracy of long dur a­
tion to engage the United States in aggressive war. One may debate the suffi­
ciency of the evidence, but hardly its existence. I t i s na tural , if somewhat ironic,
tha t the Justic e Department, instead of i nvestigatin g the possible cr iminal con­
spiracy exposed by the Pentagon Papers, has chosen rath er to investigate and
prosecute those who have revealed these ac ts to the public. Senator Fulbrig ht has
stated, in a different but related connection, th at : “I and some of my colleagues
have almost been reduced to the situatio n where it makes no difference w hat is
put into law, the admin istrati on will not abide by it.” He has also expressed his
hope tha t some day “this country will re turn to its senses and we will then have
an opportunity to r esurrec t the basic principles of law on which this country was
founded” (Congressional Record, October 4, 1971). I should only like to add
tha t thousands of dra ft resist ers and deserters and others have reluctan tly un­
dertaken civil disobedience on the basis of concerns that are, in my opinion, ra the r
similar. Having called off t he game of obedience to law, the Administration has
forfeited its auth ority to enforce the rules.
The Administration atti tude toward Congress and the public is of a piece
with its concern for legal obligations. The unending record of deceit illus trat es
a good deal of contempt for Congress and the public, in my opinion. F or example,
Secretary Rusk, testifyi ng before this Committee on Janu ary 28, 1966. stated
tha t by J anuar y, 1965 the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Army had been
moved to South Vietnam, an act that constituted “agression by means of an
armed atta ck” and entitled the U.S. to respond under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter. He requested this assertion in testimony on Februar y 18. 1966. On this
crucial matt er the Pentagon Papers tell a different story. The first reference to
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reg ula r PAVN uni ts app ears in a CIT -DI A memora ndum of Ap ril 21, 1965 whic h
‘ r eflected the accep tance into the enemy ord er of ba ttle of one regime nt of the
325th l’AVN Division said to be locate d in Kontum pr ovin ce” (I II , 438). Cheste r
Cooper, who was responsi ble for pre par ing the ma teri al on infi ltrat ion, writ es
th at by the end of April “it was believed” th at one bat tali on of reg ula r PAVN
troop s were in South Vietnam at t his time (Th e L ost Crusade, 1970, p. 276-7).
Evid ently thi s and la te r repo rts were not too pers uasiv e. On Ju ly 2, in a memo­
rand um to General Goodpaster, Joh n McNaughton st at es : “I am quit e concerned
about the increa sing proba bility th at the re are reg ula r PAVN troo ps eith er in
the II Corps are a or in Laos dire ctly acros s the bord er from II Corps ” (IV, 291,
277). On Jul y 14, the JCS included one regim ent of the 325th PAVN division in
th eir esti mat e of 48,500 “Viet Cong organi zed combat un its ” (IV, 295), and a
SNI E of Jul y 23 pre dicted th at if the U.S. increa sed its stre ngt h in South Viet­
nam to 175,000 by November 1, then in ord er to offset thi s increa se, the Com­
mu nis ts would probably intro duce a PAVN force tota llin g 20,000 to 30,000 men
by the e nd of 1965 (I II , 4S4f.).
For compari son, note th at on April 21, 1965 S ecre tary M cNam ara repo rted th at
33,500 U.S. troops were in-count ry in add itio n to 2,000 Kore ans who had been
disp atch ed on Ja nu ar y 8, 1965 (I II , 706; II I, 139). He fu rth er repo rted the
una nim ous recomm endation of the Honolul u Meeting of the prece ding day th at
U.S. forces he raise d to 82,000 supple mente d with 7,250 Kore an and Au str alia n
troop s—the day before the “ominou s” CIA -DIA repo rt. On J ulv 1, plann ed U.S.
deploy ments were 85,000 t roops (I II , 475). In mid-Ju ly, when the JCS repo rted
one PAVN regimen t in the South, the Pre sid ent approv ed the requ est th at the
U.S. troop level be rais ed to 175.000 in 1965, with ano the r 100,000 recommended
for 1966, and an estim ated U.S. killed- in-action of 500 per month (I II , 396, 416;
IV. 297. 299). Recall th at the U.S. troop level had reach ed 23,000 by the end of
1964 (II , 160) and th at U.S. force s had been direc tly engaged in combat oper a­
tions fo r th ree years, a t t ha t poin t.
The contem pt f or the pu blic is of th e same order. Fo r e xample, on F eb rua ry 26,
1966 t he Pre sid ent st a te d : “We do not have on my desk at the moment any u n ­
filled requ ests from Gen eral We stm orel and ” (New York Times editio n of the
Pent agon Pap ers, p. 467) . In fact, the re was at thi s time a req ues t to double the
troo p commitm ent, and the Pre sid ent had on his desk a Memora ndum from the
Sec reta ry of Defense sta tin g th at with the deploym ents recommend ed (400.000
by the end of 1966 and perh aps more tha n 600,000 the following ye ar ), U.S.
killed -in-act ion could be expected to reach 1,000 per m onth (IV, 309, 623-4). The
Adm inis trat ion view was acc ura tely expre ssed by Will iam Bundy, when he st ate d
th at if policies are to be modified, then “a condi tionin g of the U.S. publi c” is
nece ssary (he added th at wher e th is c ann ot be done with sufficient rap idit y, the
exec utive may find its elf trap ped by its ear lie r mis repr esen tati ons —IV, 611). It
goes w itho ut sayin g th at gover nment officials ha ve no legal au tho rit y to misre p­
res ent ma tte rs to the public, or—un der a reaso nable int erp ret ati on of the Fi rs t
Amendm ent—to pro secute the expos ure of the ir dec eit.
The gene ral att itu de tow ard s Amer ican democracy is revea led in a stri kin g
way du ring the de libe ratio ns of 1964. Pl ans fo r t he Fe bru ary 1965 es calat ion were
und erta ken with an awa ren ess of the necess ity for wa itin g un til the Pre side nt
had a Congres sional ma nda te and a pop ular manda te. The plan ning t hrou gh 1964
places “D-Day” shor tly af te r the elections. Afte r the Tonkin Gulf incid ent and
the Pre sid ent ’s “smash ing victor y at the polls”, his “feas ible options incr ease d”,
the Pent agon his tori an re la te s: “Pr esi den t Johns on was now arme d wit h both a
pop ular man date and broa d Congr ession al aut hor iza tio n” and could ther efor e
proceed (I II , 4f. ). Dur ing the Septem ber delib eratio ns, “uni ty of d omestic Amer­
ican opinio n” was rega rded as preco nditi on to escal ations , but “du ring the
November debate s, thi s is no long er an imp ort ant fac tor ”. In the inte rim , the
Pre sid ent ha d been elect ed “with a n overwhel ming ma nda te” (I II , 113-6).
It is rem ark able t ha t nowhe re does anyon e t ake n ote of the fac t th at the Con­
gressio nal supp ort was obtaine d in a ra th er dubious f ashion , an d th at th e p opul ar
ma nda te was not to escala te. The obvious conclusion to dra w from thi s hist ory
is th at peace-minded people should have voted for Sen ator Goldw ater, so th at
the “p opular ma nda te” wo uld h ave been les s ove rwhelming, since e viden tly it was
onlv its scale and n ot it s c har act er t ha t m atter ed.
To a larg e exten t, the deba te over the wa r counte rposes the “opti mis ts’ , who
believe t hat w ith persi stenc e we can win, to the “pess imis ts”, who argu e th at the
U.S. c anno t, at reaso nable cost, gu ara nte e the rule of the regime of its choice in
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South Vietnam. There is a thir d position which, unfortun ately, is barely repre­
sented in policy-making so far as t he docum entary record i ndicates : namely, tha t
the U.S. executive should abide by t he supreme law of the land a nd refra in from
forceful intervention in the intern al affairs of others. It appears that successive
Administr ations believed tha t Vietnam was the victim of a Kremlin-directed
conspiracy in 1950, tha t there was “Aggression from the North” a decade l ater,
and so on. They had the legal aut hori ty to express these beliefs and to appeal to
the Security Council of the U.N. to deter mine the existence of a thre at to peace.
Tha t they did not do so is self-explanatory. The U.S. executive h ad no auth ority
to back French colonialism, to impose a terro risti c regime (or even a benevolent
democracy) on South Vietnam, to engage in clandestine war throughout Indo­
china, or to carry out a full-scale invasion of South Vietnam in 1965, demolishing
* the peasant society, or to wipe o ut the Plain of Ja rs and much of rura l Cambodia
under Preside nt Nixon, or to bomb Haiphong, or to carry out any of the other
actions tha t have led to mass r evulsion in this country and throughout much of
the world. Had the U.S. executive been stric tly bound by its legal obligations,
which in my opinion do express reasonable principles of i nternat ional behavior,
► we would never have found ourselves in the Indochina war.
Why, then, did the U.S. become so deeply engaged in this war? In the early
period, t he documentary record now avai lable presents a fairly explicit account
of rational, if cynical, purs uit of perceived self-interest. The U.S. has strate gic
and economic interest s in S outheast Asia t hat must be secured. Holding Indochina
is essential to securing these interests . Therefore we must hold Indochina. A
critica l considerati on is J apan , which will eventually accommodate to the “Soviet
Bloc” if Southeas t Asia is lost. In effect, then, the U.S. would have lost the Pacific
phase of World W ar II, which was fought, in part, to prevent Japa n from con­
struct ing a closed “co-prosperity sphere” in Asia from which the U.S. would be
excluded. The theoret ical framew ork for these considerations was the domino,
theory, which was fo rmulate d clea rly before the Korean war, as was the decision
to support French colonialism.
It is fashionable today to d eride the domino theory, but in f act it contains an
impor tant kernel of plaus ibility, perhaps truth . National independence and revo­
lution ary social change, if successful, may very well be contagious. The danger
is wha t Wa lt ltostow, writing in 1955, called the “ideological thre at”, specifically,
“the possi bility t ha t the Chinese Communists can prove to Asians by progress in
China tha t Communist methods are better and faste r than democratic methods”
(An American Policy i n Asia, p. 7). Similar fears were expressed by t he State
Departme nt and the JCS in 1959 (Government edition of t he Pentagon Papers,
X, 1198, 1213, 1220). S tate therefo re urged th at the U.S. do w hat it can to reta rd
the economic progress of the Communist Asian states (ibid,., 1208), a decision th at
is remarkabl e in its cruelty. A similar concern for Chinese “ideological expan­
sion” was expressed in the planning for escalation in the fall of 1964 (II I, 218,
592). F ear was ex pressed tha t “the rot would spread” over mainland Southeast
Asia, and tha t Thailan d (always “the second line of defense” ) would accommo­
date to Communist China “even with out any marked militar y move by Communist
r China” (I II, 661). The “rot”, in these cases, is surely the “ideological th rea t”.
Recall tha t in this period there was much talk of a competition between the
Chinese and the Indian models of development. In this context, fear of Chinese
“ideological expansion” gave substance to the domino theory, quite apa rt from
any speculation about Chinese aggression or Kremlin-directed aggression by the
» Viet Minh.
It is interestin g tha t the domino theory was never seriously challenged in the
available record, though its more fan tastic formulati ons were discounted. R ather,
there was debate about timing and probability. Stripped of fan tasies, the theory
was not implausible. Successful social and economic development in a unified
Vietnam, Communist-led on the Chinese model, might well have posed a “thr ea t”
to other developing countries, in tha t peasant-based revolutiona ry movements
within them might have been led to follow this model instead of relying on t he
indus trial powers and adaptin g their patte rn of development to the needs and
intere sts of the indu stria l powers. This might very well have led to Japane se
moves to accommodate in some fashion to the “closed societies” of East Asia,
with a possible impact on India, ultimately even the Middle E ast, as t he domino
theory pos tula ted: not by invasion, which was most unlikely, b ut by “ideological
expansion”, which was not so improbable. In the Kennedy period, Vietnam was
elevated to the stat us of a “test case”, and, I think it is fair to say, a degree
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of hys teri a was introd uced into plann ing. Bu t neve rthel ess the rat ion al core of
policy-m aking remaine d. Developing nati ons must be ta ug ht a les so n: they must
observe the ru les, and not und erta ke “na tio nal lib era tio n'’ on th e “do-it- yourse lf”
Chinese model, w ith mass mobiliza tion of the popul ation and a focus on in ter nal
needs an d res ources.
Possibly the th re at has now diminis hed, with the va st des truc tion in South
Vietnam and elsewhere, and the ha tre ds and social dis rup tion caused by the
Ameri can inter vent ion. It may be, then , th at Vietna m can be lost to the Viet­
names e wit hou t the dire consequences of social and economic prog ress of a sor t
th at mig ht be qu ite m eanin gful to t he A sian poor.
The docum entatio n for the pre-Ken nedy perio d gives sub sta nti al supp ort to
thi s int erp ret ati on of U.S. motives. Fo r example, NSC 48/1 (Decembe r, 1049)
warn ed th at Sout heas t Asia “is the t ar ge t of a coor dinate d offensive direc ted by
the Kre mli n” (th is is “now clea r” ). The ind ust ria l pla nt of Ja pa n and such
stra teg ic m ate ria ls as I ndone sian oil mu st be denied to t he “St ali nis t bloc ”, which
migh t other wise att ain global dom ina nce ; they mus t be kep t in tlie Wes tern
orbit. Ja pa n is the cruc ial prize in Ea st Asia. Commun ist pre ssu re on Ja pa n
will mount, because of pr oxim ity, the indigen ous Jap ane se Commu nist movement
which might be ab le to expl oit cul tur al fac tor s and economic har dsh ip, and “the
pote ntia l of Communis t China as a source of raw ma ter ial s vit al to Ja pa n and
a ma rke t for its goods”. Ja pa n requ ires Asian food, r aw ma teri als, and ma rke ts;
the U.S. sho uld encour age “a consid erable incre ase in Sout hern Asia tic food and
raw ma ter ial exp orts ” to avoid “pre pon der ant dependence on Chinese sources”.
Analogous consi derat ions hold of Ind ia. Fur the rmo re, thes e ma rke ts and sources
of raw ma teri als should be developed for U.S. p urposes. “Some kin d of region al
assoc iation . . . among the non-Com munist coun tries of Asia migh t become an
imp orta nt means of developing a favo rab le atmo sphe re for such tra de among
ourselv es an d w ith oth er p ar ts of the w orld. ”
The gene ral lines of th is ana lysi s p ers ist th rou gh the Tru ma n and Eisen howe r
Adm inis trat ion s (cf. NSC/64, NSC 48/5, NSC 124/2, etc .). To cite one case, an
NSC staf f stu dy of Fe bru ary , 1952, wa rned t h a t:
The fall of Sout hea st Asia would und erli ne the app are nt economic adv anta ges
to Ja pa n of assoc iatio n with the comm unist-d ominat ed Asian sphere. Exclus ion
of Jap an from tra de with Sout hea st Asia would serio usly affect the Jap ane se
economy, and incr ease J ap an ’s dependence on United Sta tes aid. In the long run
the loss of Sout hea st Asia, especially Malay a and Indon esia, could res ult in such
economic and politica l pre ssu res in Ja pa n as to make it extr eme ly difficult to
prev ent J ap an ’s even tual accommo dation to th e Sov iet bloc. (1 ,375)
We know from othe r sources th at t he U.S. put p ress ure on Ja pa n to put a stop
to its “accom modati on” with China, offering access to Sou thea st Asia as an
expl icit inducem ent. Vietna m was rega rded as “the Keysto ne to the arch, the
finger in the dike” (Jo hn F. Kennedy, 1956—the termino logy is cha rac teri stic
of th e pe riod ).
It is often argue d th at U.S. inte rve ntio n was moti vate d by “blind an ti­
comm unism ” and othe r erro rs. It is neces sary, however, to dist ing uish between
tw o kind s of “anti-com munism ”. Oppositio n to indigeno us movement s in Asia
th at migh t purs ue the Chinese model of development is not “blind anti-com mu­
nism ”. Ra the r, it is rat ion al impe rialism , which seeks to pre ven t any nibbling
away at are as th at provide the Wes tern ind ust ria l powers (an d Ja pa n) with
free access to mark ets, raw ma teri als, a cheap labor force, the possib ility for
export, of pollutio n, and opp ortu niti es for investm ent. On the oth er hand, ref er­
ence to a “coord inated offensive dire cted hy th e K rem lin” a gai nst Sout heas t Asia,
with the Viet Minh as its agent, is indeed “blind anti-co mmun ism”, th at is, p ure
ideology, unsup porte d by evidence, bu t extre mely usefu l as a pro pag and a device
to rall y domestic supp ort for mi lit ary inte rven tion ag ain st indigen ous com­
munist -led movements. The Ru ssia ns behave no diffe rentl y when they invade
Czechoslovakia. They stat e, and per hap s even believe, th at they are doing so to
pro tect the Czech people from the mac hin atio ns of Wall Stre et, the CIA. and
the West Germa n aggress ors. In fac t, the y are seeking to pres erve the Russ ian
-empire from erosion f rom w ithin.
Adm inis trat ion spokesmen have held to the view th at by destr oyin g Vietnam
we ar e somehow s tand ing firm aga ins t Chinese o r Russ ian aggressio n. As George
Car ver of the CIA once put it, our objecti ve is : “Dem ons trat ing the ster ile
fu til ity of the mi lita nt and aggres sive exp ansi onis t polic y a dvoca ted by t he pre s­
ent ru ler s of Communi st Chin a” (IV, 82). One searc hes the recor d in vain for
 97
evidence of t his policy. The Pentagon h istoria n observes th at Chinese Communist
activity in Southeast Asia a ppeared “ominous” to Washington in late 1964 (HI ,
267), but he cites as the factu al basis only “Suka rno’s abrup t withd rawal of
Indonesia’s parti cipatio n in the U.N.”, which led to various speculations. In
earli er years, there were determined efforts, always unavailing, to establish a
link between the Viet Minh and Moscow or Peking, though th is fa ilure in no way
shook the belief, virtua lly a dogma, tha t the Vietnamese revolutionar ies must
be Chinese or Russian agents. The intellectua l failur es of th e "intelligence com­
munity” are revealed by the fact tha t the Pentagon histor ians were able to dis­
cover only one staff paper, in a record of more than two decades, “which trea ts
communist reactions primaril y in terms of the separa te nationa l intere sts of
Hanoi, Moscow, an d Peiping, rath er than primarily in terms of an overall com­
munist strateg y for which Hanoi is acting as an agent” (II , 107; a SNIB of
November, 1061). Even in the “intelligence community”, where the task is to get
the facts stra ight and not to proclaim tha t Franc e is defending the terr itor ial
integri ty of Vietnam from the Viet Minh and the “Commie-dominated bloc of
slave stat es” (Acheson, October, 1950; I, 70), it was apparentl y next to impos­
sible to perceive, or at least to express th e simple t rut h tha t North Vietnam, like
the Soviet Union, China, the U.S., and the NLF, h as i ts own interests, which are
often decisive.
The record makes clea r tha t the U.S. did not e nter the Indochina war because
it had discovered the Viet Minh to be Russia n or Chinese agents. Nor did it re­
peatedly escalate this war because i t found tha t the NLF was a puppet of the
North (or China, or Moscow). Quite the opposite was true. Fir st came the in­
tervention, for entirely different reasons, and then the effort to establish the de-
endence and control tha t was required for propaganda purposes, and also, no
doubt, for the self-image of the policy-makers. It is, afte r all, psychologically
much easier to destroy agents of Chinese aggression than those who had
captured the nation alist movement of Vietnam. One form of anti-communism
motivated U.S. inte rve ntio n: namely, opposition to indigenous communist-led
movements, under the assumptions of the domino theory. A second form of
anti-communism was invoked to ju stify the intervention, publicly and interna lly :
fea r of a Kremlin-directed conspiracy or Chinese aggression—as fa r as we
know, the figment of imagination.
Much the same ha s been tr ue elsewh ere: e.g., in Greece in the 1940’s and in the
Caribbean, repeatedly. A serious defect of the Pentagon study, inheren t in Sec­
reta ry McNamara’s guidelines, is its failu re to relate U.S. policy in Vietnam to
developments elsewhere, even in Southeast Asia. Had the historia ns been able
to spread a somewhat wider net, they would have discovered, fo r example, t hat
the domino th eory was ex pressed by S ecretary of S tate Marshall with regard to
Greece in 1947—in thi s case, th e Middle Easte rn countries, not Japa n and Indo­
nesia, were the “fart her dominoes” tha t concerned him. They would also have
discovered int riguing simila rities between U.S. intervention in Indochina and in
Korea from 1945-50. They might have noted tha t the U.S. escalation of clandes­
tine activities in Vietnam and Laos in late 1963 and 1964 apparen tly coincided
with a similar escalation of attac ks on Cambodia by t he Khmer Serei, traine d
and equipped by the U.S. Special Forces and the CIA. They would have ob­
served th at from 1948, th e U.S. was deeply involved in Thai affairs, supporting a
corru pt and at times savage milita ry dictatorsh ip, at first under a Japan ese col­
laborator. They would have determined, in short, tha t the U.S. has not been a
confused victim of events, but an active agent, pursuing policies tha t fell within
a rath er coherent global str ate gy : to carve out and stabilize a system of “open
societies”, societies in which, in partic ular, U.S. capital can operate more or
less freely. Though th is is far from the sole operativ e f actor in U.S. policy, still
it is surely the beginning of wisdom to recognize its crucial role.
It is often argued tha t the costs of such intervention demonstrate th at there
can be no underlying imperial drive. This reasoning is fallacious, however. In
the first place, the “costs” a re in large measure profits f or selected segments of
American society. It is senseless to describe stat e expenditures for je t planes
or cluster bombs or computers for the automate d air war simply as “costs of
intervention.” There are, to be sure, costs of empire tha t benefit virtu ally no
one within : 50,000 American corpses, or the deterio ration in the stre ngth of t he
U.S. economy relative to its indust rial rivals. But these general costs of empire
are social costs, while t he profits a re again highly c oncentrated. Senator Church
noted in recent Congressional H earings t ha t the U.S. has expended over $2 billion
 98

in aid t o Bra zil since 1964 t o protect a “fa vora ble investm ent clim ate” for a tota l
invest ment of about $1.7 billio n. Th is comes as no surpr ise to any student of
modern histor y. In many respects, the same was true of the Br itis h empire, aft er
the origi nal rape of Ind ia. The costs of empire are distri buted over the society
as a who le; its profits revert to a few withi n. In this respect, the empire serves
as a device for inter nal consolida tion of power and privile ge, and it is quite ir ­
relev ant to observe tha t its social costs are often very grea t.
It should also be noted tha t planner s cannot uner ring ly calc ulat e costs in
advan ce. They cannot begin all over agai n if plans go awr y. Thou gh it is pos­
sible tha t the planners of the past 25 years would not have underta ken the effort
to dominate Indochi na had they known the consequences, they did not have the
lux ury of advance knowledge. On the assumptio ns of the domino theory, in its
more real istic versions, the origi nal calcu latio n was not an unreaso nable one,
what ever one may thin k of its moral basis or its stat us in law . As I have ind i­
cated, I personally think it was deplorable on such grounds, but tha t is a differ ent
mat ter entirely . Furth ermo re, by the early 1960’s, it is my impress ion tha t other
and more irra tion al fact ors had come to predominate, a mat ter which is of some
inter est in itse lf, but which I wil l not explore here.
At one cru cial point in the plan ning to es calat e the war in 1964, W illia m Bun dy
rais ed the question wheth er it would be possible to car ry out the prefer red
esca lator y option “ under the klie g ligh ts of a democra cy” ( II I, 648). I thin k
he is quite righ t to raise this question, though not exa ctly for the reasons he
gave. Secrecy and deceit are essenti al components of aggres sion. The vis ibil ity
of the Americ an war o f ann ihila tion in South Viet nam was undoubtedly a fac to r
in turn ing much of the populatio n to protest and resista nce, much to the cred it
of Ame rican society. The social costs of empire, in a heal thy democracy, would
impede imperial planners . Bu t a system of centr alized power, insul ated from
publ ic scrut iny and opera ting in secret, possessing vas t means of destructi on
and hampered by a few const raint s will nat ura lly tend to commit aggressi on
and atroc ities. Th at is the prim ary lesson of the Penta gon histo ry, though
we hard ly need this valu able and illum ina tin g record to establ ish the fac t,
foreseen by Thomas Jeff ers on, for example . There has, in the past gener­
ation , been a contrived inat tent ion to foreig n policy on the par t of the public.
Govern ment secrecy has been a cont ribut ing fact or, fa r outweighed, in my opin­
ion, by the intense indo ctrin ation of the postwar period tha t has rendered th&
publ ic iner t until quite recen tly. It comes as no surprise, under these circu m­
stances , tha t Jeffe rson ’s predictio n was fulfil led. I f citizen s “ become inat tent ive
to the public aff air s,” he wrote, then the government “s hall all become
wolve s,” a perceptive remar k and an accu rate predictio n. Success ive admi nis­
tra tio ns “ became wolves ,” inte rnat iona l predators, arch itect s of one of the most
horrendou s catastr ophes of modern histor y.
Wh at is worse, perhaps, very lit tle has changed. Eve n many opponents of the
war pretend to themselves tha t others are to blame for the catast rophe of Vi et­
nam. In a strong edito rial statem ent aga inst the war, the N .Y . Tim es editors
w ri te :
“ Thi s is not to say tha t Amer icans , "including the poli tica l and mil itar y com­
mands and the G .I .’s themselves, did not orig inal ly conceive thei r role quite hon­
estl y as tha t of liber ators and allie s in the cause of fre ed om ; but such idea listi c
motive s had litt le chanc e to preva il aga inst local leader s skille d in the art of
man ipu latin g the ir fo reign pro tector s.” (Ma y 7,197 2).
Once agai n we ha ve the image of the Amer ican poli tica l leader ship, noble and
virtu ous , bewildered and victim ized, but not responsible, never responsible fo r
wha t it has done. The corruptio n of t he i ntel lect and the moral cowardice r evealed
by such s tatements defy comment.
Whe ther th e U .S . wil l with draw from Viet nam short of true genocide and per­
haps even the serious thre at of inte rnat iona l war is, I am afr aid , an open
question. There is, unfo rtun atel y, sufficient reason to suppose tha t the same grim
stor y w ill be re-enacted elsewhere.
The C hairman. Dr. Chomsky, that is a very inter esting an d provoca­
tive statement.
DOMIN O THEO RY

I would like to clari fy your point about th e domino theory because

it has been discussed very much.
 99
The domino theo ry which I thin k most writers and commentators
have ta lked about was of a milit ary nature . It has always been con­
ceived of in mili tary terms. It seems to me you are suggesting, not
th at th at has tr uth , bu t th at the conception of the domino theory as a
social and ideological problem is a true one. In o ther words, the con­
cept for the orga nization of society which was developing in China an d
under Ho Chi Minh was the real danger and, if allowed to proceed with­
out o ur intervention, it could succeed. I n this sense you are saying it
had va lid ity ; is tha t correct ?
Would you elab orate about it? I don’t wan t to confuse people who
will inte rpre t y our saying tha t t he domino theory is valid while the y
are still thin king of it in military terms.
Mr. Chomsky. Th at’s right . Yes, tha t is exactly my point. The
domino theory in milita ry terms was always entirely senseless.
The Chairman. Th at is the one th at has been prom oted as being
justification f or our policy, isn’t it ?
Mr. C homsky. Well, tha t is t he one th at has been promoted in most
of the public statements.
The Chairman. That is what I mean.
Mr. Chomsky. But, of course, if you look more careful ly at, for
example, the intern al record or even, say, such public statements as
the one of Mr. Rostow which I quoted in a book that appeare d in 1935,
you see a different and somewhat more plausible varia nt of the theory,
namely, the thr eat of “ideological expansion.” This, for example, was
introduc ed both by Michael Forre stal and by Ambassador Willi am
Sulliva n in the plann ing for the escalation in late 1964. They both
spoke of China ’s need for ideological successes, of the possible ideo­
logical expansion of China.
I reall y doubt very seriously tha t any American plann er who thou ght
for a l ittle about it believed tha t the Vietnamese were going to conquer
Thai land or they were g oing to conquer Malaya or Indonesia.
The C hairman. By arms?
Mr. Chomsky. By arms, and th at version of the domino theory , a l­
though quite effective in enlist ing public suppo rt for the war in a
certa in period, nevertheless certainl y had no reality.
EF FE CT OF SOCIA L AND EC ON OM IC DEV ELOPM EN T UN DE R CO M MU NI ST
CONTR OL

On t he other hand, it was very likely that the unification of Viet ­

nam, presumably this would have meant under Communist control,
would have proceeded to b ring about the kind of social and economic
development tha t mi ght have been quite m eaningful and quite ap peal ­
ing to many of the Asian poor and, correspondingly, t o pe asant move­
ments elsewhere. P easant-base d movements might have adopted such
measures and gradu ally there would be an erosion of the areas of
the so-called Thi rd World tha t were he ld to he absolutely essential
for the maintenance of American global policy, par ticu larly because
of the ir im pact on Jap an, as I mentioned. This seems to me, whatever
one may thin k about th is policy—fra nkly, I r egard it as deplorab le—-
the American policy o f interven tion, in my opinion, is deplorable on
both moral and legal grounds, b ut th at is not to say it was not ration al.
 100
The Chairman. Wh at you are saying is we were a fra id of th e suc­
cess of the control of th e NLF or the Communists?
Mr. Chomsky. Tha t is quite righ t and, in fact, if you look a t the
rare intelligence analysis, a nd to my recollection there is only one in
the Pentag on Papers , sometime in 1959, t ha t compares development
in South Vietnam to development in North Vietnam, its results were
hard ly en couragingly to the American planners who hoped to prevent
the rot fro m spreading, as they put it.
The Chairman. But they used rot in the sense of the success of the
Admi nistra tion, tha t is what I am try ing to clarify.
Mr. Chomsky. Tha t is right. I assume tha t when the American
planne rs in, let's say, late 1964, were worried th at th e rot would spread
to Tha ilan d and then Malaya and Indonesia. I cannot believe th ey
thou ght the Viet Minh or the Vietnamese would somehow conquer
these countries. Tha t was certainl y a fantasy. But there is another
sense in which the rot m ight spread and I thin k tha t is why they em­
phasized tha t Thai land might “accommodate,” the common word
tha t is used, even without milit ary moves by Communist China or
anyone else.
u.s. allegiance to self-determination of peoples
The C hairman. Where does this leave our whole central justific ation
for this and other activities—our allegiance to self-determ ination of
peoples ?
Mr. Chomsky. I do not believe t ha t American policy or th e policy
of an y g reat power is ever, has ever been, determined by commitment
to self-deter mination of peoples. Rat her it is determined by a com­
mitment to the national interest as tha t is defined by the dominant
groups in the society. Of course, virt ually witho ut exception or very
few exceptions, imperial powers state that the ir concerns a re noble,
they are interested in self-determ ination or development or one th ing
or another. I simply urge tha t we apply to ourselves th e same stand ­
ards tha t we apply to the Soviet Union , for example, when we read its
propa ganda about, its invasion of Czechoslovakia.
They also say th at it was done from noble motives, to save socialist
democracy, to prevent the Czech people from being attacked, you know,
by the Wes t Germans, run by the CIA and so on and so for th, and for
all I know t hey even believe it. But I do no t believe it and I do not
see why anyone else should. The policy fall s very simply into th e long­
term Russian objective of extendi ng and maint aining its very b rutal
hold on it s own empire, a nd the American policies have, as has often
been clearly expressed in intern al documents and elsewhere, been
motivated by the desire to create a world of what are called open
societies, meaning by tha t societies which are open to penetration ,
economic pene tration and political control by the Unite d States.
ECONOMIC ASPECTS

The Chairman. T hat , toget her with your emphasis upon the eco­
nomic aspects—you jus t sa id th e op portu nity for exploita tion by our­
selves an d our allies—seems to be a difference between your view and
 101

Mr. Schlesinger. You emphasize the significance of the economic,

and Dr. Schlesinger, yon thou ght this was o f minor importance. Do
you see any dilFerence in your view and Dr. Chomsky’s on this point
and also on the domino theory7 ?
TH IR D PO SS IB ILI TY FOR M EA NI NG OF DO MIN O TH EO RY

Mr. S chlesinger. Well, on the domino the ory : I thin k there is a

thi rd possibility, has mentioned, lying between the notion th at the
domino the ory meant tha t IIo Chi Minh was going to star t conquer­
ing other nations, on the one hand, and the notion of a purel y ideologi­
cal effect, on th e other. As I recall th e apprehensions of the time, the
phrase, t he “ falli ng dominoes”, meant neither of those thing s so much
as it meant the though t that a success in Vietnam would stimulate
comparable guerr illa efforts in Laos and Cambodia and Thai land,
and so on, and tha t these would be no doubt helped by a victorious
Communist governme nt in Saigon.
I say this, since we are l istin g variou s meanings of the term domino
theory, not because I take it seriously, bu t because I thin k th at is what
they were talk ing about. In other words, they w’ere tal king ab out the
guerri lla example r ath er than about direct conquest by a Communist
government or about purely ideological impact.
OP EN DOOR CON CEP T

Yes. on the second point, this question o f the economic inte rpre ta­
tion of Am erican policy a fte r th e wa r, obviously Mr. Chomsky and I
have very sharp differences. There is a school of thoug ht in American
diplomati c histori ans which argues tha t, since the 1890’s, A merican
foreign policy has been determined by t he purs uit of an “open door”
for th e export of American surplus goods and cap ital; and t hat, while
this policy has occasionally involved tactical differences within the
rulin g elites of the Unite d States as to how best to secure the open
door; practic ally everyth ing in our foreign policy can be reduced to
the quest fo r the open door.
In fairness to Mr. Chomsky he says this is not the sole operative
facto r in U.S. policy. I would say in certain situation s where there
are not imp orta nt milit ary, political and strategic considerations in­
volved, then th e desire to seek profits fo r American business may play
a role, and a most deformi ng one, in U.S. foreign policy. This is par ­
ticul arly true in the case of L atin America. I thi nk t here is l ittle more
shaming t han Presid ent Nixon’s direc tive in Jan ua ry tha t we should
not only suspend all aid to L atin American countries t ha t na tionalize
American-owned firms without adequate compensation but tha t we
should try to preven t intern ationa l agencies, like the IAD B (Inte r-
American Development Bank) and The World Bank, from making
loans to those countries. This sets up th e U.S. government as a collec­
tion agent for U.S. business.
However. I thin k t his kind of concern plays only a marg inal role in
our general f oreign po licy : nor do I thin k there is any necessary con­
nection between the purs uit of the open door, fo r example, a nd oppo­
sition to Sta linism.
 102
As one looks for the concept of the open door in the writin gs, for
example, of American post-wa r leaders, I foun d only one very notable
quotation which I will read to you :
“We cann ot permit the door to be closed aga inst our t rade in Ea st­
ern E urope any more than we can in C hina. We must insist on an open
door for trad e through out the world.” Well, this did not come f rom
Presid ent T ruman , Dean Acheson or one of those wicked fellows. This
was a quotation from H enry A. Wallace in th e Madison Square Gar ­
den speech of September 12. 1946, a speech tha t led to his dismissal
from the Trum an Cabinet. T his shows very clearly the disconnection
between the search for the open door, on the one hand, and any pa r­
ticu lar policies toward Russia, on the other. In other words, the open
door idea is perfec tly compatible with the Wallace policy of accommo­
dation o r appeasement of the Soviet Union as well as with the Trum an
containme nt policy; and, therefore , it cannot be said to have deter­
mined any pa rtic ular course of policy.
Moreover, it is impossible to under stand on this open door thesis
why, say. the democratic socialists of Eu rope were unhapp y about the
thre at of communism in the 1940’s. Why should the Briti sh Labor
Government, why should Atlee and Bevin, why should the Frenc h
Government under Leon Blum, why should Europ ean social demo­
crats in general have been apprehensive about the Soviet Union? Why
should they have become quite critica l at times of American policy in
this period as inadequately responsive to what they considered the
Soviet thre at ? Obviously they were not anti-Soviet in the interest of
expa nding American capitalism.
U .S . EC O N O M IC IN T E R E S T I N T H IR D WO RLD

So it seems to me that there is no basis to say tha t the economic

motive was the det ermina nt of our foreign policy, nor indeed does the
evidence cited bv Mr. Chomsky dem onstrate any such basis. His evi­
dence mostly relates to Jap an, and relates to economic matters as
components in the strate gic questions. The thesis th at the interna l
needs of American capitalism required us to go in to the thir d world
is not sustained in the evidence in Mr. Chomsky's statemen t nor indeed
can it be sustained. T will not bore you by repeat ing the figures in
my statement showing the very limited extent to which American
trad e or American investment depends upon the thi rd world.
Everyone knows tha t most of our trad e is with other developed
countries, th at most of o ur inve stment is in oth er developed countries.
You have to have i ndustri alized countries to provide much in the way
of effective markets or much in the way of investment outlets. The
figures sustain this.
T do not think we ha ve any kind of economic interest in the thir d
world tha t would have led us into Vietnam. We did have a political
strategi c interest in keep ing J apa n as a friend ly state and, the refore,
had some concern about t he economic impact of certain developments
on Ja pa n; but these were not a response to the need of American
capitalism, nor have I been able to find in the Pentag on Pape rs—
perhap s Mr. Chomskv has—any instance of business interven tion in
the form ation of our Vietnam policy.
 103
MR. CHOM SKY CALLED “ RATIONALIS T”

Mr. Chomsky may be too much of a ratio nalist. Both as a histo rian
and as occasional part icip ant in Government, I have concluded t ha t
very much of what takes place in Government is a produ ct of igno r­
ance, improvisation and mindlessness. I thin k th at stup idity is a more
helpfu l facto r in inte rpre ting our policy than conspiracy.
The Chairman. Do you wish to comment on th at ?
Mr. Chomsky. May I comment on that ? [Laugh ter.]
You see I am very—and perhaps 1 am too much of a ratio nalis t
and I have never worked in th e Government.
The Chairman. I did not h ear tha t, speak up.
Mr. Chomsky. I am certain ly a kind of a ration alist I guess, and
I have never worked in the Government so I cannot speak from in­
tern al knowledge.
Mr. S chlesinger. Was not readin g the Pentagon Pape rs enough?
Air. Chomsky. B ut I want to say t he Pentagon Paper s give an ex­
tremely ration al, also an extremely cynical justification, up to about
1960, for an immo ral or illegal interventi on th at would have su pporte d
long-term American interests. I do agree afte r 1960 thing s became
somewhat different with the test case rh etoric and so on and so forth .
SO-CALLED ERRORS HAVE SYSTEMATIC QUALITY

Now I t hin k it is a little unsatisf ying to attr ibut e A merican policy

to stupid ity. For one thing , t he errors, so-called, have a very system­
atic quality. It is a fact that one of the errors, so-called, committed
by the allegedly s tupi d leaders is tha t in variably, I believe invariably ,
I know of no counter-example, a true revolution which takes place
inside the American dominated system is interp reted as being con­
ducted by agents of the inter natio nal Communist conspiracy.
Now it is very striki ng, and in fact the Penta gon Pape rs lend a lot
of illumina tion to this. The intelligence community was assigned the
responsibility in 1948 of dem onstrat ing this thesis, of pro ving th at Ho
Chi Minh was nothi ng but an agent of intern ationa l Communist
imperialism, and it is rath er amusing to run throu gh the record. I
mean if you go th roug h the documents, and part icul arly in the gov­
ernment edition, you discover they kept tryi ng t o show it. They ne ver
were able to. They investigated all s orts of possibilities: the Bangkok
legation of the U.S.S.R. or the Shangh ai Tass office, o r one thi ng or
another, and they were never able to prove what they felt had to be
true, tha t the Viet Minh were agents of interna tional Communist
aggression. And then aft er their total failur e to establish this fact it
was taken as doctrine, a nd stated, fo rmulated.
The Chairman. I s tha t not an example o f what-----
Mr. Chomsky. I do not regard tha t as stupidi ty.
The C hairman. I see.
Mr. Chomsky. Not at all. Because this , you see-----
Senator S ymington. Wha t would you call it?
The C hairman. Wha t would you call it ?
Mr. Chomsky. I would call t his a very rationa l approa ch towards
developing a technique of prop agan da which will enlist the Ameri-
 104
can population behind the opposition to indigenous communism, and
I should note tha t tha t very same sto ry has been re capitulat ed over
and over again within th e domain o f American control. We have held,
for example, tha t in Guatemala in 1954, the Arbenz regime was an
agency of internati onal Communist conspiracy. Ta ke an other case. In
the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Johnson admin istrati on searched
very ha rd for agents of the Sino-Soviet bloc and finally, I think, was
able to coine up with about seven of them who were, you know’, over
10 years old and not dead. And then I recall once watchin g Eric
Sevareid on television describing this new and even more insidious
technique of Communist aggression, namely, smallness of numbers,
which makes the United S tates look ridiculous and makes it hard er to
find the aggressors and so on and so fo rth. Quite the same w’as true in
Gi•eece, for example, in the forties. The United States claimed, con­
tra ry to available evidence, th at the Greek guerr illa movement was
initia ted a nd suppor ted by St alin. W alt Rostow has continued to claim
thi s over the years, never presenting any evidence. He has done it again
in 1960, 1962; for all I know’, he still makes this claim. The evidence,
of course, is not definitive bu t such as exists lends no sup port to this
theory. In fact, it indicates tha t Stalin was prob ably opposed to the
Greek guerrill as and was ra the r satisfied with th e post-war imperial
settlement which gave him substanti al control over the domains he
wanted. In fa ct, we know f rom evidence of Djilas and others he tr ied
to call off the Greek guerrilla s, and there is reasonable speculation tha t
he was opposed to the p otential of an independent Balkan Communist
system very likely of a T itoist natu re which would be a counterweight
to his hoped -for monolithic power.
Fo r exactly the same reasons Stalin was always very lukewarm about
Mao, when one looks over the record. I was glad to h ear Mr. Schlesin-
ger say, i f I quote him exactly, th at the re may never have been a Sino-
Soviet bloc. Well, in the late forties there is evidence, not definitive but
suggestive, tha t Stali n was anything but enthusiastic about the triumph
of Chinese communism. I do n ot thin k tha t he could have predicted
the curren t level of confron tation but I thin k a geo-politician, if you
like, would have unde rstood th at a force th at was capable of u nifyin g
China under so-called Communist leadership, would ultimately refuse
to bend to Russian will, would be a disru ptive force in the world o rder
tha t t he Russians hoped t o control and, in fact, would challenge thei r
always quite fraud ulent revolution ary pretentions in the so-called
thi rd world.
SYS TEM ATI C ERROR IN W H A T IS ALLEGED TO BE ST UP ID IT Y

So my point is this re all y: There is a highly systematic erro r in what

is alleged to be the stup idity of the Government officials. Now that ,
I think , is very har d to explain on gro unds of stupidit y. You would
expect perha ps random er ror i f decisions were really made on the basis
of stupid ity but I find the erro r to be systematic. I th ink a very good
first approxim ation to a criterio n that, determines which elements in
foreign societies are designated as our fri ends, and which ones are des­
ignated as our enemies, a very reasonable first appr oximatio n is given
by the principle t ha t those forces which will maximize the openness of
thei r society to American free entry, t ha t means free flow of capital,
 105
free flow of investments, so on and so forth , those elements are our
friend s and the ones who oppose this are our enemies. And I believe if
one applies this criteri on one will find th at it gives a remarkabl y
accurate charact erizatio n o f Am erican policy over many years.
This expl ains not only why we are anti-Communist, but also why we
have been an ti-Fas cist, rath er selectively to be sure, and why we have
been anti-colon ialist unless the only altern ative to colonialism was an
indigenous Communist movement which would in fact close its society
and carry out mobilization of th e popul ation in kind of a do-it-your-
* self, Chinese model development.
JA P A N PR IM AR Y MOT IVE FOR U. S. IN TE RE ST IN IN DO CH IN A

t Now, on the matt er o f the open door, I do not really agree. Fi rst of
all, let me make clear, there is, I thin k, one point of agreement be­
tween us. I am not main tainin g in any written testimony or what I
stated today tha t the U.S. tried to conquer, I guess tha t is th e righ t
word, Indoch ina merely because o f its direct interest in access to the
thi rd world. Rath er, 1 insist it was Jap an that was probab ly a pr i­
mary motive. We were concerned from the beginning tha t the work­
shop of the Pacific would not carve out once again an independent
closed co-prosperity sphere as it threaten ed to do in th e late 1930’s,
possibly even accommodating to what has been called the “Sta linis t
bloc,” perha ps posing a very serious milita ry thre at to us and cer­
tainly , of course, closing oil' a vast segment of potential expansion
for the then projected American economic domination of the world.
So Ja pa n was p robably the prim ary factor, and the e xamples I have
quoted from the National Security Council memoranda and so on I
thin k indicate that.
AM ER IC AN IN VE ST M EN T IN TH IR D WORLD CO UN TR IES

Secondly, I thin k it is worth poin ting out although it is entirely

true, as Mr. Schlesinger says, th at the American investment in
thi rd world countries is sligh t propo rtiona l to GNP, neverthe­
less it is quite extensive. In fact, i f you want to see how people who are
, interested in economic expansion view the domino theory, it is useful
to read business journals. F or example, if you look a t the 1972 a nnual
repor t o f the F ar E aster n Economic Review, which is a journa l com­
mitted to economic liberalism, the editor, Derek Davies, has a review
k article of th e situati on in which he also derides the domino theory as
total fanta sy and absurd, but then he goes on to point o ut tha t Eas t
Asia is perha ps the fastes t growing area of economic development
in the wo rld ; th at 70 percent of the invest ment there is Amer ican ; that
this investment has ta ken place behind the shield of American inte r­
vention in Vietnam and could not have taken place otherw ise; and tha t
there are enormous prospects for Western and Japane se business
there; and tha t this is attrib utabl e to American courage—I have
forgotten his exact word—in preserving its position in Vietnam.
Of course, he describes this sometimes in the rhetoric of provi ding
freedom to the pea sants, and so on and so fo rth, but these a re the facts
he describes and this, it seems to me, is the ration al version of the
domino t heor y: by preve nting the rot from spreading , by prevent-
 106
ing the model of development from succeeding, by main tainin g the
second line of defense, by preve nting guerr illa forces elsewhere from
unde rtakin g sim ilar developments, we have carved out an area where
there migh t in the futu re be considerable economic expansion.
OP EN DOOR NO T MA JOR T H IN G

As to the open door itself, again let me emphasize I do not believe

American i nterests specifically in Ind ochina led us into the Indoch ina
War. I thin k it is Ame rican interests in the region, very much, as I
mentioned, as when Secretary M arshall formulated the domino theory
in 1947 with respect to Greece; he was not really concerned with
Greece, he was concerned with the fa rth er dominoes of the Middle East.
Similarl y, the American domino theory in Asia. But, nevertheless,
despite this it is a fact tha t the open door is mentioned repeatedly
in the Pentagon Paper s, sometimes explicitly in those words in the
early years.
To give you a couple of examples, and again let me emphasize I
do not thin k it was the major thin g ther e: Apr il 1945, the United
States, suppo rting the reconstitu tion of Frenc h auth ority, urged a
more liberal patte rn, specifically liberalizat ion of restrict ive Frenc h
economic policies for the protection of American interests.
It, was urged tha t France move to gra nt autonomy to its colonies
or t he people may embrace ideologies contra ry to our own or develop
a Pan Asiatic movement against all western powers, and it was fur ther
urged in the same statem ent tha t open door policies be pursued.
By 194G, December it was noted t hat the “ Fren ch appe ar to realize
no longer possible to maintain closed door here and non-French in­
terests will have chance to parti cipa te in unquestioned rich economic
possibilities.”
Although the resources of Indoch ina in fact are repeatedly men­
tioned, T could give you some references-----
The C hairman. Dr. Chomsky, I think you made that point.
Mr. Chomsky. Yes.
political accommodation obstacle to settlement

The C hairman. Before I yield to my colleagues, I want to brin g

this down to a thin g you said in the beginning which I think is
implicit in the testimony of both. You cited Dr. Kissinger's recent
stateme nt tha t the only obstacle to settlement is the political accom­
modation. I inter pret this to mean th at the acceptance of a Commu­
nist regime, no mat ter how it comes to power, is utterl y unacceptable
to this Government, and tha t this recent move as of the day before
yesterday is still based upon the same basic objectives. I am re­
minded when I t ried to elicit from Secretary Rusk what was our ob­
jective in Vietnam—I said to him, “If we win. what do we win? ”
I never did get an answer of any consequence. Of course, they never
accepted the idea tha t you are promo ting: tha t is the fear tha t if
we allowed Communism to develop from indigenous forces, a nd ef­
fective regime might be created which would be a model and an
attra ctive one to other communities. It was always on some other
basis, as you know, and cer tainly the domino theor y as then presented
 107
was always in milit ary terms, tha t is, in the sense tha t it would be
a conquest.
Appl ying this to the present situatio n, I would like both of you to
comment before I allow myself to yield to my colleagues. Is it your
belief tha t this recent move is based upon the same assumption th at
we, un der no circumstances, are going t o p ermit a Communist regime
to take place, whether it be by elections or by t he will of the people
or any other way? When the Adm inistr ation saw tha t Vietnamiza-
tion was not workin g—in other words, we could not succeed in cre-
< ating a client regime which would allow us to do what we pleased
there—then they would take this drastic action.
I would like both of you, if you would, to try to inter pret, as a
consequence o f this inquiry, how you assess the present situation,
r
PRES ENT SITUA TION IN VIETNA M

I wonder, Dr. Schlesinger. if you would sta rt on this since we have

just heard Dr. Chomsky. Wha t is your assessment of the present
situation and is there any possibility of a political negotiated set­
tlement of the war as it now goes on in Vietnam.
Mr. S ciilesinger. I thin k t he present situati on is discou raging evi­
dence of the extent to which intelligence does not rule our public
affairs. It seems to me Pres ident Nixon in his speeches of the last
2 weeks, i ncludin g the one at the Connally barbecue, has reproduced
nearly all the fallacies, with the single exception of the thre at of
China, tha t have m arked the evolution of our policy d urin g all these
years.
I thin k tha t he believes them. Perh aps Mr. Chomsky would disa­
gree. But when the Presid ent invokes the Munich, analogy, when he
says if we do not stand here there is going to be trouble in the Middle
East , and so on. I th ink th at is a perfect ly genuine belief. I t is a belief
tha t Secretar y Rusk had and it is a belief, as I sai d in my statement,
tha t many people grew up with aft er the thirt ies—the notion th at
appeasement is the inevitable precui'sor of renewed aggression is one
deeply imp lanted in th eir minds. I am af raid P resident Nixon has n ot
recognized the extent to which the w orld has changed and the extent
, to which there is a vast difference between No rth Vie tnam, on th e one
hand, and Nazi Germany, on the other.
To this degenerate idea of collective security, in which I thin k he
honestly believes, he has added the suggestion t hat his personal pres-
‘ tige is somehow involved. He puts it outside himself a b it by tal kin g
about “ respect fo r the office of the Presidenc y.’' W hat he rea lly seems
to mean is a desire to avoid what he would regard as political or
personal humiliat ion. But with extra ordin ary insensiti vity lie is un­
able to see t hat he is try ing to avoid t his at the expense of inflicting
comparable personal and political humiliat ion on other people.
Why a Presid ent of the United States should suppose th at North
Vietnam and the Soviet Union would find acceptable a public humi lia­
tion which he would not accept himse lf I cannot imagine. Th e effort
to control foreign policy by ultimatums , of the kind th at Presid ent
Nixon declared on Monday night, is a very dangerous effort.
I thin k the fallacies in his approach are abundant. l i e has added,
I would say, one othe r f allacy to his c ollection; and tha t is the notion
83-005— 73---- 8
 108
th at the Soviet. Union can deliver Hanoi. This notion has always
dogged him. Tie has never been able to unde rstand tha t the age of the
superpowers is over. The bi g states are as often captives o f the ir client
states as they are able to dom inate these client states. North Vietnam
is a nat ional state which has been figh ting th is wa r for 20 years a nd is
not goin g to be much deflected by the preferences of the Soviet Union
or of Peking, nor indeed can the Soviet Union be expected t o b lack­
mail Hanoi by cuttin g off aid to it and still mainta in any kind of
position in the Communist world.
So I would thin k that, this is a—on its s urface—a non-st arter, quite
apart, from the. technical fac t th at nothin g we do in mining th e harbo r
at Hanoi is go ing to affect milita ry operations by th e North V ietna ­
mese in Sout h Vietnam for many weeks.
I thin k the only possible hope in this speech is in the theory that ,
under a mask of truculence, Pr eside nt Nixon proposes to beat a retreat.
The only sticking point in preven ting a negotiated settlement has
been the belief of this Admin istratio n tha t the retention of a non-
Communist government in Saigon is of vital interest to the U.S. Had
we been willing to stand aside from the Saigon Government, I am
assured by people who were involved in the Pa ris nego tiations in 1968,
we could have gotten a negotiated settlement in December 1968 or
Jan uar y 1969. But Presid ent Johnson was unwillin g to follow the
advice of Governor Harr iman and Secretary Clifford, wdio favored
stand ing aside from the Saigon regime. The Vietnamiza tion policy
tied the U.S. Government even more closely to the Saigon Government
because Vietnamizatio n could succeed only as the Saigon Government
became stronger.
BASTS OF U.S. NEGOTIATIONS

Vietnamizatio n and negotiation always seemed to me to be incom­

patible. Now Vietnamization has co llapsed; and th e interes ting t hin g
was th at when the Presiden t listed in his speech the conditions which
Hanoi must meet before he would stop mining the harbors, he did not
say anyt hing about the Saigon Government. But Mr. Chomsky tells
me that, in the Kissinger testimony, which I have not yet had an op­
portu nity to read, Henry Kissinge r does seem to clin g still to the no­
tion of the preservation of a reliably non-Communist gov ernment in
Saigon.
As long as th at is the basis of our negotiations, it seems to me our
negotiat ing efforts are a fake because we know th is result will no t be
accepted by the othe r side. F or bette r or for worse, th at is the fact of
the situ ation. If we want a negotiated settlement we will have to sta nd
aside from the Thieu Government and let the internal processes of
South Vietnam politics, w hatever they may be, yield a result which
mav be unpalat able to us.
The Chairman. D o you wish to comment on th at briefly?
PRESEN T POLICY THR EAT ENS NUCLEAR WAR

Mr. Chomsky. Yes. I am in general agreement with this. I do believe

tha t the present policy t hreaten s nuclear war, and that it is wholly
irratio nal on the ground of any i nterest of any segment of American
society. My only difference is I would trace thi s irra tion ality to arou nd
1960.'
 109
WH ETH ER SOVIET UN IOX CAN DELIVER HAN OI

As to the question of whether the Soviet Union can deliver Hanoi,

which Mr. Schles inger raises, this is not a Nixo n-Kissinger invention,
and I thin k we should unde rstand how deeply rooted this is in our
policy. One of the most remarkable revelations in the Pentag on Pa ­
pers, to my mind, is th at the historia ns were able to discover only one
staff paper, of all the intelligence agencies i n a record of over two
decades, th at trea ted the North Vietnamese interest s as if they migh t
be i ndependent, as if Nort h Vietnam might be anyth ing other than
merely an agency of intern ationa l communism.
Now, the intelligence community is paid to get the facts stra igh t,
not to talk about how Ho Chi Minh is an a gent of K remlin aggression.
Yet the intelligence community, if the Pentag on Pape rs historia ns
really searched the files and this is all they could find, even the intel li­
gence community was unable to express the fact tha t North Vie tnam,
like everyone else, including the NL F, has thei r own inte rests which
are often decisive. I t was always assumed tha t somebody was con­
trol ling the North Vietnamese, it was coming from outside.
Now we are asking the Soviet Union to impose constrain ts in the
utter ly vain hope th at it can call off the Vietnamese enemy, the Viet­
namese resistance forces, and I thin k tha t again we may use the
context of heightened confron tation to carry out a heightened esca­
lation of the war in Vietnam, including, perhaps an amphibious
Marine landin g in t he north or something else which migh t be quite
intolerable to public opinion in itself but might very well be damp­
ened, in a sense, by the grea t global confron tation, the missile crisis
atmosphere, which i t ap pears the P resid ent is drivi ng tow ard.
ISSUE OF INTE RNA L SOUTH VIETNA MESE ACCOMMODATION

Now, Hen ry Kissinger in the comments quoted yesterday, assuming

again that the quotes are accurate, said tha t the only issue on which
negotiations have broken down is th e f ormati on of a coalition g overn­
ment which will then negotiate with the PR G (Provisio nal Revolu­
tionar y Government of South Vietn am). In other words, the nego­
tiation s have broken down e ntirely on the issue of whether there will
be an internal Sou th Vietnamese accommodation.
I think , assuming he is quoted correctly, tha t tha t expresses with
great clarit y the weakness of the American position, and the essence
of the American position over a 25-year period.
COM MUN IST GOVERNMENT TAKEOVER THROU GH ELECTIVE PROCESS

Senator P ercy. Mr. Ch airman, I did not h ear the answer to a very
impo rtant par t of your question, and 1 t hink it should be clarified f or
the record. A par t of the question th at you asked is whether or not
there is a policy th at our Government has adopted tha t we would
permit a Communist government to take over throu gh the elective
process, and I t hink f or the record-----
The C hairman. Any process.
Senator P ercy. And I thin k for the record, it should be clarified
tha t Dean Rusk made tha t eminently clear and this admini stratio n
 no
has made it eminently clear t hat we would accept a Communist gov­
ernme nt if it were imposed bv the elective process, but not by force.
Mr. Chomsky. If I may comment on that.
The C hairman. You may clarif y it. I myself had inter prete d it
to mean we would not accept it.
Mr. C homsky. Yes.
Senato r P ercy. Statements have been made.
Mr. Chomsky. Sta tements have been made but with some interest ­
ing conditions; namely, t ha t this victory by the Communist govern­
ment has to be within the constitutio nal framework of Vietnam, which
happens to exclude communism, and within a system of laws which
happen to rega rd certain kinds of pro-communist activiti es as a crime
punishable by death.
In fact, it is laws of tha t sort which are the legal basis for the
Phoenix progr am of assassination and “neutra lizatio n,” so-called, of
Viet Cong infra stru ctur e or political representa tives of the XLF.
Obviously, und er those laws. Dean Rusk can sav very easily tha t he
will perm it a Communist victory, namely, within a constitutional
framewor k which does not permit them to fun ction or talk even with ­
out being sentenced to death.
The Chairman. Ifow do you express it ?
Mr. S citlesinger. I n th e first place, T am doubtful as to what extent
national elections, western style elections, express the historical and
cultural processes of Vietnam. It has never seemed to me th at this is
necessarily a useful way of solving these problems unless it reflects
customs and tradi tions of the country.
In addition , looked at practic ally, the system of repression and
control which General Thieu has preserved and expanded in South
Vietnam would make any such elections as much of a farce or a
trasredy as the last election.
The C hairman. I had assumed you both agreed tha t an election
completely free of our or the present government's control, would not
be acceptable. This has been the sticking point all along. I assumed.
Perh aps i t is well that you clarified it.
C O M M U N IC A T IO N S B E T W E E N CO NG RE SS AN D EX EC U TI V E ON FO RE IG N PO LI CY

I am going to ask this last question. Do either of you thin k the

Congress can do a nythin g about this in view of the almost complete
embargo on communications between the Congress and the executive
on foreign policy, as dem onstrated as late as the day before yesterday.
Mr. S citlesinger. I think t ha t the Congress has been tre ated with
contempt over the last few weeks, not to speak over the last several
years. In my statement I acknowledged a certain sense of complicity
myself in promoting uncritical theories of a strong Presidency that
have helped shape the mood tha t led to this contempt for the Con­
gress. Senator Jav its and T had certain differences about the war powers
bill, b ut, though the exact form o f the bill had distressed me, I hoped
tha t the act of the Senate in passing tha t hill would have a chasten ing
effect upon the Executive. Yet the week afte r the Senate passed th at
bill, the Presid ent took new and drastic action without any form of
effective congressional consultation.
 Ill
Impeachm ent is a possible remedy, but i t is entire ly impracti cal at
this stage. Perh aps members of the Senate can go to the people an d
make this a n election issue. Given the techni cal obstacles to controlling
an E xecutive who does not wish to be controlle d, the only way he can
be controlle d is to make i t clear th at it is po litically fata l for him if
lie does not underta ke a degree of cooperation.
The C hairman. D o you have an y comment on th at before I yield to
Senato r Syming ton?
Mr. Chomsky. Only one thi ng, I do n ot know w hat to suggest to
Congressmen, I would not presume to do so, but I th ink whatever they
do i t should be done rapid ly and energetically. It is not only the fate
of Indoch ina th at hangs in the balance at this po int but, it seems to
me, possibly th at the thre at of nuclear war is to be tak en quite seri­
ously at th is stage. Henr y Kissinge r is a man who made his academic
repu tatio n with books in which he urged tha t we be w illing to face
the risks of Armagedd on in order to win limited conflicts, an d I be­
lieve, as I inte rpre t what is happ ening now in Government, th at is
precisely now what t he Gove rnment is doing. The urgency of th is, I do
not thi nk can be overstressed.
A PP R O PR IA T IO N S C U T O FF

Air. S chlesinger. May I add one thi ng, I think the action of the
Democratic caucus in supp orting the appr opria tions cutoff is some­
thin g th at should be pressed. Also Henry Kissinger developed theories
of nuclear war in the fifties but abandoned them or recanted in the
sixties.
Senato r J avits. I t should be bro ught out th at before the Democra tic
caucus acted this committee acted in a completely bipa rtisa n way f or
a funds cut off.
The Chairman. Senat or Symington.
TH EO R Y OF F L E X IB L E RE SP ON SE

Senator S ymington. Dr. Schlesinger, in your statem ent you say

something tha t interests me a great deal. I came into Government
before the end of World Wa r I I for a few months and have stayed
here every since. You can only at times wonder, how di d we get into
this so deeply. I often ask it of myself. I notice th at you say, “T hus
arose the counterinsu rgency mystique” and then go oil to talk about
the origin of the theory of flexible response.
Some time ago anoth er member of the White House staff of Dres­
den! Kennedy and I were t alkin g about this flexible response busi­
ness. Most of my Government experience has been in connection with
the milita ry. It seems tha t here you have hit something very im­
porta nt. I asked him about it, flexible response, an d I found he h ad
apprehensions about it also.
It seems the suggestions you have at the end of your statement
justi fy your apprehensio n, because these would not have to be sug­
gested if it was not for this new concept of flexible response. One
of the s addest thi ngs th at h as happened, to the country, in my opinion,
is the secrecy surr ound ing nuclear power. It has prevented much of the
 112
use of tha t power which would also he lp us with the prevention of
pollution and waste. I have said before tha t in a 6-day visit to Eu ­
rope with the Chairman of th e Atomic Energ y Committee, I l earned
more about the true milit ary power than in 18 years on the Armed
Services Committee and a decade on th is committee. I would ask you,
do you believe in the theory of flexible response? I t is a difficult
question, bu t after all. who is goi ng to attack th e U nited States with
some 5,700 nuclear warheads, Pola ris submarines, et cetera. Readi ng
other points you make at th e end of your s tatment, why do we have to
have t his concept of Pax Americana when anybody who a ttacked us
today knows they would be com mitting suicide?
Mr. S ciilesinger. Let me answer tha t as fran kly as I can. I was
strongly in favor of the concept of flexible response in t he fifties and
in the sixties, early sixties. It seemed to me we were in a dangerous
situati on when the only alternat ives we faced if there were a mili­
tar y challenge would be either the use of n uclear weapons o r no r e­
sponse at all. Therefore, I strong ly supporte d the new s trategy tha t
Secreta ry McNamara b rought in.
His purpose in doing so, as we all remember, was to create alter na­
tives to nuclear wa rfare in Eu rope, and that seemed to me a t the time
of t he Berlin crisis of 1961 and so on, a useful thin g to do. It seemed
to me then the more mili tary options, tha t existed, the better th e chance
of avoiding the resort to nuclear w arfare.
I thi nk that, in retrospect, the more options tha t were created the
grea ter the tempt ation to use them. Had we stuck to the more rigid
and, to my mind, less intellect ually defensible “massive re talia tion ”
strate gy we would not have diversified our forces in such a way as to
enable us easily to underta ke the Vietnam adventure. I t would not
have excluded it because as we showed at t he time of Kor ea we could,
if necessary, put, forces on the field quickly; but it was much easier
when, as in Vietnam, we ha d well diversified forces in being.
Moreover, in 1961 there was crisis in Central Europe. Today if
Will y Bra ndt can get his t reatie s throu gh the Bunde stag we may be
enterin g a period where there will be. in effect a settlement of the
terr itor ial issues raised in the Second W orld War. This, too, seems
to me to reduce the need for forces prepa red to leap in at the drop
of a hat.
I am not an expert, on the defense b udget : b ut it would seem to me-
tha t, so long as we m aintai n a nuc lear deterren t which can survive a
first strike, our need for conventional diversified forces is now much
reduced. The existence of such forces creates a tem ptation which I am
not sure is beyond our capacity to resist.
Senator Symington. Tha nk you.
Dr. Chomsky, would you comment ?
W HE RE LI M IT ED WAR S W IL L BE FOUG TIT

Mr. C homsky. Yes, I have a r ath er different a pproach to th at ques­

tion, a somewhat more skeptical one. I t hink we should ask ourselves
where those limited wars are to be fought, where is the limited re­
sponse to be exercised, where is counter-insurgency to take place. I do
not believe tha t it would be in the slightest bit realistic to assume th at
it will happe n in Berlin. A real confron tation between the great powers
 113
so f ar as I can see, would have every proba bility of escalatin g very
rapi dly to a high level nuclear confr ontation.
On the other hand, limited wars will be fough t in countries like
Vietnam.
USE OF THEORY OF FLEXI BLE RESPONSE

The technology of c ounter-insurgency will be used in Lat in Amer­

ica, and in my view, th e theory of limited war, flexible response, and
counter-insurgency, was an effort, very much like those 1 discussed
earlier, to find a way to enlist the popu lar supp ort of the American
people for the very costly effort of cr ushing indigenous movements in
the areas where the limit ed wars would be foug ht; enlistin g th eir sup­
por t by ma king it ap pear to be somehow a m atter of grea t power con­
flict which, of course, every American citizen must be very seriously
concerned with.
I do not see any way now or in 1958 at the time of the Dra per
Committee discussions, th at this whole ideology or technology had
anyth ing to do with o ur conflicts, which are quite real, with our great
power rivals. They had to do wit h our efforts to maint ain control of
weak societies, and the same is true of much of the technology th at is
being developed today, as I see it.
Consider, for example, the automated battlefield which General
Westmoreland is so h appy about and which costs billions of dollars.
Nobody believes th at the Soviet Union can be stre wn with detectors
and sensors an d tha t we can have helicopters flying over it sending
signals to central computers. Ridiculous. This is the kind of tech­
nology tha t can be used in wars agains t the weak. I thin k this is
charact eristic of th is whole system of flexible response, and, inciden tal­
ly, again the Soviet Union mirro rs us on this matter.
PRICE OF GOLD

Senator Symington. Ri ght now we are talk ing about th e political,

milit ary, economic, and moral problems incide nt to this recent escala­
tion. I noticed in this morni ng’s pa per th at t he pric e of gold was over
$54 an ounce in London. We raised the monetary price of gold from
$35 to $38, but at t he same time it must be remembered con vertabili ty
was suspended last August. Now it is c lear the $38 price is fictitious
based on the actual gold price. One expression going out of our lan­
guage is th at t he dolla r is as good as gold.
DIVERSION OF U.S. RESOURCES AND ENERGIES

If we are going to do the th ings now everybody incre asingly realizes

we must do at home so as to keep the people believing in the system,
I do no t see how we can continue to stan d t his gigant ic cost. Would
you comment?
Mr. C homsky. I thin k th at is accurate. As I said before, I am op­
posed to American imperial intervention when it succeeds or when it
fails but the fact of the matt er is th at from 1965 at least—we could
argue about the e arlier years, but at least from 1965 the intervention
seems to me lar gely irra tion al and increasing ly whollv ir ratio nal on
whatever cynical motivations one wants to accept. Weli, just consider,
 114
for example, our trad e relationsh ips with Jap an, the trad e balance
with Jap an which everyone is really upset about, and properl y so.
Th at trad e balance sh ifted in 1965. Until then we always ha d a favo r­
able trade balance with Jap an. The weakening of American capi talism
with respect to its indust rial rivals dates very precisely from thi s pe­
riod, and at this point, even e arlier, as I said, but certainly at this
poin t the war lost its rational imperial motivations, which I disap ­
proved of, and became irra tional . This is, of course, not the first time
in th e history of empire t ha t a g reat emp ire has to rn itself to pieces
by the irrati onal insistence of winning local wars and drain ing its ,
energies and its resources in doing so.
Senator S ymington. I)r . Schlesinger, would you comment?
Mr. Schlesinger. Yes, sir, I absolutely agree with you. I thin k
much of our domestic troubles, and much of our incapac ity to deal with ,
them, has been a consequence of the diversion lioth o f resources and
attenti on to what, so far as th e interests of t he Unite d States are con­
cerned, is a purely margin al and local problem on t he other side of
the world. The domestic economic consequences of Vietnam and the
interna tional economic consequences of Vietnam, horr ifyin g as is the
slaugh ter and destruction, are anothe r price this country will pay for
some time.
Senator Symington. Th ank you, Mr. Chairman.
Tha nk you, gentlemen.
The C hairman. Senato r Perc y.
C O M M EN D A TI O N OF W IT N E S S E S

Senator P ercy. Mr. Chairm an, I would like to comment first on the
quality of the hearing s we hav e h ad and the testimony. I thin k both
papers make a great contribut ion to our unde rstand ing of this prob­
lem, and certainl y I thin k the staff and the C hair i n call ing these hea r­
ings at this parti cula r ti me, not knowing how im porta nt they would
be, h ad a great deal of foresight.
W H E T H E R V IE T CO NG W ER E IN D IG E N O U S

Profes sor Chomsky, you describe the V iet Cong as indigenous. Was (
not the Viet Cong organized by people who we nt nort h afte r 1954?
Altho ugh they obviously had local sup port, was not the control ult i­
mately from Hanoi ?
Mr. Chomsky. Well, in the years up to 1959 there was no retu rn, ,
to anyone’s knowledge, of any southern regroupees. The southern
regroupees according to American intelligence, began retu rnin g in
1959. A ccording to the Penta gon Pape rs history, questionable in my
opinion, it was determined bv a meeting of the Central Committee
of the Communist Pa rty of North Vietnam in May 1959. However,
in March 1959, Pr eside nt Diem a lready said t ha t he had an Al gerian
war on his hands and, in fact, the level of insurgency was extremely
high at that, poin t. Lot me. rath er than go on with this, just simply
refe r to what is pr obablv the most ou tstand ing source on it, a recent
study by Jef frey Race, “W ar Comes to Long A n,” the most extensive
study on this matte r, which shows quite clearly th at t he insurgency
was very much in progress, an indigenous war, in 1959; tha t the south-
 115
crn regroupees then gave a good deal of substance to it as they returned
to thei r own areas and took pa rt in the insurgency, which I see no
way of objecting to frank ly, and then by 1965 t he North Vietnamese
camo in. Roughly, tha t is the picture .
IIO C II I M I N I l’s OFF ER TO U. S. OF ECO NO MIC ROLE IN VIE TN AM

Senator P ercy. I happen to concur with the conclusions t ha t Dr.

Schlesinger has come to on t he economic goals. But, Professor Chom­
sky, II o Chi Mi nh offered t he U.S. a pr ime economic role in V ietnam
1914 th rough 1964. W hy, if we were so interested in economic adv an­
tage according to you, did we n ot seize thi s o pportu nity?
Mr. Chomsky. Because it was recognized, as Dean Acheson put it
very clearly, th at IIo Chi Minh is a Communist and, theref ore, every ­
thi ng else is irreleva nt. The point is th at an outside in dustri al power
can have only a very limited, and not a very profitable, role in the
development of what is called a Communist society. Wha t is now
called communism, which in my opinion has not much to do with
trad itio nal communism, is a system o f independe nt development, mo­
bilization of the populati on, a society using its own resources for
inter nal development, not orien ting itself toward eithe r the world
marke t or toward the needs of the indust rial powers. I t hink th at was
understood and it was fo r t ha t reason th at, in a sense, ratio nally, I Io
Chi Minh’s offer was rejected.
U. S. EC ON OM IC rO LI C Y TOWARD EAS TERN EUR OPE

Senator P ercy. Here we hav e a strang e case of a Unite d States,

pre-eminent economically, supposedly obsessed by economic goals,
and yet is it not true today th at the same Neanderth al thin king prevails
and has permi tted us to get into a condition to exclude ourselves
essentially from the fastest growing markets in the world in E aster n
Europ e, where toda y we are doing $350 million worth of business, and
the rest of the western world is doing $8 billion worth of business
in th e very k ind of items tha t we are able to supply. They would like
to buy from us, but we sim ply have let politic s becloud our thin king.
Is no t this same mentality really true today ?
Mr. C homsky. Well, I would only very par tial ly agree with that . I
agree it is irrati onal from an economic point of view to refuse to
trad e with East ern Euro pe and tha t is a case, one of the cases, where
ideology overcame rationa l self-int erest.
Bu t sti ll, th e m ajor concern of any c apita list power, in my opinion,
for economic development, elsewhere will not merely be in trade , it
will be in investm ent, it will be in the possibilities of expand ing ind us­
try , even of expo rting indus try overseas. Fo r example, one of the
thing s we are d oing in A sia is expor ting American productive capac­
ity. Natu rally it will flow toward places where wages are lower and
where i ndustr ial unrest can be controlled, and so on and so forth . In ­
vestment, access to st rategi c mate rials, to raw materials, opportuniti es
for placing indu stria l capacity overseas, the uso of the labor force
overseas, all of these t hing s are very imp orta nt to an exp anding indus­
tri al power, and though tr ade is one of those many f actors it is by no
means the only one.
 116
American policy was based on the feeling tha t we could somehow
preven t the closing off of these areas in other respects, if we only
stopped tra din g with them. T hat could not have been th e case and it
is not the case but, of course, even the fullest trad e wit h, say, Easter n
Euro pe would sti ll be of only limited interest to an e xpandin g in dus­
tria l c apita list power.
LI TT LE EVI DE NCE OF ECO NOM IC CON CER N IN PE NT AG ON PA PER S

Mr. S chlesinger. Could I comment jus t briefly on a couple of these?

I will not repeat why I do not th ink tha t the economic factors played
much role or why I thin k our vital economic relat ionships are with
industr ialized and not non-indust rialized countries. I do thin k it is
interest ing in such vast volume o f paper as th e Penta gon documents
there is so l ittle evidence of economic concern. I t is necessary to pull
out of context a few statements and most of them have to do with
the situatio n of J apa n and not of Ameri can ca pitalism.
U. S. PO LIC Y IN VI ET NA M BASED ON EU RO PEA N REASO NS

I would add that , so f ar as the decisions of 1944, 1945, 1946 were

concerned, they were made by a Unite d States which was focusing on
Europe , and the real reason I thin k as to why we acquiesced in the
Briti sh-F rench imperial determin ation—the Brit ish determinatio n to
put the Fren ch back and the Frenc h determina tion to go back into
Indochin a—was because of our concern wi th the Frenc h situation in
Europe. We were pe rsuaded by th e Frenc h Government’s statements
th at the loss of Indochin a would be a grea t blow to them, th at it
would weaken them. And, given the very chancey and precario us situ ­
ation in E urop e in 1947, 1948, p artic ular ly in the year just before the
Marshal l Plan , we went along for th at reason. In other words, our
policy in Vietnam was based, in t ha t period, essentially on Euro pean
reasons rath er th an on Asian reasons.
IN IT IA TI VE S TO EX PAN D TRADE W IT II CO M MU NI ST WORLD

Senator P ercy. I presume both of you would sup port the in itiatives
being tak en now to expand trad e wi th t he C ommunist world.
Mr. Chomsky. Yes.
Mr. S chlesinger. OK by me.
U. S. PO LIC Y TOWARD CUBA

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield for a question on th at point ?

IIow do you explain the completely adama nt attitu de toward any
review of our policy tow ard Cuba? The only explanati on I see here
is the one you have been giving. I introduced a resolution and had a
hearin g on it, but the admini stratio n absolutely did not want to even
review it. They do not want us to review it. They want it to stay
exactly where it is. T his is a s trange th ing to me.
Mr. C homsky. 'Well, the Alliance for Progress was an effort to con­
tain th e “ideological expansion” of Cuba, the influence of its possible
success. I would suggest tha t if one could look in on the internal papers
 117
<j { t he a dm in ist ra tio n th ey w oul d show a d eep conc ern th at th e Ca str o
reg im e m ig ht be rev erse d.
Th e C ha irm an . I f the y s ucceed ed.
Mr . C hom sky . Ce rta in ly it w oul d be lik ely t o succeed w ith no rm al
re latio ns w ith i ts in du st ria l------
Th e C ha irm an . A nd it assum es au tom ati ca lly th at is in he re nt ly
ba d. is th a t co rre ct ?
Mr . C hom sky . I t assum es it is au tom ati ca lly b ad whe n it occu rs in
Cub a, in th e Do mi nic an Re publi c, an yw he re in th e Am eri can con ­
trol le d wo rld .
Th e C ha irm an . W hy is it no t ba d whe n it succeeds in Ru ma nia or
B ul ga ria or Ru ssia ?
Air. C hom sky . I t was con sid ere d ba d the re. In fac t, in th e ea rly
pe rio d w hen you look bac k a t 1943 and 1944------
Th e C ha irm an . I I ow do you reco ncil e t ha t wi th ou r a tti tu de to wa rd
C hi na an d Ru ssia, an d her e th e Se na to r is ta lk in g abo ut be tte r tr ad e
■which I am for . I ca nn ot un de rst an d wh y th is rea so nin g wou ld no t
ap pl y to Cub a a s well as th e o ther s.
Mr . C hom sky . W ell , I th in k so, ex cep t the ad m in ist ra tio n ha s ap ­
pa re nt ly giv en up th e lon g-h eld hop e th at Ch ina wou ld un de rg o an
in te rn al coll apse . A ft er all , th is hop e was h eld ce rta in ly by ou r St at e
D ep ar tm en t officials, it was exp ress ed to me ma ny tim es in th e lat e
six tie s, th a t Ch in a wou ld un de rgo an in te rn al col lap se an d become a
soc iety of wa rlo rd s an d, you rem emb er, peop le like Jo e Al sop in 1962
wer e pr ed ic tin g a des cen din g sp ira l wh ich wo uld lea d to th e di sin te ­
gr at io n of t he reg ime , an d on th is bas is it was assu med we sho uld do
ou r bes t to tr y to co ntr ib ute to the in ab ili ty of Ch ina to un de rta ke
in te rn al deve lopm ent.
I th in k by now th a t hop e ha s been lar ge ly lost an d ot he r so rts of
rel ati on s hav e g row n up.
Air. S chles inger . As a cig ar sm oke r I hav e lon g been fo r im ­
pr ov in g rel ati on s wi th Cub a. Mr . Ch om skv sai d he cou ld not th in k
of rev olu tio n, whi ch we did no t im me dia tel y id en tif y as Com ­
mu nis t an d did not tr y to su bv ert or pr ev en t. Th ere ha ve been, of
cou rse, some in L at in Am eri ca, t he Bo liv ian r ev olu tio n of 1952 wh ich
na tio na liz ed th e t in min es an d wh ich was e ven acce pted by a busi ness
do mi na ted ad m in ist ra tio n, th e Ei sen ho we r ad m in ist ra tio n. Ac tu all y,
whe n th e Cu ban rev olu tio n its el f too k plac e, th er e was con sid era ble
rel uct anc e on ou r p a rt t o say i t was C om mu nis t, so m uch so th a t Am ­
ba ssa do r E ar l Sm ith ha d w ri tte n a ve ry bi tt er book den ou nc ing th e
Ei sen ho we r St at e D ep ar tm en t fo r n ot r eco gnizi ng th is, as he th ou gh t,
as a C om mu nis t rev olu tio n.
I can rem em ber Ca str o com ing to Ca mb rid ge , Mass ., in 1959 an d
sp ea kin g at th e H ar var d sta diu m. He was in tro du ce d by AIcGeo rge
Bu nd y.
The. rev olu tio n i n P er u in 1966 has im pose d a ll so rts of l im ita tio ns —-
of a kin d T g en era lly s up po rt— on t he ac tiv iti es of A me ric an firms. N o
one ha s cal led th is rev olu tio n Com mu nis t, so I th in k th er e ha ve b een
a nu mb er of i nst anc es wh ere su ch rev olu tio ns ha ve not pro duced wh at
Air. Cho ms ky des crib ed as an in va ria bl e an d au tom ati c Am eri ca n
rea ctio n.
Air. C hom sky . I th in k Mr . Sc hle sin ge r m ish ea rd wh at I sa id. I d id
no t sa y we p ut d own an y rev olu tio n w hic h a pp ea re d any wh ere . AVe did
 118

no t, fo r ex am ple , p ut dow n th e C hin ese rev olu tio n, to tak e a b et te r case,

bu t I sai d a good cri terio n to de ter mi ne w ha t we do is th a t tho se ele­
me nts in ot he r societ ies wh ich are mo st ame nab le to op en ing t h a t so­
cie ty to Am eri can pe ne tra tio n are t he ones we wil l su pp or t; an d th at
was ex act ly th e case, fo r exa mpl e, in th e Bo liv ian rev olu tio n. Ei se n­
how er, qu ite in tel lig en tly on h is ass um pti on, s up po rte d t he m ost r ig ht
wi ng g ro up th a t ha d an y chan ce of po pu la r su pp or t, an d in 10 y ea rs
th a t p olic y w as su ccess ful an d-----
Mr . S ciiles inge r. H e acc epte d th e success of th e rev olu tio n.
Mr . C hom sky . W hic h was th e gr ou p th a t hea ded , th e mo st ri ght
wi ng -----
VI ET NA M PO LIC Y OF KE NN ED Y AD MI NI ST RA TIO N

Se na tor P ercy. S upp ose we ge t bac k to th e ques tion . In yo ur t es ti­

mon y you ind ica ted in a ve ry ca nd id sta teme nt th a t Vi etn am pol icy
was no t t he K enn edy ad m in is trat io n’s fine st h our. W he n t he K en ne dy
ad m in ist ra tio n too k office i n ea rly 1961, th e U. S. m ili ta ry pres enc e in
So uth V iet na m was ab ou t w ha t t he G ene va Ac cor ds allo wed , 685 m en.
an d ye t by Ma y 1961 Pr es id en t Ke nn ed y ap pro ve d th e dep loy me nt to
Vi etn am of about. 400 special forc es, th a t is tro op s, an d in iti at ed a
cov ert wa r c am pa ign ag ai ns t N or th Vie tna m.
As a mem ber of t h at ad m in ist ra tio n, an d a n i m po rtan t official wi thi n
it, can you she d any li gh t as to wh y Pr es id en t Ke nn ed y an d his top
ad vis ers th ou gh t th at th is i m po rta nt e sca lati on, sig nif ica nt esc alat ion
of U .S. in vol vem ent w as n ece ssa ry or de sira ble ?
Mr. S ciiles inge r. I can shed no li ght on it bey ond wh at ap pe ar s
in t he Pe nt ag on P ap er s. I was n ot i nvo lve d my sel f in-----
Se na to r P ercy. Fr om w ha t y ou do kno w, can you g ive me th e ba ck ­
gro un d? W ere y ou ass oci ated wi th th e ad mi ni str at io n at th a t t im e?
Mr. S cttlesinger. I w as a ssoc iate d. I was too b usy p la nn in g th e Ba y
of P igs . [L au gh ter.]
I can o nly sp ecu late th at , as t he P en ta go n P ap er s sug ges t, th ere w as
a fee lin g th at th e sit ua tio n was ge tti ng wors e an d th a t it cou ld be
stiff ene d b y t he in sert ion o f a sm all nu mb er o f A me ric an tro ops. Th ere
was a ga th er in g co un ter ins ur ge nc y my stiq ue, a pe rni cio us illu sio n
th a t influ ence d the Ke nn ed y ad mi ni str at io n. Pr es id en t Ke nn ed y was
mo stly c onc erne d du ri ng th a t pe rio d no t w ith Vi etn am b ut w ith L aos.
H e was t ry in g to rev erse t he p olic v of th e Ei sen ho we r a dm in ist ra tio n
on La os ; he was tr yi ng to br in g So uv an na Ph ou ma . whom the St ate
D ep ar tm en t reg ard ed as a Co mm unist, bac k int o th e pic tur e. Th is
ap pli es, I th in k, t o Se na to r F u lb ri g h t’s q uest ion abo ut Cu ba ; ch an g­
in g a pol icy , as we all know , is ext rem ely difficu lt, whe n th e bu rea uc ­
rac y ha s a vest ed in tere st in th e poli cy. Th e in ter na l opp osi tio n to
ch an gi ng t he poli cy on La os was ve ry inte nse. I t t ook Av ere ll H a rr i­
ma n, a ma n of con side rabl e per sisten ce, a ye ar to tu rn it b ack.
Se na to r P ercy. W hy di d th e ad m in ist ra tio n feel th ey wo uld suc ­
ceed whe n th e Fr en ch ha d fa ile d ?
Mr . S ciiles inge r. Bec ause wh en you look at th e figu res in 1961,
th er e were a t th at p oin t, acc ord ing to t he em bassy br iefi ngs in S aig on,
15,000 Vie tco ng, a nd th er e were 250,000 g ove rnm ent t roo ps. I n a s itu a­
tio n lik e th a t it was sup pos ed th a t it wou ld be ra th er easy to tea ch
th e go ve rnm en t tro op s a few tri ck s an d th ey cou ld tak e care of
them selv es.
 119

Senator P ercy. H ow did they explain, with this grea t d ispa rity of
forces, the inabi lity of the South Vietnamese to cope with the
situat ion ?
Mr. S ciilesixger. Well, they never did e xplain it because there were
differences withi n the Kennedy admin istrati on on tha t point. The
first send ing of American advisers took place in 1962, and for a time
the policy seemed to be working. Even the Communists called 1962
Diem's year. There were those like Har rima n, Roger Hilsman , and
Michael Forr esta l in the White House who were very dubious as to
* the depth of th is success and very dubious about the strateg ic h amlet
program. They felt the problem was essentially political rat her t han
militar y. But this was the year of th e Cuban missile crisis and many
other things, a nd the P entag on was handl ing Vietnam. It was a g reat
I mistake to perm it the question to be defined as a milit ary question.
DI EM regime
Senator P ercy. Can you give us an insigh t as to discussions tha t
» might have been car ried on at the time within the admini stratio n as
to the strength ens and the frag ility of the regime th at Diem had im­
posed on the country ?
Mr. Sciilesixger. Ha rrim an and Hilsman were v ery skeptical of
the s treng th of th e regime. Our general and our ambassador, General
Hark ins a nd Ambass ador Nolting , were very confident of the st rengt h
of the regime. The n ewspaper stories were fa r more accurate than the
top secret cables, and I have often believed our Vietnam policy would
be much bette r off i f duri ng the Kennedy admin istrat ion no one h ad
ever opened a top secret cable from Sa igon and instead read the New
York Times and Newsweek. I have been skeptica l every since about
Vietnam intelligence.
Senator P ercy. Can you add anyt hing to the charac ter of the pop­
ula r suppo rt or the viabil ity of the Diem regime in your own j udg ­
ment at tha t time?
Mr. Sciilesixger. I do not thin k so. I thin k I was as much in­
fluenced by Governor Har rima n and also by Ambassador Galbr aith,
who stopped over a t Saigon from time to time, and T was absolutely
r persuaded they were rig ht in th inki ng the regime had a very insecure
basis and tha t it was not democratic in any sense. However, t hat case
did not have the conclusive visible proof it required until the Bud ­
dhists riots in the spri ng of 1963. at which point it was suddenly
r recognized th at the Ha rrim an analysis was more correct tha n the
Pentago n analysis.
WH ETH ER IIIST ORIA XS WERE CALLED L’POX

Senator P ercy. We have called upon the histori ans now in hin d­
sight to give us a perspective of what went on. Preside nt Kennedy
had a gre at i nterest i n hi story and a knowledge of it. Can you tell us
from your own knowledge the inp ut th at was called upon, whether his­
torian s were called upon, to give an insight to the admin istrat ion at
tha t time when we were makin g policy decisions as to the v ery n ature
of the Aietnam situat ion—whether they had an insurgency or civil
war situation on the ir hands?
 120
Mr. Schlesinger. So f ar as I know—I do not know a bout the in­
telligence branch of the CIA b ut so fa r as I know—no sch olars were
called upon to give th eir ideas abou t it. Indeed, there were very few
courses given in American universities about V ietnam ; very few peo­
ple knew about Vie tnam; very few people ha d experience in the conn- >
try. I thin k decisions were taken in an atmosp here of inv incible ig nor­
ance compounded by the fact, as I mentioned earlier, tha t the State
Depar tment had been purg ed of those people who at least knew China
very well, and who would have served as the equivalen ts of o ur people
like Bohlen, Thompson and Har rima n with re gard to the Soviet Union. i
As I say, T thi nk th e inte llectual presumption involved in o ur V iet­
nam interventi on was extra ordin ary, and our ignorance was invin ­
cible and inexcusable.
W HE N HAVE WESTERN POWERS SUCCEEDED I N SITUAT IONS LI KE VIETNA M ?

Senator P ercy. Has there ever been a situation in your opinion,

where Weste rn powers have succeeded in meeting a s ituation similar
to tha t in Vietnam ?
Mr. S chlesinger. Well. T suppose the re have been s ituations in the
19th century before nat ionalism became crystalized an d harden ed as it
lias since become. There have been situations where a Western state has
been in a country for decades or centuries: the Portugue se are still
hangi ng on in Angola and Mozambique and have been there for a long
time. But for the Americans to come in to Vietnam, a c ountry which
they knew prac tically nothi ng about, where none of them spoke Viet­
namese, few of them even spoke Fre nch, does represen t an unusu al fief
in histo ry.
Senato r P ercy. Were the example of the British in Malaya and the
lin ks in th e Ph ilippi nes used by the Kenn edy ad minist ration at all as
examples of success, or did they feel t ha t the Vietnam situation was
entirely different ?
Mr. Schlesinger. Xo. they were, I t hink, misled by such successes.
Of course, in 1961 there was a certain analogy perhaps between Malaya
and Vietnam in the size of the forces involved, though in Malaya
there was the ethnic differentia tion which did not exist in Vietnam.
But success in the Philippin es was made possible by a combination of
milit ary action and social reform. T hat, too, was important and indeed,
as Presi dent Kennedy envisaged counter-insurgency, i t was a program
of social reform. This was un realistic because cou nter-insurgents are
not ordin arily social reformers.
Senator P ercy. Mr. Chairma n, I have a num ber of other questions
but T would like to yield to my colleagues.
The C hairman. Senat or Pell ?
Senator P ell. I than k the Senato r from Illinois for his courtesy.
COMMENDATION of w it n es s

I admire highly Professo r Schlesi nger because he has the quality of

making history simple. I think so many historian s complicate it and
there are few men like him, Toynbee and others, can make difficult
ideas lucid and one that we can follow.
 121
HISTORICAL ANALOGY TO WHE RE WE ARE TODAY

Now following up this same question of Senato r Pe rcy’s, T am

derin g if from you r broad knowledge of history, sweep of history,won­you
could give us an analogy to where we are today. I think every single
idea is rep etitious, and, as a rule, every event is repe titious—there is
very little tha t is new in the world an d very few situa tions th at have
not occurred before. I am obviously reminded of the Roman general
who on con quering C arthag e said, “We have a victory bu t it is a des­
ert .” But tha t is a milit ary comment.
I wonder if you saw any historical analogy to where we a re today
in the past cycles of history as Toynbee pointed out we are in the
19th.
Mr. S ciilesinoer. I am rath er distru stful of historical analogy
do think, though, it can be said tha t powers can develop illusions .ofI
growing streng th and over-reach themselves and get into trouble.
Then if they have any vita lity and sobriety, they learn from th at and
moderate t hei r ambitions.
I thin k the process of declination, so to speak, from being a s uper
power to being just anothe r power is a difficult one. It is one the
Briti sh had to go throu gh afte r the Second World War. It is one
countries th at lost great wars like Germany, I tal y and Jap an have tha
had
t
to go through. It is one which we must go through, more on the British
model than on the other. We must under stand tha t the pretentio ns
tha t have animat ed our foreign policy do not correspond to th e reali-
t ies of either our wisdom or o ur power, and we must d ivest ourselve s
of self-righteousness in our rhetoric and in our attit ude toward the
world.
CONTRIBU TION OF COMMITT EE

The process is pa in fu l; and I think t his committee has c ontribut

to th e criticism and reevaluation of American power and its purposeed s.
Senator P ell. I agree with you. It is our c hairman and his hearings
which really provided the backdrop aft er the abdication o f Presid ent
Johnson to make “peace1' a good word and also “appeasement,” which
was not a good word when the chairman first organized these hearings.
IIAS U.S. POLICY CHANGED WIT HO UT REALIZIN G IT ?

T am wondering if you h ave any t houg ht as to the reasons f or the

tur n in our policy th at we have not perceived in our N ation, but which
certain ly has taken place—now our empath y is automa tically extended
to those n ations who a re conservative or milita ristic and opposed to
those who are liberal, rev olution ary or civilian. I just used the a nalogy
of various aid p rogram s now where the various tax dollars are going
when we recognize a new country. I thin k we have changed o ur policy
without realizing it. I was wondering, one, whether either of you
gentlemen would agree with tha t s tatement and, two, what your view
is with regard to the correctness from the viewpoint of our nation al
interest.
Mr. C homsky. Consistent with what I said before, I do no t think
we changed our policy. I th ink we are jus t contin uing it. Fo r example ,
Senato r Church s subcommittee recently explored the situat ion in
 122
Brazil , and discovered th at our aid to Brazil shot up very rapidly
afte r the 1964 coup, “revolution” it is called there, which opened Bra­
zil to f oreign investment, which also shot up rapidly . An d as the AID
directo r testified, it was prim arily for the benefit of provi ding a f av­
orable climate for investments, that the Unit ed States spent $2 billion
in aid to protect an investment of $1.7 billion. There are many in­
stances, it is well to remember, where the Unite d States has carried
out policies like those in Vietnam but it has won. We entered Vietnam
in a serious way in the late forties. Th at was righ t af ter th e experience
of Greece where counte r-insurgency had succeeded in put ting down a
mass based indigenous movement rat her like th e Vie tnam situatio n in
many respects.
In Korea, in 1945, though th e situati on was not entirely analogous it
is close enough to be significant. When the American soldiers landed in
Korea in 1945 they found a functio ning Korean Government with
Communist partic ipatio n and much leadership as in every country
where there had been a resistance. It took 5 years to dismantle tha t gov­
ernment, to wipe out the la bor unions, to ins titute the regime of Syng-
man Rhee, which is in some ways like t hat of Diem, a righ t wing na ­
tiona list regime, not like General T hieu but like Diem. The American
policv was a success, incidentally. I t tur ned the stru ggle into a regional
conflict as was attem pted somewhat la ter in Indochina.
One could go on to list other cases where it seems to me essentially
the same policy is acting its elf out. We are try ing to protect the “open­
ness” of the society and protect these groups th at will maximally offer
us free access, using aid, counter-insurgency, every possible means that
is open to us. Sometimes we overreach as in Vietnam in 1965, where it
no lon ger seems th at we can c rush the mass force as we succeeded in
Greece.
Senator P ell. But as a rule, do you not agree i f we give the m th e
choice between givin g aid to a more conservative or more liberal gov ­
ernment at this time, we tend to give the aid to th e more conservative
government as a nation, and my point is our Government policy has
changed with out our people realizing it.
Mr. Chomsky. T do not really see that.
Senator P ell. You do not?
Mr. Chomsky. No.
Senator P ell. Greece, Brazil.
Mr. C homsky. These are countries—we would be del ighted to have
them run free elections. I do not thin k i t would make us stop sending
aid as long as thev keep the investment climate open.
Mr. Schlesinoer. May I comment on this ?
Senator P ell. Yes.
Mr. S chlesinoer. I do not th ink there is any trans cende nt necessity
tha t compels us to distinguish between rig ht and leftw ing governments
and I do not think historicall y we have done so. It mus t be remembered
duri ng the height of the cold w ar we found ourselves in a very s trin ­
gent situation w ith a lot of terr ible regimes on our side: but nonethe­
less durin g the Trum an ad minis tratio n we had the f riendl iest possible
relation s with the democratic socialist regimes of Western Europe.
Wit h t he Kennedy a dmini stratio n th e whole point of the Alliance f or
Progre ss was an effort to streng then democratic governments and
 123
parties in Lat in America. In both those cases there were stron g forces
to th e r igh t of the governments which we pr eferred . I remember pa r­
ticular ly the wailing and complaint from American business about
how the Alliance fo r Prog ress was supp ortin g people that they did no t
feel were int erested in creatin g the investment climate of which Mr.
Chomsky spoke.
So I thin k these thing s depend upon the charac ter and purposes
of t he Adm inistr ation and in the context of the times.
Senator P ell. Than k you.
MEE TING OF HISTO RIAN S TO EXA MIN E CAUSES OF COLD WAR

One final question, request for comment really, I noticed in the press
over the weekend there was a meeting of histori ans unde r your
auspices an d tha t in examining the causes of the Vietnam Wa r-----
Mr. S ciilesinger. The cold war.
Senator P ell. I am sorry, the cold war. I was wondering if you
could capsulize the opinion of that, group of scholars.
Mr. S ciilesinger. I do not thin k t here was any consensus. I t was a
group consisting of both former Government officials and historians.
A number of the histor ians were revisionists. To make a very quick
summary, I thin k tha t the revisionists had a certain impact on th e
others by makin g it necessary to see much more s ystematicall y tha n
we have in the past how the situat ion looked from the poin t o f view
of the Soviet Union. When one does t ha t it is possible t o see th at
acts which each side undertook on what it considered defensive
grounds were perceived by the other as intolera bly offensive and
threat ening , and th at it was tha t kind of misconception and mis­
perception tha t played a large role in the tran sform ing what had
been a conflict of strugg le among nations into a holy war.
On the othe r hand, I thin k the revisionist economic thesis—that,
for example, we u ndertook the cold war in order to get investment
opport unities in Eas tern Europ e—is so mething for which they pro­
vided no evidence and which was ge nerally rejected.
Senator P ell. Tha nk you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Cttatrman. Senat or from New York.
Senator J avits. Tha nk you.
IS U.S . REALLY PUL LIN G OUT OF WAR?

Mr. Sciilesinger, based upon yours and Pr ofesso r Chomsky’s knowl­

edge and views of historv , do you thin k there is anyt hing to the
theory th at the Presid ent is now engaged in some ploy on a global
basis, tha t all of this really is action for the public to digest, and
tha t behind the scenes we are re ally pullin g out o f the Vietnam W ar?
And we who feel so strong ly about his pulli ng out are prevaili ng,
althoug h we do not know it?
Mr. Sciilesinger. Well, I thin k anyt hing is possible. Tt may be
possible, as I mentioned earlier, tha t the belligerence of the speech
was a cover-up for a cave-in. I wish I could really believe that . We
will know soon enough. Tt seems a p ossibili ty: but, given the tone o f
the speech and its general continui ty with Pres ident Ni xon’s att itud e
on other occasions, it seems to me a possibility but not a p robabilit y.
S3 -6 05 — 73------ 9
 124
Senato r J avits. W hat do you thin k, Profes sor Chomsky?
Mr. Chomsky. I agree. I would be delighted if it were tru e and I
eagerly await some evidence for it but I do not see very much. In
parti cula r, K issing er’s press conference yesterday seems to me to make
it most improbable.
Senator J avits. I must say, gentlemen, th at I agree with you. I
thin k all of this is speculation which can only paralyze such action
of which we are capable. I feel, a nd I would certain ly welcome any
comment from you, tha t grea t nations cannot bluff. If they try it
they can get in terrib le trouble, do you agree with tha t ?
Mr. Schlesinger. I would agree with tha t. Wha t was i t Theodore
Roosevelt said ?—never bluff unless you are ready to shoot.
W HA T CAN CONGRESS DO?

Senator J avits. One othe r thin g I would like to ask you, as I was
not here when you may have developed it and you both know my deep
interest, of the role tha t Congress can play.
It has always seemed to me if the war powers bill were law we
would have even in this situati on a position if an extension of the
present strug gle was so grea t as to constitute a new order of hos tiliti es;
i.e., an invasion of t he no rth, for example, and t hat may st ill be. If we
had the bill on the books a very strong case could be made t ha t the
mining of Haip hong Har bor is really new, a new war, but in the
absence of this law, and considering th e fact th at climatically, as you
have said, Profes sor Schlesinger, the war powers bill does not seem
to have convinced the Pr eside nt th at he had better pay some attention
to its procedura l philosophy now even th ough it is not the law. Do
you feel tha t, and again in ligh t of historica l experience a nd prece­
dent, th at the fund cut-off route is the only route open to us, except, as
you said, an appeal to the country or in the election campaign? But
from the point of view o f the Congress, is there anyt hing else th at
either of you can see, o ther than the fund cut-off route, absent some
generic law like t he war powers bill or some a daptat ion of it?
Mr. Schlesinger. I do n ot know what happens when members of
this body are invited to the White House for a briefing.
The Chairman. They are not. [Lau ghter. ]
Mr. Schlesinger. I do no t know wh at would h appen if a deputa ­
tion of this committee of senior Senators requested a meeting of
the Pres ident and said in the most urge nt and sombre way you are
concerned about these matt ers.
The C hairman. Will the Senato r yield ? I will explain tha t remark .
The day before yesterday at the Democratic caucus the leadership
voted unanimously to i nstru ct th e m ajorit y leader to ask the relevant
chairman and ranki ng members of the committees and the minorit y
leader, Se nator Scott joined, to send a l etter requesting a meeting with
the Presiden t. Th at meeting did not take place until immediately
before the broadcast. There was absolutely no consultation, none
whatsoever.
Senato r J avits. Y ou know, if the P resid ent will not see us, no mat­
ter how eminent our delegation, we will have to find some way of
dealing with tha t, but give us your opinion as to what you see we
 125
can do, even though, as our c hairman p roperly says, perhap s we t ried
it and it has not worked but, nonetheless, the full catalog of what
you see we can do could be very valuable to us.
Mr. Chomsky. Well, look, I thin k there are a lot of things tha t
Senators can do, up to civil disobedience, for tha t matter.
president’s APPEAL for unity
I thin k the Pres ident appeale d in his speech for unity of ther
American people. Th at is necessary f or t he bluff he is tryi ng to carr y
off and inc identally , I am n ot su re i t is a bluff. I mean, 1 do n ot know
what he will do if Russian ships sta rt loading a nd unloadi ng 2 miles
away from Haip hong on the beach. I thin k you have to show him
tha t unity is not the re but there is a real commitment to stop it, and
th at kind of commitment can be shown in many ways. If tha t com­
mitment is not shown I do not thin k he is go ing to pay any atten tion
to congressional resolutions.
president’s disregard of legislation
In fac t, I was int erested to notice t ha t Ch airman Fu lbr igh t pointed
out on the floor of the Senate back on October 3rd or 4th, I think , and
Senato r Symingt on agreed, as I recall, t ha t one mig ht actually raise
the question of w hether th ere was any po int in being a Se nator of th e
United States if the Presid ent is simply going to disreg ard explici t
legislation. The context at tha t time was th e bring ing of Thai mer­
cenaries to Laos. Aft er a hea ring of the Senat e Armed Services Com­
mittee, which I found most astonishing, in which Alexis Johnso n
testified tha t the Government int erpre ted t he law l imitin g forces th ere
to local Lao forces, he in terpr eted the law as pe rmitt ing Aust ralian s,
Cambodians, Tha is, anybody the y could bri ng in. They were all local
Lao forces. I th ink it is a small incident but a reve aling one. I t means
tha t unless th ere will be some kind of demonstration, and I do not
know what kin d to suggest, a real commitment to insist upon the ob­
servance of congressional legislation, and to respond to the popular
will as reflected in Congress or, for t ha t mat ter, outside, then the coun­
try will continue to go throu gh what in a sense amounts to a series of
executive coups, rejection of popula r opinion, of congressional opinio n,
even of explicit legislation in certa in cases.
PR OP OS ITI ON TH A T 70 PE RC EN T OF CO UN TR Y BACK S PR ES ID EN T’S AC TIO N

Senat or J avits. Wh at do you say, Profess or Schlesinger, I would

like to have you answer t hat in ju st a remark, if you will, wha t do you
say to the proposit ion th at is always waved at us tha t 70 percent of the
country backs the Pres iden t’s action ?
Mr. S chlesinger. Well, I doubt very much tha t is so and even if it
is so it should not restr ain those who disagree from expressing dis­
agreement. Th ere is an aut omatic tendency when the Pr esid ent u nde r­
takes a new m ilita ry venture to rally around the flag f or a m omen t;
but my own guess is the American people a re fed up with this war.
They migh t h ave believed Pr esid ent Nixon when he said invasion of
Cambodia would have a decisive effect or when he said th at American
 126

ae ria l su pp or t fo r th e So uth Vie tna me se inv asio n of Lao s m ig ht ha ve

a de cisiv e eff ect o>r even w hen he sai d th e res um pti on of th e b om bin g of
N or th Vi etn am w ould h av e a dec isiv e e ffec t; but af te r a ti me th ey a re
bo un d to rec ogn ize the f ut il it y of e sca lati on. I th in k Kay C la pp er w as
ri ght w hen he s aid : Neve r u nd ere sti ma te t he in tell ige nce of th e A m er i­
can peo ple or ove res tim ate t he am oun t of in fo rm at io n the y hav e.
Pr es id en t Ni xon does no t com ma nd th e confid ence of th e Am eri can
peo ple in s uch a way a s to h av e hi s e ve iy vie w a uto ma tic all y acc epte d.
I th in k th e Se na tor s who ha ve s how n t hem sel ves fa r mo re ri g h t th an
th e Ex ec uti ve on th is qu esti on of Vi etn am als o h ave st ro ng con sti tue n­
cies ove r th e co un try an d ca n mak e a co un ter ve ili ng effo rt. May be a
gr ou p o f you sho uld go on tele visi on.
W HA T ELSE CAN CONGR ESS DO?

Se na to r J avits. We h ave g ott en a l it tl e aw ay fro m th e sub jec t. You

bo th ag ree th a t on e th in g mem bers can do is t o u tili ze th ei r p res tig e f or
pu bli c de cla ra tio n in one fo rm or an oth er. W ha t else can we do ? Th e
fu nd s cut- off I h av e nam ed, w ha t e lse, is t he re a ny th in g else t h a t you
can s ugg est ?
Air. C hom sky . Pe rso na lly I wo uld be str on gl y in fa vo r of a move
fo r im pe ach me nt know ing th a t it ca nn ot succeed, sim ply becaus e it
wou ld some how symb oliz e t he i nte ns ity o f t he c om mi tm ent to a voi d a
nu cle ar wa r, let us sa y, o r o th er step s th a t a re th re aten in g.
Air. S chle singe r. A la rg e vote ag ai ns t imp eac hm ent wou ld be in ­
te rp re te d as an end ors em ent of the Pr es id en t an d su pp or t of his
actio ns.
Air. C hom sky . T hat dep end s on how it is done. Le t us no t deceiv e
th e p op ul ati on of t he co un try a bo ut t he st re ng th o f a nt iw ar sen tim ent .
One sho uld be d ire ct ab out i t. Th er e is a ce rta in de gre e o f p ow er i n th e
Sen ate. I t is tr ue t h a t a st ro ng E xe cu tiv e can alw ay s fo r a ver y br ie f
per iod ra lly po pu la r su pp or t in w ha t wi ll ap pe ar to be mo me nts of
pe ril a nd d an ge r a nd so on. Bu t I th in k th e c re di bil ity of th is ad mi nis ­
tr at io n an d ea rli er ones h as s unk t o th e po in t w her e t hi s is v ery b rie f,
ve ry tra ns ito ry , an d the pow ers of th e Se nat e are pr ob ab ly gr ea te r
th an one re ali zes at this stage .
Se na to r J avits. We ll, I belie ve th e pow ers of im pe ach me nt are
pow ers that, are n ot to be uti liz ed in t he eve nt of differe nces of view on
na tio na l pol icy no m at te r how dee p. Kem emb er tha t, you ar e h ist ori an s,
an d al th ou gh we ma y dis ag ree wi th th e Pr es id en t's pol icy, it is a
dee ply hel d vi ew o f po licy by hi m.
li e is up fo r elect ion th is fal l. So I fr an kl y dou bt ver y mu ch th at
th er e is an yt hi ng to the imp eac hm ent rem edy or th a t it is even in
or de r, an d no tw ith st an di ng th e de pt h of ou r dis agr eem ent . I ju st
do no t th in k t h a t im pea chm ent is in th e b all p ar k o f A me ric an po liti ca l
lif e an d tr ad iti on . Im pe ach me nt is fo r ot he r thi ng s, hi gh cri me s and
mis dem ean ors , ty ra nn y an d so on, an d ma ny ma y define it as such,
bu t I a m so rry , I c ann ot. I s til l t hi nk , no m at te r h ow deep, i t is a very
pr of ou nd diff eren ce as to wh at ou gh t to b e t he pol icy of ou r cou ntry.
I t cou ld be gr av ely jeo pa rd izi ng t o ou r co un try , bu t th en th er e were
tho se who wa nte d to imp eac h FD R whe n he gav e th e B ri tis h the de­
str oy ers on th e same c lai m of au th or ity , so if we are go in g to jum p
 127
to impeachment every t ime we do have this basic difference, I thin k
impeachment will be held awfull y cheap.
Mr. Chomsky. I do not agree, and the reason is t ha t the presen t
acts are very different from givin g destroyers. I thin k there are very
good st rong g rounds, which Congress or someone should pursue, for
believing t ha t very serious crimes, v iolation of American and inte r­
nation al law, have been committed and continuall y are being com­
mitted. I do not see, for example, how the destruction of northe rn
Laos under the Nixon-Kis singer admin istrat ion in secret—largely
broug ht out by subcommittees of this committee—how it could be
interp reted as an ythi ng other t han a violation of trea ties to which we
are a part y o f the supreme law of the land, and I thin k th e c ontinued
escalation of the war also falls in this category.
JU ST IC E DEPAR TMENT CHOICE IN PENTAG ON PAPERS CASE

Now, un fortu natel y, take the case of the Pe ntagon Pap ers as a st rik ­
ing example. The Justi ce Depa rtmen t had a choice: it might have
gone a head, as it did, to try to prosecute the release of the papers,
or it had an altern ative, to try to investigate the possible criminal
conspiracy to engage th e coun try in an aggressive w ar th at is revealed
by the papers.
Now it is very stri kin g tha t in the case o f inform ation tha t was
released giving evidence—we can debate its sufficiency but not its
existence—but givin g some evidence of really criminal acts, th e Ju s­
tice Depar tment proceeded not to investigate and perhaps prosecute
the criminal acts, let alone termina te them, but to prosecute the release
of those fa cts to the public. This is a case where the system re ally has
failed. I mean, clea rly the Justic e D epartm ent will pro tect the inher i­
tors of policies rat her than try to prevent, to prosecute possible cri mi­
nal acts tha t were conducted by them. Here I think anoth er forum
is needed, a forum to investigate the question w hether the American
interventio n in Vietnam since 1960, certai nly since 1965, and certainl y
now is not, stric tly speaking, criminal.
HAS SYSTEM BROKEN DOWN AND FAILED?

Senator J avits. Profes sor Chomsky, I do not want to take your

wonderful mind off o ur alternati ves, but if you will allow me to just
add something to what you just said about the Pentag on Papers. Is
it not a fact in sustain ing our system th at the Depar tment is not t he
last word? Sure, you can indict, you can sue but, so long as there
are courts who will redress it, you c annot say t he system has broken
down and failed.
Mr. Chomsky. No. T am sorry, I would say t he system has broken
down and failed at this point and I do no t see t he remedy. Th e sys­
tem has broken down because of the selective prosecution. You see, the
Government may lose the case, as it lost the Ha rris bur g conspiracy
case, as it failed in its effort at prio r res trai nt of the Times, bu t it is
not prosecu ting or inv estiga ting or indicting , let alone dete rrin g those
who may be guilty of the crimes revealed in the P entago n Pa pers.
Senator J avits. There is going to be an election this fall and if the
people want another A ttorney General and ano ther appr oach they wil l
have the opport unity to do that.
 128
Mr. Chomsky. But tha t is not the way crimes are supposed to be
treat ed.
Sen ator J avits. Well-----
Mr. Chomsky. And furtherm ore, a second point in connection with
th at is not only is the Government faili ng to investigate, let alone
prosecute, the real crimes, the substantive crimes, but further more,
it is im porta nt to remember tha t th e power of the Government to in ­
dict, to subpena, to try, constitutes punishment. I know th is myself.
I have been involved with the Pent agon P apers grand jury in an effort,
so f ar successful to refuse to testi fy before t he gran d jury because I
thin k the investigation is i mproper, for the reason I just mentioned.
Well, so fa r th e courts have worked fo r me. I have been excused from
testif ying on grounds of wiret appin g and so forth. I have also been
punished. I have been punished to the tune of several thousa nd dollars
and a great deal of time and energy, and th e same thi ng was true, far
more so, of th e H arri sbu rg Seven. The Government lost, b ut the H ar ­
risbu rg Seven lost much more severely. They do not have the resources,
the ir suppor ters do not have the time, and t he same thi ng will be true
in the case of the Pe ntagon Paper s. So in two respects the system has
failed bad ly; one, failur e to prosecute substantive crimes and. two,
prosecution which appears to fail but nevertheless punishes individ ­
uals.
Senator J avits. P rofessor Chomsky, of course, th e obvious answer
to you is. “what is your system ?”
Mr. Chomsky. Well, of course. I do not have an answer to t ha t ex­
cept to say tha t here is a case where the Congress could try t o con­
struc t a different kind of for um in which the possibly criminal acts of
the Executive can in fact be investiga ted with some author ity, not
with the auth ority to prosecute—Congress does no t have th e power—
but to enlighten.
INFOR MAT ION ISSUE

Let me. just to complete this, say tha t the matt er of inform ation
which I thin k you mentioned, or Profess or Schlesinger mentioned, is
very impo rtant now. There are secret studies which do not by any
stret ch of t he imaginatio n have anyt hing to do with the n ational de­
fense, which probably would shed a g reat deal of li ght on the possible
criminal acts of the Executive and the n ature of the war. Fo r example,
there is a Band Motivation and Morale Study, sections of which actu ­
ally were in troduced by Secretar y McNamara into congressional tes­
timony back in 1966, which were very revealing. They imply , I believe,
a conscious effort to force population removal, for example. This study
is alleged to be very large, very extensive. I t deals with the attitude s
of Vietnamese peasants and defector s back in the lat e sixties. How can
tha t h ave any thing to do with nation al defense? I t could have a lot to
do with determin ing w hat went on i n th at war and why, and I thin k
probably if one looked beyond you could find many cases of thi s sort,
and somehow Congress ou ght to try to find a way to make th at kind
of informa tion public.
Senator J avits. Prof essor Chomsky, we are tr yin g to deal with the
infor mati on issue, if you have been watching the Senate’s proceedings.
Ou r own committee has been a real loader. AIv time is up but I just
 129
wanted to ask you to complete any other suggestion you have for us,
any other thi ng th at you think , any other altern ative we could have
othe r than those a lready outlined.
Mr. S ciilesinger. I do not thin k there is any gimmick.
Senat or J avits. N o, anything.
AWA KEN ING PEOPLE TO WH AT HAS BEEN GOING ON
Mr. Sciilesinger. I thin k democracy is esse ntially a process of po­
litic al education and in the end you can do thin gs only th at the
majo rity of the people are persuaded ought to be done. The com­
mittee has done an extra ordin ary job i n t hese hea rings in awakening
the people to wh at has been going on in Vietnam. I believe they ought
to do ev erythi ng they can i n the way of scatte ring around the coun­
try mak ing speeches about the situation. In the end the people have to
decide.
Senato r J avits. Profes sor Chomsky, do you wish to add anythi ng?
Mr. Chomsky. I also do n ot know a gimmick. I th ink the Sena tors
have to go to the people. They have to try to s et up forums. I thin k
a senatorial filibuster mig ht be a reasonable act, again as a symbolic
act. I t hin k one has to find methods of exp ressing a film commitment
and serving as a rall ying po int for th e p opul ar movement of opposi­
tion to the war which is unfocused, leaderless largely, and which
should have many centers of leadership , many places w ith which it
can associate. I thin k somehow tha t is the job of po litical leadership.
Now. I ju st do not know specifically what this means.
Senat or J avits. Th ank you.
Than k you, Mr. Chairman .
ACCESS TO PUBL IC MIN D
The Chairman. Ju st a comment or two. Profes sor Schlesinger,
you reminded me of this question o f access to the public mind. The
use of television as it is used now by the Presi dentia l office is an
obstacle th at is almost impossible fo r Congress to overcome. I intro ­
duced a bill on th is; it go t nowhere. B ut how can all of us, if we do
anyth ing here in our regu lar duties, compete w ith t his kind of access
to the minds of the American people when the Pres ident can go on,
as he did the other nigh t, and I suppose practi cally everyone who
has a television set sees him because it occupies th e whole spectrum.
It is a technological development which seems to me to co ntribu te to
the underm ining of the congressional power or influence or educ ating
the mind. There is h ardl y any way tha t you can compete that I know
of. Indiv idua l Senato rs can never command t ha t kind of attention.
Mr. Chomsky. Can Congress pass appro priat ions to perm it Con­
gressmen to buy time ?
The Chairman. As I say, I tried to introduce a bill but t he process
has gone so fa r tha t it is very difficult, i f not impossible, to reverse
it. There has been noth ing but a negative response to th at effort,
which was to provide some form of equal time.
I have one or two things I want to pu t into th e record, Mr. Re porter ,
and because I thi nk i t is relev ant to the questions asked by the S enator
from Illinois , I w ant to include a quote fr om th e memoirs o f Charles
 130

de Ga ull e wh ich be ars exa ctly on th is que stio n th at you were di s­

cuss ing. W e are a ll fa m ili ar w ith i t, bu t it o ug ht to be in th e rec ord —
De Ga ull e’s adv ice to Jo hn Ke nn ed y abo ut Vie tna m. I t is a ve ry
st ri ki ng thi ng , as he alw ays expre sses it in v ery ------
Mr. S chles inger . I m ig ht ad d th a t I ha ve rea d the Am eri can
mi nu tes of t h a t mee ting . I do n ot re cal l Ge ner al de Ga ull e b ein g qui te
as ex pli cit a bo ut Vi etn am a s h is own mem ory is ; I t hi nk he i mp rov ed
his mem ory of the conv ersa tion .
Th e C ha irm an . S ub sta nti ve ly or onl y as to s tyle ?
Mr. S chle singe r. Su bs tan tiv ely ; it is mu ch sh ar pe r th er e th an I
rec all it, bu t I wou ld hop e th e Se nat e Fo re ig n Re lat ion s Com mit tee
m ig ht its el f soon ge t access to th e mi nu tes of th a t me eti ng an d
check it.
Th e C ha irm an . I w ould ho pe so, too , b ut th e pro spe cts a re n ot v ery
good.
An yw ay , th is is a his tor ica l doc um ent an d it is a quo te fro m his
mem oirs.
(T he inf or m at io n r ef er re d to fo llo w s:)
Charles de Gaulle on Vietn am
(Ext ensi on of rem ark s of Hon. Andrew Jacobs, Jr., of Indi ana , in the House
of Rep resen tativ es, Monday, May 8, 1972)
Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, th e followi ng is a quot ation from Charl es de
Gaulle as it appe ared in hi s “Memoirs of H ope.”
“In South Vietnam, af te r havi ng encour aged the seizure of dic tato ria l power
by Ngo Din h Diem and has tene d th e de pa rtu re of the Frenc h advis ers, they were
beginning to ins tall the firs t elemen ts of an expe ditio nary corps und er cover of
economic aid . Joh n Kennedy gave me t o under sta nd th at the Americ an aim was
to estab lish a bulw ark aga ins t the Soviets in the Indoc hinese penin sula. But
ins tead of givin g him the appro val he want ed, I told the p res ide nt th at he was
tak ing the w rong road.
“ ‘You will find,’ I sa id to him, ‘th at int erv ent ion in th is are a will be an endless
entan gleme nt. Once a natio n h as been ar oused , no for eign power, however strong ,
can impose its will upon it. You will discov er thi s for yourselves . Fo r even if
you find local lead ers who in th ei r own int ere sts are pre par ed to obey you,
the people will not agre e to it, and indeed do not wa nt you. The ideology which
you invoke will make no difference. Indeed , in the eyes of the masses it will
become identif ied with your will to power. Th at is why the more you become in ­
volved out h ere aga ins t communism, the mo re the commun ists will app ear as the
champions of nat ion al independence, and the more supp ort they will receive, if
only from desp air. We F ren ch have had experi ence of it. You A mericans wanted
to tak e our place in Indoch ina. Now you wa nt to tak e over where we lef t off
and revive a wa r th at we brou ght to an end. I pred ict th at you will sink step by
step into a bottoml ess mil itar y and polit ical quagmire , however much you spend
in men and money. Wh at you, we and oth ers ought to do for unha ppy Asia is
not to tak e ove r the run ning of thes e st ate s ours elves, but to prov ide th em w ith the
means to escape f rom the misery a nd hum ilia tion th at, t her e a s el sewhere, are th e
causes of to ta lit ar ia n regim es. I tell you thi s in the name of th e We st.’ ”

WH Y HO CH I M IN H ’s LETTERS WERE NOT ACKNOWLEDGED

Th e C ha irm an . On e o r t wo li ttl e odd s a nd en ds I w ant ed to ask you

bef ore I y iel d a gai n.
Th ere is one g re at puz zle to me, an d yo u bo th h ave stu die d th is m at te r
an d p ar ti cu la rl y t he Pe nt ag on Pa pe rs —it has alw ays been a gr ea t m ys­
te ry to me as to wh y th e eig ht let te rs H o Chi Mi nh wr ote go t no
response wh ate ve r; no ack now led gem ent was made. I ha d no t he ard
 131
about the letters until the Pentago n Papers . Are you fam iliar with
tha t incident and do you have any explanati on of why a t tha t early
date Secretary Acheson, I assume, was completely indiffer ent to IIo ’s
pleas of assistance? You recall he would like to be treate d as we did
the Phi lippines . Can eith er of you thro w any l ight a t all on the mood
of tha t time as to why we were so indiffer ent to them?
Mr. Schlesinger. My guess is the letter s were sent over to the French
desk on the ground th at this was an inter nal problem of Fran ce;
and the people on the French desk t houg ht if we replied to them it
would be interv ention in intern al French affairs. My experience with
bureaucracy would be to think tha t is the way it went.
Mr. Chomsky. I would suggest a different reason. A fter all, there
was a period when H o Chi Minh was recognized even by France as
runni ng the government of Vietnam and there was certa inly reason
to answer his letter s; but as Dean Acheson said Ho Chi Minh was a
Communist and everything else is irrelevant.
The Chairman. He gave that as a later-----
Mr. Chomsky. In 1949, but it was t he same policy then. It didn 't
make any difference whether some political leadership was democratic,
popular, nationa list, independent, whether it was friend ly to the
United States, a nythin g, as long as i t was going to construct what we
call a Communist regime, as long as there were alternati ves which
might, exactly as the Pentago n Pape rs report, not out of c ontext but
consistently, year by ye ar, open up these are as to the western indus­
tria l societies and J apa n and help us to preserve J apa n in the western
orbit and help us to preserve the position of France, within the U.S.-
controlled global system. We were tryi ng at tha t point to make sure
tha t so-called Communist forces in Western Europ e didn ’t gain too
much asce ndancy; as l ong as tha t was the case we were not going t o
jeopardize the expansion of western power.
The C hairman. Would this same answer apply to the repor t o f the
Dixie Mission which includes, of course, the John S. Service repor t
of overtures from the Chinese Communists in 1944 which has now
been widely circulated? All of this came to the atten tion of the c hair ­
man of this committee only recently—do you think the A dminis tration
was aware of this but took the decision on the groun ds you just said?
Mr. Chomsky. Well, all we can say since the interna l records are
not available in other cases is that the decisions were taken with amaz­
ing consistency. They were taken in Greece, Korea, China, and Central
America, in Vietnam, always with the same criterion applyin g. In
• the case of the Pentagon Papers , we know i t was p retty much con­
scious ; there is enough evidence to supp ort that.
The Chairman. D o you agree?
Mr. S chlesinger. T here is no evidence to suggest th at the interests
of expandi ng American capitalism acoounted for the decisions in
Europe. There were other grou nds to oppose Sta linism.
Mr. C homsky. We were not opposing S talinism i n Greece.
Mr. S chlesinger. Ther e were grounds by western democrats.
JO H N S. SERVIC E REPOR T

The C hairman. I am curious about tha t. The Service re port of 1944

was, as you know, rath er well publicized in the Government, in t ha t
 132
he sen t it whe n th e Am bas sad or, P at ri ck H ur le y, was bac k her e. He
in fu ri at ed H ur le y, bu t I wou ld assum e th a t also so rt of ins ur es its
ha vi ng been br ou gh t to th e at te nt io n of th e Ad m in ist ra tio n.
Is yo ur an aly sis of wh y th ey did not res pond th ere , as I rec all it ,
Jo hn Ser vic e re po rte d th a t Mao m ade ve ry br oa d offers of in ves tm en t
an d so on an d assi stan ce, in du st ria l he lp an d so fo rth , an d th is, too,
wa s un ava ila ble .
Mr . C hom sky . B ut no t lik e tho se of Ch ia ng Ka i-sh ek. Th er e was
ve ry goo d rea son to oppo se St al in ism ; in fac t, I opp ose d it t he n an d
now. B ut we wer e no t oppo sin g St ali nis m i n Gr ee ce : or i n Ch ina . On
th e co nt ra ry , St al in was o ppo sed t o the Gre ek gu er rilla s an d to M ao ;
no r did we oppose St ali nis m in L at in A me ric a or elsew here. Ye t in a ll
of th ese cases t he U .S. t rie d to d est roy , an d in mo st cases succe eded in
de str oy ing , po pu la r mov eme nts wh ich th re at en ed to ex tri ca te th ei r
societ ies from th e in te rn at io na l gl obal s ystem s.
Mr . S chle singe r. Mr . Ch air m an , Mr . Cho msk y ha s ev ide nt ly fo r­
go tte n t h a t as l at e as 1947 the po lic y o f th e Am eri can G ov ern me nt w as
to e sta bli sh a co ali tio n gove rnm en t i n Ch in a betw een th e Com mu nist s
an d th e N at io na lis ts an d th a t th e mo st em ine nt liv in g Am eri can of
th at pe rio d, Ge ne ral M ars ha ll, was se nt ou t to ca rry th ro ug h th at
polic y. Th is no tio n th a t becau se of t he in ter es ts of Am eri can ca pi ta l­
ism we were em ba rke d on an eff ort to de str oy Chi nese Com mun ism
sim ply does no t acc ord wi th well kno wn hi sto ric al fac t.
Mr. C hom sky . W ell , I a m af ra id t h a t is no t tr ue . W e b eg an in 1945
to fe rr y------
Mr. S chle singe r. Y ou me an i t wa s no t tr ue ab ou t Ge ner al M ar sh all ?
Mr. C hom sky . Yes.
Mr. S chle singe r. H ow is it con sis ten t w ith yo ur prev iou s sta tem en t?
M r. C hom sky . I t is ve ry con sis ten t w ith th e gen era l the sis t h a t we
wi ll alw ays su pp or t th a t gr ou p in a soci ety, t h a t po lit ica l po ssi bil ity
in a soc iety w hic h, of cou rse, h as som e cha nce o f success a nd w ill ma ke
more easy ou r en tr y int o th e socie ty. So, in 1945, we fe rr ie d Ch ia ng ’s
tro op s all over th e plac e an d Am eri can M ari ne s an d oth ers wer e in ­
volv ed in su pp or tin g him . W he n it b ecam e obvi ous he was n ot go ing
to ob tai n th e ki nd of vi cto ry we ho ped fo r, we trie d to su pp or t th e
ki nd o f c oa liti on t h a t offere d u s ma xim al en try i nto C h in a; an d whe n
th a t fa ile d we ju st su pp or ted Ch ian g- Ka i-s he k openl y de sp ite the
po pu la r su pp or t fo r M ao irt Ch ina , wh ich was n ot p a rt o f th e S ta li n­
is t bloc at th a t time .
Th e C ha irm an . I do n’t kn ow ; th is is my own per son al cu rio sit y
an d I am no t su re th a t it pro mo tes th e re gu la r pu rp os e of th e com­
mi tte e, bu t it ha s b een a t rem end ou s puz zle to me, rea lly , h ow th is ha s
wor ked . Th er e is a ce rta in con sist enc y in yo ur th eo ry , bu t I am in ­
clin ed to t hi nk it i sn ’t q uite t h a t si m pl e; th er e ar e these ot he r hi gh ly
em oti onal m att er s. I th in k wh en you con sid er th e em otio n th a t
att en de d th e he ar in gs du ring th e M cC ar th y pe rio d, an d I do n’t
wa nt to r eh as h th at , bu t th is is a phe nom eno n t h a t I m us t s ay puz zles
me tre me nd ou sly . I do n’t un de rs ta nd it at all whe n I rea d th is. I am
sur e it seems pe cu lia r to you th a t th e Fo re ig n Re lat ion s Co mm itte e
an d its ch air ma n were so ig no ra nt of all of the se pa pe rs an d w ha t
too k pla ce her e. I ha ve of ten wo ndere d -what wo uld ha ve ha pp en ed
ha d we ha d Mr . Se rvic e as a wit nes s, as you are t hi s mo rni ng , say , in
 133
1946 or 1947. O f course, no such t hin g took place and th at knowledge
was kept closely withi n the Depa rtmen t of State so f ar as I know.
I was n ot on the committee d urin g tha t period. I certai nly was un­
aware of the re por t at tha t time.
CONCEPT OF NEUTR ALISM FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

Let me end by this question :

There was in one of yo ur state ments a reference t o ne utralism. The
committee h ad a study made by some hi storian s—some yea is ago on
the relevance of the concept of neutra lism for Southeast Asia, pa r­
ticu larly f or Indochin a.
Would neutralism, be one aspect which has a settlement? You said,
“The Pres iden t in March 1964, had warned Ambassador Lodge ‘to
knock . . . down the idea of neutr alizat ion wherever i t rears its ugly
head’ ”—tha t is a quote from, I gathe r, a Presi dentia l cable. “Neu­
tralism , as Amb assador Ta ylor noted, ‘appeare d to mean thro wing the
inter nal politica l si tuatio n open and thus invitin g Communist p arti c­
ipatio n,’ for obvious reasons an into lerable p rospect.”
Of course, ne utralism has been used often in other cases, part icu­
larly cases where great powers have come tog ether in other insoluble
situation s and this seems t o me m ight be m utually acceptable to the
Chinese and Americans and others.
Could eithe r of you comment on why is it so objectionable or
whether you thin k it is an idea th at could be usefully applie d t o the
situat ion in Vietnam ?
Mr. S ciilesinger. I have always believed t ha t neutra lizati on was
the best solution for tha t area. I t houg ht Presid ent K ennedy pursued
the correct policy in try ing to brin g about neutr alizat ion of Laos. I
wish that that policy had been extended to Vietnam.
Mr. Chomsky. Le t me jus t sav I don’t agree with your inte rpre ta­
tion of what happened in the Kennedy period. Kennedy was driv en
to the acceptance of an ea rlier R ussian pro posal f or the neutra lizati on
of Laos because o f the collapse of the efforts to suppo rt the extreme
right wing forces there.
The reason why neutralism was not accepted in Sou th V ietnam was
expressed ver y clearly, for example, by intelligence, by Ambassador
Taylor , by many others whom I have quoted. Namely; neutra lism
would mean tha t a solution would arise on the basis of political
stren gth which would mean, it was assumed, tha t the Communists
would win.
In a broade r context i t is often forgotte n, in fact, i t has almost been
kept from the public record, tha t in 1962 the National Libera tion
Fro nt proposed neutral izatio n of Sout h Vie tnam, Laos and Cambodia
as its official program.
The Chairman. When was this ?
Mr. Chomsky. 1962; tha t is the official program of the Nation al
Libera tion F ront . We may pe rhaps question whether they me ant it but
anyway it is the ir official progr am.
You will search very har d to find a record of tha t in discussions
of 1962 of these events. Yet, it was known and it was discussed, for
example, by the Frenc h experts, and, in fact, most of the people who
were close to the Vietnamese, much closer t han American intelligence
 134
or even American reporters, people like Bena rd F all, people like Jean
Claude P omonti who has lived there fo r 20 year s; people like George
Chaffard and Jean Lacouture—all of them have pointed out to the
Unite d Sta tes the separatism of the N LF and, in fact, it was expressed
in the 1962 p rogra m; and, for what it is worth, I might mention th at
Pham Van Dong repeated those words exactly to me in 1970 when I
was in Hanoi.
One may say that, they don’t mean it or something like that, bnt
th at kind of proposal has always been offered; it has been k ept secret
in the United States or it has been rejected for the reasons I have
discussed already at length.
The Chairman. This attit ude has some be aring on neu tralism, but
our very friend ly and extensive assistance to Communist countries
like Yugoslavia, Preside nt Tito—how we can accept that a nd have such
an intolerably hard line in Vietnam is a psychological puzzle th at has
always been difficult for me to deal with, and as I have al ready men­
tioned, there is Cuba.
Mr. C homsky. I thin k Acheson answered that. He said th at Titoism
was a likely outcome in Indoch ina and Acheson pointed out in one
place—I am sorry I don't have the reference in min d—that we m ight
accept th is as an absolutely last resort—if everyth ing else failed we
migh t accept a Titoi st regime—and the reasons, I believe, are the
ones I have already expressed.
C O M M E N D A T IO N OF W IT N E S S E S

The C hairman. I appreciat e very much what you gentlemen have

contribu ted to these hearings. Your papers are extra ordin arily well
done, thoug htful , and I thin k t he discussion has been very good.
I yield to the Senator from Illinois. I am going to have to leave in
a moment. I have a luncheon with the minority leader and I can’t
ignore that.
There will be inserted in the record at t his point, f rom the Congres­
sional Record of Jul y 27, 1970, an excerpt of an interview of Pre si­
dent Nixon by Mr. John Chancellor.
(The inform ation refer red to follows:)
TV I nterview With P resident Nixon of J uly 1, 1970
(Reprinted in Congressional Record, July 27.1970)
Mr. Chancellor. ..
Do you feel th at in the modern world there are situatio ns when the President
must respond agai nst the very t ight deadline or fo r reasons of s ecurity in using
American troops crossing a border wit h them when he cannot, u nder reasons you
yourself have described, consult with the Legislative Branch?
The Constitution says they declare wa r and you, sir, run it.
T he President. Another good example of course is the Cuban missile crisis.
Preside nt Kennedy had a very difficult decision there and 2 hours and a
qua rter before he ordered—and I thought with great justificatio n and great
courage—before he ordered the blockade, the use of American men t o blockade
Cuba, he told the Senate and the Congressional leaders. Now why didn’t he give
them more time ? For a very good reason he did not give them more time.
It was imperative to move soon with some surpris e and some impact or the
possibility of a nuclear confrontation might have been greater. That is one
example. I tru st we don’t have a nothe r situat ion like Cambodia, b ut I do know
tha t in the modern world, there ar e times when the Commander-in-Chief, the Pres-
 135
ident of the United States, will have to act quickly. I can assure the American
people th at this Presid ent is going to bend over backwards to consult the Senate
and consult the House whenever he feels it can be done without jeopardizing the
lives of American men.
But when it is a question of the lives of American men or the attit ude s of peo­
ple in the Senate, I am coming down har d on the side of defending the lives of
American men.
DECI SION MAKI NG PROCESS IN 19 61

Senato r P ercy. I would like to go back to 1961 to better try to under-

<• stand what happene d and what the decisionmaking processes were.
The authors of th e P entagon P ape rs concluded on the basis of Gen­
eral Taylo r's report of October 1961, th at it was the Americans who
proposed the idea to the South Vietnamese for involving American
K troops in combat.
Was this questioned or opposed by anyone in the Government at t he
time?
Mr. S chlesinger. The question of sending American troops to Viet­
nam ?
Senato r P ercy. Ri ght, and it was really the Americans who were
pressing this idea for sending troops?
Mr. S chlesinger. Yes; I read tha t in the Pentago n Papers. As I
said, I was not involved in South east Asian a ffairs and did no t remem­
ber it at th at time. I have recorded Kenn edy’s remarks to me afte r the
Taylor-Rostow repo rt in which he said, “If they were to send in Amer­
ican troops, they will come in and there will be g reat applause and
aft er 3 days will have been forgotten. It is like taking a drink and a fter
a while you have to take another .” He took more drinks, unf ortun ately,
but th at was all I can record or have recorded about his reaction.
ESTIM ATE OF LENG TH AND COST OF COM MITM ENT

Senator P ercy. After the decision was made to send forces out there,
was there any discussion that you recall w hether th is would be a long ­
term commitment, as to how’long o ur commitment w’ould be, what the
ultima te cost would be ?
Mr. Schlesinger. There was none.
Senator P ercy. H ow we saw’ the end of it ?
Mr. S chlesinger. Ind eed the impression was thi s would be a v ery
shor t commitment because of the preponderance of forces on t he side
of the Saigon Government was so great. As I say, our intelligence
« estimate was th e total number of Viet Cong at the end of 1961 was
about 15,000 and it was thou ght this w as manageable.
The Pentago n Pap ers do tell at considerable length about the Mc­
Namara plan fo r the phasin g out of American forces, a plan w hich was
developed, as I recall, at the end of 1962 and which implied to tal with­
drawal of American forces sometime in 1964, 1965. I thi nk tha t was
the estimate. It was based on i gnora nt and mistaken analysis, but it
showed tha t our original intensions were limited.
TT.S. IN TE LL IG EN CE ES TIM AT ES

Senator P ercy. We grossly miscalculated the resilience and s trengt h

of the Viet Cong and t he No rth Vietnamese sup port a decade ago, an d
 136
this appa rently lias happened again in the last few days—the South
Vietnam ambassador told me he did n’t know where all these tanks
came from. A fter all these years and th e hu ndreds of millions of do l­
lars spent on intelligence and concentrat ing our whole attentio n in
th at small area of the world, no t di rectly related to our own national
interest, why is it we still don’t have adequate intelligence about it?
Mr. S chlesinger. I n justice to t he CIA, I thin k tha t the national
intelligence estimates of the CIA, parti cula rly in the fifties, and the
estimates from the intelligence bure au of the Stat e D epartm ent in the
early sixties were not bad. I under stand tha t the CIA , for example,
according to the newspapers, only recently argued tha t the mining
of Haipho ng was not going to have miraculous effect.
On the other hand, every Presi dent is surround ed by a welter of
conflicting advice and can select the advice tha t his tem perament and
intelligence and judgme nt require, however, there is an inheren tly
distor ting process in the struc ture of government which brin gs to Pre s­
idents th e intelligence the ir subordinates wa nt th em t o h ear. There is
an extrao rdina ry capacity to reenact past folly. There is the general
comfort of the bureaucracy when it is doing the same old th ing rat her
than doin g new things.
It would seem to me in any nu mber of cases our op erational intelli ­
gence failur e was so grea t tha t it should have called for a vast up ­
heaval. When you thin k o f how many generals Lin coln went thro ugh
before he found one to win the Civil War, and when you thin k of
the way we have kept on generals o f tested mi litary imbecility in com­
mand, and then promoted them, Lincoln wouldn’t have kept those
generals two minutes. But Pr esiden ts Johnson and Nixon seem to be
imprisoned by the generals they appoi nt.
RE ACT ION OF CH IN ES E AND SOVIETS

Senato r P ercy. I assume at the National Security Council’s meeting

of 3 ho urs the o ther day a gr eat deal of deliberat ion was given to th e
thou ght of the reaction of the Chinese and the Soviets to our counte r­
actions and reactions now.
How much discussion was given at the time we sent U.S. combat
forces to South Vietnam? How much discussion was given to the im­
pact on China and the Soviet Union and the ir relations hip to us?
Mr. Schlesinger. When we sent U.S. combat un its, which was in
the sp ring of 196 5,1 was not in the Government. Our m ilitar y advisers
were sent to be a ttached to units of the ARVN. I heard of no such
discussion, but I attended Nationa l Security Council meetings only
when the y were in something I was working o n; so I never at tended
Vietnam meetings—I imagine there was some discussion but others
would know better than I.
BA CK UP SUP POR T PROVIDED NO RT H VI ET NA M

Senat or P ercy. The repo rt of the Taylor-Rostow mission concen­

trat ed on the possibilities of the infiltra tion of supplies from North
Vietnam, th e various routes an d so forth . However, was though t given
to t he backup s upport th at would be provided by Eas tern Europ e, by
the Soviet Union, by China and the various routes th at they could
 137
use—sea, rail, air—to br ing supplies in? W as there a f ull unde rstand ­
ing of the backup supp ort th at would be provided if we provided
supp ort to South Vietnam?
The Chairman. Will the Senato r yield? I jus t want t o say than k
you very much, and you continue.
Senato r P ercy. I find that at abou t this "hour it is a good time for the
Republicans t o seize control here, readin g into th e record past Repub­
lican platfo rms and so on.
The Chairman. Th at is quite all ri g h t; i t will be to our advantag e
to do tha t.
Mr. S chlesinger. I know of no discussion, b ut again someone like
McGeorge Bund y or Michael F orre stal were f ar more intima tely in­
volved in thi s a nd would know. I t mu st be remembered the appo rtion­
ment o f thi ngs was very difficult. As I said, the 15,000 Viet Cong was
the estima te; there were, of course, no regu lar Nort h Vietnamese
troops in South Vietnam until the summer of 1965, and the problem
of infiltr ation of arms and men was a very limited, minor problem.
The Tayl or-Rostow rep ort did argue the case fo r nor thern stra tegy. I
thin k th ey were absolutely wrong in thei r assumptions tha t this was
not p rima rily an i ndigenous u prisi ng which ha d been adopted for its
own purpos es by the North Vietnamese.
president Kennedy’s decision to send combat troops
Senator P ercy (pre sidin g). Presid ent Kennedy and General T aylor
were personally very close. They ha d a high rega rd fo r each other, and
yet when General Tayl or came back from his mission and recom­
mended tha t U.S. combat forces be sent, this decision was not accepted
as a recommendation by Presi dent Kennedy. When did Presi dent
Kennedy actually decide to send combat tro ops and what happened
to cause him to change h is mind ?
Mr. S chlesinger. I thin k we have to distinguish a couple of thin gs
here: Fir st, let me say personal frien dship is not necessarily a sign
of policy agreement. In the mid dle of the l ate sixties, Rober t Kennedy
and Maxwell T aylo r used to play tennis a lo t bu t they could not dis­
agree more about what ought to be done in Vietnam.
Senato r P ercy. But he did send him on a mission out there, not on
tennis or ping pong, but to assess the mili tary situation ?
Mr. Schlesinger. Yes. Kennedy sent General Tayl or because Gen­
eral Taylo r ha d been among those who had opposed in 1954 the effort
of Vice Pres ident Nixon a nd others to g et American tro ops committed
to Vietnam.
You said why did Kenn edy no t accept the recommendation to send
combat troops ?
Senator P ercy. I am more interested in why he changed his m ind
and what happene d to cause him to change his mind.
Mr. Schlesinger. Tayl or recommended two thin gs : He recommend­
ed sending mili tary advisers which would be attached to t he Vietn a­
mese Ar my and Government and he recommended se nding a combat
force. We did not send combat units unti l 1965. K ennedy did accept
the recommendation of sending advisers, so tha t his res istance was—
and contin ued—to t he notion of send ing American combat units.
 138
CON SUL TAT ION W IT H CONGRESS

Senator P ercy. Do you recall any attem pt in those days to consult

with Members of Congress on the decision to send combat troops or
on the United State s defense treaty with Vietnam ?
Mr. S chlesinger. Well. Chuck, aga in I am a defective witness be­
cause I was not involved in these things. T was involved in Lati n
American affairs and Western Europ ean affairs and could ta lk with
much more knowledge. I overheard, so to speak, when people would
talk to me occasionally about thing s that, were going on; but the
answer to that question is Tsimply don’t know.
CL A IM T H A T V IE T N A M IS T ES T OF U .S . C R ED IB IL IT Y

Senator P ercy. Ts there any foundat ion to the oft repeated claim
that Vietnam was and continues to be a real test of Unite d States
credibility of U.S. determination to stick by our commitments?
Mr. S chlesinger. I f th at was a te st, we have fail ed th at t est abomi­
nably because all we have done by all these years in Vietnam is to show
our incapacity to deal with a gu errilla movement. T th ink our persist­
ence in e rror has done far more to destroy American c redibil ity t han
withdrawal would have done. T might add this whole notion of this
kind of promiscuous test of cre dibility is wrong. The pro position t hat
if we pull out of Vietnam, other countries will expect us to pull out
from part s of the world where ou r direct and vital interests are con­
cerned is not very convincing. The idea th at, because we won’t carry
out an absurd policy in Vietnam, our adversaries will conclude tha t
we wouldn't defend Western Europe, for example, makes no sense.
By tha t argument, afte r the Soviet Union pulled its missiles out of
Cuba, we could have done any thing we wanted to in Ea stern Europe .
But it is ridiculous because you ha ve to draw a distinction between
zones of vital interest an d zones tha t don't promote interest.
No one is going to deduce from our failure to fight to the end in a
hopeless and terrib le war in a zone of no vital interest to the United
States, t ha t we will th erefore not pers ist in an area which we consider
vital to us. any more th an we would have supposed, as T say, t hat , be­
cause th e Russians pulled out of Cuba, they had lost all inter est in
Easte rn Europe. This is t he fallacy in Presid ent Nixon’s argument.
Senator P ercy. Did any allies at any time specifically raise with us
the issue as to the necessity of our suppo rting Vietnam to maintai n
our cre dibility with all o ther allies?
Mr. S chlesinger. Not to mv knowledge, but th at would have become
an issue aft er I left the Government. You know the n umber o f troops
we had in Vietnam at the end of 1963 was about 16,800. considerably
less than the number of American t roops in Korea, West Ge rmany o r
a number o f other places. P resid ent Joh nson did not mention V ietnam
in his first state of the U nion ad dress; in his second state of the Union
address in Jan uar y 1965 he gave it 100 words.
I thin k there is a dange r in readi ng back into earlie r periods the
magnitude s of the period afte r we Americanized the war. T say t his
not in defense of the Ke nnedy admini stration , because, as T have said
a number of times. I t hin k the K ennedy adm inistrat ion policy in Viet­
nam was mistaken.
 139
Senator P ercy. Professor Chomsky, just a few final questions for
you.
D E T E R M IN IN G CO UR SE OF D EV EL O PM EN T I N T H IR D WO
RLD
To w hat extent was the American insistence on having its own way
in dete rmining a course of development in the T hird Wor ld the reason
behind the Vietnam episode ?
Mr. Chomsky. I would say to an overwhelming ex tent in Vietnam
and in all the other cases I have mentioned, of course, ad ding to t ha t
the fact t ha t i t was not prim arily th e T hird W orld tha t concerned
there, but the indu stria l center of Ja pa n and the American efforts us to
insure Frenc h supp ort for our plans for Western Europe. But, of
course, it was a lways argued, and with some justice, t ha t a keystone
to th at p lan was the m aintenance of Southe ast Asia within the Am
can orbit and tha t if Indochin a was lost to the popul ar movemeri­
there this very w’ell might lead to fur the r “ideological successes,”ent to
fur the r im itation elsewhere in Sout heast Asia.
DID U .S . H A V E VI TA L IN T E R E S T I N V IE T N A M ?

Senat or P ercy. In your judgmen t, did the Unite d States have

real interest, any kind of a vital interest, in Vietnam which causedanyus
to make a commitment or is the f act of our commitment w hat created
the U.S. interes t in Vietnam—in other words, which came first, the
interest or the commitment ?
Mr. C homsky. Well. I have to hedge a littl e bit on th at because
think there were real interests tha t did lead the Unite d States intoI
Vietnam in the ear ly period.
For example, the interests described so eloquently in the National
Security Council 48 /1 tha t I read part s of, which describe the eco­
nomic and strateg ic interests of the United States in main tainin g
control of South Vietnam and Southea st Asia and J ap an and so
thin k those in terests were quite real and I thin k until about 1960on. I
one
can argue there is perhap s some real relations hip between interests
and means, althou gh it is not th e case afte r tha t. Nevertheless,
to our implementat ion of those interests. I object to it onI object moral
grounds and I would even object to i t on legal grounds.
It was legally improper. In my testimony I mentioned Nationa
Securit y Council memoranda which virtu ally refute, are almost al
parody of the laws t he executive branc h has sworn to uphold. When
people talk about our commitments and so on. I th ink our m ajor com­
mitment is to a system o f laws in which the U.N. C hart er is a center-
piece, and tha t had we simply kep t to th at we would not have pursued
whatever interests we had by forceful interventi on in the internal
affairs of someone else.

S P H E R E OF IN F L U E N C E

Senator P ercy. Lastly, in an area I wa nt to do justice to, th e sphere

of influence which Wa lter Lippm an feels t o be so impo rtan t—I did
engage in discussions with him in a seminar in Lati n Am erica : in fact,
there were brillia nt p artici pants . He had difficulty defending Vietnam
Is it likely, in your judgment, in our present state of Chinese-.

83 -6 05 — 73 ------10
 140
American re lations t hat some sort of arrangem ent is going to be made
eventually with Ch ina and tha t th e U nited States might end up with
gran ting to China the influence in an area tha t you mig ht call its
sphere of influence th at we have r eally long sought as an item ?
Mr. Chomsky. Again, I am not in the least convinced t ha t had we
left Vietnam to its own people, this would be a Chinese sphere o f in ­
fluence. On the contrary, I th ink i t is very likely tha t there would have
been a more or less Titoi st development.
VIE TN AM ESE STRON GLY A N TI -C H IN ES E ►

The Vietnamese are strongly anti-Chinese. When you vi sit Hanoi,

the first thin g they do is to take you to the Wa r Museum where t hey
show you how they defeated the Chinese th is and th at time, and so <
on and so for th. This is not for show ; tha t is very st rongly ing rai ned ;
they are s trongly independent.
If China had attempted to inte rvene in Vietnam they would be fight­
ing what we are fighting. I don’t believe-----
Senator P ercy. It is conceivable th at a Communist g overnment, a
strong one-----
Mr. Chomsky. Would be quite independent.
Senator P ercy (con tinu ing) . Might have been a bigger buffer?
Mr. C homsky. No doubt.
Senator P ercy. Strong er buffer agai nst Pek ing?
Mr. C homsky. I thin k th ere is every likelihood of th at and, in fact,
it appears in the Pentag on record as the assessment of a n umber of
people. But since the resistance-----
Senator P ercy. Our whole effort has been counterprodu ctive ac­
cordin g to t ha t theory.
CH IN ES E AGGRE SSIVENE SS

Mr. Chomsky. It has indeed been cou nterproductive according to

th at theory. We said th at we were attemp ting to contain China. I don’t
believe th at for a moment an d I migh t say t ha t to contain China is
a very simple matte r because for many reasons China has been the
least aggressive of the grea t powers. It is concerned w ith its interna l
problems. Perh aps someday in the dista nt futur e when China has
come to terms with its enormous int ernal problems, it will be an ag­
gressive sta te; but when U.S. intelligence, or t he P entago n p apers, or
histori ans try to establish tha t, they really come a cropper. For in- ■
stance, in late 1964, the Pentago n Pa pers historian says, the aggressive­
ness of Communist China seemed very ominous to the U nited States.
The one b it of evidence th at he can find is t ha t Sukarn o withdrew
Indonesia from the U.N., which led to various speculations. On those
grounds Chinese aggressiveness seemed ominous to the U nited States
and we h ad to move in to destroy Vietnam. We have to be very c are­
ful to distin guish between propag anda and facts.
TH EO RY TA UG HT AT WAR COLLEGE

Senato r P ercy. Do eith er of you happe n to know w hether the mon­

olithic theor y of Communism and world domination is still being
tau ght at the Wa r College?
 141
Mr. S chlesinger. I don’t know. I haven’t lect ured a t the Wa r Col­
lege for years.
Senato r P ercy. D o you know ?
Mr. C homsky. No.
CO MM EN DA TIO N OF W ITN ES SE S

Senat or P ercy. I want to than k both of our witnesses t oday on

behal f of the committee. We very deeply apprec iate your being here,
« the careful prep arat ion th at went into your te stimony and y our great
patience and forebearance here.
We will reconvene these hearings on the ori gin of the V ietnam W ar
tomorrow morn ing at 10 o’clock.
► Two witnesses will testi fy on the early possible war involvement in
Indoch ina—Fr an k White, OSS officer, and Abbot t Moffett, former
Stat e De partm ent official.
Than k you very much.
(Whereup on, a t 1 :20 p.m., the h earin g was adj ourned, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., Thursda y, May 11,1972.)
 CAUSES, OR IGI NS , ANI) LESS ONS OF TH E VIETN AM
WAR

T H U R S D A Y , M A Y 11 , 19 72

U n it ed S ta tes S e n a t e ,
C o m m it te e on F or eig n R el a ti o n s ,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursu ant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221,
New Senate Office Buildin g, Senat or J. W. Ful bri ght (cha irma n),
presiding.
Pres ent: Senators Ful brig ht, Jav its, and Percy.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
O P E N IN G ST A T E M E N T

Today we concentrate on a period generally overlooked in the pub ­

lic discussion of the Pentago n Pape rs or the origins of the war in
Vietnam. The roots of American involvement go deeper than the
Tonkin Gulf incident and deeper than the Kennedy or Eisenhower
commitments to South Vietnam. Because these roots reach back to
the Trum an and Roosevelt Adminis trations , i t is th at period we wish
to discuss today.
Fra nkl in Roosevelt was the first American Presid ent to pay seri­
ous attenti on to events in Fren ch Indochina . The record of his ad ­
minis tratio n clearly shows tha t he wanted Indochina to belong to
neither Jap an no r Fr ance. Duri ng the Second World W ar he pressed
our allies a nd his own Adm inistra tion to s uppo rt his proposal for an
“inter natio nal truste eship ” for the French colony, then under Ja pa ­
nese occupation. The record also shows th at neithe r his allies nor the
members of his own Admi nistra tion shared his enthusiasm for this
proposal.
When the Trum an Admi nistra tion came in to office, the State De­
partm ent quickly reversed Roosevelt’s policy and told France th at
we did not question her sovereignty over Indochina. We did this
despite the fact tha t a natio nalis t leader named Ho Chi Minh had
established a republic in August 1945, t ha t had effected control over
large areas of Vietnam above the 16th parallel. This republic ruled
North Aietnam unti l the outbreak of war between Franc e and the
Aiet Minh in December 1946. This period is relevant to American
policy because it was at this time th at we formed our opinion about
I Io Chi Minh and judged him t o be an agent of “ intern ation al Com­
munism ’ rat her t han a n ation alist leader. We formed this judgm ent
even tho ugh IIo had made a determined effort to win Amer ican sup-
 144

port both durin g and aft er the war. He said tha t he admired the
Unit ed States for its anticoloniali st policy and he s ought our diplo­
matic supp ort and economic aid. Fo r reasons th at I hope we can dis­
cover today, we ignored these overtures and supporte d the French
in thei r efforts to regain control of their colony.
BACKG ROUN D OF WI TN ES SE S

We are very fortu nate today to have as witnesses two men who
were eithe r involved in the decision-making process at the time these
events occurred or who observed the unfol ding of both our policy
and the situation in Indochina.
Mr. Fra nk M. White is a former majo r in the Office of Strate gic
Services or OSS which was the predecessor, in a sense, o f our early A
CIA, and a former repo rter for Time magazine. As an officer in the
Secret Intelligence Section of OSS, M ajor Whi te spent several months
in Hanoi in 1945 and 1946. Th ere it was his job to repo rt on the gen­
eral situation and to become acquainted with the leaders of the new
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As a repo rter for Time he has
covered not only th e more recent war in Vi etnam b ut also other post­
colonial wars around the world. He thus offers us n ot only valuable
informat ion about early postwar Indoch ina but also a unique per ­
spective on the course of events in th at troubled pa rt of the world.
Mr. Abbot Low Moffat has likewise led two distinguish ed careers.
Fo r 14 years he was a member of th e New York State Assembly and
for 17 years af ter tha t he served in the Depar tment of Stat e. He offers
the committee valuable insigh t into the period we are studyi ng be­
cause he was Ch ief of the Division of Southeas t Asian Affairs in the
Stat e Depa rtmen t from 1943 to 1947, the years when the foundation
of our cold war foreign policy was laid. Throug hout this time the
formul ation of our policy toward Frenc h Indochin a came part ly
under his supervision.
Mr. Moffat also has the distincti on of being the l ast American diplo­
mat to talk with Ho Chi Minh.
I think i t is extremely ti mely and fortu nate tha t we have two such
qualified witnesses on the origin of what I thin k is the greatest
traged y in the his tory of t his country, with the exception of our own
Civil War. While we have heard many distinguish ed scholars and
observers, I don’t know of anyone who could bring to the committee
and to the attenti on of the public a more realistic and convincing
account of the early days of the creation of Vietnam and its inde- «
pendence—and more signific antly for us, th e early days of our own
involvement. The traged y of this involvement and the trage dy of
the mistakes of a grea t people, of the United States o f America,
comes t hrou gh from the testimony of such men bette r than in any
testimony that I have heard about.
Mr. White , you have no t prepa red a formal statement but if you
would, in effect, sort of reminisce for the benefit of the committee
from y our personal experiences and observations of Mr. H o Chi Minh
and t he circumstances th at surrounde d th e bi rth of the pres ent policy
th at finds us in virtua lly a conf rontatio n with the two o ther greatest
powers in the world.
As you know, this morni ng I just heard on the radio as I came down
here an account of a very tough response by the government of Russia
 145
to the latest initia tive of our own government. It couldn’t be more
timely th an we now study how it is tha t we starte d and how this whole
matte r began.
I wonder if you could do tha t? Say a littl e about your personal
relations t here, more than I did, an d then tell us wh at you know about
the beginning of this ex traor dinar y policy th at the United Sta tes has
been following.
STATEME NT OF FRA NK M. WH ITE , FORMER MAJOR, OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC SERV ICES; FORMER REPO RTER, TIME MAGAZINE
Mr. White . Mr. Chairm an, I certainly will-----
The Chairman. Pu ll t ha t microphone in. We have a v ery inefficient
and weak system of public address here so you will have to pull it in
rat her close because the audience cannot hear you.
Mr. W hite . F irs t o f all, Mr. Chairm an, it is a grea t pleasu re to be
here and I do hope t ha t t he kind of ba ckground tha t Mr. Moffat and
I can give you will be of help to the committee.
M R . ’W H IT E ’S E X PE R IE N C E S

I would like to stat e in the first place tha t this goes back quite a long
time and one’s memory does get somewhat rusty b ut I have followed
the events in Indoch ina since tha t time f airl y closely in a r ath er pro­
fessional way.
I arriv ed at this p oint in time as an officer in OSS. I h ad been on
operations i n South east Asia.
The Chairman. W hat was this time period ? W hen d id you arriv e ?
Mr. W hite . I went t o Southeas t Asia in the first pa rt of 1943 and
1944.
The Chairman. 1944?
Mr. W hite . Yes.
The Chairman. 1943 ?
Mr. W hite . T he mission of O SS—there were a number of missions
of OSS at th at time in Southeast Asia, but I was m ainly involved in
those guerrillq operations behind Japa nese lines.
The C hairman. In N orth Vietnam?
Mr. W hite . My par ticu lar opera tions did not take me to North Viet­
nam but some of ou r other operations did. OSS did send missions in
and met Ho—this is pa rt of the record—before the Japan ese
surrendered .
My own operation s were mainly i n Burma and Tha ilan d; but ju st
aft er the bomb exploded—we had moved for ward to Rangoon which
had been cleared of Japa nese forces—and OSS wanted then to send
what we called at the time “city teams” into all those capit als of
Japane se occupied Southea st Asia because it was clear, ap paren tly, t o
our superiors in Washi ngton and elsewhere t ha t there would be no
other intelligence group sending any kind of reports t o Washi ngton
or to the S tate Depar tment or to the Dep artme nt of Defense—the War
Depart ment a t tha t time—because obviously there were as yet no State
Depar tment officers the re ; th ere were no cons ulates: nobody was th ere
represen ting U.S. interests in tha t p art of the world.
In any event we were all invited, or those of us were invited to
volunteer if we wanted to and were selected out for various cities.
 146
I volunteered and selected out for Saigon because prim arily they
wanted someone who had had professional repor ting experience and
before the war I had been a correspondent for the United Pres s; and,
secondly, they wanted people who at least, according to th eir records,
spoke French , and it app eared on my record, ra ther inaccurate ly, th at
I spoke F rench. And so T was with a team tha t went. We were pr e­
pared, actually, to paratro op into Saigon but, as a mat ter of fact,
when we flew over the field we could see the Jap anese below and they
were perfectly prep ared to permit a plane to land. So instead of j ump­
ing in, rath er cavalier fashion, we landed in rath er more orthodox
fashion.
The Chairman. What was the date of that ?
Air. W hite. This was the day after the bomb.
The Chairman. You are talk ing about th e atomic bomb here or in
Hiroshima ?
Mr. White . T am talk ing about the first one.
The C hairman. Yes.
Mr. W hite . And T can 't real ly tell you the precise day o f the month
because T have forgotten.
The Chairman. Tt, was in August of 1945 ?
Mr. W hite . Yes, it was the second or thi rd week in August some­
time.
The Chairman. Th at’s right, 1945.
Mr. White . Th at’s right.
The Chairman. And you landed in Saigon ?
Mr. W hite . Right.
The C hairman. Go ahead.
witness’ mission as liaison
Mr. W hite . Then, t o ge t more d irectly to the point where I believe
the committee’s interests lie, I stayed in Saigon on various missions
I was—we were—divided up with functions among the several offi­
cers w ithin this group. Among o ther things, T was to be liaison with
both th e F rench and the Britis h when they arrive d on the scene. The
Britis h were the occupying—were responsible for the occupation of all
Southeast Asia below the 16th parallel . A Brit ish general was the
normal commander of t his o pera tion ; Lo rd Mountb atten was the chief
commander; he delegated tha t p art of the world to a Bri tish Lt. Gen­
eral Gracev, and the French were then soon to be rep resented by Ad­
miral D’Argenlieu, and then, later , by Field Marshal LeClerc. So
my nominal role was to do the liaison between my group and those two
commands as they were fleshed out.
I should remind you tha t we got th ere very ea rly in th e game. The
Briti sh came with an initial delegation, a hal f dozen officers; the
French came and the Bri tish came on in force later.
Anyhow, at the end of October, the 1st of November, approximately,
we had noticed a t Saigon th at a numbe r of things were trans piri ng and
there was a request t ha t I be sent with a small group to Han oi, which
was a rath er complicated affair t hen because there were a lot of ju ris­
dictional problems between the two thea ters o f ope ration s; so I had to
go and clear my mission with General Mac Arthu r’s headqu arters
in the Philip pines and then late r en route to—it was t he long way
 147
around to Hanoi, but I went by Manila and then subsequently to
Shangha i.
In Shangh ai I was provided with Air F orce tran spor tatio n for me
and my group to Hanoi an d we arrive d in Hano i around the—my recol­
lection is—the middle of November.
ACCOUNT OF HA NO I

Two th ings were then in the process of happ ening : Well, perhaps,
at this junctu re, Mr. Chairma n, I had occasion t o write a dispatch
many years l ate r for publication in Life magazine and this was sent
actually from Indoch ina because I was t here as a correspondent.
The C hairman. Why do n’t you read those. I thin k-----
Mr. W hite . Would tha t be proper?
The Chairman. Certain ly.
Mr. W hite . I will tr y.
The C hairman. Th is is an account afte r you arrive d in Hano i ?
Mr. W hite . This was an account of those days in Hanoi th at I was
to write some 20 years l at er :
In December, 1945, Hanoi was a stran ge and stricken town, restive, covered
with a film of red dust raised, more often than not, by crowds of tense demon­
stra tor s moving in the streets. Most of the demonstrato rs carried streamer s
identifying them as “Viet Minh” but there was also a profusion of non-Commu-
nis t groups, less numerous and less well-organized, marching in counterdemon­
stration s. Whateve r thei r political identification, the processions invariably
headed fo r a dark red building then called “Le Palai s du Gouvernement” inside
of which lived-----
The Chairman. Please re ad t ha t a little slower so we can get it. We
don’t have copies of it, so read it so I can hea r it clearly.
Mr. White (r eadin g) :
* * * processions invariab ly headed for a dark red building then called “Le
Pala is du Gouvernement” inside of which lived a frail, lonely man named Ho
Chi Minh.
The C hairman. This was your first meeting ?
Mr. W hite . Thi s was my first meeting.
Late in 1945 Ho had proclaimed the independence of the State of Vietnam
“within the French Union.” In discussions with French represent atives i n Hanoi,
notably with Sainteny, who was Chief of the French mission, Ho was trying to
iron out precisely what the term “independence with in th e French Union” really
meant. The negotiations were not going well. For one thing, the French them­
selves dis agreed on the whole question of independence. Saiteny and his group
proposed to give Vietnam something akin to “commonwealth sta tus ” with sub­
stan tial autonomy in many fields, including i ts own army.
The arri val of the first French troops December 19th and the way they
arrive d fur the r darkened the scene. Under the Yalta agreement, Britis h troops
from the Indian Army constitu ted the Allied Occupation Force in the south
of Vietnam, below the lGth parallel. In Tonkin the Chinese had been given
the occupation assignment. The Chinese, u nder Marshal Lu Han, who was also
called t he “other Chinese Gimo,” had devoted themselves to looting the country
systematically of everyt hing of value they could find.
I was tryin g, s ir, in th is dis patch, t o p ortr ay the way Han oi looked
at tha t time. The French had not been authorized as yet to retu rn in
any str en gth ; Ho was runn ing a precario usly organized provisional
government and the Chinese were t he main occupation force at the
time, and they were bu sy looting t he country. I t was curio us to see
 148

they were ca rryin g everythi ng off from out of Hanoi on th eir backs
like ants leaving an anthill. I t was an extra ordin ary scene. Thi s was
the situati on when I arr ived at that time.
w it ne ss ’ mi ss io n

I go on in t his dispatch saying th ere had been an OSS detachment

in Hanoi bu t it had been recalled.
My mission w as to replace the Hanoi group. In the absence of any other offi­
cial Americans, my assignment was to repor t political developments in Tonkin
to the War Departmen t and to the State Department. With me were a radio
operator and a cryptographer. With our radio and “one-time p ad”—now, a one­
time pad is a system of encoding and decoding we all used t o use in the field—
we set up operations in a couple of rooms on the top floor of the Metropole
Hotel. I sent a message to Ho Chi Minh identifyin g myself and asked to be
received.
For the chronicle of what happened a fte r our a rriv al in Hanoi, via a U.S. Air
Force C-46 cargo plane from Canton—
I have t o rely on memory of many years ago. Th e d ispatches tha t
I was to send from Hano i were all sent thro ugh channels by our radi o
from the Hotel Metropole. The y went to OSS, I suppose, someplace,
then into the archives of t hat period. Unless, of course, they have been
destroyed, th ey are probably still classified. A t lea st we sent t hem all
Top Secret, encoded, but, anyway I have no way to refe r back to re­
fresh my memory on the period.
But the overall scene does remain vivid.
There were mobs in the streets. Chinese troops continued to file out of Hanoi
carryin g thei r lo ot in bullock carts, capture d Japanes e trucks and even on t heir
backs.
All the elements of a combustive explosion were there.
The Fren ch h ad been given au thori zatio n; presumably Wa shington
concurred. T was no t told but anyhow, th e Frenc h were goin g to re-
occupy, reinvest Tonkin in the month of December of th at ye ar ; and
they had assembled a flot illa of warship s headed by th e b attle cruiser
Richel ieu and they also h ad a flotilla of LS T’s; they obviously had
been American at one time but were provided by the Brit ish from
American sources origi nally.
Anyhow, the poin t to me—the functio n of my mission at th at junc­
ture was to see how thi s explosive si tuation mig ht develop.
Ho was there. The Frenc h coming b ack; there were th e Chinese.
Everybo dy was—many people were acting pre tty independe ntly of
instruct ions from the ir main capital. We were al l a long way from
instructio ns from h igher authoritie s.
Anyhow, picking up my di spa tch :
I sat in a water front cafe in Haiphong and watched the incoming heavy-
cruiser RICHELIEU, then the only ca pital ship in the French navy, lob shells
into the foothills behind t he port city. These, i t turned out later, constituted a
show of force rat her th an an atta ck but the shelling served t o heighten tensions
anothe r notch.
CON VER SATI ON W IT H HO CITI M IN H

At the epicenter of all this sat Ho Chi Minh who invited me t o call on him
shortly afte r the French lan ding a t Haiphong.
Ho received me late in the afternoon. Save fo r a doorman, he a ppeared to be
alone i n the big palace. I sat with him in the main “salon” in the fron t of the
building, both of us side by side in straight backed chairs, a small ta ble between
 149
us. We were undistur bed for the next two hours. There were no i nterruptio ns,
no secretaries, no telephone calls, no messengers. This by itsel f was strange,
given the conflict and tumu lt outside. At one ju nctu re a male servant produced
tea and left. Ho wore the trad ition al high-buttoned tunic, floppy pant s of the
same khaki material. His beard was then wispy and his manner curiously
detached. I was unprepar ed for a person so slight.
I began t he conversation, explaining th at I had come to repo rt on events th en
happening in Vietnam and to t rans mit wh atever messages he might want passed
to U.S. autho rities in Washington. I can’t remember th e conversation in detail,
of course, but the general burden of his remarks are still with me. The con­
versation began in French but he l ate r switched to English. He begged my par-
» don, saying tha t he would like to use his English which he rarely had occasion
to do. The fa ct was t ha t his English was be tter than my French.
He had no specific messages he wanted to transm it, but he said he w as glad
tha t there was inter est in th e Un ited States in w hat was tr anspi ring in this fa r­
away corner of the globe.
> Ho wondered if Americans knew how st rongly the Vietnamese people desired
independence. He went back to the history of early Chinese invasions, then
reviewed t he French occupation an d finally t he past five yea rs under the Jap a­
nese. In grea t detail he developed h is theme, the burden of which was th at no
mat ter who the occupier, the Vietnamese people had always been determined
to resist. At no junc ture in this recital did he refe r in any way to himself or
even to the Communist Party , although he was to mention the lat ter lat er on.
The second p art of t he conversation had to do with the present situat ion and
what it implied f or the futu re of the country. For a man who had spent most
of th e las t five y ears hidden in the jungles of no rthwest Tonkin with a price on
his head, he passed over the Japan ese invasion of recent history with littl e
comment.
Ho talked at grea ter length about the Chinese who were still streaming out
of the city. The hards hip and destruction they had caused in thei r relatively
brief s tay br ought him, i t seemed to me, very close to tears, especially the ir bru tal
trea tmen t of Vietnamese women.
But wliat Ho really wanted to talk about wasn' t the pas t but his country’s
prospects f or the future. He re ferred to the past mainly to underscore the resil­
iency and determin ation of the people. Having made his case f or the will of the
Vietnamese to be independent, he then began to discuss what they would need
to realize a bette r future . It was mainly in this context th at he mentioned France,
the Soviet Union—and, la ter th e United States, in tha t order.
As for France, Ho sa id tha t in many ways the French had been helpful to the
country and tha t a special “sympatliie” existed between the French and “our
people.” He continued by saying t ha t he felt tha t many French recognized finally
tha t time s had changed and tha t t he t radi tiona l colonial form of rule had to end.
He believed tha t men like Sai nteny and others understood this and were p repared
to cede re al independence to Vietnam over a period of years. However, he could
not be sure. He could not be ce rtain th at the arrangem ents he was rea ching with
French represent atives in Hanoi would be honored either in Saigon or in Paris.
Only time would tell that. Nor, he continued, could he be sure th at many of h is
own people would be willing to tru st the French or abide t he delays th at might
occur in the negotiations.
• He asked me if I had seen the crowds in the streets. When I said t ha t I had but
was not sure what they meant, he replied, “For many of ou r people, patience has
come to an end.”
IIO C H I M IN H ’s CONV ERSAT ION
He then brought up the Soviet Union. It was only at this junc ture tha t he
mentioned any thing about himself personally. He referre d to his young days as
an “id ealist ” and his resultin g trou bles with French police. He mentioned t ha t a
sister had been maltr eated and imprisoned in th e Pen al Colony a t Poulo Condor.
Tha t is the one where the cages were to appea r in more recent
times—as a result of her activ ity and his.
Eventually he ha d gone to the Soviet Union, he said, and s tudied the teaching
of Marx and Lenin. He did not dwell on this much except to say th at he believed
tha t revolution had benefited the Russian people and tha t he had become a be­
liever in Communism. But he went on to say tha t he did not believe t ha t the
 150

Soviet Union eith er could or would make any kind of a real con trib utio n to
build ing of wh at he called a new Vietnam .
And let. me make an aside here, not from my notes, bu t I do also
recall at tha t time th at one of the peculia rities of Ho was his enormous
curiosity. He wanted to be told abou t everythi ng and thi s was not only
a tr ai t th at I found myself in tal kin g to him bu t I ha d a colleague in
the British intelligence there at the time, well known, Colonel T revor
Wilson, who stayed on in Hanoi for many, many years both under
cover and above groun d; and he, also—I have seen him since in the last
several years and he had tha t same recollection t ha t Ho was always
deeply curious as to what was going on. H o knew, fo r e xample, th at
there had been la rge destruction by the German invasion of Russia.
He knew th at the re had been some reconstruction but he had no idea—
he asked me wh at went on in 'Stal ingrad. Of course. I had not seen
Stali ngra d either but I had seen more recent newspapers and I had
read them and T could give him more of an account than he had, since
he had been so isolated. You have no idea wh at li ving five years in a
jungle in a remote northwestern corner is.
H O C H I M I N I l ’s CO RR ES PO ND EN CE W IT H G A N D H I AN D N E H R U

He was most destitute of knowledge, and dur ing thi s period. I learned
from his conversations but also from my British colleague friend,
tha t he engaged in long correspondence with Gandhi and Nehru;
people he would just write out of the blue and ask them for thei r
views of wha t was going on and they responded to him. So th ere was
a voluminous amount of what must be fascinatin g correspondence,
someplace, of all thi s correspondence, (Ho) trv ing to recover from his
ignorance of what was going on in th e world.
Vie t n a m ’s n e e d fo r in v e s t m e n t s o f m o n e y a n d m a c h in e s

It was in thi s con text th at he asked me if I had seen any of the Vietnam ese
coun trysid e. I co nfessed I had seen hut l itt le of the south and none of the north.
Then he wen t into a length y desc riptio n of the economy of the count ry, par tic u­
lar ly stre ssin g its dependence on rice. W ha t we really need, he said, is larg e in­
vest men ts of money an d machines, at f irst to rep air an d improv e o ur dike system
and then lat er, when we ar e s elf-sufficient in food, the means to ma ke u s a nw lem
count ry in the ind ustr ial sense. Then he asked me if I tho ugh t the Rus sian s at
pre sen t could make such a cont ribut ion. I said I was not in any positio n to
know.
Then he answ ered his own questi on by descr ibing his und ers tan din g of the
dest ruct ion th at the wa r had caused in the Soviet Union, and concluded tha t
the Rus sian s would have th ei r han ds ful l for the n ext decade in rebu ildin g thei r
own coun try.
The Uni ted State s, Ho said, was proba bly in the b est positio n to aid Vietnam
in the pos tw ar years. He said th at we h ad emerged from the w ar wit h enormous
power and pres tige in the world. He also mention ed th at America was a Pacific
power and the refo re would logically have a pa rti cu lar int ere st in the area . He
also dwelled a t some leng th on the disp ositi on of Americ ans as a people to be
sym path etic to self-d eterm inati on of na tio ns and genero us in mak ing con trib u­
tion s to less fo rtu na te stat es. Bu t here aga in he doubted th at the United Stat es
Govern ment could he counted on to come to the aid of Viet nam—in a massiv e way.
He said he fel t th at the U.S. Govern ment would find more urge nt thing s to do.
He said somet hing to the effect tha t, af te r all. Vietnam is a small cou ntry and
fa r away. Vietn am could not be expected to loom l arg e in the preoc cupa tions of
the U nited State s.
[Laug hter.]
 Mr. W hite [Readin g] :
In short, he was sayi ng th at he hoped America would int ere st its elf in Vietnam
hut he d idn ’t believe, in th e fin al an alysi s, we would.
It was qui te da rk when I lef t the palace. He had given me no specific messages
or requ ests to tran sm it. I ret urn ed to the Metropole. We had made no firm p lans
to m eet a gain .
RE CE PT IO N GIV EN BY HO I N PAL ACE
Thu s it came as a sur pri se to receive a message from Ho ju st a few moments
af te r ret urn ing to th e hotel. The message said th at he reg rett ed the s ho rt notice,
hu t would I car e to come to a recepti on he was givin g th at same evenin g at the
Pal ace ? The inv itat ion sounded qui te casu al and extem poraneo us, hut I changed
unif orm s a nd was back a t the pa lace by 7 :00 p.m. I t tur ned o ut to he an e xtr ao r­
din ary evening.
Ther e w ere thr ee oth er gues ts w ith Ho wh en I was ushe red into the sam e sa lon
we’d met in t ha t a fter noo n before .
All th ree w ere Vietnam ese. Two w ere e lderl y men in ma nda rin robes a nd head-
pieces. The t hi rd was much yo unger. He wo re wh ite s hor ts a nd an open neck w hite
shi rt. The la tt er was intr oduced to me a s “The Prov ision al Min ister of Nati onal
Defens e.” He was Nguyen Van Giap—the genera l. At th at time the name held
lit tle significance, nor could I engage him in much conv ersat ion eit he r in Fren ch
or English . The two elde rs tur ne d out to be prov ision al min iste rs also—of educ a­
tion a nd cu ltu ral a ffair s, or some such. At the ti me I f elt t ha t I was simply being
given an opp ortu nity to meet some of Ho’s ofiicial fa mil y infor mall y. Rose wine
was served.
Then sudden ly oth er gues ts b egan arr ivin g. Thro ugh the double doo rs of th e big
room bu rst Gene ral LeClerc gripp ing his wh ite malaco n cane, followed by Gen­
era ls Valluy and Sala n, Sain teny and finally Colonel Mirma nbeau , LeClerc ’s
Chief of Staff. T his w as th e fi rst te am—
As I expl ained e arlier, as I was a liaison officer, I knew al l of them
well—
Although my assoc iatio n wit h LeClerc had alwa ys been cordia l, the Fre nch
neve r concealed th eir irr ita tio n and di str us t of OSS.
LeClerc was v isibly dis tressed to see me there. He had no ide a t ha t
Americans were there , and it is not mentioned in this par ticu lar dis­
patch because i t wasn’t perti nent bu t General LeClerc ha d been very
unhap py with the activities of the Frenc h OSS unit in the south of
the border as well as those in the north.
The Chairman. You mean the Americans ?
Mr. W hite . Yes, sir ; I am sorry.
The C hairman. The A merican OSS?
Mr. W hite . Yes, our activities.
The C ttatrman. Yes.
Mr. W hite . And indeed the first detachment commander in the
south was a young American colonel called Pet er Dewey, and the
French ha d succeeded, in ways t hat were never explained to us, in ef ­
fecting Colonel Dewey's recall, and indeed it was ironic and rath er
tragi c th at Colonel Dewey was assassinated in Saigon the nigh t before
he was to have been rec alled; and it was r ath er unclear to all of us
there at the time who did th e assassination. I persona lly saw the assas­
sination h appen because it happened very close to where we were stay­
ing and T could actual ly see the people shooti ng the guns at him. so it
could be determined w hether it was a native Annamite, non-Caucasian,
if you will, but who ordered the assassination was never cle ar; but it
was clear tha t the French were very pleased to have Dewey recalled.
Next in order of arriv al came the Field Commander o f Lu Han 's
Chinese army and his Chief of Staff. The greetings exchanged on all
 152
sides were glacial and, finally, repre senting th e Br itis h Commander in-
Indochin a, came Lt. Colonel Trevo r Wilson, the Chief of Ml -5 in
Hanoi, the one whom I r eferr ed to earlier.
ANECDOTE REGARD ING DI NN ER

We did not make a cozy group. When din ner was announced, I wasn’t prepared
for tha t either. At first I wasn’t su re t hat I was invited for dinner. Ho’s note to
me had only mentioned a “reception.” Befitting my relatively modest rank of
Major, obviously among four-st ar generals and above, I held back until all the
others had found their places at the dinner table and were seated. If there
hadn’t been an empty chair I was prepared to slink away but th ere was an empty
chair and it was next to Ho’s place, and I could see tha t there was an invitati on
and the inv itation c arried my name.
The dinner was a horror. The French confined themselves to the bares t mini­
mum of conversation and scarcely spoke to the Chinese. For their part, the
Chinese got drunk,—really wildly drunk, and at one point Ho spoke to me
very quietly and I turned to him and I said, “I think, Monsieur Le President
there is some resentment over the seating arrange ment.” I meant my place, of
course, next to him as the seat of honor. “I can see th at, ” said Ho, “but who else
would I have to ta lk to?" he replied.
I think it was a r ath er te lling anecdote. I hope so, because he did at
tha t point in time, give the whole impression of a man very much iso­
lated, very much defensive and very much on the reserve.
I saw Ho Chi Minh several other times in the course of the weeks I stayed
on in Hanoi but none of these encounters were terribly memorable.
HO' S LEAVING FOR PARIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS W IT H FREN CH GOVERNMENT
There were plenty of developments to report to Washington including Ho’s
decision to go to Paris to finish his negotiations with the French government.
And then, of course, in March—tha t was the conclusion of this
dispatch tha t I was to write for Life —Ho did go and I will leave
to others who r eported to this committee ear lier on w hat trans pired
in Paris.
My own tour was finished there. Ho left. When I last saw him before
he left for Par is and his discussions, he was hopeful but not part ic­
ularly confident tha t they were going to work out. He felt, as he
originally suggested to me, tha t extremists on both sides, his own as
well as French public opinion, would make it very difficult for him
to come to a meaningful agreement in achieving a real measure of
independence for his cou ntry.
Obviously, he was more tlian propheti c in some of the thing s he said.
Then I return ed to Saigon and stayed on in the theate r somewhat
longer on other missions, and then came home.
WITN ESS IN VIETN AM BEFORE, DURING TET OFFENSIVE

It is maybe pertine nt to the testimony tha t I can provide for the

committee tha t after this period I had one other occasion to spend a
substanti al amount of time in Vietnam, and tha t was durin g the Tet
offensive or jus t before the Tet offensive in 1967 and 1968.1 was a cor­
respondent at tha t junctu re for Time and Life magazines; and
then from the period ma inly fr om 1948 to 1950 I was on the Par is staff
of Time magazine and Life magazine, and then in 1954 at the time
 153
of tlie Peace Conference in Geneva I ret urned to Pari s a nd was, fr om
then un til the mi ddle or the first p art of the 1960’s, I was Pa ris Bureau
Chief of the two magazines and, of course, one of the prin cipal stories
we had at th at time was the F rench aspect of th e Vietnam story ; and
also I had occasion to watch the dissolution of the Fren ch colonial
empire elsewhere, most nota bly in North A frica, and I did cover the
Frenc h depa rture from such countries as Tunisia, Morocco and Al­
geria and a good deal of th e Frenc h bl ack empire or black Africa .
PARALLELS BETWEE N WITHDRAW AL EFFORTS

If the chairm an will f orgive me. I ca n't he lp but be stru ck by some

paralle ls between t he U.S. efforts t o w ithdraw from Vietnam and the
problems of the Fren ch withdra wal from North A frica. So many of
the argumen ts it seemed pe rta ine d; I have th at s ort of deja vu feeling
th at I have been thro ugh some of this before because we heard so
many of these a rguments in t he p ast from m any sim ilar qu arters th at
we now hear in this country, about our partic ipatio n in Vietnam.
One of those is the one that you have heard most often fr om Fr ench
governments—was the one about our credulity —“Will anybody ever
listen to Fran ce if we withd raw from—” the most drama tic one, of
course, was Alg eria, but also from Morocco and Tu nisia be fore th at—
“Wh at will Fran ce’s word be wo rth? ”
Anoth er popu lar argum ent at the time wa s: “We are l etti ng down
our allies, our American friend s.” Very many Frenc h leaders would
arg ue : “O ur America n fri ends would be let down because we are hold­
ing on for strate gic reasons in North Afr ica : The naval bases in
Morocco and Tunis ia.”
There was anoth er a rgumen t th at the F rench leadership used to use
again st depa rting from the ir colonies. T his one was or would be the
economic one t ha t we heard some of yesterday. I was privilege d to
listen to some of the testimony yesterday, the argum ent th at these
colonies in No rth A frica were essential, vital to Frenc h nati onal inte r­
ests, economically as well as strategicall y and politically .
The four th and very princip al argument , was the mili tary one,
somewhat associated with the prestige one, but the one tha t goes:
So many of our sons have fou ght here and died here, and to leave aft er
this would be a d isgrace to France, dishonor to our sons”—argumen ts
you hear, obviously, passionately in this cou ntry now.
BLOOD BATH ARGUMENT

Anothe r one th at was st rongly argued and at least I seem to hea r

reverberatio ns in America now, is th e one, is the economic one I was
allud ing to and it is also the one th at goes f amil iarly into the nig ht
of the long knives.
The Chairman. Blood bath?
Mr. W hite . Pardo n?
The Chairman. Blood bath?
Mr. W hite . Blood bath is the phrase.
The Chairman. Th at is what tbev called it.
Mr. W hite . It was ar gued if the Frenc h were to leave any one of
those places from Vietnam down thr ough Tunisia, Morocco, Alger ia,
 154

th a t ou r fri en ds , i.e., th e reg ime s th a t the Fr en ch h ad pu t in pla ce—

th ey used to arg ue the y wer e du ly elec ted— fre qu en tly some ki nd of
an elec toral proc ess ha d been gone th ro ug h— bu t no t ma ny of us
ki dd ed ours elve s t h at th ey w ere re all y b ona fide dem ocr ati cal ly elec ted
in ou r sense of th e wo rd, bu t in any eve nt, how eve r, th ey wer e or
or how the y go t the re, to de pa rt an d leav e th er e was tan ta m ou nt to
con dem nin g th em to de ath .
I th in k th at th e mem bers of the com mit tee wo uld hav e to be ha rd
pre sse d not to figu re ou t wh ate ve r ha pp en ed to all tho se peop le.
Yo u kno w th er e wa sn’t all th at big a bloo d ba th . In th e case of
Vi etn am b efo re, a few mi nis ter s, a few Fr en ch c re atu re s lik e Ba o Da i
su dd en ly fou nd it muc h mo re he alt hy to liv e in vi lla s on th e Fr en ch
Ri vi er a th an to s tay whe re th ey were , but. they ha d vi lla s on th e R iv ie ra
any how , mos t of them . So th e notio n th a t whe n th e Fr en ch prese nce,
as th e Fr en ch like t o use th e wo rd, de pa rte d fro m an y of the se place s
th a t the Fr en ch cr ed ul ity wou ld be att ac ke d, Fr en ch wo rd in in te r­
na tio na l circl es wou ld lose forc e an d au th or ity , th a t th e econo my
wo uld be wre cked , th at peop le wou ld be kil led —non e of the se th in gs ,
in fac t, in my opi nio n, cam e to pass.
To be sure , ma ny Fr en ch gr av ey ar ds co nta in th e bod ies of yo un g
Fr en ch me n, br av e yo un g Fr en ch me n, who die d in Vi etn am an d th at
is t o be de pl or ed : bu t t he n oti on th at?—well , le t me pu t it an ot he r w a y :
Th e Fr en ch fr an c at th at tim e du ring th is pe rio d of th e 1940’s, ea rly
1950’s, the Fr en ch fr an c wa s ab ou t 600 to the do lla r in the blac k m ark et,
if my rec olle ctio n is cor rec t. I conf ess to ha vi ng exc han ged some
do lla rs in tho se da ys at th a t pric e. Th e Fr en ch fr an c is ver y st ro ng —
4 to 1 to t he do lla r—4 to 1, a nd s tre ng th en in g eve ry day , so in ter ms
of wh at it di d to th e Fr en ch econo my an d w ha t it did to t he Fr en ch
voice, I t hi nk i t i s h ea rd as lo ud ly in t he w or ld as it w as b efo re, be for e
Al ge ria , bef ore lea vin g In do ch in a.
DANGE ROUS TO DRAW TOO M AN Y PAR ALL ELS

I th in k it is alw ays da ng ero us to dr aw too ma ny pa ral lel s. As a

pro fes sio nal co rre sp on de nt, I a m not i n t he p ar al le l-d ra w in g b usine ss,
bu t T do th in k it is wo rth no tin g, to th e peo ple whos e con cern th is
who le aff air is, some of t hos e th in gs t h a t wer e di re ct ly pr ed ict ed a nd
as rel ate d, re fe rr ed to in th is pr ese nt con tex t, a t least, in th e case of
th e F re nc h in In do ch in a an d t he F re nc h i n N or th A fr ic a, tho se t hi ng s
su bs tant ially di d no t tra ns pi re .
I th in k I wo uld lik e to lea ve it th er e, bu t I wou ld in vi te th e
Ch ai r to ask me any que stio ns in are as th a t he feel s I can be of an y
en lig hte nm en t.
(T ak e 1 an d tak e 2 o f F ra n k W hi te ’s di sp atch o f Ja nuar y 22, 1968,
fo llo w :)
Saigon, January 22, 1968.
To: Lang for Farmer, New York.
Fro m: Fran k White, Saigon.
Tn December 1945, Hanoi was a strange and stricken town, restive, covered
with a film of red dust raised, more often than not, by crowds of tense demon­
stra tors moving in the streets. Most of the demonstrato rs carried streame rs
identifying them a s “Viet Minh” but t here wa s also a profusion of non-Communist
groups, less numerous and less well organized, marching in counter demonstra­
tions. Whatever thei r political identification, the processions in variably headed
 155
for a dark red building then called “Le Pala is Du Gouvernement” inside of which
lived a frai l lonely man named Ho Chi Minh.
Late in 1945 Ho had proclaimed the independence of the sta te of Vietnam
“within the French union.” In discussions with French represent atives in Hanoi,
notably with Sainteny, who was chief of the French mission, Ho was tryin g to
iron out precisely what the term “independence within the French union” rea lly
me ant The negotiations were not going well. For one thing, the French them­
selves disagreed on th e whole question of indei>endence. Sainteny a nd his group
proposed to give Vietnam something ak in to “commonwealth sta tus ” with sub­
stan tial autonomy in many fields, including its own army.
The arri val of the first French troops Dec. 19th, and the way they arrived
fur the r darkened the scene. Under the Yalta Agreement, B ritish troops from the
India n Army c onstituted the Allied Occupation Force in the south of Vietnam,
below the 16th parallel. In Tonkin the Chinese had been given the occupation
assign ment The Chinese under Marshall Lu Han (the “oth er Chinese Gimo”) had
devoted themselves to looting the country systematical ly of e verything of value
they could find.
This, then, was the situat ion when I arriv ed in Hanoi. At the time I was a
young majo r in the OSS (Office of S trategic Services) in Saigon, th ere had been
an OSS detachment in Hanoi but it had been recalled. My mission was to re­
place the Hanoi group. In the absence of any other official Americans, my
assignment was to repor t political developments in Tonkin to the War Depart ­
ment and to the Stat e Department. With me were a radio operato r and a
cryptographer . With our radio and “one-time pad” code books, we set up opera­
tions in a couple of rooms on the top floor of the Metropole Hotel. I sen t a message
to Ho Chi Minh, identifying myself and asked to be received.
For the chronicle of what happened afte r our arri val in Hanoi, via a U.S.
Airforce C-46 cargo plane from Canton, I now rely without too much confi­
dence on memories of 22 years ago. The dispatches I sent to my own rea r base
at Singapore f or forwar ding to Washington may or may not still exist in CIA
archives. In any event I haven’t seen them.
But the overall scene remains as vivid as a flash of ligh tning again st a tower­
ing storm. There were the mobs in the streets. Chinese troops continued to file
out of Hanoi, carryin g the ir loot in bullock carts, capture d Japanese trucks an d
even on th eir backs. They took everything—plumbing fixtures, tiles off the roofs,
furn itur e and even stripped pipes of buildings. And into the port of Haiphong
steamed t he flotilla, loaded with French troops, un der the command of an angry
and fru stra ted General (lat er Marshal) LeClerc.
All the elements of the combustive explosion were there. Would the French
fire on the pillaging Chinese? How would the Vietnamese, already bloodied in
skirmishes w ith the French in v arious par ts of the country, react to the s ight of
a French reinvestment of thei r capital city? I sat in a wate rfron t cafe in Hai­
phong and watch ed the incoming heavy cruis er “Richelieu”, then the only capital
ship in the French navy, lob shells into the foothills behind the port city. These,
it turned out later, constitute d a show of force rat her than an atta ck but the
shelling served to heighten tensions ano ther notch.
At the epicenter of all this sat Ho Chi Minh who invited me to call on him
shortly a fte r the Fr ench land ing at Haiphong.
Ho received me late in the afternoon. Save fo r a doorman he appeared to be
alone in the big palace. I sat with him in the main “salon” in the fron t of the
building, both of us side by side in straight-backed chairs, a small tabl e between
us. We were undistur bed for the next two hours. There were no interrupti ons,
no secretaries, no telephone calls, no messengers. This by itself was strange , given
the conflict and tumu lt outside. At one junctu re a male ser vant produced tea and
left. Ho wore the tra ditio nal high buttoned tunic, floppy pa nts of the same khaki
material. His beard was then wispy an d his manner curiously detached. I was
unprepared fo r a person so sli gh t
I began th e conversation, explaining t ha t I had come to report on events then
happening in Vietnam and to t rans mit whatever messages he might want passed
to U.S. autho rities in Washington. I can’t remember th e conversation in detail,
of course, but the general burden of his remark s are still with me. Tlie conver­
sation began in French but he l ate r switched to English. He begged my pardon,
saying tha t he would like to use his English which he rarely had occasion to
do. The fact was tha t his English was bett er than my French.
He had no specific messages he wanted to transm it, but he said he w as glad
tha t there was inter est in the United States in what was trans pirin g in this far
away corner of the globe.
83- 60 5— 73 ------ 11
 156
We wondered if Americans knew liow strongly the Vietnamese people desired
independence. He went hack to the history of early Chinese invasions, then
reviewed the French occupation and finally the past five years under the Jap a­
nese. In great d etail he developed our theme, the burden of which was th at no
mat ter who the occupier, the Vietnamese people had always been determined
to resist. At no juncture in thi s reci tal did he refe r in any way to himself or even
to the Communist P arty, although he was to mention t he lat ter late r on.
The second p art of the conversation had to do with the present situat ion and
what it implied for the f utur e of the country. For a man who had spent most of
the last five years hidden in the jungles of northwe st Tonkin with a price on
his head, he passed over the Japanes e invasion of recent history with little
comment.
He talked at grea ter length about the Chinese who were still streami ng out
of the city. The hardsh ip and destruction they had caused in their relatively
brief stay brought him, it seemed to me, very close to tears, especially their
brut al tr eatme nt of Vietnamese women.
But what Ho really wanted to talk about wasn’t the past but his country’s
prospects for the future. He referr ed to the past mainly to underscore the
resiliency and determinatio n of the people. Having made his case for t he will of
the Vietnamese to be independent, he the n began to discuss wh at they would need
to realize a b etter fut ure. It was mainly in this context th at he mentioned France,
the Soviet Union and the United States, in th at order.
As for France, Ho said tha t in many ways the French had been helpful to
the country and tha t a special “sympathie” existed between the French and
“our people”. He continued by saying tha t he f elt tha t many French recognized
finally tha t times had changed and tha t the tradit ional colonial form of rule
had to end. He believed tha t men like Sainteny and others understood this and
were prepared to cede real independence to Vietnam over a period of years. How­
ever, he could not be sure. He could not be certain t ha t the ar rangements he was
reaching with French represent atives in Hanoi would be honored ei ther in Sai­
gon or in Paris. Only time would tell that. Nor, he continued, could he be s ure
th at many of his own people would be willing to tru st the French or abide the
delays. He asked me i f I h ad seen the crowds in the streets. When I said th at I
had but was not sure what they meant, he rep lied : “For many of our people,
patience has come to an end.”
He then brought up the Soviet Union. It was only at this junctu re tha t he
mentioned anything about himself personally. He re ferred to his young days as
a “idealist ” a nd his result ing troubles with French police. He mentioned tha t a
siste r had been maltr eated and imprisoned in the penal colony a t Poulo Condor
as a result of his activity. Eventua lly he h ad gone to the Soviet Union, he said,
and studied the teachings of Marx and Lenin. He did not dwell on this much
except to say th at he believed tha t revolution had benefited the Russian people
and tha t he had become a believer in Communism. B ut he went on to say tha t he
did not believe tha t the Soviet Union e ither could or would make any kind of
a real contribution to building of what he called a new Vietnam in the nea r future.
It was in this context th at he asked me if I had seen any of t he Vietnamese
countryside. I confessed I had seen but littl e of the south and none of the north.
Then he went into a lengthy description of the economy of the country, partic u­
larl y stressing its dependence on rice. What we real ly need, he said, is larg e in­
vestments of money an d machines—at first to repair and improve our dike sys­
tem and then later , when we are self sufficient in food, the means to make us a
modern country in the indu stria l sense. Then he asked me if I thought the R us­
sians at present could make such a contribution. I said I didn’t know. Then he
answered his own question by describing his underst anding of the destruction
th at the war had caused in the Soviet Union (remember, this was 1946) and
concluded tha t the Russians would have thei r hands full “for the next decade”
in rebuilding th eir own country.
The United S tates, Ho said, was probably in t he best position to aid Vietnam
in the post-war years. He said tha t we had emerged from the w ar with enormous
power and prestige in the world. He also mentioned th at America was a Pacific
power and therefore would logically have a par ticu lar int erest in the area. He also
dwelled a t some le ngth on th e disposition of Americans as a people to be sym­
pathet ic to self determina tion of nations and generous in making contributions
to less fortun ate states. But here again he doubted tha t the United S tates Gov­
ernment could be counted on to come to the aid of Vietnam. He s aid he felt t hat
 157
the U.S. Govern ment would find more urg ent
to the affect th at, af te r all, Vietnam, is a smallthin gs to do. He sai d somet hing
cou ntry and fa r away. Vietn am
could not be expected to loom larg e in the preocc
In sh ort, he was sayi ng th at he hoped A meric a wupati ons of the United State s.
bu t he di dn’t believe, in the final ana lysis , we would. ould int ere st i tse lf in Vietnam
It was quit e da rk when I le ft the palace. He had given
sages or requ ests t o tra nsm it. I ret urn ed to the metrop me no specific mes­
pla ns to m eet aga in. ole. We ha d made no firm
Thu s it cam e as a sur pri se to receive a messag from Ho a
ret urn ing to the hotel. The message read th at hee reg few moments af te r
would I car e to come to a recepti on he was giving rett ed the sho rt notice, but
th at same evening at the
pala ce? The inv ita tio n sounded quit e casu al and e xtemp
unif orm s and was back a t the pa lace by 7 p.m. It turn edoraneo us, but I change d
out to be a n ex tra ord i­
na ry evening.
The re were thr ee oth er gues ts with Ho when I was ushe
salo n we’d met in before. All thr ee were Vietnamese. red into the same
ma nda rin robes an d headpie ces. The th ird was much Two were elderly men in
younger. He wore wh ite
sho rts and a n open neck whi te shi rt. The la tt er was int rodu
visio nal min iste r o f nat ion al defense .” He was Nguyen Vanced to me as “the pro ­
name he ld lit tle signif icance. Nor co uld I engage him in much Giap. At the ti me th e
in Fren ch or E nglish . The two elder s tu rne d out to conv ersati on ei th er
of educ ation and cu ltu ral affa irs, or some such. be pro vision al min ister s also—
At the time I felt th at I was:
simply be ing gi ven an opp ortu nity to m eet some of Ho ’s official family info rma lly.
Rose wine was served.
Then sudde nly oth er gues ts began arr ivin g. Throu gh the
the big room bu rst Gener al Leclerc gripp ing his whi te malac double doors of
by Gene rals Valluy and Sala n, Saint eny, and ca cane, followed
LeClerc ’s chie f of staff. Thi s was the first t eam forfinally Colonel Mirma nbeau ,
China. I kn ew the m well and they knew me. At the timthe Fren ch mi lita ry in Indo-
sta ff as the liais on officer f or our Saigon deta chm ent eofI w as on Gene ral Leclerc ’s
OSS. Althoug h my asso ­
ciat ion with Leclerc ha d alw ays been cordi al, the Fre nch
irr ita tio n and di str us t of OSS. LeClerc and company hadneve r concealed the ir
th at nig ht a t H o Chi M inh’s or for t ha t m at te not looked for me
r for anyon e else.
But even the Fre nch were sta rtl ed to see the nex t group
the field comm ander of Lu Ha n’s Chine se of arr iva ls. In came
ings exchan ged on all sides were glacial. arm y and his chief of staff. The gre et­
And finally, rep rese ntin g the Bri tish
comm ander in Indo-C hina, came Lt. Col. Tre vor Wilson, the chief of MI-5 in
Hanoi.
We d id not make a cozy group. When din ner w as annou nced
for th at eith er. At first I wa sn’t sur e th at I was invi ted I was n’t pr epar ed
to me had only mentio ned “a recep tion.” Befitt for dinne r. Ho’s note
un til all the othe rs had foun d th eir places and ing my modest ran k I held back
the re ha dn ’t been an empty c ha ir I was p rep are d towere seate d at the table. If
slink a way. Bu t the re was__
an d i t wa s ne xt to Ho’s. I sa t down.
The din ner was a horr or. The Fre nch confined themse lves
mum of conve rsatio n a nd scarce ly spoke to the Chinese to the ba res t mini­
got dru nk “gam be-ing” everyo ne arou nd the table. At . For th eir p ar t t he Chines e
very quietly. “I thi nk Mr. Pre sid ent the re is some reseone poin t I spoke to Ho
ntm ent over the sea ting
arr ang em ent a t thi s tab le.” I me ant of cour se my place ne xt to him. “Yes,” he
replied, “I c an see t ha t. Bu t who else could I t alk to ?”
I saw Ho Chi Minh sev eral oth er times in the course of
on in Hano i but no ne of the se encou nters were memorable. the weeks I stay ed
developm ents to rep ort to Wash ingto n inclu ding Ho’s decisio Ther e were plen ty o f
to finish h is ne goti ation s w ith th e Fr enc h Go n to go to Pa ris
vernment.
One person who had seen a good deal of Ho before thi s perio
time the re af ter was my Br iti sh colleague, Tre vor Wilson. d and for some
Br iti sh officer in Hano i af te r the Jap ane se surr end ere Wilson was the first
B rit ai n’s first consul gen eral acc redi ted to Ho Chi Minh’s provis d and la te r became
He is stil l aro und thi s pa rt of the world. Now 65, Wilson ional go vernm ent
car eer as public info rma tion officer for the Br itis h E mbassy is windi ng up his
Tre vor and I dined tog eth er the oth er nig ht in Vientia ne. in Laos.
mentio ned in pr in t bu t Wilso n’s memory isn’t all th at good I woul dn’t wa nt it
rememb ered the d inn er we wen t to t ha t nig ht in Hanoi. In thes e days. Bu t he
wher e in his possession th e menu th at was served fac t h e s til l has some­
people at the table . My own souv enir of the nig ht was aut ogr aph ed by mos t of the
an auto gra phe d pic tur e
 158
of hi mse lf t ha t Ho se nt me a t the hote l the follow ing day. Across it w ere wri tte n
the w or ds : “To my good f riend , Com mand ant White , Sincerely, Ho Chi Minh.”
Wilso n recal ls Ho “As a man of gre at sinc erity .” Exc ept for official occasions,
says Wilson, he li ved as a herm it. He neve r wore any thin g save the same kha ki
tunics , one way or the other . He left in Marc h. I retu rne d to Saigon.
Tre vor and I dined tog ethe r the oth er nigh t in Vientia ne. I woul dn’t wa nt it
mentio ned in pr in t but Wilson’s memory isn ’t all th at good thes e days. Bu t he
remem bered the d inn er we w ent to th at ni ght in Hanoi. In f act he stil l has some­
where in his possession the menu th at was served aut ogra phe d by most of the
people at th e table. My own souv enir of the nig ht was an aut ogr aph ed pic ture
completely unad orne d by any deco ratio ns or design ations . Wilson does no t reca ll
Ho d rin kin g a nyth ing oth er then t ea or an occas ional b ottl e of soda.
App aren tly Ho held consid erable affection f or Wilson. Wilson occupied a vill a
ju st adj ace nt to the govern ment palac e grounds . Occasiona lly Ho would drop
over unann ounce d to talk . He inv aria bly came alone. Once Ho inv ited W ilson to
att en d a soccer match wit h him. As pa rt of the ceremonies, Ho was supposed to
kick the ba ll to st ar t the game. Wilson recal ls i t as a ra th er pat he tic si ght wat ch­
ing a man as fra il as Ho try ing to k ick the b all bu t he gave it a deter min ed try.
As one of t he few, i f not the only, wes tern d iplom at in Han oi at th e time, Wil ­
son w as often call ed on to in terv ene w ith Ho’s governm ent. When he c ouldn’t g et
actio n thro ugh reg ular chann els, Wilson appea led dire ctly to Ho. “He a lway s to ld
the t ru th to me,” sa ys Wilson, “bu t you h ad to tell h im the t ru th , too.” One such
occasion involved a requ est from the Fren ch to do so methi ng abo ut the plig ht of
14 Fre nch officers being held by the Commun ists somewhere in the coun try.
Ho ins ist Wilson give him the exa ct name of each of the Frenc hmen , find out
whe re they were (ap par ent ly ha d no means or did n’t wa nt to find out for him ­
self) and finally Wilson mu st sub mit a documen t giving his (Wilso n’s) word
th at the Frenchm en, when appre hend ed, had not been in the coun try seeking to
har m the people of Vietna m.
Wilson had no difficulty get tin g the name s from the Fre nch , bu t he did have
to h ire some Chinese u nde rwo rld type s to loca te th e p riso n wh ere t hey were bein g
held. Wilson also asc erta ine d t hat the Fre nchm en h ad been p ar t of a group try ing
to resc ue oth er Fren chm en in the co unt ry and, as such, had no m ilit ary or espio­
nag e motives. This much estab lishe d, Ho hand ed Wilson a note a ddre ssed to the
comm ander of the ja il whe re th e Fren chm en were held. Wilson perso nally went
to t he ja il and the comm ander ho nored Ho’s note.
Over the period of time Wilson knew Ho—from Septem ber 1945 u nti l Decem­
ber 1946—Wilson fo und th at H o Chi M inh rar ely discusse d his perso nal life. He
did, however, tal k abo ut his firs t tri p to E urop e as a “Plon geu r” on a messa gerie
ma riti me stea mer an d also, lat er, as a dish was her at the Savoy in London.
Sim ilarl y Ho rar ely mentio ned any thin g abo ut his fami ly—only the sis ter he
spoke to me about. “I often wond ered how he became so well-edu cated and so
well infor med ,” says Wilson, “pa rti cu lar ly in view of the fa ct he had so lit tle
form al schooling and s pen t so much of h is life in hidin g.”
I t is curio us to say the lea st th at no one I’ve met who knew Ho Chi Minh
ever found him exh ibit ing th e qua litie s of tough minded ness or au tho rita ria nis m
th at are norm ally the ha llm ark the polit ical being pa rtic ula rly the commu nist
pol itic al anima l. In observi ng Ho in th at hist oric ally t ur bu len t perio d of ’45-46,
Tre vor Wilson notice d thi s anom aly. His exp lana tion is th at the ha rd core
commu nist rev olut iona ries aro und Ho, notab ly Van Giap, recognized th at given
the tra dit ion ali st na tu re of the Vietn amese people, they needed a fa th er type
image as the head of th ei r mov ement and th at the per son alit y of Ho Chi Minh was
ideall y s uite d to t he ir pu rposes. Wilson is p ersu ade d th at Ho was not cons ulted or
a pa rty to most of the bru tal mea sure s th at the regime took, pa rti cu lar ly those
aga ins t landh oldin g peas ants.
The end of the ir assoc iatio n seems to supp ort thi s view, a t lea st in Wilso n’s
opinion.
Ho le ft Pa ris in the lat e spr ing or ear ly summe r of 1946. Thi s fiasco of the
Fon tain blea u talk s from the Vietn ames e poin t of view ha d been glossed over
und er a meaningl ess communique. Ho took a slow boat back to Vietnam, land ing
in the South (Wilson is uns ure exa ctly where, but proba bly Saig on). Admi ral
Th ier ry D’Argenlieu, t he F ren ch high commissioner, met the b oat and k issed Ho
on bot h cheeks.
How ever intende d, D ’Argenlieu’s emb race very nea rly became the kis s of d eat h
for H o Chi Minh. Bet ween the t ime of h is final re tu rn to Han oi in October unt il
 159
Decembe r 19th when the Viet Minh att ac ke d an d finally occupied Hano i, Ho
became a vi rtu al pris one r of his own regime. “I could neve r see him alone
aga in,” recal ls W ilson. “They moved him fr om one reside nce t o anot her. He could
nev er speak t o me pri vat ely .” One o f the l as t occasions they saw each oth er was
ear ly in December. Wilson had calle d to del iver an im po rta nt let ter of stat e.
(No t for use, it was a comm unica tion from Ne hru ). Ho, acco rding to Wilson,
rea d the lett er, smiled wis tful ly and said, “J us t tell him I have received his
message. ”
The Chairman. Ju st a couple o f questions and then I will go to
Mr. Moffat.
WAS HO REPRESENTA TIVE OF RUSS IANS ? INT ERN ATIO NAL COM MUN ISM?

Your de scription t here of your meeting with H o was a very moving

one. Did you get th e impression t ha t he was act ing as an agent for th e
Russians? Did he convey to you an atti tud e tha t he was the re as a
representa tive of Russia?
Mr. W hite . No, certain ly not.
The Chairman. H ow a bout China, did you get the impression t ha t
he was there as an agent of inter natio nal communism?
Mr. W hite . No, quite the contr ary was the case; obviously the C hi­
nese Communists were 2 years away from taki ng power i n China at
the time, or 3, but quite the contrar y, he dwelt at really extr aor­
dina ry length on t radi tion al hostili ty between his own people and the
Chinese people. It was exacerbated by th e fa ct they were there looting
his cou ntry ; he dwelt very much on it.
The Chairman. Did he refe r t o Mao Tse-tung as havin g been one
of his princ ipal sponsors, frien d or otherwise?
Mr. W hite . He did not.
The Chairman. Did he refe r to him at all?
Mr. W hite . He d id n ot mention Mao Tse-tung a t all.
The Chairman. Well-----
Mr. W hite . Nor, I confess, did I ask hi m an ythi ng about Mao Tse-
tung, either.
The Chairman. But our policy used to be justified on the g round
tha t he was a representative of an inter nation al Communist conspiracy
and was merely a c at’s paw in th e service of t ha t conspiracy.
Mr. W hite. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. But your impression doesn’t confirm tha t ?
Mr. W hite . No, si r; it was not. As I say, when he did discuss the
Soviet Unio n, he said, “I don’t th ink the re is much th at we here can
look for in terms of any kind of aid, moral, political or economic.”
HO THO UGH T U.S. WOULD BE SYMP ATHE TIC

The Chairman. But he did th ink the United States would be sympa­
thetic to his striv ing for independence?
Mr. White . Yes.
The Chairman. Did he know any thing abou t F ran kli n Roosevelt’s
views?
Mr. W hite . Yes, he did. He wanted to know more.
The Chairman. D id he believe tha t our Government would assist
him, i f not mate rially a t least m orally, th at we would be in sup port of
it or not?
 160
Mr. W hite. Yes, he said th at he felt t ha t as a young cou ntry st rug ­
gling for its independence, t ha t Vietnam would find sympathy from
the American people and from the U.S. Government.
The Chairman. Being as well-infor med, a ppare ntly, as you say he
was striv ing to be, he still did not think tha t Vietnam would ever
att rac t the attenti on of the Unite d States ? He was afra id Vietnam
would not attr act atten tion; the U.S. would not take intere st in it?
Mr. W hite . Th at’s right. He said tha t he fe lt it ranked well down
on the list of U.S. preoccupations.
The Chairman. li e was not a very good prophet, was he?
[Laug hter.]
The C hairman. I thin k it is extremely interes ting and so con­
vincing as to how completely misguided we were.
availability of reports

One last question:

You did report what you are tellin g us ?
Mr. White . Oh, yes.
The Chairman. To our government ?
Mr. White. Right.
The Chairman. Y ou don’t know whether those repor ts are in the
State Departm ent or in th e Defense D epartm ent or where they are?
Mr. W hite. I canno t say, sir.
The Chairman. Di d you la ter ever see any of the people to whom
you reported in the Unite d States and discuss this matter ?
Mr. W hite . No, I did not. It is curious.
The C hairman. Who was the head of the OSS at tha t time when you
were there ? Was it Donovan ? Who was the head ?
Mr. W hite . General Donovan was still alive, yes, sir ; and very
active.
The C hairman. Was he the head of OSS ?
Mr. W hite. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. In Washingto n?
Mr. W hite . In W ash ing ton ; yes, sir.
The C hairman. If those re ports came through , would they come in
the normal course of events to him or his office?
Mr. W hite. Sir, Mr. Chairma n, we understood our reports were
distrib uted, were made available, by OSS-----
The Chairman. T o the State Department?
Mr. W hite . To the State D epartme nt and to the War Department,
The Chairman. Have you ever made inquiries whether any of
those reports are still in existence ?
Mr. W hite . I have never made a formal one. I have seen—I have
had friend s who have been in CIA and I have said, I have often won­
dered a1oud where they might have gone but I never-----
The Chairman. Coiild you help our staff ident ify those reports, get
more detail so we could initia te a request for them ?
Mr. W hite . Yes, certainly, of course. I will try.
The Chairman. It would be interest ing at least to inquire as to
whether or not those reports were available. I thin k they would be
historical documents. They are not in the Pen tagon Papers. I suppose.
Do you know whether your documents were tran sfer red to the
custody of the CIA or not ?
 161
Mr. W hite . I have no firsthand, personal knowledge o f tha t, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. All right.
Than k you very much. We will come back to you.
The Chairman. I would like to now ask Mr. Moffat if you would give
us y our statement. It is very interest ing. You just sta y there and we
will probably pursu e this later.
STATEME NT OF ABBOT LOW MOFFAT, FORMER CHIE F, DIVIS ION
OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFF AIR S, DEPAR TMENT OF STATE
Mr. Moffat. Se nator, I have been asked to present a statement of
my recollections of the hand ling of the Indochin a problem in the
Depa rtmen t of State-----
The Chairman. Before you go on that, are you aware of the repor ts ?
Did these reports come to you ?
Mr. Moffat. I saw some of them, sir.
The Chairman. Good.
Mr. Moffat. I can’t—I will come to that later.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Moffat. We saw much less of th e In dochina rep orts than we—
I saw of t he Siamese. I had close work ing relations with the OSS on
the Siamese matte rs. I never could get it established on the Indoch ina
ones. I thi nk all the OSS files are in the custody of the CIA a nd th ey
are in St. Louis, because I tri ed to get hold of some in connection w ith
some research I was doing on Siam and I thin k th at i9 where they are.
The Chairman. Than k you very much, but go ahead. We will come
back to tha t afte r you make your statement.
Mr. W hite . Well, I was asked to present a statement of my recol­
lections of the hand ling of the Indoch ina problem in and duri ng the
immediate postwar period 1945-1947, a t which time I was Chief of
the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs.
I would like, Senator, to congra tulate the committee on the excel­
lent S tudy No. 2 p repar ed by Robert M. Blum of you r staff. The two
papers in the study are extremely competent summaries, it seems to me,
and I doubt th at I can add a nyth ing except p erhaps to place a sli ghtly
different emphasis on certain points.
The C hairman. I appr eciate very much you r comment on th at, Mr.
Moffat.
Mr. Moffat. I t is n ot possible t o under stand some o f the develop­
ments in 1945 without knowledge of what happened before. Unt il
the spring of 1944, the Office of Fa r East ern Affairs h ad no jurisd ic­
tion over those areas of the F ar Eas t which were colonies of Europ ean
countries, impo rtan t though those colonies might be in Fa r East ern
policy questions.
The Brit ish Commonwealth desk and the Western Europ ean desk
in the Office of Euro pean Affairs handled the problems and policies
concerning all Briti sh, French, D utch and Portugues e colonies as in­
tegral p arts of relations with the mother countries.
ESTA BLIS HME NT OF OFFICE OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

In the sprin g of 1944, however, th ere was established in the Office

of Fa r East ern Affairs a new Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs,
 162
the name of which was l ater changed to Divis ion of Southeast Asian
Affairs, as our major activities clearl y rela ted to Southeas t Asia o ther
tha n t he P hilippin es. To thi s division was given p rimar y jurisdi ction
of matter s r elatin g to Tha iland a nd concurren t ju risdictio n with the
appr opria te Europ ean desk of matter s relat ing to the Europ ean col­
onies in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific Ocean. The significant word
in t ha t stat ement is “con current.” I t meant t ha t neither the Euro pean
nor the Fa r East ern Divisions had th e power to act without th e con­
currence of the othe r, so tha t whichever division m ight be opposed to
affirmative or innovative action could prevent such action; and in
practice, moreover, it proved almost impossible to raise conflicting
views for resolution at higher levels as we were directed to agree before
consideration would be given to our recommendations.
Lawrence Salisbur y was named chief of the new division and on
his resignation from the departm ent about two months later I was
designated to succeed him and served in th at capacity unti l Ju ly 1947.
NATION ALIST SEN TIM ENT BECOMING IMPO RTAN T FORCE IN S.E. ASIA

There h ad been many hopes a nd gene ralities uttered about the post­
war world including no t least the Atla ntic Char ter, and the colonial
powers from time to time spoke vaguely of more self-government for
the ir colonies af ter the war. As we considered the prewa r na tional ist
movements in Southeast As ia an d studied such repo rts as we then had
from the area, we reached the conclusion tha t natio nalist sentiment
was becoming an im port ant force in Southeast Asia. We felt tha t not
only to accomplish self-government which t radi tion al American pol­
icy has always favored, but also to cap ture the natio nalist movements
in behalf of the war effort our allies s hould be u rged to be specific
in what they proposed to do aft er the war.
BRIEF ING PAPER FOR PRESI DENT’S USE AT SECOND QUEBEC
CONFEREN CE

Our division prepa red, therefore, a briefing pape r for the Pre si­
dent’s use at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944,
which was in itiale d by all the appr opria te divisions and offices and
was signed by the Secreta ry o f St ate, Mr. Hull , on September 8.
I would like to quote fro m t ha t memorandum as i t appears in Mr.
Hu ll’s memoirs because i t states our government’s goal at tha t time
and because of its reference to truste eshi ps:
In thi s memoran dum we sugge sted the val ue of “early, dra ma tic and con­
certe d announ cement s by the nat ion s concerned maki ng definite commitm ents
as to the fu tur e of the regio ns of Sou thea st Asia. ” We ad ded : “It would be
especi ally helpf ul if such conce rted anno uncem ents could include (1) specific
da tes when independ ence or complete (domi nion) self-gove rnment will be ac­
corded, (2) specific step s to be t ake n to develop n ativ e c apac ity for self-ru le, and
(3) a pledge of economic auton omy and equ alit y of economic t rea tm en t tow ard
oth er nation s.
Such annou nceme nts migh t well be accompa nied by . . . a pledge to esta blis h
a regio nal commission. The value of such concert ed announ cement s would be
stil l fu rth er enhanc ed if each of the colonial powers concerned would pledge
a form al dec lara tion of tru ste esh ip und er an int ern ati onal org aniz atio n for
the perio d of t ut el ag e; but it m ight be unwi se for t he Unit ed Sta tes to att em pt
to ins ist upon such a dec lara tion of tru ste esh ip by one coun try if sim ila r dec-
 163
lar ati ons could not be secured from the other s. In add itio n to th ei r gre at value
as psychological wa rfa re, such annou ncem ents would app ear to be dire ctly in
line with Ame rican pos twa r in ter est .”
Althou gh Mr. Hul l wrote t he memorandum, the Presiden t warmly
approved the idea th e S ecretary presented , so f ar as I know, no effort
was made to seek such concerted announcements, presumabl y because
of the implacable opposition o f Mr. Church ill to the trusteeship p rinc i­
ple and to any discussion of British terr itorie s.
GROUNDSWELL OF NATIO NALIS M ENG ULFIN G S.E. ASIA

While the Europ ean Divisions had initi ated the memorandum
because, I believe, of its importan ce in psychological warfa re, I did
not feel th at they were entir ely happy with the more basic objective.
From then on and as more and more inform ation was received, one of
our major tasks durin g the whole time tha t I was with the Division
of S outheast Asian Affairs was to ti y to convince the E uropea n D ivi­
sions of the mounting groundswell of nationalism which was engulf ­
ing all Southeast Asia and, indeed, before I l eft the division, South ­
ern Asia as well.
Thei r concern, o f course, focused on our relations with the major
Europe an pow ers; rat her natur ally they tended to consider the colonial
problems in Southeast Asia as of relatively m inor importance.
I well recall one senior officer ask ing me one day. “Why are you
concerning you rself with Indonesia ? I t’s only a Dut ch colony.” There
seemed to be little unders tandin g of what was h appen ing in South ­
east Asia. Time and again the natio nalist movements were char acter ­
ized as s imply the effect of Japane se propag anda. There was also, I
felt, l ittle concept of th e effect on the people of Southeast Asia of see­
ing the Europe ans driven from the area bv the Japanese , and no
thoug ht seemed to be given to the effect o f th e massive, indeed to tal,
dislocation of the economic and social life of these people under the
impact of the changes wroug ht by the war. We felt strongly tha t t he
colonial powers could not pick up where they ha d been forced to leave
off or even with an allowance fo r 4 years of pol itical development.
We became convinced t ha t duri ng the 4 years of war natio nalis ­
tic sentiment had progressed faste r and far the r tha n it would have
evolved during 20 or more years of peace.
pr esi de nt roosevelt’s vie w on in do ch in a

As is well known, Pres iden t Roosevelt during 1943 and the first h alf
of 1944 expressed frequent ly th e view t ha t Ind ochin a should be taken
from the F rench at th e end of the war and pla ced un der int ernati onal
trustees hip pendi ng full independence, a nd I migh t say at my level
we never got—I don’t thin k we had any memories of tha t conversa­
tion—of those conversations—at all tha t the Pres iden t had, but th is
next one became our bible, I migh t say.
As late as Febr uary, 1944, the depar tment in a memorandum to the
Presid ent proposed to proceed on the assumption tha t Frenc h armed
forces would be employed to some extent in mi litar y operati ons to free
Indoch ina from the Japane se, and th at it would be desirable in the
civil affairs admin istrati on of the country to employ F rench nationa ls
 164

havin g an intima te knowledge of the country. Th e Pre siden t endorsed

this memorandum simply and succinctly: ‘‘No Fr ench help in Ind o­
china—country on trustees hip.”
We in the Southeast Asia Division strongly favored th e P resid ent’s
desire f or Indoch ina and I hoped th at he had some as yet secret plan
by which he expected to effect such trusteeship , for we were unable
to see how it could be implemented without app lying the same policy
to th e Brit ish and Dutch colonies in t he area. I felt theref ore t ha t we
should at least voice our reservation which I did in the memorandum
sent to the Pr eside nt on September 8.
BRI TIS H SUPPORT OF FRE NC H RETURN TO INDO CHIN A

Duri ng the weeks following t he second Quebec Conference, Briti sh

supp ort of a French retur n to Indoch ina became incr easingly app ar­
ent. A large French m ilitar y mission was atta ched t o th e South Eas t
Asia Command—SEAC—and the Brit ish SOE, correspondi ng to our
OSS, who were actively engaged in undercover operations in Ind o­
china, were ordered by th e For eign Office to devote thei r efforts solely
to the Fren ch and to have nothin g to do with Annamite or other
native organizations.
PRESID ENT ROOSEVELT’S HOP E FOR T RUS TEES HIP FOR INDO CHIN A

These and other facts were called to the Presi dent ’s attentio n in
November, together with an OSS statement th at the Brit ish and
Dutch had arrive d at agreement regar ding the futu re of Southeast
Asia and were now about to brin g the French into the picture. The
Presi dent reacted sharply. American approva l must not be given to
any Frenc h m ilita ry mission, he di rect ed; all our people and also the
Britis h, Dutch and Fren ch must unders tand th at we expected to be
consulted on the futur e of Indoc hina; and the n the significant rem ark
insofa r as trusteesh ip was concerned: “We have made no final deci­
sions on t he futu re of Indoc hina.”
The conference a t Yalta took place some weeks late r and on April
3 th e Secreta ry of State issued a statement with the Pres ident ’s a p­
proval tha t th e Unit ed States, as a res ult of the Yalta talks , looked to
trustee ship as a postwar arrang ement only for terri torie s ta ken from
the enemy an d such terr itori es as migh t volunta rily be placed under
trusteeship . As the Fren ch clearly had no intention of volunta rily
placing Indochi na under trust eeship, Mr. Stettin ius’ stateme nt marked
the public end of Mr. Roosevelt’s earlie r hope for a trustee ship for
Indochina .
FRE NC H PRESSED FOR U.S. HE LP IN RECOVERING IND OCH INA

As the w ar approached its climax, the F rench. throu gh t he B ritish,

pressed h ard er for American h elp in t he recovery of Indochi na from
the Japan ese and for an active p ar t in such operation, and also for a
formal civil affairs agreement. As late as Jan uar y 1945, the Pres i­
dent was ada mant t ha t he did not want th e Unit ed States to be mixed
up in any decisions affecting the futu re of Indo china. Those were fo r
the postwar period and he di d no t wa nt to get mixed up in any mili-
 165
tar y effort to liberate Indochin a from the Japanese. But th e Frenc h
did not give up. When in March Jap an ousted the collaborationis t
regime in Indoch ina and took over direc t control, several thousand
Fren ch tro ops briefly opposed the Jap anese before crossing into China
and the Frenc h asked for supplies and assistance from the 14th A ir
Force in China. Althou gh the Presi dent d isapprove d the release of a
statement suggested by the Depa rtmen t explai ning th at the Unite d
States would give such help as i t could be consistent w ith the opera­
tions and plans to which it was committed, the Depar tment and the
Joi nt Chiefs authorize d the 14th A ir Force, in aid of the Frenc h, to
underta ke operations agains t the Japan ese in Indochin a provided
such action did not interf ere with other planned operations.
C O N FL IC T OF V IE W T O IN T B E T W E E N SO U T H EA ST A SI A N D IV IS IO N AN D
E U R O PE A N O FF IC E

Duri ng th is period we in the Sout heast Asian Division had increas­

ingly the impression tha t the Euro pean Office favored the outrig ht
retu rn o f In dochi na to F rance and h ad li ttle real concern about auto n­
omy or self-rule or even of increased native partic ipatio n in the gov­
ernment. An indication of this arose when a briefing memorandum
should, we felt , be prepa red for the Pres ident fo r th e Yalta Confer ­
ence. We knew we could not get concurrence in a statement about Indo ­
china th at would meet our views, so we circulated again the memo­
randum signed by Mr. Hull on September 8. This time the Eu ropean
Divisions declined to in itial the document they had initial ed less tha n
6 months before. No briefing pape r concerning Southeast Asia ac­
companied t he Presid ent to Yalta, so f ar as I know.
The n et result of all t his was th at as the w ar in Eu rope ended, the
Depart ment had no agreed policy re gard ing the futu re of I ndochina.
The Europ ean Office and the Western Europ e Division, confronted
with th e ma jor problems rel ating to a h oped-fo r resurgence of F rance
in Eu rope, believed th at our rela tions w ith Fr ance were of pa ramount
interes t to the Unite d States, th at we should not risk jeopard izing
them in any way over a Frenc h colony which in any event was no
business of ours, and in all good f aith th ough t i t was not in our best
interests even to press for reform in Indoch ina because i t might em­
barra ss our rela tions with th e Frenc h.
Indeed, a senior officer in the Europe an Office told me some two
years, late r when war between the F rench a nd Vietnamese had begun,
tha t if he could have had his way American troops would have been
used to restore the Fre nch to power in Indochina.
On t he other hand, we in the Division of Southeast A sian Affairs
felt tha t the Unite d States had definite r esponsibilities with regar d
to Indochi na. I t was our m ilitar y power th at would lib erate Indoch ina
from Ja pa n; the Frenc h in indo china had collaborated with the
Japa nese ; they had not even attempt ed to honor the ir protect orate
responsibilitie s; there was a strong n ation alist movement among the
A ietnamese who had f or centuries comprised a proud and independe nt
count ry; and .futu re peace and stabil ity in the area depended, we felt,
on a recognition of t he natu ral aspirat ions of the peoples of the area.
My perso nal hope was th at the Frenc h would gr ant independence to
 166
the peoples of Indo china, but I did not feel we should carry o ur sup­
por t of the Indochinese to the point of a break with our ally. France,
weak as she th en was, was still a stronge r and more valuabl e a lly to
us than Indoch ina would be i f we had to make a choice between t he
two and Fran ce which was striv ing to reb uild it s str engt h a nd r egain
its soul needed our help, n ot a f rac turi ng of relations. B ut I disagreed
tota lly with the Europe an Office in its opposition to put ting pressure
on the Fren ch to do what I f elt was not only in our intere st b ut also
actually in the interest of France.
This conflict of viewpoints came to a h ead a week afte r Pres ident
Roosevelt’s death, when a memorandum for Pres ident Trum an was
prepa red in the Europ ean Office and sent to the Fa r Eas tern Office
for concurrence. I nstead, we p repa red an a lternati ve dr af t memoran ­
dum for the Presid ent.
CONCERNS OF DIVISIO N OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Our first concern was tha t th e E UR memorandum did no t give the

new P resid ent the background inform ation which we thou ght rig ht­
fully he should have as t o Presi dent Roosevelt’s views or the recent
history of Indochina.
Our second concern was t ha t while we recognized th at i t would be
contra ry to American int erests to break w ith F rance over the question
of Indochinese independence, we were n ot prepar ed to accept as ade­
quate statements about exerting influence i n the direction of having
the Frenc h liberalize the ir past policies. We could and we should, we
believed, be very specific and actually use the power we had to t ry to
secure self -government in Indochina . The French had indicated an
intentio n to change the ir prew ar policies toward Indochin a even
though the ir various statements, in our opinion, seemed inadequate
to the situ ation and unlikely to assure peace and stabi lity in the coun­
try. We felt thei r change in atti tude had been due to a realization
of the anti-Fr ench independence sentiment among the Indochinese who
must be wooed if Fren ch admin istratio n was to be successful and, sec­
ondly, to u ncert ainty as to our a ttitu de add a feeling t ha t our s uppor t
for the restorat ion of Indoch ina to Fran ce could be secured only by
adoption of a more libe ral policy. I f we informe d the Frenc h, as pro­
posed in th e EU R me morandum, th at we would not oppose the retu rn
of Indoc hina we would negate our influence in securing French policies
consonant with our interests.
We wrote:
Becaus e the l iber atio n of Indo chin a is, In fact , depen dent on Americ an defe at
of Jap an , because we are sacrif icing blood and tre asu re to ass ure peace and
sta bil ity in the Fa r Fa st, pos twa r main tena nce of which will be larg ely our
resp onsib ility, because wit hou t reco gnitio n of the dynam ic tren ds tow ard self-
govern ment among the peoples of Asia, the re can be no peace and sta bil ity In
the F ar B ast a nd the peoples of Sou the ast Asia may em brace ideologie s con tra ry
to our own or develop a pan-A siati c movem ent ag ain st all wes tern powers,
FF bel ieves—th at is. F ar Ea ste rn Office—believes th at I t w ould not be unr eas on­
able for t he Unite d Sta tes t o ins ist th at the Fren ch give adeq uate assu ranc es as
to the imple menti ng of policies in Indo chin a which we consi der esse ntial to
ass ure peace an d s tab ility in th e F ar Fa st.
We urge, there fore, th at the policy of the Uni ted Sta tes should be not to
oppose th e res tora tion o f Indo china to Fr anc e, provide d the Fre nch give adeq uate
assu ran ces as to the follo win g:
 167
Then we li sted five poi nts of which (a) is pert inen t here :
(a) Developm ent of a nat ion al or fed era l gover nmen to be run for
increa singl y by the I ndoc hines e themse lves wi th no special tprivile an d
or oth er p erson s who ar e not inh ab ita nts an d c itize ns o f Ind ochi na ges for Fre nch
the forese eable fu tu re Indo chin a can be full y self-gove rning andso autono t ha t wit hin
along de moc ratic lines, excep t in m att ers of imp eria l concern in which mous
should be a pa rtn er in th e F ren ch Union. Indo chin a

EUROPEAN OFFI CE’S VIEW POINT

The E uropea n viewpoint was expressed by Mr. Dunn who, on re

ing our paper , said he believed it would be better to let the m atter drad­
rath er than base Un ited States policy on th e FE version of th Indift
china paper. He believed th at we should draw close to Grea t eBri o­
tain
and F rance the two s trongest W estern Europe an c ountries; we should
attem pt to remove sources of fricti on between Fran ce and the United
States and try to allay her apprehensio ns th at we were going to
propose that ter rito ry be taken from her.
''We should use our influence to improve the government of Ind o­
china,” he s aid, “but should not interf ere.” He wanted wholehearted
cooperation with Fran ce and indicat ed tha t he share Bid aul t’s fear
for western civilization as a result of the dominance of Russia. in
Europe.
FRE NCH INTEREST 1

In our view, pressures for specific reforms would not, of course,

liked by th e Frenc h but they would not cause a break in our frienbe d­
ship or fu ndame ntal support. We felt th at wha t we were seeking was
actually in the Fren ch interest as well as our own; self-government
would release the F rench fro m the heavy economic dr ain which In do­
china h ad been for years to everyone but the Banque de l’Indoch ine;
and with her long association with the Indochinese, Franc e would
easily conserve her c ultur al influence and would clearly be a favored
country in inter natio nal economic relations.
Admitt edly, the infe riori ty complex from which Franc e was suf­
ferin g as a result of the war was turn ing F rench th oughts to dreams
of a resto red i mperial g lory rath er tha n to more prosaic problems of
substantive economic and p ractical power, but I thou ght this obstacle
not so gre at as t o preclude us from pressing for what seemed to us
both rig ht and sensible.

COMPROMISE QUAL ITY PAPER

While both Mr. Grew, who was A cting Secretarv of Stat e in the
absence of Mr. S tettin ius in San Franci sco, and Mr. Ph illip s who
acting as head of the Eur opean Office fo r Mr. Dunn, agreed with was the
policy pape r which we su bmitted, Mr. Grew gave instructions
a new pa per must be dra fted on which b oth the Europ ean Office tha and
t
the F ar Eas tern Office would agree. My frien d, the late Samuel Reber,
represented EU R duri ng the ensuing discussions and I represented
FE .
The compromise pap er was a sincere a ttemp t to reach a policy on
which all could agree as we both recognized tha t the Departm ent
could have only one policy to ward Indochina , n ot two.
 168
Basically, we agreed tha t the Preside nt should be furnishe d pert i­
nent facts which eith er EUR or FE thoug ht imp orta nt; but instead
of conditioning nonopposition to the return of Indochina to France
upon the receiving of assurance on five major points, we recommended
tha t we appr oach the French, explain our interest and concern, and
ask the French to give some positive indication of thei r intentions
with respect to each of the five points.
It was certa inly my view tha t if we had these answers we would be
in a much better position to determine futur e policy, and tha t this
technique would a lert the French to our interest but withou t thre at
or promise. I think it must have been a good compromise paper. My
own staff was horrified that I h ad abandoned all we had struggled for,
while Jimmy Dunn sent a scorching wire fro m San Francis co w hither
Bill Phil lips h ad forwarded the dra ft, totall y repud iatin g any pa rt
of the compromise. The suggested inquiry was never sent to the
French.
S IT U A T IO N I N IN D O C H IN A CH A N G ED W H E N JA P A N SU RR EN DE RE D

A few weeks late r Jap an surrend ered and the situatio n in Ind o­
china changed rapidly. The Vietnamese tried to take over all Viet­
namese t errit ory and disarm the Japane se before the Allies should
arrive in Indochina. They were successful in establishin g a working
admini stration in the tw o n orthe rn provinces of Tonkin and Annam,
but facti onal dissension among various independence groups in Cochin
China minimized the effectiveness of the ir admini stratio n in tha t
province. Nevertheless, fo r 20 days the Provisiona l Vietnamese Gov­
ernment ruled all the terr ito ry inhabite d by Vietnamese. Then the
Brit ish placed the Frenc h back in power in t he area they controlled
south of the 10th par allel. In the nort h the Vietnamese remained in
power by arrangem ent with the Nationali st Chinese who were there
to secure t he disarm ing of the Japane se north of the 10th parallel.
N EG O TI A TI O N S B E T W E E N F R E N C H AN D V IE T N A M E SE

Wit h Frenc h forces back in Indochin a and with all po tential lever­
age gone, there was littl e tha t the United States could do to alter
the outcome. Wo watched the negotiations between French and Viet­
namese fr om the sidelines, encouraged when a t times it seemed as if
a libera l arrangem ent would be worked out, sorrowful ly when both
sides would breach agreements th at had been made and when it gra d­
ually became appa rent tha t as the French broug ht more milita ry
forces into the country thei r willingness to concede self-rule corre­
spondin gly decreased. I thin k both EU R and FE hoped that the
Fren ch would reach an effective agreement with the Vietnam Pr o­
visional Government ; but late in 1946 a concern about Communist
expansion be gan to be evident in the Departmen t.
We are reapin g today, in my opinion, and so are all Vietnamese,
Laotians, and Cambodians, the tr agedy of our fixation on the th eory
of monolithic, aggressive communism tha t began to develop a t this
time and to affect our objective analyses of certain problems.
I have always been convinced tha t if the French had worked sin ­
cerely w ith Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam would have evolved with a Com-
 169
munist regime that , it is true, but a regime t ha t followed the interests
of Vietnam first. There would have been no domination by China
afte r China became Communist and cooperation with the Soviet Union
would have been primari ly as an instrum ent to offset Chinese pressures.
I have never met an American, be he militar y, OSS, diplomat, or
journa list, who had met Ho Chi Minh who did not reach the same
belief: tha t Ho Chi Minh was first and foremost a Vietnamese n a­
tionalist. He was also a Communist and believed t ha t Communism
offered the l>est hope for the Vietnamese people. But his loyalty was
to his people. When I was in Indoch ina it was str ikin g how the top
echelon of competent French officials held almost unanimously the
same view.
Actually, there was no alterna tive to an agreement with Ho Chi
Minh or to a crushin g of the natio nalist groundsw ell which my owm
observations convinced me could not be done. An y other government
recognized by the Fre nch would of necessity be puppets of the Frenc h
and incapable of holdin g t he loyalty of the Vietnamese people.
CONCERN ABOUT COM MUN IST DOMINAT ION OF VIETNAM ESE GOVERNMENT

As Depar tment concern about the Communist domination of the

Vietnamese Government became more appa rent and more uncritic al
we began, T felt, to allow our fears of such domination to overrule
our bette r judgm ent; we let the natio nalist feelings of the country
recede in importance and we igno red the fath er figure tha t Ho Chi
Minh was becoming for most Vietnamese. The French seemed not
adverse to taki ng advant age of our increasing preoccupation with
Communism.
A telegram from our consul at Hanoi, James O’Sullivan, at the
end of December offered some sound cautio nary ad vice :
“Frenc h concern over Communism,” he concluded, “may well be
devised to div ert Depa rtmen t’s atten tion from Frencli policy in Indo ­
china.”
I always fel t tha t we could see the situatio n in Southeast Asia more
objectively t han the Briti sh, the French , and the Dutch because we
could, until the fear o f Communism affected objectivity, analyze p rob­
lems without the han dicap of self- interest, prejudice, pride or domestic
politics. I strug gled t o preserve Siam fro m excessive Britis h pressures
at the conclusion of the war.
IF FRANCE HAD GRANTED INDE PEND ENCE TO VIETN AM

As to I ndoch ina and the Netherla nds E ast Indies , I fe lt i t essential

tha t these cou ntries be gra nted the political independence they longed
for, t ha t by making such a gran t, France , f or instance, would in fact
develop close ties with Vietnam because the Vietnamese ha d always
grea t respect and likin g for Fren ch culture a nd many, includin g H o
Chi Minh, would ha ve liked to maint ain warm ties with Franc e a nd
to have Frenc h advisers in posts where foreign expert help was needed.
Volunt ary eliminatio n of hated foreign control would have per ­
mitted h appy and m utuall y beneficial relati ons to develop between the
two countries. This was in fact the policy France successfully followed
later in West Afri ca, bu t the Fr ench people felt a deep affront to th eir
 170

pr id e at th e t ho ug ht of g iv ing up a ny so ver eig nty or con trol o ver In do ­

ch ina ju st as la te r th ey suffered sim ila r im ag ine d loss of fac e ove r
Al ge ria .
I sti ll b elie ve th at ha d th e F re nc h bee n w ill in g to gr an t ind epe nde nce
to Vi etn am in 1946 t he y coul d ha ve wor ked ou t an arr an ge me nt wi th
th e Vi etn am gov ern me nt th a t wou ld hav e pr ote cte d th ei r cu ltu ra l in ­
fluence an d le ft the m wi th an obvious a dv an tag e ove r all ot he r n ati ons
in econom ic d eal ing s w ith Vi etn am .
I t wo uld ha ve tak en a gre atn ess th ey did no t th en possess , an d it
wo uld hav e t ak en a b re ad th o f v isio n t o see be yon d t he sp iritu al a shes
fro m wh ich t he y were r isi ng , as J ea n M onn et la te r h ad vi sio n fo r E u ­
rop e, bu t th e fa ilu re t o see t he ir o wn tr ue i nte res t, mi spl ace d ide as of
pr es tig e an d glo ry, pr ess ure s fro m th e Ba nque de l’Ind oc hin e, pr es ­
sur es fro m pe tty officials an d tho se Fr en ch wh o ha d se ttle d in In do ­
ch ina —no t th e be st ty pe of Fr en ch m en ge ne ral ly, dom esti c po liti cs a nd
th e ind eci sio n ar isi ng fro m un sta bl e go ver nm ent at home —al l thes e
co ns pir ed to m ake th e Fr en ch in tra ns ig en t a t t he tim e. W he th er if the
con cern ab ou t th e ex ten sio n of a mo no lith ic C om mu nism ha d n ot aris en
at t h a t pa rt ic ul ar m om ent o f hi st or y th e sto ry w oul d ha ve e nded d if ­
fe re nt ly , I do not know.
I was aw ay fro m W ash in gt on fo r ne ar ly 3 mo nth s fro m Nov em­
be r 1946, t o Fe br ua ry 1947, b ecau se soon af te r lea vi ng In do ch in a at
th e e nd of Dec emb er I wa s or de red to go t o C an be rra as Ad vis er t o th e
Am eri can D ele gat e to t he So uth Pa cifi c Con fere nce. B ut m y 2 mo nths
in So uth ea st Asi a ha d conf irme d, I fel t, my ea rli er ide as an d I was
pa rt ic ul ar ly h ea rts ick at t he ou tbr ea k of w ar betw een th e Fr en ch an d
the V ietn ame se.

HO CH I M IN H ’s “ dire ct COMM UNIST CONN ECTIO N”

On my re tu rn to th e D ep ar tm en t in m id -F eb ru ar y, I fo un d th at a
tel eg ram h ad been se nt t o Pa ri s e ar lie r t h at mo nth in a n e ffor t to ex ert
influ ence to wa rd se cur ing a se ttle me nt wi th th e V ietn amese. T hat tel e­
gr am ha d, how ever , spo ken sh ar pl y ag ai ns t th e da ng er of Ho Chi
M inh ’s “ di re ct C om mu nis t c onn ect ion ” an d ou r op po sit ion t o seei ng a
colo nial a dm in ist ra tio n su pp la nt ed by a n ad m in ist ra tio n con tro lled by
th e Kr em lin . Th is was imp ecc able the or y wi th wh ich one cou ld no t
qu ar re l, bu t it w as a pr e ju dg m en t of t he fa cts fo r wh ich I cou ld find
no su pp or t. So fa r as I w as aw are , n o e vide nce t o su pp or t t he a ssu mp ­
tio ns o f a dir ec t t ie to th e K re m lin h ad e ver bee n r ece ived a nd i t com­
ple tel y d isr eg ard ed Ho Ch i M in h’s inten se na tio na lis m.

TELEGRAM OP MA T 13 , 19 47

Th e Fr en ch pre sen tly in dic ate d th a t the y were see kin g tr ue re pr e­

sen tat ive s of th e Vie tna me se wi th who m the y cou ld neg oti ate . We
were dee ply conc erne d in my div isi on becaus e we fe lt th a t wou ld be
fu til e an d an y re su lti ng go ve rnm en t w ould be a p up pe t o f t he F ren ch .
W e de ter mi ne d to ma ke one fina l tr y an d in a tel eg ram t h a t was s ent
on Ma y 13, 1947, we spo ke of t he seven new na tio ns th a t wer e in th e
proc ess of ach iev ing or st ru gg lin g to achi eve ind epe nde nce or au to n­
omy in so uth ern an d so uth ea ste rn As ia, an d th a t in view o f th e gr ea t
 171
strides to ward autonomy made by o ther people in this area it could be
dangerous if the French-Vietna mese arrangem ents accorded less
autonomy.
We said th at we f elt the best safeg uard agains t Communist control
or antiwestern, pan-Asia tic tendencies would be close association be­
tween the newly autonomous peoples and the countries with which
they had long been associated, but such association had to be volun­
tar y if it was to be lasting.
A p rotrac tion of the situation then existi ng in Ind ochina could only
destroy t he basis for vol untary cooperatio n a nd leave a legacy o f b it­
terness t ha t would ir revocably alienate t he Vietnamese f rom Franc e
and those values represented by Fran ce and other western democra­
cies. We were inescapably concerned with the situation in the Fa r
Eas t gener ally and wi th those developments in Indoc hina which could
have a profou nd effect on the situation. We hoped tha t the French
would be generous in the ir attem pt to find an early solution which,
by recognizing the legi timate desires of the Vietnamese, would restore
peace a nd deprive antidemocra tic forces of a powerful weapon.
The e ntire telegram has also accepted the Fr ench thesis th at it was
the Vietnamese who initia ted the fighting between the two countries.
It seemed t o me i mpo rtan t to redress somewhat th e onesided pr opa­
ganda which the Fren ch had mainta ined and at least make clear the
Vietnamese view of developments.
Fo r the inform ation of our ambassador, but with auth ority to re­
peat to the Fren ch if the occasion w arran ted, we said, frank ly, th at
the Frenc h position tha t the fighting which began December 19 was
the result of an initia l Vietnamese attac k seemed t o us dangerously
onesided as it ign ored Colonel Debes’ a ttack on H aipho ng on Novem­
ber 23 and the “understa ndable Vietnamese contention tha t a stand
had to be made at some po int in view of t he s teady Fren ch encroach­
ments a fte r March 6 on the a utho rity and terr itor y of Vietn am,” and
we cited as examples the establishment of the Cochin Chinese Republic,
the occupation of southern Annam and the Moi Platea u, and the
Dal at plan for a French- dominate d federat ion to which Vietnam
would be subservient.
Fina lly, we expressed our concern lest the Fren ch efforts to find “true
representati ves of Vietnam” with whom to negotiate migh t result in
the creation of an impoten t pupp et government along the lines of
the Cochin China regime or tha t restora tion of Bao Dai migh t be
attempted.
I have referr ed to this telegram at some len gth because it was the
last action rega rdin g I ndochina with which I was associated, because
it summarized reasonably well, I think , what we had long been say­
ing within the Depart ment, and because it reflected also my own ob­
servations in the field and the need to unders tand the Vietnamese
view of developments as well as t he Fren ch view.
A M E R IC A N IN F L U E N C E N IL

As we had anticip ated, American “influence” in the situat ion was

nil. Two months late r I tra nsfe rred from th e Depart ment to th e Amer­
ican Mission f or Aid to Greece where I was the f irst p olitical adviser

83 -6 05 — 7: ■12
 172
to Go ve rno r Gis wol d an d la te r lia iso n betw een the c iv ili an si de of th e
miss ion an d Ge ner al Va n F lee t.
I ha d no fa rt h er res po ns ibi lity in con nec tion wi th Ind och ine se a f­
fa ir s or per son al kno wle dge of sub seq uen t dev elopm ents, exc ept as
I occ asio nall y ran i nto pe ople.
(M r. M off at’s pre pa re d st ate me nt fo llo ws :)
Statem ent by A bbot L ow Moffat, former C h ie f , D ivis ion of Southea st Asian
Affa irs , D epartm ent of State
I have been asked to pres ent a sta tem ent of my recolle ctions of the han dlin g
of the Indo china problem in the Dep artm ent of Sta te dur ing the imme diate
post war period, 1945-1947, at which time I was Chief of the Divisio n of Sou th­
east Asian Affairs.
I would like to con gra tula te the Committee on the excel lent Study No. 2
prep ared by Robe rt M. Blum of you r staff. The two pap ers in the Study ar e
extrem ely compete nt summa ries, it seems to me, and I doub t th at I can add
any thin g except perh aps to place a slig htly diffe rent emph asis on cer tain points.
i t is not possible to und ers tan d some of the develop ments in 1945 wit hou t
knowledge of wh at happene d before. Unt il the spri ng of 1944 the Office of Fa r
Ea ste rn Affair s had no jur isd ict ion over those are as of the F ar Ea st which
were colonies of Euro pean coun tries , imp ort ant thou gh those colonies mig ht
be in F ar Eas tern policy questi ons. The Br itis h Commonw ealth desk and the
We ster n Euro pean desk in the Office o f Euro pean Affair s hand led the problems
and policies concerni ng all Bri tish , Fren ch, Dutch, and Port ugu ese colonies as
int egr al pa rts of rela tion s with the mot her countr ies. In the spri ng of 1944,
however, t her e was estab lishe d in th e Office of Fa r E ast ern Aff airs a new D ivision
of South west Pacific Affairs, the name of which was la te r change d to Division
of Sou thea st Asian Affai rs as our ma jor act ivit ies clea rly rela ted to Sou thea st
Asia oth er tha n the Ph ilipp ines. To thi s Division was give n p rim ary j uris dic tion
of ma tte rs rela ting to Th ail and and c onc urre nt juri sdi ctio n wit h the ap pro pria te
Eur ope an desk of m att er s rel ati ng to the Euro pean colonies in Sout heas t Asia
and in the Pacif ic Ocean. The signif icant word in th at s tate me nt is “concu rren t”.
I t me ant th at ne ith er the Eur ope an nor the Fa r Ea ste rn Divisi ons had the
power to ac t wit hou t the concur rence of the oth er so th at which ever Division
mig ht be opposed to affirmat ive or innov ative action could prev ent such ac tio n;
and in prac tice moreover it proved almo st impossible to rais e conflicting views
for resol ution at h igh er levels as we w ere direc ted to agre e before c onsid eratio n
would be given to our recomm endatio ns.
Lawr ence Salis bury was name d chie f of the new Divisio n and on his resi g­
nat ion from the D epa rtm ent abo ut two mont hs la te r I was de signa ted to su cceed
him and served in th at capa city un til July , 1947.
The re ha d been man y hopes and gen eral itie s utt ere d abo ut the p ostw ar wrorld
inclu ding not lea st the Atl ant ic Ch arte r, and the colonial powers from time to
time spoke vaguely of more self-gov ernmen t for the ir colonies af te r the war.
As we considere d the pre wa r na tio nal ist movements in Sou thea st Asia and
stu died such rep orts as we the n had from the are a, we reach ed the conclusion
th at na tio na lis t sen tim ent was becoming an im porta nt force in Sout heas t Asia.
We f el t th at n ot only to accompl ish self-gov ernmen t which tra dit ion al America n
policy ha s alw ays fa vored , but al so to cap ture the na tio nal ist movements in b ehalf
of the wa r effort our allie s shou ld be urged to be specific i n wh at they proposed
to do af te r the war. Our divisio n prepa red, there fore, a briefing pap er for the
Pre sid en t’s use at t he Second Quebec Conference in September, 1944, w hich was
ini tia led by all the ap pro pri ate Divisio ns and Offices and was signed by the
Sec reta ry of State , Mr. Hull , on Septemb er 8. I would like to quote from th at
memo randu m as it app ears in Mr. Hu ll’s Memo irs becaus e it sta tes our govern ­
men t’s goal at th at time and becau se of its refer ence to trus tees hips .
“In thi s [mem orandum ] we sugges ted the valu e of ‘earl y, dram atic , and con­
cer ted annou nceme nts by the nat ion s concerne d mak ing definite commi tments
as to the fut ure of the regions of Sou thea st Asia ’. We ad de d:
‘“ It would be especial ly h elpfu l i f such c oncerte d annou ncemen ts could i nclude
(1) specific dat es when independ ence of complete (domin ion) self-gove rnment
will be accorded, (2) specific steps to be ta ken to develop nat ive c apaci ty fo r self-
rule, and (3) a pledge of economic auton omy and equ alit y of economic tr ea t­
ment tow ard oth er nation s.
 173
“ ‘Such annou ncem ents might well be accomp anied by . . . a pledge to e stab lish
a region al commission. . . . The value of such concer ted annou ncem ents would
be s till fu rt he r enha nced if each o f the colonial powers concerned would pledge
a form al dec lara tion of trus tee shi p und er an inte rna tio nal org aniz ation for the
period of tu tel ag e; bu t it migh t be unwise for the United Sta tes to att em pt
to insi st upon such a dec lara tion of t rus tee shi p by one coun try if sim ila r d ecl ara ­
tions could not be secu red from the othe rs. In add itio n to the ir gre at value as
psychological wa rfa re, such anno unce ment s would app ear to be dir ect ly in line
with Amer ican pos twa r int ere st. ’ ”
So fa r as I know no effort was made to seek such concert ed annou ncem ents
presum ably because of the implac able oppositio n of Mr. Ch urchil l to the tru ste e­
ship princ iple and to any discussi on of Br itis h ter rito ries . Yet as Mr. Hu ll
explains,
“I t might be tho ugh t th at we were presu mpt uous in seeking to pre sen t our
idea s to the B riti sh, Fren ch, and Dutch Govern ments as to wh at they should do
with the ir own Pacific possessions. We had, however, two righ ts to tak e such
action. One w as the f ac t th at the libe rati on of those poss essions would not have
been achieve d—and possibly never could have been achieved—ex cept by the
Unite d Sta tes forces. The oth er was our int ere st in seeing th at peace in the
Pacific, rest ored by o ur forces, should continu e. And we could not help believing
th at the indefi nite con tinu ance of the Bri tish . Dutch, and Fren ch possessio ns in
the Orien t in a sta te of dependence pro vided a numb er of foci for f utu re troub le
and per hap s war. Per ma nen t p eace could not be ass ure d unless th ese posse ssions
were sta rte d on the roa d to independen ce, af te r the examp le of the Phili ppin es.
We believed th at we wer e tak ing the long-ra nge view, and th at a las tin g peace
in the Pacific was of g rea ter u ltim ate benefit to Br ita in, Fran ce, and t he N ethe r­
land s—as well as to the whole world—t han the possible imme diate benefits of
holding on to c olonies.”
While the Eur ope an Divisions had ins tall ed the memora ndum because, I be­
lieve, of its impo rtan ce in psychological wa rfar e, I did not feel th at they were
enti rely h appy with th e more basic obje ctive. From th en on and as more an d m ore
info rma tion w as received, one of our ma jor task s, dur ing the whole time th at I
was wit h the Divisio n of Sou thea st Asia n Affairs, was to try to convince th e
Euro pean Divisio ns of th e moun ting groun dswel l of nati ona lism which was en­
gulfing all Sou thea st Asi a and indeed, befor e I le ft the Division, Sou ther n Asia
as well.
The ir concern, of course, focussed on our rela tion s with the ma jor Eur ope an
powe rs; ra th er n atu ral ly they tended to c onsid er the colonia l p roblem s in Sout h­
eas t Asia a s o f re lati vely m inor impo rtance . I well reca ll one sen ior officer ask ing
me one d ay “Why are you concerni ng you rsel f with Ind on esi a; its onl y a Dutc h
colony?” Ther e seemed to be lit tle under sta ndi ng of wh at was happ enin g in
Sout hea st Asia. Time and aga in the nat ion ali st movement s wer e ch arac teri zed a s
simply the eff ect of Ja pan ese pr opag anda . The re was also, I felt, lit tle conce pt of
the effect on th e people of Sou thea st Asia o f seeing t he Euro pean s dri ven f rom the
are a by the Japa nese , and no th oug ht seemed to be given to the effect of th e m as­
sive, indeed tot al disloc ation o f t he economic and soc ial l ife of th ese people u nde r
the impac t of the ch ange s w roug ht by th e war. We fe lt stron gly th at th e col onial
powers could not pick up wher e they had been forced to leave off o r even wi th
an allowan ce for fou r yea rs of politi cal development. We became convinced th at
dur ing the fou r year s of wa r na tio na lis t sent imen t had progr essed fa ste r and
fa rth er t han i t would have evolved dur ing tw enty or m ore ye ars of pe ace.
As is well known Pre sid ent Roosevelt dur ing 1943 and the fir st ha lf of 1944
expres sed freq uen tly the view th at Indo china should be tak en from the Fren ch
at the end of the wa r and placed und er int ern ati onal tru stee shi p pendi ng ful l
independence. As la te as Feb rua ry, 1944, th e D epa rtm ent in a memo randum to the
Pres iden t pr oposed to proceed on the ass ump tion th at Fr enc h arme d f orce s would
be employed to some ext ent in mili tary oper ation s to fre e Indo china from the
Japa nese, and t hftt it wo uld be des irabl e in the civil aff airs a dm ini str ati on of the
count ry to employ Fren ch nat ion als hav ing an int im ate knowledge of th e cou ntry.
The Pre sid ent endors ed thi s memoran dum simply and suc cin ctl y: “No Fren ch
help in Indo chin a—cou ntry on tru ste esh ip” .
We in the Sou thea st Asia Division stron gly favor ed the Pre sid ent ’s desi re for
Indoc hina and I hoped th at he h ad some as y et sec ret pla n by w hich he e xpected
to effect s uch tru ste esh ip for we w ere unab le to see how i t could be im plemen ted
wit hou t appl ying the same policy to the Br iti sh and Dutch colonies in the are a.
I felt the refo re th at we shoul d a t lea st voice our rese rva tion w hich I did in the
 174
memorandum sent to the Presiden t by Mr. Hull on September 8 from which I
have quoted. Mr. Hull wro te in h is Memoirs tha t the Pre sident warmly approved
the ideas in the memorandum.
During the weeks following the Second Quebec Conference B ritish support of
a French retur n to Indochina became increasingly apparent. A large French
milita ry mission was attac hed to the South East Asia Command (SEAC) and the
Briti sh SOE (corresponding to our OSS), who were actively engaged in under­
cover operations in Indochina, were ordered by the Foreign Office to devote thei r
efforts solely to the French and to have nothing to do wi th Annamite or other
native organizations. These and other facts were called to the Presid ent’s atten ­
tion in November tog ether with an OSS stateme nt tha t the Brit ish and Dutch
had arrive d at agr eement regarding the futu re of S outheast Asia and were now
about to bring the French into the picture. The Presi dent reacted sharply. Ameri­
can approval must not be given to any French militar y mission, he d irec ted; all
our people and also the British, Dutch, and French must unders tand tha t we
expected to be consulted on the futu re of Indo chin a; and then the significant
remark insofar as trusteesh ip was co ncerned: “We have made no final decisions
on the futu re of Indochina”.
The Conference at Y alta took place some weeks late r. Shortly aft er the P resi­
dent’s retu rn I had lunch w ith Charles Taussig who was working on Caribbean
matt ers for the Presiden t and was deeply concerned with colonial problems. He
was to have breakf ast with the Presi dent the next day and since we had heard
nothing promised to inquire wha t if any decisions had been made with regard
to Indochina. He reported tha t the Presid ent said tha t rat he r than inter na­
tional trusteeship for Indochina he had agreed tha t France might be the trust ee.
On April 3, however, the Secretary of State issued a statem ent with the Presi ­
dent’s approval tha t the United States, as a result of t he Yalta talks, looked to
trustees hip as a postwar arrang emen t only fo r t errit ories taken from the enemy
and such territ ories as might voluntar ily be placed under trusteeship. As the
French clearly had no i ntention of vo luntarily placing Indochina under trust ee­
ship, Mr. Stettin ius’ statem ent marked the public end of Mr. Roosevelt’s earli er
hope for a truste eship f or Indochina.
As the war approached its climax, the French, through the British, pressed
hard er for American help in the recovery of Indochina from the Japanese and
for an activ e pa rt in such operation, and also for a formal civil aff airs agreement
between the United Stat es an d F rance relatin g to the militar y admini stratio n to
be established as the Japanes e were driven out. As l ate as Janua ry, 1945, the
Preside nt was adama nt tha t he d id not want the United States to be mixed up
in any decisions affecting the futu re of I ndoc hina ; those were for postwar. And
he did not want to get mixed up in any military effort to libera te Indochina
from the Japanese. But the French did not give up. When In March Japa n ousted
the collaborationist regime in Indochina and took over direct control several
thousand French troops briefly opposed the Japanese before crossing into
China and the French asked f or supplies and assistance from the 14th Air Force
in China. Although the Presid ent disapproved the release of a stateme nt sug­
gested by the Department explaining tha t the United States would give such
help as it could consistent with the operations and plans to which it was com­
mitted, the Department and the Join t Chiefs authoriz ed the 14th A ir Force, in
aid of the French, to underta ke operations against the Japane se in Indochina
provided such action did not interf ere with o ther planned operations.
During this period we had increasingly the impression tha t the European
Office favored the outrig ht retu rn of Indochina to France and had little real
concern about autonomy or self-rule or even of increased native particip ation in
the government. An indication of this arose when a briefing memorandum
should, we felt, be prepared for the Preside nt fo r the Yalta Conference. We knew
we could not get concurrence in a statem ent about Indochina tha t would meet
our views, so we circulated again the memorandum signed by Mr. Hull on
September 8. This time t he European Divisions declined to initial the document
they had initia ted less than six months before. No briefing paper concerning
Southeast Asia accompanied the Presid ent to Yalta so f ar as I know.
The n et re sult of all this was th at as the war in Europe ended the De partment
had no agreed policy regarding the futu re of Indochina. The European Office
and the Western Europe Division, confronted with the major problems rela ting
to a hoped-for resurgence of Fra nce in Europe, believed th at our relations with
Franc e were of paramo unt inte iest to the United Sta tes; tha t we should not
 175
risk jeopardizing them in any way over a French colony which in any event
was no business of ou rs; and in all good fait h thought it was not in our best
interests even to press for reform in Indochina because it might embarr ass our
relations with the French. Indeed, a senior officer in the European Office told
me some two years lat er when war between the French and Vietnamese had
begun, tha t if he could have had his way American troops would have been used
to restor e the French to power in Indochina.
On the other hand, we in t he Division of Southeas t Asian Affairs fe lt tha t the
United States had definite responsibilities with regard to Indochina. It was our
militar y power tha t would lib erate Indochina from Ja pa n; the French in Indo­
china had collaborated with the Jap an ese ; they had not even attempt ed to
honor the ir protec torate respo nsibili ties; there was a strong natio nalist move­
ment among the Vietnamese who h ad for centuries comprised a proud and in­
dependent country ; and futur e peace a nd stabili ty in t he ar ea depended, we felt,
on a recognition of the nat ura l aspira tions of the peoples of t he area. My per­
sonal hope was tha t the French would gra nt independence to the peoples of
Indochina, but I did not feel we should carry our support of the Indochinese to
the point of a break with our ally. France, weak as she then was, was still a
stronger and more valuable ally to us than Indochina would he if we had to
make a choice between the two and Franc e which was striving to rebuild its
stren gth and regain its soul needed ou r help, no t a frac turin g of relations. But
I disagreed totally with the European Office in its opposition to p utting press ure
on the French to do what I f elt w’as n ot only in our inter est but also a ctually in
the inter est of Fr ance.
This conflict of viewpoints came to a head a week afte r Presid ent Roosevelt’s
death when a memorandum for Pre sident Truma n was p repared in th e European
Office and sent to the Fa r E astern Office fo r concurrence. As I recall the occasion
I was handed a copy of this memorandum about 5 o’clock on a Frida y aft er­
noon with the request th at our approval or comments be re ady for a meeting of
the top level Staff Committee the next morning a t 11. We did succeed in having
our comments and an alter nativ e dr aft memorandum for the P residen t ready next
day but not in time for the meeting, and more th an a month elapsed before in
fact the Staff Committee considered the issue. Then Mr. Grew who was Acting
Secretary in the absence of Mr. Stettini us in San Francisco told the group t ha t
he had two papers concerning Indochina, one from EUR, one from F E ; th at he
had read bo th ; and th at he concurred in the paper from FE. He turned to Mr.
William Phillips who was acting as head of the European Office fo r Mr. Dunn
who was also in San Francisco and asked what he thought. Mr. Phillips replied
tha t he had r ead both papers and th at he too agreed with t he F ar Eas tern Office
memorandum. Mr. Grew then asked Mr. Phill ips to arran ge tha t one policy paper
be prepared on which both the E uropean Office and the Fa r E aste rn Office would
agree. I represented FE i n the ensuing discussions and my friend, the l ate Samuel
Reber, represente d EUR.
Our first concern in the Southeast Asia Division ha d been th at the EUR mem­
orandum did not give the new Preside nt the background information which we
thought rightfu lly he should have as to Preside nt Roosevelt’s views or the
recent history of Indochina.
Our second concern was th at while we recognized th at it would be c ontrar y
to American intere sts to break with Franc e over the question of Indochinese
independence, we were not prepare d to accept as adequate statem ents about
exertin g influence in the direction of having the French liberalize the ir pas t
policies. We could and we should, we believed, be very specific an d actually use
the power we had to try to secure self-government in Indochina. The French had
indicated an intention to change thei r prew ar policies towards Indochina even
though thei r various statements, in our opinion, seemed inadequate to the
situati on and unlikely to assure peace and stabili ty in the country. We felt
the ir change in atti tud e had been due to a realizatio n of the anti-French in­
dependence sentiment among the Indochinese who must be wooed if French
admini stration was to be successful and secondly to unce rtaint y as to our
atti tude and a feeling tha t o ur support for th e rest oratio n of Indochina to F rance
could be secured only by adoption of a more li beral policy. If we informed the
French, as proposed in the EUR memorandum, th at we would not oppose the
retu rn of Indochina we would nega tive o ur Influence In securing F rench policies
consonant with our interests. We wrot e:
“Because the libe ration of Indochina is, in fact, dependent on American defeat
of Ja pa n; because we are sacrificing blood and trea sure to assure peace and
 176
stabili ty in the Fa r East, postwar maintenance of which will be largely our
respon sibili ty; because without recognition of the dynamic tre nds towards self-
government among the peoples of Asia ther e can be no peace and stabilit y in the
Fa r East and the peoples of Southeast Asia may embrace ideologies contrary to
our own or develop a pan-Asiatic movement against all western powers, FE
believes tha t it would not be unrea sonable for the United States to insist tha t
the French give adequate assurances as to t he implementing of policies in Indo­
china which we consider essential to assure peace and stabili ty in the Far East.
We urge, therefore, tha t the policy of the United States should be not to oppose
the re storatio n of Indochina to France, provided the French give adequate assur ­
ances as to the following
We then listed five points of which a and d are perti nent here.
“a. Development of a national or federal government to be run for and
increasingly by the Indochinese themselves with no special privileges for
French or other persons who are not inhabi tants and citizens of Indochina so
tha t within the foreseeable futur e Indochina can be fully self-governing and
autonomous along democratic lines, except in matt ers of imperial concern in
which Indochina should be a part ner in t he French Union.
* * * * * * *
d. Acceptance of a f ronti er between Indochina and Thailand, to be determined
by an impartial, intern ational commission.”
The EUR viewpoint was expressed by Mr. Dunn who on reading our p aper said
he believed i t would be bett er to let the mat ter drif t rat her than base United
States policy on the FE version of the Indochina paper. He believed tha t we
should draw close to Great Brita in and France the two stro ngest western Euro­
pean countr ies; we should at temp t to remove source of friction between Fr ance
and the United States and try to allay her apprehensions th at we were going
to propose tha t terr itor y be taken from her. “We should use our influence to
improve the government of Indochina,” he said, “but should not interf ere.” He
wanted wholehearted cooperation with France and indicated th at he share
Bidau lt’s f ear for western civilization as a result of the dominance of Russia in
Europe.
In our view p ressures for specific reforms would not, of course, be liked by
the French but they would not cause a break in our friendship or fundamental
support. We felt tha t what we were seeking was actually in th e French interest
as well as our own : self-government would release the French from the heavy
economic drain which Indochina h ad been for years to everyone but t he Banque
de l’lndochine; and with her long association with the Indochinese France would
easily conserve her cultural influence and would clearly be a favored country
in intern ationa l economic relations. Admittedly, the inferi ority complex from
which Fra nce was suffering as a r esult of the war was tu rning F rench thoughts
to dreams of a restored imperial glory rat he r than to more prosaic problems of
substant ive economic and practical power, but I thought this obstacle not so
great as to preclude us from pressing for what seemed to us both right and
sensible.
A practical illustra tion of what I had in mind was afforded some months
lat er in our relations with France over Siam, previewed in point d above. In
1940 the T hai overran by militar y force substan tial terr itor y in Indochina. The
Japanese forced the Fre nch to cede thi s t errit ory to Thaila nd. It was t he Ameri­
can position tha t terri tory seized with Japanese aid must be returned, hut
withou t prejudice to futu re terri toria l adjustments. These border lands had
been a source of friction for years. They had been acquired by th e French from
Siam piecemeal, essentially at the point of a gun, during the heyday of colonial
expansion. While fully legalized by treat ies of cession the Siamese always felt
that, th e lands taken by the French belonged to them. When France was weak
they took back what they fe lt was thei r own.
I felt strongly tha t f or futu re peace in the area the border should he adju sted
and delimited if possible on its merits and not. on leg alistic arguments, and tha t
this delimitation should he by some intern ationa l group tha t would hear both
sides and then make a decision th at both would accent. I suggested informally
by the French Minister in Washington tha t as p art of or immediately upon agree­
ment hv Siam to return the terri torie s the French agree to an examination of
the border by an internation al tribuna l. He was horrified; this reflected on
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French honor; they might adju st an island here or t here in a river channel, but
they would not let an intern ationa l tribun al suggest what the boundary of
French terri tory should be. But I was quite sure tha t the Siamese would not
retu rn the te rrito ries unless they received some such assurance, so I kept pressing
every so often. Each new suggestion was greeted wit h an “Impossibl e!” And then
one yea r and a day lat er the French referred to my first suggestion and agreed
to i t; discussions got under way ; a treat y was signed ; the Siamese return ed the
ter rit or ies ; and an interna tional Conciliation Commission was established. I
might add tha t the Conciliation Commission upheld the French contentions re­
garding the border ; but what I am t rying to i llus trat e is tha t where there was
something a t stake t ha t the French wanted i t was possible to exe rt p ressure and
secure affirmative results without jeopardising relations. I have always felt t he
same could have been accomplished in great er or less degree with respect to
Indochina.
The compromise paper tha t Sam Reber and I agreed upon was a sincere
attem pt to reach a policy on which all could agree as we both recognized tha t
the Departm ent could h ave only one policy toward Indochina, not two. Basically,
we agreed th at the Presid ent should be furnished pertine nt facts which either
EUR or FE thought im por tan t; hut ins tead of conditioning non-opposition to the
retu rn of Indochina to France upon the receiving of assurance on five major
points, we recommended t ha t we approach the French, explain our inter est and
concern, and ask the French to give some positve indication of thei r intentions
with respect to each of t he five points. It was certainly my view th at if we had
the answers we would be i n a much bette r position to determine futu re policy,
and tha t this technique would ale rt th e Fren ch to our in terest but without thr eat
or promise. I think it must have been a good compromise paper. My own staff
were horrified tha t I had abandoned all we had struggled for; while Jimmy
Dunn sent a scorching wire from San Francisco, writ er Bill Phillips had for­
warded the dra ft totally repudiat ing any p art of the compromise. The suggested
inquiry was never direct ed to the French.
A few weeks la ter Japa n surrendere d and the situatio n in Indochina changed
rapidly. The Vietnamese tr ied to take over al l Vietnamese te rrito ry and disarm
the Japane se before th e Allies should a rrive in Indochina. They were successful
in establi shing a working admi nistrat ion in the two n orthern provinces of Tonkin
and Annam, but factional dissension among various independence groups in
Cochin China minimized t he effectiveness of thei r admin istrat ion in tha t prov­
ince. Nevertheless for twenty days the Provisional Vietnam Government ruled
all the terri tory inhabited by Vietnamese. Then the Britis h placed the French
back in power in the area th ey controlled south of the 16th pa rallel. In the north
the Vietnamese remained in power by arr angeme nt with the nati onal ist Chinese
who were there to secure the disarming of the Japane se north of the 16th
parallel.
With French forces back in Indochina and with all potential leverage gone,
there was litt le t ha t the United Sta tes could do to a lter the outcome. We watched
the negoti ations between Fren ch and Vietnamese from the sidelines, encouraged
when a t times it seemed as if a liberal arrang ement would be worked out, sor­
rowfully when both sides would breach agreements t ha t had been made and when
it gradually became appa rent tha t as the French brought more milit ary forces
into the country t heir willingness to concede self-rule correspondingly decreased.
I th ink both EUR and FE hoped that t he French would reach an effective ag ree­
ment with the Vietnam Provision al Government, but l ate in 1946 a concern about
communist expansion began to be evident in the Department.
We are reaping today, in my opinion, and so are all Vietnamese, Lao tians, and
Cambodians, t he tragedy of o ur fixation on the theory of monolithic aggressive
communism tha t began to develop at this time and to affect our objective
analyses of c ertain problems. I have always been convinced t hat if the French
had worked sincerely with Ho Chi Minh Vietnam would have evolved with a
communist regime, but a regime tha t followed the interes ts of Vietnam first.
There w’ould have been no domination by China aft er China became communist
and cooperation with the Soviet Union would have been primar ily as an in­
strume nt to offset Chinese pressures.
T have never met an American, be he military, OSS. diplomat, or journal ist,
who had met Ho Chi Minh who did not reach the same belief: tha t Ho Chi
Minh was first and fo remost a Vietnamese nationalist . He was also a communist
and believed tha t communism offered the best hope for the Vietnamese people.
 178
Bu t his loya lty was to his people. When I was in Indo china it was str iki ng how
the top echelon of com petent Fren ch officials held alm ost unani mousl y the same
view.
Actual ly the re was no alte rna tiv e to an agre emen t with Ho Chi Minh or to a
crus hin g of the nat ion ali st groun ds well which my own obse rvatio ns convinced
me could not be done. Any oth er gover nmen t recognized by the Fren ch would
of ne cessit y be pup pets of th e F renc h and incap able of h olding t he l oyal ty of t he
Vietna mese people.
As D epa rtm ent concern abo ut the comm unist domi natio n of the Vietn am Gov­
ernm ent became more app are nt and more unc riti cal we began, I felt , to allow
fea rs of such domin ation to over rule be tte r jud gm ent ; we let the nat ion ali st
feeling s of the countr y r ecede i n im port ance and we ign ored the f at he r f igure t ha t
Ho Chi Minh was becoming for most Vietname se. The Fren ch seemed no t ad vers e
to tak ing adv anta ge of our incr easi ng preocc upatio n wit h communism.
A teleg ram from our able consul a t Hano i, Jam es O’Sulliva n, at the end of
December offered some sound cau tion ary advice. He tho ught it “pec uli ar” th at
the Fre nch should only now become c oncerne d abou t th e comm unists in Hanoi.
To his cer tai n knowledge, they had known for yea rs th at Nguyen Ai Quoc and
IIo Chi Minh were one a nd the sa me person and th at he stood high in the T hird
Int ern ati onal, and for over a yea r the y had suspected th at Ho Chi Minh might
be recei ving i nst ruc tion s fr om Moscow. He fu rth er tho ugh t i t w as “very pec ulia r”
th at Fr enc h concern should be br oug ht to the D epa rtm ent ’s a tte nti on at t he very
moment they were app aren tly beginn ing to shi ft th eir prog ram in Tonk in and
when they mig ht be pre par ing to force the Vietna m Governm ent to colla borat e
on F ren ch term s or to esta blish a pupp et govern ment in its place. “Fre nch con­
cern over Communism,” he concluded, “may well be devised to div ert De par t­
men t’s atten tio n from Fre nch policy in Ind ochi na.”
I alw ays fe lt th at we could see th e situ ati on in Sou the ast Asia more objec­
tively th an the Bri tish , the Fren ch, and the Dutch because we could, unt il
the f ea r of communism affected o bjecti vity, analy ze problem s wit hou t the han d­
icap of self- inter est, preju dice, pride , or domesti c politics. I strug gled to pre ­
serve Siam from excessive Br itis h pre ssu res at the conclusion of the wa r and
was convince d th at we were servin g not only the Siamese int ere st but also the
Br itis h int ere st, a view they have, I believe, long since accepted. As to Indo­
china and the Net herl and s Ea st Indi es I fe lt it esse ntial th at these coun tries
be gra nte d the politi cal indepe ndenc e they longed fo r; th at by mak ing such a
gr an t Fran ce, for instan ce, would in fa ct develop close ties with Vietnam
because the Vietnam ese had alwa ys gre at resp ect and likin g for Fre nch cult ure
and many, inclu ding Ho Chi Minh, would have liked to ma int ain warm ties
wit h Fra nce and to have Fren ch adv iser s in posts where forei gn exp ert help
was needed. Volu ntary elimi natio n of hat ed foreign control would have per-
rqitte d hap py and mut uall y beneficial rela tion s to develop between the two
count ries. This wa s in fac t the policy Fra nce s uccessf ully followed la te r in West
Afric a, bu t the Fren ch people fe lt a deep affr ont to th ei r prid e at the tho ugh t
of giving up any sovere ignty or contro l over Indoc hina ju st as la te r they suf ­
fere d sim ila r imagined loss of face over Algeria.
I stil l believe th at had the Fre nch been willing to gra nt independe nce to
Vietn am in 1946 the y could hav e work ed out arr ang eme nts with the Vietnam
Govern ment th at would hav e prot ecte d th ei r cul tur al influence and le ft them
wit h an obvious adv anta ge over all oth er nat ion s in economic dealin gs wit h
Vietnam. It would have tak en a gre atn ess the y did not then possess, and it
would have tak en a bre adt h of vision to see beyond the spi ritu al ashe s from
which the y were rising, as Jea n Monnet la te r had vision for Europe , but the
fa ilu re to see the ir own tru e inte res t, misplaced idea s of pres tige and glory,
pre ssu res from the Banq ue de 1’Tndochine; pres sure s from pet ty officials and
thos e Fre nch who had settl ed in Indo chin a—not the best type of Fre nch man
genera lly, domestic politics, and the indecision aris ing from uns tabl e govern­
men ts at home—all these co nspired to make the F renc h int ran sig ent at t he time.
Wh ethe r if th e concern abo ut the exten sion of a monol ithic communism had not
aris en at th at pa rti cu lar mome nt of hist ory the story would hav e ended dif­
fer ent ly I do not know.
I was awa y from Wash ingto n for n ear ly thr ee mont hs from November 1946 to
Fe bru ary 1947 because soon af te r leav ing Indoc hina a t th e end of December
I was orde red to go to Can berr a as Advis er to the American deleg ate to the
South Pacific Conference. Bu t my two mont hs in Sou thea st Asia ha d confirmed,
 179
I felt, my ear lier ideas and I was parti cula rly heartsic k at the outbreak of war
between the French and Vietnamese.
On my retu rn to the Departm ent in mid-Februar y I found tha t a telegram
had been s ent t o P aris ea rlier t ha t month in an effort to exert influence tow ards
securing a settleme nt w ith the Vietnamese. T hat telegra m had, however, spoken
sharply again st the danger of Ho Chi Minh's “direct Communist connection”
and our opposition to seeing a colonial admin istrati on supplanted by a n admin­
istra tion controlled by the Kremlin. This was impeccable theory with which
one could not quarrel, but it was a prejudgme nt of the facts for which I could
find no support. So f ar as I was aw are no evidence to support the assumption of
a direct tie to the Kremlin had ever been received and it completely disre­
garded Ho Chi Minh’s intense nationalism.
The Fr ench presently indicated t ha t they were seeking “true repres entativ es”
of the Vietnamese wi th whom t hey could negotiate. We were deeply concerned
in my Division because we felt tha t would be futile and any resu lting government
would be a puppet of the French. We determined to make one final try and in
a telegram th at was sent on May 13, 1947, we spoke of the seven new nations
th at were in the process of achieving or struggling to achieve independence or
autonomy in southern and southea stern Asia, and th at in view of the great
strides towards autonomy made by other people in this area it could be dangerous
if the French-Vietnamese arrangem ents accorded less autonomy.
We s aid tha t we felt the best safeguar d again st communist control or anti ­
western, pan-asia tic tendencies would be close association between the newly
autonomous peoples and the countries with which they had long been associated,
but such association had to be voluntary if it was to be lasting and achieve
positive results. A pro tractio n of the situat ion then existing in Indochina could
only destroy the basis f or voluntary cooperation and leave a legacy of bit terness
th at would irrevocably alienat e the Vietnamese from France and those values
represented by France and other western democracies. We were inescapably
concerned with the situat ion in the Fa r Eas t generally and with those develop­
ments in Indochina which could have a profound effect on tha t’ si tuation. We
hoped th at the French would be generous in their attem pt to find an early solu­
tion which, by recognizing the legitimate desires of the Vietnamese, would restore
peace and deprive anti-democratic forces of a powerful weapon.
The e arlier telegram had also accepted the French thesis tha t it was t he Viet­
namese who initia ted the fighting between the two countries. It seemed to
me im portant to redress somewhat the one-sided p ropaganda which the French
had maintai ned and at leas t make clear the Vietnamese view of developments.
For the informatio n of our Ambassador, but with auth ority to repea t to the
French if the occasion warrant ed, we said frankly tha t the French position
tha t the fighting which began December 19 was the result of an initi al Viet­
namese at tack seemed to us dangerously one-sided as it ignored Col. Debes’ at ­
tack on Haiphong on November 23 and the “understand able Vietnamese con­
tention tha t a s tand had to be made a t some poi nt in view of th e steady French
encroachments aft er March 6 on the auth ority and terr itor y of Vietnam,” and
we cited as examples th e esta blishment of the Cochin Chinese Republic, t he occu­
pation of southern Annam and the Moi Plateau, and the Dala t plan for a
French-dominated Fed eration to which Vietnam would be subservient.
Finally, we expressed our concern lest the French efforts to find “true repre­
sentative s of Vietnam” with whom to negotiate might resul t in the creation of
an impotent puppet government along the lines of t he Cochin China regime or
tha t resto ration of Baodai might be attempted.
I have referre d to this telegram at some length because it was the las t action
regarding Indochina with which I was associated, because i t summarized reason ­
ably well, I think, what we had long been saying within the Department, and
because it reflected also my own observations in the field an d the need to under­
stand t he Vietnamese view of developments as well as the French view.
As we had anticip ated American “influence” in the situation was nil. Two
months late r I tran sfer red from the Departm ent to the American Mission for
Aid to Greece where I was at first political advisor to Governor Griswold and
lat er liasion between the civilian side of the Mission and General Van Fleet.
I had no fu rth er responsibility in connection with Indochinese affairs or personal
knowledge of subsequent developments.
The C hairman. I s uspect you kept up with th e developments pret ty
closely.
 180
Mr. Moffat, your account a nd Mr. Whit e’s really leave me with a
feeling of a kind of a Greek t ragedy. A fter all you r efforts, the repo rt
from Mr. Whi te, we find ourselves in a si tuation th at is so dangerous,
and has already been so costly, th at it is almost impossible to express
my feelings about it. There is no point, I guess, in always thin king
about what might have been. You have related, both of you, such
significant aspects of how we became committed tha t I th ink it would
be very valuable if we could get the attenti on of our government upon
how we became committed, in order to better evaluate the wisdom of
continui ng to stay there.
CREATION OF PUP PET GOVERNMENT

Your reference to the Frenc h creating a pupp et government—that

is exactly what we have done. This is precisely what you were so
afra id the Fr ench would do, and now we have done it.
I will proceed to some individual questions.
DEAN ACIIE SON’s ATTITUDE

You caug ht my int erest in th e end. You talk ed about th e telegram.

You said, “The telegram had, however, spoken sharp ly agains t the
danger of ITo Chi Minh’s ‘direct Communist connection.’”
Was tha t telegram sent by Dean Acheson ?
Mr. Moffat. Well, Dean Acheson was Act ing Secreta ry; his name
is on every telegram. I don ’t know whether he saw it or not.
'Phe Chairman. It is one th at has been r eferred to in the P entagon
Paper s, I believe, and it came out in the repo rt of t he subcommittee
as i llus trati ng his attitude . This rath er drama tic change between the
attit ude of the Ad ministra tions of F rank lin Roosevelt and Har ry T ru ­
man, is it not fai r to say th at this represented the influence of Secre­
tar y Acheson? Your explana tion of t he relative influence of the Bu­
reaus of Europea n Affairs and Southeast Asian Affairs fits into tha t
very clearly, I think. Secretary Acheson had been oriented, I guess,
all his life very largely to the Europea n thea ter and had been very
close in many respects to negotia tions with the Br itish duri ng the war.
BRI TISH government’s SUPPORT OF U.S . VIETN AM POLICY

Anothe r thou ght occurred to me—this persistence of the Briti sh

government’s support for our policy in Vietnam is rath er un dersta nd­
able when we see the very gr eat responsibility the y have for it, because
tha t was a major influence, i f I under stand you correctly, d urin g this
period prohi bitin g or inte rferi ng with our following the policy t hat
your agency, your division, recommended, was it not?
Mr. Moffat. Well, they kept doing everythi ng they could to put
the Fren ch back into Indoch ina and they supported them whole­
heartedly.
The Chairman. I didn ’t realize it when I heard Prime Minister
Wilson make such a glowing eulogy of Presid ent Johns on’s policy
down at the "White House one nig ht; I didn ’t realize there was a
background of guilt which he must have felt for having gotten us
involved in this affair, so they still persist in it.
 181
Mr. Moffat. They di dn’t get us involved.
The Chairman. They were a good obstacle to our following what
you recommended, were they not ?
Mr. Moffat. I think, in par t, but I thin k the opposition of the
Europ ean Office was just what I said, tha t they believed tha t our
prim ary intere st was to help build the French back and they con­
sidered tha t the colony was relatively unim port ant and not really
any of o ur business and the real in terest from the American viewpoint
was to strengt hen the French.
The Chairman. They were again st the liquidation of the ir own
colonial empire or anyone else’s because they th ough t their s was going
to be. influenced bv it ; is that a fa ir stateme nt ?
Mr. Moffat. The Br itish were, exactly.
The Chairman. So whatever influence they had, which was pre tty
grea t at tha t time, with the prestige of Churchill, was agains t the
policy th at you have announced Pr eside nt Roosevelt wished to follow
with r egar d to Indochi na?
Mr. Moffat. Th at is right.
The C hairman. I s tha t not correct ?
Mr. Moffat. Th at is true.
AL LI ES IN F L U E N C E D U .S . JU D G M E N T

The C hairman. S o we have been had, as the slang goes, by our allies
influencing ou r judgment. I can under stand how th at could ha ppen.
They were all experienced communities; we were relatively new in
this area and it isn' t just, to blame peo ple; it is to try to unde rstand
and at least to develop sufficient ma turi ty on our own pa rt tha t at
the pres ent time a t least we ought to be able to profit by these mistakes
and to follow our own policy; and I am fra nk to ray I can’t un der­
stand why we cannot.
This, taken tog ether with Mr. W hite ’s very moving statem ent abo ut
Ho Chi Minh as an individua l, and his attit ude toward us and the
world, r eally, it is just incredible t hat a great nation could be so mis­
guided. And I must say, I still find it almost impossible to und erstand
how we go t ourselves oif into th is misguided venture, tr agic venture,
which is costing us so much.
FRE NCH LEFT IND OCH INA TO U.S.

The Frenc h, of course, they finally, in the ir wisdom, were more

realistic and they left Indochina and they left it to us. We stepped
into thei r shoes, did we not?
Mr. Moffat. Well, there was an interv al there—I start ed in my
first dr af t—to use tha t expression, but technically I believe there
was—what was it. about 3 years aft er Dienbienphu, before we really
moved in.
The C hairman. Y ou mean physically ?
Mr. Moffat. Yes.
The Chairman. But phi losophically and diplomatically we moved
almost immediately aft er the conference in Geneva to create SEA TO,
with the obvious purpose, as it has turne d out to be, to preven t the
implementation of Ge neva; is tha t correct ?
 182
Mr. Moffat. I don’t feel I know enough about tha t p erio d; I really
don’t.
I know I jus t didn’t like SEATO.
The Chairman. Th at has been its effect, has it not ?
I have seen mention of the Brit ish attitu de but this almost con­
tinuous obsequiousness to American policy in Vietnam, I think, is
explained pre tty well by what you said here. The ir Forei gn Office
havin g taken tha t view, I can feel they just have not quite been
immune from th at feelin g of complicity in our policy there. Ev en with
this lates t escalation, and I have not read all the pap ers exh austively, .
but I believe they are t he only signific ant c ountry tha t has approved
the statement of 3 days ago. I don’t believe any other Europe an
country of any consequence has approved it. Have you seen any
notification of it? *
Mr. Moffat. I have not seen it.
The Chairman. I t is the only one, and I must say I don’t th ink it
is to the ir credit in view of the ir interest, the ir influence, in getti ng
us involved.
CLA SSI FIC AT ION OF W IT NE SS ’ REPORT S

I would be very interested i f the committee could have these.reports,

simply to complete the record of the committee on this earlie r state
while it is on our minds. I will initia te and really try to get your
reports, if possible. I don’t know why they should remain classified,
do you, Mr. White, aft er all these years?
Mr. W hite . No, I don’t, sir.
The Chairman. There is no reason. It would seem to me they
would be impo rtan t historical documents.
Mr. W hite . I ncide ntally , I would like to add-----
The Chairman. Wha t?
NO RES PON SE TO REPORTS

Mr. W hite . Perhap s i t is r elevant to a dd th at those of us who were

filing repor ts from the field, as we were always referr ed to, it was
like drop ping stones down a bottomless well. My files or my dispatches
from Hanoi at the time were quite voluminous and. I felt, quite com­
plete insof ar as what I was doing, what I could see, what I could
repor t, w hat I could analyze, wh at I could assess, what I could evalu-
uate, an d I never, oth er th an to receive some instruc tions about logis­
tics and food and trave l and so on, I never really got any response ’
to th e substance of these repo rts at all, no reaction from h ighe r head ­
quarters , to repo rt tha t the dispatches had reached the Departm ent
or if so what departm ents and, you know, it was really—we were
way out at the end of the line.
Mr. Moffat. May I say tha t is an experience a great many of us
have had. We had the same t hin g when we sent memoranda to the
president. I never knew until I read Mr. Hu ll’s statement in his
memoirs, tha t he had ever seen the memorandum which I wrote on
colonies and the desira bility of try ing to get specific commitments.
The Chairman. There was very littl e intercommunication. You
would file them and th at was tha t. You never knew whether they
came to the ir attention.
 183
Mr. W hite . In our case, OSS case, as intelligence officers, we learned
to live with the centra l fact of intelligence life and th at is t ha t you
specifically know as littl e ab out w hat anybody else was doing as your
function will per mit. So I didn ’t expect to get, you know, lavish inflow.
But, for example, I was never told exactly why the OSS mission in
Hanoi th at I replaced h ad been w ithdra wn except I was advised th at
they had “exceeded auth ority .”
WITHDRA WAL OF COLONEL GALLAGHER AND PATT I MISS ION FROM HAN OI

The Chairman. Was there a Colonel Galla gher in t he mission tha t

you replaced ?
Mr. W hite . Colonel Gallag her was active in the area but he was
never there at the time I was there.
The Chairman. Bu t was he there at the time preceding you?
Mr. W hite . Yes, he had been the re briefly and he h ad come back.
He had been there w ith th e mission t ha t I replaced, which was called
the Pa tti mission because it was headed by a Major Pa tti.
The Chairman. H ow large was the mission ?
Mr. W hite . I real ly can’t be very sure. They were—in fac t, they le ft
on t he very air cra ft th at b rough t me in, my group, and it seemed to
me as we passed each other there were 8 or 9 of them.
The Chairman. Eigh t or nine of them ?
Mr. W hite . I could be wrong about that.
The Chairman. I s Colonel Gallag her still around ? Do you know ?
Mr. W hit e. I can ’t tell you, sir.
The C hairman. Doyou know ?
How many were in your mission with you ?
Mr. White . At the time in Hanoi ?
The Chairman. Yes, while you were in Hanoi ?
Mr. White . Ju st three of us.
The Chairman. Three of you ?
Mr. W hite . Myself, a young crypt ograp her, and a radio operator.
The Chairman. I have run across something about references to
the very cordial relations between Galla gher and Ho Chi Minh ; is
tha t not true?
Mr. White . Yes, th at is true. It is in-----
The C hairman. Is th at w hat exceeded his autho rity—being frien dly
with Ho Chi Minh?
Mr. W hite . Th at could possibly be. As I say, it was not explained
to me precisely why they were withdrawn.
The Chairman. You don’t know ?
Mr. W hite . Bu t I do know th e Brit ish and the Frenc h very ser­
iously resented OSS acti vity insof ar as they rela ted to-----
The Chairman. Fo r t he same reasons Mr. Moffat re ferre d t o : th ey
just did n’t want the American s meddling, they were afr aid we would
be int erested in the independence of Vietnam—is th at your view ?
Mr. W hite . Tha t’s right.
ASSASSINATION OF COLONEL DEWEY

The Chairman. You intima ted—you did not state it, prope rly so ;
you could not prove it, tha t the assassination of Col. Dewey was le ft
 184
up in the air as if it w asn't unreasonable to believe it might have been
inspired by the F rench ?
Mr. W hite. Th at is a conclusion tha t has been drawn.
The Chairman. Tha t is a conclusion ?
Mr. W hite . But without any basis, any foundation, in evidence so
fa r as I know.
Air. Chairman. Expl ain a littl e more in detail, who was Mr.
Dewey ?
Air. W hite. Colonel Dewey was a young—not so young—he was
an O SS officer who took t he origi nal detachment of which I was pa rt
into Saigon.
The Chairman. Yes?
Air. W hite. Wh at precisely his autho rizati on and instructi ons
were from our higher headquarter s vis-a-vis native, national ist
groups, I don't know. But he d id see the prominent leaders of many
groups, some clandestinely and some otherwise, in Saigon durin g
tha t period.
The Chairman. Would you say he was identified w ith the na tiona l­
ist elements among th e Vietnamese?
Air. W hite. Well, cer tainly I can say th is because it is a m atter of
record and it is a matte r of my personal experience, tha t Colonel
Dewey came from a terrib ly well-connected f amily in Illino is at the
time.
The Chairman. Was he a relative to Congressman Dewey ?
Air. W hite. Yes.
Se na tor P ercy. Congressman Dewey—a son.
The Chairman. A son ?
Air. W hite. So n; tha t’s right.
The Chairman. Charles Dewey ?
Air. White . Yes.
The Chairman. I knew him. I didn’t know there was a connection.
Air. W hite. Ili s name was Pete r Dewey bu t in my capacity as a
liaison officer, General Gracey and G eneral LeClerc very often tol d me
how much they resented Dew’ey’s activity in seeing nationa list leaders.
The Chairman. The y didn ’t thin k much better of yourself either,
did they ?
Air. W hite. They did n’t like any of us.
QU ES TIO N OF COL ONI AL POW ER AG AIN ST IT S COLONY

The Chairman. This is a very sad, but I think a very significant

thing, because of the emphasis tha t you and Air. Aloffat both put
upon the nation alist charact er of the movement, as opposed to the
alleged Communism. It is clear from both of you and was so clear to
you and others t hat i t is incredible th at it did not impress our people
more in view of our own history.
If we had been a great colonial power, I can see how we could be
sympathetic w ith the Br itish p oint of vi ew; but thi s w’hole thing is one
of the most mysterious aberr ations t ha t th is c ountry ha s ever engaged
in. I t is the only case I know of—maybe, Air. Moffat, you, being a pro­
fessional, know of any other cases in which th is co untry has taken the
 185

pos itio n of th e colo nial pow er ag ain st its c olony. I)o you know of any
ot he r exa mp le i n ou r who le h ist or y ?
Mr . M offat. I can ’t th in k of a ny ri g h t off th e ba t.
Th e C hai rm an . I c an ’t th in k of an y eit he r. I do n’t kn ow of any . All
du ri ng th is pe rio d, we did pro cee d la te r to enc our age the Du tch to
get ou t of In do ne sia , di d we n ot ?
Mr. M offat. Yes.
Th e C ha irm an . We ce rta in ly we re ac cused of it. The D utc h res ent ed
it ver y mu ch an d the sam e in In dia an d I th in k in E gy pt an d all
aro un d. Ve ry o fte n it is n ot hi ng bu t sy mp ath y, by t ha t I mea n i n m any
cases th er e is no tang ib le act ion , bu t ou r sym pa thi es and ou r enc our­
age ments hav e a lwa ys be en in t h at conn ectio n.
Th ere we re one or tw o th in gs ----- -

W HE TH ER BAN GLA DES H WAS COLONY OF WE ST PA KI ST AN

Se na to r P ercy. Mr. Ch air ma n, if yo u wo ul dn 't mi nd an in te rr up ­

tio n, I wo nde r howT you wou ld loo k up on ou r re lat io ns hip wi th Pa ki st an
an d Ba ng lad es h as to wh ethe r Ba ng lad esh was rea lly a colon y an d
tre at ed as a colony of W es t Pa ki st an ? We ce rta in ly bac ked up an d
su pp or te d W est P ak ist an .
Th e C ha irm an . I do n’t con side r, due to th e ver y sho rt life of th is
cre ati on , c rea tio n as a re su lt of w ar, th a t i t was a c oloni al rel ati on shi p.
I t ce rta in ly is no t co mp ara ble to th e B ri ti sh an d Fr en ch whe re one
ali en peo ple hav e gon e in by forc e an d do mi na ted ano the r. It is my
un de rs ta nd in g th a t na tio n was cre ate d up on rel igi ous gr ou nd s: the
div isio n was an effor to div ide th e Mos lem s fro m th e Hi nd us . U nt il
ye ste rda y, I ne ve r h ea rd an yone s ug ge st t h a t it was a c oloni al rel atio n­
sh ip, bu t in th a t case we di dn ’t do an yt hi ng ot he r th an ti lt th e con­
ver sat ion . I d on ’t th in k th at is— at lea st in my view —it is n ot an ex am ­
ple o f an e xe mp tio n to th a t ru le, b ecau se I wo uld n ot con sid er th a t a
colo nial rel ati on sh ip.

preside nt Roosevelt' s memoran dum on indo ciiin a

W ou ld yo u ex pla in , ju st exp lore , ex pa nd ju st a bi t on Pr es id en t

Roo sev elt’s m em ora ndum . I t say s sim ply an d suc cinc tly, “No Fr en ch
he lp in In do ch in a—c ou nt ry on tru ste es hi p. ” T hat is a ver y cr yp tic
messa ge. Co uld yo u e xp an d t h a t a bi t, w ould you ?
Mr. M offat. The re wa s “F D R ” at the end o f it.
Th e C ha irm an . W ha t? Exp la in it.
Mr. M offat . T hat is th e ex ten t of his message . Fie ha d ap pa re nt ly
to ld th e Se cr et ar y of St at e a good ma ny tim es abo ut his po sit ion on
wa nt in g tru ste es hi p an d w’hen t hi s pa pe r came to h im in di ca tin g th a t
th e D ep ar tm en t wo uld lik e to hel p th e Fr en ch ge t back , he ju st sai d
“No F re nc h he lp in In do ch in a. ” I t was en dor sed i n t he up pe r le ftha nd
co m er of the do cum ent .
Th e C ha irm an . H e th ou gh t th a t was th e dis po sit ion o f it— no hel p
to th e Fr en ch ?
Mr. M offat. A nd t he n th e D ep ar tm en t s ent a le tte r to th e m ili ta ry ,
beca use th is re la ted to th e m ili ta ry , you see, an d ju st in fo rm ed the m
of w ha t the Pr es id en t sai d, ad di ng t h at t he re was n ot hi ng t o be done
ab ou t im ple me nti ng the tr us tee sh ip purpo se a t th is time.
CHANGE IN FDR’s POLICY BY TRUMAN ADMINI STRATIO N

Th e C hai rma n . One l as t qu esti on, at lea st be for e I yie ld to t he S en a­

to r fro m Ill ino is.
W ha t ha s been th e ve ry cru x of th e m at te r to me was th is ra th er
dr am at ic cha nge betw een F D R ’s po licy an d th at of th e Tr um an A d ­
m in ist ra tio n. U su all y we th in k of a c on tin uit y in th e bu rea ucr acy , th a t
th e cha nge of a Pr es id en t docs no t usu all y cha nge th e bu rea ucr acy .
We ha ve a ver y rem ark ab le co nti nu ati on in pol icy betw een Jo hn so n
an d N ixo n, i n m y op ini on, th e way th ey view th e wo rld a nd th e t hi ng s
th ey con tin ue to as pir e to, an d I am no t sure th at it is ve ry dif fer ent
fro m Ke nne dy. I t hi nk I co uld say t h a t th er e was a g re at er si m ila rit y
in ma ny respects to th e at tit ud e of the se th re e Ad m in ist ra tio ns , an d
I assum e th e burea ucr acy ha s mu ch to d o wi th i t, bu t th er e seemed to
be a ve ry ma rke d an d sh ar p de ma rca tio n—a nd alm ost i mm edi ate ly—
bet we en' the d ea th of F D R an d t he access ion t o pow er o f T ru ma n. One
of the most sig nif ica nt th in gs is th is : Th e Tru m an Do ctrin e was an ­
noun ced, I believe, ab ou t a ye ar la te r th an th e pe rio d you mentio ned
here , wa s it not, i n 1947 ?
Air. M offat. Mar ch 194 7,1 th in k.
Th e C hai rm an . M ar ch 1947 ?
Mr. M offat. Th at is 2 ye ars la ter .
Th e C hai rm an . T wo yea rs l a te r ?
Mr . M offat. Fro m th e P re si de nt ’s dea th.
Th e C hai rm an . C ould you ela borat e a bi t on wh at you th in k hap ­
pen ed th er e ?
Mr . M offat. W ell , sir, I do n’t th in k th er e was a cha nge in t he b u­
rea ucr acy . I th in k th e poli cy was th er e all alon g. W e h ad be en fee lin g
th is ; th er e was th e sp lit ins ide th e De pa rtm en t betw een tho se of us
who wer e fol low ing F a r E as te rn Af fai rs an d tho se who were on th e
Eu ro pe an Aff airs . Ev er y so of ten , I th in k, effo rts wer e mad e, wh ile
Mr. Roo sev elt was in office to ge t him to ap pr oa ch mo re closely t he ir
po in t of view ab ou t th e Fr en ch an d In do ch ina . Th ese wer e rebu ffed ,
as on th is occasio n, w ith th is “ No F re nc h h elp .”
W ha t ha pp en ed was, on Roo sev elt’s d ea th, t he m ili ta ry were wa nt ­
in g ce rta in decis ions ma de ap rop os of th e the ate rs. Th er e ha d been
ce rta in arr an ge me nts mad e, as you know , betw een Ch ia ng Ka i-c he k
an d M ou ntb att en , an d alt ho ug h In do ch in a was the or eti ca lly in th e
Ch ina The at er an d u nd er Am eri can st ra teg ic res po ns ibi lity , ei th er side
cou ld go in an d fig ht an d th ey wou ld th en div ide u p th e th ea te r la te r
on. O ur m ili ta ry w an ted some decis ions m ade in c onn ecti on wi th th at .
I do n’t kno w wh eth er th a t ha d ac tua lly s ta rte d bef ore t he Pr es id en t’s
de ath or n ot, bu t an yw ay, t he p rop osa l t o ge t a pol icy s tat em en t e ma ­
na ted f rom t h at an d th e Eu ro pe an D ivi sio n th en sa id, “W ell , a ll r ig ht ,
le t’s see if we can ge t th e sam e pol icy ,” th at I th in k the y wa nte d all
th e tim e----- -
Th e C hai rm an . Ye s.
Mr . M offat (c on tin ui ng ). A nd th ey ha d been pu sh in g it.
Th e t hi ng th at up se t me so v er y s erio usl y ab ou t th is was th ei r me mo­
ran du m , whi ch is in th e Pe nt ag on Pa pe rs. I t d id n’t give M r. Tr um an
 187
any back ground inform ation as to what Roosevelt's policies had been,
or why th ey were cha nging it, and I always thou ght tha t was w hat
really aggrieved me so th at I went to town on thi s one very strong ly
to get the background to the President.
The Chairman. They censored his informa tion ?
Mr. Moffat. Well, you are supposed to send short memoranda, sir.
[Laug hter.]
The Chairman. Then, if I can summarize, th e Europ ean Division
of the Stat e Depar tment had all along believed in this and your di-
. vision and Roosevelt had been in opposition ?
Upon his d eath the bureaucracy did assert itself and convinced Mr.
Trum an of it, is that a fa ir summary ?
Mr. Moffat. I think it is a fai r summary, sir.
» We neve r sent a memo to the Pre sid en t; no memorandum went to
the Pre sid ent ; there was no policy paper.
The C hairman. T o Trum an ?
Mr. Moffat. Yes, sir.
The C hairman. I see.
Mr. Moffat. So it continued to “d rif t” until such time as the French
were in there and then there was nothing for us to do.
The Chairman. The Sena tor from Illinois?
RUSSI AN STATE MENT IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDE NT’S ACTIONS

Senator P ercy. I am sorry I did not hear Mr. Whit e’s testimony.
I flew in from Chicago this morning , but I have h ad a chance to scan
throu gh Mr. Moffat’s. I am going to resist the tempt ation to ask you
for your reaction, for a while anyway, on the Russian statemen t th at
has been released in response to the Pres ident ’s actions, bu t—if you
have not seen tha t statement—I can give you the summation of it
very quickly, and I would very much apprecia te your reaction to it.
OFFIC IAL REACTION TO H o ’s STATEM ENT OF FR IEN DS HIP FOR U.S.

But so th at we may continue our historical inquiry, I would very

much app reciate, Mr. Moffat, your reactions to and knowledge as to
what m ight have been the response, the official response, of th e Unite d
States Government when we did receive and learn of stateme nts made
by Ho as to his professed frien dshi p for the Unite d States —was
there a n official reaction ever ?
r Mr. Moffat. The position, a nd we were very sy mpatheti c w ith Ho
Chi Minh who was, in our opinion, perfec tly clear—a lett er addressed
to the Presid ent of the United States cannot be answered without, in
effect, I mean, other than from the head of another state, witho ut
actually involving recognition. W e ta lked with him, we h ad all com­
munications w ith him, bu t the re was no answer ever sent to a fo rmal
inquiry addressed t o the Presid ent of the Unit ed States, and I think
if we had, tha t would have been taken by the F rench in t ha t case as a
really serious affront and possibly a breach of int ernatio nal etiquette.
Senator P ercy. Were his statements acknowledged to the ext ent th at
we possibly could, under intern ationa l protocol, or were they also
ignored simply because he was a Communist ?
Mr. M offat. It had nothing to do with his being a Communist. I
wrote one of those memos saying we shouldn’t answer this.
83-605 0 —73------13
 188

Se na to r P ercy. Ou r la ck of official resp onse s w as well under sto od by

him , sim ply becau se of his u nd er sta nd in g o f i nt er na tio na l p roto col ?
Mr . M offat. I d on ’t know wh at h is rea cti on wou ld be, bu t I assume
th at he wo uld ha ve u nders too d th at .
Se na to r P ercy. Mr. W hi te ------
Mr . M offat. May I ju st on th is po int , wh ich was ma de ye ste rda y
by M r. Cho msk y o r som ebody , t h a t t hi s was becau se he was a Com mu­
ni st— th at wave of wo rry ing ab ou t com mun ism di dn ’t tak e effect,
di dn ’t b egi n t o become im po rta nt , in th e D ep ar tm en t un til t he end of
1946 , an d all the se com mu nic atio ns ha d come in lon g be for e t ha t.

OF FIC IA L VI EW OF HO C H I M IN H

Se na tor P ercy. N ow, M r. W hi te , was th er e an y official view tak en

by th e OS S or any ot he r go ve rnm en tal agen cy th at you know of, of
Ho Chi M inh ?
Mr . W h it e . No, I don ’t belie ve we h ad a n official view in th at s en se;
ou r mis sion was to tr y to adv ise th e de pa rtm en ts, ou r he ad qu art ers ,
who w as o n f irs t bas e i n t hi s pa rti cu la r par t of th e wo rld , a nd w ha t h e
was up t o ; an d in t h a t con tex t it wa s c lea r t h at th e pa rt y an d th e p a r­
tic ul ar lea de r wh o w as on firs t wa s ce rta inl y Ho Ch i M inh . M y i ns tru c­
tion s, fo r e xam ple , w hen I rea che d Ha no i were t o seek ou t an d re po rt
on th e pr in ci pa l peo ple. Th ere was no t an y specific ref ere nce to Ho
Chi Mi nh as such , b ut i t is c lea r th a t th e pr inc ip al per son , at l eas t on
th at side o f th e fen ce, wa s Ho.
Se na to r P ercy. Y ou he ard Mr . Mo ffa t’s sta tem en t as to how he
look ed on Ho. W as he look ed on as a Com mu nis t of any pa rt ic ul ar
so rt? W as he look ed up on str ic tly as a Com mu nis t wi th in th e na tio n­
ali sts ’ pa rt ic ul ar fra me wo rk or was he looke d upo n by th e OS S as an
ag en t of Moscow ?
Mr . W h it e . Ce rta in ly n ot by tho se of us who were th ere , M r. Pe rcy .
We look ed at h im as a lea de r of a pa rty , th e pr in ci pa l pa rt y an d th e
pr in ci pa l lea der . I ha d occas ion to rec ount some con ver sat ion s I ha d
wi th him , an d he ne ve r mad e an y secr et or att em pt ed to dow nplay
th e fa ct t h at he wa s a Co mm unist an d ha d been a Com mu nis t, th at he
ha d been to Rus sia , th a t he ha d been int ere ste d in wo rk ing fo r the
Co mm uni st cause in ma ny par ts of th e wo rld and so fo rth , bu t when
I talk ed to him he was ta ki ng a rea lly qui te m atte r-o f- fa ct who is
goi ng t o he lp me ge t th is pla ce ru nn in g—yo u know.
DID HO C H I M IN H PROVI DE SERVI CES FOR U .S . ?

Se na to r P ercy. D id he pe rfo rm an y servic es th at you kno w of fo r

the U ni te d St ate s G overn me nt ? W as he of any a ssis tanc e, fo r inst anc e,
in co nne ctio n w ith the res cui ng o f d own ed A me ric an fliers ?
Mr . W h it e . Yes, lie w as. I ask ed him p ar tic ul ar ly a bo ut t hi s b ecaus e
one of t he fun ctio ns we ha d in OS S was to at te m pt to loca te peop le
who h ad been pa rti cu la rly h ero ic in defe nse of A me ric an int ere sts a nd
peop le in th at are a du rin g the Ja pa ne se occ upat ion.
W e ha d he ard th at Ho ha d ind eed hel ped two Am eri can fliers,
Na vy pil ots , reac h saf ety in Ch in a, an d ac co rdi ng to th e re po rt we
ha d at th e tim e, whi ch we ha d no t ha d any way , rea lly , to confi rm,
bu t it was t h at h e ha d walke d pe rso na lly all th e way fro m his m oun-
 189

tainous retrea t, hideaway, in north ern Tonkin to Kunming, to the

outskirts of Ku nming, an d delivered those two pilots o ver in effect to
American a uthori ties in K unm ing ; and he allowed tha t th at was true,
but before I could ask him for any details and get him to explain
the length of the tri p and so for th, he rat her uncomfortably shifted
the subject to something he was more parti cula rly anxious to talk
about, which was where could he get—
Senator P ercy. C ould you give us the benefit of any conversation
you mig ht h ave ha d with OSS officers who had worked with the V iet
Minh before you arrived, as to what Ho was really doing ?
Was he fightin g the Japa nese or was he o perat ing in just harassi ng
operations and stockpilin g resources to fight his own battles late r;
tha t is, for the postwa r use ?
Mr. W hite . Yes, if I unders tand your question, I didn ’t have any
debriefing from the operatio n I succeeded. T he very limited conver­
sations I had with the dep artin g group was tha t Ho had in fact
been very useful in, and very resist ant to t he Japane se—harassment
was about the limit, harassme nt and provision of intelligence, was
about th e limi t of his c ontribution. But there had been no lack of co­
operation, o r enthusiasm, on his par t. The answer to your par t whether
he was laying some kind of in frast ructu re, lay ing some plans fo r later,
I did not get tha t impression. I did n’t get the impression th at he
was using resistance to the Japanese, as a ploy for bring ing in powe r
his own g roup. But I can’t—I am not a terri bly reliable witness on
th at point.
H O C H I M I N l f s OU TL OO K ON C H IN E S E -V IE T N A M E S E R E L A T IO N S H IP S

Senator P ercy. Did he ever comment to you on the long hist ory of
China ’s attem pt to dominate Indochin a ?
Mr. W hite . Yes, sir. You will find in this dispatch th at t ha t was
very much on his mind when he discussed this with me. He g ave me,
in fact, a prim er on Indochinese h istory or th e hi story of th e people,
which is mainly one of resistance to the Chinese over a course of 800
years, and he gave th at to me in grea t detail.
Senat or P ercy. Did he comment t o you or describe wh at his out­
look would be on Chinese-Vietnamese relationships?
Mr. W hite . In th e sense, by inference certa inly, he would resist all
forms of Chinese do mination of an independent Vietnam; th at was
the ir histor ical p osition and it was a very prac tical feeling he ha d this
day which was exacerb ated, as I said a littl e bit earlier, by the fact
tha t his pa rt of the world, the province of Tonkin and the northe rn
pa rt of Annam, th at pa rt north of the 16th parallel, were under
Chinese occupation and the Chinese were looting the country very
diligently. Here again it is th e Chinese problem tha t was uppe rmost
in his mind.
Mr. Moffat. Senator, could I say something about that?
Senator P ercy. Yes, Mr. Moffat.
Mr. M offat. I thin k one of the problems we have in discussing the
problems of t his period is tha t C hina was nationa list at th is time and
the Communists did not come into China for anothe r 3 years, but
what a gr eat many of us fe lt, and I have always felt, tha t th e innate
feeling and concern about China would have prevented domination
 190

by a Communist China of a Communist Vietnam just as the latt er

would oppose a Nationalist China.
Senator P ercy. Was there a feelin g on your pa rt th at he was person-
nally prejudiced agains t the Chinese, and what was the depth of his
feeling about them ? How did he describe them a nd what might have
been imbued in the ex isting leadership as a result of t ha t indoctr ina­
tion?
Mr. W hite . In his discussions with me he would refer to the Chinese
as “our tradi tiona l enemy.” Bu t he referr ed in a rath er academic
sense rath er t han in an emotional or an immediate sense. He sort of—
“as you know, we have been resisting Chinese domination for 800
years” and then go on to tell me about some e arly Chinese emperor
who had done something part icula rly offensive t o the Indochinese
pride.
Senator P ercy. Could you comment on th e much discussed t heory
tha t if it is our objective to resist Chinese aggression in tha t area,
tha t possibly one of the best wrays to do i t might have been to have a
strong, unified Vietnam under some stron g, powerful leader like Ho
who was not a puppe t o f P eking ? Ho looked upon China as a tra di­
tional enemy and Ho would resist with everythi ng he could any in­
vasion of tha t area or undue influence in tha t area by the Chinese.
Mr. W hite . Yes, I agree with tha t, but I would l ike t o put it the
other way around, if you don’t mind.
Senator P ercy. Rephrase it yourself.
Mr. W hite . I t is my opinion th at if Ave had proceeded the oth er way
in this t ragi c story and th at there h ad been an inde pendent but indeed
Communist or Communist sy mpathizi ng Ind ochina, tha t i t would no t
now be dominated or in any way influenced by Peking. The back­
ground of the relationships between the two countries would have
seen t o tha t, as well as Ho and the innate nationali sm of the entire
people.
witness’ assessment or December 1946 meeting with ho
Senato r P ercy. Mr. Moffat, when you returned to the Dep artmen t of
State a fte r your December 1946 meeting with Ho, wThat did you re port
and how was your assessment received ?
Mr. Moffat. Well, it was quite an interval. I didn ’t get back until
the middle of F ebruary . I continued t o send back diary l etters which
don’t appea r in th e Committee stu dy an d in some of these I let myself
go to members of my d ivision in comments on Indochina, as the De­
partm ent seemed to be ge tting much too much concerned on the Com­
munist business and t hat it didn ’t—it was not justified in th at par t of
the world. I did somehow—I lead the tel egrams and I still don’t know
how’ I managed to get tha t one of May 13 throu gh the Department,
but th at was the last effort we were able to make.
F R E N C H M ET HO DS OF RE AC TI VA TI NG CO NT RO L I N IN D O C H IN A

Senato r P ercy. H ow would you characterize the French methods

of rea ctivat ing th eir control in t ha t p art of the world, postwar? Wha t
methods, what techniques did they use ?
Mr. White . Which one of us, sir ?
Senat or P ercy. Well, Mr. Moffat first?
 191
Air. M offat. I w as tr yin g to------
Se na to r P ercy. I wo uld like bot h o f you to an swe r.
Mr. M offat. I th in k Mr . W hi te cou ld giv e you rea lly mo re on th e
gro un d ope rat ion s.
Th e b asic pro ble m was t h at the y d id no t w an t to s tic k by t h ei r M arc h
6 ag ree me nt. As y ou know, the Chi nes e wo uld n’t pu ll ou t no rt h wh en
th ey w ere sup pos ed to. Th ere w as a lon g del ay, b ut th en H o Ch i M inh
did make th e ag ree me nt th a t he wo uld le t th e Fr en ch s end in forc es
pea cef ull y, an d th e Fr en ch ma de th e ag ree me nt th a t Vi etn am was t o
be reco gni zed as a fre e sta te ins ide t he F re nc h Un ion . I th in k peo ple
mis under sto od, ag ai n ta lk in g in te rn at io na l law , an d th in k we cou ld
ha ve rec ogn ized Vi etn am a t th a t tim e, bu t th er e was no que stio n of
fo rei gn rel ati on s in t he M ar ch 6 ag re em en t; th e Vie tna me se were n ot
giv en th a t pow er. T h at was to be su bje ct to disc ussion. W e co uld n’t
hav e tu rn ed aro un d an d rec ogn ized “th e fre e st at e” ins ide th e Un ion
at t h at sta ge un de r i nt er na tio na l law .
B ut th e Fr en ch we re ju st enc roa ch ing an d pu lli ng bac k on eac h
com mit me nt th ey mad e. Th e Vie tna me se wer e do ing ex act ly th e sam e
th ing . Th ey were m ak in g att ac ks her e an d the re. Th ey wer e bo th
br ea ch ing a gre em ent s.
Th e Fr en ch were mo re succ essf ul, how eve r, in ma kin g fu rt her an d
str on ge r move s an d I wou ld hav e sa id th ere was a piec eme al br ea k­
dow n of wh at th ey ha d fir st agr eed t o as th ey go t str on ge r m ili ta ril y.
Now, I th in k F ra n k W hi te ca n s ay mo re ab ou t th e ac tua l o pe rat ion s
in th e field.
Se na to r P ercy. Mr. W hit e?
Mr . W h it e . Yes, sir , I can re po rt h ow it was o n th e gr ou nd at t he
time .
I rem ember sh or tly af te r we ar riv ed , Ge ne ral Le Cle rc ar ri ve d on
th e sh ip Pa ste ur in Sa igo n, I gue ss it was a t th e end of Se pte mb er,
1945—an d h e ha d a re gim en t of Fr en ch tro op s b ut, of cours e, th ey wer e
Fr en ch Le gio nn air es an d I doub t if t he re were ha lf a doze n Fr en ch ­
men in th e en tir e gr ou p. Th ey were ma inl y Ge rm an s fro m PO W
camp s. Bu t, any how , Ge ner al Le Cle rc ma de it ve ry cle ar ea rly on as
he pa ra ph ra se d th e fam ous ph ras e of W ins to n Ch ur ch ill , sa id : “I
di dn ’t come bac k to In do ch in a to giv e In do ch in a bac k to th e In do ­
chin ese. ” H is fo rces w her eve r t he y cou ld rea ss ert th e Fr en ch p rese nce,
di d so a nd if i t wo uld req uir e do ing i t in an agg res siv e, ru th le ss way ,
the y d id it.
On th e ot he r ha nd , I wou ld leav e t he r eco rd inco mp lete a nd u nc lea r
if it we ren ’t also st at ed th a t Vi et M inh na tio na lis ts, la te r to become,
you know , to be th e pr ec ur so rs of th e Vi et Con g, com mi tted excesses
of th ei r own. Fr en ch civ ilia ns were br uta liz ed on occasi ons, an d th is
com bin atio n o f e xcesses o n bot h side s f inal ly er up te d int o th e w ar t h at
was to come later . B ut it sta rte d— it foll owe d th e flag, as it were.
Ev ery pla ce it we nt th e excesses beg an a nd so fo rt h how ever , th e F re nc h
did in th e s outh ma na ge to o bta in an d enf orc e a ce rta in d egr ee of co n­
tro l by th e end o f 1946.

COMPARISON OF VIET M IN H AND FREN CH ADMINI STRATIO N

Se na tor P ercy. S pec ifica lly, cou ld bo th of you com par e th e na tu re

of t he Vi et Mi nh ad m in ist ra tio n in th e no rth of In do ch in a an d th a t
of th e Fr en ch in tho se are as th ey were br in gi ng un de r th ei r co ntr ol ?
 192
Wha t different techniques, approaches, procedures, methods did each
of them use ?
Mr. Moffat. I don’t know that I could answer th at question. I don’t
feel I am personally familiar.
Senator P ercy. Mr. White ?
Mr. W hite . Well, I can go this fa r and say when in areas the French
assumed control they resorted to the fami liar people and practices of
the prew ar regime. Many of the people, many of the bureaucracy, both
native and French, were restore d to the same kind of positions they
had before. Now, in the areas t ha t th e V iet Minh controlled, we were
not the re to be able to observe any more than we were able to observe
it in the Vietnamization prog ram now.
SOVIET RE PLY TO PR ES IDE NT NI XO N’s SPE EC H

Senator P ercy. Those are all the historical questions I have. Per ­
haps then I will t urn to th e Soviet reply today to Presid ent Nixon’s
speech.
You know how I feel about this war. I would say tha t thi s first reac­
tion of the Soviet Government to the mining of North Vietnamese
harbors gives some hope tha t a c onfrontat ion can be avoided, and tha t
the summit conference will not be cancelled. The sum mit wasn’t even
mentioned in their reaction, and if this is true, then I would hope we
could continue efforts to develop constructive relations w ith the Soviet
Union, China and other world powers.
I thin k your own reac tion would be most in teresti ng and helpful
to us. The Soviet statement reads as follows:
The Soviet Government r esolu tely insi sts th at th e United Sta tes ’ steps to block
the coas t and dis rup t groun d commu nicatio ns of the Demo cratic Republic of
Vietnam be can cel'ed wit hou t delay.
The Governm ent of the Unite d Sta tes announc ed a new esca latio n of its ag­
gressive actio ns in Vietnam, the actio ns th at complica te fu rth er t he situ atio n in
Sou thea st A sia a nd a re fra ug ht with s erious consequenc es fo r i nte rna tio nal peace
and secur ity.
The state ment said th at Nixon gave an order for “mining the en tries
into th e N orth Vietnamese ports so as to prev ent ships from reaching
the ports, for intensification of bombing of the DRV terr itor y and,
specifically, fo r h itti ng from the air railroa ds and other communica­
tions.”
And I quote fu rth er from thei r stat eme nt:
In thi s way, the Unite d Sta tes tri es to brea k the economic, tra de and othe r
rela tion s th at the DRV has developed with othe r stat es, to depri ve the Demo­
cra tic Republ ic of Vietnam of the oppo rtuni ty to receive aid for its people to
rebuff the U.S. a ggressio n and also to receive foodstu ffs and oth er supplies from
(as r eceive d) the peacef ul popula tion.
The statement demanded tha t acts of U.S. aggression against the
DRV be ended, t hat th e rig ht to freedom of i nterna tional navigation
and trad e be respected. The Soviet Government expresses hope tha t
this point of view is shared by the government and people of all peace-
loving states.
The R ussians sa id :
No m at te r wh at fals e pre tex ts are used to cover up the ad ven tur ist action s of
the Uni ted Stat es arm ed forces in Vietnam , the real purpos e of thes e actio ns is
 193
obvious: It is not to save the United States from humiliation but to save the
notorious “Vietnamization” policy which suffers an obvious failure.
The K remlin sa id :
Intensification of the bombings of the DRV terri tory and Washington’s at­
tempts to establish singlehandedly its own rules of intern ationa l navigation
cannot but cause indignation and strong censure. These actions show again for
the whole world t he pirat ic natu re of t he war which the United States has un­
leased and continues agai nst the Vietnamese people for many years.
The Soviets said the U.S. has signed the Geneva Convention an d:
The Soviet Union considers as inadmissible the U.S. actions which jeopardize
the freedom of navigation and security of Soviet and other ships.
The Soviet Union will draw from this approp riate conclusions tha t the Gov­
ernment of t he United States will b ear the entire responsibility for the possible
consequences of its illegal actions.
The Russ ians warned the Un ited State s it is following “a dangerous
and slippery road ” an d said tha t it can lead only to a new complica*
tion of the inte rnatio nal s ituation.
REACTIONS TO SOVIET STATEM ENT
Now, from your long experience with communications from the
Soviet Union, and consid ering the si tuation th at we face today, the re­
action of each of you to tha t statement would be very much ap preci­
ated.
Mr. Moffat. Well, I read one ot her par agr aph which bothers me
even more and tha t is th e ne xt to the l ast p arag rap h which says—you
have had the word “inadmissible” which I believe in the Diplomatic
Corps is a strong word. Th en it says, “The Soviet Gov ernment reso­
lutely insists th at t he U.S. steps to block the coast be cancelled without
delay.” And tha t is a wfully strong language in a n inte rnatio nal state ­
ment. I th ink they have l eft some things out but I thi nk th ere is going
to have to be some face-saving all around o r else we may very easily
get into a very serious confronta tion.
Senator P ercy. Mr. White ?
Mr. W hite . Yes, my offhand reaction to—I mean, not offhand b ut
my instan t reaction is th at I am surpris ed th at the Soviets did not take
a more hostile sou nding response tha n this one 'because I feel tha t the
admin istratio n in each one of its major moves part icula rly in the
last 10 days, but over the period of its concern in this affair has at
each possible occasion taken another tur n of the screw and at some
juncture, I do t hink it is going to result in a rup turi ng relations hip
between ourselves and t he Soviet Union and cause them to suffer seri­
ously. I would not have been surpri sed if the s ummit h ad been called
off.
Senator P ercy. I would have agreed with much of what you said.
Mr. White . It still may be.
Senator P ercy. Mr. Chairm an, those are all the questions I have.
The Chairman. Than k you.
I have ju st seen this message and my first reaction is like yours. I
think i t is a very restrai ned statement under the circumstances an d I
hope it will continue to be restrained. T hat is going to be a very difficult
subject fo r thi s morning. There are a few odds and ends I would like
to explore before we adjourn.
 194

FREN CH COLLABORATION WI TH JAPA NES E

Mr. Moffat, I thin k you said in your statement tha t the French
collaborated with the Japane se which was news to me. Could you
explain th at a little fu rthe r ?
Mr. Moffat. They acted as hosts to the J apan ese; they kept th e a d­
minist ration in operation, officially French, hut the Japanese ran the
country and they jus t went along with it. Th ere was nothing they could
do but they went along in order to stay in power, I th ink, largely.
The Chairman. Y ou mean while the Japanese-----
Mr. Moffat. Duri ng t he p eriod of th e J apanese, from the time the
Japanese moved in unt il the-----
The C hairman. What was tha t period, just for the record? I would
like it.
Mr. Moffat. Tha t would have been in 1941, December 1941.
The Chairman. Unt il when ?
Mr. Moffat. Until March 1945.
The Chairman. Were the French nominally adminis tering the
country?
Mr. Moffat. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chairman. B ut un der the direction of the Ja pane se; is that the
way it was ?
Mr. Moffat. Yes, sir. Under the Decoux administration.
The Chairman. But the regul ar provincial admini stratio n was still
French?
Mr. Moffat. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Althoug h th ey were, of course, t akin g t heir orders
from t he Ja panese ?
Mr. Moffat. Yes, sir.
RECOGNITION OF TWO VIETNAMS

The Chairman. Te ll me, Mr. Moffat, durin g your experience was

there any recognition by the gov ernment ther e were two Vietnams ?
Mr. Moffat. We always treate d it as one.
The C hairman. D id anybody trea t it as two, to your knowledge?
Mr. Moffat. Well, in Cochin China the southern province, there
were a whole series of nationa list factions there, and the Viet Minh
or the Vietnam Government did not have th e same control and they
didn ’t have a chance to develop it before they were pushed out because
tha t was in the area controlled by the British.
The Chairman. But prio r to the intervention of foreigners, the
French always considered it one country, did they not?
Mr. M offat. No, Cochin China was set up as a colony, but Tonkin
and Annam were protect orates which did not include sovereignty.
The Chairman. What was the distinction of th at ?
Mr. Moffat. We recognized th e emperor, I mean t he French rec­
ognized the emperor and protectorate and the French had a protec­
tora te of those two states agreeing to take care of them and to prevent
aggression against them, and th at is why I said earlier they had not
honored their own responsibilities.
 195
ROLE OF BAO DAI

The Chairman. You mentioned Bao Dai ; just what was his role
during -----
Mr. Moffat. Well, he had a series of roles.
The C hairman. What was he prio r to the war ?
Mr. Moffat. He was emperor in Annam at Hue, and then when
Ho Chi Minh set up and established a Vietnam Provisiona l Govern­
ment, they persuaded Bao Dai tha t he had better back them so he
threw his su pport behind them, otherwise he would have been throw n
out; I guess he was actually eliminated for a time; and then later
the French decided, with our encouragement, to select Bao Dai to
head a pupp et government, as the one person they could thin k of
who could rally the non-Communist elements in Vietnam around him.
So he came back as the ruler but he d idn 't last very long before he
went back to the Riviera.
The Chairman. I am afra id I am not making it very clear.
Was Bao Dai jus t the emperor of just Annam, not Tonkin and
Cochin China ?
Mr. Moffat. Not Cochin China. Was Tonkin pa rt of it? No, ju st
Annam.
Mr. W hite . J us t Annam.
The C hairman. Th e capi tal of Annam is Hu e?
Mr. W hite . H ue.
The Chairman. Wha t was in Tonkin at t ha t time?
Mr. W hite . Tonkin was an independent, was a pro tectorat e as Mr.
Moffat says.
The Chairman. Directly under a Frenc h government?
Mr. W hite . Th at’s right.
The Chairman. This palace you met at, you met with Ho, was
old-----
Mr. W hite . Tha t was the Fren ch residence or palace.
The Chairman. The French residence fo r the Frenc h represe nta­
tive.
VI ET NA M REGARDED AS SIN GL E PO LIT IC AL E N TI TY

Often we have talked about the section in the Geneva Accords which
says the 17th par allel is not to be recognized as a politic al division or
for any purpose other than for this regrouping.
Are you fam iliar with tha t ?
Mr. W hite . Th at is my recollection.
The Chairman. Which leaves the impression tha t they rega rd it,
all of Vie tnam, as a single political entity. Is th at correct, Mr. Moffat?
Mr. Moffat. Well, except t here was to be a plebiscite both in the
north and in the sou th; and the original problem t ha t Ho Chi Minh
had, everybody recognized his complete control of t he north, but the
various factions and the Frenc h efforts to break th e south away f rom
them, they said we will have a plebiscite and this was one of the agr ee­
ments which was n ot carried out. By tha t time, nobody truste d any
vote anyw ay; it depended on who was control ling the election.
 196

US E OF ELE CTI ONS

Th e C hai rma n . H ad elec tion s been used as a me tho d of de ter mi n­

ing lea de rsh ip ot he r th an a t t he vil lag e leve l ?
Mr . M offat. I d on ’t t hi nk so.
Th e C hai rma n . Th ey elec ted vil lag e chie fs ju st by th e way one
does in a New Eng la nd tow n mee ting , I suppo se. Is th at rig ht ? Is
th a t yo ur i mpr essi on ?
Mr. W hi te . T h at is my imp ress ion , yes. I coul d be wr ong on th is,
bu t I am vi rtu al ly ce rta in th at , fo r exam ple, when he des crib ed hi m ­
se lf to me as th e Pro vis ion al Pr es id en t or th e Pr es id en t of the P ro ­
vis ion al Go ver nm ent o f To nk in, Ho h ad nev er stoo d fo r any election.
H e ma y hav e been electe d by his own pa rt y mem bers bu t th er e ha d
been no pleb isci te or a ny gen era l elect ion of a ny k ind t h at es tablish ed
him as th e p res ide nt.

FR EN CH BOM BARD MEN T OF HA IP HO NG

Th e C hai rma n . Mr. W hit e, were you in H ai ph on g when th e F re nc h

bom bar ded Ha ip ho ng at so rt of the beg inn ing of the war ?
Mr. W hi te . Y es, I was.
Th e C hair man . A nd kil led , it is alle ged , 6,000 Vi etna mes e? I hav e
seen ac coun ts th a t th ey ki lle d 6,000.
Mr. W hi te . I believ e t h at t o be e xag ger ate d. W he n I c ame in I w as
at a w at er fr on t bi str o a t a ti me , as I re cal l------
Th e C hai rm an . At wh at?
Mr. W hi te . A w at er fr on t cafe , bis tro , si tti ng ou t the re.
Th e C hai rma n . W ha t is th e d ate ?
Mr. W hi te . I t was in Nov emb er o f 1945.
Mr. M offat. N o.
Mr. W hi te . No, the Fr en ch ret ur ne d.
Mr. M offat. T h at is why I th in k we were ge tti ng con fuse d here .
Th er e were two of tho se epis ode s th at I reme mber.
Th e C hai rm an . Tw o e piso des ?
Mr. M offat. Nov emb er 1946, w as when Colone l Debe s bom bard ed.
Mr. W hi te . Th at ’s ri gh t.
Mr. M offat. Th at is a l at er one.
Mr. W hi te . I am re fe rr in g whe n he firs t came back an d br ou gh t
th is flot illa, and th e ba ttl e cru ise r Ric hel ieu . Th ey came in an d the y
fire d off a live ly can nonad e of b ig gun s b ut w he the r th e big gun s a ctu ­
all y—t he y di dn ’t hi t any p a rt where I was ne ar no r did I see any
evid ence o f dam age. I th in k it w as a 14th of J uly s alu te.
Th e C hai rma n . I t was l arg ely a w arn ing , I sup pose ?
Mr. W hi te . Th at ’s ri gh t.
Th e C hair man . R at he r th an the real bom bar dm ent . As lon g as we
ar e on th a t sub jec t, you were n ot th ere la te r when t he y rea lly d id kill
a lo t of p eople, is th a t r ig ht ?
Mr. M offat. Yes , I was the re sh or tly af te r th at .
Th e C hai rma n . Describe, th at . W ha t ha ppene d ?
Mr. M offat. I am tr yi ng t o go back n ow becaus e t hi s is a ft er al l, 25
ye ar s now, to ge t th e det ail s. Th e Fr en ch br ou gh t up a fleet o f boats
an d gav e an ul tim atu m of 3 hou rs. I th in k the Vie tnam ese mu st
ag ree t o tu rn o ver th e cust oms whi ch were sup pos ed to be V ietn ame se
 197
or jo intly administere d to the Fr ench and set up a zone th at the Vi et­
namese might not go into, part -----
The C hairman. Wh at is t ha t day ? I want to get it clear. When di d
this happe n ?
Mr. Moffat. In November 1946, sir.
The C hairman. 1946?
Mr. Moffat. I have always thou ght t ha t this part icula r episode was
what precip itated the decision of t he Vietnamese to fight. T here was
no time ? physically, to get an answe r—I mean, to get t he message of
this ultimatu m up to Hanoi and get a reply, and they asked f or an
extension and they promised to get off the message and get a decision
from the government.
Instead , the bombardment took place as promised at the end of 3
hours, w ith the shells very carefully avoiding the Chinese sector but
going into the Vietnamese section o f town, and I was stayin g s hortly
afte r this with th e American Consul at Hanoi and th ere was a S tan d­
ard Oil man who shared the ap artme nt with him. He had been down in
Haiph ong within 24 hours of the bombardment, so that I had not just
Vietnamese propagand a but at least what I considered a fai rly reliable,
almost eye witness of it. I tho ught his estimate was about 2,000 killed.
It might have been more.
The Chairman. It has been—I have read it— I don’t remember
whether it was Bern ard F all ’s book or David Schoenbrun in his lecture
tha t estimated 6,000 Vietnamese were killed.
Mr. Moffat. My memory—it may be correct.
The Chairman. But it was an ultimatum directed at the Ho Chi
Minh Government ?
Mr. M offat. I t was an ultimatu m directed at the—yes, V iet Minh
Government.
The Chairman. They gave him no time to clear out ?
Mr. Moffat. They gave the Vietnamese no time to carry out the
agreement.
The C hairman. Th at is more ar bitr ary th an we a re ; we gave them
3 days to clear out.
[Laugh ter.]
The C hairman. They didn ’t have time in 3 hours ; it was obvious
they didn ’t expect them to ; they just wanted to prec ipitate it.
P O PU LA R IT Y OF H O C H I M IN H

Mr. White or both of you, I have read—I th ink it is i n Eise nhower’s

book, tha t if an election had been held at approxima tely this time,
1944, 1945, I thin k he is reported to have said tha t Ho Chi Minh
would have received 80 percent of the popul ar vote.
Have you ever heard that statement ?
Mr. Moffat. I heard tha t statement, I th ink, a ttrib uted to Mr. Eisen­
hower or was it to Mr. Dulles? Anyway, everybody recognized-----
The Chairman. It was Eisenhower. I read it in the book myself,
“The M andate for Change.” I was going to ask wh at you th ink of it.
Was he really a popu lar figure ?
Mr. Moffat. Yes, sir.
The C hairman. D o you th ink tha t was a reasonable estimate?
Mr. Moffat. Eig hty or 75,1 would certainly say yes.
 198

The Chairman. He was very popular ?

Mr. Moffat. I f not it was the anti- French feeling a nd he symbolized
it, 90 t ha t even if they weren’t for him, which many of them were be­
cause he had so symbolized the national ist movement, they would have
voted for him.
The Chairman. Wha t was your feeling, Mr. White ?
Mr. W hite . I agree. I believe it would be something on th at order
of m ajority. To add to what Mr. Moffat has just said, which I agree
with too, Ho was the only really recognizable political figure operating
there at the time.
1 don’t—1 am not suggesting tha t tha t was because he excluded
opposition. He was curious. I have met many wo rld leaders in my l ife
before bu t he was the le ast sort of megalomaniac, if you will, of any
tha t I have ever met. He actually abjured standi ng on balconies, you
know, or popula r appeals. When he went around he just walked
around the streets as anybody did, you know, with no official cars,
no pomp and panoply of any ki nd ; but he was about the only recog­
nizable person to vote for.
HO C H I M IN H ’s BACK GROUND

The C hairman. You make him—I thought, in your initia l state­

ment there—a very appeali ng figure. I mean, you said you were im­
pressed by him. Then you said small in his stat ure; he was a very
small man ?
Mr. White . Yes, tiny.
The Chairman. And quiet spoken ?
Mr. W hite . Yes, he suffered. He told me a littl e about his health.
He suffered from—dur ing the Japane se occupation he was liv ing in
the woods, in the jungle, and he h ad a bad case of tuberculosis, and as
Mr.-----
The C hairman. Tuberculosis ?
Mr. W hite . Yes, and Mr. Blum’s repo rt cites a group, an OSS
group, which went in with a doctor and gave him some penicillin and
so for th—not penicillin—sulpha drugs in those days, and he told me
tha t he was fairl y convinced tha t tha t was responsible for his re­
covery from tuberculosis.
The Chairman. Y ou said he spoke Englis h bette r than you did
French. H ad he visited America ?
Mr. White . Yes, he had.
The C hairman. Did he tell you anythi ng about his experiences
here ?
Mr. W hite . Well, I was involved in writin g several cover stories on
Ho in late r days with Time magazine and Life, and although Ho
himself did n’t tell me much about his travels, other than to mention
tha t he had been to the United State s and he had seen-----
The Chairman. Where had he been in the United States ?
Mr. W hite . All he mentioned was New Yo rk; he mentioned he had
been to Engl and and to Russia, and, of course, to France. And-----
The C hairman. H ow did he get to New York, as a tourist ?
Mr. White . Yes, he was a—steward.
The C hairman. Steward on a boat?
 199
Mr. White . Steward on a bo at; yes, sir.
The Chairman. What kind of boat, do you know ?
Mr. White . I th ink it was a French boat.
The Chairman. French boat. How long did he stay in New York ?
Mr. W hite. I don’t know. As we pieced this t ogether from what r e­
ports we could obtain, not fr om Ho in Time, th at is, Time magazine, he
must have been in New York not a long time but I gathere d 2 or
3 months.
The Chairman. T wo or 3 months. Did he work in New York as
* a steward, I mean, as a waiter ?
Mr. White . As a waiter ?
The C hairman. A s a waiter?
Mr. W hite . Yes.
» The C hairman. Do you know where ?
Mr. W hite . No, I ca n’t—I can tell you some o f the other places he
was where he worked. He su rfaced in P ar is ; he was not a waiter bu t a
dishwasher in the Continental Hotel in Pari s. He also worked as a
photo graph er’s assistant, developer and ac tually made some pictures.
He was interested in pho tography .
The C hairman. Pho tograp hy?
Mr. W hite . Yes.
The C hairman. Did he tell you about his v isit to the Versailles con­
ference ?
Mr. W hite. No, he did not.
The C hairman. I t is reported he was there.
Mr. W hite . I t has been rep orted and t ha t is al l in the record some­
place, but he j ust did n ot hap pen to mention i t to me in our conversa­
tion.
The C hairman. Where did he learn E ngli sh ? How did he hap pen to
learn Engl ish ?
Mr. W hite . Well, this brief exposure in th e U nited States helped,
and-----
The Chairman. He must have been a quick learner if he learned
Englis h in three months.
Mr. White . I believe so; I believe so.
HO C H I M IN I!

The C hairman. You said he was very curious?

Mr. White . Yes, tha t was one of the reasons I came away with not as
* much knowledge f rom my several h ours with him, because I spent as
much time answering questions as I d id ask ing when I was w ith him.
The C hairman. Yes.
Mr. W hite. And , in his desire f or inf ormatio n he was terr ibly eclec­
tic. He wanted to know everything about everything.
The Chairman. Was he in London? Did you say he had been in
London ?
Mr. White . Pa rdon?
The Chairman. Did you say he had been in London, too ?
Mr. White. I didn ’t say he had been in London.
The Chairman. I seem to have heard tha t he had been.
Mr. White . I thi nk so, too, but I can’t remember respond ing to that .
 200

Th e C hai rm an . I t hi nk so mebo dy sai d he wor ked i n th e Ri tz Ho tel

in Lo ndo n, but. I am no t sure . Sc hoenb run seemed to know him qui te
well.
Mr. W hi te . Yes. Dav e kne w him. As a yo ung co rre sp on de nt in
P ar is Da vid Sc hoe nbr un met Ho when Ho caqie to th is fam ous Fon -
tai nb leu -V ers ail les conf eren ce t o ne gotia te w ith the Fr en ch .
Th e C hair man . Oh , yes.
Mr . W hi te . An d mos t of th e ot he r cor res po nd ent s ap pa re nt ly in
P ar is w ere eit he r too busy or to o u na wa re or wh ate ver , a nd d id n’t pa y
mu ch a tte nt io n to h im ; but D av id Sc hoenb run did in vit e h im to di nn er
an d Ho sh owed u p an d the y ha d a mea l t og eth er a nd h e s aw him s ev­
era l ti me s on t h at occasion.

M E E T IN G W IT H H O C H I M I N H , DE CE M BE R, 19 4G

Th e C hair man . Mr. Moff at, wh at was yo ur im pre ssio n of Ho ? Ho w

di d yo u r eac t to him as an in div id ua l ?
Mr . M offat. I w as t rem end ously imp ress ed wi th him .
Th e C hair man . De scrib e it a lit tle fo r t he r ecor d. We a re all ig no r­
an t an d eve rybo dy is abo ut him . We wa nt to bene fit by yo ur ex pe ri­
ence. W he n did you mee t him an d tel l us a lit tle bi t ab ou t wh at y ou
did .
Mr. M offat. I w en t to ca ll on him .
Th e C hair man . Wh at ye ar ?W ha t tim e ?
Mr. Moffat. I n Dec emb er 1946.
Th e C hair man . Ye s?
Mr. M offat. I t was a week bef ore the fig hti ng bro ke ou t an d it
was— I ha d ask ed fo r an ap po int m en t t o m eet him , a nd th e re po rt was
th at he was ill, an d nob ody knew wh eth er it w as a dip lom ati c illn ess
or a bon a fide illnes s. Th e ne xt th in g I knew , I w as inv ite d to come t o
th e pal ace at 5 :00 o’clock, I th in k it was, an d I was tr yi ng to rem em ­
be r; I th in k th er e were one or two oth ers pre sen t. Gia m, not Gia p.
O’Su lli va n, ou r cons ul, an d Gia m, woul d be th e equ iva len t of U nd er
Se cr etar y in the Fo re ig n Office. H o was in bed.
Th e C hai rma n . He rea lly was ill, yo u th in k ?
Mr. M offat. Yes, he was. He tal ke d fo r ab ou t 15 or 20 min utes . I
ha d no in str uc tio ns ; th ey ha d no t come. We ha d discu ssed th is
me eti ng bef ore I lef t W ash ing ton . Th e big p rob lem was how fa r the
De pa rtm en t wa s go ing to g o on t hi s a nti -C om mu nis t a ngle w hich I was
ra th er w orr ied ab out , a nd so I h ad no ins tru cti on s a nd I re all y c ou ldn ’t
say an yth ing . I list ene d to w ha t he sai d an d I, of cours e, rep or ted to
th e De pa rtm en t an d th en I also inc lud ed it in a di ar y le tte r whi ch I
sen t bac k t o t he office—my wif e an d th e office—my w ife was in t he D e­
pa rtm en t, too—a nd th at is inc lud ed in the com mit tee pr in t. Bu t,
fra nk ly , I ha d a fee lin g ju st th at I was in the pres ence of someb ody
who was g re at , a nd I d on ’t know ho w y ou q uit e d efine it.
Th e C hai rma n . I know.
Mr. M offat. B ut ------
Th e C hai rm an . It doe sn't ha pp en too of ten .
Mr. M offat. It does n ot h ap pe n to o ofte n.
Th e C hai rm an . T h at ’s r ig ht . Go a hea d.
 201

QU ES TIO N REGARD ING AL TER NAT IVE TO HO

Mr. M offat. Co uld I ad d one th in g? W he n you were sa yi ng were

th er e any alt ern ati ve s. I th in k you pro ba bly are aw are t h a t th er e was
a very big rev olt ag ains t the Fr en ch in 1930 a nd 1931, w hic h fina lly
becam e qu ite a lar ge m ili ta ry op er ati on bef ore the y were able to pu t
it do w n; an d th er e were na tio na lis t lea de rs in th at gro up . Al l exc ept
Ho , an d I im agi ne Gi ap an d a few oth ers of th e Co mm unist gr ou p,
all were ca pt ur ed a nd al l w ere k ille d.
Th e r es ul t i s wh en th e n ex t ti me cam e, a nd th er e wa s an ot he r sm all er
rev olt in 1941, whic h was p ut do wn by th e Fr en ch —the Ja pa ne se stoo d
asid e an d let the m pu t it dow n—a gr ea t ma ny mo re na tio na lis t lea d­
ers were eli mi nat ed. Th e ne t re su lt was th at an y po tent ial riv al, you
m ig ht say , to Ho Ch i Mi nh, ha d ju st been eli mi na ted by th e Fr en ch
an d he wa s the one o ut sta nd in g nat io na lis t le ft.
Th e C ha irm an . The only one ab le to sur viv e ?
Mr. M offat . W hic h is th e rea son th a t th e Co mm uni sts were abl e
in In do ch in a to ca pt ur e th e na tio na lis t mov eme nt wh ich t he y di d not
in a ny ot he r co un try in S ou the ast As ia.
DE SCR IPT ION OF HO C H I M IN H

Th e C ha irm an . T o r et ur n to H o a b it, desc ribe a b it— you sa id you

fe lt you were in th e pres ence of a gr ea t ma n—j us t fo r th e rec ord , I
am ver y cu rio us my sel f—d escr ibe a li ttl e mo re ab ou t him , yo ur im ­
pre ssio ns abo ut him . Di d you hav e th e same fee lin g of his gr ea t
cu rio sit y an d his exp ect ati on s of fri en ds hi p fo r th e U ni te d St ate s?
W ha t did he say ?
Mr. M offat . H e tal ke d abo ut th e im me dia te—h is des ire fo r fr ie nd ­
sh ip wi th the U ni te d St ate s an d fo r hel p. I t w as ju st n ot t h at t yp e of
con ver sat ion wh ere he tal ke d aro un d or be f ul l of c uri osi ty. H e knew
th at I ha d come fro m t he St at e De pa rtm en t. I t seemed he was ho pi ng
th at I wo uld ha ve some messa ge f or hi m an d I w as m ise rab le n ot bei ng
able t o say an yth in g. Hi s qui etne ss was, I t hi nk , o ne o f t he th in gs a nd
I do n’t t hi nk it was a q uiet nes s of ju st b ein g sick. I ha d a fee lin g o f a
qu iet per so na lit y th a t wa s------
Mr. W h it e . R eflecti ve.
H o ’s LET TER S TO U. S. GOV ERN MEN T NOT ACKN OWLE DGED

Th e C ha irm an . Th e Pe nt ag on Pa pe rs say th a t he ad dre sse d ei gh t

let ter s to the Go ve rnm en t of the Un ite d St ate s an d the y were nev er
ack now ledg ed. Do y ou kno w an yt hi ng ab ou t t h at ?
Mr. M offat . Y es, si r; I e xp lai ne d to Se na tor P er cy a bo ut t ha t.
Th e C ha irm an . I am s orr y.
Mr. M offat . Le tte rs to the Pr es id en t of th e U ni te d St ates exc ept
fro m hea ds of sta te, c er tain ly fro m some body who is in opp osi tio n to
the hea d of s tat e of a fri en dl y co un try , are n ot ack now ledged b ecau se
as a m at te r o f po licy , th e P re sid en t ca n’t be gin en ga gin g in cor res po nd ­
ence wi th peo ple ar ou nd the wo rld ; an d th at is ju st a m at te r of in ­
te rn atio na l etiq uet te. Th ey do n’t get ackn owl edg ed. I th in k if we
 202
had, I thin k th ere would have been very, very severe repercussions—
it would have been almos t tan tamo unt to recognition and tha t would
have made—have meant a break with the French.
The Chairman. Have you ever seen the letters?
Mr. Moffat. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. Wh at did they say? Can you summarize the type
of things they said ?
Mr. Moffat. Very much the same. Again, if I remember them, that
he wanted American aid; he hoped for American suppo rt in their
nationa list struggle. They varied, I think , as I recall. The one th at is
mentioned i n t he—in you r study, in your committee print , is the one
where he really wanted us to throw the French off the Fa r Easte rn
Commission, which w’as, of course, fa r more tha n just an appeal for
help.
The Chairman. Yes.
GEN ERA L GIA l’

Tell me, did you meet General Giap ?

Mr. Moffat. Oh, yes, several times.
The C hairman. Could you give us a brief comment about him?
Mr. Moffat. My memory of Giap was t ha t—and I noticed in my
diary t ha t he was the firslt of w hat I called the typi cal Commie—the
cartoon Commie tha t I met; in other words, he was absolutely im­
mobile as to face. He h ad no—I jus t couldn’t get any reaction out of
him a t all. So I just didn ’t take to him very much. I j ust felt his sort
of stoniness. On the other hand, I found a grea t many people who
knew’ him, French an d others, who really knew him—I met him only
just at a cocktail par ty or reception or something, a couple of times—
all liked him immensely. One reason th at he was so very bit ter in this
fighting was t ha t his wife had been killed by the French in one of
the—at some stage—I don’t remember the details b ut I know’ t ha t he
added a personal equation to his other feelings.
The Chairman. Tha t is designed to do that.
Mr. White, did you meet Giap ?
Mr. White . Yes. I thoug ht he was the waiter.
[Laug hter.]
He came and he stood quietly at one junc ture when I was ta lking
to Ho for a l ong time, and he was we aring s ort of an open shirt and
shorts which w as not partic ularly unusual but i t was so rt of the garb
tha t the houseboys often wore and i t wasn’t u ntil lat er at some point in
the conversation tha t Ho t urne d to him to c larify himself on a point,
tha t I realized t hat he wasn’t a waiter, but I found him—then subse­
quently I was to encounter him two or three times ag ain and I r ather
agree wi th Mr. Moffat’s appr aisal, tha t he was no t th e outgoing type
person th at Ho was, and since he had some language problem we
didn ’t find a way to converse easily-----
The Chairman. He did n’t speak English a t all ?
Mr. W hite . No, he d idn 't speak Engli sh at all and my recollection
was tha t he was much more comfo rtable in Vietnamese or Annamite,
as the language was called, then, than he was in French, so we ju st
didn ’t ge t on.
 203
DID TH E CHI NES E RELEASE HO CH I M IN II FROM PRIS ON?

Th e C ha irm an . Th is is v ery in ter est ing .

One o th er t hi ng y ou rem ind ed me o f : I th in k I rec all th a t H o Ch i
Mi nh was in p ris on in Ch ina whe n, a lon g in 1943 or 1944 an d th a t we o r
someone in sp ire d Ch ian g Ka i-s he k to rele ase him in or de r to come
dow n an d a dvi se o ur O S S ; is th a t co rre ct ?
Does eith er o ne of y ou hav e an y kno wle dge ab ou t th at , th at h e ha d
been in pri so n, th e Chi nes e ha d ca ug ht him , I th in k, in Sh an gh ai or
some where a nd pu t hi m i n pr iso n, b ut we ha d so me thi ng to do w ith ha v­
ing him rele ase d so he co uld com e dow n a nd be of ass ista nce in o pposi ng
th e J ap an es e; is t h a t a c orr ec t mem ory or n ot?
Mr . M offat. I do n’t know , sir.
Th e C ha irm an . D o you kn ow ?
Mr . W h it e . Mr . F ul br ig ht , t h a t ha s been r ep or ted . We c ar rie d th a t
in a d isp at ch or in a c over st or y a t t h a t t im e—d one on him m any y ea rs
la te r, bu t t he i nfe ren ce w as th er e was n o way we cou ld re ally conf irm
it bu t t h a t is on e o f t he ve rsio ns or on e s to ry t h a t ha s been r ep or ted .
Th e C ha irm an . I k now I r ea d it so mew here a nd w ond ere d wh eth er
you knew an yt hi ng abo ut i t—h e d id n’t m ent ion th a t to you ?
Mr . W h it e . N o, he did not.
Th e C ha irm an . He di dn ’t ha ve an yt hi ng fav or ab le to say ab ou t
th e C hin ese ?
IMP RIS ONM ENT AND DEATH OF HO CH I M IN H ’s SISTER

Mr . W h it e . N o, he di d not . B ut I mu st confe ss, he did no t pa ra de

his pe rso na l sit ua tio ns at all. Th e only th in g, the one he re ally me n­
tio ne d in pa ssi ng was th e im pr iso nm en t an d sub seq uen t de ath of his
si st er ; but he d id n’t dw ell on th a t ve ry m uch. H e jus t sa id------
Th e C ha irm an . He took those th in gs ph ilo so ph ica lly , a pp ar en tly ?
Mr. W h it e . A t le as t thr .t wa s th e a pp ear anc e.
Th e C ha irm an . Ap pe ar ed to be------
Mr. W h it e . A nd i t was, how eve r, i t was d ed ica tio n to his sis ter t h at
I he ar d peo ple who kne w him , you kno w, Fr en ch peo ple who ha d
kno wn h im befo re, t h a t was g ive n as p a rt o f t he rea son wh y he nev er
m arr ied .
Th e C ha irm an . H e was im pr iso ne d by whom ? I mean, his sis ter
was im pri son ed by whom ?
Mr. W h it e . By t he Fr en ch .
Th e C ha irm an . By th e F re nc h ?
Mr. W h it e . Yes.
Th e C ha irm an . And inc arc era ted in th e cag es ?
Mr. W h it e . Yes.
Th e C ha irm an . T h at is no t des ign ed to en de ar the m, eit her . Mr.
Bl um say s he res ear che d th is an d th at th e Chi nes e did relea se Ho
Chi M inh in or de r to en lis t his assi sta nce in op po sin g th e Ja pa ne se
in T on kin ; is th a t r ig ht ? W it h L u H an , I thi nk .
Mr. W h it e . Yes.
PRESIDEN T DIEM

Th e C hai rm an . Th ere is o ne o th er ch ara cte r. Di d ei th er of y ou mee t

. Pr es id en t Die m ?

83-605 0— 73------14
 204
Mr. Moffat. No, si r; I didn’t.
Mr. White . No, si r; I di dn’t.
The Chairman. H e came over here; he was in this country for a
while. He had been a member of the French Provincia l Government.
Had he not been the go vernor of one of the provinces ? I wondered if
you could draw any comparison between Diem and Ho as individuals.
But neithe r of you met Diem.
Mr. Moffat. No.
Mr. W hite . I do know something as a student of th e subject mat­
ter. He was a Maryknoll Brothe r, a lay brother, from the Catholic
church. In fact, as I recall, another one o f hi9 bro thers was Arch­
bishop of Vietnam. I believe he did come up throu gh the provincial
admini stratio n bu t it would have been as a Fre nch functionary.
The Chairman. Back in the thirties, something like tha t ?
Mr. White . Yes.
C O M M EN D A TI O N OF W IT N E SS ES

The Chairman. Anything else ? Th is has been extremely interesting.

I ha te to impose on your time and keep you so late, b ut we don’t often
run across anyone who has firsthand infor mation about these historical
events. I think they are extremely impor tant if this country is ever
to so rt out its ideas and its prejudices and its misconceptions and be­
gin to think righ t about some of our relations. I t is h ard to get this
kind of materia l or to present it. I am sure you have presented it in
Life magazine, b ut under circumstances, I expect, which were not as
ominous as they are today. It may be by bring ing it out again tha t
we could ho pefully impress some people about and cause us to reflect
upon our present policy as well as our past ones and our futur e ones.
You have been extremely kind to come here.
Do you have anything at all you would like to add ?
Mr. Moffat. I would like to ju st make one comment, if I m ight, sir.
The C hairman. I would welcome any.
economic theory of u.s. movement into s.e. AS IA

Mr. Moffat. Yesterday there was a question, a discussion, on the

economic theory of our movement into Southeast Asia, a nd a couple
of clauses from one of my p apers was read in sup port of th at theory.
You will note from one of those tha t I read toda y there is a reference
to the Open Door policy or in equivalent language. I favored the
Open Door policy in Indoch ina and in all of these countries, I th ink,
just basically as p art of t he general, liberal policy th at all of us had
favored for many, many years, considering interna tional trad e as one
of the big facets of peace. I don’t think I ever thou ght in terms of
seeking a place to put investments. I also felt tha t the Open Door
policy would be very beneficial to the Vietnamese and to the people in
those areas, who at tha t time were restricted very clearly to the
French an d had no opportunity to do trade with others.
The thi rd th in g: I was concerned about Southeast Asia economically
because it was the source of tw o ra w m aterials th at were of gre at im­
portance to us, and we wanted to lie sure w’e would have the op­
portu nity to get them. One was tin ; the other which we now forg et
 305
abo ut in la rg e p a rt was na tu ra l rub be r. A t th a t stag e, na tu ra l ru bb er
was sti ll vi tal .
Sy nt he tic ru bb er was ju st be gi nn in g to come in an d was sti ll onl y
at a n ex pe rim en tal stag e. I hope d ou r g ene ral poli cy wou ld he lp br ea k
dow n th e tin an d ru bb er ca rte ls whi ch were a sever e ha nd icap to
Am eri can im po rts of need ed raw ma ter ial s. Al th ou gh I ha ve he ar d
of peo ple who feel we sho uld go int o thes e are as in or de r to ma ke it
poss ible fo r Am eri can busin ess to inv est, ce rta in ly th at was th e la st
th in g I th in k any of us were thi nk in g a bou t a t th a t sta ge.
Th e C hai rm an . Th ere was a diff eren ce of view betw een th e w it ­
nesses y es ter da y on th is poi nt.
Mr. M offat . I k now th er e w as, sir .
Th e C hai rm an . One g ave gr ea t em pha sis.
Mr. M offat . I ju st wa nt t o say t h a t was not th e sit ua tio n. Th e ob­
ject ives I sta ted ta lk in g abo ut the Op en Do or were t he re fo r th e re a­
sons I hav e giv en an d no o the r.
Th e C hai rm an . T h at wa s ce rta in ly one po in t o f vi ew, a nd I su ppo se
it is alw ays an elem ent in it, bu t I believ e Pr of es so r Sch les ing er
th ou gh t it w as mu ch mor e com plex t ha n ju st be ing econom ics, even as
th e do mi na nt moti ve.
Do you ha ve a ny o th er c omm ent you care to mak e, Mr. W hi te ?
Mr. W h it e . N o, Mr . Ch air m an , I do n’t belie ve I do.

commendation of witness es

Th e C ha irm an . We ar e ce rta in ly i nd ebt ed to both o f you g ent lem en

fo r com ing here. I kno w it is a gr ea t bu rd en to you an d few peop le
like to com e bef ore a ny c omm ittee . W7e h ave difficu lty in ge tti ng good
witne sses, com pet ent witnes ses. You wou ld be su rpr ise d how ma ny
fo rm er mem bers of Go ver nm ent h ave dec line d to pa rtic ip at e in these
hea rin gs, espe cial ly tho se int im ate ly con nect ed wit h the se polic ies, so
it is a gr ea t hel p to h ave y ou come. We are v ery m uch obl ige d to yo u.
Tha nk yo u ver y much . I f yo u sho uld h ave an y com men ts th a t occu r
to you , we wou ld welcome any com me nt; you can wr ite us.

commendation of staff work

Mr. W h it e . I wou ld like to say I com men d th e co mm ittee on its staf f

wor k in its ha nd lin g of th is he ar in g an d th e re po rts t h a t hav e gone
fo rth .
Th e C ha irm an . I kno w the sta ff ap pre cia tes th a t an d tho se of us
who h elp ed select the m ap pre cia te it. W e d on ’t have m any com pli me nts
of th at ki nd. T ha nk you v ery m uch.
(W he reu po n, at 12 :50 p.m., th e he ar in g was ad jou rn ed , to rec on­
vene sub jec t to t he c all of t he c ha ir. )
 208

THE ESSENTIAL DOMINO:

AMERICAN POLITICS AND VIETNAM
By Le sli e H . Gelb

AS He nr y Kiss inge r has wr itte n, pub lic su pp ort is “th e acid

test of a for eign poli cy.” Fo r a Pre sid en t to be successf ul
-L ^ i n m ain tai nin g his n ati on ’s secu rity he needs to beli eve, and
othe rs need to believ e, tha t he has solid sup po rt at home. It was
Pre sid ent Jo hn so n’s ju dgme nt tha t i f the Un ite d States pe rm itte d
the fal l of Vie tna m to com munis m, Am eri can pol itics w ould tur n
ugly and inw ard an d the wo rld wo uld be a less safe plac e in wh ich
to live. La ter , Pr esi den t Ni xo n wo uld de cla re: “T he rig ht way
out of Vie tna m is cr uci al to ou r ch ang ing role in the wo rld , and
the peace in the wo rld .” In or de r to gain su pp ort f or these ju dg ­
ments and the o bjectiv es in Vie tna m wh ich flowed fro m them , our
Pre sid ent s have had to weav e tog eth er the stee l-of -wa r stra tegy
wit h the stra nds of dome stic poli tics.
N ei th er the Am eric ans no r the Vie tnam ese com muni sts had
good odds fo r a tra di tio na l mi lit ary vic tory in Vie tnam . Give n
the mu tua l wi ll to cont inue the wa r and self- imp osed Am eri can
res tra int in the use of force, stal ema te was the most like ly ou t­
come.
Th is com mon per cep tion ha d a cr itic al im pac t on the strat egie s
of b oth sides. It m ean t t ha t the “w in ne r” w oul d be t he one whose
wil l to pers ist gave out first. H an oi ’s wil l, because of the nat ure
of its gov ernm ent, society and economy , and because the N or th
Viet nam ese wer e figh ting in and fo r th eir cou ntry , was firm er
by fa r tha n W ash ing ton ’s. W ash ing ton ’s wil l, becaus e of the
vag arie s of Am eri can poli tics and the wid esp rea d disl ike of in ­
term ina ble and ind ete rm ina te Asi an lan d wars, pres ente d an in­
vit ing targ et. Fo r both sides, then , U.S. dom estic pol itic s—
pub lic su pp ort and opp osit ion to the wa r—was to be the key
stress point .
Am eri can publi c opi nio n was the essent ial dom ino. O ur lea d­
ers knew it. H an oi ’s le ade rs knew it. Ea ch gea red its stra tegy —
both the rhe tor ic and the con duc t of the wa r— to this fact.
Ha noi ado pted wh at seems to hav e been a two -pro nge d str at­
egy to ca use U .S. wi thd raw al fro m Vie tna m by p lay ing on A m er ­
ican dom estic polit ics. Th e first aim was to try to conv ince
Am eric ans th at unless U .S. forces w ith dre w, th e k ill in g of Am er-
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460 FO RE IG N AF FA IR S
icans would never end. Han oi’s leaders seemed to have hoped
that as the war dragged on, Americans would come to see a hope­
less portr ait of corru pt Saigon leadership and an ineffective
South Vietnamese army. At the same time, Hanoi would seek to
demonstrate a willingness to match force w ith force at ever-in-
creasing levels. If the American public, or significant minorities
of the public, could be convinced of these factors, c ontinuation
of the war by the U.S. leadership would become bad politics.
The second aim of Han oi’s strategy, as I imagine it, was to
provide a face-saving exit for A merican leaders. It would not be
enough—indeed, it might be dangerous from Hano i’s view—to
leave official Washington in a situation where w ithdrawa l could
only mean defeat. Th at might lead to un limited escalation of the
war. Am erican leaders had to be assured that withdra wal could
take place w ithout severe withdr awal symptoms. From time to
time, Hanoi offered settlement packages that were not without
appeal. Thes e proposals, however, did not appeal to our leaders
because they were not looking for a face-saving way out, bu t for
a noncommunist South Vietnam.
Perhaps the surest sign that Han oi’s strategy made sense was
that our own leaders also believed that American politics was
the Achilles heel.
Officials rarely write memos with any explicit reference to
domestic affairs, and seldom even talk about them except to
friends and newspapermen off-the-record. The unfounded but
nevertheless potent myth about politics stopping at the water ’s
edge creates great pressure to keep one’s mouth shut, to think and
speak of foreign affairs as if it were something sacred. A fter all,
foreign policy deals w ith the security of our nation, and this is
no subject for narrow political advantage. President Trum an
once told a State Depart ment official who dared to speak di­
rectly on the subject that he should not tell him about domestic
problems, bu t about “what is right .”
The public literat ure emanating from the inner circles is
nearly silent on the connections between foreign policy and do­
mestic politics. And officials are almost as wary of talking about
domestic politics as they are of writin g on the subject. We get
glimpses of those few instances in odd ways. For example, the
point of Kenneth O ’Donnell’s article in the August 7, 1970 issue
of Lif e is to assure us that President Kennedy was waiting for the
right moment to pull out of Vietnam. Th at right moment for
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A M E R IC A N P O L IT IC S A N D V IE T N A M 461
Pr esi de nt Kenn edy, O ’Don nel l decla res, was af ter the 1964
pre sid en tia l electi ons whe n the issue cou ld no lon ger be used
aga inst him . O r, we h ea r f rom close associ ates of Pr esi de nt Jo hn ­
son t ha t on a few occasions he wo uld gu ard ed ly tal k on the sub ­
ject. La ter , in his mem oirs, he w ro te:
. . . I knew our people well enough to reali ze tha t if we walk ed away
from Vietnam and let Southeast Asia fal l, there would follow a divisi ve and
destr uctiv e debate in our country. . . . A divisiv e debate about “who lost Viet­
nam ” would be, in my judgme nt, even more destruct ive to our nati onal life
than the argum ent over China had been. . . . Our allie s . . . throu ghou t the
wo rld would conclude tha t our wor d was wor th little or nothin g . . . Moscow
and Peking] could not resist the oppo rtun ity to expand thei r contro l into the
vacuum of power. . . . Wit h Moscow and Peking . . . moving for wa rd, we
wou ld retu rn to a wo rld role to preve nt thei r full takeov er of Europe, Asia,
and the Mid dle East—afte r they ha d committed themselves.

Few wi ll deny th at wh at ou r Pre sid ent s chose to do or chose

not to do in Vie tna m was ver y mu ch tied to dom estic politi cs.
Yet, the myt h is pote nt, and official silence on the subj ect pr e­
vails. Pre sid ent s suffe r becaus e the conn ectio ns betw een for eig n
and dom estic af fairs, wh ile ta lke d abo ut priv ate ly, are not trea ted
in a syste matic way. So fa r as one knows, cri tic al assu mptio ns
abo ut wh at wi ll or wi ll not ga rn er po pu lar su pp or t are lef t un ­
cha llen ged . Fo r exam ple, now her e in the exec utiv e bra nch of
gov ern me nt did one feel free to do a pa pe r wh ich said “ H er e is
how the rig ht- wi ng cou ld be con tain ed if we acce pted H an oi ’s
best off er.” In this way the Pr esi de nt is supp osed to “ke ep his
opti ons op en. ” As was the case in Vie tnam , how ever , he may
succee d in tra pp in g him self . An ot he r cost of this silenc e is tha t
analys ts try in g to piece decisi ons back tog eth er fo r his tory are
lef t wi th ou t evide nce.
Ac ade mic ians and pu bli c-o pin ion exp erts have he lpe d to pe r­
pet uat e the myt h in th ei r own way by “d em on str ati ng ” tha t fo r­
eign pol icy simp ly is not a sal ien t issue to the voter and tha t
wh ate ve r the Pre sid en t says and does goes. Pre sid ent s have, I
thi nk, k now n b etter . Cit ize ns may no t sin gle out natio nal secu rity
affa irs as the basis for th eir vote s—a lth oug h w ar an d peac e issues
ofte n are so men tion ed— bu t the sec urit y area ine vita bly plays an
im po rta nt pa rt in de ter mi nin g th eir ove ral l imp ress ion of how
the Pr es id en t is d oin g his job. Mo reo ver , com mun icat ion s lea d­
ers and “e lite s” jud ge the Pr es id en t’s per for ma nce wi th reg ard
to nat ion al secu rity, and the moo d wh ich they conve y to the
publi c affects pub lic app rai sal s of the man in the W hi te Hou se.
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462 FO RE IG N AF FA IR S
11
On the surface, it seemed that our Presidents should have no
special problems about U.S. goals in Vietnam. While no one
presumed th at Asian land wars were popular, there was evident
general acceptance of U.S. worldwide security responsibilities
among the public, press and Congress. And yet, problems did
arise.
One problem grew out of how to talk publicly about U.S. goals
without tying our hands in Saigon and in negotiations. In N a­
tional Security Action Memorand um 52 of May 11, 1961, Presi ­
dent Kennedy approved the objective of “ preve nt(ing ) Commu­
nist domination of South Viet nam.” I n N SAM 288 of Marc h 17,
1964, President Johnso n’s objective was defined as “an inde­
pendent non-Communist South Vietnam.” But our leaders did
not choose to use this language when talking to the American
people. Public statements of goals came closest to the private
formulations in phrases like “stopping aggression.” The classi­
fied language of the N S AMs was app arently deemed too nega­
tive and not in line with the American tradition. Something
positive and more in keeping with American mythology was
required, and so the public goals became “self-determ ination,”
“free elections,” and “perm itting the South Vietnamese freely to
determine their own futur e.”
As a practical matter, self-determination language tended to
commit Washington to the existing Saigon government—perhaps
to a greater extent than even those who backed that regime de­
sired. Wa shington’s representatives in Saigon made much of the
necessity and virtue of holding elections. Elections, so Saigon’s
leaders were told, would help to sell the war to the American
people. W hen Saigon’s leaders obliged, held elections and pre­
dictably won them, Washington found itself confronted with a
government that had become “legitimat e.” And this legitimacy
conferred upon the winners increased b argainin g strength. The
Thie u and Ky power groups were thereby better able to resist
pressures for reform. Legitimacy in American eyes also invested
their regime with an enhanced voice in negotiations. As an ally,
Saigon had the right to consultations. As a legitimate govern­
ment, Saigon expected and received the right to approve the
beginning of negotiations and the terms of settlement. As a con­
sequence, attaining a settlement that did not ensure the perpe tua­
tion of the i ncumbent Saigon regime became highly improbable.
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AM ER IC AN PO LI TI CS AN D VI ET NA M 463
Although it must be said t hat many Washington policy-makers
were not troubled by these problems, there were also many who
both shared official aims and wanted reform and flexibility.
These people found themselves without leverage.
A second problem was how to talk publicly about goals wi th­
out unleashing pressures for the unlimited use of force. While
the objective of a noncommunist South Vietnam was specific,
our leaders did not want to employ maximum force to achieve it.
President Johnson prohibited use of U.S. ground and air forces
in Cambodia, ground forces in Laos, invasion of North Vietna m;
he also restricted air power in the North . He did not want to
risk a wider war and he sought to minim ize civilian casualties.
But unlimi ted ends, in time, are bound to lead to a call for un­
limited means and the possibility always existed that popular
frustration or passion would bring about irresistible demands to
make means consistent with ends.
A third problem developed in 1966 as the ends of the war
themselves came into question. From this point on, President
Johnson was faced with a delicate choice. On the one hand, he
could have chosen to wave the “bloody flag” and infuse the war
with popular emotion. This, in the Pr esident’s estimation, would
have lit right-wing fires to win the war, thus eroding barriers
against the all-out use of force. And once these barriers were torn
down, so Lyndon Johnson apparentl y reasoned, right-wing de­
mands could not be controlled. Such a strategy also would have
been incompatible with the Presiden t’s political style, which
emphasized consensus above all. On the other hand, he could run
parallel to this line by challen ging his critics wit h innuendo and
with the argument that fighting locally in Vietnam was prevent­
ing the outbreak of large-scale aggression elsewhere. President
Johnson picked this course. Instead of insinuating that his critics
were traitors or communists, he called them “nervous Nellies”
and “ prophets of gloom and doom.” Instead of holdin g parades
down Pennsylvania Avenue, he held award ceremonies in the
Oval Office. As the wa r dragged on, however, none of this was
sufficient to quell the growing opposition.
Ill

The fact that the wa r was drag ging on related in part to the
historical roots of the conflict in Vietnam and to the means which
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson chose to fight it. Gra dual esca-
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464 FO RE IG N AF FA IR S
lation was the chosen strategy for fighting the war. This fitted
in inte llectually with the Kennedy-Johnson m ilitary doctrine of
flexible and controlled response. In Vietnam, it meant a “slow
squeeze” bombing policy for No rth Vietnam and an attrition
policy for South Vietnam. Decisions about means, however, were
based upon judgments about both the least risky way to fight the
war and the best way to maintain public suppo rt at home.
The constraints which domestic politics imposed on the air
war against the No rth were aimed at minimizin g civilian casu­
alties and the loss of pilots. T his meant avoiding key popula ­
tion centers and other highly defended areas. Such constraints
were reinf orced by diplomatic judgments which sought to mini­
mize the risk of confronta tion wi th China and Russia. (All this,
however, did not prev ent the bombing of most fixed targets and
the dropp ing of more explosive tonnage than in all World
Wa r II .) The strategic decision to bomb in a gradual but rising
pattern (Roll ing Thu nde r) rather than a simultaneous whole
system cam paign (the Join t Chiefs of Staff [JC S] eight-week
plan) was probably made on diplom atic grounds.
It is also true that the bombing itself became a salient political
issue as pressures to begin negotiations increased. While Ame r­
ican rig ht-wing and governmental leaders kept insisting on ma­
jor concessions for stopping the bombing, doves argued that it
should be stopped only in return for Han oi’s promise to begin
talks. Whet her and on w hat terms to stop the bombing emerged
as the most symbolic political issue of the war in 1967 and 1968.
Domestic politics imposed a dominant constraint on the size
and development of the ground war in the South as well. As
many U.S. servicemen as possible could be sent to Vietnam as
quickly as possible for short terms of service, subject only to a
presidential prohibiti on against calling up the Reserves. In
accordance with established m ilitary procedure, U.S. force pos­
ture was designed to expand by means of Active Reserve and N a­
tional Guard call-ups. But to do so would be to disrup t lives of
many American families. Because the President did not want to
incur this pol itical liability, he chose to deplete and weaken U.S.
forces stationed in Europe and America and to increase draf t
calls. The burden fell on the young and the poor; for this and
other reasons, political opposition to the war tended to congeal
around these groups and th eir legislative allies. Not until Marc h
1968 did the J CS and their political allies outside the govern-
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AM ER IC AN PO LI TI CS AN D VI ET NA M 465
mcnt succeed in forcing the Pres ident’s hand on the Reserve issue,
and then he acceded only to a 25,000-man call-up.
If, after 1965, force decisions called for the maximum pos­
sible, given domestic and diplomatic constraints, domestic poli­
tics dictated the minimum necessary disruption of American life.
This was the case not only with respect to Reserve call-ups, but
with respect to the economics of the war. President Johnson
wanted guns and butter. He did not inform his chief economic
advisers of the fall 1965 decision to achieve a force level of 175,-
000 men. He resisted pressures for increased taxes througho ut
1966. Finally, in late 1967, he asked fo r a ten percent surtax, but
this fell far short of paying for the mounting costs of the war.
Moreover, he refused to let congressional leaders call it a war
tax. Short-r un prosperity was purchased at the price of long-run
inflation.
Domestic politics also impelled the leaders of the Johnson ad­
ministration to become fire-fighters. Actions in Vietnam, if not
dictated, were often shaped by daily criticisms at home. The
many false starts on the pacification program came in response
to charges by legislators and journalists that Johnson was not
doing enough about “ the o ther war.” If legislators insisted that
Saigon’s forces do more of the fighting, willy-nilly, the size of
those forces was increased. No matter that the issue was quality,
not size. Size could be fixed faster. And so it was with many
other issues as the Administra tion sought vainly to paper over
critical television reports and front-page news stories with short-
run solutions.
But short-term fixes and a policy of not demanding domestic
sacrifices were not enough. The Presiden t also had to manipu late
time horizons carefully. Just as Hanoi tried to p ortray the war
as never-ending, Washington had to feed the impression of near-
term winnabi lity. The public would not stand for gradualism if
it promised only open-ended fighting with continued U.S. fatal­
ities. Thu s was born the policy of c ontrolled optimism. Pressure
from the W hite House was felt t hrough out the government, into
the field, down to the very bottom of the command structure.
Show progress politically and militar ily! Visitors to the Oval
Office would be trea ted to a l ook at President Johnson pulling
Ambassador Lodge’s or Ambassador Bunker’s “weekly nodis”
cable out of his inside jacket pocket and hearing how things were
getting better. Pointed questions about when the war would end
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466 FO RE IG N AF FA IR S
were side-stepped if possible. Only if answers had to be pro vided
would the truth be admitted. (Fortu nately for Administra tion
strategy, the news media made little of these isolated revelations.)
Admitt ing to the public that the war would take time, officials
seemed to have reasoned, would play into Han oi’s hands. So,
* whenever possible, the Administra tion assured the public of u lti­
mate success. Some officials were allowed to climb out on a limb
and p redict imminent victory. Others volunteered their genuine
> optimism. The net effect was to lead the public to think t hat the
end was near. But the dilemma of this strategy could not have
been lost on our leaders. Optimism without results would only
work for so long; afte r that, it would produce the credibil ity gap.
IV

Behind the fall into the credibi lity gap and beyond the Presi ­
dent’s domestic strategy, there resided a vital and unquestioned
assumption—that America was basically hawkish and that the
forces of conservatism, if not reaction, would always prevail over
the liberal groups. Thi s assumption probably underpinned Pres­
ident Kennedy’s remarks to Kenneth O’Donnell and Senator
Mansfield in 1963 that he was wa iting until after the next elec­
tion before changing direction in Vietnam. In the ensuing years,
President Johnson occasionally lectured reporters and his own
aides on the politics of the wa r. H e is supposed to have told them
that they were worrying about the wrong domestic opposition.
They were worrying, so the stories ran, about the liberals and
the doves, b ut the real problem was the conservatives. They had
“done in” President Trum an over China. They still held the
reins of power in the congressional committees. They were the
difference between the success and failure of Great Society leg­
islation. And waiting in the wings was latent right-win g Mc-
Carthyism, thr eatenin g to strike at all that liberals held dear if a
President of the United States ever lost a war. Although none of
these stories can be taken at face value, the point is there—the
nation, in the opinion of our leaders, would not tolerate the loss of
a “free” country to communism.
Were Presidents Kennedy and Johnson correct in their esti­
mation of American politics as essentially conservative? Was the
strategy of gradualism consistent with these assumptions? And
was this strategy the best way of convincing Hanoi that they
had the public support necessary to stay the course in Vietnam?
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AM ER IC AN PO LI TI CS AN D VI ET NA M 467
The evidence on the first question is mixed. For the assump­
tion that U.S. politics were essentially conservative, we have the
facts that : professional politicians widely held this view; con­
servatives did influence the Congress d isproportion ately to th eir
numbers; President Trum an did suffer because of China and
Korea; public opinion polls from 1954 until a year ago did show
a ma jority of Americans against losing South Vietnam to com­
munism. Against this assumption, we have the facts that: the
alternatives in many of the Vietnam polls (unilat eral w ithdraw al
or a nnihilation of the enemy) gave the respondent little choice;
other polls showed a majority against losing to communism, but
also showed a majority against using U.S. forces to accomplish
this; polls on foreign affairs strongly tend to follow the presi­
dential lead; the Pre sident’s overall popularity was droppin g in
the polls; and the majority of Americans eventually did turn
against the war, or at least against fighting at any sizable cost in
lives and dollars.
Perhap s the answer is that o ur Presidents were right about the
conservative thrust of American politics until March 1968, and
that it took the experience of the Vietnam W ar to deflate public
passions about losing countries to communism.
The answer to the second question—did the strategy of grad­
ualism fit the assumption of hawkishness?—is yes, but more than
that as well. On the surface, the strategy was directed toward
the right wing. As the war went on, gradualism did become the
functional equivalent of escalation. And escalation, in t urn, was
supposed to meet not only the increasing military needs in the
field, but appease the hawks at home as well. Yet, the right wing
was not satisfied. The y always wanted much more than Johnson
would give. And the President must have known that this would
be the case, for his strategy was much more complex than a
simple effort to placate the Right.
On a deeper level, gradualism was designed to control both
the Right and the Left. With respect to the management of the
domestic aspects of the war, it rested im plicitly on the belief that
asking the public to swallow the war whole would backfire,
leading to irresistible pressures either to win or get out. It was
the p roduct of the old consensus game. The key was to stake out
the middle ground. Everyone was to be given the illusion that the
war would soon be over. The Righ t was to be given escalation.
The Left was to be given occasional peace overtures. The middle
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468 F O R E IG N Zx FF AI RS

wo uld not be asked to pay for the wa r. Th e Ri gh t wou ld be as­

sured tha t Sou th Vie tna m wo uld not be lost. Th e Le ft wou ld be
fri gh ten ed into subm ission by the spe cte r of M cC art hy ism . But
the key to the wh ole stra tegy was phas ing.
T he r ig ht -w in g rea ctio n was the ult im ate nig htm are . Th is was
to be for est all ed and the haw ks con trol led by not losing , by esca­
lat ing a nd by pro mi sin g vic tory . But give n these par am ete rs the
im me dia te pro ble m was to keep the doves, the libe rals and the
Le ft in line.
In t he sho rt run, Pr esi de nt Joh nso n was mor e w ary of the Le ft
tha n of the Ri gh t. Th e M cC ar th yi te nig htm are mi gh t come to
pass i f the Un ite d States lost Vie tnam . But it cou ld hap pen only
if the doves and the Le ft first gai ned the ascen dancy , only if th eir
opp osi tion to the w ar spr ead to the mi dd le and across to the
Ri gh t. Th e Le ft and the lib era ls wer e the only ones who wo uld
ope nly press fo r wi thd raw al, for “lo sing .” Th e Ri gh t wo uld be
un hap py, dis gru ntl ed , but they wo uld nev er press the case for
wi th dr aw al to the pub lic. Th e Le ft and the doves wo uld —and,
to a lar ge exten t, they pre vai led .
V
A ll this raises the final que stio n—was the Pr es id en t’s stra tegy
the best wa y of m aki ng H an oi belie ve th at U.S. Pre sid ent s wo uld
be a ble to c ont inu e the wa r un til N or th V iet nam qu it? M y guess
is th at H an oi ’s l ead ers not only w ere conf ident t hey co uld out las t
gra du ali sm in the field, bu t also wer e awa re tha t such a stra tegy
was a sign of the dom estic po liti cal weakn ess of ou r Pre side nts.
Th e “slo w-sq uee ze” ap pro ac h showe d Ha no i two thin gs. On
the one ha nd, it si gna led tha t A me ric a c ould a lways do mo re m ili ­
tar ily , wh ile on the oth er, it reve aled tha t the Pr esi de nt wo uld
not do all th at was necess ary to win . A step -by-s tep stra teg y of
thr ea t can sp rin g eit he r fro m con victi on or end emi c weaknes s.
U.S. pol icy t ow ard V iet nam s pra ng fro m both . M an ip ul ati on by
forc e or “co mp elle nce ” had gre at app eal as a w ar stra tegy . But
wi th each pass ing ye ar of w ar the dom estic po liti cal posi tion of
the Pr esi de nt gre w wea ker.
Ov er time, the use of thre ats cou ld not hid e the Pr es id en t’s
fea r th at the ful fill me nt of his thr eat s wo uld be as costly to the
Un ite d States as to N or th Vie tnam . Go ing all- out to win ap pa r­
ently pres ente d Pr esi de nt Joh nso n wi th a dou ble nig htm are . If
the pu bli c we nt alon g, it mi gh t po rte nd w ar wi th Ch ina or Rus-
 21 8

AM ER IC AN PO LI TI CS AN D VI ET NA M 469
sia and a garrison state at home. If the public balked and wanted
to “bug out,” a McCarth yite reaction might ensue. And yet,
going less than all-out would not be enough to win milita rily—
at least for many years. Only by accepting the risks of using
maximum force and only by asking for domestic sacrifices could
President Johnson have convinced Hanoi that the U nited States
had crossed the threshold from a policy of questionable persis­
tence to a wa r of no return, and t hat the Ame rican commitment
to the war was irrevocable.
Thus, President Johnson’s dilemma was stark. He would not
try maximum force to win, because that would risk World
Wa r II I. He would not replay Vietnam as China 1949, lose it
and take the case to the public, because t hat would risk another
round of McCarthyism. He would, as a last resort, repl ay Viet­
nam as Korea, hoping to outlast the other side and getting them
to agree to stay on their side of the line—and risk wearing down
his nation and countrymen.
President Johnson could look back at the Korean Wa r and
think it was bad, but not as bad as losing China. Ha rry Tr uman
was rou ndly attacked for his self-rest raint in fighting the Korean
Wa r—and yet, most Americans saw it as a courageous decision,
and the history books were filled with praise for the beleagured
President. China ruined President Truma n. Th at is, it ruined
him politi cally at th at time—and its “loss” did ignite McC arthy ­
ism. But in the perspective of those very same history books,
President Tru man ’s decision to back away from the corrupt
regime of Chiang and accept the tide of Mao was hailed as his
most courageous and wisest hour. Lyndon Johnson did not see it
that way. He would continue with middle-course actions in V iet­
nam, playing off Left and Righ t against one another at home. This
strategy satisfied neither hawks nor doves; nor did it face down
the Nor th Vietnamese. The costs were staggering and are still
incalculable—as are the costs of what might have been had the
United States withdraw n or gone “ all-out.” And yet, President
Johnson played his hand well enough to prevent the essential
domino from falling and to persist in his policy.
VI
On Ja nuar y 25, 1972, President Nixon publicly revealed two
peace proposals which Henry Kissinger had made secretly to
Hanoi. One proposal dealt with an overall settlement, including
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470 F O R E IG N A F F A IR S

free electi ons “r un by an ind epe nde nt body rep res ent ing all po­
liti cal forces in Sou th Vi etn am ,” wit h int ern ati onal sup ervi sion ,
and wi th Pr es id en t T hi eu ste pp ing d own fro m office p rio r to the
vote. Th e second prop osal , a mi lit ary s ettl eme nt car ved out fro m
the ove rall sett leme nt, offere d “a tota l wi th dr aw al fro m Sou th
Vie tna m of all U.S. forces and oth er for eig n forces . . . wi thi n
six mo nth s” pro vid ed tha t Ha no i agr ee to a phas ed ret urn of
U.S. pris one rs of wa r and an Ind oc hin a-w ide ceasefi re “i m pl e­
men t (in g) the pri nc ip le tha t all arm ed forces of the cou ntri es of
In do ch ina must rem ain wi thi n th eir nat ion al fro nti ers .” Ce rta in
am big uiti es in these prop osal s wi th resp ect to the power s of the
ele cto ral comm ission , the tim ing of the mu tua l wi thd raw al, fu ­
tur e U.S . m ili tar y aid to Saigo n, and the pha sin g of a se ttlem ent,
cou ld ind ica te a new Am eri ca n flexibi lity- Stil l, the Pr esi de nt did
make cle ar th at Ha no i had ign ore d and, in effect, had foun d
both pack ages una cce pta ble . Ha no i has long oppo sed both ele c­
tions c ont rol led by ot he r th an a co alit ion g ove rnm ent a nd a ceas e­
fire -m utu al wi th dr aw al as too risky for its su pport ers in Sou th
Vie tnam . Y et, A me ric ans wer e boun d to see t he Pr es id en t’s offe rs
as reaso nable , as a fa ir com prom ise. Th e Pr esi de nt did man age
to qu iet V ietn am c ritic s.
But the his tory of po pu lar and pol itic al reac tion to pre sid en ­
tial peace ove rtu res is fi lled wit h peaks and valley s. Both Jo hn ­
son and Ni xo n have been able to gai n renew ed su pp or t in the
sho rt run only to lose it as th ei r prop osal s prov ed non -neg otia ble
and as the rea litie s of the w ar aga in reass ert thems elves. As
Am eri can tro op levels dec line , U.S. ba rga ini ng pow er eva po ­
rates. W hi le a good case can be mad e tha t eit he r of the “n ew”
offers are in H an oi ’s inte rest to acce pt, Ha no i seems like ly to
con tinu e to reje ct them . T he ir aim app ear s to be not only w ith ­
dra wa l of the di re ct U.S . m ili tar y presen ce, but the cessati on of
all m ilit ary assistan ce to the Saig on regim e, inc lud ing nava l and
air s up po rt fro m beyo nd In do ch ina itself. At this time , the odds
are they wil l settle fo r no thi ng less. Th e wa r wi ll go on. An d
because the poli tics of the wa r are so f rag ile , it still behoove s us
to take a c loser look at wh ere we stand on Vie tna m in Am eri ca.
Pre sid en t Ni xo n has define d the U.S. obje ctive in Vie tna m in
the same o ver all term s as did Pr esi de nt Joh nso n. In his Fe br ua ry
25, 1971, “F or eig n Po lic y Re po rt, ” Pr esi de nt Ni xo n affirme d
tha t wi th resp ect to bot h neg otia tion s and Vi etn am iza tio n, “W e
seek the op po rtu ni ty for the Sou th Vie tnam ese peo ple to det er-

8 3 -6 0 5 O -7 3 - 15
 220

AM ER IC AN PO LI TI CS AN D VI ET NA M 471
mine their own political future without outside interference.”
With the invasion of Laos and with ever-receding possibilities
for a negotiated settlement, the goal of Vietnamizatio n was clar i­
fied to mean “prov iding a reasonable chance fo r the South Vi et­
namese to defend themselves.” Some were led to believe that this
meant American forces would be totally withdraw n with the
President hoping for a “decent interva l” to elapse after that f ull
withdr awal and before a communist takeover, so that our respon­
sibility for the collapse of the Saigon government would be d i­
minished. Others interprete d it as merely an indication that we
are progressively turning over the fighting to the Saigon govern­
ment. Still others saw it as the old objective of “an independent
noncommunist South Vietnam” and as a way of preserving the
Thieu regime. Dressed in new, moderate words because the war
itself is being deeply questioned, the N ixon goal has occasioned
more controversy than President Johnson’s. But it has also af­
forded the President the flexibility necessary for troop reduc­
tions.
By May 1972, the U.S. troop ceiling in Vietnam will be 69,000
men. And the Pre sident has promised another troop withdraw al
announcement before that time. If Hanoi continues to reject the
Nixon peace proposals, Vietnamiz ation will result in the main­
tenance of two American residual forces as long as is necessary:
one in Vietnam providing essentially logistical support, and the
other (not counted as p art of the force ceiling) in Tha iland and
on ca rriers off the Vietnamese shore p roviding air power. I t c er­
tainly includes continuing economic and militar y assistance to
Saigon at close to $2 billion per ye ar as well.
The Viet namization policy has p roduced a different domestic
political problem than President Johnson’s policy of escalation.
For President Johnson, the problem was how many troops could
be put into Vietnam and profitably employed despite tenuous
domestic support. For President Nixon, the problem has been
how few troops can be wi thdrawn while maintainin g a milit ary
balance in Vietnam but still assuaging the growing domestic
opposition.
The issue for both Presidents was how to balance military risks
in the field with conflicting political risks at home. President
Johnson, who was not faced with serious domestic opposition to
the war until March 1968, took few risks with the situation in
Vietnam. A fter opinion tur ned against the war, President John-
 221

472 F O R E IG N A F F A IR S

son pa id fo r this e ar lie r deci sion wit h t he loss of po liti cal stre ngt h.
Pr esi de nt Ni xo n has been assu min g risks on both scales. H e has
take n chan ces wi th po pu la r su pp or t by or de rin g the invas ions of
Ca mb odi a and Laos and the “p rot ect ive rea ctio n” bom bin g
strike s a gai nst N or th Vie tnam . Bu t he ha s also run risks in Sou th
Vie tna m by r ed uc ing for ces fas ter t han t he U.S . m ili tar y deem ed
safe. T he c om bin atio n of moves has led to a red uct ion in A m er i­
can dea ths and cas ualt ies (fr om ove r 500 pe r week in 1968 to
abo ut 50 pe r wee k at the be gin nin g of 1972) and costs (fr om
abo ut $25 bil lio n in 1968 to abo ut $7 b illi on for 1972). T he m ili ­
tar y situ atio n has rem ain ed stab le in Vie tna m. Fo r the Pr es i­
de nt’s purpo ses, h is s trat egy has been a n ap pa re nt success at h ome
and in Vi etn am — at least i n the wa ke of his J an ua ry 25th speech .
On one level, Pr esi de nt N ix on seems to have succ eeded in
ne ut ra liz in g Vi etn am as a pri me issue in the for thc om ing N o ­
vem ber ele ctio n. As Se cre tar y o f Defe nse M elv in La ird said in a
telev ision in ter vi ew : “T he A me ric an peo ple un der sta nd the d if ­
fere nce betw een ad dit ion a nd su btr ac tio n.” U.S. troo ps have bee n
wi th dr aw n fro m Vie tna m on sch edu le and even ahe ad of the
sche dule of pre sid en tia l ann ounc eme nts. T he wi nd in g down of
the wa r and the steep dr op in Am eri ca n casu altie s, acc ord ing to
this view, have def use d the opp osit ion .
V II
Po lit ica l pu nd its have obse rved wh at was the re fo r all of us
to see—th e gen era l sub sidi ng of acti ve cri tic ism of the Pr es i­
de nt’s Vie tna m polic y. Such cri tic ism no lon ger dom ina ted the
news me dia in the w eek pre ce din g N ix on ’s C hin a visit. Becaus e
they seemed to ill us tra te the conseq uence s of the Pr es id en t’s po l­
icy, the inva sion of Ca mb odi a and the subs eque nt tra ge dy at
Ken t Stat e in 1970 pro bab ly rep res ent ed the hig h po int of op ­
positi on. But a c urio us phe nom eno n dev elop ed the rea fte r. W hi le
opp osit ion to t he w ar w ide ned thr ou gh ou t the Un ite d States, the
gro up of activ e crit ics seem ingl y nar row ed to the politi ca l Le ft.
Mo re Am eri can s we re aga ins t the wa r, bu t few er we re do ing
any thi ng abo ut th ei r belie fs. Pr es id en t Ni xo n rea ped an oth er
po liti cal benef it fro m Ca mb odi a— it def used rig ht- wi ng cr it i­
cism of wa r polic y. Con serv ativ es seemed gra tifi ed th at this
san ctu ary fina lly had been inv ade d and pleas ed by the subse ­
que nt U .S. tro op red ucti ons. U nli ke Joh nso n, Ni xo n did n ot have
to w orr y abo ut his rig ht fla nk fro m this po int on.
 222

AM ER IC AN PO LI TI CS AN D VI ET NA M 473
While questioning of the war by Congressmen and Senators
became more widespread, and while amendments were passed
which placed limits on U.S. involvement in Cambodia and Laos,
the M cGovern -Hatfield Am endment to set a deadline for with ­
drawal of all American forces failed by a larger vote in 1971
than in 1970. The political th rust of congressional opposition did *
not succeed in compelling the Presiden t to accept total with ­
drawal by a certain date in exchange for POWs only, but it d id
succeed in making escalation of the wa r more improbable and in «
hastening troop reductions. In oth er words, congressional opposi­
tion to the w ar increased, but legislators still showed themselves
ready to follow the Presiden t’s lead as long as U.S. troops were
being withdrawn, U.S. casualties were being reduced and as long
as it looked as if Vietn amization was working.
On a different level, however, Vietnam seems to remain a ma­
jor political issue. An October 1971 Gallu p report ranked Viet­
nam right behind economic problems and well ahead of crime,
race, poverty and other matters on the list of “the most important
problems facing this country today.” One Harr is poll showed
that a majority of the American people believed that the wa r in
Vietnam was immoral. A Februa ry 1971 Gallup poll found that
61 percent believed that the war was a mistake while only 28
percent felt t hat it was not. More revealing are the responses in
Gall up’s A ugust 1971 report where it was asked: “Suppose one
candidate for Congress . . . said that he favors gett ing all U.S.
armed forces out of Vietnam by July 1 of next year, and he is op­
posed by a candidate who says we must leave about 50,000 troops
there to help the South Vietnamese. Other things being equal,
which candidate would you prefe r?” Sixty-one percent favored
complete withdrawl, while 28 percent wanted to leave troops and
11 percent had no opinion. More importantly for President
Nixon, Gallup claimed in his Ju ne 1971 report that the Presi­
dent faces a “giant-size credibili ty gap on Vietnam.” I n response
to the question: “Do you think that the N ixon administration is
or is not telling the publ ic all they should know about the Viet­
nam war?,” 24 percent said “is” and 67 percent said “is not.” And
despite the Pre sident ’s promises to end the war, 51 percent of the
respondents believed that the war will last two years or more, or
never end. A t bottom, President Nixo n’s c redibility gap has the
same sources as Preside nt Johnson’s—promises of an end to a war
that does not end.
 223

474 FO RE IG N AF FA IR S
The results of these polls n otwithstanding, critics of the war
themselves seem to believe that the Presiden t has captured the
electoral high ground. Most of these critics have switched the
terms of their attack from arguing that the Preside nt’s policy
will not work to a rguing that it is immoral and will only per­
petuate the war and the consequences of the war. This tacit con­
cession to the progress of Vietnamiza tion and to the political
success of the Preside nt’s latest peace proposal at once evokes
the true feelings of the critics and their political weakness. T hei r
moral argument assumes a strong public interest in Vietnam, but
in reality it seems to be that while the American public is in­
creasingly opposed to the war, the majo rity really does not want
to hear about it. Moreover, if the plight of people in Biafra and
more recently in Ba ngladesh—to say nothing of the My Lai mas­
sacres—did not touch the moral sensitivity of even a f raction of
Americans, it is doubtful that the specter of Vietnamese ki lling
Vietnamese would s tir the national conscience either. As long as
fewer Americans are in Vietnam, fewer Americans are being
killed and the cost of the war is being reduced, opposition to the
Presid ent’s policy will be unlikely to change that policy.
All of these politic al calculations are based on the assumption
that the situation in V ietnam in the fall of 1972 will not be a p­
preciably different from what it is early this spring. Wha t
would happen politically in the United States if the situation
were deterior ating in one way or another? One scenario would
have the Nor th Vietnamese stepping up their military attacks,
defeating the Saigon government forces, and on the verge of
nullifyin g Vietnam ization. Such an eventuality might lead many
Americans to believe that fo ur years of N ixon ’s policy had been
for naught, that essentially the United States was back to where
it was in 1965. It is unlikely, however, that Vietnamiza tion will
prove to be such an immediate failure. The Nor th Vietnamese
forces are weaker and the Saigon forces stronger than most
critics had predicted they would be a year or three years ago.
Therefo re, the kind of collapse posited in this scenario is highly
improbable. But should it come to pass, latent opposition to the
war would be rekindled and the President would be in a very
difficult position at home.
A second scenario would have the Nor th Vietnamese la unch­
ing countrywide offensives w ith spotty victories, and the United
States in retaliation carryin g out a continuing program of air
 224

AM ER IC AN PO LI TI CS AN D VI ET NA M 475
strikes against population and population-rel ated targets in
Nor th Vietnam. T his scenario seems more likely than the first.
Presiden t Nixo n has promised on many occasions to take “ deci­
sive action” in the event Hanoi increases the tempo of fighting
in the South, and he has on a number of occasions ca rried out
that threat. While it is true that past congressional, media and
popul ar reactions to these “protective-r eaction” bombing raids
against No rth Vietnam have not been widespread, the image of
U.S. planes hi tting new targets in Nor th Vietnam right before
election time would remind the American people that the war
was still going on. Latent opposition to the war would again
emerge, to the probable disadvantage of the Presid ent.
If the war heats up in the summer and fall, it w ill be a polit­
ical issue in the Novem ber elections. And it wi ll be a bitter issue.
Nei the r Republicans nor Democrats will want for superlative
and invective. But no matter who is elected Preside nt in 1972,
Vietnam will continue to take its toll on American society. If
Preside nt Nixon is reelected and the war grinds on indetermi ­
nately, the youth and the intellectual s of our nation will become
ever more alienated. Th is is not a large g roup of people, but they
are precious to the national conscience. If a Dem ocrat is elected
who is prepared to meet all of H anoi ’s demands, end the war and
not provide the Saigon government with any assistance whatever,
he will be charged with having “snatched defeat from the jaws
of victory.” Presiden t Johnson ’s nightmare of the right-wing
reaction could well become a reality.
The only somewhat hopeful way out of this dilemma is for
Preside nt Nixon now to share responsibility with the present
Congress in offering the sole proposal that still might break the
negotiating deadlock—a term inal date fo r the withdra wal of all
U.S. forces and an end to a ll U.S. bombing in Indochin a in re­
turn for the safe wi thdraw al of forces and the phased return of
POWs. As I wri te, the Pr esident has not yet made this proposal.
The nation, I believe, would unite behind this approach. Such
unity would not be without impact on Han oi’s leaders, whatever
their internal differences are, at this moment, with respect to a
settlement of the war. F or while Hano i’s leaders may not be able
to agree to propose such a solution, they may be able to agree
to accept it.
 R EP R IN T 206

Vie tna m:
Th e S ys te m W or ke d

by LESLIE H. GELB

TH E B R O O K IN G S IN S T IT U T IO N
W A S H IN G T O N DC 1971

(225)
 226

RE PR IN T 206
Credit: Rep rinte d August 1971, with permis sion, from Foreign Policy, Nu mb er 3,
Sum mer 1971, pp. 140-67. © 1971 by Na tion al Affairs, Inc.
The Au tho r: Leslie H. Gelb is a Senior Fello w in the Fore ign Policy Studi es Pr o­
gram at the Brooki ngs Insti tution .
No te: Th e inte rpre tati ons and conc lusion s in Brooki ngs rep rin ts are thos e of the
auth ors and do no t necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or trust ees of the
Brooki ngs Ins titut ion or of orga niza tion s th at sup por t its resea rch.

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 227
VIETNAM:
THE SYSTEM WORKED
by Leslie H. Gelb
I he story of Unit ed States policy toward
Vietnam is either far better or far worse
than generally supposed. Our Presidents and
most of those who influenced their decisions
did not stumble step by step into Vietna m,
» unawar e of the quagmire. U.S. involvem ent
did not stem from a failure to foresee
consequences.
Vietn am was indeed a quagmire, but most
of o ur leaders knew it. Of cours e there were
optimists and periods where many were
genuinely optimistic. But those periods were
infreq uent and short-lived and were invari ­
ably followed by periods of deep pessimism.
Very few, to be sure, envisione d what the
Vietn am situatio n would be like by 1968.
Most realized, however, tha t “ the light at the
end of the tu nnel” was very fa r away—if not
finally unreacha ble. Nevertheless, our Presi­
dents persevered. Given inter natio nal com­
pulsions to “ keep our w ord” a nd “save face,”
domestic prohi bition s against “losing,” and
their personal stakes, our leaders did “ what
was necessary,” did it abou t the way they
wanted, were prep ared to pay the costs, and
plowed on wit h a mixture o f hope and doom.
They “saw” no acceptable alternative.
Three propositi ons suggest why th e U nited
States became involved in V ietnam , why th e
process was gradual, and what the real ex­
pectations of o ur leaders were:
First, U.S. involve ment in Vietn am is n ot
mainly or mostly a st ory of step by step, in­
advert ent de scent into unforese en quick sand.
* It is primarily a story of why U.S. leaders
considered tha t it was vita l not to lose Viet­
nam by force to Commun ism. Our leaders
believed Vietn am to be vital not for itself,
but for what they thou ght its “loss” would
mean interna tionally and domestically. Pre-
140.
Gtlb
vious involv ement made furt her involve ment
more unavoidable, and, to this extent , com­
mitments were inherited. But judgments of
Viet nam’s “vita lness”—beginning with the
Korean War—were sufficient in themselves
to set the course for escalation.
Second, our Presidents were never actually
seeking a military victory in Vietna m. They
were doing only what they thou ght was
minimally necessary at each stage to keep
Indochi na, and later South Vietna m, out of
Comm unist h ands. T his forced ou r Presidents
to be brakemen , to do less tha n those who
were urging military victory and to reject
proposals for disengagement. It also meant
tha t our Presidents wanted a negotiated
settlement withou t fully realizing (though
realizing more tha n thei r critics) tha t a civil
war cann ot be end ed by political compromise.
Third, our Presidents and most of their
lieutenan ts were not deluded by optimistic
reports of progress and did not proceed on
the basis of wishful think ing about winning
a military victory in South Vietna m. They
recognized tha t the steps they were taking
were not adequate to win the war and tha t
unless Han oi relented, they would ha ve to do
more and more. The ir strategy was to perse­
vere in the hope tha t t heir will to cont inue—
if not the practical effects of thei r actions
—would cause the Comm unists to relent.
Each of these proposit ions is explored
below.
I. Ends: “We Can't Afford to Lose"
Thos e who led the Unite d States into
Vietna m did so with th eir eyes open, knowing
why, and believing they had the will to
succeed. Th e deepening involvem ent was not
inadver tent, but mainly deductive. It flowed
with sureness from the perceived stakes and
atte ndan t high objectives. U.S. policy dis­
played remarkable cont inuity . Th ere were not
dozens o f likely “ turni ng point s.” Each post­
war President inherited previous commit­
ments. Each extended these commitments.
Each adminis tration from 1947 to 1969
141.
 228
believed th at it was neces sary to pre ven t the
loss o f Vi etn am and , afte r 1954, Sou th
Vi etn am by force to the Com mun ists. Th e
reas ons fo r this var ied from pe rson to pers on,
fro m bur eauc racy to bur eauc racy , ove r time
an d in e mph asis . For the mo st par t, how ever ,
they ha d little to do with Vie tna m itself. A
few men argued th at Vi etn am ha d intr ins ic
strateg ic milit ary an d econ omic imp orta nce ,
bu t this view nev er prev ailed . Th e rea son s
rested on br oa der int ern ati on al, dom estic ,
an d bur eau cra tic con sid era tion s.
O ur leade rs gave th e international rep ercu s­
sion s of “ losin g” as the ir do m ina nt exp licit
rea son f or Vi etn am ’s im por tan ce. Du rin g th e
Tr um an Ad mi nis tra tio n, In do ch ina ’s im po r­
tan ce was mea sure d in term s of Fren ch-
Am eric an rela tion s an d Wa shi ng ton ’s de sire
to reb uild Fran ce int o the cent erpi ece of
futu re Eu rop ean secur ity. Aft er th e cold war
he ate d up an d a fter the fall of Ch in a, a Fre nch
defe at in Ind oc hin a was also seen as a defe at
for th e policy of co nta inm en t. In th e Eisen ­
how er years, Ind oc hin a becam e a “ testin g
gr ou nd ” betw een th e Free Wor ld an d Co m­
mun ism an d th e bas is for the fa mou s “ dom ino
the ory ” by w hich t he fall of Ind oc hin a would
lead to th e d ete rio rat ion of Ame rica n security
ar ou nd t he globe. Pre side nt Ken nedy publicly
reaffirmed the fallin g dom ino con cep t. His
prim ary con cer n, how eve r, was for his “ rep­
ut ati on for ac tio n” afte r th e Bay of Pigs fiasco,
the Vi en na mee ting wit h Kh rus hch ev, and
th e Laos crisis, an d in meeti ng th e chal leng e
of “ wars of na tio na l lib era tio n” by co un ter ­
insur gency wa rfare . U nd er Presi dent John so n,
the code wor d rati ona les becam e Mu nic h,
credib ility, com mit me nts an d the U.S . word,
a wate rshe d test of wills with Co mm uni sm,
raising the costs of a ggression, an d th e pr in ­
ciple th at arm ed aggression sha ll no t be
allowed to succeed. Th ere is ev ery rea son to
assume tha t o ur l eader s actuall y beli eved wha t
they said, given b ot h the co ld war co nte xt in
whic h they were all rear ed and the lack of
con trad icto ry eviden ce.
Wi th very few excep tions , the n, ou r le aders
142.
Ge lb
since Wor ld Wa r II saw Vie tna m as a vital
fac tor in al lianc e politics , U .S.- Sov iet-C hine se
rela tion s, an d dete rrenc e. Th is was as t ru e in
1950 and 1954 as it was in 1961 an d 1965. T he
rec ord of Unit ed States mili tary an d e cono mic
assis tanc e to fight Co mm uni sm in In do ch ina
tells thi s story qui te clearly. From 1945 to
1951, U.S. aid to F ranc e tota led o ve r $3.5 bil­
lion . W ith ou t this, the Fre nch po sit ion in
In do ch ina would ha ve been un ten ab le. By
1951, the U.S. was payin g ab ou t 40 per cen t
o f th e costs of the In do ch ina war an d ou r
sha re was going up. In 1954, it is estim ated,
U.S. econ omic an d tec hni cal assist ance
am ou nte d to $703 millio n an d milit ary aid
tot ale d alm ost $2 billi on. Th is add ed up to
alm ost 80 perc ent of the tot al Fre nc h costs.
From 1955 to 1961, U.S . milita ry a id a verag ed
ab ou t $200 mi llion per year. Th is mad e So uth
Vi etn am the seco nd largest reci pien t of s uch
aid, top ped onl y by Korea. By 1963, Sou th
Vi etn am ran ked first amo ng recip ient s of
milita ry assista nce. In e cono mic assist ance, it
follow ed onl y Ind ia an d Paki stan.
Th e domestic reper cussi ons of “ losing ”
Vi etn am prob ably were equally im po rta nt in
Presi dent ial minds . Lett ing Vi etn am “go
Co mm un ist ” was und oub tedl y seen as:
[> ope nin g the floodga tes to dom estic c riti ­
cism an d atta ck for being “so ft on Co m­
mu nis m” or ju st plain soft;
[> dissi patin g P reside ntial influe nce by h av ­
ing to answ er thes e c harges;
[> ali ena ting c ons erva tive lead ersh ip in the
Con gres s an d ther eby end ange ring th e Presi­
de nt ’s legislative progr am;
t> jeopardiz ing elect ion pro spe cts for the
Presi dent a nd h is party ;
[> un der cut ting dom estic sup po rt for a
“ resp onsi ble” U.S. world role; an d
t> enlargin g the prosp ects for a right-wi ng
rea cti on —the nigh tma re of a M cC art hy ite
garri son state.
U.S. dom estic politic s req uire d ou r leaders
to ma int ain bo th a peacefu l wor ld an d one
in whi ch Co mm un ist ex pan sio n was s toppe d.
In ord er to hav e th e public s up po rt necessa ry
143.
 229
to use force against Commu nism, our leaders
had to employ st rong generalized, ideological
rhetoric. Th e price of this rhetor ic was co n­
sistency. How co uld our leaders shed Ameri­
can blood in Korea and keep large numbers
of American tro ops in Euro pe at great expense
unless they were also willing to stop Com ­
munism in V ietnam?
Bureaucratic judgments and stakes were
also involved in defining U.S. interests
in Vietna m. Most bureauc rats probably
prompt ed o r s hared the belief of the ir leaders
abou t the serious repercussions of losing
Vietna m. Once direct bureaucr atic presence
was established after the French departu re,
this belief was reinforced and extended. The
military had to prove tha t Americ an arms
and advice could succeed where the French
could not. Th e Foreign Service ha d to prove
tha t it c ould bring abou t political stability in
Saigon an d “buil d a n atio n.” The cia h ad to
prove tha t pacification would work, aid had
to prove tha t millions o f dollars in a ssistance
and advice cou ld bri ng political returns.
The U.S. commit ment was rationalized as
early as 1950. It was set in 1955 when we
replaced the French. Its logic was furthe r
fulfilled by President Kennedy. After 1965,
when the U.S. took over the war, it was
immeasurably ha rdened.
There was little cond itiona l charact er to
the U.S. commit ment—except for avoiding
“the big w ar.” Every President talked about
the ultimate responsibility resting with the
Vietnamese (and the French before them).
This “co ndit ion” seems to have been meant
much more as a warning to our friends tha n
a real limitation. In every crunch , it was swept
aside. The only real limit applied to Russia
and Chin a. Ou r leaders were no t prep ared to
run the risks of nuclear war o r even th e risks
of a direct conv entio nal military con fron ta­
tion with the Soviet Un ion and Chi na. These
were separate decisions. Th e line between
them and everything else done in Vietna m
always held firm. With this exception, the
commitmen t was always defined in terms of
144.
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the objective to deny the Com munists c ontro l
over all Vietnam . T his was fu rther defined to
preclude coalition governments with the
Communists.
The im portance of the objective was evalu ­
ated in terms o f cost, a nd the perceived costs
of disengagement outweighed the cost of
furth er engagement. Some allies might urge
disengagement, but then cond emn the U.S.
for doing so. Th e domestic groups which were
expected to criticize growing involvem ent
always were believed to be outnum bered by
those who would hav e attacked “cutt ing and
runn ing. ” The question of wheth er our
leaders would have started down the road if
they knew this would mean over half a mil­
lion men in Vietna m, over 40,000 U.S.
deaths, and the expendi ture of well over
$100 billion is historically irrelevant. Only
Presidents Kennedy and Joh nso n had to
conf ron t the possibility of these large costs.
The poin t is tha t each admi nistra tion was
prepared to pay th e costs it could foresee for
itself. No one seemed to have a better solu­
tion. Each could at least pass th e b aton o n to
the next.
Presidents could not trea t Vietn am as if
it were “v ital” without creating high stakes
interna tional ly, domestically, and withi n thei r
own b ureaucracies. But the rh etoric conveyed
different messages:
To the Communi sts, it was a signal tha t
their action s would be met by count eracti ons.
To the American people, it set the belief
tha t the President would ensure tha t the
threa tened natio n did not fall into Com mu­
nist han ds—although withou t the antici pa­
tion of sacrificing America n lives.
To the Congress, it m arked the Presiden t’s
responsibility to ensure t ha t V ietnam did not
go Comm unist and maximized incentives for
legislators to support him or at least remain
silent.
To the U.S. professional military, it was a
promise tha t U.S. forces would be used, if
necessary and to the degree necessary, to
defend V ietnam.
145.
 230
To the professional U.S. diplomat, it
meant letting our allies know that the U.S.
cared a bout their fate.
To the President, it laid the groundwork
for the present action and showed tha t he
was prepared to take the next step to keep
Vietn am non-Com munist.
Words were making V ietnam into a sh ow­
case—an Asian Berlin. In the process,
Vietna m grew into a test case of U.S. credi­
bility—to oppone nts, to allies, but perhaps
most importantly, t o ourselves. Public opinion
polls seemed to con firm the political dangers.
Already established bureaucratic judgments
about the importanc e of Vietna m matured
into cherish ed convicti ons an d organizational
interests. T he war dragged on.
Each successive President, initially caught
by his own belief, was furthe r ensnarle d by
his ow n rhetoric, and the basis for the belief
went unchallenged. Debates re volved a round
how to do things better, and whethe r they
could be done, not whethe r they were worth
doing. Prior to 1961, an occasional s enato r or
Southeast Asian specialist would raise a lonely
and weak voice in doubt . Some press criticism
began thereafter. And later still, wandering
American minstrels returne d from t he field to
tell their tales of woe in private. General
Ridgway as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1954
questioned the value of Vietnam as against its
potenti al costs a nd dangers, and succeeded in
blunting a proposed U.S. military initiative,
although not for the reasons he advanced.
Und er Secretary of State George Ball raised
the issue of inter natio nal priorities in the
summer of 1965 and lost. Clark Clifford as
Secretary of Defense openly challenged the
winnability of the war, as well as Vie tnam ’s
strategic significance, a nd argued for domestic
priorities. But no systematic o r serious exam­
inati on of Viet nam’s importance to the
Unite d States was ever under taken within t he
government. Endless assertions passed for
analysis. Presidents neither encouraged nor
permitted serious questioning, for to do so
would be to foster the idea th at their resolve
146.
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was something less th an complete. Th e objec­
tive of a n on-Com munist Vietna m, and after
1954 a non-Com munist South Vietna m,
drove U.S. involveme nt ever more deeply
each step of the way.
II. Means: “Take the Minimal Necessary Steps”
None of our Presidents was seeking total
victory over the Vietnamese Communists.
War critics who wanted victory always knew
this. Those who wanted the U.S. to get o ut
never believed it. Each President was essen­
tially doing what he though t was minimally
necessary to prevent a Comm unist victory
during his tenure in office. Each, of course,
sought to strength en the anti-Com munist
Vietnamese forces, but with the aim of a
negotiated settlement. Part of the tragedy of
Vietnam was tha t the compromises our
Presidents were prepa red to offer could never
lead to an end of the war. These preferred
compromises only served to reinforce the
convic tion of both Comm unist and anti-
Comm unist Vietnamese tha t they had to
fight to the finish in their civil war. A nd so,
more minimal steps were always necessary.
Ou r Presidents were pressured o n all sides.
The pressures for victory came mainly from
the inside a nd were reflected on the outside.
From inside the admini stration s, three forces
almost invariably pushed hard. First, the
military establishmen t generally initiated
requests for broadenin g an d intensifying U.S.
military action. Ou r professional military
placed great weight on the strategic signif­
icance of Vietnam; they were given a job to
do; th eir prestige was involved; and of crucial
importanc e (in t he 1960’s)—the lives of many
American servicemen were being lost. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the maag (Military
Assistance Ad visory Group) Chiefs and later
the Com mand er of U.S. forces in Vietnam
were the focal points for these pressures.
Second, our Ambassador s in Saigon, sup­
ported by the State Departm ent, at times
pressed for and often supporte d big steps
forward. Thei r reasons were similar to those
147.
 231
of the military. Thirdly, an ever-present group
of “fixers” was making urgent demand s to
strengthe n and broad en the Saigon govern­
ment in order to achieve political victory.
Every executive agency had its fixers. They
were usually able men whose entire preoccu­
patio n was to make things better in Vietnam .
From outside the admi nistra tion, there were
hawks who insisted on winning and hawks
who wanted to “win or get o ut. ” C apito l Hill
hawks, the conservativ e press, and, for m any
years, Cath olic organiza tions were in the
forefront.
Th e pressures for disengagement and for
de-escalation derived mostly from th e outside
with occasional and often unkn own allies
from within. Small for most of the Vietn am
years, these forces grew steadily in strength
from 1965 o nward . Isolated congressmen and
senator s led the fight. First they did so on
anticol onialist grounds. Lat er the ir objecti ons
developed moral aspects (interfering in a
civil war) and extend ed to non-winna bility,
domestic priorities, and the senselessness of
the war. Peace organizat ions and studen t
groups in particu lar came to domin ate head­
lines and air time. Journali sts played a critical
role—especially throu gh television reports.
From within each admin istrati on, oppositi on
could be found: (1) among isolated military
men who di d not want the U.S. in an Asian
land war; (2) a mong some S tate Depart ment
intelligence and area specialists who knew
Vietna m and believed the U.S. objective was
unat taina ble at any reasona ble price; and
(3) within the civili an agencies of the Defense
Depa rtment and isolated individua ls at State
and cia, particula rly after 1966, whose efforts
were t raine d on finding a politically feasible
way out.
Ou r Presidents reacted to the pressures as
brakemen, pulling the switch against both
the advocates of “decisive escalati on” and
the advocates of disengagement. The politics
of the Presidency largely dictate d this role,
but the personalities of the Presidents were
also impor tant. Non e were as ideological as
148.
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many persons a roun d them. A ll were basically
centrist politicians.
The ir immediate aim was always to prevent
a C omm unist takeover. Th e actions they ap­
proved were usually only what was minimally
necessary to that aim. Each President deter­
mined the “minimal necessity” by trial and
error and his own judgment. T hey might h ave
done more and done it more rapidly if they
were convinc ed that: (1) the thre at of a
Comm unist takeove r were more immediate,
(2) U.S. domestic politics would have been
more permissive, (3) the governm ent of
South Vietn am had the requisite political
stability and military potent ial for effective
use a nd (4) the job really would have gotten
done. After 1965, however, the minimal
necessity became the maximum they could
get given the same domestic and in terna tion al
constrai nts.
The tact ic o f the minimally necessary deci­
sion makes o ptimum sense for t he politics o f
the Presidency. Even our strongest Presidents
have te nded to shy away from decisive action.
It has been too uncerta in, too risky. They
derive thei r streng th from moveme nt (the
image of a lot of activity) and building and
neutralizing opp onents . T oo seldom has there
been forceful moral leadership; it may even
be undemocra tic. The small step that main­
tains the momen tum gives the President the
chance to gather more political support . It
gives the appea rance of minimizing possible
mistakes. It allows time to gauge reactions.
It serves as a pressure-relieving valve against
those who want to do more. It can be do led
out. Above all, it gives the President some­
thing to d o next time.
The tactic makes c onsumm ate sense when
it is believed tha t nothi ng will fully work or
tha t t he costs of a “ winning” move would be
too high. This was the case with Vietna m.
This decision-making tactic explains why th e
U.S. involvem ent in Vietn am was gradual
and step by step.
While the immediate aim was to preven t a
Comm unist victory an d improve th e po sition
149.
 232
of th e anti -Communists, the longer term goal
was a political settlement. As late as February
1947, Secretary of State Marshall expressed
the hope tha t “a pacific basis of adjustme nt
of the difficulties” between France and the
Vietm inh could be foun d. 1 After that,
Tr um an’s policy hardened, but there is no
evidence to suggest tha t until 1950 he was
urging the French not to settle with the
Vietnames e Communis ts. Eisenhower, it
should be remembered, was the President who
tacitly agreed (by n ot interve ning in 1954) t o
the creati on of a Comm unist state in No rth
Vietna m. President Kennedy had all he could
do to preven t complete political collapse in
South Vietnam . H e had, therefore, little basis
on which to compromise. President John son
inheri ted this political instability, and to add
to his woes, he faced in 1965 what seemed to
be the prospect of a Comm unist military
victory. Yet, by his standin g offer for free an d
intern ationa lly supervised elections, he ap­
parently was prepared to accept Comm unist
particip ation in the political life of the
South.
By tradi tiona l diplomatic stand ards of
negotiations between sovereign states, these
were no t fatuous compromises. O ne compro­
mise was, in effect, to guarantee tha t the
Commu nists could remain in secure contr ol
of N orth Vietnam . The U.S. would not seek
to overt hrow this regime. The other com­
promise was to allow the Comm unists in
South V ietnam to seek power along the lines
of Comm unist parties in France and Italy,
i.e. to give them a “pe rmane nt minority
positio n.”
But the real struggle in Vietn am was not
between sovereign states. It was among Viet­
namese. It was a civil war and a war for
natio nal independence.
Here in lies th e parado x and the tragedy of
Vietna m. Most of our leaders and their
critics di d see th at Vietna m was a quagmire,
but did not see that the real stakes—who shall
‘New York Times, February 8. 1947.
150.
Gelb
govern Vietna m—were not negotiable. Free
elections, local sharing of power, intern ation al
supervision, cease-fires—none of these could
serve as a basis for settlement. What were
legitimate compromises from Wash ington ’s
point of view were matters of life and death
to the Vietnamese. For A merican leaders, the
stakes were “ keeping thei r word” and saving
their political necks. For t he Vietnamese, the
stakes were their lives and their lifelong
political aspirations. Free elections meant
bodily exposur e to the C ommu nist guerrillas
and likely defeat to the anti-C ommunists. The
risk was too great. The re was no trust, no
confidence.
The Vietn am war could no more be settled
by tradi tiona l diplomati c compromises tha n
any other civil war. President Lincoln could
not settle with the South. The Spanish
Republicans and Gene ral Franco ’s Loyalists
could not have conceivably mended their
fences by elections. Non e of the post-World
War II insurgencies—Greece, Malaya, and the
Philippines—ended with a negotiated peace.
In each of these cases, the civil differences
were put to rest—if at all—only by th e logic
of war.
It is commonly acknowledged that Viet nam
would have fallen to the Communists in
1945-46, i n 1954, a nd in 1965 h ad it n ot been
for the interv ention of first the French and
then the Americans. The Vietnamese Com ­
munists, who were also by history the Viet­
namese nationalists, would not accept only
part of a prize for which they had paid so
heavily. The anti-Co mmuni st Vietnamese,
protected by th e French and the Americans,
would not pu t themselves at the Commun ists’
mercy.
It may be tha t our Presidents understo od
this better tha n their critics. The critics,
especially on the political left, fought for
“better compromises,” not realizing that even
the best could not be good enough, and fought
for broad national ist gov ernments, not realiz­
ing there was no middle force in Vietnam .
Our Presidents, it seems, recognized that there
151.
 233
was no middle groun d and t hat “bette r com ­
promises” would frighten our Saigon allies
without bringing abou t a compromise peace.
And they believed tha t a neutraliz ation
formula would compromise South Vietn am
away to the Comm unists. So th e longer-term
aim of peace repeatedly gave way to the im­
mediate needs of the war and the next
necessary step.
III. Expectations: “We Must Persevere"
Each new step was take n not because of
wishful thinkin g or optimism ab out its leading
to a victory in South Vietna m. Few of our
leaders thou ght tha t they could win t he war
in a co nven tion al sense o r tha t the Comm u­
nists would be decimate d to a p oint tha t they
would simply fade away. Even as new and
furthe r steps were take n, coup led with e xpres­
sions of optimism, many of our leaders
realized tha t more—and still more—would
have to be done. Few of these men felt c on­
fident abou t how it would all end or when.
After 1965, however, they allowed the im­
pression of “ winnab ility” to grow in orde r t o
justify thei r already heavy investme nt and
domestic suppo rt f or the war.
The strategy always was to persevere. Per­
severance, it seemed, was the only way to
avoid or postpo ne ha ving to pay the domestic
political costs of failure. Finally, perseverance,
it was hoped, would convinc e the Comm u­
nists tha t our will to conti nue was firm.
Perhaps, then, with domestic support for
perseverance, with bombing No rth Vietna m,
and with inflicting heavy casualties in the
South, the Comm unists would relent. Per­
haps, th en, a compromise could be negotiated
to save th e C omm unists ’ face with out giving
them South Vietnam .
Optimism was a par t of the “gamesman­
ship” of Vie tnam. It h ad a purpose. Personal-
organizat ional op timism was the produ ct o f a
number of m otivat ions and calculations:
t> Career services tacitly and sometimes
explicitly pressured their professionals to im­
part good news.
152.
Gelb
t> Good news was seen as a job well done;
bad news as personal failure.
> The reporting system was set up so tha t
assessments were made by the implementors.
t> Optimism bred optimism so tha t it was
difficult to be pessimistic this time if you were
optimistic the last time.
t> People told their superiors what they
thou ght they wanted to hear.
C>The American ethic is to get the job
done.
Policy optimism also sprang from several
ratio nal needs:
C>To maint ain domestic support for the
war.
t> To keep up th e mo raleo f ourVietnam ese
allies and build some confidence and trust
between us an d them.
t> To stimulate military and bureaucrati c
morale to work hard.
There were, however, genuine optimists
and grounds for genuine optimism. Some
periods looked promising: th e year pr eceding
the French downfall at Dienbie nphu; the
years of the second Eisenhower Presidency
when most att enti on was riveted on Laos and
before the insurgency was stepped up in
South Vietnam ; 1962 and early 1963 before
the strategic ham let pacification p rogram col­
lapsed; and the last six mo nths o f 1967 before
the 1968 T et offensive.
Many addition al periods by comparis on
with previous years yielded a sense of real
improvemen t. By most conv entio nal stan ­
dards—th e size and firepower of friendly
Vietnames e forces, the numbe r of hamlets
pacified, th e n umber of “ free elections” being
held, the numbe r of C ommun ists killed, and
so forth—reaso nable men could and did thin k
in cautiously optimistic terms.
But comparis on with years past is an
illusory measure when it is not coupled with
judgments about how far there still is t o go
and how likely it is tha t the goal can ever be
reached. It was all t oo easy to confuse shor t­
term breathi ng spells with long-term trends
and to confuse “things getting bett er” with
153.
 234
“win ning.” Many of those who h ad genuine
hope suffered from either a lack of knowledge
about V ietnam or a lack of sensitivity toward
politics or both.
The basis for pessimism and the warning
signals were always pr esent. Public portrayals
of success glowed more brightly t han the full
range of classified reporting. Readily available
informal and personal accounts were less
optimistic still. The political instability of our
Vietnamese allies-—from Bao Dai through
Diem to President Thi eu have always been
apparent . Th e weaknesses of the armed forces
of our Vietnamese allies were common
knowledge. Few years went by when the
fighting did not gain i n intensity. Our leaders
did not have to know much about Vietna m
to see all this.
Most o f our leaders saw the Vietn am quag­
mire for what it was. Optimism was, by and
large, put in perspective. This means tha t
many knew that each step would be followed
by anoth er. Most seemed to hav e unde rstood
tha t more assistance would be required e ither
to improve the relative position of ou r Viet­
namese allies or simply to prev ent a dete riora­
tion of their p osition. Almost each year and
often several times a year, key decisions had
to be made to prevent deterio ration or col­
lapse. These decisions were made with hard
bargaining, bu t rapidly eno ugh for us now to
perceive a preconceived consensus to go on .
Sometimes several new steps were decided at
once, bu t a nnoun ced and implemented piece­
meal. The whole patt ern conveyed the feeling
of more to come.
With a tragic sense of “no ex it," o ur leaders
stayed their course. They seemed to hope
more tha n expect tha t something would
“give.” The hope was to convince the Viet­
namese Commun ists throu gh perseverance
tha t the U.S. would stay in South Vietn am
until they aban done d their struggle. The
hope, in a sense, was t he product o f disbelief.
How could a tiny, backward Asian country
not have a breaking point when opposed by
the might of the Unit ed States? How could
154.
Gelb
they not relent and negotiate with the U.S.?
An d yet, few could answer two questions
with any confidence: Why should the Com ­
munists aban don tomorrow the goals they
had been paying so dear a price to obtai n
yesterday? Wha t was there really to negotiate?
No one seemed to be able to develop a per­
suasive scenario on how the war could end
by peaceful means.
Ou r Presidents, given their politics and
thinkin g, had nothin g to do but persevere.
But the Commu nists’ strategy was also to
persevere, to make the U.S. go home. It was
and is a civil war for n ationa l independence.
It was and is a Gree k tragedy.
IV. After Twenty-Five Years
A quick review of history supports these
interpre tations . To the Roosevelt Adminis­
trat ion during World War II, Indoc hina was
no t perceived as a “vit al” area. The Unite d
States defeated Japan without Southea st Asia,
and Ind ochin a was n ot occupied by th e allies
until after Japan’s defeat, fdr spoke informally
to friends and newsmen of placing Indoc hina
und er Unite d Nation s trusteeship after the
war, but —aware of Fre nch, British and U.S.
bureaucrat ic hostility to this—made no de­
tailed plans and asked for no staff work prior
to his death. For all practical purposes,
Tru man inherite d no Southeast Asia policy.
In 1946 and 1947, the U.S. acquiesced in
the re-establishment of French sovereignty.
Ou r policy was a passive o ne of h oping for a
negotiated settlement of the “difficulties”
between Paris and the Vietm inh indepen­
dence movement of Ho Chi Minh. To the
south, in Indonesia, we had started to pressure
the Dutch to grant independenc e and with­
draw, and a residue of anticolonialism re­
mained in our first inchoat e approache s to
an Indoc hina policy as well.
But events in Europe and Chi na changed
the con text from mid-1947 on. Two impo rtant
priorities were to rearm and streng then France
as the cornerst one of European defense and
recovery in the face of Russian pressure, and
155.
 235
to prevent a furthe r expa nsion of victorious
Chinese Communi sm. The Tru man Doctrin e
depicted a world full of dominoes. In May
1950, before Korea, Secretary of State
Acheson anno unce d tha t the U.S. would
provide military and economic assistance to
the French and their Indochin ese allies for
the direct purpose of combating Comm unist
• expansi on. 2 After years o f hesitating, T rum an
finally decided tha t anti-Co mmuni sm was
more imp orta nt tha n anticolon ialism in
Indochina.
• Acheson admits tha t U.S. policy was a
“muddled hodgepodge”:
The criticism, however, fails to recognize
the limits o n the exten t to which one may
successfully coerce an ally. . . . Furth er­
more, the result of withhold ing help to
France would, at most, have removed the
colonial power. It could not have made the
resulting situati on a beneficial one either
for Indoc hina or for Southe ast Asia, or in
the more impo rtant effort of fur thering the
stability and defense of Europe. So while
we may have tried to muddle throug h and
were certainly not successful, I could not
thin k the n or later of a better course. O ne
can suggest, perhaps, doing nothing. Th at
might have had merit, but as an attitude
for t he leader o f a great alliance tow ard an
impo rtant ally, indeed one essential to a
critical endeavor , it had its demerits, too. 3
Several mon ths after the Korean War
began, Aches on recalled the warning of an
“able colleague”: “N ot only was there real
danger tha t our efforts would fail in their
immediate purpose and waste valuable re­
sources in the process, but we were moving
into a position in Indoc hina in which ‘our
responsibilities tend to suppl ant rath er tha n
• complement those of the Frenc h’.” Acheso n
then remembers: “I decided however, tha t
having put our han d to the plow, we would
not look back.” 4 He decided this despite the
’ Departm ent of St ate Bulletin, May 1950, p. 821.
’Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation, fj^ ew Tor);.
W. W. Norto n. 1969) , p. 673.
•Ibid., p. 674.
156.
8 3 -6 0 5 0 - 73 - 16
Ge lb
fact tha t he "recognized as no longer valid
an earlier French inten tion to so w eaken the
enemy before reducing French forces in In do­
china th at indigenous forces could han dle the
situat ion.” 5
V. The Eisenhower Administration
President Eisenhower inherite d the prob­
lem. Althou gh, with V ietm inh successes, th e
situati on took on graver overtones, he, too,
pursued a policy of “minim um actio n” to
preven t the total “loss” of V ietnam to Com ­
munism. Sherm an Adams, Eisenh ower’s assis­
tant , explains how the problem was seen in
the mid-1950’s:
If the Comm unists had pushed on with an
aggressive offensive after the fall of Dien-
bienphu , instead of stopping and agreeing
to stay out o f South ern V ietnam, Laos and
Cambo dia, there was a strong possibility
tha t the Unit ed States would have moved
against them. A complete Com munis t co n­
quest of Indoch ina would have had far
graver consequence for the West tha n a
Red victory in Korea. 6
Apparen tly the President felt he could live
with Comm unist co ntrol in the restricted area
of No rth Vietna m, away from the rest of
Southea st Asia.
Eisenhower did n ot take the minim al neces­
sary step to save all of I ndoch ina, but he did
take t he necessary steps to prevent the loss of
most of Indochi na. He paid almost all the
French war cost, increased the U.S. military
advisory mission, supplied forty B-26’s to the
French, and conti nued the thre at of U.S.
inter venti on, first by “un ited acti on" and
the n by forming seato. In taking these ac­
tions, Eisenhower was deciding against Vice-
President Nixo n and Admira l Radford,
Cha irma n of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who
favored U.S. inter vent ion in force, and
against G eneral Ridgway, Chi ef o f the Army
•Ibid., p. 676-7.
•Sherman Adamj, Firsthand Repor t fJ^ew "for\ : Har-
per Row. 1961 ), p. 120.
157.
 236
Staff, who opposed any action tha t could
lead to an Asian land war. He was treading
the well-worn middle path of doing just
enough to balan ce off contrad ictory domestic,
bureaucratic, and inter natio nal pressures.
The Vietnamese Comm unists agreed to the
compromise, believing that winning the full
prize was only a m atter of time.
In public statements and later in his
memoirs, P resident Eisenhower gave glimpses
of his reasoning. A t the time of Dienbienp hu,
he noted, “. . . we ought to look at th is thin g
with some optimis m a nd some determin ation
. . . long faces and defeatism do n’t win
battles .”’ Later he wrote, “I am convinced
tha t the French could no t win the war because
the interna l political situati on in Vietnam ,
weak and confused, badly weakened their
military position. ” 8 But he persevered never­
theless, believing tha t “th e decision to give
this aid was almost compulsory. Th e Unite d
States had n o real a lternat ive unless we were
to a ban don So utheas t A sia.”’
Th e Genev a Confe rence of 1954 was fol­
lowed by eighteen bleak and pessimistic
mon ths as official Washin gton wondered
whether the pieces could be put back together.
Despite or perhaps because of t he pessimism,
U.S. aid was increased. The n, in the fall of
1956, Dulles could say: “ We have a clean base
there now, witho ut a tain t of colonialism.
Dienbien phu was a blessing in disguise.”10
The years of “ cautious o ptimism” had begun.
President Eisenhower kept the U.S. out of
war because h e allowed a territorial compro­
mise with the Commun ists. More critically,
’ Public Papers of the Presidents, Eisenhower, 1954,
p. 471. This remark w a s rnade on M ay 12, 1954.
'Dw igh t D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, f) fe w
York: Doubleday, 19637, p. 372.
•Ibid ., p. 373.
“ Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, flsfew
York-' Dell, 19627, p. 182. Eisenhower himself wrote
that in 1954 "Th e stronge st reason of all for United
States refusal to respond by itself to French pleas was
our traditi on of anti-colonialism.” ( in Manda te for
Change, p. 3737
158.
Gelb
he decided to replace the French and mainta in
a direct U.S. presence in Indochi na. With
strong rhetoric, military training programs,
support for Ngo D inh Diem in his refusal to
hold the elections prescribed by the Geneva
accords, and continui ng military and eco­
nomic assistance, he made the new state or
“zone” of South Vietna m an American
responsibility. Several years of military quiet
in South V ietnam did n ot hide the smoldering
political turmoil in that country nor did it
obscure th e newspaper hea dlines which regu­
larly proclaimed tha t the war in Indochi na
had shifted to Laos.
VI. The Kennedy Administration
The Admi nistrat ion of John F. Kennedy
began in an aura of domestic sacrifice and
inter natio nal confr ontat ion. The inaugura­
tion speech set the tone of U.S. responsibil­
ities in “haz ardous and dangero us” times.
Vietna m had a special and immediate im­
portanc e which derived from the general
inter natio nal situa tion. K ennedy’s predictions
about dangerous times came true quickly—
and stayed true—and he wanted to show
strength to the Communists. But it was also
the precarious situation in Laos and the
“ne utralist ” compromise which Kennedy was
preparing for Laos tha t were driving the
President deeper in to Vietnam. In Sorensen’s
words, Kennedy was “ skeptical of the e xtent
of our involvemen t [in Vietnam] but un­
willing to aban don his predecessor’s pledge
or permit a Com munist conquest. . .
Kennedy had to face three basic general
decisions. First, was top priority to go to
political reform or fighting the war? On this
issue the fixers, who wanted to give priority
to political reform, were arrayed against the
military. Second, should the line of involve­
ment be drawn a t combat units? On th is issue
the fixers were more quiet th an in oppositi on.
The military and the Count ry Team pushed
hard —even urging the President to threat en
"Th eod ore Sorensen, Kennedy, CHew f o rk : Harper &
Row. 1965J. p. 639.
159.
 2?>1
Hanoi with U.S. bombing. Some counter ­
weight came from State a nd the White H ouse
staff. Third , should the President make a
clear, irrevocable and open-ende d commit­
ment to prevent a Com muni st victory?
Would this strengt hen or weaken the U.S.
han d in Saigon? Would it frighten away t he
Communists? Wha t would be the domestic
political consequences?
Kennedy’s tactics and decisions—like
Eisenhower’s—followed t he patt ern of doing
what was minimally necessary. O n the polit­
ical versus military priority issue, Kennedy
did not make increasing military assistance
definitively contin gent on political reform,
but he pointe d to the absence of reform as
the main r eason for limiting t he U .S. military
role. O n the combat unit issue, according to
biographer Sorensen, “Kenned y never made
a final negative decision on troops. In typical
Kennedy fa shion, he made it difficult for any
of the pro-in terven tion advocates to charge
him privately with weakness.” 12 O n the third
issue, he avoided an open-ended commitment,
but escalated his rhetoric abou t the impor­
tance of Vie tnam. While h e did a uthorize an
increase o f U.S. military personne l from 685
to 16,000, he did so slowly, an d n ot in two or
three big decisions. H e c ontinual ly doled out
the increases. He gave encouragem ent to
bureaucratic pla nning and studying as a safety
valve—a valve he thou ght he could control.
He kept a very tight rein on informa tion to
the public abou t th e war. In Salinger’s words,
he “was not anxious to admit the existence
of a real war . . By minimizing U.S. in­
volvement, Kennedy was trying to avoid pub­
lic pressures either to do more or to do less.
The President would make it “th eir” war
until he had no choice but to look at it in a
different light. He would no t look at it in
anot her light until Diem, who looked like a
losing horse, was replaced. He would not
” Ibid., p. 654.
“ Pierre Salinger, Wi th Kennedy, ( \e u i "for\: Double­
day. 1966), pp. 319-329.
160.
Gelb
gamble on long odds. But it is no t clear w hat
he expected to get as a replacement for Diem.
With th e exception of much o f 1962, which
even the Nort h Vietnamese have called
“Diem’s year,” the principal Kennedy deci­
sions were made in an atmosph ere o f det eri­
oratio n, not progress, in Vietna m. This
feeling of deterio ration explains why Kennedy
dispatc hed so many high-level missions to
Vietn am. As Kennedy’s biographers have
written, the President was not really being
told he was winning, but how much more he
would h ave to do.
Writing in 1965, Theo dore Sorensen
summed up the White House view of events
following th e Diem coup in Novemb er 1963:
The President, while eager to make clear
tha t our aim was to get out of Vietnam , had
always been doubtful abou t the optimistic
reports constan tly filed by the military on
the progress of the war. . . . The struggle
could well be, he thought , this nat ion ’s
severest test of endurance and pati ence. . . .
He was simply going to weather it out, a
nasty, untidy mess to which there was no
othe r acceptable solution. Talk o f aband on­
ing so unstab le an ally an d so costly a com­
mitment ‘only makes it easy for the
Commu nists,’ said the President. ‘I thin k
we s hould stay.’14
VII. The Johnson Administration
Lyndon Joh nson assumed office with a
reput ation as a pragmatic politician and not
a cold war ideologue. His history on Southeast
Asia indicated cautio n and compara tive re­
straint. An d yet it was this same ma n w ho as
President presided ove r a nd led the U.S. into
massive involvement .
Thre e facts con spired to make it easier for
John son to take the plunge on the assumed
importanc e of Vietnam tha n his predecessors.
First, the world was a safer place to live in
and Vietn am was the only conti nuing crisis.
Europe was secure. Th e Sino-Soviet split ha d
deepened. Mutual nuclear deterrenc e existed
“ Sorensen, op. cit., p. 661.
161.
 238

G el b

between the two superpowers. Second, the “fixers” who felt th at U.S. c onduct of the war
situatio n in Vietn am was more desperate than missed its political essence an d for the doves
it ever had been. If the U.S. had not inter­ who wante d to see something besides destruc­
vened in 1965, South Vietnam would have tion, John son placed new e mphasis on "th e
been conque red by the Communists. Third, othe r war”—pacification, nation-building,
after years of effort, the U.S. conve ntiona l and political development—in February 1966.
military forces were big enough and ready John son referred to this whole complex of
enough to inte rvene. Unlike his predecessors, actions and the air war in partic ular as his
John son had the military capability to back attemp t to “seduce not rape” the Nor th
up his words. Vietnamese.
In sum, Vietn am became relatively more The objective of the John son Adm inistr a­
importa nt, it was in greater danger, and the tion was to main tain an indepe nden t non-
U.S. was in a position to do something Comm unist South Vietna m. In the later
about it. years, this was rephrased: “ allowing the South
At Johns Hopki ns in April 1965, the Vietnamese to determine their own future
President told the American people what he without externa l interference.” As the Presi­
would do: “ We will do everything necessary dent crossed the old barriers in pursuit of
to reach tha t objective [of no extern al inter­ this objective, he es tablished new ones. While
ference in South Vietnam], and we will do he ordered the bombing of No rth Vietnam ,
only what is absolutely necessary.” But in he would not approve the bombing o f targets
order to prevent defeat and in o rder to keep which ran the risk of conf ront ation with
the faith with his most loyal suppor ters, the Chi na and Russia. While he permitted the
minimum necessary became the functio nal U.S. force level in Vietn am to go ov er one-
equivale nt of gradual escalation. The Air half million men, he would not agree to call
Force and the Comm ander in Chief, Pacific up the Reserves. While he was willing to
(cincpac) pressed ha rd for full systems bomb­ spend $25 billion in o ne year o n the war, he
ing—the author ity to destroy 94 key Nor th would not put the U.S. economy on a war­
Vietnamese targets in 16 days. Johns on, time mobilization footing. But the most
backed and pressured in the other direction impo rtant Johns on barrier was raised against
by Secretary McNam ara, doled out approval invading Cambodia, Laos, and No rth Viet­
for new targets ov er thr ee years in a pain stak­ nam. This limitation was also a corners tone
ing and piecemeal fashion. John son accom­ in the President’s hopes for a compromise
modated dovish pressure and the advice of settlement. He would agree to th e p erman ent
the many pragmatists who surrou nded him existence o f No rth Vietn am—even help that
by making peace overtures. But these over­ country economically—if Nor th Vietnam
tures were either accompanied with or fol­ would extend tha t same right to South
lowed by e scalation. John son moved toward Vietnam .
those who w anted three-quart ers o f a million In or der to s ustain public and bureaucratic
U.S. fighting men in Vietnam , but he never support for his policy, Johnso n’s m ethod was
got there. Guide d by judgments of domes­ to browbeat and isolate his opponents. To
tic repercussion and influenced again by the American people, he p ainted th e alterna­
McNamara, the President made at least eight tives to what he was doi ng as irresponsible
separate decisions on U.S. force levels in or reckless. In ei ther case, the result would be
Vietna m over a four-year period. 15 For the a greater risk of future general war. The
bureaucracy used this same technique of
“ See the C h ro n o lo g y in 17.S. Se na te F o re ig n R el at io ns
C o m m itt e e. B a ckg ro u n d In fo rm a ti o n R e la ti n g to S o u th ­ creating the bug-out o r bomb- out extremes in
east A s ia a nd V ie tn a m , M a rc h 19 69 . order to ma intain as many of its own members

162. 163.
 239
in “ the middle roa d.” The price of consensus
—within the bureaucracy and in the public
at large—was invariably a middle road of
contrad ictions and no priorities for act ion.
President John son was the master of con­
sensus. On Vietn am this required melding
the propo nent s of negotiatio ns with the
propo nents of military victory. T he tec hnique
for maint aining th is Vietn am consensus was
gradual escalation punc tuate d by dramati c
peace overtures. As the war was escalated
without an end in sight, the number s of
people John son could hold together dimin ­
ished. Th e pressures for disengagement or for
“decisive military actio n” became enormou s,
but with the “haw ks” always o utnum bering
and more strategically placed tha n the
“doves.”
John son knew he had inherited a deteri­
orating situati on in Vietn am. Vietcong mili­
tary successes and con stan t change in the
Saigon governm ent from 1964 to 1966 were
not secrets to anyone. T hrou ghou t the critical
year of 1965, he struck the themes of endur ­
ance and more-to-come. In his May 4, 1965
requests for Vietn am Supplemental Appr o­
priation s he warned: “I see no choice b ut to
contin ue the course we are on, filled as it is
with peril and unce rtain ty.” In his July 28,
1965 press conference he anno unce d a new
125,000 troop ceiling and went on to say:
“Ad dition al forces will be needed later, and
they will be sent as requ ested.”
Talk ab out “tu rning corn ers” and winning
a military victory reached a crescendo in 1967-
At th e same time a new coun terp oint emerged
—“st alemate.” 16 The message of the stalemate
prop onen ts was tha t the U.S. was strong
enough to preve nt de feat, but tha t the situa­
tion defied victory. Ha noi wo uld co ntinu e to
match the U.S. force build-up and would
not “cry uncle” over the bombing. The
Saigon governm ent a nd army h ad basic polit­
ical a nd structur al problems which they were
unlikely to be able to overcome. Stalemate,
“ R. W. Apple, ‘'Vietnam. The Signs of Stalemate,"
New York Times, A ugust 7, 1967.
164.
Gelb
it was urged, should be used as a basis for
getting a compromise settlement with Hanoi .
These arguments were not lost on the
President. At Guam in March 1967, while
other s arou nd him were waxing eloquen t
abou t progress, the President was guardedly
optimistic, speaking of “a favorab le turnin g
point, militarily and politically.” But after
one of the meetings he was reported to have
said: “We have a difficult, a serious, long-
drawn-out, agonizing problem th at we do not
have an answer fo r.” 17 N or did the President
overlook the effects of th e 1968 Te t offensive,
coming as it did after many mont hs of
virtually unqualified optimism by him and by
others. He stopped the bombing partially,
increased troop strength slightly, made a peace
overtur e, and a nnou nced his retirement.
In Novem ber 1963, John son is quote d as
saying: “I am not going to be the President
who saw Southeas t Asia go the way Chi na
went.” 18 In the spring of 1965, Lady Bird
John son quoted him as saying: “I can ’t get
out. I ca n’t finish it w ith what I ha ve got. So
what the Hell can I do?” 19 President Jo hnso n,
like his predecessors, persevered and hand ed
the war o n to his successor.
VI II. Whe re Do We Go From Here?
If Vietn am were a story of how t he system
failed, t hat is, if ou r leaders d id not d o what
they wanted to do or if they did no t realize
what they were doing or what was hap pening,
it would be easy to package a large and
assorted box of policy-making panaceas . For
example: Fix the meth od of reporting from
the field. Fix the way progress is mea sured in
a guerrilla war. Make sure the President sees
all the real alternatives. But these are all
third-ord er issues, because the U.S. political-
bureaucratic system did n ot fail; it worked.
‘'Quo ted in Henry Brandon, Anatomy of Erro r, ( Bos­
ton: Gambit, 1969J, p. 102.
"T om Wicker, JFK and LBJ, CHcu> Tor^.- Penguin
Books, 1968), p. 208.
"L ad y Bird Johnson, A Wh ite House Diary, (J^eui
fo rk : Holt, Rinehart and Win sto n, 1970) , p. 248.
165.
 240
O ut leade rs felt they ha d to pre ven t the
loss of Vi etn am to Co mm uni sm, an d they
hav e suc ceede d so far in d oin g ju st th at. Mo st
of tho se who made Vi etn am policy still
believe th at they did th e righ t thi ng an d
lam ent onl y the dome stic repe rcus sion s of
the ir act ion s. It is beca use th e price of at ta in ­
ing this goal has been so de ar in lives, tru st,
dolla rs, an d prior ities, an d the benefi ts so
inta ngib le, rem ote, and oft en implau sible,
th at t hese lea ders an d we ourse lves are forc ed
to seek new answ ers and new policies.
Para doxically, the way to get these new
answ ers is no t by askin g why did the system
fail, bu t why did it work so tragically well.
Th ere is, the n, only on e first -orde r issue—how
an d why doe s ou r polit ical-bur eauc ratic sys­
tem decid e wha t is v ital an d wh at is n ot? By
whom , in wh at ma nne r, an d for wha t r easo ns
was it deci ded th at all V iet na m mus t no t fall
int o Co mm un ist hands ?
Alm ost all of ou r leaders s ince 1949 s har ed
this co nvi cti on. Onl y a few voices in the
wilde rness were raise d in opp osit ion. Eve n as
late as mid-1967, most critic s were argu ing
th at the U.S. could no t afford to lose or be
“d riv en from t he field,” th at th e r eal pro blem
was ou r bo mb ing of N or th V iet na m, a nd th at
this ha d to be s top ped in ord er to brin g a bou t
a ne gotia ted s ettle men t. Fewe r still were urging
th at s uch a set tlem ent sho uld invo lve a c oali ­
tio n gov ern me nt with th e Co mm uni sts.
Har dly an yo ne was saying th at the out com e
in Vi etn am d id no t matt er.
Th ere is little evide nce of muc h critica l
thi nk ing ab ou t the rela tion of Vi etn am to
U.S. securit y. Schol ars, jour nali sts, pol iti­
cians , an d bur eau cra ts all seem to hav e
assum ed eit he r th at Vi etn am was “v ital ” to
U.S. na tio na l securit y or th at the Am eric an
people woul d no t sta nd for the loss of “ an ­
ot he r” cou ntr y to Com mun ism .
An ti-C om mu nis m has bee n an d still is a
po ten t force in Am erica n politics, an d mo st
people wh o were dealin g with th e Vi etn am
pro blem simply believed th at the Con gres s
an d th e public would “ pu nis h” tho se wh o
166.
Celb
were “ soft on C om mu nis m. ” O ur lea ders no t
only ant icip ated this kin d of pu blic reac tion ,
but b elieve d th at t her e were v alid reas ons f or
not per mit ting th e Co mm uni sts to take all of
Vie tna m by force. In oth er words, they
believed in wha t the y were doin g on the
nat ion al securit y "m eri ts. ” Th e dom ino
theo ry, which was at th e he art o f t he mat ter,
rested on the widely sha red att itud e th at
security was indivisible, th at weakne ss in one
place would only invi te aggression in oth ers .
W hat c an be done?
Th e Presi dent c an do more t ha n Presi dents
hav e in the past to call his na tio na l security
burea ucra cy to t ask. He c an show t he burea u­
cracy t ha t he expects it to be m ore ri gorous in
dete rmi nin g wha t is vita l or im po rta nt or
un im po rta nt. Specifically, he can reject rea­
son ing whi ch simply asse rts th at securit y is
indivisible, an d he ca n foste r the belief th at
while the worl d is an inte rco nne cte d whole,
acti ons can be tak en in cer tain par ts of the
world to com pen sate for acti ons whic h are
no t tak en elsewh ere. For exam ple, if t he real
con cer n ab ou t Vi etn am were the effect o f its
loss on Jap an , the Mid dle East an d Berlin,
could we no t tak e act ion s in each of thes e
places to mitigat e the “ Vie tna m fall out ”?
No ne o f thes e efforts with the burea ucra cy
ca n succeed, how ever , unless the re is a
chan ge in gene ral politic al atti tud es as well.
If anti-C om mu nis m persis ts as an ove rrid ing
domes tic politi cal issue it will also be the
mai n bur eau crat ic issue. Alte ring publ ic
atti tude s will t ake time, edu cati on, an d pol it­
ical cour age—a nd it will crea te a real d ilem ma
for the Presi dent. If th e Pres iden t goes “ too
fa r” in re-ed ucati ng public an d cong ressio nal
opinio ns ab ou t Co mm uni sm , he may find
th at he will h ave little su pp ort for th rea ten ing
or using milita ry force wh en he believes th at
ou r security really is at stake. In the end , it
will still be the Presi dent who is h eld resp on­
sible for U.S. security . Yet, if ou r Vie tna m
expe rienc e has tau ght us any thin g, it is th at
the Pres ident must begin the process of re­
edu cati on despi te the risks.
167.
 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO OSS ACTIVITY
IN FRENCH INDOCHINA
INTRODUCTION
Sections I, II , and I I I have been reproduced by offset prin ting in
order to convey to the rea der a b etter sense of the orig inal documents.
Because of thei r poor legibility the documents in section IV were
set in pri nt keeping the format of the original documents.
(241)
 I. THE “DEE R” MISSION TO VIET MINH HEAD­
QUARTERS, JULY-SEPT EMBER, 1945
SP EC IA L OPERAT IONS BRANCH
APO 6 2 7

D at e s 1q May 194-5

SUBJECT : L e tte r o f I n s tr u c tio n s .

TO : L ia j. Thom as
1 . You a r e SO Team Ho. _______________ _______ , Code
name D e e r_____ . You en d y o u r te am a r e to p ro c e e d to P ose h
__________ a s y o u r f i r s t d e s t i n a t i o n . V'hen yo u a r r i v e a t y o u r
f i r s t d e s t i n a t i o n yo u w i l l be m et by (_________
____________ fr om th e OSS Sub B a se . I n th e e v e n t yo u a r e n o t me t
by him yo u w i l l i n q u i r e CCC.E q.___________________________________
w ha t h i s ph on e nu mb er i s ’ oi’ how to c o n t a c t hi m . You a r e t.o t e l l
•____________________ i n t o v h a t a r e a yo u a r e g o in g an d he w i l l
a s s i s t yo u i n r e a c h in g yo ur f i n a l d e s t i n a t i o n .
2 . Yo ur te a m 's an d y o u r m is s io n i s t o i n t e r d i c t J a p
l i n e s o f Co m m un ic at io n i n th e H an oi — N in gm ing
________a r e a , t h i s in c lu d e s RH & Hi gh wa y ;
y o u r s e c o n d a ry m is s io n s a r e t o w or k w it h g u e r r i l l a s as w e ll a s
i n d i c a t e t a r g e t s o f o p p o r tu n it y f o r th e a i r f o r c e , You a r e to
o p e r a te w it h ________ Iand Chinese units as assigned
Se e a t t a c h e d o v e r la y f o r y o u r o p e r a ti n g a r e a . From ti m e to ti m e
yo u may be a sk e d f o r w e a th e r r e p o r t s f o r a i r d ro p s a s w e ll as f o r
a i r f o r c e o p e r a t i o n s . T h is in f o rm a ti o n w i l l be a sk ed by (1 )
(2 )C a p t T h o rn to n , wh ose co de name i s (1 ) f o r th e a ^r f o r c e

3» The Comm andin g an d L ia is o n o f f i c e r o f a l l te am s o p e-

• r a t i n g i n th e a r e a m e n ti o n e d i n p a ra g ra p h 2 w i l l b e ___________ |
________ , wh os e co de name i s Chow » and " t 1*42 0 w i l l he w it h
th e h e a d q u a r te r s o f CCC a t P o se h (? )_______________ .
He w i l l c o o r d in a te , as' •m uch as p o s s i b l e , th e a c t i v i t i e s o f th e
SG te am s i n th e a r e a . From him yo u w i l l r e c e i v e , fr om ti m e to
ti m e , i n s t r u c t i o n s an d q u e s ti o n s .
4 . Yo ur r a d i o co m m un ic at io ns w i l l be t i e d i n to _________
______ f n d f o r a l l y o u r su p p ly r e q u e s ts yo u w i l l us e s u p p ly co de
l i s t is s u e d to y o u , an d th e y w i l l be ta k e n c a r e o f by L t ', /h a ll e n
_ ______th u s r e l i e v i n g __________________.___ o f p u r e ly a d m in is t r a - „
t i v e m a t t e r s , A lt h o u g h y o u r co m m un ic at io ns w i l l be w it h _______
____________________________w i l l r e l a y e d a 11 m e ss ag es s e n t
by yo u.
(243)
 244

1 > 17 J u l y 19 45
i Kum lung
R e ce iv ed a t Kunm ing T on ki n
27 J u l y 19 45 v i a F .I .C .

To : Chow v i a Wam pler

•From: D ee r R e p o rt #1

I. The L an d in g :
We a l l la n d e d s a f e l y . 3 g t Z e i l s k i , L t H o n tf o rt an d I la n d e d in
t r e e s an d g o t a few m in or s c r a t c h e s . W hi le ha n g in g i n t h e t r e e I
w hi pp ed o u t my H an di e T a lk ie an d wa s a b le to h e a r yo u an sw er on ce .
I was u n ab le to p u l l o u t my v e ry p i s t o l .
II. The R e c e p ti o n :
We w er e f i r s t g r e e te d by \'i of AGAS an d by
fth e bo y fr om B o st o n , an d em plo ye d by GBT. I th e n wa s c a l l e d on
f o r a s h o r t s p e e c h to th e g u a r d . Th ey p r e s e n te d arm s an d I gav e
f o r t h a fev / fl o w e ry s e n te n c e s . The g u a rd c o n s is te d o f a b o u t 200
arm ed me n. Arm ame nt c o n s is te d o f F re n c h r i f l e s , a few B re n s , a few
to m m ie s, a fe w c a r b in e s an d a few s t e n s . I wa s th e n e s c o r te d t o ITr.
R oe , one o f th e b ig le a d e r s o f th e ( V ie t H in h L ea gu e) P a r ty . He
sp e ak s e x c e l l e n t E n g li s h b u t i s v e ry we ak p h y s ic a l ly as he r e c e n t l y
w al ke d i n fr om T s in g s i . He r e c e iv e d u s m os t c o r d i a l l y , We th e n
w er e show n o u r q u a r t e r s . Th ey ha d b u i l t f o r us a s p e c i a l bambo o
s h e l t e r , c o n s i s t i n g o f a bambo o f l o o r a few f e e t o f f th e g ro u n d an d
a r o o f o f pa lm l e a v e s . We th e n ha d su p p e r c o n s is ti n g o f B ee r
( r e c e n t l y c a p tu r e d ) r i c e , bamb oo s p r o u t s , an d b ar b e cu ed ster/ sT. Th ey
f r e s h l y s la u g h te r e d a cow i n o u r h o n o r.
I I I . E qu ip m en t:
Il o ti ii n g a p p e a rs b ro k e n . By 7 Pii th e y ha d b ro u g h t a l l th e co n­
t a i n e r s to o u r “ ho us e* '.
IV . W ea th er :
C o o le r t h s n P o se h . . e s l e p t v er y c o m fo rt a b ly on our s i l k s h e e t s .
V. H cd io :
We t i d e d to make c o n t a c t a t 8 :0 0 t h i s m or ni ng (1 7 J u l y ) b u t
s u n s u c c e s s f u l, b u t w i l l t r y t o n i t e on 6 o ’c lo c k s k e d . AGAS s e n t
bac k -word on t i . e i r r a d io t h a t ue we . e a l l C. K.
V I. C on fe re nce w it h H r. H oe , P a r t y L e a d e r:
Had lo ng c o n fe re n c e w it h Ho e, l t h i s m or ni ng (1 7 J u ly )
The m ai n d i s c u s s i o n c e n te r e d on ou r t a r g e t an d th e F re n c h .
 A. F i r s t th e F re n c h . ’ r . F.oe s a i d i f th e g u - r d h ad know n F o n t-
f o r t wa3 F re n c h th e y m ig h t ha ve ha d hi- a s h o t on th e s p o t . H r. Hoe
p e r s o n a ll y l i k e s many F re n c h b u t he sa y s m os t o f ?. is s o l d i e r s d o n ’ t .
He sa y s when th e Fr en ch , r e t r e a t e d fr om Ca ob an g th e y s h o t an d g a s s e d
many p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s . H o n tf o r t’ s i d e n t i t y was g iv e n awa y a t on ce
b e c a u se one o f th e A nn em ite s r e c o g n iz e d him h .v in g know n him a t Cao ­
ba ng .
He c o n ti n u e d t o sa y t h a t th e p a r ty ha d ab o u t 3 ,0 0 0 o r mor e men
un d er ar ms i n T on ki n an d t h a t we w ou ld be h e lp e d ev er yw he re we w e n t-
pr ov id eo , th e F re n c h w er e n o t w it h u s . I a sk e d i f he w ou ld a g re e t o
u s se n d in g i n o n ly th e F re n c h o f f i c e r s an d th e A nn am ite s a t P o se h .
He s a id n o . He w i l l wel com e 10 m i l l i o n A m er ic an s, ho v/ ev er , He
f u r t h e r a g re e d t h a t i f th e F re n c h a g re e d he wo ul d c o n s e n t to ou r
b r in g in g i n th e A nn am it es now a t P o se h . Ho v/e ve r, f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s
i t w ou ld be b e t t e r n o t t o :
1) He ca n g iv e me h e re as many men a s I n e e d . He rec om me nd s n o t
mor e th a n 10 0 . Many a r e p a r t i a l l y t r a i n e d un d er a le a d e r who wa s
t r a i n e d i n g u e r i l l a w a r fa r e by th e Hav y i n C h in a.
2) T he se men h e re know th e c o u n tr y b e t t e r .
3) S e c u r i t y . Too many p la n e s w i l l a t t r a c t th e J a p s .
4) D o u b tf u l i f th e F re n ch w i l l g iv e th em up .
He i s w i l l i n g t h a t PHAC an d LCGC3 re m a in h e r e , b u t s in c e th e y
a r e a s s o c ia te d w it h th e F re n c h p r e f e r s t h e i r r e t u r n . He c a n f u r n i s h
u s w it h a l l th e i n t e r p r e t e r s we n e e d .
B. S ec on d th e t a r g e t . He s u g g e s ts a ch an ge i n o u r t a r g e t , t o
w i t : o p e r a te on th e T h ai N gu ye n, Bac Ka n, Cao Ban g r o a d i n s t e a d o f
K an oe -L an gs on r o a d , f o r th e f o ll o w in g r e a s o n s :
1) The a i r f o r c e ha s d is r u p te d th e t r a f f i c on E an o i- L an g so n r o c d .
2) I t h a s l o s t i t s im p o rt a n ce s in c e H an ni ng was ta k e n .
3) Th e J a p s a r e i n much g r e a t e r f o rc e i n t h a t a r e a .
4) The VHL P a r t y a r e n o t a s s tr o n g o r as w e ll ar m ed i n t h a t a r e a
5) The J a p s a r e c o n s ta n tl y u s in g th e T ha i- H gu ge n- B ac Ka n. F or e
so t h a t H an oi -L an gs on r o a d .
6) B e t t e r a r e a f o r t r a i n i n g s o l d i e r s h e r e .
7) The p r e s e n t a r e a i s c o m p le te ly c o n t r o l l e d b y th e VML. -Ho
Ja p s p e n e tra te .
o) T h is a r e a i s be co mi ng s t a t i c an d fr om h e r e we ca n ta k e ou r
men a f t e r th e y a re t r a i n e d an d mor e s o u th o p e r a te on t h e RR t o L ao -
ka y an d e v e n tu a ll y on th e HR l i n e H a n o i- S a ig o n , w hi ch i s much mor e
v i t a l an d im p o r ta n t, or i f n e c e s s a r y ta k e o u r t r a i n e d men an d o p e r a te
on E an o i- L cn g so n r o a d .
VZZ Re co m m en da tio ns :
I u r g e n tl y rec om me nd th e f o ll o w in g -and r e q u e s t th e f o ll o w in g :
a) E li m in a te a l l F re n ch an d Ann ame se a t P o se h .
b) R e tu rn K o n t f o r t , Ph ac A Lo go s to P o se h . T h is ca n be do ne
so on a s th e y La ve co m p le te d an L -5 s t r i p an d \ i s g o in g
o u t F r id a y (2 0 J u l y ) by L - J .
c) P a ra c h u te a l l th e r e s t o f b o th te am s in cl u d in g ; m e d ic a l men
h e re as so on a s p o s s i b le w i t h - a l l ar ms an d .' b o u t l / 3 r d o f th e . dem o-
 246

l i ’c io n eq u ip m en t.
g ) T r a in t e men h er e en d th e n »?.ove n o r th en d o p e r a te n e r Cho
Chu ’..'h ere ve w i l l g e t a n o th e r DZ an d dr op th e re m a in d e r o f th e su p ­
p l i e s . he p la n to s e t up a f a i r l y pe rm an en t b -s e t h e r e .
e ) R e c a ll £.nd R o n g lo is im m e d ia te ly t o P o se n . I f
th e y ha ve s t a r t e d o u t w a lk in g an e f f o r t m us t be made to r e c r l l th a n .
f ) Se nd down O'.iT new s p h o to s an d p r i n t i n g p a p e r f o r l o c a l w or k.
Wou ld be a b ig h e l p .
g ) F o rg e t th e Com mun ist Bo gy . in.iL is n o t Co mm un ist . S ta n d s f o r
fr ee d om an d re fo rm s fr om F re n c h h a r s h n e s s . VLL wo uld be w i l l i n g to
t a l k to some Hi gh Ke nk in g F re n ch o f f i c e r (G e n e ra l S e b o t i e r , eg ) and.
se e w h at F re n ch w ou ld ha ve t o o f f e r . I f F re n ch go p a r t way w it h th em
th e y n i g h t wo rk w it h F re n c h — p a r t i c u l a r l y , i f S e b a t i e r w ou ld come
h e r e . I t m ig ht be do ne .
e q u ip m e n t:
T ry t o g e t t h e f o ll o w in g i n a d d i ti o n to w ha t we h a v e : 6 A m er ic an s
1 . 10 II“ 3 ’ s w it h S i l e n c e r s (Go od f o r J a p s e n t r i e s & ad va nc e
g u a rd s)
2 . 4 m o rt a rs (60mn ) w it h Ammo
3 . J u n g le b o o ts , s n e a k e rs or s a n d a ls o r c l o t h sh o e s f o r ea ch
A m er ic an i n a d d i t i o n t o G -I s h o e s .
4 . B la n k e t or l i g h t s le e p in g ba g p e r man a s th e n i g h ts g e t c o o l.
5. A ll r a tio n s p o s s ib le .
6 . P le n ty o f co ok in g u t e n s i l s .
7 . 5 5“g & l w a te r c a n s . 10 f o ld in g ca n v as w a te r b u c k e ts .
8 . P le n ty o f D r a t i o n s .
9 . P le n ty o f m os qu it o r e p e l l e n t a t le a s e 30 0 b o w ti e s .
10 . P le n ty o f m e d ic a l s u p p li e s e s p e c i a l l y f o r s k in i n f e c t i o n su ch
a s : (Some p o is o n o u s p l a n t s h e re ) F r a z e r ’s s o l u t i o n , p o ta ss iu m
p er m a n g an a te , s a l i c y l i c a c id o in tm e n t.
11 . H x tr a to o th b r u s h e s .
12 . P le n ty o f e n tr e n c h in g t o o l s an d m a c h e tt e s . (1 0 o f ea ch )
13 . H el m et p e r A m er ic an .
14 . I.i os qu ito n e t s . (1 00 )
1 5 . 100 G re en f a ti g u e s u i t s , s m a ll s i z e s , o r ca m o u fl ag ed ju n g le
s u i t s an d m ec han ic s ca ps (n o k h a k i c l o th e s )
1 6 . 1 p r k h a k i s h o r ts p e r A m er ic an .
17 . 20 h a n c ie t a l k i e s (SCR 53^ ) i f p o s s ib le - e x tr e m e ly u s e f u l f o r
ou r s e n t r i e s on m ou nta in p e a k s, (sp are b e tte r io s )
l o . C a n d le s - a s many a s p o s s i b l e .
19 . H ap s. I f p o s s ib le 5 co m pl et e s e t s o f 1 :1 0 0 ,0 0 0 f o r T on ki n
(I n d o -C h in a e d i t i o n 19 37 )- A ls o. so m e map (5 s e t s ) to co ve r
a r e a s o u th o f H an oi as f a r S out h a s H a ti n h r o t H a ti n h
(1 8 -4 0 , 10b and w es t 200 k il o m e te r s ) . E s s e n t i a l f o r p a rL o is
an d a s g i f t s to p s r t y an d m i l i t a r y c h i e f s who ne ed n ap s b a d ly
/. Is o na o s c a le 1 :1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 (H in d JCOO) sh ee "t # K 3 4 8 , en ­
t i t l e d "HUB".
 247

30 . Two (2 ) ga s d ri v e n go ne r cst ors and two (2 ) lo ud sp ea ke rs fo r

6$ 4.
21 . O'./I News p i c t u r e s an d new s l e a f l e t s i n An na ne se i f p o s s i b le
22 . P le n ty o f p i c t u r e m ag az in es ( L i f e ) , b o o k s, n ew sp a p er s.
23 . Am mu nit ion f o r p r e s e n t w es po ns t h y h a v e - a s much a s p o s s i b le
o f f o ll o w in g :
a ) 9mm f o r s t e n
b) .3 03 c a l f o r B re n s.
c) 3ma f o r F re n ch r i f l e s .
24 . 25 t o 50 .4 5 c a l p i s t o l s .
2 5 . Buy p le n ty o f s a l t a t F o se h . n a t i v e s v e ry s h o r t o f i t .
2 6 . Te n ( a t le a _ ,t ) w ir e c u t t e r s a n a p o le c li m b in g s p ik e s (To
r a i s e h e l l w it h t e l e g r a p h i c sy st em )
27. B az o r f o r p ru m ie r.
28 . 1 s m a ll p o r ta b l e ty p e w r it e r .
29 . 10 w a tc h e s f o r o p e r a ti o n a l g i f t s t o p a r t y an d m i l i t a r y
le a d e rs .
3 0 . S e v e r a l po un ds p r i n t i n g p a p e r f o r l o c a l p a p e rs an d 120 w or k.
Ne ed ro u g h p a p e r to ta k e t h e i r in k . S iz e 24 M x 12 ” a p p ro x .

ALLISON E . THCLi-.S
I’a j o r , I n f . *
L e a d e r, Team DZE2.
 248

Kim lun g
FTC
20 J u l y 19 45
TO : M aj or Wam pler
FROM: M aj or Thom as

1 . I am s e n d in g a co m pl et e w r i t t e n r e p o r t to
w hic h I w ou ld l i k e to ha ve yo u r e a d .
2 . I am s e n d in g t h i s ba ck by L;ho ca n v e r i f y a i:
th e f a c t s .
3 . Th e f i r s t f a c t i s t h a t a l l th e F re n c h an d Ann ame se a t
P o se h w i l l ha ve t o be e li m in a te d o r we w i l l ha ve t o go b a c k . Th<
VI.LL P a r ty i s v e r y s tr o n g h er e en d one ca n n o t w or k w it h o u t th em .
Th ey ha ve a lo n g l i s t o f g r ie v a n c e s a g a in s t th e F re n c h . How eve r
th e y w ou ld be w i l l i n g t o t a l k to a h ig h r a n k in g F re nch o f f i c i a l
l i k e G e n e ra l S e b a t i e r , w hi ch we m ig h t be a b le t o a r r a n g e , i f th e
F re n c h a r e re e d y t o g r a n t c e r t a i n c o n c e s s io n s .
4 . R e q u e st t e n t a t i v e ch an ge i n t a r g e t a r e a . Wou ld l i k e to
t r a i n o u r men h e re to do some w or k n e a r Cho Chu an d th e n move
to w a rd H an oi -L an gs on Ro ad . T he re i s b e t t e r s e c u r i t y h e re f o r
t r a i n i n g an d t h e p a r t y i s s tr o n g h e r e .

/ s / M aj or A. K. Thom as
0- 12 34 24 1
 249

APPSl-iHIX I

L i s t o f g r ie v s n c e s VHL P a r ty h a s a g i n s t F re n ch :
1) H r. H oe , th e c h i e f , ha s ha d h i s w if e an d c h i l d r e n ta k e n
awa y fr om him by th e F re n c h an d h i s la n d s b u rn ed .
2) Th e F re n c h on le a v in g C ao ba ng , g a s s e d an d s h o t p o l i t i c a l
p ris o n e rs .
3) He av y ta x e s on gr o w th an d s a l e o f fo o d .
4 ) Ho c o n g r e g a ti o n o f more th a n 5 p e rs o n s p e r m it te d w it h o u t
a lic e n s e .
5) P r a c t i c a l l y f o r c e d s a l e o f op ium an d a lc o h o l on th e
p o p u la ti o n .
6) IIo fr ee do m o f p r e s s .
7) O ut la w o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s .
8) C o n tr o l an d l i m i t a t i o n o f s a l t .
T h is i s o n ly a p a r t i a l l i s t

APP5HDIX I I
V1JL P a r ty :
1) V1.-L s ta n d s f o r V ie t K in h L ea gu e.
2 ) I t i s an am al ga m at io n o f a l l p a r t i e s i n 19 40 .
3) I t i s a la r g e an d s tr o n g f o ll o w in g a t l e a s t 3 ,0 0 0 arm ed men
i n T o n k in a lo n e .
4) I t s ta n d s f o r fr ee d o m an d in d e p en d e n ce .
5) I t i s n o t Com mu nist o r Com mu nis t c o n t r o l l e d o r Com mu nis t l e d
 HE POH T OH DE RR M IS S IO N ------M AJO R A . K . THO MAS

CHAPTERS

I. O rg an iza tio n of m is si on at Kunming.

II. P re pa ra ti on a t Posa h

III. p re p ar at io n a t T si ng si

IV. T ri p to F ro n ti e r and tr a in in g o f Fre nch

V. P re par at io n fo r jump and—jump in to F .I .C .

VI. L if e in F .I .C . from a rr iv a l of Advance P ar ty to a rr iv a l of

rem ain de r of team and Cap t. Ho lla nd .

VI I. T ra in in g and s e le c ti o n of tr oo ps

V II I. Ac tio n tak en a f t e r Jap su rr en de r 15 Augu stt

A. March to Tha i Nguyen

B. B a tt le by Vietm inh tro op s ag ai n st Ja ps at Th ai Nguyen

3X. Pe ri od o f pea ce and r e s t a f te r b a tt le of Th ai Nguyen.

X. Hanoi .

XI. Re tur n to KUnming.

APPENDIX

I. In ve nt or y of m at er ia l ca pt ur ed , number of wounded a t Th ai Nguyen

I I . Pa pe r on VIETMINH p a rt y .
 251

HEAD QUAR TERS

OFFICE CF STRATEGIC SERVICES
CniNA THEATER
APO 627
17 Septem ber 1945

SUBJECT1 Re por t on Doer M is si o n .•

TO 1 Chief* SO Branc h, OSS/CT.

I, O r g a n iz a ti o n a t Kunm ing.

A. Pe rso nn el!
1) Major ALLISON K. THOMAS, 0-12 842 /4, Team L ead er
2) L t. Rone DEF0URN2AUX, O-8879I3, As et. Team Lead er
3) l e t Sg t Will iam ZEIL~KI, 35540059* Radio Op era tor
4) s /s g t Lawrence VOGT, 32246498, Vtoapona In st ru c to r
5) Sg t Aaron SQUIRES, 32056087* F ie ld Pho to.
6) Pfo Pa ul HOAGLAND, 42097161, Male Nuroe.
7) Pfo Honry PRUNIER, 11071414, Annomose In te rp re te r
(Pf o P ru ni er Joi ne d ua l a t e r at T si ng si - 18 June )

B. Mia siom
1) Our pri ma ry mi ssi on was to pe ne tr at e in to Fronoh Indo -Chi na by
food and so t up a ba se ne ar th e Hanoi-Lang3on roa d and ra il ro a d and to de st ro y,
blow up and ren der uoo loo s as much o f th e roa d and ra il ro a d os p o ss ib le .
2) Seco ndar y to th is was tho ga th er in g of in te ll ig e n c e , tho ro boin g
th e p o s s ib il it y th a t th e m iss io n migh t ev en tu al ly be one of in te ll ig e n c e on ly .
3) ?'e were to work w ith an ot ho r toam le d by Ca pt. Ho lla nd. I t was
pla nne d th a t a f te r ou r a r r iv a l in FIC th o two teams would s p l i t up eac h wi th
ap pr ox im ate ly 5° g u e ri ll a s apl oo o.
C.Br ie fin g! \
1) Wo wore ab ly br ie fe d by L t. S co tt o f P .I . and by R&A, who fu rn ­
ish ed ua wi th pho tog rap hs and a com plete lo g o f th e Hanoi-L angson ro ad .
2) The Mapping Se ct io n was m ost he lp fu l in gi vi ng us a l l maps r e ­
qu es ted .
3) Ca pt. Brown of S .I . gave us on ex ce ll en t b ri ef in g on what was
known o f J.O«B. in F .I .C .
D. Su pp lie s!
1) Wo Wei's su pp lie d wit h weapons and mi sc ell an eo us item s fo r a
•st an da rd* 50-mon g u o ri ll a group in cl ud in g p ri n c ip a ll y oo rb ino s, Tommies,
Bazook as, & de m oli tio n equip ment . (
2) Honors her o go to Ca pt. Tolman in R&A who was most h el pf u l in
h is ad vi ce on th e l a t e s t de mo lit ion ga dg et s.

8 3 -6 0 5 O -7 3 - 17
 252

II. P re pa ra ti on a t Pos eh.

A. Our f i r s t le g of th e .jo urn ey was to pro cee d to Pose h to co nt ac t

OSS Hq th er e und er th e comnand of who was to ar ra ng e de­
t a i l s of th e march in to FIC, in cl ud in g the ob ta in in g of th e tro op s we were
to hav e, e tc .

B. On th e 21 st May, IS gt . Vogt , S gt . Z e il s k i, l e f t
by tr uc k and t r a i l e r fo r Pos eh.
C. On th e 26th of May Sg t S q ui re s, Pf c Hoag land, and my sel f l e f t by
pl an e from Kunming and ar ri ve d a t Pos eh th e same tim e as th e ot he rs who had
come by tr u ck . That af te rn oo n I had a co nf ere nc e wi th jC ap t. BABINEAU,
Ca pt. HOLLAND, and Ca pt. BOGGS. I t was dec ide d th a t I would le av e to T si ng si
(C hin gh si) tomorrow to co nt ac t Mr. Georg es Vtou who had two compan ies o f bor der
p a tr o l tr oo ps pl ac ed a t ou r d is p o si ti o n by th e Chi nese Ma rsh all of th e War
Zone. The se two companies were to be tr a in e d by us and accompany us in to FIC-
in ot h er words th es e tr oo ps were to be ou r g u e ri ll a s .

III. P re p ar at io n fo r M iss ion a t T si n g si .

27 Mayi I l e f t Pos eh fo r T si ng si by L-5 pl an e. Very in te re s ti n g t r i p ov er

th e mo un tai ns . (The p il o t go t lo s t f o r 15 min ute s and I tho ug ht I was ov er th e
FIC bo rd er a lr ea d y ). I was met a t th e sma ll a ir s tr ip by Ca pt . Gwinn of th e
Chi nes e Combat Command (CCC) and Ca pt. F is h , Ai r L ia is on O ff ic er o f th e 69th
Wing, bo th of wham had sm all de ta ch ne nt s th e re .
(Th at ni gh t I was ro y a ll y in tro du ce d to th e town by hav ing a "Gahm Bay*
p a rt y a t th e Golde n Gate R es ta ur an t und er th e au sp ic es o f th e
•Dragon Lady" where I was in tro du ce d ov er wine cups to v ar io u s Chi nese
o ff ic e rs o f th e 62nd Army)
28 May: I was ab ly b ri ef ed on th e m il it a ry s it u a ti o n by Ca pt . Gwinn o f
CCC who in di ca te d th er e were ve ry few Jap tro op s on th e f r o n ti e r and th a t onl y
th e towns were he ld in fo rc e . I he ld a lon g conferen ce* wit h Mr. Georges Vfou-
a most ab le and pl ea sa nt man. He had been edu cat ed in 'Europe and spoke Fre nch
fl u e n tl y and some E ng lis h. He was a Chi nes e C iv il A dm in is tra to r in th e na tu re
of a Bor der P oli ce and Customs O ff ic ia l who had two B at ta li o n s of tr oo ps -n ot
re g u la r arm y-un der h is command. In b ri e f h is tr oo ps were po or ly armed and
tr a in e d and would welcome new equ ipm ent. They would be rea dy to s t a r t tr a in ­
ing in a week and would be w il li n g to cr os s th e f r o n ti e r . (E xac t lo c a ti o n of
ou r ta rg e t a t th is tim e was no t re ve al ed to Mr. Wou, no r was i t ev er re ve al ed
to him as sub seq uen t ev en ts made a chan ge in p la n s) .

29 May; Inform ed by /(t ha t Kunming was g e tt in g 100 Annamese tro op s

and Fr en ch o ff ic e rs fo r my us e.
31 May> Remainder o f my team and Ca pt. HOLLAND'S team l e f t Pos eh af oo t
fo r T si n g s i.
Atte nde d gr ad ua tio n e x e rc is es fo r the HCO's o f th e 62nd Army.
Gave a spe ech in which I s ta te d we were fi g h ti n g ag ai ns t th e Ja ps and wished
them good lu ck , e tc . Met Gen eral Wang o f th e 62nd. T hi s had no th in g to do
wi th my m is si on , but si nc e I was th e hi gh es t ran kin g American o f f ic e r in town
 i t was c o n si d er ed more o r l e s s o b li g a to r y to a tt e n d su ch fu n c ti o n s . T h e ir
s a lu te to Sun Yat su n seemed s in c e re and was v er y im pr es si ve .

2 Ju n e : Made c o n ta c t a t T s in g s i w it h ^zho I le a rn e d f o r th e
f i r s t tim e was an OSS r e p r e s e n ta ti v e , al th o u g h I had not bee n to ld o f h is ex ­
is te n c e when I was a t Kunming. As fa r a3 I co ul d g a th e r he was OSS su p p li ed bu t
was o nly 50% OSS fu r n is h in g in fo rm a ti o n a ls o to AGA3 and was o r i g i n a l l y p a r t
o f a ne bu lo us m y st er io u s GHT o rg a n iz a ti o n . |was an ex tr em el y im po rt an t
c o n ta c t. He was in e x c e ll e n t r e la ti o n s h ip w it h th e C hi ne se , was re sp e c te d by
CCC and a l l co nc er ne d. Hi s i n te l li g e n c e on Ja p a c t i v i t i e s in FIC was o f th e
b e st and r a te d th e h ig h e s t by a l l a t T s in g s i. Al so a s f a r as I co ui d d is c o v e r,
a lt h o he was OSS su p p li e d , OSS to o k h i s in te ll ig e n c e r e p o rt s w it h a g r a in o f
s a l t . I t was he who in fo rm ed me th a t i t would be im poss ib le to work w it h th e
Fr en ch i n FI C. (T h is l a t e r tu rn ed out to ba 100% t r u e ) . Hi s r e p o r ts were se n t
to a L t. Fe nn a t Kunming, whom I d i d n 't know.

3 -4 Ju n e : \w ir es th a t C ap t. EBAUGH w il l a r r i v e to ta k e o v er th e
C hi ne se tr o o p s o f Mr. Wou and I w il l work w ith Fr en ch and Ann ami te tr o o p s . Ka j.
C o u rt h la c , Fr en ch Array, fro m Kunming and |a rr iv ed T s in g s i w ith p la n s
to work w it h 100 Fr en ch and an na m ite tr o o p s . The co m po si tio n o f th e Fr en ch
tr o o p s was ap pro xim at el y as fo ll o w s < 40 w hi te F re nc h s o l d i e r s , 60 Annamese
s o l d i e r s , 8 Fr en ch o f f i c e r s . Th ese tr o o p s were a lr e a d y a t T s in g s i, ha vi ng
r e c e n tl y come fro m FI C . A "h ig h le v e l" co nf er en ce was h e ld , th e fo ll o w in g
p er so n s be in g p re se n ts

Am eric an Army Fr en ch Army

M ajo r C o u rt h la c , fro m Kunming

M aj or THOMAS C ap t. Bau deno n, Commanding F re nch tr oo ps
lo f th e Fr en ch
I n te ll ig e n c e M is si on a t T s in g s i.
The fo ll o w in g p o in ts we re ta k e n up :
1) Q ues ti on o f p er m is si o n o f F re nc h Tr oo ps to s ta y . (s ai d th a t
th e Ch in es e M ar sh al l o f th e 4 th 'Ja r Zone had now gi ve n h is p e rm is si o n f o r th e
F re nc h tr o o p s to re m ai n 4 week s more in th e 4 th War Zo ne, al th o u g h th e y had
r e c e n tl y be en o rd e re d o u t.
2) Q ue st io n o f c lo th in g . The Fr en ch s ta te d th a t in a d d it io n to arm s
th e Fr en ch woul d ha ve to hav e c lo th in g . S ta te d he would se e wha t he
co ul d do ab ou t t h a t .
3) Q ue st io n o f s o ld ie r s pa y and fo od . M aj or C ourt hla c ev en ap pr oa ch ed
th e su b je c t o f o u r pay in g th e Fr en ch s o l d i e r s . "Le so l" a s he c a ll e d i t . When
I p o in te d ou t how p re p o st e ro u s t h i s was th e su b je c t was dr op pe d ev en h o tt e n th an
a "ho t p o ta to ." He a ls o wan ted us to fu rn is h fo od and r a ti o n s . Th isw as l i k e ­
wi se de mu ire d to and r e je c te d to to to by th e Am eric an d e le g a ti o n . ( L a te r i t
was ag re ed th a t th e Fr en ch m ig ht be a b le to Buy a c e r t a i n amount o f C r a ti o n s
fro m u s) .
4) Time T ab le f o r t r a i n i n g and movement o f tr o o p s in to FI Ci
7 Ju ne -A dv an ce p a r ty c o n s is ti n g o f some Am eric ans and 1 Fr en ch s e c ti o n
move so uth to f r o n t i e r to s e t up tr a i n i n g camp.
9 Ju ne -A dv an ce P a rt y a r r i v e t r a i n i n g camp.
12 Jun e-M ain p a rt y jo in ad va nc e p a r ty and t r a i n i n g in Am eri can an as
woul d be gin .
14 Ju ne -A dv an ce P a r ty c o n s is ti n g o f Am eri can o f f i c e r s and ra d io w it h
one sm al l Fr en ch sq ua d le a s e bv .f o o t f o r Adva nce Bas e in FIC
 somew here so ut h of Pho Bin h G ia .
24 Jun e-A dv an ce P a rt y a r r iv e Advanc e Bas e FI C.
26 Ju n e- T ra in in g o f ma in body en d.
28 Jun e-M ain body be gi n ma rch to FIC
10 Ju ly -M ai n body jo in Adva nce p a rt y a t Advan ce Ba se .
1 Aug -Commence d e m o li ti o n a c ti o n a g a in s t t a r g e t, to w it : Ha no i-
Lan gso n ro a d .
5 ) P a ra ch u ti n g o f s u p p li e s . I t was de ci de d th a t what was nee de d f o r
t r a i n i n g and ma rch would be p ar ac hute d a t tr a in in g ba se fro m p la n e comin g fro m
Po se h, th e re m ai nd er to be par ac hu te d a t o u r Advance Bas e "b eh in d th e li n e s "
in FIC .
7 Ju ne: The r e s t o f my team and HnT .T. Ai m ' s tea m a rr iv e d T s in g s i a f t e r 7
da ys ma rc h fro m Po se h. The y en co un te re d se v e ra l d i f f i c u l t i e s w it h th e mou nt­
a in s and in g e tt i n g c o o li e s to tr a n s p o r t o ur s u p p li e s , some o f wh ich were
be in g br ou gh t down to s t a r t tr a in in g th e C hi ne se tr o o p s.

10 Ju ne 1 The Fr en ch sa y th ey a re di sc ou rg ge d be ca us e no Am eri can eq uip me nt

y e t an d th ey on ly hav e eno ugh money f o r 15 more da ys . C ap t. Eba ugh a rr iv e d
w it h h is team .

11 Ju n e ; T hi ng s bre ak . f^wires he can g e t c lo th e s f o r F re n ch . Fr en ch

sa y th ey w il l "f ee d" th em se lv es and money ha s a r ri v e d f o r them . EBAUGH ta k e s
o v e r th e bo rd er p a tr o l tr o o p s o f M. Yfou r e li e v in g me o f th a t w or ry .

12 Ju n e i Mr. YJou Okehs th e tr a i n i n g a re a f o r o ur Fr en ch tr o o p s a t On nin g,

a s n a il v i ll a g e n e ar th e f r o n t i e r , a few k il o m e te rs we st o f T it i o u . The Fr en ch
ha d in fo rm ed me t h a t t h i s was se cu re fro m Ja p ey es and la rg e eno ugh f o r t r a i n ­
in g p u rp o se s.

IV. T ri p to F r o n t i e r and t r a i n i n g o f F re n ch .

13 Ju n e : Am eri can s w it h 20 Fr en ch le a v e a fo o t f o r On nin g.

I ro n a in a t T s in g s i to t r y and a rr an g e f o r gu id es f o r o u r e n tr y
in to FIC w ith ( I was ex tr em el y an xi ou s f o r n a ti v e guid es a s I th ou gh t
t h i s was th e o nly p r a c ti c a b le way to e n te r FIC s a f e ly . sa id he co ul d
e a s il y a rr a n g e same th ro ug h h is c o n ta ct w ith |tCBT-AGAS Man) who
was now in c e n tr a l To nk in . Re ce ive d fo ll o w in g w ir e fro m (on th e su b je c t:
"PAITI s e n t wi re 11 Jun e to ([ (a u th o ri z in g us e o f GET f o r g u id e s ." On
a g ai n a p re a c h in g (he in fo rm ed me t h a t a p p a re n tl y OSS and h i3 Hq. were
ha vi ng d i f f i c u l t i e s and t h a t he had be en inf or me d e x a c tl y th e c o n tr a ry . T h is
was ex tr em el y d is h e a tt e n in g t o m ys el f a s w el l as | Vie co ul d no t un de r­
st an d why s in c e we co ul d g e t al on g so w el l in th e f i e l d why peo p le in Kunming
c o u ld n ’t do li k e w is e . So I had to go ah ea d and pr oc ee d w it ho ut g u id es , when
same was r e a d il y a v a il a b le . Als o re c e iv e d fo ll o w in g w ir e fro m (qu ote :
"Have two Ann arait e i n te r p r e t e r s and L t. S te w a rt , S . I . w ith Ra dio and C ap t.
Po pp er o f S & T. They w il l b ri n g and t r a i n i n te l li g e n c e ." un qu ot e.

14 Ju n e : Mai n body o f Fr en ch l e f t f o r On nin g.

15 Ju ne: Re ce ive d fo ll o w in g vri re fro m HOLLAND now a t Onn ing:

"Ar ea u n s u it a b le . Ko s u it a b le dr op gr ou nd . Ja p a c t i v i t i e s to o
c lo s e . Ho ld Ma in Body T s in g s i. "
 255

l6 Ju no : L e ft T s in g s i w it h Ca pt. Baud enon "on hors e f u l l sp ee d ahe ad " f o r

On nin g. Ye s, th e Fr en ch had giv en us a bad s t e e r in s e le c ti n g On nin g. Ko t
s u f f i c ie n t fo od o r q u a rt e rs he re f o r 100 men and no s u it a b le dr op gr ou nd . I
is su e d o rd e r f o r ev er yo ne to move to T it i o u .

o Po se h

o T s in g s i

I
—o T it io u

17 Jun e 1 Made re c c e a t T it i o u and fo un d s u it a b le DZ and p la c e f o r

q u a r te r s and t r a i n i n g .

18 Ju ne « R ec ei ve d fo ll o w in g me ssa ge fro m |"W ire fro m Kunming o rd e rs

no is s u in g su p p li e s o r equ ipm en t to Fr en ch pe nd in g s o lu ti o n o f d i f f i c u l t i e s .
B el ie v e th ey su sp ec t d o u b le c ro ss —Let yo u know f u r th e r de ve lo pm en ts ." Al so
re c e iv e d me ssa ge by c o u r ie r to th e e f f e c t t h a t [had be en o rd er ed to
Kunming. De cid ed to le a v e f o r Po se h to se a what th e Fr en ch tr o u b le was and
a tt e m p t to c o n ta c t l a t e s t in te ll ig e n c e on FIC as he was my o n ly ,
so urc e o f in fo rm at io n on th e s u b je c t. On th e ro ad to T si n g si fro m T it io u mot
F re nc h r e a r p a r ty . Comming down w it h them were C ap t. Po pp er an d P fc P ru n ie r.
C ap t. Po pp er th e n inf or me d me th a t he wa sn’ t b ri n g in g 10 An nam ites w ith him
bu t t h a t he was t o t r a i n 10 Ann am ites f o r in te ll ig e n c e th a t ha d a lr e a d y been
s e le c te d f o r him . I t was th e f i r s t tim e I had he ar d ab ou t t h a t . (T his l a t e r
tu rn e d ou t to be a so re p o in t w ith th e Fr en ch who ha dn ’t be en t o ld o f i t
e i t h e r and th ey c o u ld n 't un de rs ta nd why an Am eri can sh ou ld t r a i n t h e i r men in
in te ll ig e n c e f o r FIC whan th ey had j u s t come out o f th e r e . Anyhow th ey l e t
POPPER go ah ea d and s e l e c t and t r a i n 10 men, an d in s p i t e o f F re nc h o p p o si ti o n ,
he did a v er y c r e d it a b le jo b .)

19 Ju ne : At T s in g s i had l e f t th e fo ll o w in g me ssa ge f o r me whi ch

hud come to him fro m "P le as e a d v is e Thomas i f he e n te r s FIC w it h
Fr en ch he w il l f in d whol e p o p u la ti o n a g a in s t the m an d w il l g e t no fo o d , w il l
a ls o be sn ip ed a t as n a ti v e s h a te F re n c h ." T h is v e r if i e d an e a r l i e r me ssa ge
whic h s ta te d t h a t a Fr en ch -A m er ican m is si o n would not a t a l l be welc ome. I
had p re v io u s ly d is c u ss e d th e p o in t w ith (and Fr en ch o f f i c e r s and th e
Fr en ch Co nsu l a t T s in g s i. They a ls o as su re d me th a t many ti m e s th e n a ti v e s ha d
he lp ed th e Fr en ch i n F IC -i n f a c t had he lp ed many es ca pe fro m th e Ja p s, th a t th e
m a jo ri ty o f th e p o p u la ti o n was pro -F re n ch , and th a t th e m is si o n was su re to
su cc ee d e s p e c ia ll y w it h Am eric an O f f ic e r s p re se n t and u si n g Am eri can co ve r.
(T hi s l a t e r pr ov ed p a r tl y tr u e , p a r tl y f a l s e . The n a ti v e s o f FIC d id he lp th e
Fr en ch on hum an it ar ia n p r in c ip le s es ca p e, bu t were an yt hi ng bu t p ro -F re n ch ).
 I hnd my do ubts abo ut th a m at te r and so di d Major RSVOL of th e Fre nch
M iss ion a t T si ng ai (he was the on ly Frenchman who di d) who s ta te d th a t un le ss
we had an agree ment wi th th e VIETMINH p a rt y , pe im it ti ng th e Fren ch to e n te r,
i t was ho pe le ss . (E ve nts l a t e r prove d th is to be tr u e ). (I n c id e n ta ll y , th e
f i r s t time I had eve ry hea rd of th e VIETMINH was from the Fre nch a t T si n g si ).

19 Ju ne :-2 6 Ju ne : Awa iting OK to su pp ly Fre nch .

26 Ju ne : OK came from Hq au th or iz in g the is su in g of su pp lie s to th e Fre nc h.
Hol lan d s ta rt e d h is tr a in in g and co nti nu ed tr a in in g th a Fre nch wi th Pop per and
|u n ti l 3 Ju ly .

28 Ju ne t At Pos eh I re ce iv ed the news th a t Hq had approve d a pla n to jump

in . Every body now happy . Ap par ent ly hon ors go to AGAS fo r fu rn is hi ng th e Drop
Zone.
2 Ju ly : R e tu rn ed from Kunming. P la ns f i n a ll y appro ved fo r jump.
A ll Fr en ch & Americ ans ord ere d to Pos eh fo r jump tr a in in g .

3 Ju ly t I re tu rn ed to T si ng si by L-5«

4-6 J u ly : America ns fle w by L-5 from T si h g si to Pos eh. I made arr ang eme nts
thr ou gh Chi nese a u th o ri ti e s per m it ti ng th e Fre nch to walk to Po seh . L t. Ste wa rt
of SI was gr an te d emergency le av e and a ls o fl ew to Po seh . His ra dio op er at or
infor med me th a t he was bein g re pl ac ed by a L t. B ar net t. However, th is L t. ne ve r
a rr iv e d .

V. P re pa ra ti on fo r Jump and Jump in to FIC.

7 Ju ly » I re tu rn ed to Pos eh.
7-1 5 Ju ly : P re pa ra ti ons were made and ele me nta ry jump tr a in in g was gi ve n to
a l l "non -jum pers " by .\BABINEAU, and WHALLAN. In th e meantime (re­
cei ve d a message from Hq which in tu rn came from AGAS, gi vi ng th e DZ co or di n­
a te s , s ta ti n g th a t th er e were abo ut 3, 00 0 armed g u e ri ll a s in Ton kin, and th a t
a combined Fren ch-A mer ican m iss io n would no t be welcome. I ag ai n di sc us se d th e
m at te r wi th (and sin ce th er e was no d ir e c ti v e from Kunming on th e su b je ct ,
I de cid ed to jump in as Advance P ar ty wi th one Fre nch o ff ic e r who would re p o rt
bac k him se lf to th e r e s t of th e Fre nch on th e su b je c t. Ca pt. Baudenon and the
r e s t of th e Fre nch o ff ic e rs were in acc ord w ith th is pl an .
l6 Ju ly > The fo llo w in g pe rso nn el made the ms elv es rea dy f o r th e jumpj
Ma jor THOMAS L t. MONTFORT-French Army
S g t. ZEILSKI Sg t. LOGOS -Fr enc h-,i nna mit e
P fc . PRUINIER S gt . PHAC -Annam ite
Flew ov er th e DA in th e morning bu t pa ne ls no t o u t. Flew ov er ag ain in
th e af te rn oo n. Pa ne ls were ou t and ou t we we nt. Ito one h u rt . A ll pack ages OK,
bu t MONTFORT, ZEIL3KI and I lan ded in tr e e s .
Rece ived c o rd ia ll y on th e groun d by o f AGAS.
Gr ee ted by 200 armed guard s of th e Vietm inh p a rt y . I gave a l i t t l e spe ech to
the ra- co nsi de red ob li ga to ry -a nd Mr. Lee, a P ar ty Le ade r, was my in te rp re te r. A
ve ry im pre ssi ve re ce pt io n com mit tee. We were th en le d thro ugh th e fo r e s t pa th h,
th en und er a bamboo archway wi th th e si gn in E ng lis h above"Welcome to ou r
Americen Fr ie nd s" and the n con duc ted to ou r qu ar te rs which had been re c e n tl y
b u il t fo r us . I t co ns is te d of a cl ea n ty p ic a l Ton kin bamboo hou se, which tu rn ed
 257

o u t to ba ve ry co m fo rt ab le . We we re th en in tr o d u ce d to Mr. Hoo, P a r ty L ea der , who

welcome d us and p re se n te d us w ith a f a tt e d c a l f and some Ha noi b e e r f o r ou r su pper .
We sp en t th e n ig h t p e a c e fu ll y , hap py th a t a t l a s t we had a r ri v e d .

VI . L if e in FIC fro m a r r i v a l o f Adv an ce P a rt y to a r r i v a l o f re m ai nd er o f tea m.

17 J u l y ; Our camp was lo c a te d on th e si d e o f a h i l l in a bamboo f o r e s t a t

th e end o f Kim lung Gorg e ab ou t 1 k il o fro m th e sm al l v i ll a g e o f Ki ml un g. Zim in ng
i t s e l f i s lo c a te d 27 k i lo s al m os t due e a s t o f Tuy en Quang and ab ou t 47 k il o s
no rt h w es t o f T h ai I&u yeh , th e p ro v in c ia l c a p i t a l . The m il i ta r y c o o rd in a te s on th e
FIC map, s c a le 1: 100,0 00, a r e : Sh ee t #26 (W es t) , 17»5~45«5«
We were a few y a rd s fro m th e hu t o f Mr. Hoo, Vi etm in h P a r ty C hi ef
and a ls o a few y ar d s fro m (o f AGAS. Im m ed ia te ly to
th e we st o f us u n ro ll e d o ur dr op zon e wh ich c o n s is te d o f a f l a t v a ll e y o f r i c e
p a d d ie s su rr ou nd ed by f o r e s te d h i l l s .
The i d e n t i ty o f Mr. C.M. Hoo, re co gn iz ed Vi etm in h P a r ty L ea der , was
a m ys te ry to u s. Hoo, was h i s co de name . L a te r, when he beceme p re s id e n t o f th e
P ro v is io n a l Gove rnmen t o f Vi etm in h (I nd o- C hi na ) a t H an oi , he d iv ulg ed h i s r e a l
name whi ch i s Ho Ch i Minh.
Hel d lo ng co nfe re nce w it h Mr. Hoo, (Ho Ch i Mi nh) , on th e s u b je c t
o f th e F re n ch . He s t a te d t h a t th e Vi etm in h P a r ty , o r Le ag ue , was an am alg am ati on
o f a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s o rg a n iz ed f o r th e so le pu rp os e o f o u st in g a l l fo re ig n
po we rs and was wo rki ng f o r th e l i b e r t y and co mp le te ind ep en de nc e o f In do -C hi na .
I t had no p o l i t i c a l id e a s beyo nd t h a t as i t s members came fro m a l l p o l i t i c a l
g ro u p s. A ft e r l i b e r t y had be en ac h ie v ed , th e n th ey wou ld wo rry ab ou t p o l i t i c s .
He d e f i n i t e l y ta bo oe d th e id e a t h a t th e p a rt y was co m m un ist ic. He s t a t e d th a t a t
l e a s t 85% o f th e pe op le o f To nk in were members o r sy m pa th et ic w it h i t 3 ai m s. I t
wou ld o b v io u sl y be to th e mo st o rd in a ry o b se rv er t h a t th e p e as an ts d id n ’t know
wha t th e word communism o r s o c ia li sm m ea nt -b ut th ey did un de rs ta nd l i b e r t y and
in de pe nd en ce .
C on se qu en tly , Mr. Hoo made i t ve ry c le a r to me t h a t i t wo uld be
im p o ss ib le f o r L t. M o n tf o rt , th e Fr en ch O f f ic e r , to s ta y , n o r woul d an y more Fr en ch
be we lcom e. He p o in te d ou t many g ri e v a n c e s h is pe op le had a g a in s t th e Fr en ch an d
many o f h is peo p le h a te d them wo rse th a n th e Ja p s . I n f a c t , ev er yo ne ta lk e d
a g a in s t th e Ja p F a s c i s t s an d Fr en ch F a s c is ts w it h eq ual f e rv o r . He s a id he would
welcom e a m il li o n Am eric an s o ld ie r s to come in bu t no t any Fr en ch ev en th ou gh th e y
we re s o ld ie r s and i n s i s t e d t h a t th ey wer e her e to f i g h t Ja ps o n ly , be ca us e as
Mr . Hoo m ai nta in ed i t wou ld o n ly be an op en in g wedge f o r them . He in d ic a te d he
wou ld g la d e ly e s c o rt L t. M on tf or t s a f e ly ba ck to th e f r o n t i e r as he ha d done many
o th e r Fre nch me n. I t was ag re ed t h a t I woul d n o ti f y my Hq on th e s u b je c t and L t.
M o n tf o rt would r e tu r n so o n e st , e i t h e r by L -5 o r a f o o t. L t. M ontf ort was made
aw ard o f th e s i t u a t i o n and ca ble d th e same news to th e Fr en ch a t P os eh . He was
m os t an xi ou s to r e tu r n to Kunming to e x p la in th e e n t i r e s i t u a t i o n , ina sm uc h as
Mr. Hoo welcome d a t a l k w it h any hi gh ra nkin g Fr en ch o f f i c i a l , e s p e c i a l l y on th e
s u b je c t o f DeGAULLE’s p ro cl am at io n co nc er ni ng FIC whi ch co n ta in ed some v e ry vag ue
p o in ts .
As to S g t. LOGOS and S g t. PHAC, Mr. Hoo co ns en te d to t h e i r s ta y in g
on , how ever do ub te d i f th e F re nch would r e le a s e the m. T his tu rn ed out to be th e
c a se .
18 J u ly : Made ra d io c o n ta c t w it h P os eh . Inf or me d bn Fr en ch q u e st io n
an d he c o u ld n 't u nder st an d why, sa yin g th e fr e n c h h er e were f in e c h a p s -t o whi ch
I h e a r te d ly a g re e d . E v e n tu a ll y , how eve r i t su nk th ro ug h and th e F re n ch a t Po se h
v/ere el im in at ed . However, be for e th ey were el im in ate d i t waa a c tu a ll y dec ide d
th a t Ca pt . Ho llan d and th e Fre nch would jump bl in d ne ar th e o ri g in a l ta rg e t a re a .
I wire d back th a t th is would be no thi ng bu t su ic id e and a f te r Hol lan d and Ca pt.
Baudenon fle w ove r th e ta rg e t ar ea the y came to the same co nc lu si on .

19 J u ly i Had lon g co nfe ren ce wi th and Mr. HOO re ta rg e t a re a.

They f e l t i t be st th a t we tr a in ou r tro op s he re , si nc e th e VIETHINH LEAGUE wa3
ve ry st ro ng he re and si nc e he cou ld e a s il y fu rn is h imm edia tely 100 g u e ri ll a s and
we co uld s t a r t op er at in g on th e Thai-N guyen- Backa n ro ad (C ol on ia l Route #3 ).
When ou r tro op s were "i n th e groo ve" we co uld the n move to th e more dang erou s
ar ea and op er at e on th e LANGSON-HANOI ro ad .
Hoo s ta te d he cou ld re ce iv e any number of SO team s, which co uld in time and
wit h pr ep ar at io n be se nt anywhere eve n as fa r sou th as SAIGON.
I wire d same to jl.ly chang e fo r a new tem pora ry ta rg e t was approv ed
and Ho llan d was to jump to me and s t a r t to th e o ri g in a l ta rg e t a re a slo wl y and
be gin th e ground work th e re . I cab led bac k th a t th a t was th e on ly way i t cou ld
work and was gl ad th a t P03EH had f in a ll y se en th e l i g h t .

20 Ju ly : Spe nt a l l day a t L-5 s t r ip a t Thanh-La (p re pa re d by jof

AGAS) w ai tin g fo r pla ne which was to tak e jt o kunming. Se nt comp lete
w ri tt e n re p o rt to Hq.

23 -2U J u ly ; Took tr ip wi th 5 guard s to obs erv e ro ad Th ai Nguyen-Tuyen Quang.

No ta rg e t he re has Ja ps had no t used roa d in la s t month.

25 Ju ly : Mr. Hoo, P ar ty C hi ef , ag ai n ex pr es se d des ir e to ta l k w ith hig h

Fr en ch o f f ic ia l e it h e r a t Kunming o r h er e. I forw arde d th is re qu es t to Pose h and
^forwarded same to AGAS Hq a t KUNMING.

27-29 J u ly : Took t r i p wi th P ru n ie r and 6 guard s to make Recce of Co lon ial

Route #3 . Hade pe rs on al re co nn ais sa nc e of Jap he ld f o r t a t Cho Chu, where I had
th e pl ea su re of se ei ng 10 Ja ps at th e fo rt -t h ro u g h th e te le sc o p e. Rec eive d mes­
sage by c o u ri e r from (that Hol lan d was about to a rr iv e so ca nc el le d r e s t
o f t r i p and re tu rn ed to Kimlung. (Cho Chu once th e Ja ps were out would have made
an ex c e ll e n t base fo r ou r a tt a c k on th e ro ad ).
30 Ju ly : Ar riv ed back a t Kimlung . Gr ee ted by Ca pt. Hol lan d and rem ain der of
my te an who had a l l par ac hu ted su cc es sf u ll y ye st er da y.

31 J u ly ; Ho llan d, Stoy ka, and j |l e f t wi th 30 gua rds fo r ar ea sou th

of Pho Binh Gi a, to se t up advanc e bas e th e re . L t. Mo ntg ort, Sgt Logo s, Sgt Phac
l e f t to jo in Fre nch ^Re fuge es' 1 a t a nea rby v il la g e . These re fu ge es had been in
a Jap co nc en tr at io n camp at Tara Dao bu t th e VIETHINH tr oo ps at ta ck ed th e camp
(s u ff er ed c a su a lt ie s in so doi ng) and the n re le as ed th e Fr en ch and now were ta ki ng
ca re of them . 5|'o f AGAS was ar ra ng in g Red Cro ss su pp li es fo r them and
It on tf or t was goin g to le ad -t ho se who co uld wa lk-o ut of FIC by fo o t, and th e women
and c h il d re n were to f l y ou t by L- 5.
 31 J u ly : Was in fo rm ed by Po se h t h a t C ap t. S in gla ub and tea m v/aa to dr op to
me a t on ce . I w ir ed ba ck t h a t t h i s was im p o ss ib le , w ith ou t ad va nc e n o ti c e , be ­
ca us e i t ta k e s tim e to a rr a n g e q u a rt e rs and g et fo od , a s th a t i s a v er y d i f f i c u l t
pr ob lem h e re . F ur th er m or e, Si ngla ub would be welcome he re by Hq woul d hav e to
s e l e c t a n o th e r ta r g e t ( I in d ic a te d what I th ou gh t woul d be a good on e) as th e fo od
pr ob lem wou ld n o t p er m it t?/o se p a ra te g u e r i l l a tea m s o f 100 men ea ch in th e same
a r e a . The b e st p la n on S in g la u b I f e l t wou ld be f o r him to dr op to H ol la nd and
s e t up a ba se in th a t a re a ina sm uch a s th a t t a r g e t was so much mor e im p o rt a n t.
Howev er, he co ul d a ls o dr op t o me and th en wa lk to h i s se le c te d a re a .

V II . T ra in in g and s e le c ti o n o f tr o o p s .

1- 6 Aug; Mr . Hoo be gan ro un di ng up 200 hu nd re d s o ld ie r s f o r us o u t o f w h ic h /

we we re to p ic k th e b e st 10 0. P la n s we re made f o r us to move 3 o r 4 k il o s away \
to a new lo c a ti o n whi ch would be b e t t e r f o r a t r a i n i n g a re a , ina sm uch a s i t had )
a lr e a d y be en us ed as a sc hool by th e VML.

7 Augi Moved to new l o c a t io n .

9 Augt S ta r te d f i r s t da y o f t r a i n i n g . T ra in in g in e a rn e st to make up f o r
l o s t tim e fro m 5*30 AM to 5

10 Aug: Re ce iv ed o u r l a s t p a ra c h u te ca rg o dr op o f 22 c h u te s. Re ce iv ed mes ­
sa ge fro m Po se h s t a t i n g t h a t Eba ugh had ca ptu re d in FIC w it h h is C hi ne se tr oops
two p ro -J a p v i l l a g e s . T h is was d is h e a rt e n in g news as i t was ob vi ou s Eba ugh was
no t i n f r ie n d ly c o n ta ct th e VTETi'IKH and th a t th e Vlhl'MIKH wer e on ly tr y in g to
kee p out th e C hi ne se who i n th e p a s t had a ct ed as b a n d it s and ro b b e rs in FI C. To
sa y th a t i n FIC th e re a re an y p ro -J ap v il la g e s - w e ll , no th in g co ul d be f a r t h e r fr om
th e t r u t h . In re fe re n c e to th i3 la m en ta bl e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s I w ir ed th e fo ll o w in g
to Po se h: "P le as e fo rw ar d fo ll o w in g to Eb aug h. VIETMINH p a r ty c h ie f her e sa ys
he ha s no o b je c ti o n s to C hi ne se f i g h ti n g in FIC un de r Am eric an c o n tr o l i f th ey
don’t a c t l ik e b a n d it s . C hi ef h er e se n t me ssa ge by c o u r ie r to P a rt y C h ie f CAOBANG
a re a to c o n ta c t Ebau gh and e n te r in to am ic ab le r e l a t i o n s ." I had e a r l i e r se n t to
Po se h th e fo ll o w in g me ssa ge f o r Eab ugh , "T el l Eba ugh P a rt y h er e w il li n g to coo p­
e r a t e w ith C hin es e. W ill be in v a lu a b le in f u r n is h in g g u id e s . No do ub t ca n p u ll
co o rd in a te d a tt a c k s . T e ll Ebau gh Ch in es e f e a r s t h a t p a r ty co nr au ni st ic un fo un de d" .

10 -1 4 Aug: T ra in in g c o h ti n u in g a t h ig h sp ee d in c a rb in e s , M - l' s , Tommyguns,

Ba zoo ka s, IAIG 's, B re ns , M or ta rs and G re na de s. R ec eiv ed news th a t Ja p su rr e n d e r
im mi nen t.

V II I. A ct io n ta k e n a f t e r Jap su rr e n d e r IS Au gu st .

A. Mar ch to T ha i Ngu yen:

15 Aug: De cid ed a f t e r co nf er en ce w it h p a r ty le a d e r s th a t in vi ew o f
Ja p su rr e n d e r i t was now th e op po rt un e tim e to wind up th e t r a i n i n g and h i t th e
ro ad in th e g e n er a l d i r e c ti o n o f T ha i Nguye n and se e what co ul d be don e in th e
way of " a c ti o n ." Tr oo ps were ord er ed to g e t re ad y to le a v e th e ne xt m or ni ng .
Am eri can s sp en t th e day p ac kin g and g e tt i n g re ad y to b re ak camp. As f a r as th e
tr a i n i n g o f o ur tr o o p s was co nc er ne d i t was no t f i n is h e d . What we had don e had
be en done f a s t and n o t a l l s u b je c ts by any means had be en co ve re d. How ever, th e
 boy s pi ck ed i t up f a s t , had be en ea ge r t o le a r n and made up f o r i t i n s p i r i t
wha t th ey s t i l l la ck ed in tr a i n i n g .

16 Aug» Y/hen th e new3 was re ce iv e d t h a t Ja p su rr e n d e r was p ro b a b le I 3e nt

a w ire to P03 eh s t a ti n g t h a t we m ig ht be a b le to o b ta in th e su rr e n d e r o f a l l Ja p
tr o o p s in ou r a re a , th a t we wou ld fo ll ow te rm s o f Geneva co nv en ti on , and e v en t­
u a ll y tu r n a l l Ja p p ri s o n e rs and arms we m igh t g e t ov er to th e p ro p e r a u th o r i t ie s ,
fo ll o w in g th e A ll ie d S urr en d er n e g o ti a ti o n s w ith th e J a p s.
The an sw er to t h i s was th a t as f a r as we wer e co nc er ne d th e war was ov er and
un de r no ci rc um st an ce s were we to ac ce pt any Ja p s u rr e n d e rs . T h is was in de ed
ex tr em el y d is h e a rt e n in g to me a s we a l l f e l t t h a t we had ri s k e d o u r l i v e s in com­
in g her e and now when th e goi ng was to be ea sy we wer e no t allo w ed to g e t in on
th e g ra v y .
Howeve r, s in c e th e re was no p o in t an y lo n g e r in s ta y in g in th e de ep da rk
m os qu ito b i t t e n f o r e s t s anym ore vze bro ke camp and l e f t w ith th e s o l d i e r s th a t morn
in g a t 11«3 0 Zld. Our in te n ti o n was to move a t l e a s t as f a r as T ha i Nguy en whic h
was a f a i r l y goo d si z e town and s e t up mor e co m fo rt ab le q u a rt e rs th e re and aw ai t
de ve lo pm en ts . From t h i s p o in t on we re c e iv e d no o f f i c i a l news on th e occ u p at io n
o f FIC by th e A l l ie s . \'Ib le a rn e d th ro ug h AGAS th a t pr obab ly th e C hi ne se would
oc cup y th e n o rt h e rn h a lf o f FIC and th e B r i ti s h th e So ut he rn h a lf .
On le a v in g Kimlu ng I had a f i n a l co nf er en ce w it h Mr. Hoo who in d ic a te d to
me he would l i k e me to st a y in F IC a s lo n g as p o s s ib le . I r e p li e d t h a t th a t was
a q u e st io n f o r my C.O. in Kunming, and do ub te d i f i t would be p o s s ib le inas much
a s h is p a r ty was no t re co gn iz ed no r was h is co un tr y in de pe nd en t a s y e t .
Mr. Hoo had c a ll e d a co n fe re nce of a l l p a r ty le a d e r s and d e le g a te s a t Kiml ung
fro m a l l o v er To nk in to d is c u ss t h e i r f u t u r e p o li c y , and th e y we re a l l p re se n t to
se e th e tr o o p s o f f .
A rr iv ed l a t e a t n ig h t a t th e v il la g e o f Dong Man.

17 Aug: Sec ond da y o f m ar ch . St ay ed a l l n ig h t a t Phuc Li nh no t f a r fro m

Hun gson . Mar ched on ma in ro ad p a r t o f th e way an d we saw why th e Ja p s ha d no t us ed
th e ro a d . The g u e r il l a s had to rn up th e b ri d g e s , dug c r a t e r s , and p la c ed la r g e
t r e e s a cr o ss th e ro ad in s t r a te g i c p la c e s .

Kim lung ox
\ -Q .P hu c L in h o T ha i Nguyen
Dong Man V-
o Hung son ~- - - — ~ o
z T hi nh Dan

18 Augi A s e c ti o n o f th e tr o o p s made a re cc e o f Hun gso n. Abo ut 20 Ja ps s t i l l

a t th e p o s t, bu t P a rt y le a d e r, Mr. Van, de ci de d th a t th e re wa3 not much p o in t in
w a is ti n g a da y her e in tr y in g to a tt a c k i t bu t go on f o r b ig g e r game a t T ah i
Nguy en, wh ich was th e p ro v in c ia l c a p i t a l . The Am eric ans and th e re m ai ni ng tr o o p s
in th e me an tim e hea ded f o r th e v il la g e o f T hi nh Dan, a few k il o s so u th o f T ha i
Nguye n.
19 Augt A ll tr o o p s to - g e th e r ag ai n and a l l moved a l i t t l e c lo s e r to T ha i
Nguy en. The P a r ty le a d e rs made p la n s to e n te r th e town a t 4 AM in th e mo rn ing ,
su rr ou nd th e p o s t, occ upy s t r a t e g i c s p o ts , demand th e su rr e n d e r o f th e "Gu ards
In di ge ne ,f fro m th e p ro v in c ia l Go ver nor and th en is s u e a su rr e n d e r ul tim at um to
th e Ja ps in th e name o f th e VIETMINH LEAGUE.
 A gr ou p o f VIETMINH p a r ty members came ou t fro m tow n and drew up a p la n o f
th e town sho win g Ja p p o s it io n s . The y s a id th e re were ab ou t 30 to fyO Ja p s in th e
p o st and none i n th e tow n. The Ja p s had a k it c h e n in town bu t us ed i t o n ly in
th e da yt im e. T h is l a t e r pr ov ed f a ls e and i t tu rn ed o u t th e re were sm al l d e ta ch ­
me nts o f Ja p s in fo u r d i f f e r e n t b u il d in g s th ro ug ho ut th e town .
We re c e iv e d a me ssa ge fro m Po3 eh s t a ti n g we were to s i t t i g h t and no t go to
Han oi w ith ou t o rd e rs fro m Hq. T h is a g a in was st unnin g new s. We co ul d not un de r­
st a n d t h i s . I f Ha noi was s a f e to e n te r and we be in g AmeBicans we c o u ld n ’t se e
th e p o in t bu t gu es se d t h a t Hq. th ou gh t we wou ld not be s t r i c t l y n e u tr a l inas muc h
as we worked f o r a few wee ks w it h th e VIETMINH. Howev er, c o n v er se ly c o n si d e ri n g
e v er y th in g Hq. H ad n't be en n e u tr a l es f a r as th e s e pe op le wer e co nc er ne d when we
is su e d arms to th e F re nch . Of c o u rs e , th e c o u n te r arg ume nt and q u it e p la u s ib le
on e was th a t th e F re nc h were o u r A ll ie s and th e VIETMINH p a r ty was a s e c re t p a r ty
wo rk ing a g a in s t th e Fr en ch whose e x is te n c e was n o t re co gn iz ed by any pow er.
An ot he r p o in t we th ou gh t m ig ht hav e so m eth in g to do w it h i t was t h a t s in c e G en 'l
Ma cA rth ur was in ch ar ge o f su re en d er n e g o ti a ti o n s no OSS p e rs o n n el wer e allo we d
to pr oc ee d to H an oi . (T h is tu rn e d out to be er ro neo us be ca us e we l a t e r le a rn e d
th ro ug h th e VIETMINH th a t an ALLIED m is si o n o f In q u ir y hea de d by a C a p t. P a t t i
ha d a r ri v e d i n H an oi . Po se h, on q u e st io n in g , in fo rm ed us th a t t h i s was o ur own
C ap t. PATTI o f OSS).

B. B a tt le by VIETMINH tr o o p s a g a in s t Ja p s a t T ha i Nguye n.

20 Augi From 3 Jtf.I to l±M th e tr o o p s sl ow ly moved in th e d a rk n es s to

oc cu py th e tow n. The Am eri can s were in th e 3r d E ch el on and were e s c o rt e d to a
s a fe hou se on th e o u t s k i r t s o f tow n on th e o p p o si te s id e o f th e Ja p P o s t, where
th ey sp en t th e n e x t few da ys p e a c e fu ll y w a it in g f o r th e b a t t l e be tw ee n th e Ja ps
and VIETMINH to en d. I i s 3 u e d an o rd e r to them "t o s ta y pu t" ina sm uch as th e war
was o v e r tty er e was no p o in t in t h e i r go in g o u t in th e s t r e e t s to g e t t h e i r
f i n g e r s bu rn ed and fu rt h er m o re Po se h had is su e d o rd e rs to "c ea se o p e ra ti o n s " .
I was ke pt inf or me d o f what was ha pp en in g a t a l l tim es by a p a r ty l i a i s o n
man.
About 6: 30 AM news was re c e iv e d t h a t th e P ro v in c ia l Go ve rn or had c a p it u la te d
and tu rn ed o v er h is 160 tr o o p s o f th e "Guar d In di ge ne " w it h o u t f i r i n g a sh o t.
The VIETMINH th u s .o bt ai ne d im m ed ia te ly many r i f l e s , on m un iti on , c lo th in g , e tc .
The P ro v in c ia l Go ve rno r was th en pe rs ua de d to pr oc ee d w ith a w hit e f l a g w it h
a c i v i l i a n who sp ok e Ja pa ne se p a s t th e v a ri o u s Ja p p o s i t io n s . In a few m in ut es
ev ery on e was hap py be ca us e he came ba ck w it h a Ja p c i v i l i a n . Im m ed ia te ly a s u r ­
re n d e r ul tim at um was v z ri tt en wh ich s t a te d t h a t Ja pa n had su rr e n d er e d , th a t i t
was u s e le s s to c o n ti n u e , and th a t th e te rm s o f th e Gen eva co nv en ti on wou ld be
fo ll o w ed . The Ja p c i v i l i a n th e n pr oc ee de d ev ery wh ere w ith i t but th e Ja p s r e ­
fu se d to su rr e n d e r. As a r e s u l t o f th e Ja p r e f u s a l f i r i n g s t a r te d on b o th s id e s
and co nti nued s p o r a d ic a ll y th e r e s t o f th e day and n ig h t.

21 Aug» The VIETMINH de ci de d t o la u n ch a sm al l a tt a c k to show th e Ja ps

how st ro n g th ey we re . Abou t 3 Kv! " a ll h e ll " br ok e lo o s e . Th e VIETMINH f i r e d f o r
ab ou t 10 m in ut es w it h Fr en ch r i f l e s , F re nc h ma chi ne gu ns , Ja p ma ch ine gu ns ( t h a t
had be en ca p tu re d in p re v io u s en ga ge m en ts ), B r i ti s h s te n s and bre ns (w hi ch th e
B r it is h had par ac hute d to th e Fr en ch h e re ), gr en ad es and weppons wh ich we had
gi ve n them wh ich in cl ud ed ba zo ok as , K - ls , and HE A n ti -t a n k g re n ad e s. Hovzever,
th e Ja p3 we re w el l i n s t a l l e d in t h e i r c o n cr e te f o r t i f i c a t i o n s and i t i s do ub t­
f u l i f any were ev en wounded a t t h i s ti m e . But th e to w ns pe op le were d u ly ira- .
p re se ed by th e " a tt a c k " . '• 1
 A woman p a r tl y C hi ne se , p a r tl y Ja pan es e, was di sc over ed hid in g i n town and
she ag re ed to c a rr y a w hi te f l a g to th e Ja p p o st w ith th e "p ap er ". The "p ap er "
was to ne d down q u it e a b i t . In st e ad o f deman ding u n co n d it io n al s u rr e n d e r i t m er el y
s ta te d t h a t i t was u s e le s s f o r bo th s id e s to co nt in ue th e s tr u g g le and l e t s hav e a
p er so n to per so n t a l k on th e m a tt e r . The youn g la d y ap pr oa ch ed th e g a te o f th e
P o st and sh ou te d in Ja pa ne se bu t no on e came to mee t h e r. F in a ll y sh e was i n ­
s tr u c te d by a f a r o f f Ja pa ne se vo ic e to th ro w th e pap er over th e w a ll . She d id t h i s
ad im m ed ia te ly a Ja p s o l d i e r f i r e d fro m th e bl oc kh ou se . She had be en acc om pan ied
by a n o th e r Ja pa ne se woman c i v i l i a n who was wounded in th e arm . The VIETMDIH ad ­
m in is te re d f i r s t a id to t h i s Ja pa ne se woman and to ok h e r to th e lo c a l h o s p it a l.

22 Aug: F ir in g co nt in ue d th ro ug ho ut th e to m . The Ja ps s t a r te d f i r i n g a
50mra m o rt a r and se v e ra l c iv i l ia n s wer e wounded .

23 Aug: The VIETMINH made an a tt a c k on th e "V il la G au ti er " wher e th e Jap

S e c re t p o li c e we re l iv i n g . They e n te re d th e hou se bu t d is co v er ed th e 3 o r 4 Ja ps
had ev ac ua te d du ri ng th e n ig h t. Howe ver, th e p ri z e d o f war wer e c o n si d e ra b le ,
c o n s is ti n g i n p a r t of gu ns , do cu me nts , g a s o li n e , and s e v e ra l c as es o f TOT (F re n ch ).
The VT5TMIHH a ls o made an a tt a c k on th e Jap s ta b le s n e a r th e p o st and r e ­
le a se d 8 Ja p h o rs e s.

24 Aug: Once more th e VIETMINH t r i e d to get th e Ja p s to t a l k . An ot he r Ja p

c i v i l i a n woman came ou t o f h id in g . ( I t ap pea rs th e re ha d be en ab ou t 5 Ja p c iv i l ia n s
in town who had be en co nn ec te d w it h e x p lo it in g th e lo c a l m in es ). She ag re ed to
ta k e th e me ssa ge w it h a w hi te f l a g . She jumped ov er th e w al l o f th e Ja p p o st and
was n ev er se en o r he ar d of ag ai n .

25 Aug: In th e mo rn ing th e VIETMINH made an a tt a c k a g a in st a n o th e r b u il d in g

in tow n whe re two Ja ps we re ho ld in g o u t. The Ja p3 he re had a ls o ev ac ua te d th e
n ig h t b e fo re . How th ey got p a s t th e gu ar ds i s s t i l l a m ys te ry . The VIETMINH
"t oo k ba ck " fro m th e Ja p s h er e c o n si d e ra b le q u a n ti ti e s o f r i c e , s a l t , su g a r, e tc .
(S ee Ap pe nd ix f o r co mp lete l i s t o f m a t e r i a l) . In th e a ft e rn o o n , su cc es s a t l a s t .
An oth er Ja p ma le c iv i l ia n ag re ed to go a g ai n wi th a w hi te f la g and th e "p ap er ".
Her e i s a ti 'a n s la ti o n o f th e doc ume nt: "We hav e ju s t re ce iv e d an o rd e r fro m ou r
Supr eme C ou nc il to ce as e f i r i n g . T he re ha3 bee n a t Han oi n e g o ti a ti o n s be twe en th e
VIETMINH a u th o r i t ie s and th e Ja pa ne se a u t h o r i t i e s . We have or der ed ou r s o ld ie r s
to ce a se f i r i n g . We hope th a t you w il l a ls o ce as e f i r e . I f you f i r e we s h a ll be
o b li g e d to de fe nd o u rs e lv e s , and you w il l be ch ar ge d w ith th e r e s p o n s i b i li t y o f
t h i s u s e le s s ca rn ag e b ef o re th e A ll ie d M is si o n . The A ll ie d M is si on i s now a c tu a ll y
a t H a n o i. "
He f i r s t went to th e Ja p k it c h e n whe re 4 Ja ps we re lo c a te d . The y ga ve i n .
The n he went w it h two Ja p s fro m th e k it c h e n to th e Ja p "G end arm eri e" wh ere i t was
d is c o v er e d th e Ja p s had ev ac ua te d th e pre v io u s n ig h t. The n a l l 3 wen t to th e Ja p
G a rr is o n and in f iv e m in ut es th e Ja p C ap ta in se n t an ans we r ba ck t h a t he was w i l l ­
in g to cea3© f i r e i f th e VIETMINH d id li k e w is e . A re nd ez -v ou s was s e t and th e Ja p
C ap ta in ha d a co nf er en ce w it h th e VlhTPIINH c h ie f . I t was ag re ed th a t f i r i n g would
ce a se , th a t th e Ja p s would kee p t h e i r aim s bu t would be r e s t r i c t e d to th e c o n fi n e s
o f t h e i r p o s t, and th e VIETMINH would se nd fo od to the m. (L a te r eve n t h i s was r e ­
la x e d an d th e Ja ps were all ow ed to c i r c u l a t e in town w it ho ut arm s whe re th ey were
s u r p r is e d to f in d se ve n e q u a ll y s u rp ri s e d Am eric ans o u t s t r o l l i n g th e s t r e e t s on
a sh op pi ng an d p ic tu r e ta lc in g t o u r .)
 263

26 Aug: Day of f i n a l l i b e r a t i o n and c e le b r a ti o n f o r th e tow n. Pe op le ceme

o u t on th e s t r e e t s a g a in . Alm ost ev er y b u il d in g ha d a VIETMINH f l a g wav ing .
(Th e VjOSTMU'IH f l a g i s re d w ith a ye ll ow s t a r in th e c e n te r ) . P ar ad es were h el d ,
and th e new ly o rg an iz ed m un ic ip al go ve rnm en t go t un de r way.

IS . P e ri o d o f pe ac e and r e s t a f t e r th e b a t t l e o f T ha i Nguye n.

27 Aug - 9 S e p ti Du rin g t h i s p e ri o d th e Am eri can s were co m fo rt ab ly house d

in th e fo rm er P r o v in c ia l G ove rn or 's q u a r te r s , w e ll -f e d and ca re d f o r by th e
VIETMINH. The tim e v/as sp en t in g e tt i n g f a t , g e tt in g a su n -t a n , v i s i t i n g th e c i t y
and w a it in g f o r p e n n is si o n to go to Ha no i t o g e t a pla ne f o r Kunming and home.
So now I ca n ta k e tim e o u t h er e to d e sc ri b e somewhat ou r l i f e in FIC fro m
th e mundane p o in t o f vi ew .
A c tu a ll y th e c o u n tr y si d e o f To nk in i s ve ry b e a u ti f u l. I t i s m ou nta ino us
w ith la r g e f o r e s t s . I n ev er y v a ll e y a re th e r i c e pad die s where the peo p le ek e
o u t a me ag er l i v i n g . T h ei r r i c e d ie t i s su pp le m en ted by a few ch ic k en s, p ig s,
bamboo s p r o u ts , "j ungle " te a v ta ro o (som ewh at l i k e th e p o ta to e ), a few f o r e s t
f r u i t s , some ba na na s and f a r t h e r so uth some p in ea p p le s and g r a p e f r u i t. T h e ir d ie t
i s ex tr em el y d e f ic ie n t wh ich i s e v id e n t by th e d is te n d e d b e ll i e s o f tlie is? c h il d re n
The p e a s a n ts i n g e n e ra l in To nk in a re ex tr em el y bad o f f . Th ey hav e few
c lo th e s . What th ey do hav e c o n s is ts o f pa tc he d ov er ra g s and th e c h il d re n ru n
aro un d na ke d. But th ey a re a l l ha rd wo rk ing and h o n e st . The pe op le a r e p r i n ­
c ip a ll y o f th r e e ty pe s-A nn am es e, Tho , and Man. They a l l sp ea k d i f f e r e n t la ng ua ge s
o r d i a l e c t s . The Tho a re s tr o n g ly VIETMUIH i n se n ti m e n t. The Man h i l l t r i b e s a re
a n c ie n t. p e o p le s who l i v e in th e v er y re mo te and is o la te d p la c e s . T h e ir d re ss i s
c o lo r f u l. The women we ar blu e and alw ay s wear s i l v e r and co pp er c o in s and c o lo r ­
f u l be ad s. The y a re a ls o VIFTMINII in p o l i t i c a l se nti m en t.
The VIETMINH d id e v er y th in g to make ou r st a y as p le a sa n t as p o s s ib le f o r u s .
The y ga ve us t h e i r b e s t fo od and we sel do m went w it ho ut a ch ic ke n o r a duc k o r
m ea t o f some ki nd to go al on g w it h ou r r i c e . They would go f o r m il e s to o b ta in
ba na na s f o r U3. At ev er y v i ll a g e we e n te re d on ou r v a ri o u s t r i p s th e whole popu ­
l a t i o n would tu r n o u t to welcome us an d p re se n t to us th e "ke y to th e v il la g e "
as i t we re. The v i ll a g e gu ar d would re n d e r a s a lu te w it h t h e i r a n c ie n t ar m s. The
v il la g e headman woul d giv e U3 a l i t t l e sp ee ch o f welcome and p re se n t u s w it h g i f t s
o f ba na na s, eg gs , o r fl o w e rs . Then th e c h il d re n in th e gr ou p would s in g a n a ti v e
son g o r two and th en ev er yo ne would jo in in and si ng a VIETMUIH so ng o f in de pe n­
den ce an d l i b e r t y . The sc en es wer e in v a r ia b ly im pre ss iv e and "t ou ch in g" to a l l
th e Am eri can s as we knew th ey wer e e x p re ss in g wha t was in t h e i r h e a r ts and o f f e r ­
in g to us th e b e st g i f t s th ey ha d.

X. Ha no i.

9 Sp pt - 16 S e p t: Our tea m l e f t by f o o t , c a r, and bo at and a r ri v e d a t Ha no i

ab ou t 4 PM. We o b ta in e d q u a rt e rs th ro ug h th e VIETMINH p a r ty , wh ich was a u th o ri z e d
by th e PATTI MISSION.
We sp en t th e tim e fro m 9 Se pt to l 6 S e p t, se e in g th e c it y , bn yi ng so u v e n ir s,
sa yi ng go od -by e t o ou r VJETMUIH f r ie n d s , and ladi ng ar ra ng em en ts to r e tu r n to
Kunming. Ha no i was an ex tr em el y f e s t i v e c it y f o r ev er yo ne ex ce p t th e Fr en ch .
 VIEII’HiH f la g s were f ly in g from al m os t ev er y ho us e. Ba nn ers were s tr e tc h e d
a c ro ss th e s t r e e t s wi th v a ri o u s "s lo ga ns " in Annamese, E n g li sh , C hi ne se , R us si an ,
In d ia n , e tc . Fr en ch was n o ti c e a b ly a b se n t.
Some o f th e sl og an s se en eve ryw he re were as fo llo w s* "Welcome A ll ie s " ,
"Welcome Pe ac e Com miss ion" , "Down wi th Fr en ch Im p e ri a li sm ". , "L bt s k ic k ou t Fr en ch
Im per ia li sm ", "In de pen de nce o r De ath" , "2 ,0 00 ,0 00 pe op le di ed un de r F re nc h domi ­
n a ti o n " , "VIETMINH f o r th e VIETAMESE".
The VIETMINH p a rt y a t Ha noi had s e t up a P ro v is io n a l Gove rnmen t and is su ed
a "D e c la ra ti o n o f In de pe nd en ce ".
Our f r ie n d o f th e f o r e s t , Mr. C.M. Hoo, now Mr. Ho Ch i Minh, was P re si d e n t
o f th e P ro v is io n a l Governm ent and M in is te r o f F o re ig h A f f a ir s . A no th er fr ie n d o f
th e f o r e s t , Mr. Van, now VMfeuyen Giap became M in is te r o f I n t e r i o r . P a rt y mem­
b e rs were ap po in te d c ab in et memb ers. The new gov ern men t ap pe ar s to be e n th u s ia ­
s t i c a l l y su pport ed by th e m a jo ri ty o f th e p o p u la ti o n in ev er y p ro vin ce o f In do ­
c h in a . The new gov ern men t was gi ve n s tr e n g th by th e r e s ig n a ti o n and a b d ic a ti o n
o f Bao Dad, fo rm er pu pp et Em per or, who o ff e re d h is s e rv ic e s as f r ie n d and a d v is e r .
The pe op le know th e Fr en ch in te n d to come ba ck bu t th ey kee p sa y in g i f th ey
come ba ck w it h arms th ey w il l f ig h t to th e d e a th .
The s to r y o f o ur ex p er ie nce s in In do -C hi na i s m elo dr am at ic in th e fo ll o w in g
se n se . On 16 Ju ly we were li v i n g in th e f o r e s t s o f In do -C hi na w it h th e C hi ef o f '
th e VIETMINH p a r ty . L es s th a n two mo nths l a t e r , t h i s same c h ie f had become
P re si d e n t o f th e new P ro v is io n a l Gover nment and was i n s t a l l e d in th e fo rm er home
o f th e Fr en ch "R es id en t S u p er io r" in H an oi .

X I. R et urn to Kunming.

On 16 Sefc.t 1945 our team re tu rn e d by p la n e to Kunming, C hi na .

Ma jor , I n fa n tr y
Commanding Team DEER
 265

THE VIETMINH PARTY OH LEAGUE

M a jo r A .K . T ho m as , 0 3 3

1. Foundat io n
2. O rg a n iz a tio n
3. P e rso n n e l
4» S tr e n g th
5. P u rp o se and P o li o ie a
6. F o re ig n r e l a t i o n s
7« P ro p ag an d a
8. G u e r i l l a W a r fa re
9, F o r m a t io n o f G o v er n m en t a f t e r J a p S u r r e n d e r

(T h e m a t e r i a l i n t h i s r e p o r t w as o b t a i n e d d u r i n g
a tw o m o n th s s t a y i n F r e n c h In d o - C h in a - l6 J u l y
t o l6 S e p te m b e r 1945* I * wa s o b t a i n e d m o s tl y
fr o m P a r t y l e a d e r s a n d h e n c e ma y be b i a s e d a nd
not a ll o f i t is v e rifie d . W he re t h e m a t e r i a l
w as o b t a i n e d , b y p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e
w r i t e r , i t c a n b e a s c e r t a i n e d fr o m t h e t e x t )
 266

THE VTETHIKH PARTY 0 3 LEAGUE

I. FOUNDATION

T he V ie tm in h L e a g u e ( o r In d o C h in e s e P e o p le s In d e p e n d e n c e C o n f e d e r a t i o n )
wa s o r g a n i z e d i n 1 9 3 6 . I n 1 9 40 i * be ca m e a n a m a lg a m a ti o n o f a l l t h e n e x i s t i n g
p a r t i e s , h o w e v e r, t h e n u c le u s o f e a c h p a r t y r e m a in e d .

I I . ORGANIZATION

In a s m u c h a s th e p a r t y wa s n e c e s s a r i l y s e c r e t an d u n d e rg ro u n d t h e e x a t t
o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d c o m p o s i ti o n wa s n e c e s s a r i l y n e b l e o u s . L e a d e r s w e re c o n s t a n t l y
c h a n g in g .
I n g e n e r a l , g he o r g a n i z a t i o n a t t h e to p i s c l e a r . T h i s c o n s i s t e d o f a
d e m o c r a ti c c o u n c i l o f 9 m en . T h e C o u n c il c o n s i s t e d o f tw o d e l e g a t e s fr o m
T o n k in , tw o fr o m Ann am, tw o fr o m C o c h in -C h in a , tw o fr o m C am b o d ia , a n d o n e
fr o m L a o s .

I I I . PERSONNEL

T h e tw o m o s t im p o r ta n t p a r t y m em be rs t h a t we cam e i n c o n t a c t w it h w er e
H r . C.M . Hoo ( r e a l nam e* Ho C h i M in h) a nd M r. V an ( r e a l na m et Vo N gu ye n G ia p ) .
T h e s e tw o w e re c o n s t a n t l y n e a r u s i n t h e tw o m o n th s we w e re i n F . I . C .
M r. Hoo l a t e r b e c a n e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e P r o v i s i o n a l G ov er n m en t a n d M r. V an
be ca m e M i n i s t e r o f I n t e r i o r . 4
B o th a r e e x tr e m e ly s i n c e r e a nd a b l e an d b e l i e v e 100% i n t h e in d e p e n d e n c e
o f F . I . C . T h e y h a v e e n d u re d e x tr e m e h a r d s h i p s i n t h e f o r e s t s o f F . I . C . B o th
h a v e l e f t i s t s y m p a th ie s an d a c c o r d i n g t o C a p t . P a t t i , S . I . , M r. Hoo i s a n o u t ­
r i g h t C om m u n is t.

IV . STRENGTH

A c c o r d in g t o p a r t y l e a d e r s , VML r e p r e s e n t s a t l e a s t 85% o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n
o f Ann am, C o c h i n ,- C h in a , T o n k in , an d C a m b o d ia . T h i s f i g u r e i n c l u d e s s y m p a t h iz e r s
a s w e ll a s m e m b e rs .-
I t wa s c o n s e r v a t i v e l y e s t i m a t e d t h a t i n T o n k in t h e r e w e re a p p r o x im a te ly
3 ,0 0 0 a im e d g u e r i l l a s . T h i s f i g u r e d id n o t i n c l u d e v i l l a g e g u a r d s .
I t i s s a i d t h a t t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e g r e a t s t r e n g t h o f VML i n c o m p a ri s o n t o
o t h e r p a r t i e s wa3 t h a t i t a p p e a le d t o t h e p e o p le e n m a s s e , t h e p e a s a n t s a n d t h e
d e p r e s s e d . W h e re a s , o t h e r p a r t i e s w ork ed o n l y am ong t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l g r o u p s .

V. PURPOSE AND PO LI CI ES

A. P l a t f o r m .
P a r t y l e a d e r s s t a t e t h a t i t s m a in p l a t f o r m i s t h e c o m p le te in d e p e n d e n c e
a n d l i b e r t y o f t h e i r c o u n t r y . T h e y h a d s to o d f o r F r e n c h a n d J a p g r i e v a n c e s l o n g
e n o u g h an d w er e r e a d y f o r in d e p e n d e n c e .
 267

Howev er, th ey were r e a l i s t i c to s t a t e t h a t th ey kne77 th e Fr en ch would, r e ­

tu r n and th a t th e b e st th ey co ul d hope f o r th e p re se n t was re fo rm , bu t th e y in ­
s i s t e d on t h e i r ind ep en de nc e in a f a i r l y sh o rt p e ri o d o f y e a r s - t h i s ra n a l l th e
way fro m 5 to 15 y e a r s .
The le a d e r s a ls o s ta te d and ad m it te d th a t th ey would nee d o u ts id e te c h n ic a l
hel p i f in de pe nd en ce we re ac hie ved . The y e s p e c ia ll y welcomed th e hel p Am eric a
m ig ht giv e in th e way o f te c h n ic ia n s .

B. P o l i t i c s .

As fa r a s p o l i t i c s - o u t s i d e o f in de pe nd en ce -w as co nc ern ed n o th in g was men­

ti o n e d . T h e ir aim was l i b e r t y , th ey s a id , a f t e r th a t th ey would d is c u s s p o l i t i ­
c a l q u e st io n s .
The y were veh eme nt i n t h e i r d e n ia l th a t th e P a r ty was co m m un is tic . T hi s
was pu re pr op ag an da , th ey s a id , p u t ou t by th e Fr en ch and Ch ine se to d i s c r e d i t
t h e i r p a rt y .
I t was obvio us, i t was s ia d , to th e mo st ca su al o b se rv er t h a t th e o rd in a ry
un ed uc at ed p ea sa n t who was 100% V ie tm in h, had nev er he ar d of th e word comauni sm
o r knew what i t m ea nt .
The le a d e r s made an an al og y to th e USA a t th e tim e i t was se ek in g in de pe nd ­
en ce . Th er e wer e no p a r t i e s bu t on ly p a t r i o t s . P o l i t i c s came l a t e r .
I l a t e r le a rn e d t h a t many o f th e p a r ty le a d e r s , in cl u d in g Mr. Hoo and Mr.
Van had co mm un isti c sy m pa th ie s. I f not o u t- r ig h t com mun ists th ey we re d e f in i t e l y
l e f t i s t s . . Many o th e r le a d e r s b e li e v e in some for m o f so c ia li sm .
Howe ver, a l l p a r t i e s and p e rs o n s, in cl u d in g i n d u s t r i a l i s t s a re now u n it e d
f o r in de pe nd en ce . P o l i t i c s come l a t e r , th ey sa y.

VI . FOREIGN RELATIONS

Th er e was no o f f i c i a l r e p re s e n ta ti v e o f th e p a r ty e i t h e r a t Kunming o r
Ch un gk ing . T h is i s ob vi ou s inas muc h as th e p a rt y was re co gn iz ed by no on e, ie
by no fo re ig n powe r. Howev er, th e r e were Annamese pe op le a t th e s e c i t i e s who
wer e p a rt y members*

A. F re n ch . The Vi etm inh cam paig ned a g a in st bo th th e Ja ps and F re nch , a lt h o

r e a li a e d th a t th e Ja p was a g r e a te r da ng er w hi le ho was he re and c a r r ie d on
a c ti v e w ar fa re a g a in s t him . However, th ey did no t sh oo t any Fr en ch b u t to th e
c o n tr a ry o nly ke pt them un de r s u r v e il la n c e and e sc o rt e d many o f them to s a fe ty
in C hi na . The y know Fr an ce i s a g re a t c o u n tr y -b u t th ey have no r e s p e c t f o r i t s
c o lo n ia l p o li c y . Howe ver, to show to th e wo rld th ey wer e no t b a n d it s but a c tu a ll y
h u m an it ar ia n s th ey fo ll ow ed th e p r in c ip le o f ta k in g ca re o f th er a- at l e a s t f o r th e
momen t. The b e st exam ple of h e lp in g th e Fr en ch was a t Tam Dao. The Ja p s had a
c o n c e n tr a ti o n camp th e re f o r ab ou t 20 Fr en ch , in c lu d in g men, women and c h il d r e n .
The Vi etm inh la un ch ed an a tt a c k , su ff e re d some l o s s e s , bu t li b e r a t e d a l l th e
Fr en ch and pr oc ee de d to ta k e ca re of them . Howev er, t h a t do es no t mean th ey a re
p ro -F re nch . To th e c o n tr a ry th ey a re an ti p F re n ch . But th e abo ve a c t s show th ey
fo ll o w p r in c ip le s o f j u s t ic e .
The g ri ev a n ce s a g a in s t th e F re nc h a re s p e c if ic and many. As s t a te d to me
h e re ar e some in p a r tj

83 -6 05 0 - 7 3 - 1 8
 1. To re th an 5 pa rs on s c o u ld n 't as se m bl e w ith ou t a p e rm it .
2. High ta xe3 on la n d , m at ch es , he ad ta x e s , e tc .
3. P r iv a te sc h o o ls fo rb id d en . ,
4. Hard o r im po ss ib le to g e t c e r ta in g o v 't a d m in is tr a ti v e p o s ts o r
g e t in b ig b u si n e ss .
5. I f r i c e i s 3 h o rt , pe op le s ta r v e and th e Fr en ch hogs g et th e r i c e .
S e v e ra l m il li o n pe op le st a rv e d r e c e n tl y i t was sa id be ca us e o f
Fr en ch ho ar di ng th e ri c e - a n d i t a l l s p o il e d .
6. A p r ic e was pu t on th e he ad o f p o l i t i c a l le a d e r s . So many p i a s tr e s
and so much s a l t o ff e re d as a re w ar d.
7. The y woul d buy sa lt -d em an di ng a c e r t a i n q u a n ti fy , and i f same was
no t re ac h ed , would c o n fi s c a te a l l o t i t . The y would buy i t f o r sa y
30 so us and s e l l i t ba ck th e same amoun t f o r 3 p i a s t r e s .
8. Fo rc ed sq le of opium and a lc o h o l. I f a m a g is tr a te d i d n 't buy hi 3 qu ot a,
th e v il l a g e com mi tte e was a r e s te d . Opium co nsu mp tio n was en co ur ag ed
by pr op ag an da .
9. Fo rb ad e ev en m an da rin s and la n d lo rd s to hav e arm s.
10 . Fo rb ad e a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r ti e s and tr a d e u n io n s. L ea de rs p u t in j a i l .
11 . R at io n cou pon s nec es sa ry f o r c lo th e s . F re nc h had s p e c ia l "A" co up on s.
Cou ld g e t more and s e l l t h e i r su rp lu s a t a p r o f i t .
12 . Ta xe s on gr ow ing fo od and i t s s a l e .
13 . Inhuma n p r a c ti c e s !
eg -S hooti ng and g a ss in g o f p o l i t i c a l p ri s o n e rs a t Cao bang .
3 rd de gr ee p r a c ti c e s o f th e S u re te .
14 . C on tr ol and l im i ta t io n o f s a l t .
15 . Ko fre ed om o f th e p r e s s .
16 . Po or ty p e o f Fr en ch c o lo n ia l a d m in is tr a to r . M or al s, e tc . ba d. Emp eror
o f Annam and King o f Camb odia m er el y st o o g es and pu p p et s.
17 . Fr en ch ga ve 8 g i r l s f o r th e p le a s u re o f Ja p may or a t Ha no i.
(F re nc h sa y th ey we re fo rc e d to do i t . )

The P a rt y le a d e r s were a t a l l tim es w il li n g t o t a l k to Fr en ch le a d e r s on

q u e st io n s of re fo rm s and on
f o r FIC , wh ich th ey cla im ed
re g a rd th ey we re w il li n g to
t h a t th e F re nc h come h e re .
a c tu a ll y sc he du le d to go to
q u e st io n s co nc er ni ng G en er al D eG au ll e' s p ro cl am at io n
to be va gu e. As ev id en ce o f t h e i r good f a i t h in t h i s
f l y to Kunming f o r t h i s pu rp os e r a th e r th an i n s i s t
AGAS was us ed as in te rm e d ia ry . The P a r ty C hi ef was
Kunming v/hen th e su rr e n d e r o f th e Ja p s was an no un ced .

B. C hin es e. The r e la ti o n s w it h th e C hi ne se hav e not be en p le a s a n t. Fo r

exa mp le, th e p a r ty c h ie f Mr. C.M. Hoo was a r r e s te d in Ch ina h e ld w it ho ut a t r i a l
and ch ar ge d w it h be in g a Jap sp y, so i t was s ta te d by Hoo. P ro ba bl y th e t r u t h was
t h a t he was a r r e s te d be ca us e o f h is l e f t i s t sy m pa th ie s.
The C hi ne se hav e re p e a te d ly ac cu se d th e VML as be in g b a n d it s and t h a t th e
p a r ty i s c a 'j n u n is ti c .
The C hi ne se hav e sp on so re d an Anna mite P a rt y o f i t s own wh ich i t cl ai m s to
be th e tr u e p a r ty .
C hi ne se tr o o p s o r i r r e g u l a r s hav e c ro ss e d th e f r o n t ie r and committed a c ts
o f b a n d it ry .
F ol lo w in g a re pu rp or te d to be some e x c e rp ts o f l e t t e r s se n t to th e VML by
th e C hi ne se sp on so re d p a rt y i
 269

"F rie nd we re ce iv e d an o rd e r from th e commander in c h ie f ( t h a t mean3

G en er al Chang F a i K w e i- tr a n sl a to r) to come an d work in In do -C hi na . Ee cau s9
com rad es of d i f f e r e n t l o c a l i t i e s no t y e t u n it e d , \ie ca nn ot ex ec ute t h a t o rd e r.
’We w ri te t h i s l e t t e r to t e l l you , e it h e r yo ur gr ou p s h a l l jo in o u r gr ou p to
work to g e th e r, o r you s t i c k to communism. In th e l a t t e r c as e, when o u r army
e n te r s In do -C hi na , we w il l d e st ro y yo u, th en i t w il l be to o l a t e f o r yo u to
r e p e n t. In 24 ho ur s you mu st come to se e us to t a l k th in g s o v e r.
sig ne d* The P eo pl es R ev olu ti onar y P a rt y o f In do -C hi na
2 1 /5 /4 5 Commander of th e F i r s t T ai -T o i o f th e F i r s t C h it o il
Luu P in g Man"
9*9999 99*9 99 9949*9999 «*>9****9**
"Our army re c e iv e d o rd e rs to come h er e to ho ld th e R ev o lu ti o n ar y Lea gue
o rg a n iz e a re v o lu ti o n a ry go ve rn me nt, and to d e st ro y th e Ja p s. P le a. se , t e l l
th e p o p u la ti o n o f th e v i ll a g e s to come home. I f th ey keep on h id in g i n th e
m ou nt ai ns th ey w il l be pu ni sh ed as b a n d it s.

8 J u ly , 1945 si gned : L ia ng kie n Thoong

Kham Loong Pan

"Our army re c e iv e d o rd e rs to s t a ti o n in th e d i f f e r e n t d i s t r i c t s o f La ng son ,

in o rd e r to d e s tr o y b a n d it p a r t i e s , and to kee p pe ac e and o r d e r. 'He hop e th e
lo c a l p o p u la ti o n c o o p er a te s w ith us to p r o te c t t h e i r l i f e and to kee p pe ac e and
o rd e r in t h e i r l o c a l i t i e s .

J u ly sig ne d* Pe op le Rev . Army o f In do -C hi na

F i r s t C h it o i.
Commander Lee in g Khe.
2nd Comm. L ia ng t in g Li n"
♦ >> >>«{t$ •>:j» * *»>0 ** ***X* 4*•’>0aj»%$»>»X* $
"The aim o f o ur army i s to he lp th e n a ti o n a l re v o lu ti o n o f In do -C hi na and
t o d e st ro y b a n d it p a r ti e s in d if f e r e n t p la c e s o f th a t c o u n tr y . We le a r n th a t
th e r e ar e d i f f e r e n t p a r ti e s ma kin g a g it a ti o n and pr op ag an da f o r f a ls e d o c tr in e ,
c o n tr a ry to th e d o c tr in e o f th e R e volu ti onar y Lea gue o f In do -C hi na .
But we w il l pa rd on th es e p a r ti e s i f th ey su rr e n d e r to u s, ob ey th e d o c tr in e
o f o u r p a r ty , V/e, th e comman ders w il l be ge ne ro us and pa rd on th e p a s t . From th e
da y o f t h i s p ro cl am at io n , a l l p a r t i e s mu st se nd r e p re s e n ta ti v e s to o u r Hq. to
as k f o r su rr e n d e r. O th er w is e we s h a ll se nd b ig army to d e s tr o y them p i t i l e s s l y .

sig ne d*P eo pl e Rev . Army o f In do -C hi na .

F i r s t C h it o i.
Commander Lee in g Khe.
2nd Comm. Li an g Ti ng l i n . "
**9*99**99999*9 *9*9 999* *9*9 *9** *«««

Ge ne ra l S ia o Wan, one o f th e 4*h War Zone c h ie f s , v ic e ch ai rm an o f th e Wai -

ts u - s u (F o re ig n a f f a i r s s e c ti o n , M ar sh al l Ch ian g f a Kwei be in g th e ch ai rm an ), and
a r r e p r e s e n ta ti v e o f l.i ar ch al Ch ian g f a Kwei t o le a d th e R e v o lu ti o n ar y Le agu e o f
Ind o Ch ina w ro te in one o f h i s l e t t e r s to Mr . C.M. Hoo Vi et m in h P a rt y C h ie f as
fo llo w s*
 »1. The VI,IL us es t e r r o r i s t i c p o l ic i e s and i s com mun ist.
2. VML us es "d ie ha rd and ly in g p o li c ie s " v i s - a - v is f r ie n d ly n a ti o n whi ch
sy m pa th iz es w it h In do -C hi ne se re v o lu ti o n ; t h i s i s ta u n ti n g In do -C hi ne se re v o lu ­
ti o n , ta u n ti n g th e f r ie n d ly n a ti o n .
3 . VML d o es n ’t f ig h t th e Ja p s, bu t f i g h ts Ch ina and In do -C hi ne se P eo p le .
4 . VML le a d e r s hav e no i n te l li g e n c e , no good a t t i t u d e , no c onfi den ce . They
alw ay s show na rro w, re a c ti o n a ry , in c a p a b le , ir r e s p o n s ib le . Ev ery wh ere pe op le
d e sp is e them . They d o n 't g et any s o c ia l p o s it io n , to sa y no th in g o f i n t e r ­
n a ti o n a l p o s i t i o n . . . "

G en er al .S ia P yon to ld an E x ec uti ve Member o f th e Re ve l Lea gue o f In do -C hi na

th e fo llo w in g* ( th e member was h is p ro te g e bef or e bu t now in d is g ra c e be ca us e o f
be in g f r ie n d ly to VML): "V M L i s wo rse th a n b a n d it s . I f VML do es n’ t g e t ou t
o f Ba ola c h e ’d den d b a n d it s to d e st ro y i t . I f th e b a n d it s ca nn ot do i t , h e’d
se nd r e g u la r tr o o p s, f i r s t to f ig h t V M L, th en to f ig h t th e Ja p s. Mr. C.M. Hoo
fl ew ba ck on bo ar d an Am eric an p la n e . The Am eric ans gav e him r a d io s o t and money
to do in te ll ig e n c e s e rv ic e f o r them . On th e o th e r ha nd , Hoo ke ep s a l l th e news
fro m C hi na ’s kno wle dge . He added* I ’l l im m ed ia tely g iv e th e o rd e r to f ig h t VML.
Any VML man ca ug ht in Ch ina w il l be k i l l e d . No VML w il l be al lo w ed to coma to
C h in a .. * 6 May 1945-
In a n o th e r t a l k w ith th e same member i t i s re p o rt e d th a t th e G en er al sa id
th e fo llo w in g* "So lo ng as VML r e p r e s e n ta ti v e s do n’t come to C hi ng si to se e him,
he ke ep s c o n si d er in g VML as enemy, and he w il l in fo rm Am eric a and En gl an d to
d e c la re VML b a n d it s , and th ey w il l se nd p la n e s to bomb, to ma ch ine gu n, and to
hu m down ho us es in th os e p la c e s wher e VML e x is t s . And th e n th e R e volu ti onar y
Lea gue w il l be se n t in to re o rg a n iz e .

C. Am eri can . The P a rt y ha s n o th in g bu t p r a is e an d k in d n e ss fo r th e Ameri ­

ca ns and to se nd st u d e n ts th er e and i n v it e Am eric an te c h n ic ia n s h er e i s i t s de ­
s i r e . I t3 r e la ti o n w ith Am eric an OSO p er so n n el and AGAS per so n n el ha s bee n
ver y f r i e n d l y . The P a rt y ha s he lp ed i n r e tu r n in g se v e ra l Am eric an p i l o t s and
Mr . C.M. Hoo ha d a p e rs o n al co nf er ne ce w it h Ge ne ra l Ch en au lt a t Kunming on th e
s u b je c t.

V II . PROPAGANDA
Pr op ag an da to f u r t h e r th e p a r ti e s p la tf o rm was c a r r ie d on by sm al l pr op a­
ga nd a gr ou ps who tr a v e le d ab ou t th e c o u n tr y . Th ese gr ou ps o r co m m itt ee s con­
s is te d in a la r g e p a r t by s tu d e n ts .

The Co mm ittee p u b li sh ed fro m tim e to tim e ph am pl ets and l e a f l e t s in whi ch

i t ex pre ss ed th e p a r ti e s p o l ic i e s and ex ho rt ed th e pe op le a g a in st th e Ja p s and
F re nch . T h is was o f a li m it e d e x te n t as du ri n g th e occ u p at io n p r i n ti n g me tho ds
and pap er were, a t a prem ium.

V II I. GUERILLA T/ARFARE
Be fo re th e Ja p su rr e n d e r o f 15 Au gu st , i t was s ta te d by p a rt y c h ie f s , th a t
th e re we re in To nk in ab ou t 3, 00 0 armed g u e r il l a s o p e ra ti n g in sm al l ban ds o f to
 271

15 to 20 men. T h e ir armam ent c o n s is te d o f th e Fr en ch 8mm r i f l e o r "KUsq uston"

some ol d Fr en ch Ma chin e Guns, R us si an r i f l e s , ve ry o ld si n g le sh ot pow der typ e
sh ot gu ns , some s te n s and Bre ns (w hic h had be en ar pp pe d by th e B r i ti s h to th e
Fr en ch a f t e r 9 M ar ch ), some ca ptu re d Ja p weap ons, and l a s t l y bows and ar ro w s, o f
which th e w r it e r ha s se en s e v e ra l.
Du rin g th e tim e, th e w r it e r was in FIC v/ ith Vi etm in h tr oops (16 J u ly to
25 A ug us t), r e p o rt s wer e c o n st a n tl y comin g in o f s n a il c la sh e s w it h Vi etm in h
tr o o p s a g a in st Ja p co nv oy s. To l i s t a l l th es e c la sh e s i s im po ss ib le si n c e many
a re no t known and wha t i s known th e in te ll ig e n c e on i t was not alw ay s to o c le a r
due to th e ex tre me d i f f i c u l t i e s of com mu nic ati on .
N a tu ra ll y , th e Ja p s wer e no match f o r th e p o o rl y aime d V ie tm in h, th e r e f o r e
t h e i r a c ti o n was u s u a ll y h i t and ru n, sel do m wi pin g out a whol e Ja p colum n and
sel do m c a p tu ri n g Ja p m a te r ie l.
The fo ll o w in g a re some f a i r l y w el l a u th e n ti c a te d eng age me nts be tw ee n Ja ps
and Vi etm in h tr o o p s in Tonk in*
1 . Ja p L t. Haraodi k i ll e d a t T ha i Nguye n.
2. 10 Ju ly -C ap tu re d 36 r i f l e s a t Lu c-a n-C hau
3 . 14 J l y -C ap tu re d 40 r i f l e s a t Yen Bin h.
4 . 25 July-VML ca ptu re d d i s t r i c t s o f Hie pho a and Yen Th e.
5 . 4 Ju ly -2 0 Fre nch me n-m en, women and c h il d re n , i n Ja p c o n c e n tr a ti o n camp
a t Tara Dao l ib e r a t e d by Vi et m in h.
6. 23 J u ly -9 s in g le sh ot r i f l e s , 18 h o rs e s, 5 to n s o f r i c e ca p tu re d nea r
Cho Moi on C o lo n ia l Ro ute 3
7 . 20 -^5 Au gu st- Oc cu pie d town o f T h ai Nguy en. Ja p s re fu se d to su rr e n d e r
f o r 5 da ys , s t r e e t f i g h ti n g . C ap tu re d ov er 500 r i f l e s , 250 p a ir s o f
sh oes , 72 b la n k e ts , 8 h o rs e s, 4 au to m obil es , o v er 3*000 to n s o f r i c e ,
la r g e q u a n ti e s su g a r, s a l t and many m is ce ll a n eo u s a r t i c l e s .

(Th e abo ve re p re s e n ts only a f r a c t i o n o f a l l eng age me nts )

In many o th e r wa ys the pe op le hi n der ed th e Ja p s. The y des tr o y ed b ri d g e s ,

dug c r a t e r s in ro a d s, put b a rr ic a d e s a c ro ss ro a d s, and th e pe op le o f Cho Chu
bu rn ed down t h e i r e n ti r e v il la g e and l e f t th e r u in s to th e Ja p s.

IX. F0 Ml AT ION OF GOVERNiJENT AFTER JAP SURRENDER

Im m ed iately a f t e r th e 15th Augu st ann ouncem ent o f su rr e n d e r n e g o ti a ti o n s

P a rt y le a d e r s be gan mo ving in to Ha no i. The Ja p s had e n te re d in to n e g o ti a ti o n s
w it h th e Vi etm in h th e r e p e rm it ti n g them to c a rr y arm s and al lo w in g t h e i r p a ra d e s,
d em o n st ra ti o n s, " m a n if e st a ti o n s" , e tc .
The Vi etm inh to ok o v er se v e ra l p u b li c b u il d in g s in c lu d in g th e fo rm er home
o f th e Fr en ch "R es id en t S u p e ri o r" . The "Gu ard s In di ge ne " a ls o su rr e n d er e d to th e
V ie tm in h, no t o n ly in Ha no i bu t ev er yw he re . The Vi etm in h th u s o b ta in e d a l l th e r
asnns, am mu nit ion , st o c k s o f c lo th in g , e tc .
The p a r ty s e t up a new P ro v is io n a l Gove rnmen t s e le c ti n g p a r ty and n o n -p a rt y
membe rs to c a b in e t p o s ts . The new gov ern me nt was e n th u s ia s t i c a ll y su pp or te d by
what ap pe ar ed to be a v a s t m a jo ri ty o f th e p o p u la ti o n a l l over F .I .C . Th e pu pp et
em pe ro r, Ba od ai, ab d ic at e d in i t s fa v o r and o ff e re d h is s e rv ic e s as a d v is o r.
The Gover nment pr oc la im ed a "D ec la ra ti o n o f In de pe nd en ce ". I t a ls o s ta te d
th a t a g e n e ra l e le c ti o n would be h e ld in two mo nth s, and u n iv e rs a l su ff ra g e would
be in e f f e c t . Ev ery one over 18 would ha ve v o ti n g p r iv il e g e s , ex ce pt c ri m in a ls
and th o se in sa n e.
Mr. C.M. Hoo ( r e a l name Ho Chi Minh) wa3 made tem po ra ry P re s id e n t o f th e
P ro v is io n a l Co un cil and M in is te r o f F o re ig n a f f a i r s . Mr. Van ( r e a l namei Vo
Nguyen Gi ap ) was made te m po ra ry m in is te r of th e I n t e r i o r .
PI CT UR ES FRO M TH E “ D E E R ” MI SS ION WIT H OR IG IN AL CA PT IO NS

A ug us t 15, 1945 —“T ra in in g na ti ve so ld ie rs in th e us e of t h e C ar bi ne by

tr ia n g u la ti o n .”

A ug us t 16, 1945 —“F ir in g t h e Ca rb in e.

 274

A ug us t 17, 1945 —“S ol di er s pr ac tic e gr en ad e th ro w in g. ”

A ug us t 17, 1945 —“ Maj . Th om as il lu st ra ti n g t h e us e of gr en ad e. ”

276
 277

A ug us t 17, 1945 —“A not her p ar ty o f l ea de rs f ro m H ano i f or co nf er en ce to d e te r­

mi ne na ti on al poli cy fo r In do -C hi na .”
 278

A ug us t 19, 1945 —“S old ier s re st in g on tr a il to Th ai N gu ye n, ou r objec tiv e.

T ra il is se cr et on e tw is ti ng t h ru ric e field s an d fo re st s. ”

A ug us t 19, 1945 —“ In vi lla ge of Ta m Din h. Vi et Min h le ad er s pl an at ta ck on

Ja p ga rr is on in T ha i N gu ye n”
 279

A ug us t 20, 1945 —“T roo ps ta k e up po sit io ns in s tr e e t”

A ugu st 20, 1945 —“P re p ar in g to mo ve off t o fi gh t.”

 280

Se pt em be r 1, 1945 —“R oa d th ru Th ai Ng uy en to H an oi .”

Se pt em be r 23, 1945 —Bu s (c ha rc oa l bu rn er ) be tw ee n H an oi an d he re .

II. “DETACHMENT 404”: MISSION TO SAIGON
HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
INDIA BURMA THEATER

25 Au gu st 1945

SUBJECT: O p e ra ti o n EMBANKMENT

TO i L t. C o fi -M o sc ri p ~
O p e ra ti o n s O f f i c e r

1 . M aj or Ma ha rg h a s in fo rm ed me t h a t L t. '' o l . C as s,
B r i t i s h SEAC A s s a u lt U n it comman der f o r S a ig o n , r e q u e s te d i n y e s ­
t e r d a y ’s 100 0 m e e ti n g t h a t th e com mandin g o f f i c e r o f t h e OSS u n i t ,
t o be a tt a c h e d t o h i s command su b m it t o him a s ta te m e n t c o n c e rn in g
th e o b j e c t iv e s an d re q u ir e m e n ts o f EMBANKMENT.
A
2 . The o b j e c t iv e s o f EMBANKMENT, t o q u o te fr om C o lo n el
C o u g h li n ’s memora ndum to t h e C h ie f s 'o i’ F i el d Mio s i o n s, 15 A ug us t
19 45 , a r e , " th e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f Vfar C ri m es , p r i s o n e r s o f w a r, an d
c o n d it i o n o f (U .S ») p r o p e r t i e s ’’, R A i i s i n t e r e s t e d aB w e ll in
t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f su c h do cu m en ts an d p u b li s h e d m a t e r i a l a s may p ro v e
o f i n t e r e s t t o t h e Li br ary o f C o n g re ss ,

3 . S in o e EMBANKMENT w i l l ha ve co m m un ic at io n f a c i l i t i e s ,
an d s i n c e i t i s my i n t e n t i o n to r e q u i s i t i o n s u i t a b l e U .S . p r o p e r ty
(s u c h as t h e Te xa co home) as a H q. jf lJ iJ s u i t a b l e r e q u i s i t i o n s ha ve
bee n mad e f o r fo o d ,a n d s p e c ia l fu n d s a l l o t t e d f o r t h e h i r i n g o f
d o m e st ic a id an d p u rc h a se o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , I do n o t se e a t t h i s
ti m e t h a t EMBANKMENT h a s an y l i s t o f re q u ir e m e n ts t o p r e s e n t to
C o l. C a s s ,
y' .

A. PETER DEWEY /
M aj o r, AUS ' . /
* EMBANKMENT C.O . 1
 282

BRANCH HEADQUARTERS
D e t. ItOU
S A IG O N , FR EN CH EJ D O -C H IN A

17 S e p t . / 19U5

SUBJECT: C h ro n o lo g ic a l l i s t o f d a te s f o r M is si o n EMBANKMENT.

TO s Commanding O f f i c e r , OSS SU D et ac hm en t UoU, S a ig o n FI C .

1 . The fo ll o w in g i s a c h r o n o lo g ic a l l i s t o f th e mo re im p o rt a n t
d a te s o f m is s io n EMBANKMENT, up t o an d in c lu d in g 17 S e p t ., 19U5>.

2 S e p t, Ad va nc e PO’.V p a r t y c o n s i s t in g o f L t . C ou na ss e an d 3 EM
a r r i v e d S a ig o n .

U S e p t. 1 s t e c h e lo n EMBANKMENT c o n s i s t in g o f L t . C o l. Dewey ,
M aj or B lu e c h e l, C a p t. F r o s t , L t s . Be kk er an d Wick s
a r r i v e d S a ig o n .

5 S e p t. 2 n d .e c h e lo n EMBANKMENT, c o n s i s t in g o f C a p ts . W hi t? ,
C o o ld ig e an d V a rn e r, a r r i v e d S a ig o n . 8 co mb at c ar g o
p la n e s a r r i v e d f o r e v a c u a ti o n o f POWs.

6 S e p t. 2lU A m er ic an POWs d e p a r te d f o r C a lc u tt a v i a 8 co mb at
c a rg o p l a n e s .

7 S e p t. R e si d en c e o f M r. F e r i e r a c q u ir e d f o r EMBANKMENT he ad ­
q u a r t e r s . P h y s ic a l p o s s e s s io n ta k e n .

10 S e p t . H ou se ho ld s t a f f o f s e r v a n ts a c q u ir e d . F re n c h O f f ic e r s
o f ACM e n t e r t a i n e d a t d i n n e r .

12 S e p t . C a p t. L eo nar d a r r i v e d S a ig o n .

13 S e p t. M aj or Ge n. G ra ce y a r r i v e d S a ig o n . C a p ts . C oo li dg e an d
V a rn e r d e p a r te d f o r D a la t.

15 S e p t . C a p ts . C ooli dge an d V a rn er r e tu r n e d fr om D a l a t .

HE RB ER T^ BLUE CHE^ ---- -

M aj or, CAC
A d ju ta n t.

//
 283

i-iLB-2739-A
ER A nC il 'HE ADQ UAR TER S
O F F IC E OF S l i l A E G I C S E R V IC E S
DE TA CI EIE RT I4.OI4.

Saigon , FIC .,
30 Septcnberl9U$»

SUBJSCTi P o li ti c a l aims and phil oso phy of th e Vi et Liinh Government of

French Indo-C hina, and th ei r a tt it u d e toward America and
Americana.
TO The Commanding O ff ic er , OSS Detachment Uol|, Head quart ers SSAC.
APO U32. *

The aim of the Vie t I'inh pa rt y aa expr esse d by Forei gn M ini ste r
Pnam Ilgoc Thach dur ing an inte rvi cnr on 1$ September, 19^5, was to g^in
by peac eabl e means se lf government f o r the Annanese peo ple . Ho st at ed
th a t tlie pa rty was su ff ic ie n tl y we ll orga nize d to assume immediate gov­
ernment of Vi et liam, i . c . , tho th re e co st al prov ince s of Cochinch ina,
Annan, and Tonkin. Laos and Cambodia ar e con side red se pa rat e co un tri es
by tho Annanese, bu t th e ir pla ns inc lud ed pro vis ion s fo r an en ten te with
thos e two pro vin ces tog oth er wi th Thaila nd whereby an economic blo c could
be formed.

pie main ob je ct iv e was to ri d the Annamites of French ru le , immed­

ia te ly i f po ss ib le , gra du all y i f nec ess ary (th e P li li pp in es pl an was fre q­
ue nt ly ci te d by i!. Thach as a model ). According to Thach, th is w?.3 by no
means inco mpa tible wit h French de si re s, fo r French commercial in te re st s
would remai n. In f a c t ho st at ed th a t the Vi et f'inh wanted and needed
French in te re st s to develop tho cou ntry . But i t was al so in fe rr ed th a t
an Annai'iese government "would be in a po si ti on to exclude un de sir ab le firm s
and in vi to oth er fo re ig n in te re s ts , p a rt ic u la rl y American. Thach wa3
thoro ughly convinced th at American concern s could make an immense co nt ri ­
bu tio n to tho development of th e cou ntr y.
According to the or ig in al pl an , the ain3 of th e Vi et liinh were to
bo pre sen ted to th e French Government and al so to the B ri ti sh and American
re pr es en ta ti v e3 who, i t was hoped, would a s s is t as ne ut ra ls i n subseq uent
ne go tia tio ns . Thach hoped th a t th e French would r eco gni ze the "j u st and
rcaso nabl o claim s of th e Vi et liinh" and make pro vis ion s fo r a t le a s t a
small measure of Annan ite s e lf -r u le . I t appe ars th a t tho Vi et Finh exp ect­
ed the French to heed the arguments and the* B ri ti sh to "weigh them impar­
ti a ll y " .
But as the si tu a ti o n pro gre sse d, no one rec eiv ed the Vi et liinh
Mi nis ter s and tho pa rty was f orc ed to evacu ate tho pu bli c bu ild in gs they
had been usi ng l’or th e ir government. The Vi et i'inh pr ot es te d bu t gra dua lly
re ti re d , under fo rc e of arms, ev en tua lly dec idin g on a pa ssi ve cour se of
ac tio n, namely - to evacu ate all. Annamites from Saigon Cholon ar ea , and
se t up he adq uar ter s in the cou ntr y. I t was f e l t th a t Saigon could be
broug ht to terms wit hou t vio len ce sin ce tho French po pu lat ion was en ti re ly

83 -60 5 0 - 73 - 19
( P o li ti c a l aims and Piiilosopl iy, Cont. )
dependent upon Annamited fo r foo d. Fu rth er , no Annamite would work fo r
any Frenchman, and thus a ll French concer ns would be unabl e to fu nc tio n.
Since the Vi et iiinh co nt ro lle d a t le a s t a ma jor ity of th e Annamites by one
moans or an oth er, such a pla n was qu ite pra ct ic ab le .
On the 22nd of Scpter.'.ber, the eve of the out bre aks , Thach st at ed
in an in te rv i ew, th at as a f in a l measure of des per ati on cs' th e Vie t i.linh
would sta ge a mass demo nstra tion of many thousands of Annamite3 marching
throug h Saigon comp letly unarmed and car ry ing only bann ers and emblems
of the p a rt y . I t was hoped th at French and B ri ti sh tro ops would f ir o on
the Annamites caus ing many ca us al ti es , bri ng ing the at te nt io n of th e world
to the se "pe ac efu l, fre edo a-l oving ma rty rs" .
I am civa nced th a t Thach a t no time planne d on having rec our se to
vio len ce and I have reaso n to be lie ve th a t ho i s appal ed by th e tu rn even ts
have tak en . I t is ce rt ai n he longed fo r the goodwil l and fri en ds hi p of
Americans and of th e B ri ti sh as w el l, though in the l a t t e r cas e he vraa
disco urage d by many re bu ff s. Pr io r to 1 October, General Gracey had .
ref use d to meet wit h the lo ad er s of tho Vi et iiinh and ign ore d th e ir pl ea s
fo r a con fere nce . H. Thach i s rec ogn i zed by General Gracey an d Colonol
Ce dil le as tho o ff ic ia l spokesman and one of the th re e le ad er s of the
Southe rn Committee of the Vi et ’’in h.
Since 23 September when th e Frenc h, through fo rc e of am s, took over
tiie c it y h a ll , the Annaraese have re so rt ed to a re ign of te r r o r . Their cry
lias been "dea th to a ll Europeans", and have engaged in kid nap pin gs, murders ,
ars on, and in di sc rim in at e sn ip in g. Sic or ig in al pla n of evac uatin g
Saigon and the reb y cu tti ng i t of f from a l l sour ces of food supp ly was
pla ced in op er at io n, bu t in ad di tio n armed ’warfare of a so rt has been
re so rt ed to and many small pi tc he d b a tt le s have re su lt ed . Ju st how f a r
the Annamese w il l go in th e ir de ter mi nat ion to gain se lf independence
remains to be see n.
I >
An in te re st in g bu t imp orta nt si d e -l ig h t is tho fa c t th a t Americans
ar e no t cond iderc d to belong in the c la ss if ic a ti o n ’’Europeans". Americans
ar e con sid ere d to be a sep ara te peo ple, and the Vie t Finh le ad er s exor esse d
tiie hope th a t Amsidcans -would v i ew fav ora bly th e ir bid fo r independen ce,
sin ce wa ourse lve s foug ht fo r and gainod our independence under a si tu at io n
con side red to be si m ila r to th a t ns cxi s ts in Indo Cliina to- da y. The Viot
i.'iinh l ea de rs wore es pe ci al ly des iro us of gain ing our fri en ds hi p and oft en
exor esse d tho hope th a t we would sponso r th e ir bi d fo r independence and
the reb y fo rc e tho French to y ie ld .
In view of the for ego ing , and in view of the many in sta nc es of
defe renc e shorn to me and oth er members of tho 033 mis sion vdiilo moving
throug h Annamite d is tr ic ts unde r pr ot ec tio n of a dis pla ye d American fl ag ,
d e ta il s of which arc cont aine d in an att ac he d a ff id a v it , I an convinced
th at Major A. P 7TER DElVEf, AC, O-9119U7, was ambushed and ki ll ed through
being mistak en of bein g of a nat io n al it y ot he r than American. If the Jeep
in which he was ri di ng a t tho time of th e in ci de nt had heen dis pl ay in g an
American f la g , I fe e l po si ti ve th a t the sho ts would not have been fi re d .
A fl ag was no t bein g dis pla yed in accofd ancc wit h vo rb al in st ru ct io ns is s ­
ued by Genera l Gracey, Conoanding General of the A lli ed Con trol Co mi ssi on,
Saig on. D et ai ls of thos e in st ru ct io ns ar e cont aine d in an accompanying
a f f i d av it .

HE RB ERT J . BL Ui iC UE L,
C a s t . , C A C .,
O -S 0 6 6 1 9 .
 285

M L Q -2 73 9- J

BiiALCii HTADQUAdTilHS
OFr’ICS OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
D sm an zK ii UoU

Sa ig on , F IC .,
30 Se pt em be r, 19li3

SUBJECT: Comments on r e p o r t p u b li sh e d by th e A ll ie d C on tr ol Com missi on,

S ai go n, co nc er ni ng th e e v e n ts o f 26 Se pte m be r, 19U5.
TO : 7ne Corimanding O ff ic e r, OSS De tac hm ent Uoh, H ea dq ua rt er s S’lAC,
I APO Ji32.

1 , Tno fo ll o v /i n g comments a rc made T/ ith re g a rd s to st a te m e n ts

co n ta in ed in th e r e p o r t p u b li sh e d by th e A ll ie d C on tr ol Com missi on,
Sa ig on , co nc er ni ng th e e v en ts of 26 Se pte m be r, 19 'i5 .

A. P a r. 6, 2nd l i n e "o rd er ed to ------- re co v er Col Dewey’ 3

body fo rc e h e a d q u a rt e rs we re no t a ra ro a t t h a t ti r. o
th a t. th e bo dy o f Col Dewey ha d be en ta ke n awr y by th e
Anncumcse. tl a jo r DLBASCiiES was f i r s t in fo rm ed o f t h a t
f a c t by Ma jor knUADS, AC, s h o r tl y a f t e r ap pea ri ng a t th e
sc en e o f th e in c id e n t. T hi s i s v e r i f i e d in P a r. 9, l i n n
7, - 'ddi'iiiALI th en e x p la in e d ------- to r e s to r e o rd e r - -
e tc ., ".

B. P a r. 13 , l i n e 2 . "They came to th e a r e a ’i n MT ------- (bo )

a tt a c k th e Am eric an mi s s io n " . Th is i s a s ta te n a t o f
f a c t f o r 5/iiich T aj o r ArSUAM ha s no pro o f o f an y k in d .

C. P a r. ,1 ? , l i n e 6 . "Co l Caos ha d as ke d De we y---- s a t i s f i e d

T/ith*’sa f e ty o f h is h o u se ". I ha ve no kno wle dge o f t h i s .
Ma jor DC.;"dx n e v er me nt io ne d th e in c id e n t to me n o r to any
o th e r member o f th e OGS m is si o n .

P a r. 2 k . I hav e no kno wle dge o f t h i s in c id e n t.

IS. P a r. 2J?. To th e s e co nc nl 3i on s I do n o t a g re e . W hil e i t
i3 tr u e th e Annamece fi re d , on th e OSS h e a d q u a rt e rs in s p i te
o f th e f a c t an Am eric an f la g was f ly in g , y e t by t h i s tim e
th e f i g h t was on an d I do not b e li e v e th e Annamose st op ed
to c o n si d e r o r to r e a l i s e th ey vrere a tt a c k in g Am eri can oc c­
up ie d p ro p o r ty . They wor e un do ub te dl y se ek in g re ve ng e f o r
th e 5 An na mi tcs h i t d u ri n g th e co ur se o f r y es ca pe fr o n th e
a-fb ush, an d not ai ri g b p t fo rc o o f a rn s co ul d st o p th e n . To
us o t h i s a s a pr em ia f o r the co nc uls io n t h a t " i t i s ex tr em el y
d o u b tf u l w he th er th e fl y in g o f a f la g oh th e p a in ti n g o f th e
U. S. f l a g on th e Je ep "would hav o had any d e te r r e n t e f f e c t
on th e a tt a c k e r s " , io w it h o u t l o g i c a l se qu en ce . T ha t i s a
co n c u ls io n th ey wo uld l i k e to b e li e v e , b u t the y' ha ve no f a c t s
w it h wh ich to pro pound su ch a s ta te m e n t.
Il
IIE R3 3U ? J . BLUE CIIEL ,
C a n t . . CAC .
 286

M LB -2 73 9- B

A F F ID A V IT

Be fo re me th e un d er si g ne d a u th o r it y du ly empowered to ta k e ack now led ­

gem en ts, ap pe ar ed C ap ta in HERBERT J . BLUECHEL, 0-2 86 81 9, knov/n to me to be
th e p e rs o n vfhose name i s su b sc ri b e d be low , and ha vi ng be en by me f i r s t
du ly sw orn , d id on o a th •w ith ou t f e a r o r co mp ul sio n, s t a t e as fo ll o w s:

T hi s i s an ac co un t o f th e e v e n ts su bs eq ue nt to and fo ll o w in g th e k i l ­
li n g o f A. PETER DEJEY, M ajo r, AC, O-9119U7?
A ll ev en ts d e ta il e d h e re in tr a n s p ir e d on Wednesday, 26 Se pte mb er 19U3.
In ac co rd an ce w it h ar ra ng em en ts p re v io u s ly made, Ma jor DEWEY was sch edu led ,
to d e p a rt Sa ig on f o r C a lc u tt a , In d ia , and su bs eq ue nt ly Kandy , Ce ylo n, v ia
ATC. A ra d io mes sage ha d be en re c e iv e d on th e a ft e rn o o n o f 23 Se pte mb er
in fo rm in g u s o f th e ex pe ct ed a r r i v a l o f an ATC p la n e in Sa ig on a t ap p ro x i­
m at el y O9*3o ho ur s 26 Se pte m be r. A cc or di ng ly Maj or DE.VEY made a l l n e c e ss a ry
p re p a ra ti o n s to d e p a rt on t h a t p la n e , an d on th e mor nin g o f 26 Se pte mb er I
dr ov e iiim to th e a i r - p o r t in ou r Je ep , fo ll o w in g th e ro u t9 mar ked "A" on
th e acc om pan yin g sk e tc h . V/d d e p a rt e d OSS h e a d q u ar te rs a t ap p ro xi m at el y
09 :00 an d a r r iv e d a t th e a i r - p o r t a t ap Dr ox im ate ly 09 *1 0. Th ere we con ­
ta c te d M ajo r FRANK H. RHOADS, AC, O-UOH879, commanding ATC p e rs o n n e l
s ta ti o n e d in Sa ig on . He in fo rm ed u s he ha d n o t re c e iv e d news o f th e p la n e
as y e t, b u t ex pe ct ed i t to a r r iv e b e fo re no on. I th en dr ov e Ma jor DEWEY
to th e C o n ti n e n ta l H o te l, Sa ig on , fo ll o w in g th e ro u te mar ked "B" on accom­
pa ny in g sk e tc h , wh ere we p ic k ed up h is lu g g ag e. Ma jor DEWEY ha d a t h is
d is p o s a l a room in th e H ot el wh ere he co nd uc te d c o n si d e ra b le OSS b u si n e ss ,
and T he re he a ls o k e p t c o n si d e ra b le o f h is p e rs o n a l qq ui pm en t. Je re tu rn e d
to th e a i r - p o r t fo ll o w in g ro u te "B" a r r iv in g a t ap pr ox im at el y 1 0: 3 0. At
ab ou t 11 :0 0 Ma jor DEiTEY d is c o v e re d he ha d l e f t h is dog ta g s a t th e H ot el ,
an d I dr ov e him to th e C o n ti n e n ta l to re c o v e r same. Du rin g th e co ur se o f
t h i s t r i p we we re in fo rm ed C ap ta in JOSEPH R. COOLIDGE, AC, O-83U932, a
member o f th e OSS M is si on , ha d be en br ou gh t in fro m D a la t in a r a t h e r
se ri o u s c o n d it io n fro m wounds re c e iv e d i n a f i g h t w it h arm ed an na m it es .
l,See s e p a ra te re p o rt f o r f u l l d e t a i l s ) . We saw C ap t. COOLIDGE a t th e
B r it is h 7 3th F ie ld Ambu lance H o s p it a l, and a f t e r Ma jor DE.7EY had as su re d
h im se lf t h a t Ca pt . COOLIDGE was re c e iv in g ad eq ua te m ed ic al a tt e n ti o n , we
re tu rn e d to th e a i r - p o r t fo ll o w in g ro u te "B", a r r iv in g a t ap pr ox im at el y
12 :1 3.

D ur in g th e co ur se o f th e s e t r i p s be tw ee n th e a i r - p o r t , OSS h e a d q u a rt e rs
an d S ai go n, we en co un te re d s e v e r a l annam ese c o n st ru c te d ro a d b lo c k s, lo c a ­
ti o n s o f wh ich a re ma rke d on acc om pan ying sk e tc h . At no ne o f th e se ro ad
bl oc ks d id vre se e d is p la y e d any arm s o r an y anna mes e b e a ri n g arm s. At a l l
ro ad b lo c k s en co un te re d, th e re w er e u s u a ll y p re s e n t 3 o r U ann ame se, b u t
in a l l in s ta n c e s th e s e pe op le we re una rme d an d o ff e re d no re s is ta n c e to
ou r p a s s in g , 'ih is i s p a r t i c u l a r l y tr u e of th e ro ad b lo ck Ho. 1, wh ich i s
th e p o in t a t wh ich Ma jor DE'.VEY wa s k il le d , and i s a ls o th e voa d bl oc k
th ro ug h wh ich we p as se d on ou r i n i t i a l t r i p to th e a i r - p o r t a t 0 9 :0 0.
A t t h a t ti m e we en co un te re d no r e s is t a n c e o f any k in d , and p as se d th ro ug h
th e b lo ck v/ it ho ut in c id e n t. As wa s u su a l, th e re we re se v er al Q*armed
anna mes e l o i t e r i n g w it h in th e im me di ate v i c i n i t y , b u t no arm s vrere ob se rv ed
by e i t h e r of u s . T hi s p a r t i c u l a r ro ad b lo ck (No. 1) ha d be en i n e x is te n c e
si n c e Sun day , 23 Se pte mb er 19U3, an d a l l members o f OSS ha d p as se d th ro ug h
 287

i t a g re a t many ti m es d u ri n g th e co urs e o f th e wee k. At no tim e was an y

re s is ta n c e en co un te re d by a ry OSS member.

I t w i l l be n o te d fro m th e sk e tc h map t h a t ro u te "A" i s th e s h o r te s t

ro u te to th e a i r - p o r t fro m OSS h e a d q u a rt e rs , and f o r t h a t re as on was f o l ­
low ed c o n si d e ra b ly when any OSS member tr a v e ll e d to o r fro m th e a i r - p o r t ,
eve n tho ug h i t was a ba ck ro ad an d in poo r c o n d it io n . Ro ute "G", as
mar ked on th e sk e tc h map, i s th e mo st d i r e c t ro u te to S ai go n; how eve r, i t
p a ss e s th ro ug h a th ic k ly p o p u la te d an na m ite v il la g e , and a t v a ri o u s tim es
p r i o r to Sund ay 23 Se pte m be r, an d a t p r a c t i c a l l y a l l ti m es a f t e r t h a t d a te ,
th e ro u te vra.s bl ock ed by a s e r ie s of a t l e a s t 20 ro ad b lo c k s, an d to b y -p a ss
th e s e ca us ed a c o n si d e ra b le lo s s o f ti m e. T h er ef o re , i t wa s ou r cu sto m to
ta k e ro u te "A" to th e a i r - p o r t , an d fro m th e r e ro u te "B" in t o Sa ig on , we
ha vi ng de ci d e d t h i s to be th e s a f t e s t an d e a s i e s t ro u te to fo ll o w .

A t 12 :2 5 M ajo r DE.7EY de ci de d vie wo uld hav e tim e to re tu r n to OSS he ad ­

q u a rt e rs f o r lu n c h , an d ar ra ng ed w it h th e ATC p e rs o n n el t h a t i n e v en t th e
p la n e sh ou ld a r r iv e d u ri n g our ab se nc e, i t s d e p a rt u re wo uld be d el ay ed
u n t i l Ma jor DEtEY ha d re tu rn e d to th e f i e l d . A cc or di ng ly , we l e f t th e
a i r - p o r t in th e Je ep , an d f o r th e f i r s t ti m e t h a t da y, M ajo r DEWEY was
d ri v in g . He was arme d w it h a c a l .U5 C ol t au to m at ic p i s t o l , an d a c a l .3 0
c a rb in e , M -l . I was arm ed w it h one c a l .U5 C o lt au to m at ic p i s t o l , in c lu d -
di ng 3 c l i p s o f am mu nit ion t o t a l l i n g 21 ro un ds . Vfe fo ll ow ed ro u te "A",
an d a s we ap pr oa ch ed ro ad bl oc k No. 1 , I d id n o t se e o r n o ti c e an y th in g
u n u su a l. Th ere we re s e v e ra l una rm ed anna mese l o i t e r i n g ar ou nd as u s u a l,
an d no th in g ap pe ar ed to hav e be en ch an ge d o r a lt e r e d si n c e our i n i t i a l
t r i p a t 0 9 :0 0 . From th e acc om pan yin g sk et ch i t w i l l be no te d t h a t i t was
a st a g g e re d b lo c k , n e c e s s it a ti n g an "S" man euv er on th e p a r t o f th e Je ep
to n e g o ti a te . The bl oc k i t s e l f was c o n st ru c te d o f t r e e lim bs an d b ru sh ,
and in i t s e l f was n o t fo rm id ab le in any se ns e o f th e wo rd. Howev er, i t
was n e c e ss a ry to slo w down when p a ss in g th ro ug h, an d when th e a c ti o n to ok
p la c e th e Je ep wa s t r a v e ll in g ap pr ox im at el y 8 m il es p e r h o u r. Th is i s an
e s ti m a te .

Ma jo r DPiVEY was ta lk in g to me ab ou t th e u n fo rt u n a te ex per ie nc e s u f­

fe re d by C ap t. COOLIDGE and he was q u it e u p s e t ab ou t th e in c id e n t. The
Jee p wa s in th e p o s it io n o f tr a v e r s in g th e cu rv ed p o rt io n o f th e "S ", and
th us was t r a v e l l i n g a t an an gle to th e ma in co ur se of th e ro a d . A t t h a t
moment, a hi dd en l i g h t mac hin e gun ope ned f i r e a t p o in t bl an k ra n g e.
The gun was mou nted in th e d it c h on th e E a st si d e o f th e ro ad and ha d be en
ca mo uf lag ed w it h b ru sh . At th e tim e th e b u r s t v/as f i r e d , I v,as lo o k in g a t
Ma jor DEiVEY to b e t t e r h ea r wh at he was sa y in g , an d saw o u t o f th e c o m e r
of ny ey e th e p o s it io n of th e ma chi ne gun a s re v e a le d by th e f i r i n g .
The b u l l e t s s tr u c k Ma jor DEiVEY on th e l e f t si d e o f th e he ad s l i g h t l y to
th e r e a r n e a r th e l e f t e a r . I th in k one b u l l e t sh o t o f f a p o rt io n o f h is
lo w er jaw , al th o u g h I' m n o t to o c e r t a in o f t h i s . Blo od gu she d in a l l
d ir e c ti o n s , an d I am c e r t a in M ajo r DEJEY me t i n s ta n t d e a th . None o f th e
b u l l e t s s tr u c k me, nor d id any o f them p ie r c e th e w in d sh ie ld t h a t I
n o ti c e d . I t i s s a fe to assum e t h a t a l l sh o ts f i r e d e n te re d Ma jor DEJEY's
bod y. Th is o cc u rr ed a t ap pr ox im at el y 1 2 :3 0 .

I c e r t i f y t h a t n e it h e r Ma jor DE.7EY nor m ys el f d id an y th in g to pr ov ok e

th e in c id e n t, an d t h a t no w ar ni ng was gi ve n by th e ann ame se p r i o r to th e
op en ing o f f i r e . I do n o t know th e ty pe of mac hine gu n, b u t w i l l c e r t i f y
th q t i t was an a u to m at ic weapon as was e v id e n t fro m th e r a t e o f f i r e h e a rd
 288

The Je ep co nt in ued on i t s an gle co u rs e , and upon re ac h in g th e d it c h

on th e V/est si d e o f th e ro ad , r o ll e d ov er on i t s r i g h t s id e . The up ­
tu rn e d c h a s s is a ff o rd e d me p ro te c ti o n fro m su bs eq ue nt f i r i n g o f th e ma chi ne
gu n. Ma jor DE./EY's bod y ca ug ht on th e s te e ri n g wh ee l and re m ain ed in th e
Je ep . I d id n o t ha ve th e tim e to exam ine th e body c a r e f u ll y , b u t fro m th e
e x te rn a l c o n d it io n o f th e he ad and th e amo unt o f bl oo d fl ow in g fro m th e
s e v e ra l wou nds, I f e l t p o s it iv e he was de ad a t t h a t ti m e, and v /i ll so c e r­
t i f y . At no tim e a f t e r th e sh o ts we re f i r e d d id he u t t e r a sou nd , and eve n
tho ug h I re m ain ed al o n g si d e th e Je ep f o r a p e ri o d o f th re e o r fo u r m in ut es ,
I d id n o t ob se rv e him to make a move o f an y k in d . Be fo re le a v in g th e sce ne
of th e k i l l i n g , I to ok a l a s t lo ok a t th e body to be c e r t a in t h a t th e re was
n o th in g I co ul d do f o r him .
A t th e p o in t wh ere th e Je ep tu rn ed ov er i s a th ic k he dg e, b ei ng ap pr o­
x im a te ly 3 f e e t tl ii c k and 6 o r 7 f e e t h ig h . Ti lls a ff o rd e d me p ro te c ti o n
fro m th e anna mese a c ro s s th e ro ad who we re f i r i n g r i f l e s in my d ir e c ti o n .
I gr ab be d th e c a rb in e an d at te m pt ed to sh oot a t se v e ra l ann ame se who wer e
ap pr oa ch in g me an d f i r i n g f i f l e s . T h ei r ro u te o f ap pr oa ch was al on g ro u te
"D" as mar ked on th e sk e tc h . The c a rb in e jammed an d I was fo rc e d to ab an da n
i t and dep end on ny p i s t o l . I was f o r tu n a te in i n f l i c t i n g th r e e h i t s on th e
anna mese ap pr oa ch in g al on g ro u te "D", ca us in g th e re m ai ni ng to ta k e co v er .
I n o ti c e d ap pr ox im at el y 10 , al th oug h I d id n o t ta k e tim e to c o u n t. Lo oki ng
th ro ug h th e he dge I n o ti c e d 10 o r l£ an na m ite s mak ing t h e i r way so uth on th e
ro ad i n th e d ir e c ti o n o f th e OSS h e a d q u a rt e rs , an d r e a li z e d th e y we re
a tt e m p ti n g to c u t me o f f fro m my on ly l i n e of r e t r e a t . I f i r e d s e v e ra l
sh o ts a t them ca usi ng them to ta k e c o v e r. A t t h i s p o in t I cr aw le d un de r
th e Jee p i n o rd e r to ta k e a l a s t lo ok a t Ma jor DEWEY’ s bo dy , an d was s a t i s ­
f i e d I co ul d do n o th in g f o r him and was c e r ta in he was dea d. I th e n macfe
ny way down th e he dg e in th e d ir e c ti o n o f th e OSS h e a d q u a rt e rs , em plo yin g
f i r e an d movement t a c t i c s . The hed ge ex te nds ap pr ox im at el y 100 y a rd s , and
th e OSS ho us e i s ap pr ox im at el y £00 y a rd s fro m th e sc en e o f th e i n i t i a l
sh o o ti n g . I re ac hed th e end o f th e he dg e w it h o u t be in g h i t , an d can c s t i f y
t h a t I d id h i t f i v e o f th e p u rs u in g an nam ese . Ih e s t r e tc h o f gro und b o r­
d e ri n g th e West si d e o f th e ro ad c o n s t it u te s th e Sa ig on Go lf Co ur se . The
gro un d i s l e v e l an d f l a t , an d th e a re a fro m th e end o f th e hed ge to th e
OSS h e a d q u a rt e rs i s de vo id of an y co ve r t h a t co ul d be us ed as p ro te c ti o n
fro m r i f l e f i r e . Si nc e th e p u rs u in g anna mes e we re c lo s in g in on me I had
no ch oi ce b u t to make a ru n f o r i t . Th is I d id , d u ri ng th e co urs e o f wh ich
a g r e a t f u s i l l a d e o f sh o ts we re f i r e d a t me b u t none fo un d t h e i r ta r g e t .
I re ac he d OSS h e a d q u a rt e rs an d im m ed ia te ly a le r te d a l l p er so n n e l to de fe nd
a g a in s t th e ex pe ct ed anna mes e a tt a c k . Du rin g th e a c ti o n j u s t d e sc ri b e d I
had exp end ed 18 o f ny 21 ro un ds o f am mu nit ion .

P re s e n t in th e OSS h e a d q u a rt e rs a t th e tim e of ny a r r i v a l , wh ich was

a t ap pr ox im at el y 12 :li £, wer e th e fo ll o w in g :

C ap t. FRANK U. '.’/HITS, I n f . , O-1O175U7

T/5 GEORGE WICKES, DIKL, 32938637
Ma jor FRANCOIS VERGER, Fr en ch A m y, a tt a c h e d to E Gro up, Sa igo n
C o n tr o l Com miss ion.
Mr. JAMES McCLINCY, Am eri can War C or re sp on de nt
Mr. WILLIAM DOWNS, " » "
The l a s t th r e e p er so n s l i s t e d ha d be en in v it e d to lu nch by C ap t, WHITE.
 These I pl ac ed a t s tr a te g ic pl ac es in and arou nd th e house and o r­
de red tluam to f i r e a t any armed annamese th ey saw f ir i n g a t o r ap pr oa ch ing
th e ho use . I roamed from p o in t to p o in t in th e house and a s s is te d in
sto pp in g th e a tt a c k of th e annam ese. Our arms co nsi st ed of f iv e c a l .30
ca rb in es , H -l , and as so rt ed p is to ls in cl ud in g th re e c a l. 3 2 's , th re e
c a l. 30*s, and f iv e c a l. au to m at ic s.
For th e ne x t 20 or 30 mi nu tes f ir in g was b ri sk , and we in f l i c t e d nany
h it s on th e annamese who had de plo yed the ms elv es on th e go lf co ur se whic h
ex ten ds to th e f ro n t of th e he ad qu ar te rs . I would es ti m at e th e a tt a c k in g
fo rc e to number ap pr ox im ate ly 50 . th e g o lf co urs e ha vin g become un te na bl e,
th e annamese moved to th e No rth , Ea st and Sou th si d es of th e hou se f ir i n g
from un de r th e co ve r of th e heavy bu she s and hed ges th a t su rro un d the hou se
From t h is tim e on f ir i n g was ve ry in te rr a it a n t.
At ap pr ox im ate ly 13: 30, 1 s t L t. LESLIE S. FROST, SC, 0-53 071 1, and
2nd L t. HERBERT W, VARNER, UP, O-1799U01, bo th members OSS, ap pe ar ed on
th e sc en e, hadny dr iv en to th e hous e from th e a ir - p o r t fo llo w in g ro ut e "A".
See accomoan ying re p o rt s su bm itte d by bo th o f fi c e r s . They w ere acco moan ied
by: S gt . GERALD E. BOHN 37319392, P vt . LYMAN C. HANNA 3U 33 W 6, members of
th e ATC det ach me nt st a ti o n e d in Sa igo n. A ll were ex tre me ly fo rt u n a te in
re ac hi ng th e he ad qu ar te rs w ith ou t be in g f ir e d on si nc e th ey had to tr a v e rs e
th e ro ad blo ck a t whi ch Major DE.7EY was k il le d . Fo rt un at el y th ey a rr iv e d
du rin g a l u l l in th e sh oo tin g. Both o f fi c e r s re po rt ed th e Jee p to be in
th e p o si ti o n as when I l e f t i t . L t. VARNER too k up a de fe ns iv e p o si ti o n .
L t. FROST be in g ou r ra di o o pe ra to r, I or de re d to im me dia tel y co n ta ct ou r
he ad qu ar te rs a t Kandy, Ceyl on. Th is he su bs eq ue ntl y d id , and I kep t them
info rme d of wh at was tr a n sp ir in g . Our te lep ho ne li n e s had bee n cu t so I
ra di oe d to Kandy as ki ng them to co nt ac t th e B ri ti s h ra dio s ta ti o n a t th e
Gard ens, w ith th e re q u e st th q t th ey in tu rn co n ta ct th e Co nt ro l Commission
in Sai gon qnd n o ti fy them of ou r p o si ti o n . I la t e r le ar ne d th a t t h is had
bee n acc om pli she d, al tho ug h word had al re ad y rea ch ed B ri ti s h He ad qu art ers
in a manner which w il l be su bs eq ua ntl y de sc ri be d.
At ap pr ox im ate ly 13 :15 a machin e gun opened f i r e from ou r r ig h t f ro n t
and i t i s presum ed th a t th is was th e same gun th a t k il l e d Majo r DK.7EY.
Alth oug h th e gun f ir e d se ve ra l b u rs ts ,n o h it s were su st ai n ed . Thi s was
th e on ly tim e th e gun fi re d , and si nc e i t was no t seen a f t e r th e ce ss a ti o n
of h o s t i l i t i e s , i t i s presumed i t was removed to a hid de n pl ac e f o r sa fe
ke ep ing . At ap pr ox im ate ly 13: 35 I or de re d Capt.VJQLTE to pl ac e th e Jap a­
nes e gu ard s a t s tr a te g ic pl ac es in and aro und th e ho us e. Ther e wer e 9 in
a l l , and th e ir pri ma ry du ty had been to gua rd th e house on a 2U-hou r sch e­
dul e. Thi s Ca pt. VflUTE di d to my s a ti s f a c ti o n , al tho ug h I must re p o rt th e
Jap ane se d id n o t ta ke any p a r t in th e fi g h ti n g u n t i l ap pr ox im ate ly 15 :10
when one Ja pa ne se, who had bee n st a ti o n e d on th e ro of , f ir e d 2 sh ot s in to
a th ic k clump of bu she s bo ar din g th e hous e on th e Nor th si d e .
By 15 :00 f i r i n g had ce as ed and th e ann am ites had bee n fo rc ed to re ­
t i r e bec aus e of th e acc ur ac y of our f i r e . At ab ou t 15 :10 th ey r a is e d a
Red Cro ss fl a g and app roac hed th e go lf co ur se to our f ro n t to evq cuq te
th e ir dead and wounded. At th is p o in t Ca pt. GOSLIN, B ri ti s h Army, walk ed
in to ou r hou se, hav ing come from h is q u ar te rs abo ut 150 ya rd s to th e So uth .
He ha d he ard th e f ir i n g b u t was no t aware we had bee n at ta c k ed . At th is
moment th e two war co rre sp on de nt s^ UcCLINCY and DO’.'flJS, ask ed pe rm iss io n
to pro cee d to th e a ir - p o r t in or de r to n o ti fy B ri ti s h He ad qu art ers of our
si tu a ti o n and to req ue st ai d. There i s on th e go lf cours e a con cre te
drai nag e di tc h, U fe e t wide and $ fe e t deep which ten pi na tes in the
v ic in it y of th e a ir -p o rt . See accompanying ske tch . I gra nte d them pe r­
missi on to go and in st ru ct ed them to proce ed down th is di tc h which vrould
give them good p ro te ct io n in case they were at ta ck ed . A vi su al recon ­
nai ssa nce from th e roo f of our house rev eal ed th a t th er e ver e no annamit es
v is ib le along the li n e of th e ir ro ut e, and the y took of f. They had wi th
them two Cal. and 100 rounds of ammunition. They subs eque ntly
reache d the a ir -p o rt wit hou t in ci de nt and con tac ted itfapor RHOADS who in
tu rn n o ti fi e d B ri ti sh Head quar ters. For d e ta il s of subseq uent ev en ts,
see re po rt as subm itted by laajor RHOADS, at ta ch ed .

At about l$ :1 0, a tru ck f il le d wit h Japanese working pa rt y was ob­

serve d pas sin g dovm. the road North in fr o n t of th e house. Capt. WHITE
req ues ted perm issi on to stop them and have them accompany him t o rec ove r
the body of Major DEWEY. This perm issi on I gra nte d a ft e r as ce rt ai ni ng
th a t th e ar ea around our hea dqu arte rs was comp arativ ely sa fe and fr ee of
armed ann ami tes. For d e ta il s of th is missi on see re po rt at ta ch ed as
w ri tt en by Capt. WHITE.

I remained a t hea dqu arte rs dur ing a l l th is time in ord er to ma inta in

command of the si tu at io n and to mai ntain co nt ro l of the ra di o co nt ac t
which had been es ta bl is he d r it h our hea dquar ter s in Kandy, Ceylon. I kep t
our hea dqu art ers fu ll y informed of a l l eve nts as the y occ urr ed. I was
informed of the ne go tia tio ns fo r the rec ove ry of Major DEWEY's body and
subsequ ent re su lt s, and upon the ar ri v al of the troo p of Gurkhas, I imme­
d ia te ly orde red a l l per son nel to ga the r th e ir pe rso na l belo ngin gs and to
pre par e to evac uate the house, sin ce the are a could no t be ade qua tely
defended ag ai ns t a ni gh t at ta ck wi th our lim ite d pe rso nn el. We had only
one tru ck av ai la bl e, and th is we load ed to the li m it with the more impor­
ta n t item s, inc lu di ng the rad io equipment.

Vfe de par ted OSS house a t appr oxim ately 17:1$ unde r es co rt of a po rti on
of the Gurkha tro op . Before lea vin g I in st ru ct ed th e Japanes e guard to
ma inta in th e ir guard po st s. We ar riv ed a t the Hotel Co ntin ent al a t 17:^ 0,
where vie es ta bl is he d ourse lve s in su ita bl e qu ar te rs .

At 18:00 I pa id a v i s i t to Colonel CEDILLE and informed him of the

eve nts ju st de scr ibe d, and app rai sed him o f th e fa ct s conc erni ng Major
DEWEY's body. He pe rso na lly wnnt to see Gen, GRACEY and word rea che d me
sh or tly th e re a ft er th a t the y had pe rso na lly orde red a l l fo rc es unde r th e ir
command t o cond uct a con ple te sea rch fo r hi s body.

I canno t speak too hig hly of th e oers onn el pr es en t dur ing th e above
des crib ed ac ti on . My ord ers were ca rr ie d out e x p li c it ly and ac cu ra tel y,
and a l l re fl e c te d the tru e s p ir it and tr ai nin g of the U. S. Amy. Captai n
WHITE and T/$ WICKES ar e es pe ci al ly to be commended: Capt. WHITE fo r the
way i n which he execute d my se ve ral ord ers to him, and fo r h is courage in
vo lun tee rin g fo r the tas k of proc eedi ng down th e road to rec over the body
 291

o f Ma jor DE.'fEI, he ha vi ng v o lu n te e re d i n s p it e o f th e f a c t tl ia t a c o n si ­
d e ra b le numb er o f arm ed ann ame se v.e re s t i l l v /i th in th e im me dia te v i c i n i t y .
T/5 GEORGE WICKES f o r th e p e rs o n a l co ur ag e d is p la y e d i n m ee tin g th e i n i ­
t i a l o n sl au g h t o f th e a tt a c k in g fo r c e , an d f o r h is su bs eq ue nt a c ti o n s
an d ex tre m e c o o p e ra ti o n d u ri n g th e b a la n c e of th e a c ti o n .

I t i s th e s p i r i t and co ur ag e o f su ch men t h a t hav e made th e U ni te d

S ta te s Am y th e fo rm id ab le s t r ik i n g fo rc e t h a t i t i s to -d a y .

C a p t. , CAC.
0-2 86 81 9.

o f f i ce t h i s ______ I 3 — ___________da y o f _________ 19U5.

My eomnig a iu n e x p ir e s

S ig n a tu re 6-U«4 ar y

W it n e ss e s ;-

1) _______________________________

*
 292

i o MLB-2 7 3 9 -E

a f f id a v it

Bef ore me th e un de rsi gn ed a u th o ri ty du ly emoowered to ta ke aclmo wledg e-

-m ent s, ap pe are d Cap tain FRANK M. WHITE J r . , O-1O175U7, kn ow to me to be
• th e pe rso n whose name i s su bs cr ib ed bel ow, and hav ing been by me f i r s t
du ly sworn, di d on oa th w ith ou t f e a r or com puls ion, s ta te as fo llo w s:

•A ft er hav ing ob ta in ed pr op er cl ea ra nc e from th e M iss ion Ex ec uti ve

g f fi c e r , I in v it e d th re e pe rs on s to ou r he ad qu ar te rs f o r lu nc he on . They
were Major FRANCOIS VERGER, a Fre nch o f fi c e r at ta ch ed to th e A ll ie d Co ntr ol
Commission, Mr. JAMES McCLINCY and Mr. WILLIAM DO’WNS, bo th America n war
i co rr es po nd en ts . I pi ck ed them up a t th e Co nt in en ta l Ho tel a t 12 »l5 and
, we pr oce ede d im me dia tel y to th e he ad qu ar te rs hous e v ia Ruo Pa ul Blan chy.
| , We pr og re ss ed w ith ou t in c id e n t thr ou gh numerous roa d bl oc ks u n t i l wo
.]; rea che d th e tu rn ab ou t la b el e d P oi nt 2 (Se e at ta ch ed sk o tc h ). Thoro wo
■hea rd ge n er al f ir in g in th e imm edia te v ic in it y and wo no te d oo vo ral bu rn­
in g b u il d in g s. We wer e to ld by an o f fi c e r of th e B ri ti sh Army who
app roa che d ou r ca r th a t th e tr o u b le was no t se rio us , and th a t th e Gurkha
tr oo ps w ith him had th e si tu a ti o n i n hand .
The re ga in in g mi le of th e t r i p from th e tu rn ab ou t to th e OSS hea dqu ar­
te r s was made w ith ou t in c id e n t.
Almost imm edi ate ly a f te r a rr iv in g a t th e hous e we beg an to he ar r i f l e
f i r e . We ste pp ed to th e f ro n t po rc h in an e f f o r t to lo c a te th e ri fl em en
or t h e ir ta r g e t. None of us had any id ea a t th e tim e th a t vie ou rs el ve s
viere pr ob ab ly th e in te nd ed ta rg e ts .
A ft er a few rou nds had st ru ck ne ar and aro und th e ho use , I ’went to
th e seco nd fl o o r, en te re d th e arms room and bro ke ou t a l l th e ca rb in es we had .
I gave one to L t. 7/1CKS vrho was in th e bu il di ng a t ou r a r r iv a l; a secon d
to Majo r VERGER; th e th ir d to Mr. DOWNS and I ke pt th e l a s t pi ec e f o r n y s e lf .
Only a m at te r of mi nu tes l a t e r Ca pt. BLUECHEL was si g h te d coming in
th ro ug h th e fr o n t ga te of th e ho us e. As he was co ve red w it h blo od and
stu mb lin g from ex ha us tio n I rus he d to th e lawn to meet him. TEC-5 WICKS
was w it h me. The ot her s rema ined in th e hou se. Ca pt. BLUECHEL to ld us
t h a t Maj or DEWEY had bee n k il le d in an ambush se ve ra l hun dre d ya rd s up
th e ro ad (P oi nt A) and th a t he had had to f ig h t h is way bac k to th e hous e
to sav e h is own l i f e . He or de re d us to def end ou rs el ve s and th e house
a g a in st th e impen ding a tt a c k . Hie tim e, al tho ug h I do n o t remember r e ­
fe r ri n g to my w atch , must have bee n ab ou t 12 :50 .
A ft er he ar in g Ca pt. BLUECHEL's ne ks , V/ICKS and I saw fo u r ann am ites
ru sh in g tow ards th e hous e from ac ro ss th e go lf co ur se . TCiey were armed. •
V/ICKS and I commenced f i r e alm os t sim ul ta ne ou sly . Three of them drop ped
b u t th e fo u rt h go t away, al th ou gh we b el ie ve we h i t him.
By th is tim e Major VERGER jo in ed 'WICKS and I in th e yar d. We f ir e d
a t wh ate ver ta rg e ts pr es en te d the m se lve s. Ten mi nut es or so l a t e r we
r e ti r e d to th e hous e i t s e l f whic h af fo rd ed b e tt e r v is io n . In th e mean­
tim e, th e th re e Jap ane se gua rds who were on du ty when Major BLUECHEL
re tu rn ed to th e hou se, st ay ed a t th e ir po st s b u t too k no a c ti v e p a r t in
th e ac ti o n . . *‘
 293

A f te r re g a in in g th e ho us e th e e n ti r e gro up d is pos ed th em se lv es a t
va nt ag e p o in ts on th e se co nd f l o o r an d th e ro o f un de r d ir e c ti o n of C ap t.
BLUECHEL. Our f i r i n g was b r is k a t t h i s ti m e - th e re b ei n g no s c a r c it y
o f t a r g e t s . The an na m it es wer e de pl oy ed g e n e ra ll y in gr ou ps o f fro m 5
to 10 p e r gr ou p, s e v e r a l o f wh ich co ul d be se en i n th e g o lf c o u rs e o ff
to ou r r i g h t f r o n t . L a te r , p ro bab ly be ca us e o f th e e f f e c ti v e f i r e be in g
d e li v e re d fro m th e hou se , th ey be ga n to le a v e t h e i r p o s it io n s i n th e g o lf
co ur se an d ap pe ar ed to be a tt e m p ti n g to fl a n k th e n o rt h s id e o f our ho use .
I b is ro u te o f ap or oa ch wo uld ha ve a ff o rd e d them much b e t t e r co v e r.
I
S h o rt ly b e fo re 13 :3 0 C ap t. BLUECHEL in s tr u c t e d me to re d is p o se th e
!Ja pa ne se g u a rd s. By t h i s ti m e th e o r i g in a l th r e e who we re a t th e f r o n t
g at e The n h o s t i l i t i e s be ga n ha d in c re a s e d to s ix , th e new a r r i v a l s p re ­
sum abl y ha vi ng come o u t o f th e gu ar d ho us e when i t becam e e v id e n t to
th o se th e r e t h a t th e ma in ho us e was be in g a tt a c k e d .
I s ta ti o n e d fo u r o f th e s i x on th e fl a n k s an d r e a r o f th e ho us e
whe re th ey wo uld be in a b e t t e r p o s it io n to d e a l w it h a tt a c k s fro m th o se
q u a r te r s . One of th e Ja p s was k e p t in th e ho us e w it h u s as re s e rv e an d,
i n th e e v e n t th e o u ts id e Ja ps tu rn e d on u s , f o r p o s s ib le use a s a h o st a g e .
F ir e a t t h i s ju n c ti o n was in t e r m it te n t. A t ab o u t 13 :3 0 a tr u c k
tow in g a p a ss e n g e r c a r ap or oa ch ed th e ho use fro m th e N or th . We re co g ­
n iz e d th e p a ss e n g e rs a s L ts . VARNER an d F ro s t o f o u r own de ta ch m en t w it h
two e n li s t e d men o f th e A ir T ra n sp o rt Command. We we re n a tu r a ll y s u r­
p r is e d to se e the m a s th ey ha d ha d to come th ro ug h th e ro ad bl ock a t
wh ich Ma jo r DKJEY was amb ush ed.

A t 1^ :1 0 th e an na m it es r a is e d a Red Cr oss f l a g i n th e g o lf co ur se
a c ro s s th e ro a d . A f te r a co nf er en ce i t was de ci de d to ta k e ad va nt ag e
in th e h a l t in h o s t i l i t i e s to se nd o u t f o r a id . DO'.TNS an d McCLINCI, th e
two w ar co rre spo nd en tS5 1 v o lu n te e re d to co os s th e g o lf c o u rs e . They we re
in s tr u c t e d by C ap t. BLUECHEL to ke ep w e ll to th e So ut h o f th e a re a h el d
by th e an na m it es , an d make f o r th e a i r - f i e l d wh ere th ey wo uld be a b le to
n o ti f y B r it is h h e a d q u a rt e rs by te le p h o n e o f o u r s i t u a t i o n . Th is th ey d id .
D is ta n c e to th e a i r - f i e l d b ei ng ap pr ox im at el y I2 to 2 m il e s .
W ith in a n o th e r 10 m in ut es we si g h te d a 3 -t o n Ja p tr u c k pro ce ed in g
So ut h on th e ro a d . I t was c a rr y in g a pa rit y o f unar med Ja pa ne se s a i l o r s .
I as ke d M ajo r BLUECHEL f o r p e rm is si o n to commandeer th e tr u c k and us e i t
i n an e f f o r t to re c o v e r Ma jor DEWEY's bo dy . P er m is si on was gr an te dj i an d,
ac co mp an ied by Ma jor VERGER, we o rd e re d th e tr u c k to tu r n aro un d an d ta k e
u s to th e s i t e o f th e k il l i n g.

A f te r c o n si d e ra b le arg um en t w it h th e Ja p NCO who e i t h e r co uld A’ t

u n d e rs ta n d my o rd e rs o r was r e l u c t a n t to re tu r n up th e ro ad , we fo rc e d
th e Ja ps to d ri v e u s to th e b a r r ic a d e . We dis mo un ted an d se ar ch ed
ar ou nd th e b a rr ic a d e b u t d is c o v e re d t h a t b o th th e M a jo r' s bo dy an d h is
Je ep ha d be en c a r r ie d away .

As VERGER an d I viere d e c id in g on our n e x t move we n o ti c e d f u r th e r

up th e ro ad a gro up o f An na mi tes d is p la y in g a Red Cr os s f l a g . As we we re
on an e rr a n d o f me rcy o u rs e lv e s we de te rm in ed to t r y an d st o p th e an na mi te
 294

a id p a r ty an d o b ta in t h e i r a s s is ta n c e in re co v e ri n g th e M a jo r' s bo dy .
Th is we d id and j u s t as we made c o n ta c t vr ith th e an na m ite s we o u rs e lv e s
we re jo in e d by Ma jo r i*TlAHK RHOADS, USAAF. In h is je e p Ma jor RHOADS ha d
w it h him a S a n it a ry Co rps Ma jor , one e n li s te d man o f h i s ATC de ta ch m en t,
and McCLUICY an d DOWNS, a l l o f whom he had me t a t th e a i r - f i e l d . .
Yfe ap pr oa ch ed th e an na mi te f i r s t a id p a rt y in a gr ou p. Ma jor VERGI21
was ho ld in g up a c a rb in e w it h a w hit e han d k er ch ie f t i e d to i t . In Fr en ch
I ex p la in ed to an an na m ite in ch ar ge w ha t I 'wa nte d. He to ld u s he wo uld
summon th e an na m ite f i e l d commander an d we ag re ed on a tr u c e f o r t h i s
pu rp os e.
Du rin g th e in te rm is s io n w hil e we w a it e d f o r th e a r r i v a l o f th e
an na m ite le a d e r we ha d a ch an ce to lo ok ab out and tk ke st o ck o f th e
s i tu a t io n . We we re a b le to d e te c t th e pre se n ce o f a c o n si d e ra b le gro up
o f arm ed an na m it es who we re und er p a r t i a l co ve r in th e a re a . We vrere
n o t, how eve r, a b le to se e an y ev id en ce o f th e mac hin e gun wh ich k i l l e d
Ma jor DEWEY and wh ich l a t e r ha d be en emp loy ed a g a in s t th e ho us e.
W ith in a few m in ut es th e Red Cr os s man re tu rn e d w it h th e man who was
p re s e n te d to u s a s th e c h ie f of th e an na mi te f i e l d fo r c e . He was. b etw ee n
t h i r t y and t h i r t y - f i v e y e a rs o ld an d wor e m il it a r y b o o ts and b re a c h e s .
He spo ke f a i r Fr en ch b u t no E n g li sh . C on ve rs at io n w it h him was d i f f i c u l t
ina sm uch as he was i n a s t a t e o f ex ci te m en t ver g in g on h y s t e r ia .
Im m ed ia te ly we ex p la in e d to him t h a t we we re Am eri can s an d t h a t we
ha d come se ek in g th e body o f Ma jor DE.7EY. A t f i r s t he s a id he knew no ­
th in g of an y bo dy b u t a t o u r in s is te n c e he was a b le to remem ber an
" in c id e n t" in wh ich a C ol on el ha d be en k i l l e d a t th e b a rr ic a d e .

I t w as d i f f i c u l t a l l al on g to make much se ns e ou t o f t h i s man, b u t

in th e co urs e o f th e p a rl e y we had ad m is si on s t h a t h is men ha d sh o t
Co lo ne l DEWEY an d t h a t th ey ha d f i r e d on our ho us e. Howev er, th ro ughout
he s to u tl y m ai nt ai ne d t h a t ha d he known t h a t th e Co lo ne l was an Am eri ca n,
he wo uld ne ver hav e al lo w ed th e sh o ts f i r e d . He ha d a tt a c k e d th e ho us e,
he s a id , b ec au se he b e li e v e d th a t b o th Fr en ch an d B r it is h o f f i c e r s li v e d
th e re ,e v e n tho ug h on ly an Am eric an f l a g was fl ow n, and be ca us e we ha d
k i l l e d so many o f h is men. Du rin g th e co ur se o f th e f ig h ti n g he s a id we
ha d k i l l e d e ig h t an na m it es . He d id n o t me nti on th e numb er o f wounde d he
ha d s u f fe re d .

We t r i e d to come im m ed ia te ly to th e p o in t b u t on ly a f t e r some l i t t l e
tim e we re we a b le to make an y ar ra ng em en ts f o r th e re co v er y o f th e bo dy .
We f i n a l l y re ac h ed th e fo ll o w in g te rm s: we wou ld al 1 nw him to re c o v e r
th re e o f h is de ad fro m th e g o lf co urs e im m ed ia te ly i n f r o n t o f th e OSS
ho us e i n exc ha ng e f o r wh ich he wo uld pr od uc e th e bod y o f C ol on el DEWEY.
We p e rm it te d h is men to use Ma jor RHOADS' je ep f o r t h i s p ur po se .

In th e mean time our n e g o ti a ti o n s vrere h in de re d by th e two wa r c o rr e s

po nd en ts , DOWNS and McCLINCY, who ha d re tu rn e d w it h ll a jo r RHOADS. The
c o rr es p o n d en ts k ep t p ly in g th e an na m ite le a d e r w it h q u e st io n s wh ich
pr ov ok ed fro m him le n g th y an d im pa ss io ne d sp ee ch es on th e i n d i g n it ie s
s u ff e re d by th e Vi et- M inh fro m th e Fr en ch . He a ls o a tt a c k e d th e B r it is h '
a t le n g th , ch ar gi ng t h a t th e B r it is h , to o , d e s ir e d to "d om ina te" th e
an na m ite p e o p le .
 295

tfi th in ano the r 10 minutes th e jeep had ret ur ne d from the go lf cou rse
wi th the th re e annaraite dead la id acr oss the hood. We no tic ed th a t the
equipment on them, inc lud ing ca rt ri dg e boxes and cant eens -was Japa nese.
Our p a rt of the ba rg ain f u lf il le d , the annamite ch ief and a d e ta il was
about to de pa rt to br in g the Co lon el' s body to us . Whether he vrould have
ev en tua lly ca rr ie d ou t hi s pled ge i s imp ossi ble to say.
At the moment of h is de pa rtu re fi ri n g broke out anew, th is time coming
from th e v ic in it y of Po in t 2. 'We were ab le to see immed iately th a t th e
shoo ting vras coming from a pa rty of Gurkhas ( la te r id e n ti fi e d as two p la ­
toons of th e 31 st Gurkha R if le s) . They were coming ftp th e road tovrards us
and were stampeding a la rg e number of non-c omba ttant annam ites ahead of them.
Our po si ti on the n - bei ng in annaraite hands wit h Gurkhas coming tovrards
us - began to become awkward. This si tu at io n was fu rt h e r comp licate d by the
j two war cor res po nd en ts. App aren tly bei ng un fa m ili ar wit h the di sp o si ti o n ff
Gurkha tro op s dur ing combat, th e two corr espo nde nts atte mp ted to h a lt the
oncoming tro op s in or de r to spa re the non-co mbatta nt annara ites caugh t be­
tween the li n e s.
On agreement wi th Major RHOADS I broke of f my n eg ot ia tio ns wi th the
annara ites in an e ff o rt to tr y and pre ven t tro ub le between DOWS and MeCLINCY
and th e B ri ti sh Major commanding the Gurkhas. I vras un su cc es sfu l. The
corr esp ond ent s demanded th a t th e Gurkhas r e ti r e whi le the c iv il ia n s were
cle ar ed from the ar ea . The Major re fu se d. He to ld them h is ord ers were to
re st or e or de r "by th e use of maximum for ce" and th a t vras what he in te nd ed
to do. The corr esp ond ent s charg ed him wit h bein g a "murderer" i f he con­
tin ue d. I fi n a ll y managed to convince th e corr espo nde nts th a t the y were
was ting th e ir own and everyone e ls e 's time and the y ret urn ed to OSS hea d-
qu ar te rs wi th me. Upon ny re tu rn to the house I rep or ted b ri e fl y what had
happened to Capt. BLUECHEL. At appr oxim ately 17 500 we evac uate d the OSS
he ad qu art ers , moving to th e Co nti nen tal Hot el.

f'RAi’lK
Capt. In f. ,
0-10173h7

w itn ess hmy hai

ojE fi e e th is IS day of 19h$.

Wi tne sse s: -

1) __ ______________________
Mol OSS
2) __ ______________________
 296

/STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT

Y/AR DEPARTMENT
APO 1*32

2$ Octob er 19h5

SUBJECT: In v es ti g at io n of Death of Major P et er Dewey

TO : STRATEGIC SERVICES OFFICER, IBT

1. The in v e st ig a ti o n of the de ath of Major Dewey and th e <

a ff id a v it s se cu re d p e rt in e n t th er et o by Ca pta in Bl uec hel have been
revi ewe d by th e un de rsi gn ed and ar e be lie ve d to c o n st it u te a ve ry
thor oug h and work man -like jo b. The re por ts ar e r e la ti v e ly di sp as ­
si o n at e and und er the cir cu ms tan ces r e f le c t as cl os e an app rox im atio n
of the tr u th as would be p o ss ib le . In any ca se , Ca pta in Bl uec hel is
ob vio us ly the mos t info rmed and lo g ic a l sou rce of inf or m ati on .

2. From my own ob se rv at io n and st ud y, the ge ne ra l s it u a ­

ti o n in Saigo n r e f le c ts an in te n se d e s ir e on the p a r t of the Annanese
fo r inde pend ence and thor oug h ha tr ed by them of the Fren ch -and any
ot he r wh ite pe op le vzho happen to be in any way su pp or tin g or sym pat hiz ­
ing wi th the Fre nch . I t is tr u e th a t th ey may be r e la ti v e ly more
fa vo ra bl y dis po sed toward the Amer icans , bu t i t sho uld be bor ne in
mind th a t th e ave rage Annamese th in ks in term s of "w hit e" pe op le,
and makes ve ry l i t t l e d is ti n c ti o n betw een European and American. The
ha tr ed of the Annamese fo r the Frenc h has been br ou gh t ab ou t by the
no t too en lig ht en ed po li cy of the Fre nch , which has been to e x p lo it
the Annamese to the g re a te st deg ree p os si bl e and tr e a t them more or
le ss w ith con tem pt. To my ob se rv at io n, the Fre nch made a l o t of money
ou t of th e Jap ane se occ up ati on and ar e most anxi ous to have someone
co n tr o l th e Annamese. The Annamese n a tu ra ll y g re a tl y re se n t the B ri ­
ti s h p ro te c ti o n of Frenc h in tc re st o and inasmuch as the American
m il it a ry in Saigo n re g u la rl y at te nd B ri ti s h s ta f f m ee tin gs , i t is
q u it e li k e ly th a t the Annamese in f e r th a t th e Unit ed S ta te s t a c it ly
app rove s th e B ri ti sh po li cy .

3. The ov er t B ri ti sh a tt it u d e is to disa rm the Ja pa ne se,

send them home, and g et ou t as soon as p o ss ib le . I f in a c tu a l f a c t
th i3 i3 don e, i t is dou bted i f tiie Fren ch w il l be ab le to c o n tr o l the
s it u a ti o n .
. <
4. With sp e c if ic re fe re nc e to the de at h of Major Dewey, in
my judgm ent th er e is no qu es tio n bu t th at he was k il le d by the Anna-
■ mese, and i t is hi gh ly u n li k el y th a t the Annamese had any id ea of hi s
 297

id e n ti ty a t the time he was sh ot . There is some qu est ion in my

mind as to whether i t v/ould have made a gr ea t de al o f d if fe re n ce
had he been fl y in g an American fl a g . The road blo ck and the machine
gun emplacement appea r to have been arran ged wit h the in te nt io n o f
sho oti ng a t the ne xt wh ite man th at came by. I t is po ss ib le even
th at the ob je ct iv e was to sec ur e a je ep and such arras and ammunition
as might be in the je ep . On the oth er hand, i t is c le a r th at the re
was no p os si bl e way fo r the Annamese to d is ti n gu is h the occu pants of
the je ep from French oth er than th at i t is the B ri ti sh and Americans
v/ho dr iv e jee ps in tho Saig on ar ea .

I t appea rs th at 'G en er al Grac ey i s not w el l su it ed to

hi s assig nmen t. lie seems to have adopted a no ta bly b u ll - li k e a t t i ­
tude toward the Annamese c al cu la ti n g th at th is would cow them. In
the li g h t o f la t e r ex pe rie nc e, he shou ld have re a li ze d th at in th ei r
ov er ly emo tion al sjt at e, they would re a ct v io le n tl y towards hi s b lu ff 3 .
I t al so is app aren t th a t he had no need to b lu ff, bu t cou ld have
wa ited u n ti l adequat e fo rc es were a t hi s d is po sa l. His blu nd eri ngs
wit h the Frenc h POVPs was most i l l ad vis ed , and the re i s su b st an ti al
reas on fo r b el ie vi n g th at hi s mish andl ing o f hi s own assign ment was
the g r e a te st si n g le immediate co nt rib ut io n to the in te n si fi c a ti o n of
Annamese an im osi ty toward a l l wh ite s in Saig on, and thus in d ir e c tl y
co nt rib ut ed toward Major Dewey's dea th. Fu rth er, i t is appa rent th at
in is su in g hi s ord ers th at no fl a g s v/ould be flown by anyone oth er
than hi m se lf, he wa3 th in kin g too much in terms of hi s own pe rso na l
p re st ig e ra th er than in terms o f tho s a fe ty o f hi s own and Amer ican,
o ff ic e r s . , , . '

6. There is no v/ay of se cu rin g any d ir e ct co rro bo ra tio n

or de n ia l o f the B ri ti sh sta tem ent th at Major Dewey to ld L t. Col one l
Cass he was " s a ti s fi e d wi tn the s a fe ty o f hi s es ta bl ish m en t." I t is
ob vio us , however, th at the B ri ti sh were com ple tel y s a ti s fi e d with
even le ss pr ot ec ti on a t ISLD llq acr oss and down th e road from the OSS
Hq, and on ly in the li g h t o f la te r developments would the is su e take
on impo rtan ce. Grac ey ve ry pro ba bly gr o ss ly unde resti mate d the dang er.

7. I t seems ap pr op ria te to mention here th at Cap tain Blu e-

ch el was doin g an ou tst an din g in te ll ig e n c e job in Sai gon . There was
alm ost a co ns tan t flo w of v is it o r s to hi s qu ar te rs , inc lu di ng top
ran kin g Japan ese, B ri ti sh and French o f f i c i a l s , many French c iv il ia n s
of impo rtan ce, and he v/as a ls o , u n ti l Gen eral Gracey made the si tu a ­
tio n too d i f f i c u l t , in touch wi th le ad in g Annamese. With re ga rd to
the se la s t , hov/ever, i t is app aren t th at the p o li t ic a l le ad er s of
the Annamese were unab le to co nt ro l them and con seq uen tly sc an t re ­
li a n ce shou ld be pla ce d on th e ir commitments. AI30 Cap tain Blu ec he l
 298

is most de se rv ing o f commendation fo r the typo o f le ad er sh ip he

di sp la ye d. I t v/as obviou s th at he commanded the re sp ec t and co n fi ­
dence of tho se se rv in g Tinder him, as ’.ve il as the o ff ic e r s wi th whom
ho conduc ted li a is o n a c t iv it ie s .

8. .As a fu rt he r gr at ui to us comment, i t i3 u n li k el y in my
opin ion th at m il it a ry per son nel w i l l in the fu tu re be in a po si ti on
to sec ure much va lu ab le in te ll ig e n ce from French Indo- China . As soon
as the si tu a ti o n reac hes a po in t where elemen ts of dang er are in con-
; t r o l, the y shou ld be .re pl ac ed by c iv il ia n per son nel op er ati ng tuider
: the cov er o f newspaper corre spon dent s or oth ers havin g le gi ti m at e
bu sin ess in the ar ea . ,

F. hi. SMALL
Major,AGD

(D ict ate d bu t not re ad .) —

 299

83 -6 05 0 - 73 - 20
■
III. SECRET INTELLIGENCE BRANCH (S.I.)
REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
THE VIET MINH

M r. B uw T e le 9 6 4 -
L 'a n c i e n t H o te l de la
R e sid e n c e S u p e rie u r

H o m e m i n i s t e r s e n d s h is c o m p l i m e n t s to th e A m e r ic a n m i l i t a r y .

m i s s i o n a n d a p o lo g i z e s

(301)
 302

K ct 4 '^ fc> C<T'A^.

/ft • Am
f h r. n ^ ^ i, ,/ L -
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4 , / . / , / & ?'■/> y ■+ ' y -JH £>

,„ .? - / r / / , ; ''*
4,<7x A'fl " ' - ':

f o r n o t b e in g a b le to c o m e h im s e lf . M , B uw is m y p e r s o n a l

d e p u ty a n d i s e m p o w e r e d to k e e p c o n ta c t w it h th e A m e r ic a n

d e le g a t e s . We s h o u ld be v e r y g r a t e f u l to th e A m e r ic a n m i s s i o n

to f a c i l i t a t e h is w o r k u n t il e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f o f f ic ia l r e l a t i o n s .

Vo n g u y e n G ia p

*
 303

F e ll o w C ou nt ry m en !

The V ie tn am es e p e o p le h e a r t i l y v/el com ef th e a l l i e d

f o r c e s w h ic h a r e e n t e r i n g o u r t e r r i t o r y i n o r d e r to d is a rm
th e J a p a n e s e .
h ow ev er , vze a r e d e te rm in e d to op po se th e m ov in g i n o f
0
th e F re n c h e le m e n ts , b e c a u se t h e i r d a r k ai m i s t o r e e s t a b l i s h
th e f r e n c h r u l e o v e r o u r F a th e r la n d .

F e ll o w C ou nt ry m en !

At th e p r e s e n t momen t a fevz Fr en ch m en ha ve ma nag ed to

f i l t e r i n t o o u r t e r r i t o r y , th e Go ve rnm en t e x p e c ts e v e ry man to
p r e p a r e h im s e lf to f i g h t f o r our l i b e r t y an d in d e p e n d e n c e .

P r e s id e n t HoC hiLi inh

 304

F .- :\ x; iA d? sis
c«
v ic s c ? -j ’ U ? ? : ' 7 i 7 i ; c i J ’ ~"A - r agc
31 ??.A"CH
if C 5? 7

1 o Ae p t c : ;b c r 19 4 5

S u b je c t: In te r v ie w w it h Dao D ei , fo rm s” ’ em pe ro r o f Anna;:;
To : C h ie f o f I n t e l l i g e n c e D iv is io n ,C 5 'J .C h in a “h e a t r e •

1 . A t H a n o i, d u r in g th e we ek o f th e 1 0 th o f S e p te m b e r,
1 ° 4 5 , I had. a n I n t e r v i e w w it h Dao D a i, f o rm e r em p e ro r o f A nn an ,
a t w hic h ” o _Ch_i>.J :i n h , th e pr e s i d e n t o f th e P r o v i s i o n a l "Govern ­
m en t _o f_ _V iet F a n a n d P p in c e 5o u p h an o u v o n 3 ,'t ?r ef ~ b rp th E rr ''o T ''t h e
k i n s o f L ao s7 ” w er e p r e s e n t . 'T h e " in te r v ie w - w a s on a f r i e n d l y , '"
u n o f f i c i a l b a s i s , a s a r e s u l t o f a n i n v i t a t i o n fr om Ho Ch i L in h .

2 . Dao D a i, d u r i n g th e i n t e r v i e w , s t a t e d t h a t h e had
v o l i n t a r i l y a b d i c a t e d , an d wa s n o t c o e r c e d by t h e P r o v i s i o n a l
G ov er nm en t. He s a i d t h a t h e w ou ld no l o n j e r s e e h i s p e o p le
o p p r e s s e d , an d t h a t , a p p r o v in g th e n a t i o n a l i s t i c a c t i o n o f th e
V ie t H in h , h e t h e r e f o r e a b d ic a te d , a s a n ex am p le to h i s p e o p le .
He sa id , t h a t h i s < r ; a t ho pe wa s t h a t th e p e o p le o f '- 'i e t Ham
c o u ld s a i n th e in d e p e n d e n c e th e y so a r d e n t l y d e s i r e , an d t h a t
he 'w ou ld r a t h e r l i v e a s a p r i v a t e c i t i s e n w it h a f r e e p e o p le
th a n r u l e a n a t i o n o f s l a v e s -
 305

C ? ? JC2 0? "TRATTTIC l^RVICTH CHIkA ’’"TATR-C

ST RR?."CH
\?C 527
19 S ep te m ber 19 ^5

S u b je c t: I n te r v ie w w it h P r in c e 3ou ph.ano uvc .ng o f La os

To : C h ie f o f I n t e l l i g e n c e D iv is io n ,C S S , Ch in a T h e a tr e

1. . l i t H an oi , d u r in g th e we ek o f th e 1 0 th o f Se pt em be r.,
19 A5 j I ha d a n in te r v ie w in th e s tu d y o f th e P a l a i s du R e s id e n t
S u p e r ie u r , w it h P r in c e -5.onj3h an.cu.v on", b r o t h e r o f th e k in g o f
L a o s. Fo rm er em pe ro r Ra o D a i, .a n d P r e s i d e n t Ho Ch i K in h we re
a ls o p re s e n t. —•=
2 . Th us f a r , th e vi ew g e n e r a ll ? / , i s t h a t La os i s . 'r e ­
m a in in g a l o o f fro m th e V ie t K in h gove rn m en t. The p r in c e s a id
f i r s t o f a l l t h a t t h i s was n o t t r u e ,, an d t h a t he wa s i n H an oi
to make a rr a n g e m e n ts w it h Ho Chi H in h to s u p p o rt th e V ie t Ham
g o v er n m en t. He s a id t h a t th e p e o p le o f L a o s, a lt h o u g h th e y p r e ­
v i o u s l y ha ve ha d t r o u b l e w it h th e An nam ese , ti e rs now g e n e r a l l y
i n sy m pa th y w it h th e r e v o l u t i o n a r y mo ve me nt. He s a i d t h a t he
w ou ld do a l l i n h i s po w er to a i d V ie t Ham i n i t s a tt e m p ts a t
In d e p e n d e n c e , an d t h a t h e wo uld a l s o do a l l p o s s i b l e to make
a l a s t i n g a g re em en t an d sy m pa th y bet w ee n th e go ve rn m en t o f
V ie t Ham an d L a o s. He s e n t to h i s p e o p le a m es sa ge o f wh at
h e was d o in g i n H an oi, an d t h a t he sh o u ld n e v e r . r e t u r n to h i s
c o u n tr y u n t i l i t , a s th e r e s t o f In d o -C h ln a was f r e e , - e s a id
t h a t he wo uld no lo n g e r w at ch h i s p e o p le be e x p l o i t e d , an d
t h a t he was p e r s o n a l l y i n f u l l a g re e m e n t w it h Ho Ch i I' in h an d
th e go ve rn m en t an d i d e a l s o f th e p e o p le o f V ie t Ham.
 306

HZA9C/J P T iR ’S
C ? 3TF.AT3HC d'H'HEC-Lo C"1 .t THFATRH
51 Ty.AHC-
\ ‘0 52 ?
19 S ep te m be r 194 5

S u b je c t: I n te r v ie w w it h Ho Chi MInh
Vo : C h ie f o f I n t e l l i g e n c e D i v i s i o n ,0 3 3 ,C hi na T h e a tr e

1. At H an oi, d u ri n g th e wee k o f th e 1 0 th o f S ep te m ber ,

I , th e u n d e rs ig n e d , n e t an d t a l k e d to Ho Chi MI nh, th e P r e s i ­
d e n t o f th e _ 2 r o^d. a i Qr.al Gover nmen t o f V ie t Ha n. I ha d know n-
Ho f o r a lm o st f o u r m on th s, h a v in g n e t him up on p a r a c h u ti n g
i n t o In d o -C h in a a t Chu Chu . As a r e s u l t , my m e e ti n g s i n ^ a n o i
w er e m e re ly a re n ew al o f a c q u a in ta n c e s h ip , an d a l l th e t a l k s
w er e on a s t r i c t l y f r i e n d l y an d u n o f f i c i a l b a s i s , a s was th e
lu n ch eo n I to o k w it h him an d h i s c a b i n e t . S ix mem bers o f th e
P r o v i s i o n a l Go ver nm ent w er e p r e s e n t .
2 . H r. v o c o n t i n u a l l y a f f ir m e d t h a t he i s n o t a r a b id
r e v o l u t i o n a r y , b u t m er el y a na n vzho d e s i r e s au to no m y f o r h i s
p e o p le . He s a id t h a t he r e a l i z e s f u l l y th e d a n g e rs an d ob ­
s t a c l e s h i s p e o p le fa c e i n t h e i r f i g h t f o r in dep en de nce ,., an d
he know s t h a t i t i s n o t to be o b ta in e d q u ic k ly an d e a s i l y .
He 3 ta te d t h a t a s s u r e d ly th e F re nch w i l l t r y to r e t u r n in
f o r c e , b u t hop es t h a t th e y w i l l b e w i l l i n g to s e t t l e p e a c e ­
f u l l y th e a f f a i r , an d w i l l r e s p e c t th e r i g h t s an d ho p es o f
h i s p e o p le . He a l s o s t a t e d t h a t he i s s u re b lo o d sh e d w i l l
en su e, - ho w ev er , i f th e y f o r c e f u l l y t r y to im po se a g a in th e
re gi m e o f fo rm er d a y s. He s a id t h a t he doe s n o t d e s i r e b lo o d ­
sh ed o r r e v o l u t i o n i f i t ca n be a v o id e d , an d w i l l do e v e ry ­
th i n g i n h i s po we r to n e g o t i a t e p e a c e f u ll y w it h th e F re n c h .
Ho we ve r, i f t h i s c a n n o t be b ro u g h t a b o u t, he s a id t h a t he an d
h i s p e o p le w i l l f i g h t . He a s s u r e d me t h a t ,i f t h a t I s n e c e s s a r y ,
h i s o e o p le a r e p re p a re d f o r a lo n g s t r u g g le o f t e n o r tw en ty
y e a r s , an d a r e w i l l i n g t o f i g h t f o r th e fr e e d o m ,n o t o f t h e i r
own, b u t o f f u t u r e g e n e r a ti o n s .
3. C o n ce rn in g th e U n it e ! S t a t e s , Mr. Ho s a i d t h a t he
a s k s n o th in g , b u t lo o k s h o p e f u ll y in t h a t d i r e c t i o n f o r m or al
s u p p o r t. He e x p re s s e d a d m ir a ti o n fo b th e A t l a n t i c C h a r te r , a s
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f th e fr e e d o m -l o v in g s p i r i t o f th e A m er ic an
p e o p le , and pr es um ed t h a t "f re ed om f o r a l l p e o p le s" in c lu d e d
fre ed om f o r th e Ann ame se p e o p le . T h e r e f o r e , h e e x p re s s e d h i s
a n x i e t y to h$.ve th e U n it e d S t a t e s 'Gov ernm ent an d p e o p le know
th e f a c t s o f th e fo rm e r Fr en ch re gi m e in In d o -C h in a , an d th e
a s p i r a t i o n s , a c t i o n s , an d d e te r m in a ti o n o f i t s n a t i v e p e o p le s
a t th e mom ent. He f e e l s c e r t a i n t h a t i f th e p e o p le o f th e U ni ­
t e J S ta te s had t h i s kn ow le dg e, t h e i r m or al s u p p o rt w ou ld be
a s s u r e d . He s a i d ," T h i s i s a l l I a s k , t h a t new s o f In d o -C h in a
be gi ve n to th e w or ld "
 307

4 . C o n c e rn in g i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , Ir r . Ho s t a t e d t h a t he
w as f u l l y a w a re o f t h e g r e a t d i f f i c u l t i e s h i s p e o p le f a c e ,,
th e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f f a m in e , e d u c a t i o n , r e c o n s t u c t i o h , f i n a n c e ,
w o rl d p o l i t i c s , a t e . , ma de e s p e c i a l l y d i f i c u l t by t h e d e a r t h
o f men e x p e r ie n c e d i n g o v e rn m e n ta l c a p a c i t i e s . He s a i d t h a t
th o u g h t h e s t r u g g l e w oul d be d i f f i c u l t , h i s p e o p le w er e w i l ­
lin g t o e n d u re i t an d w e re c a p a b le o f s e t t l i n g t h e i r p r o b ­
le m s s a t i s f a c t o r i l y .

p . h y p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n i s t h a t h r . Ho Ch i H ln h i s a
b r i l l i a n t a n d c a p a b le m an , c o m p le te ly s i n c e r e i n h i s o p i n i o n s .
I b e l i e v e t h a t wh en h e s p e a k s , h e s p e a k s f o r h i s p e o p l e , f o r
I h a v e t r a v e l l e d th r o u g h o u t T o n k in p r o v i n c e , an d fo u n d t h a t i n
t h a t a r e a p e o p le o f a l l c l a s s e s a r e im bu ed w it h t h e sa me s p i r i t
and d e te r m in a tio n a s t h e i r le a d e r .
 308

c ? ’ICS C? Tv " r '" ' g--*TCE3 C -T ’A m’: T

51 0 3;’/ 7Ch
A?O 527
20 Ce pt em be r 124 5

u b .l e c t: T c p o rt on th e P r o v is io n a l lo ve rn m en t, TEC
’o : C h ie f o f I n t e l l i g e n c e D iv is io n , 0-"3, Ch in a T h e a tr e

1 . Ja ck gro und d u ri n g J a p a n e se o c c u p a ti o n
a . The V ie t L'.inh who we rn f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t th e F re nc h
s e n t a d e le g a ti o n to th e F re nc h sh ow in g t h e i r w i l l -
in ri k e ss to f o r g e t d i f f e r e n c e s in o r d e r to f i g h t th e
common ene my , th e J a p a n e s e . The Fr en ch r e f u s e d . The
V ie t Ki nh to o k t o th e h i l l s an d c o n ti n u e d f i g h t i n g ,
(S o u rc e : ___•

b . ’Then th e F re nch l e f t , th e y co m m itt ed a t r o c i t i e s

a g a i n s t In na ne se p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s , ex am pl e, g a s -
s in g a t Cao Sa ng , ( S o u rc e :

c . 3a o D ai , fo rm er em pe ro r o f Annara, . who wo rk ed w it h
'T he ~^ re nc h an d a l s o th e J a p a n e se whe n th e y a r r i v e d ,
l a t e r tu rn e d to V ie t K in h . (S o u rc e :

d . The V ie t Kl nh p o l i c y , d u r in g th e Ja p a n e se o c c u p a ti o n ,
was n o t to har m Fr en ch i n In d o -O h in a , b u t m e re ly to
e s c o r t the m to th e C hi ne se b o r d e r o r to s a f e t y .
(S o u rc e :

e . The V ie t k in h c o n ti n u e d f i g h t i n g th e Ja p a n e se by b u l ­
l e t , p ro p a g a n d a , an d e v a c u a ti o n . The Ja p a n e se wo uld
e n t e r a. v i l l a g e fro m w hi ch e v e r y th in g t r a n s p o r t a b l e ,
ha d be en re m ov ed , when th e y a d v a n c e d , th e y wo ul d be
f a r t h e r and f a r t h e r fro m fo o d , th e n th e V ie t Hi nh
wo uld a t t a c k . (S o u rc e :

2 . fo rm in g o f P r o v is io n a l C-ov ernm ent

The P r o v is io n a l Go ver nm ent i s an o u tg ro w th o f th e
c o n t r o l l i n g f o r c e s in th e m i l i t a r y re si st a n c e .' * T -' r.
Chi *.i hh h a s be ?n su pr em e com man der f o r a lo n g
w h il e , an d h i s m os t t r u s t e d men g r a d u a ll y as su m ed
p o s i t i o n s o f a c c e p te d pro m in en ce . The l e a d e r s a r e
th e le a d e r s o f th e r e v o lu ti o n a r y a c t i v i t y - s t r s c k l n g
 o v e r a Io n- : o e r lo d o f ye ar 3> How t h e a c t u a l p o s ts
o'? fo ve m m en t w er e c h o se n , e x c e p t t h a t o f . p r e s i d e n t ,
I do n o t kno w, o u t th e p r e s id e n c y wa s o f f e r e d u n a n i­
m ou sl y. ( S o u rc e :

S t r u c t u r e o f Go ve rn m en t
The g o v er n m en ta l s t r u c t u r e i s t h a t o f s u c c e s s iv e r e s ­
p o n s i b i l i t y / . I n ea ch v i l l a g e i s a na n wh o, f o r th e
w e lf a r e an d c o n d u c t o f h i s v i l l a g e , i s r e s p o n s i b l e
to th e na n who h e a d s th e d i s t r i c t , Many o f th e fo rm e r
m a n d a ri n s an d a d m i n i s t r a t o r s w it h e x p e ri e n c e i n su ch
a f f a i r s a r e now w or ki ng w it h th e V i e t Min h in th e
same c a p a c i t i e s . T h is sy st e m gr ow s s u c c e s s i v e l y un ­
t i l th e p r e s id e n c y i s re a c h e d . T h er e i s a p p a r e n t l y
no ch ec k up on th e c a b i n e t o r p r e s id e n c y o n ly a mu-
t u a l ’ se n se o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . (S o u rc e :
__ __ __ ,\3 ao D a i, th e
fo rm e r em pe ro r o f Ann an , h a s now b ee n a c c e p te d i n
an a d v is o r y c a p a c i t y , an d a s an ex am pl e f o r p ro p a ­
ga nd a p u rp o se s by th e P r o v i s i o n a l Go ve rn m en t o f V ie t
Nam. ( S o u rc e s :
/3 ao Da i t o l d ’ me t h a t he ’ao dT ba re TT '
v o io f T ta r il y a s an ex am pl e to h i s pe op le ..

P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s in v o lv e d
a . V ie t Tdinh- a c o a l i t i o n p a r t y co m bi ni n- r V ie t Va n,
Co mm un ist , an d a lm o s t a l l o t h e r p a r t i e s . I t i s a l s o
know n .a s Le ag ue p o u r 1 ' In d e p e n d e n c e de 1* In d o C h in e .
The c o r r e c t name o f th e p a r t y i s V i e t Nam Doc La p
Dong K in h. (S o u r c e s :
_ _ v ---- ----------- - ------

"b. V ie t Nam- th e se co nd p a r t y o f im p o rt a n c e in 7I C ,
o s t e n s i b l y p a r t o f V ie t V in h , b u t s u p p o r ti n g Sa c Da i
on th e s i d e . More sy m p a th e ti c to w a rd s C h in e se th a n
V ie t V In h. ( S o u rc e s :
.................. V
c . Com mu nist p a r t y - now p a r t o f V ie t M'in h, r. o t v e ry
Im p o rt a n t b u t tr o u b le s o m e . Mo st i n c i d e n t s come fro m
th e y o u th i n t h i s p a r t y . ( S o u rc e :

d . Da l V i e t - J a p a n e s e sp o n s e re d y o u th . T ro ub le so m e
a lo n g pro p ag an d a l i n e s , b u t n o t p o w e r f u l .( S o u rc e

? lr .a n ce

R e c e iv in g a id fro m C hin es e g ro u p s p o s s i b l y . P o n s i b i l i
o f some a i d fro m R u s s ia , b u t d o u b t f u l . ( S o u rc e :
 310

6 . Army an d P o li c e f o r c e
a . The Army o f th e p r e s e n t -o ve rn m en t i s a p e a -
. s e n t an d c i v i l i a n arm y w it h many fo rm e r s o l ­
d i e r s in th e T re nc h ar m y. ? o r th e m os t p a r t ,
th e y a r e p o o rl y ar m ed . They ha ve F re n c h , Ame­
r i c a n , T h ir .e se , Ja p a n e s e we ap on s an d a n c i e n t ■>
f l i n t - l o c k s . Th ey ha ve ^ re n an d m ac hi ne gu ns
o u t n o th in g l a r g e r . ?h e s p i r i t o f th e Army,
ho w ev er , i s v e ry go od , a s tr o n g d e te r m in a ti o n
to a c h ie v e In d ep en d en ce ay an y c o s t . They ha ve
no p a ra d e gr ou nd d i s c i p l i n e , b u t ob ey w it h o u t
q u e s ti o n an d im m e d ia te ly th e o r d e r s o f t h e i r
s u p e r i o r s . (S o u rc e :
b . The p o l i c e f o r c e i s a l s o a c i v i l i a n on e and
i s n o rm a ll y e f f i c i e n t an d w e ll -b e h a v e d .
( S o u rc e :
7 . I n t e r n a l R e la ti o n s
a . E d u c a ti o n - V ie t Minh i s a lr e a d y e d u c a ti n g i t s
p e o p le . I hav e a tt e n d e d s c h o o ls i n th e ju n g le
and i n v i l l a g e s . I n o u r cam p, sc h o o l c o n ti n u e d
i n th e f r e e h o u rs o f th e e v e n in g . F la n s f o r
fu tu fc e e d u c a ti o n a r e u n d e r w a y .( S o u rc e :

b . R e c o n s tr u c ti o n - th e Go ve rnm en t o f V ie t Nam
hope s f o r f o r e i g n e n t e r p r i s e , c a p i t a l , an d
t e c h n i c a l a i d . I t i s lo o k in g p a r t i c u l a r l y to
th e U n it e d S t a t e s . (S o u rc e : . il
c . Go ve rn me nt p o s t s - t h e r i s a d e a r t h o f t r a i n e d
men , b u t I 'r . Ho f e e l s s u r e t h a t th o u g h d i f f i ­
c u l t , th e .1ob cy n be a c c o m p li sh e d . ( S o u rc e :

d . Cam bod ian q u e s ti o n - r e l a t i o n s w it h Cam bod ia a r e

e x c e l l e n t . (S o u rc e :
r
e . L a o ti a n q u e s ti o n - P ri n c e Sou ph an ou vo ng , b r o t h e r ,
o f th e k in g o f L ao s, is " i n H an oi ~U d~ cb nf er w it h
Ho Chi Mi nh. He i s th e r e to e s t a b l i s h c lo s e co l-
l a b o r a t l o r r b e twe en La os and. th e V ie t Van go ver n­
m en t. (S o u rc e : •
__________ I------- ---------------------------
■: 8 . T o re ig n R e la ti o n s
a . T ra n c e - th e go ve rn m en t knows th e T re hc h w i l l
r e t u r n . I f Fr en ch r e s p e c t t h e i r r i g h t s , w i l l
n e g o t i a t e p e a c e f u ll y , b u t i f th e T re nc h t r y
to Im po se th e fo rm e r re g im e , th e Viet' .-’ame se
w i l l f i g h t c o n t i n u a l l y . ( S o u rc e s :
 311

b . C h in a- V ie t 'am f e a r s C h in e ’ s i n t e n t i o n s in
vis vz o f on e th ou sa nd y e a rs o f C h in es o .d o m in a­
t i o n . The y a l s o f e a r C hi ne se ec on om ic s t r a n g l e ­
h o ld , b u t a r e w i l l i n g to c o - o p e r a te and ho pe
f o r th e b e s t . ( S o u rc e :
c . Z n g la n l- th e Vnname se r e s p e c t T a g la n d ’ s i n ­
t e g r i t y a s a n a t i o n , b u t f e a r t h a t sh e w i l l
a i d F re nc h i n i m p e r i a l i s t i c p o l i c i e s . The y
w an t Z n p ll s h f r i e n d s h i p an d co mm erc e. (S o u rc e :

X d . R u s s ia - th e V ie t Fi rt h i s u s in g Co m m un ist ic mwth
m et ho ds in many t h i n g s , su ch a s th e l i v i n g o f
r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s in th e ju n g le , an d i n s o c i a l
s i t u a t i o n s , b u t do e3 n o t p o l i t i c a l l y em br ac e
.R u s s ia n Communism. (S o u rc e :__

X e . U n it e d S t a t e s - V ie t Kara lo o k s to A m er ic a f o r
m o ra l s u p p o r t i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e , a lm o st ex ­
p e c t i t . The Ahn ame se a r e a n x io u s t h a t th e
U n it e d S t a t e s sh o u ld know th e s i t u a t i o n in
FIC b e f o r e th e w ar , an d th e a c t i o n s an d th e
a s p i r a t i o n s th e y ha ve a t th e mom ent. ( S o u rc e:

9» F u tu re P la n s o f th e P r o v is io n a l Go ve rnm en t
a . Th ey p la n to r e s i s t th e F re nc h c o n t i n u a l l y
b . A n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n is .. .p la n n ed when p r a c t i ­
c a b le .
c . I f p e o p le w an t hi m , 3? o Da i w i l l be r e i n s t a t e d
d . The c h o ic e od th e go ve rn m en t an d o f i t s l e a d e r s
w i l l r e s t e n t i r e l y w it h th e p e o p le .( S o u r c e s :

ATTACKKZUTS 1 . A nn am ite n ew sp ap er s
2 . D e c la r a ti o n o f In dep en den ce
S .L e t t r e au x am is d ’Hanoi*'-'
[Atta chm ents not printed]
IV: JLndxv.
k
FROE: Swift SUB-SOURCE: As stated

AREA: Frenc h In do-Chi na DATE OF REPORT: 17 Oct. 4 5 ’ OC T I 8 i9'’5

SUBJECT: Poli tical I nformation DATE OF EIFO.: 25 Sept. - 15 Oct. 45

The re volu tion ary acti vity in Ind o-China at t h e .present_tirae is the_out_-

grow th of th e secret soci eties whi ch hav e existe d in An nam since t he Fr ench

aut hori ty has bee n estab lished. The first trouble s wer e at Hue, in June,1335,

The n about tw ent y thous and Anname se att acke d the Frenc h troops of Gen eral de

Courcy, w hil e ki ng Ha n Nghi of Anna m £led fro m his palace. The scholar, Phan

Boi Chau, secre tly fona ed a g roup to re store the th rone to the youn g prince,

Cuong De. Phan. Boi C hau offe red the p rinc e to t he Annamese revolutionaries ,

as the sy mbol o f the tra diti on dest roye d by the French.

.After the Russ o-Japa nese w ar of 1905, Phan Boi Ch au went to J apan where

he fou nded the Vie t Na m Duy T an Koi or S ocie ty for the Eod erni zatio n of Annam,

wit h the object of sen ding s tudents to Japan, wh o wer e destin ed to f orm the

beginn ings of a r evolu tiona ry army, He al so wr ote an ti-Fr ench pamphlets, and

dire cted revolts in the center of Anna m.

(
Afte r the t reat y betwee n France and Japan in 1907, t he prince, Cuong De,

and his mentor, Fhan Bo i Chau, Trent to sou th Ch ina Ther e they organ ized in

1912 the Viet N am Qua ng Phuc Hoi, or Assoc iation for the Resto rati on of the

Country. This group direc ted revol ts in Hanoi and Saigon, and in the famous

revo luti onary district of Yen Bay in Annam. In 1920, the po wer of Fha n 3oi Cha u

•..as broken; he was a rreste d i n 1925, then later released. H e ended his life

quietly, and o ld man passe d by his times.

In 1929, Nguy en Ai 4uoc fou ded the Annamese Communist Party, several as ­

sociati ons grouped to-get her w ith a com mon ai m of op posin g French domination.

In it were, first, le Pa rti Revolut ionai re du Houve l Annam, founded by ancien t

revol utionar ies wh o wer e poli tical pricone rs in the penti tenti ary at po ulo Con­

done. Scoori^, I 1Associ ation Nguy en An Ilinh of about eight h undred persons of the
 313

poor peasantry, and small proprie tors, if ter some attempts at revo luti onar y

activity, he vas cond emned to pr ison in 1929. His group bro ke up and j oined

the rank s of 1 ’Asso cia tio n des Jcunesses Revolutionnaifce Annaniite, created

in 1 927 by Ng uyen Ai Q uoc to aid in res isting French domination, and to

esta blis h a d emocra tic governm ent. The pla n had tv;o parts: first, the l ibe­

rat ion of the country, and the n aid to oth er peoples still under coloni al

domina tion; and secondly, an allia nce wi th Russia, Th e third goup, the Armani te

Comm unist Party, was t he Viet N am Quoc D an Dan g or le Parti Nati onalist An-

naraite, foun ded i n To nkin in 192 7 b y a g roup o f youn g students. It was this

orga niza tion which made the mu ti ny at the garri son of Yen Bay, infl aming the

who le of Indo-China. It prov oke d severe F rench reprisals whi ch di sorgam' r.p.d

the pa rt y for a shor t time, but its me mber s los t the ir id entity in the larger

Comm unist Party.

Ngu yen Ai Quoc, also kno wn as Ly Thuy, and n ow as Ho Chi Ninh, preside nt

of th e P rovi siona l Go vernmen t of Viet Nam, born i n 1892 in the pr ovin ce of

Ngh e A n i n Annam, a pro vinc e fam ous for it s r evolu tiona ry activity. His f ather

was a scho lar who oc cupi ed an offi cial positio n, but wh o was alcoh olic and

thr oug h thi s weaknes s, becam e de stitute . He g rew up to fix th e r espon sibil ity

for his f at he r’s unfo rtun ate experi ences on the mandarinate, w ho m he criticized

for the ir h augh ty and excell ent l ivi ng i n compar ison with that of th e general

popula tion, and vjhom he a ccuse d of serv ilit y and gr eed in thei r relations wit h

the repres entat ives of t he F renc h governnnhft. D uring this time, his father

earned his livin g by givin g lees ons in Chineze character s an d b y directin g

classe s f or illiterates.

’..hen he wa s n inete en year s old, in 1911, Nguyen A i «uoc left his home

for Sai gon where he em barked as a sa ilor on the ship, latouch e-Tre ville . He
 314

v is it e d America and }i.o j.and, and fi n a ll y disemba rked ii . Fra nce . In P ar is ,

he con tinu ed hi s st ud ie s him sel f, p a rt ic u la rl y in p o li ti c a l and so c ia l
economy. ’.Then t he world War was over in 1913, he wrote a pam phle t,"C ahie r
des Re vin dic ati on s du Peuple Annamite", which he add res sed to M.- Clemenceau,
Hr. Lloyd George, and to Pr es ide nt Wils on. At th is tim e, he al so fre one nte d
th e Ligue des Dr oi ts de 1 'Homme, and was in it ia te d in to th e free mas ons. *
In 1920, wi th Mr. Rappopo rt, he att en de d th e Na tio nal Congress of th e French
Communist P ar ty . He cr ea ted an an ti- Fr en ch in te r- c o lo n ia l uni on, and in
1922, he founde d th e newspaper, P ar ia , in which he denounced im pe ria lis m.
In 1923, he went to Moscow as th e re pr es en ta ti ve fo r Indo-C hin a a t th e In te r­
na ti on al Congress of Pe as an ts. He sta yed in Ru ssi a, met Borodin, and stu di ed
a t th e famous Conn n t e r n sch oo l. In 1925, he went to Canton und er th e name
of Ly Thuy, to work in th e pr es s bure au of th e Rus sian co ns ula te, and th er e
he founded th e "Ligue des Peuple s Opprimes e t 1*Asso cia tio n des Jeu nes ses
Re vo lut ion na ire s AnnamitesS
In 1927, came th e coup d 'e ta t of Chiang Kai Shek, and Nguyen Ai Quoc
fl e d wit h Borodin and Gen er al Ga lie n. He tr av e ll e d thro ugh Europe, and
f i n al ly re tu rn ed to th e Ori ent to Siam, where he remaine d as a ref ug ee
wh ile numbers of jfoung re vo lu tio na ri es from Vinh and Ha Tinh gat he red

aroun d him.

At th is time in Annam, th er e were J>wo pr in ci pa l an ti- Fr en ch grou ps,

le s Jeun esse s Re vo lut io nn air es; and le P a rt i Re vo lut ion nai re du Nouvel
Annam. The f i r s t was in a ra th e r d if fi c u lt po si ti on , i t s le ad er , Hguyen
Ai Quoc, havin g had to fl e e from Canton, and hi s two lie ute na nts ,H on g Son
and Hotung Han, having been impr isone d. Hotung Man, thro ugh Chinese con-
ta ct s, w as re le as ed se ve ra l weeks la te r , and wi th h is comrades, Lam Due
Thu, Truong Van_Lenh, and Quang Dat, di re ct ed th e AssociaSSsbfttion and
ach iev ed 3ome suc ces s wit h th e ir propaga nda. The ot he r group , le P a rt i
du Nouvel Annam, se nt him de le ga te s, ask ing fo r a fu sio n of th e ir p a rt ie s.
He pr os ely te d th e de le ga tes who in tu rn went out for- him t o co nt ac t st u -
 315

de nt s, pr of es so rs , e tc . and no fu sio n was ef fe ct ed .

In th e beg inn ing of Jan uar y, 1929, Genra l Li Yan King; jcoramander of th e
scho ol of '.Thampoa too k ac ti o n ag ai ns t th e An/nmite imm igra nts. Th irt ee n ca det s
were ar re st ed , and Hotung Nan and Le Quang Dat were impri sone d u n ti l 15 August,
1929. lieanv /hile, Hong Son was li ber at ed a t the end of December, 1928, and he
con tinu ed to d ir e c t th e as so ci at io n . On 1 Nay, 1929, th e ann ual cong ress of
th e As so cia tio n des Jeu nes ses Re vo lut ion nai res Annaraites i«as opened, and th e
th re e de leg ate s from Tonkin sug ges ted th a t th e name of th e group be changed
to th e Indo- Chine se Communist Pa rty . This was th e ori gi n og th e pr es en t Com­
mun ist p ar ty . I t st a rt e d to w ri te pamphl ets denounci ng th e le ad er s of l'A ss o ci -
a ti o n des Jeu nes ses and gai ned ground from Tonkin to Cambodia, vzhere i t was
jo in ed by abou t fi v e thoud and adh ere nts of ISA sso cia tio n Nguyen An I lin h. I t ’
made such ra pi d pr og re ss th a t th e "Je une sses " , to co un ter ac t i t , formed a
se ar et Communist group from th e cream of i t s own or ga ni za tio n. Thus, in 1929,
th e re were th re e r iv a l Communist groups co -e xi st en t in Annam. F ir s t, le P a rt i
Communist In do -C hin ois e- 'Dong Duong Cong San Dang, th e remnant of th e Asso ci­
a ti o n des Je un ess es . Second, le P a rt i Communist Annam ite-Vi et Nam Cong San
Dang, th e se cr et pa rt y formed w ith in the" Jeun esse s!J Th ird , le Groupement
Communist Ind o-C hin ois e- Dong Duong Cong San L ieu Doan, made of th e P a rt i
du Nouvel Annam. The impass e between th e Indo-C hinese Communist Pa rty and
th e Annamite Communist Pa rt y was f in a ll y broken by th e fo rm er 's sug ges tio n
th a t Nguyen Ai Quoc le ad them bo th . The ce n tr al committee o f th e As soc iat ion
des Jeu nes ses se nt a de le ga te to Siam t o re c a ll him. Nguyen Ai Quon embarked
fo r Kowlihon, ar ri vin g a t th e beg inni gn of 1929. He too k ove r d ir ec ti o n of
a f f a ir s , and ca ll ed to Kowloon de le ga tes from a l l Communist gro ups, to ld them
to fu se , and to obey hi s or de rs . The O rie nt al Bureau- Communist Head quar ters
in Sha ngh ai- wanted th e th re e p a rt ie s to jo in th e fe de ra tio n cr ea te d a t
Sing apor e fo r so uth ea st A si a! . Nguyen Ai Quoc ob je cte d. The so lu ti on was t h a t
th e th re e SSr tiSS p a rt ie s fus ed in to th e Annamese Communist Pa rty , a na ti on al
p ar ty wi th th e name of one o f th e form er th re e, and which was d ir e c tl y conne cted

8 3 -6 0 5 0 - 73 - 21
 316

with the B ureau d'Orient. Hguyen Ai Quoc gave to this iw w nationa l unifi ed

party a provisio nal organizat inn with proletar iat direction, and wit h its

center in Indo-China. Under his direction, syndicates o f students and workers tret-

v/ere orgaized, and he foun ded the Anna nese secti n of the "Ligue centre

1 ’Lmoerialiasme et 1'Oppres sion Coloniale'.' This or ganizati n was de stined

to bring into his par ty many anti -French people who had thus far b elonged

to no poli tical group. In Cochin-China, he organ ized syn dicates a mong workers

in the Franco-Asiat ic Petrol Co., in the arsenal, in the electr ic pla nts of

Cholo n and Saigon, etc. In Tonkiu, the cott on and silk mill s of Haiphong,

and elsewhere we re organized . I n Annam, the same th ing occurred in the

railro ad companies, the forest service, and the schools.

In April, 1931, at Hong Kong, he came under the surveillance of the

police, while carrying on a corresponde nce be tween the Bu reau d'Orient and

the central committee of the I ndo-Chinese Communist Party. His capture was

difficult however, for he left for Ca nton where, on Chinese territory, it

was impossible to arr est him. The Indo-Chinese surete, durin g an invest igat ion

in Saigon, found papers saying that he int ended to retur n to Saigon. The .

British police we re informed, and he was arrested b y them on 6 June,1931,

duri ng his passa ge to Hon g Kong. He was condemned to two years impris onment

in Hon g Kong, but ap pealed th e case to London.

After his prison sentence, Ho Chi iiinh was releas ed through th e efforts

of Hr. Loewnsby, an Engl ish a tt ou me y. U nder this name, he went to Fukien,

v/here he st ayed s ome months, then to Shanghai, a nd finally back to Indo-Chiaa.

During his imprisonment, and ther eafter unti l about 1942, he and th e League

were actin g underground. In this year, he ’went to C hina as the repres entat ive

of the Viet iiinh League. Immediate ly upon his crossing the frontier, he was

imprisoned b y the Ch inese for thirte en months. A fter his release a t Liuchow,
he wen t to Ku nmi ng to cont act the Chinese and A mericans, and his o wn under­

ground. organ ization . V/hile there, he did some tra nsla ting for th e Of fice of

War In formati on. Fr om Kunming, afte r hav ing con tacte d Gen eral Ch ennault, he

fle w to Poseh and went fr om there, wit h an AC-AS team to Cao Bang. Fro m this

time, he wo rke d wit h t his tea m and i ts organization, estab lishi ng a netwo rk

all over Tonk in pro vinc e to ai d Amer ican pilots who fell in French Indo-Chi na.

This vzork c ontin ued u nti l th e e nd of th e war, but an additi onal A mer ical grou p

star ted vzork with h im agai nst th e Japane se in July, 1945, w he n two groups of

Offic e of Stra tegic S ervic es perso nnel parac hut ed to his headq uarte rs at Chu Chu
Thes e two groups, wit h th eir Anname se troops, wer e enga ged i n gatherin g in­

tellig ence, and in Comma ndo operat ions agai nst roads, bridges, and all lines

of com muni cati on bet wee n Lang son and Hano i. In ea rly August, at th e Chu Chu

headquart ers, a na tional confe rence vzas held, and Ho Chi LIinh was elected

chai rman of th e Centra l Sxec utiv e Committee. This committee was al so a

ten tati ve p rovi sion al g overnment , and mo st of its member s did ta ke office.

After the Japane se submissi on, he went t o Hanoi, arriv ing t here 31 August,

1945® He too k a p ubli c o ath of office as pres ident of the Prov isio nal Govern ­

men t of th e Rep ubli c of Viet N am on 2 Sept embe r,in Hanoi.

I'

The mai n opp osit ion to the Provi siona l Gover nment of Viet Ma m comes from

the gr oup head ed by Nguyen Hai Than. This gent leman now about sev enty years

old , was b o m at Ha Don g or N am Dinh. His fam ily vzas of the intelligentia,

and he rece ived a g ood classic al Chinese education. Aft er t he Rus so-Ja pane se

war in 1905, he was a me mbe r of the grou p vzhich went t o Jap an wit h P han Boi

Chau. O n l eav ing Jap an , he went to China , maki ng his liv ing b y tea chi ng an d

by his kn owl edge nec romanc y. L ittle is know n of his act ivi ty fro m this time

until the outbr eak of th e war in 1941, except t hat he vzas at bharapoa academy

in Canto n as an emplo yee sometime be twe en 1926 and 1929.

 A fte r th e Jap aiL -e occ upa tion of Indo-C hina, th e -maaiese in China,

the bul k of './horn were ref uge es from Langson, formed a lea gu e, of which
Nguyen Kai Than was a member. This leag ue accomp lished l i t t l e however,
sin ce there was in te rn a l di ss en si on . L at er , when t he Japan ese sur ren ded ,
Nguyen Hai Than, in Ting Hsi a t th e tim e, jo in ed v/ith th e Chinese in th e ir
march fo r th e occ upa tion of Indo- China . Here he was joi ne d by Vi Van Dinh,
form er mand arin of Langson, and by ot he r members of the man dari nate and

th e ir ad he re nt s, and al so by va rio us forme r pro -Jap ane se and pro -Fr enc h
gro ups .

The p o li ti c a l si tu at io n , as i t sta nd s a t th e moment, i s th a t Nguyen

I
Hai Than, in sp it e of pu bl ic de ni al s from Chungking, and al so de ni al s from
Genera l Ko Yeng^Chen a nd Gener al Lu Han in Hanoi, is bein g sup por ted by
th e Chinese u n o ff ic ia ll y . He is seen en te rin g Chinese he ad qu art ers a l­

most d ai ly , and th er e i s d ir e c t tel ep ho ne con nec tion between h is p ri v at e

off ic e and th a t of Gener al Lu Kan. This Chinese sup por t of Nguyen Hai

Than i s weakenin g, bu t s t i l l e x is ts . The po si ti on of Ho Chi Ninh and

th e Pr ov is io na l Governemtn is becoming pr ec ar io us , bec aus e, alt ho ug h
he is supp orte d yb by th e gr ea t mass of th e po pu lat ion , th e we alt hy and
th e in te U ig e n ti s of th e cou ntry fav or Nguyen Hai Than. At pre se n t, th is
is ext rem ely dangerous becau se th e Pr ov isi on al Government is alm ost en­
t i r e l y wit ho ut fu nd s.

PHR3CHAL C33ZRVATION
I, ta n c e rt if y to the fa c t th a t th e gr ea t mass
of th e po pu lat ion sup por ts Ho Chi Ninh and hi s pa rt y, and to th e a n ti —Japan ese
 319

ac ti on in which th ey have engage d. I have seen men who were wounded in .^ -

busc ades o f Japa nese tr oo ps , have tr e a te d th e ir wounds, and have ta lk ed to
them about th e ir exp eri enc es and a sp ir a ti o n s. In tr a v e ll in g thro ugh Tonkin,
eve ry v il la g e fle w th e Vi et I’ln h fl a g , and had armed so ld ie rs many w ith
Jap ane se weapons tak en in r a id s . The women and ch ild re n were al so org an ize d,
and a l l were en th u si as ti c in th e ir su pp or t. The imp orta nt th in g is th a t a l l
were co gn isa nt od th e fa c t th a t indep enden ce vzas no t to be gain ed in a day,
and were pr ep are d to con tin ue th e ir st ru gg le fo r yea rs . In th e ru ra l ar ea s,
I found no t one in st an ce of op po sit ion to th e Vie t Liinh, even among fo rmer
government o f f ic ia ls . In Hanoi, th e si tu a ti o n is somewhat di fferenf.. Cpl.
Rob ert Ca llah an and I bo th saw how w el l th e m aj or ity of th e peop le fo llo w

th e or de rs of Ho Chi liin h and th e Pr ov is io na l Goverrasefabj, bu t al so saw t h a t

some of th e we alt hy merch ants and forme r high Annamese o ff ic ia ls fa vo r Nguyen
Hai Than. Some of th es e form er mandarin s ar e ro y a li s ts , .and de si re th e re ­
tu rn of th e im pe ria l ho use . However, Bao Dai, forme r emperor ofl Annam, to ld
me pe rs on al ly th a t he does no t de si re to re tu rn to th e th ro ne , th a t h is ab­
d ic at io n was vo lu nt ar y, and th a t he is in complet e acc ord wi th th e pr es en t
P ro vi si on al Government and i t s as p ir a ti o n s. At th e samfe tim e as Bao Da i’s
sta tem en t, Ho Chi Einh sa id th a t alth oug h he form erly fav ore d Communist
id e a ls , he now re a li ze d th a t such id ea ls were im pr ac tic ab le fo r h is co un try ,
and th a t hi s po li cy now was one of re pu bli ca n na tio na lis m, in which de ci si on
re st ed wi th th e pe op le. I f th ey wanted an im pe ria l house, wit hou t power such
as th a t in Engla nd, he and h is pa rt y had no ob je ct io ns , and th a t is was en­
t i r e l y fo r th e peo ple to de cid e.

ATTACHMENTS:1) L is t of pr es en t ca bi ne ts members, th e ir po si ti on s, and forme r

p o li ti c a l a f f il ia ti o n s .
2) L is t of re vo lu tio na ry p a rt ie s of Indo -Chi na.

8 3 -6 0 5 0 - 73 - 22
 320

ATTaC!E.3NT 1

G ov om nc nt O f f i c ia l s

So ur ce s
7 0 co *» i o

1* The fo ll o w in g g iv e s th e na me s, o f f i c e s , an d fo rm er p o l i t i c a l a f -

f i l i a t i o n s o f th e m os t im p o rt a n t o f f i c i a l s i n th e p re s e n t P ro v is io n a l

G ov er nm en t.

ItSCXO O ff ic e o r m in is tr y Fo rm er P o l i t i c a l " 193

Bo c h i Uinh . P r e s id e n t n a tio n a lis t

Vo ng uy en Gi an In te rio r C cm iu n is t

T ra n hu y L ie u Pr op ag an da A ns . C u lt u r a l

Vu d in h Boo E d u ca ti o n De mo cra t

Nguy en To n a ti o n a l S a fe ty So P a r ty

Nguy en n an h 3 a Eco nom ics A s s . C a th o li c

Ph aa va n Bong F in an ce C o m u n io t

Duong du e H ien Yo uth De mo cra t

va n
Lo w n Il io n P u b li c Work S o c ia lis t

Vu tr e n g Khahh J u s ti c e iio P a r ty
« It
Dao tr o n g Kim C okesu n ic a ti o n s

It II
Pham ngo o Th ach L io di ci ns

Gu Buy Can No O f f i c ia l PosJ» De mo cra t

n w n a tio n a lis t
Ngu yan va n Kuan
n o P a r ty
Chu va n Tan N a ti o n a l D ef en se
 321

AT TA CK S, 2

P o l i t i c a l P a r t ie s

So ur ce s
7 O c t. 45
1. The fo ll o w in g l i s t in c lu d e s th e p a r t i e s wh ich e x is te d b e fo r e th e

V ie t Mirth to o k o v e r th e go ve rn m en t. Th ese p a r t i e s a re l i s t e d in o r d e r o f
im po rt an ce a c c o rd in g to th 9 num ber o f me mb ers . In fo rm a ti o n g iv e n ab ou t

th e p a r t i e s in c lu d e s : i ) T ra n s la ti o n o f p a r ty name

i i ) P a rt y p la tf o rm
iii) Or ga ns o f Pr op ag an da ■■
iv ) P a rt y le ad er (w he n a v a il a b le )

A. Nong da n cu u quoo h o i
i ) A g r ic u lt u r a l a s s o c ia ti o n f o r th e n a ti o n a l s a lv a ti o n

i i ) P la tf o rm
a . S u f f ic ie n t o u lt iv a te a b le la n d
b . Im pro vem en t o f th e a g r i c u l t u r a l sy ste m
S ed u ct io n
c . A b e li ti e n o f la n d t a x

d,

i i i ) Duo i g ia c nu oc ( Tha nh Hoa)

H ie p( Ba gi an g)

V ie t nam do c la p ( Cao ba ng )
Nuoc nam mo i ( Khu G ia i pho ng)

B. Tha nh n ie n cuu quoc h o i

i ) Yo uth a s s o c ia ti o n f o r th e n a ti o n a l s a lv a ti o n

i i ) P la tf o rm
a o F re e de ve lo pm en t o f th e in te ll & u a l and mo dal f a c u l t i e s

b . Free dom o f c i r c u l a t i o n
o-^-Sup p r c e io n - o f —re c e n t s t u d ie s
ft. M o d if ic a ti o n o f th e c u r r io u la
 322

i i i ) Hon nuo c (H an oi)

C. Cong nh an cu u quo c h o i
i ) As so c ia ti o n o f workmen f o r th e n a ti o n a l s a lv a ti o n

i i ) P la t f o m
a . In c re a se i n s a l a r ie s
b . R ed uc tio n o f w or ki ng ho ur d

c . S o o ia l in su ra n c e
d . Imp rove men t o f m a te ri a l an d i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e

e • Work ingm ens ’ l e g i s l a t i o n

f . F ix ed n ir ira im s a l a r i e s

i i i ) Lao don g

D» Phu nu cuu qu oc dosm

i ) Womens le ag u e f o r th e n a ti o n a l s a lv a ti o n

i i ) P la tf o rm
a . Vernal e em an ci pa ti on for m th e fe u d a l yo ke

b . Eq ua l r i g h ts o f men

i i i ) Hone b e fo re Au gus t
How: G ai nu oc nam
r \
iv ) Le ad er x sH ll e i Tam Kin h

E» Vi etn am da n ohu da ng
i ) D em oc rat io p a r ty o f Vi etn am

i i ) P la tf o rm

a . Hew dem ocr acy

i i i ) Doo la p
iv ) L ea de r: Duong due Hi en
 323

F , Viet Nam ft, . qu oo h o i

i ) V iet na m es e a s s o c ia ti o n f o r th e n a ti o n a l sa lv no n

i i ) P la tf o rm

a . D em oc ra tic l i b e r t i e s $ Re du cto n o f to x a s )
iii) VietN am

G. T h ii e u n ie n t i e n pho ng d o i
i ) li in e r s gro up f o r th e n a ti o n a l s a lv a ti o n
r
i i ) P la tf o rm

a . S u f f ic ie n t sc h o o ls f o r the m

b , De vel opme nt o f th e m o ra l, i n t e l l e c t u a l , an d p h y s io a l f a c u l t i e s
i i i ) Hone

H, Nhi don g cuu vo ng ho i

i ) Yo uth a s s o c ia ti o n f o t th e n a ti o n a l s a lv a ti o n
i i ) P la tf o rm

a* P ro p e r e d u c a ti o n
i i i ) None

I, Thuo ng nh an ouu quoc h o i

i ) Bu sin es sm en s a s s o c ia ti o n f o r th e n a ti o n a l s a lv a ti o n
i i ) P la tf o rm

a . Free dom o f tr a d e
b . Free dom o f e m ig ra ti o n

* c» o f p a te n ts
i i i ) None

J , Don^; duo ng cor .g son. da ng

i ) Communist. .p a rt y ,p. f_ ^nd o - Chi na

i i ) P la tf o rm
a . Im pr ov em en t o f t h e l i f e o f th e •'.• ork 5n .j;a n
 324

b . U ni ve rs al su ff ra g e

i i i ) Co g i a i phong
iv ) Le ad er : Pham va n dong

K. Din h s i cuu quoc ho i

i ) H i l i t a r y a s s o c ia ti o n f o r th e n a ti o n a l s a lv a ti o n

i i ) P la tf o rm
a . Improv emenj: o f m i l i t a r y I f e and ed uc at ta .

i i i ) Ken go i li n h

Ch ien da u

L . ^a n ho a cu u quoc h o i
i ) C u lt u ra l a s s o c ia ti o n f o r th e, n a ti o n a l s a lv a ti o n

ii) P la tf o rm
a . A b o li ti o n o f th e ' io r io v .c n ee e p ra c ti c e d by th e F re nc h

b . C re a ti o n o f a nevf c u lt u re

i i i ) T ie n Phong
iv ) L ea de r: Nguyen huu Dang

Ho Vi en chu c cuu quoc h oi

i ) A s so c ia ti v a o f o f f i c i a l s an d em plo yee s f o r t h e n a ti o n a l s a lv a ti o n

i i ) P la tf ra m
a . imp rove me nt o f th e m a te ri a l l i f e
b . F a ir pl ac em en t aa co rd in g to c a p a c it y and a p ti tu d e

i i i ) None
II . - Linhv ion -ou u__qu Qn _b oi
.on

ii '- ^ S l& tf o ra
a ." -P u r- yo uth

i i i ) lio ns
 IJ O* Phu la o ouu qu oc h o i

i ) A s s o c ia ti o n o f old . p e o p le f o r th 9 n a ti o n a l s a l v a ti o n

i i ) P la tf o rm

a . S upp ort f o r th e ag ed
i i i ) Hone

0 9 . V ie t Mem quo c da n da ng
i ) <33

i i ) D em oc ra tic l i b e r t i e s

E ep u b li ca n re gi m e
i i i ) Hone

A W / v X ’W ' V

2 . The fo ll o w in g p a r t i e s a re th o s e whixsh w ere p ro -J a p a n e se

A. V ie t nam quo c da n da ng

i ) T hi s p a r t y was for me d a f t e r 9 Ma rch 45 , an d a ft e rw a rd s u n it e d w it h

th e Da i v i e t quo o g ia l i e n m in h u nde r th e name o f V ie tnam qu oc Han

3toi» A f te r th e V ie t Mi nh came in t o po we r, on e o f i t s th e le a d e rs o f

th e p a r t y , Hhuon g To ng, f l e d t o C hi na to a l l y h im s e lf w it h Nguy en

E ai Than , le a d e r o f th e p ro -C h in es e p a rt y ,V ie tn a m ea ch menh Dong

min h ho i , Ee to o k th e name o f D r. Pham T ra n a f t e r he f l e d .
i i ) Le ad er s* Ngu yen th e Ng hie p

Nguy en ng oc Son

Nhuon g Tong ( Hoang pham Tna n)

B» D ai v i e t quo c xa (a ls o known a s)

D ai v i e t quoc g ia l i e n m in h "
V ie t nam quo c da n h o i

i ) T hi s p a r t y was fo un de d in 1942. I t ho d no sy st em o r o rg an i ■rat.inn

and was n o t h e ld in much es te em by th e p e o p le . I t s ne w sp ap er was

Ha iph ong n h a t ba o
 326

. . i i ) ' Th? lo a u o rs w er e: Phem d in h Cuong

Tru ong an h Tu
C. V ie t na n phu c quo c dong min h hoi
i ) T hi s p a r t y was fo un de d i n Soj &i rta mb er, 19 40 , a f t e r th e Ja pa ne se i n ­

v a si o n a t Longs o n , b u t n e v e r ha d much o rg a n iz a ti o n . A ft e r th e Fr an oe -

Ja pa ne se a rm is ti c e a t Landon, th e p a r t y n o lo n g e r re c e iv e d a id fro m
th e Ja p a n e se , and was e a s i l y su pp re ss ed by th e F re n c h , The s u rv iv ig

membe rs f l e d to C hi na .
i i ) Le dd er : Tr an tr u n g Lap

D. V ie t nam th a h h n ie n ja i_ q u o c Jh o i
i ) T hi s p a r t y , fo un de d a f t e r 9 M ar ch 45 , re c e iv e d arm s an d m u n it io n s

n o ta b ly fro m th e Ja p a n e se . Th ey p a r t ic i p a te d i n p ro -J a p a n e se a c t i ­

v i t i e s an d e sp io n ag e,

i i ) L ea de r Vo va n Cam

E . Da i v i e t do n ch in h
i ) P a rt y was fo un de d in 19 41 . I t ha s be en su p p re ss e d by th e F re nc h

an d i s now d is s o lv e d . The le a d e r ha s f l e d to C hi na .

i i ) L ea de r t Hguyn tu ong Tern

5 . The fo ll o w in g a re p a r t i e s wh ich a re now i n th e V ie t Min h w hi ch we re dom ed

a f t e r th e V ie t Minh to o k ove r th e po w er .

A. Cong th uo ng cu u qoo h o i
i<) A ss o c ia ti o n o£ bu sin es sm en ! dan d i n d u s t r i a l i s t s f o r th e n a ti o n a l

s a lv a ti o n

i i ) P la tf o rm
a . I n t e r e s t s o f th e ab ove

B . L in h v ie n cu u quoo h o i
i ) A s so c ia ti o n o f s tu d e n ts fo lh e n a ti o n a l s a lv a ti o n

i i ) P la tf o rm : You th i n t e r e s t s
B." Cuu b in h s i cu u quoc
i ) A ss o c ia ti o n o f fo rm er m i l i t a ^ r i l f o r th e n a ti o n a l s a lv a ti o n

i i ) P la tf o rm
a . P ro - m il it a ry l e g i s l a t i o n
IV. STRATEGIC S ERVICE UNIT “INTELLIGENCE
DISSEM INATIO N” REPORTS FROM FRENC H
INDOCHINA
The S.S.U. assumed some of the intelligence and record keeping
functions of the O.S.S. when the latt er was disb anded in September
1945. Althou gh th e names of th e sources have been deleted, the reports
from Hanoi presumably come f rom Fra nk White.
(327)
 STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT, WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, D.C.
I ntelligence Dissemination Number A-65936
Cou ntry : French Indo-China. Original Rpt.
Sub ject : Military and Political Infor- Date of in fo : 28 Febru ary 1946.
mation. Date of rp t: 5 March 1946.
Origin : Saigon. Dis trib ute d: 7 March 1946.
The atre : Indo-China. Confirmation: Supplement.
Sour ce: [dele te]. Reference.
Subsour ce: No. of Pages 2.
Eva lua tion : A-2. Attachments.
1. On 27 Februa ry, about 100 French troops mostly from the 2nd Armored
and Colonial Infa ntry Divisions, in more than 3 hours’ rioting burned and
sacked the residence of Paul Valere, Edito r of the Socialist Weekly, La Justice.
The imme diate cause of the a ttac k was th e editorial which the Socialist weekly,
always sharply critica l of the conduct of French soldiers, published on the
morning of 27 February , defending it s stand and reminding the troops tha t they
were paid by the Government of France of which the Socialist P arty is t he key­
stone. Sale of this issue was halted around 18 hours w’hen 2nd Division troops
seized paper s from new’sboys and cafe reader s and burned them in the main
square in Saigon. Mobs of soldiers then wrecked the shop and printi ng plant in
which the paper was published and destroyed copies of the new Diocesan organ,
Inform ation Catholique and some 20,000 leaflets which were being printe d for
distrib ution in Hanoi by the F rench Army.
2. At the same time, the apar tmen t of the leading Socialist, Metter, was
ransacked and he was dragged from his sick bed and beaten in the main street
in Saigon. The attac k on Metter was apparentl y instigate d by a lieuten ant of
Spahis (North African native cava lry), who denounced him as the instig ator
of the resolution printed on 24 Februa ry in the weekly Annamese language
supplement Tuong Lai which called for recognition of Viet Nam independence
and immediate cessation of hostilities. As the lieute nant and soldiers dragged
Metter from his apartmen t, rioting troops shouted “Vive Le Clerc, Death to the
Communists, Thorez to the pos t’” sma shing the windows of t he apartm ent and
looting and burning its contents. Despite protestation s, Metter, who it is under­
stood was imprisoned 2% years under Vichy admin istrati on for resistance
activit y in Indo-China, was badly beaten and only saved from lynching by la st
minute intervention.
3. The rioting occurred while the street s were posted with Military Police
guarding the arri val of d’Argenlieu from Pari s at approximately 23 hours.
Some observers believe tha t the coincidence of d’Argenlieu’s arri val and the
riot was not accidental but intended to emphasize Army protes t again st any
possible moderation of Fre nch terms to Viet Nam Government. It is the general
opinion tha t the rioting, if not on orders from French Army headquar ters, at
least had t he open sanction of high-rank ing officers, many of whom were present
and expressed approbation.
4. There is a tendency in some q uarte rs to overemphasize the coincidence of
the riots and d’Argenlieu’s arriv al. Many of the troops involved have no real
consciousness of the significance of d’Argenlieu’s trip to Par is and most are
certain ly not anxious to continue a fight which will result in the shedding of
the ir blood.
5. The following a re believed to be the basic causes of the dem onstr ation s:
a. Criticism of the Army by the newspaper La Ju stice which in p arti cula r
in one edition replied to General Le Clerc (see in troduction to pa ragra ph 5
in dessemination [deleted] with personal praise for him but pointed out
(328)
 329
tha t most of the Regular Army in Saigon was interes ted in political and
financial gain, and also referr ed to the poor record of the Regul ar Army
who joined Vichy during th e war. (See also p arag raph 2 in dissemination.)
ft. The civilian population is antago nistic towar d anyone who suggests a
compromise with Viet Minh or accuses French Indo-China French of war ­
time coll aboration with the Japan ese or Vichy. Nearly all the demonst rators
were unth inking ant i-Leftists.
6. The degree to which the riots had official m ilitar y sanction i s not yet known
but General Le Clerc is allegedly concerned. However no positive action was
taken to quell t he distu rbances.
7. Former “legonnaires” favor cessation of La Justi ce because each issue de­
mands prior ity a ction aga inst war time collaborators.
8. The Socialist-Marxist Part y, which comprises only 130 members including
a few open-minded old-timers, is responsible for La Justice.
 STRATE GIC SERVIC ES UNIT, WAR DEPAR TMENT
Washington , D.C.
I ntelligence Disseminatio n N umber A-65963
Co un try : Fren ch Indo-Ch ina. Origi nal Rpt.
Sub ject : Poli tica l Info rma tion . Dat e of in fo : 4 March 1946.
O rig in: Hanoi. Dat e of rp t. : 6 March 1946.
Th ea tre : Indo-China. D ist rib ut ed : 8 March 1946.
Sour ce: [dele te]. Co nfir mat ion : Supplement.
Sub sou rce: Unst ated . Referenc e.
Ev alu ati on : B-3. No. of pages.
Atta chm ents.

On 1 March Nguyen Hai Tan, Vice Pre sid ent of the new Annamese Govern­
ment (see disse min ation [del eted ]) disap pear ed af te r unsucc essful atte mp ts
to resign. Ho Chi Minh claims th at his whe reabo uts are unknown. On 2 March
the Annamese Congress adjo urne d af te r appr ovin g the proposed cabinet . On
4 M arch the cabi net held its first meeting. Ho Chi M inh claims th at t hey offered
the presid ency to Bao Dai, form er Emp eror of the Annam, but th at Annamese
lead ers fea red a chang e would unde rmin e the moral e of the people.
(330)
 STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT, WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, D.C.
I ntelligence Dissemination Number A-65963a
Cou ntry : French Indo-China. Original Rpt.
Subject: Military Information. Date of in fo : As stated.
Orig in: Hanoi. Date of r p t. : 6 March 1946.
Th ea tre : Indo-China. Distrib uted : 8 March 1946.
Source: [delete]. Confirma tion: Supplement.
Subsource: As Stated. Reference.
Eva lua tion : As Stated. No. of Pages.
Attachments.

No te: See dissemination [delete] which re ports the attempt ed French landing
at Ha iphong on 6 March.
4 March 19^6
F-2 1. On 5 March 10,000 French troops will arriv e at Haiphong and on
6 March they will disembark. About 9 March 6,000 more will land. No air in­
vasion is expected because of fear of Chinese reaction. Sub so urce : [delete]
F-3 2. The French did not tell General Lu Han of the date of landing until
4 March. Landing at Haiphong will be forbidden by the Chinese because it will
involve Chinese troops in clashes and will hinder the withd rawal of Chinese
Forces through Hon Cay. The Chinese will insist tha t the French go back and
land at Tourane so tha t Chinese withdr awal can proceed smoothly. Bloodshed
and scorched eart h appear likely unless pressure is brought on the French to
negotiate intellig ently with the Annamese. Sub source : [delete]
5 March 19^5
F-3 3. The Chinese have been forced to agree to the French landing at Haiphong
on 6 March. (See above pa ragraph , informati on as of 4 March). Twelve planes
of ammunition and weapons will arriv e on 6 March for the Hanoi g arrison and
will be distri buted immediately. North Indo-China will be returne d to French
control by 31 March but Chinese troops will not withdr aw by tha t date. The
date of withdra wal of Chinese troops is indefinite. The date for handing over
Hanoi to the F rench is some time prior to 31 March. Sub sou rce: Unstated.
F-3 4. F irs t French troops lan ded a t Haiphong will be motorized and equipped
with United States vehicles and weapons. This will decrease the protection
afforded by t he American flag and there is a strong possibility tha t i t will create
resentment among the Annamese for Americans and in some cases may result
in Annamese mistaking Americans for French. Sub sour ce: Unstated.
F-3 5. On 4 March General Salan advised Ho Chi Minh as follow s: Chinese
plans for han ding over cities and r ura l are as a re extremely vague. The Chinese in
Hanoi were caught unawar e by the suddenness of French reoccupation. The
French have 50 tran spo rt planes for ferrying troops to outlying points. The
French may put the Hanoi garris on under the command of t he Chinese tempo­
rarily. The French will assume control of Haiphong when all the contingent of
10,000 troops has disembarked. Hanoi will be handed over piecemeal. Chinese
troops will protect overseas Chinese.
(331)
 STRAT EGIC SERVI CES UNIT, WAR DEPAR TMEN T
W ash ing ton , D.C.
I ntelligence D isse mi na tio n N umber (?)
Co un try : Fren ch Indo-Chin a. Ori gina l R pt.
Su bje ct: Fre nch and Chinese Clashes. Da te of in fo : 6 March 1946
Ori gin : Shan ghai. Da te of r p t. : 6 March 1946.
T he at re : China. Dis trib ute d : 6 March 1946.
Sourc e: [dele te]. Con firm atio n: Supplement.
Subs ource : Unst ated . No. of pages.
Ev alu ati on : B-3. Atta chm ents.
1. F renc h and Chinese forc es are fightin g at Hai phon g as a res ult of Fren ch
atte mp ts to land . Two small Chinese gunb oats were sunk by Fre nch nav al fire.
The Chinese ar e try ing to neg otia te (po rtio n mis sing ). The Fre nch Chief of
Staff st ate s th at the Chinese opened fire on the Fre nch bo ats and th at t he Frenc h
did n ot at tem pt t o force a landin g.
 STRA TEGIC SERV ICES UNIT, WAR DEPAR TMENT
Washington , D.C.
I ntelligence Dissemi nation Number A-66643
Co un try : Fre nch Indo-C hina. Ori gina l R p t. :
Su bj ec t: Toli tica l Inf orm atio n. Da te of i nf o. : 17 March 1946.
O rig in : Hanoi. Da te of rp t. : 26 March 1946.
Th ea tre : Indo-Ch ina. Dis trib ute d : 28 March 1946.
Sou rce: [dele ted] . Co nfir mat ion : supplem ent.
Sub Sour ce: Refere nce.
Ev alu ati on : C-2. No. of pa ge s: 2.
Atta chm ents .
1. Ho Chi Minh sta ted th at he could not gu ara nte e a peace ful recep tion to
Gene ral Le Clerc’s force s unles s the Fre nch ha d dem onst rate d th eir inte ntio n
by 20 March to ca rry ou t th e con ditio ns of th e 6 Marc h accord.
Fiel d Comm ent: Since th is rep ort was delay ed in tran smis sion , [delet ed] con­
tai ns l at er in form ation .
2. Ho Chi Minh accuse d the Fre nch of bad fa ith on the following cou nts:
fai lur e to open “imm edia te” neg otiat ions wit h the Viet Nam Governmen t, and
cont inue d actio n by Fre nch troo ps in Cochin China. As a res ult of th ese fail ure s,
dem ons trat ion s have been stag ed by Anna mite s and the Pre ss is clamo ring
for the da te t o be se t for inde penden ce par leys in Pa ris.
3. Sain teny infor med source th at Pa ris was too busy with oth er ma tte rs to
fix th e date.
4. Ho Chi Minh is obviously since re in wishin g to avoid troubl e, but fea rs
th at the bad fa ith evidence by the Fre nch will weaken his hold on the people
and stre ngt hen the ext rem ists , whom he descri bes as oppo rtuni sts.
5. Ho’s chie f oppone nt is Vice- Presid ent Nguyen Ha i Tha n, repo rted in dis ­
semi natio n [dele ted] to have disa ppe ared af te r unsuc cessf ul atte mp ts to resign
as Vice -Pres ident of the new Anname se Governmen t. Nguyen Ha i Th an is
believed to be in the Moncay Prov ince form ing a hard -cor e resi stan ce group
of unspecified size. (See diss emi nati on [delete d] par agr aph 4). Ho Chi Minh
is wor ried over Nguyen Ha i Th an ’s defecti on and also fea rs th at the local
rum or is tru e inas muc h as th e la tt er contro ls a dieh ard group composed of
seve ral Ann amit e p arti es.
6. Desp ite Fre nch and Br iti sh o ptimism , the situ atio n rem ains highly volatile .
Fre nch and Govern ment post ers thr oug hou t the city urge calmn ess and ma in­
tena nce of order . Howe ver an Ann amit e newsm an offered to show source s a
secr et w’ell-for tified are a of na tive houses.
7. The Ann amit e Pre ss claim s th at the “Jus tic e” inci dent in Saigon (see
diss emi nati on [dele ted] was pa rt of the Fren ch fas cis t prog ram. Tonkin ese
con tra ry to th ei r Saigon colleagues , have had an 8 mon ths’ pro pag and a diet
of “independ ence or de ath ”, givin g them ample time to make fu ll pre pa rat ion s
for the ir fight. Du ring thi s period, arm s and amm uniti ons were ava ilab le from
the Jap ane se a nd l at er from the Chinese.
8. At pre sen t it is imposs ible to spec ulate on the Chinese positio n, eit he r the ir
pre sen t sta tu s or th ei r at tit ud e in case o f a show-down. D espite th ei r knowledge
th at H aiph ong is be ing looted, ne ith er Ho Chi Minh nor Sain teny dar e complain.
The la tte r adm its th at Fre nch troo ps are stil l sm arti ng from the Haip hong
deb ark atio n incid ent bu t is hopeful th at the troops are satisfi ed with the official
exp lana tion th at the shell ing res ulte d from misu nder stand ing.
 STRAT EGIC SERVI CES UNIT, WAR DEPART MENT
Washington , D.C.
I ntelligen ce D iss em ina tio n N umber A-6 642 0
Co un try : F ren ch Indo-China. Orig inal Rpt.
Su bje ct: Pol itic al Infor mati on. Dat e of info : 17,18 March 1946.
Orig in: Hanoi. Dat e of r p t. : 20 March 1946.
T he at re : In do-Chin a. Dist ribu ted : 22 March 1946.
Sourc e: [dele te]. Con firm atio n: Supplement.
Sub S ource : As s tated . No. of pages.
Ev al ua tio n: As state d. Attachm ents.
17 March 1946
F- 3 1. A young fema le Annam ese Viet Minh office work er un witt ingl y in formed
a high Chinese official th at while on a prop agan da mission las t week to a village
30 kilom eters from Hanoi, she encou ntered 1 Belgian, 1 Russia n-Pole , 1 Swiss,
and 1 unknow n fore igne r livin g in t he villa ge. Sub source: [delete ]
18 March 1946
C-3 2. The Chinese are af ra id to pres s the Annames e girl for fu rth er detai ls
for f ea r t ha t she realiz e the imp orta nce of the in forma tion.
C— 0. The Chinese thi nk thi s is a Moscow Group oper ating wit h Ho Chi Minh
despi te the fac t th at Ho Chi Minh claims he is a non-communis t. The Chinese
ar e inves tigat ing. Sub source: [dele te]
C-0 3. This incid ent may be used by Ho Chi Minh to stre ngt hen Chinese
dete rmi nat ion to rem ain in Fre nch Indo-Ch ina, or it may be the corne rston e of
a Ho Chi Minh-Moscow-Felix Gouin tria ngle which will shi ft into high gear
as soon as Fren ch imp eria lists hav e been replaced . Sub source: [delete]
F- 3 4. An Annam ese r epo rts th at Ng uyan Ha i T han h as recen tly been fo rming
a resis tanc e go vernme nt a t Moncay.
Was hing ton Comment: D issem inati on [delete ] repo rted t ha t Nguyen Hai Th an,
Vice- Presid ent of the new Annames e gov ernmen t, disa ppe ared a fte r unsucces sful
att em pts to re sign.
C-0 5. Should the Ho Chi Minh-Moscow-Felix Gouin tria ngl e mate riali ze, it
app ears likely th at Chinese Na tion alis ts will be forced to encou rage a resis tanc e
mov eme nt Sub source: [delete ]
(334)
 STRATE GIC SERV ICES UNI T, WAR DEPA RTME NT
W ash ing ton , D.C.
I ntell igence D iss em ina tio n N umber A-66423
Cou ntry : French Indio-China. Original Rpt.
Sub ject : French Troops Ente r Hanoi. Date of inf o.: 18 March 1946.
Orig in: Hanoi. Date of r p t. : 20 March 1946.
The atre: Indo-China. Distrib uted : 22 March 1946.
Source: [delete]. Confirma tion: Supplement.
Subsou rce: Unstated. Reference.
Eva lua tion : F-2. No. of pages.
Attachments.
On 18 March, French troops entered Hanoi without incident. The city is
abnormally quiet.
 STRAT EGIC SERV ICES UNIT, WAR DEPAR TMEN T
Washington , D.C.
I ntelligence Dissemin ation Number A-66441
Co un try : F ren ch Indo-China. Orig inal Rpt.
Su bj ec t: Pol itic al and Mil itary Info r- Dat e of i nf o. : 19 March 1946.
mation. Dat e of r p t. : 21 March 1946.
O rig in: Hanoi. Dis trib ute d : 25 March 1946.
T he at re : Indo-China. Con firm atio n: Supplement.
Sour ce: [dele te]. Reference.
Su bso urc e: No. of pages.
Ev al ua tio n: C-3. Attac hmen ts.
In a n inte rvie w with source, Gener al Le Clerc reveal ed the followin g o pin ion s:
1. He expr essed confidence t ha t the re would be no m ajo r Anna mite resis tanc e
to Fre nch ret urn , citi ng as evidence of successfu l nego tiatio ns his peacefu l
entr y into Han oi on 18 March. He says the re is no t ru th in t he r um or of fig hting
at Hongay.
2. Fre nch feelin g is run nin g high ag ain st the Chinese becau se of bomb ard­
ment and looting but Gene ral Le Clerc sta tes th at he has tak en meas ures to
prev ent such inciden ts. (See d isse min ation [d ele te] )
Sourc e Commen t: Fre nch forces did not ca rry arm s on t he nig ht of 18 March
but th ei r conduc t has not been such as to lessen possible dang er. See dessemi na-
tion [de lete ])
3. Gene ral Le Clerc sta tes tha t, in accord ance wi th agre eme nts signed with
the Chinese, Ch inese tr oops will begin wit hdr aw al on 31 March, thu s i nfer enti ally
denyin g Yuen’s stat em ent th at the Fren ch are anxio us to hav e the Chinese
rema in a t le ast a couple mor e months.
 STRAT EGIC SERV ICES UNIT, WAR DEPA RTME NT
Washington , D.C.
I ntelligence Dissemin ation N umber A-66610
Co un try : Fre nch In do-Chin a. Ori gina l Rpt.
Su bj ec t: Pol itic al and Economic infor - Da te o f in fo .: 20 March 1946.
mation . Dat e of r p t. : 26 March 1946.
Or ig in : Hanoi. Di stri but ed : 27 Marc h 1946.
Th ea tre : Indo-Ch ina. Con firm atio n: Supplement.
Sour ce: [dele te]. Referen ce.
Sub sou rce : As sta ted . No. of page s: 2.
Ev al ua tio n: As stat ed. Atta chme nts.

C-2 1. Co ntr ary to rum ors th at his gover nmen t pres ente d an ult im atu m to
Fra nce de man ding t ha t the d ate be fixed fo r t he begin ning of the Pa ris in depe nd­
ence negot iatio ns, Ho Chi Minh now app ear s more confident of Fre nch sinc erity
th an ever before. ( See para gr ap h 1 in dissem inati on [de let e]. )
C-2 2. In a lengt hy con vers ation wit h source, Ho Chi Minh sta ted th a t his
gover nmen t has made exh aus tiv e effor t to exp lain to Vietn ames e its reas on for
signi ng an agre eme nt wit h the Fren ch, and th at m ass meetin gs have been st aged
thro ugh out th e c ount ry to cl ari fy th e gov ernm ental poin t of view. Th ese me etings,
Ho Chi Minh believes, ar e larg ely respon sible for the peace cur ren tly reigning .
C-2 3. He sta ted th at both he and Gene ral Le Clerc, wit h whom he has had
two cord ial meeting s, agre e th a t Viet Nam’s most imme diate needs ar e peace
an d incre ased food produ ction, a nd th at the fa ct t ha t t her e h ave been no inc iden ts
thu s fa r is p roof of th e go vern men t’s ab ility to co ntro l th e people.
Sourc e Commen t: H o Chi Mi nh i s fi rmly convinced th at w hat hi s co unt ry needs
most in its stru ggl e for indepe ndenc e is the sym path y and und ers tan din g of the
Ameri can people.
C-2 4. He sta ted fra nk ly th at if the Unit ed Sta tes ’ Sta te De par tme nt would
publicly condone his signin g of the accord of 6 March, his positio n would be
imm easu rably st reng then ed. The ma in reaso n h e dem anded t ha t the independe nce
nego tiatio ns be held in Pa ris was in ord er th at the deleg ation mig ht be i n close
con tact wit h the Unit ed Sta tes embassy for “symp athy and techn ical advic e”.
C-2 5. In thi s connecti on, he fea rs th at because of his widely adv erti sed
comm unist backg roun d America, Br ita in and China mig ht be suspicio us of his
adm ini stra tio n. He adm its being a stu de nt of Mar x but claims th at Indo-C hina
mu st hav e the pra ctic al sup por t of cap ita lis t cou ntrie s for ano the r 50 yea rs
before her prod ucti vity can be bro ugh t ab rea st of her needs.
C-2 6. While the food sho rtag e is serious, he believes th at fa r few er will
sta rve in Tonk in thi s ye ar th an la st ye ar when 2,000,000 sta rve d to dea th
chiefly because of Jap ane se requ isitio ns, dyke dama ge and droug ht. He sta tes
th at th e g overn ment ha s u ndert ake n an ag ric ult ur al dive rsific ation p rogra m w ith
emph asis on g ard en vegetab les, which is gre atly relie ving th e situ atio n. Fu rth er ­
more, even wit hou t Fre nch tech nica l advice, most of the dykes will be rep aire d
by the May pl ant ing season.
C-3 7. Gene ral Le Clerc sta tes th at the Chinese stil l refu se to make the
Haip hong docks ava ilab le to the Fren ch. Never theless , he priv atel y feels th at
he is in a good positio n mi lita rily in the event of Anname se trouble .
C-3 8. Vir tual ly all Fre nch stor es ar e now open in Hanoi, many for the first
time in months . Cab aret s wit h a full quota of Anname se girl s ar e open and
ar e cat erin g to both Chinese and Fre nch GI trad e. Uti litie s ar e fun ction ing but
sti ll wit h a limi ted capa city. Fo r the first time, the Fre nch newsp aper
L’ENTEN TE publish ed news ins tea d of fea tur e ma ter ial on 20 March. The
gen eral ten or o f the 20 Marc h edit ion was “Ha noi L ibere. ”
 STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT, WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, D.C.
I ntelligence Dissemination Number A-66609
Country : French Indo-China. Original Rpt.
Sub ject : Political Informatio n—North Date of in fo. : 20 March 1946.
Indo-China. Date of R pt .: 26 March 1946.
Origin : Hanoi. Distribu ted : 28 March 1946.
Theatre : Indo-China. Confirma tion: Supplement.
Source: [delete]. Reference.
Subsource : As stated. No. of pages.
Eva luat ion: C-3. Attachments.
General Lu Han is telling United States correspondents tha t the Chinese are
preparing to demand reparatio ns for the Haiphong shelling. Repiton, Chief
French General Headq uarters Liaison Officer (see para graph 2 in dissemination
[dele te]) indicates tha t the French will counter the Chinese demand with a
demand for repar ation for shell damage to the TRIOMPHANT and other
warships.
Source Comment: Such negotiations will have little repercussions in Hanoi
since a settlem ent would be handled elsewhere a t some d istan t date.
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 STRAT EGIC SERV ICES UNIT, WAR DEPA RTME NT
Washington , D.C.
I ntelligence Dissemin ation Numbeb A-66557
Co un try : Fre nch In do-Chin a. Orig inal Rpt.
Su bj ec t: Mi lita ry an d Pol itic al Inf or- Da te of in fo .: 22 March 1946.
mation . Dat e of r p t. : 25 Marc h 1946.
Or ig in : Hanoi. Dis trib ute d : 26 March 1946.
T he at re : Indo-Ch ina. Con firm atio n: Supplement.
Sour ce: [dele te]. Referen ce.
Sub sou rce : As sta ted . No. of pages.
Ev al ua tio n: C-2. Atta chm ents .
1. Resp onsib ility for the ma inte nan ce of law and ord er in Haip hong is
schedul ed to pass from th e Chine se to t he F ren ch on 22 March.
2. Pla ns for Fre nch reli ef of the Chinese ar e tri lat er al , being supp orted by
the i ndor seme nts of b oth Gene ral Lu Ha n and H o Ch i Minh. The larg e citie s a nd
towns are to be join tly occupied by Fre nch and Vietna mese tro op s; the villages
and sma ller town s by Vietn amese only. Defens e Commissio ner Tr an Van Giap
is mak ing 10,000 Vietn ames e troo ps ava ilab le to aug men t Gener al Le Clerc’s
15,000 troop s as specified in the agre eme nt between the Fre nch Repub lic and
the Viet Nam. (See att ac hm en t 2 in disse min ation [d ele te] ). Subsou rce for
par ag rap hs 1 an d 2: [dele te]
3. An est im ate of to tal Vietna mese stre ngth indi cat es between 30,000 and
40,000 troo ps of which 75% ar e ade quat ely equipped wit h small arms . Fre nch
tac tic al maps show num erous Vietna mese garr ison s, dis trib ute d stra tegi call y,
mos t of them not exceed ing 200, and the ir command not unified, probab ly due
to a lac k of speedy commun ication s. Sub source: [delet e]
4. Only the mos t ten tat ive plan for Chinese rep atr iat ion has been given the
Fre nch by Gene ral Lu Ha n’s hea dqu arte rs. The 60tli Army, stat ion ed in the
Hai phong-E ast Haip hong -Han oi a re a is schedu led to lea ve on Unite d Sta tes ship s.
The 93rd Army is expected to ret ur n overl and to Yunn an a t an unspecified date.
The 5 3rd Army is the only Chung king Army in Han oi which has not revea led its
inte ntio n. Of the thr ee armi es, only the 53rd is specifically char ged wit h the
mai nten anc e of law an d o rder.
5. In an att em pt to improve Franco -Chin ese rela tion s, Gener al Le Clerc
pro test ed the ant i-F ren ch at tit ud e of the local Chinese Pre ss and in tu rn was
ass ure d by G enera l Lu Ha n t ha t he w as al ter ing its tone.
6. The Fren ch ar e most anxi ous to rega in prop erti es now occupied by the
Chinese, bu t a t the mome nt ar e unwi lling to press th ei r claims.
Repi ton sta tes th at the Haip hong- Hano i rail way is usable , as well as the
Nort hbou nd line, as fa r as the Chinese border . Tr an spo rta tio n on t he Haipho ng-
Saigon rail wa y ha s been int err up ted by severa l destr oyed bridg es nea r Tour ane.
(339)
 STRATEGIC SERVICE S UNIT, WAR DEP ARTME NT
Washington, D.C.
I ntelligence Dissemination Number A-66684
Co un try : Fren ch Indo-China. Orig inal R pt.
Su bje ct: Poli tical I nform ation. Date of in fo .: 24 March 1946.
Or igi n: Hanoi. Date of r p t. : 27 March 1946.
Th ea tre : Indo-China. Di str ib ut ed : 29 March 1946.
Source: [delet ed]. Con firm ation : Supplement.
Sub sou rce: Reference.
Ev alu ati on : A-2. No. of pages.
Attach ments .

1. The fac t th at the Fren ch and Vietnam ese have lived toge ther one week
peacefully is significant and promising. However, a growing unea sines s and
confusion among the Vietnamese is alre ady evide nt in the nat ive Pre ss and in
the priv ate state men ts of governm ent leaders . The Mar xist organ “Tr ut h” con­
siders t he 6 March accord ra th er a tru ce tha n a preli min ary tre aty , and demands
the immed iate commencement of Pa ris nego tiation s and the inclusi on of Cochin
China in the Viet Nam Republic. The gene ral impress ion is th at th e Vietnamese,
bewildered by the suddenn ess of the armi stice , do not und ers tan d the ir new
sta tus and feel they a re b eing somehow cheated.
2. Ho Chi Minli ma inta ins a res tain ed impati ence with Fre nch hesi tati on to
begin negotiat ions. Vo Nguyen Giap told source on 23 March th at the Viet­
namese could no t be expected to rem ain q uiet indefinitely.
3. However, on 24 March the Vietnam ese had the sati sfac tion of seeing some
of the ir troops relieve Chinese sen trie s arou nd Hanoi. A sign ifica nt sigh t was a
Fren ch officer leading Vietna mese tro ops to th eir posts.
4. Comments on t he Franco-V iet Nam Mili tary Liaison Group heade d by R epi­
ton, Chief French General He adq uar ters L iaison Officer, are g enera lly favorab le.
There seems to be a mutu al und erst and ing on the mil itar y side of the pictur e.
5. Colonel Trev or Wilson, Chief of the Bri tish Mission at Hanoi, is leavin g
Hano i at the end of Ma rch as the B riti sh consid er his mission accomplished.
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