Table of Contents

Pakistan’s political crisis - a country in transformation ................................................1

A background on Pakistani politics ...................................................................... 1
The Ousting of Imran Khan and the Pakistani Judicial system ............................. 2
Additional pressures facing the new government ............................................... 3
Recent developments ......................................................................................... 3
Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 3
Political and Constitutional Crises in Pakistan: An Explainer and Recommendations ...4
Delayed Provincial Elections................................................................................ 5
Powers Of The Chief Justice Of Pakistan .............................................................. 6
Arrests of Opposition Leaders and Consequent Extrajudicial Violence................ 7
Proposed Trial of Civilians in Military Courts ....................................................... 9
Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 9
Why is Pakistan government trying to clip Supreme Court’s powers? .......................11
What has the government done? ..................................................................... 12
What triggered the gov’t-court tussle? ............................................................. 12
What do legal experts say? ............................................................................... 13
 Pakistan's Political and Constitutional Crisis

Pakistan’s political crisis - a country in transformation

BY J O E L M O F FAT

September 22, 2023

Political instability at the core of the Pakistani state threatens the intricate, yet delicate,

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domestic power balance that has worked to sustain the volatile nation. Imran Khan’s challenge
against the Pakistani political establishment that followed the ex-cricketer’s ousting last year
followed by his arrest this month is indicative of both the deep political structures of the state
but also reflects a new testing of this status quo. Furthermore, the transitional government that
overtook Khan has experienced persistent shock and tragedy in its first year of power. With the
turbulent context surrounding Khan, the lead up to the upcoming general elections in
November could prove to be one of the most consequential periods of the country’s recent
history.

A background on Pakistani politics

Following the violent cessation of Bangladesh in 1971, Pakistan has shifted between
intermittent eras of military dictatorship and civilian governance. The latter periods have been
characterised by the intertwining dynasties of the Bhuttos and the Sharifs. Through their
associated political parties, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the various incarnations of the
Pakistan Muslim League N (PMLN) respectively, the two families have dominated civilian
governance in Pakistan. However, even during these intervening periods of civilian control, the
military retains a strong domineering influence over domestic politics.

The territorial division of Pakistan splits the country into four provinces (Baluchistan, Punjab,
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and Sindh), two administrative units (Azad and Jammu Kashmir and
Gilgit-Baltistan) and Islamabad operating as a distinct federal territory. These regions are
generally distinguished by their linguistic and ethnic characteristics, whilst also indicative of
unique voting patterns. Indeed, Pakistan’s predominant parties have often defined themselves
along these regional cleavages. For instance, Sindh has been the historic centre of PPP support,
whereas the PMLN has generally been favoured in Punjab [1]. With the latter province being by
far the most populous of the country, it holds a fundamental role in the political process.
Indeed, governments are made through winning a majority vote in Punjab.

The creation of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (Movement for Justice, PTI) party by Imran Khan
in the late 1990s significantly upset this political status quo. Despite the party initially achieving

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little success in the first few decades of its existence (in one election the only Parliamentary seat
the party won was for Khan himself [2]), its victory in the 2018 General Elections proved a
historically unprecedented moment. The PTI became the most voted party in Punjab in the
2018 General Elections, robbing PMLN of its regional stronghold.

The Ousting of Imran Khan and the Pakistani Judicial system

Imran Khan’s seemingly perfect storm of political ascension was cut short by the no-confidence
vote placed against him in April 2022. Khan attempted to block the vote by dissolving
parliament, an action the Supreme Court quickly ruled unconstitutional [3]. Khan persistently
stressed a US-backed conspiracy against him during his tenure, founded on a continued
unwillingness to reduce support for Russia and China [4]. Following his removal, Shehbaz Sharif
(brother of three-time PM Nawaz Sharif) took the position of interim Prime Minister, with a
general election called for November this year. The aftermath triggered a period of heightened
internal political tension, with the subsequent year witnessing Khan’s fight for his political life.

As a proclaimed dissident, the ex-PM has envisioned himself in a classically populist fashion as a
true representative of the people’s will against the corrupt establishment. Months of tension
erupted into violence following the arrest of Khan in April earlier this year. The arrest was based
on multiple corruption accusations that Khan has consistently rejected as “biased” [5].
Following the claims of Khan, pro-PTI protesters targeted their indignation at the military. The
official residence of an army commander in Lahore and the army headquarters in Rawalpindi
were both targeted [6].

The fate of Khan has exposed a previously unseen rift between the courts and the military.
Shortly following his arrest, the Supreme Court issued a declaration that the act was unlawful
and ordered his immediate release [7]. Furthermore, the Islamabad High Court granted Khan
pre-emptive bail on several corruption cases [8]. The emergence of the judicial system as an
independent power broker within the Pakistani political domain is historically unprecedented.

The military has acted as the domineering influence on the judicial system, in many cases
covertly dictating its rulings [9]. Where it was in the interest of the military for dissidents to be
removed or journalists pushed away, the courts provided legal recourse. Indeed, they even
granted three military coups the legal stamp of approval [10]. The conflation of interest
between the courts and the military regarding Khan’s political campaign against corruption
facilitated his successful rise to power in 2018. It is ultimately the break of this coercive alliance
that is facilitating Khan’s survival, with the Supreme Court issuing several rulings that have
undermined the military’s attempts to permanently remove Khan from the Pakistani political
realm.

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Additional pressures facing the new government

Rampant domestic political strife is not the singular pressure threatening the interim
government, with Pakistan victim to severe issues of financial insolvency. Indeed, the country is
living month to month financially. It is predicted that a failure of IMF support will ensure a near
100% chance of government default within 6 months [11]. Sharif’s government worked to
unlock at least a portion of the $2.5 billion left out of a $6.5 billion programme Pakistan entered
in 2019, which was set to expire by the end of July [12]. The government was able to secure this
money by the middle of that month [13]. The recently proposed budget must satisfy the
demands of the IMF lest Pakistan be plunged further into a fiscal crisis. Furthermore, the
interim government is still dealing with the previous year’s traumatic floods that submerged
much of the country early in its tenure. The financial resources needed for reconstruction and
safeguarding the vulnerable are simply not available domestically, with foreign aid and
investment also being dreadfully insufficient [14]. With Pakistan under significant risk from
climate-induced threats, securing financial resources to ensure future climate security is an
existential threat.

Recent developments

The 5th of August saw the final arrest of Khan, representing a culmination of these months of
turmoil. This has proved a significant upset to the ongoing political drama of the preceding year.
The final verdict has found Khan guilty of financial corruption, forcing him to serve a 3 year term
[15]. During this time he will be unable to run for office. With the expulsion of several PTI
politicians, the party is in dire circumstances. Following the arrest, Khan posted a video to his
personal twitter page demanding the immediate mobilisation of his supporters. Khan’s political
future seem increasingly dim, the reaction from the Pakistani civil society may determine the
outcome.

Conclusion

The preceding year has witnessed a domestic crisis engulf Pakistan. Since the ousting of Khan,
the provisional government has fought a political battle for the future of the state. The
continued contention of Khan against this transitory government has exposed the dissolution of
the delicate power balance between Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the military that has
historically been a tenet of the state. The transitional government’s management of this
situation is beset by several domestic challenges that have disputed their tenure since its
initiation. Most notable are the extensive flooding and a potentially fatal financial crisis. Politics
work fast and unpredictably in Pakistan, and for the upcoming four months before the general
election, anything is possible. The stakes of control have never been higher.

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Political and Constitutional Crises in Pakistan: An Explainer and
Recommendations

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Mary Hunter

Mary Hunter is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews, researching the Islamisation of Pakistan. She
is also a freelance writer on issues relating to Islamophobia, Pakistan and its diaspora in the UK.

May 28, 2023


There are four major interconnected and mutually exacerbating political and constitutional
crises currently unfolding in Pakistan, in addition to its economic woes, increasing frequency of
terror attacks and its ongoing recovery in the wake of last year’s floods. These crises are
delayed provincial elections, questions over the powers of the Chief Justice, arrests of
opposition leaders and consequent extrajudicial violence and, finally, the proposed trials of
civilians under military courts.

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Delayed Provincial Elections
After Imran Khan was ousted from office by a vote of no confidence, he announced in
December 2022 that the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) assemblies would be dissolved
to pave the way for elections and to disassociate his party from the “current corrupt political
system” amidst rising inflation, unemployment and a brain drain. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
(PTI)-led assemblies were eventually dissolved in January 2023, Punjab on the 14 and KP on the
18. Article 105 of the constitution states that provincial elections must be held within 90 days
after dissolution, which means that elections should have been held in Punjab and KP by the 14
and 18 April, respectively.

On 20 February, President Alvi unilaterally declared 9 April as the date for the Punjab and KP
elections in order to uphold the constitution after he claimed that the governors of Punjab and
KP had not performed their duty to appoint a date. The Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Umar Ata
Bandial decided to take suo motu notice (action taken by the court of its own volition) of the
issue two days later, with the Supreme Court (SC) consequently declaring on 1 March that
elections should be held within the 90-day period, allowing the Election Commission of Pakistan
(ECP) to deviate from this deadline by the “barest minimum.”

Yet, the ECP announced on 22 March that the Punjab elections would be postponed until 8
October, setting the same date for KP a few days later. This was after the interior and finance
ministries had informed the ECP that “elections are not possible due to deteriorating law and
order situation, charged political environment, serious threat to politicians” and that it would
be difficult for the federal government to release the necessary funds due to the economic
crisis. The army had also suggested it would not be available for election duties in light of the
security situation across the country.

The authorities must conduct their investigations and application of the law consistently and
without political motivation, regardless of the political affiliation of the involved parties.
Otherwise, the integrity of the government and police will remain shattered.
The PTI consequently approached the SC to contest the ECP’s delay in elections. Shortly after,
on 4 April, the SC (a three-member bench under CJP Bandial) ruled that the ECP’s
postponement of the Punjab elections was “unconstitutional” and announced that elections
would be held on 14 May for the Punjab Assembly, citing that the ECP did not have the
authority to extend the constitutional deadline for elections. It directed the federal government
to release the required election funds for both Punjab and KP by 10 April and for the Punjab
caretaker government and federal government to provide security plans. The central bank

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subsequently allocated the funds to conduct the Punjab elections but stated that it did not have
the authority to release the funds, while the National Assembly passed a resolution to not
release those funds on 17 April.

In line with Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah’s warning on 22 April that elections would not be
held on 14 May because the army, judiciary and ECP were not ready, 14 May passed by without
the Punjab elections being held. Therefore, the lapse of the 90-day period for elections
represents a violation of the constitution in a move largely characterized as “democracy
delayed is democracy denied”.

Powers Of The Chief Justice Of Pakistan

Another crisis emerged out of the above, insofar as the CJP had taken suo motu notice on 22
February of the delay in announcing the provincial elections, a power granted to the SC through
Article 184(3) of the constitution. The original nine-member bench was reduced to five; after
four judges recused themselves, and it was ruled in a 3-2 verdict on 1 March that the elections
had to be held within the 90-day constitutional period.

The same day, SC justices Mansoor Ali Shah and Jamal Khan Mandokhail released a dissenting
note, calling for a “revisit” to the “power of one-man show enjoyed by the office of the Chief
Justice of Pakistan,” given its incompatibility with “democratic norms” and susceptibility to
“abuse of power.” Two of the major issues Shah and Mandokhail identified with suo
motu proceedings were that, firstly, the action should not constitute “judicial overreach” if, like
in this case, the issue was already pending adjudication before a provincial high court or had
already been decided by a high court, secondly, that this original jurisdiction of the court is
“extraordinary” and only to be exercised in “exceptional cases” relating to the protection of
fundamental rights. “This jurisdiction must not, therefore, be frequently and incautiously
exercised, lest it damages the public image of the Court as an impartial judicial institution.”

Usama Khawar, a practising lawyer and teacher of law at LUMS, wrote in Dawn that the suo
motu jurisdiction had been challenged before but without success and that, practically, suo
motu “means that the CJP may take up any issue of interest to him, fix it for hearing before a
bench of his choosing, which almost always is the bench headed by himself and give a decision
of his liking. Most importantly, there is no remedy of appeal against the decision by the SC in its
original jurisdiction.”

As another lawyer, Azwar Shakeel, noted, the two senior-most judges, Qazi Faez Isa and Sardar
Tariq Masood, were not included in the bench, while Mazahir Ali Akbar Naqvi was, despite the
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audio leak controversy. Isa would later pen a note with Aminuddin Khan that the CJP does not
have the authority to make special benches nor decide its members; after a five-member bench
was formed in response to the PTI’s petition about the ECP’s delay in the election date. After
Khan and Mandokhail recused themselves, the three-member bench ruled that the ECP’s delay
in the Punjab elections was “unconstitutional” and that they should be held on 14 May.

On 28 March, the federal cabinet approved new legislation, called the Supreme Court (Practice
and Procedure) Bill, 2023, with the aim of removing the powers of the Chief Justice of Pakistan
to take suo motu notice and to constitute benches. The bill was swiftly passed by the National
Assembly on 29 March, which has been welcomed by some lawyers in light of the identified
issues above.

The central constitutional and political questions here thus include: who has the constitutional
authority to choose a date for provincial elections after the assemblies stand dissolved (Shah
and Mandokhail’s note states the Lahore High Court ruled it was the ECP)? Do the suo
motu powers of the Chief Justice represent the overreach of the SC, and do they reduce the
integrity and credibility of the Court? Has the judiciary, particularly the figure of the CJP,
become too politicised or activist (chief of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F) (JUI-F), Maulana Fazl-
ur-Rehman, had called for a sit-in of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) outside the SC,
alleging that the CJP been “facilitating” Khan)?

Arrests of Opposition Leaders and Consequent Extrajudicial Violence

Imran Khan was arrested on 9 May by paramilitary rangers on the orders of the National
Accountability Bureau (NAB) during his appearance at the Islamabad High Court on corruption
charges. He was arrested in relation to the Al-Qadir Trust case, “which alleges that the PTI chief
and his wife obtained billions of rupees and land worth hundreds of kanals from a real estate
firm for legalising Rs50 billion that was identified and returned to the country by the UK during
the previous PTI government.”

On the same day, widespread protests and rioting broke out, with the BBC reporting from
Islamabad on the same day that highways had been blocked, fires lit and stones were thrown.
There was also an attack by protestors on the Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in
Rawalpindi, the Lahore Corps Commander’s House and family and the setting on fire of the
Radio Pakistan building in Peshawar. At least eight people are reported to have died, and
hundreds more have been injured in the protests. Unacceptable extrajudicial violence,
vandalism and arson have been meted out by the general public and the police alike. The

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government has also been accused of double standards for allowing and even facilitating a JUI-
led sit-in in front of the SC on 15 May while section 144 was enforced in the capital.

On 10-11 May, numerous significant PTI leaders were arrested, largely under section 3 of the
Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, in relation to the aforementioned law
and order situation across the country. Others were charged for other alleged offences, such as
Omar Sarfraz Cheema for misuse of powers while being the governor of Punjab. After some
leaders had been released and granted bail, they were rearrested, including Shireen Mazari,
Senator Falak Naz, Maleeka Bokhair and Yasmin Rashid.

Three days after Khan’s arrest, on 11 May, the SC ruled that the “manner of execution of the
arrest warrant” issued against Imran Khan was “invalid and unlawful”, despite the Islamabad
High Court had declared his arrest legal after finding that his fundamental rights under articles
4, 9, 10-A and 14 of the constitution had been infringed. When summoned to court the
following day, Khan was granted bail for two weeks in relation to the Al-Qadir Trust case and
protected from any rearrest before that time.

The political affiliation of the violent protests and the forces that have incited them have been
disputed. A spokesperson for the Punjab Police said on 15 May that 3,186 PTI workers had been
arrested since 9 May, with the Punjab government’s intelligence wing tasked with identifying
those within the PTI suspected of involvement in the attack on the Corps Commander’s House.
But Imran Khan alleged that this campaign is a ruse to “silence and oppress PTI workers and
supporters” and that the violent protestors of 9 May were employed by the state to ruin the
PTI’s image, though he nor the PTI have offered any evidence to support this claim. Khan’s own
government was criticised for its repeated crackdown on the political opposition, with Human
Rights Watch alleging that opposition leaders were arrested on politically motivated charges, in
which the NAB again played a partial role. However, the sheer number of PTI leaders and
workers in such a short time span has been greater.

While those who have responded to the arrest of PTI leaders with violence and intimidation
against the state and the people must face justice, all members of the party cannot be treated
indiscriminately for the crimes of some of its members. After it was reported that 564 PTI
workers had been arrested, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan tweeted on 14 May that
it is “deeply concerned by reports of random arrests and cases filed arbitrarily against PTI
workers across Pakistan. A distinction must always be made between those resorting to
violence and nonviolent political workers. No one must ever be penalised for their party
affiliations. This goes against all democratic norms.”
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Proposed Trial of Civilians in Military Courts
During a special Corps Commanders Conference on 15 May, it was announced that civilians
suspected of involvement in the unrest could be tried under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 and
the Official Secrets Act, with the army terming 9 May when military installations were attacked
as a “black day.” While the Army Act is primarily concerned with trials of military and civilian
personnel employed by the Pakistan Army, amendments to the Army Act in 2015 allowed
civilians to be tried by military courts if they, among other things, were involved in attacking
military officers or installations, terrorism and wider anti-state activities. But ultimately,
prosecution requires sanction from the federal government. This was confirmed by a retired
army official, who also said that over 20 civilians had been tried under the Army Act during
Khan’s tenure. Indeed, a letter was written by Human Rights Watch to Khan while he was the
prime minister in August 2018, which addressed how military courts had been reinstated in
March 2018 to try civilians, in part because they do not allow independent monitoring.

PML-N’s Senior Vice President, Maryam Nawaz, has since supported the call to try those
involved in the violence on 9 May in light of the politicisation of the civilian courts, alleging that
they have become “controversial and a tool of a political party,” referring to the PTI.
However, lawyers have suggested that the use of military courts against civilians is an affront to
human rights, contravening Article 10-A of the constitution (right to a fair trial). They should be
avoided at all costs, noting that the related offences are covered by Pakistan Penal Code, such
as rioting, mutiny and defilement of the national flag.

Dinushika Dissanayake, Deputy Regional Director for South Asia at Amnesty International,
also said that the organisation had “documented a catalogue of human right violations
stemming from trying civilians in military courts in Pakistan, including flagrant disregard for due
process, lack of transparency, coerced confessions, and executions after grossly unfair trials.
Therefore, any indication that the trial of civilians could be held in military courts is
incompatible with Pakistan’s obligations under international human rights law.”

Conclusions
These overlapping political and constitutional crises relating to democracy, the integrity of the
judiciary and office of the president, the powers of the CJP, arrests of opposition leaders,
extrajudicial violence by the public and authorities and the trial of civilians within the military
courts are not new phenomena in Pakistan, yet their consequences for the rights of the people,
the state of the judiciary, law and order and political polarisation remain dire. Politically
motivated arrests of opposition leaders and the use of military courts had occurred under

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Khan’s government, to which he and his party are now falling victim. This cannot excuse the
treatment of Khan and the wider PTI, but it does complicate the path towards a resolution and
a commitment to “never again”, given the messy involvement of all parties, past and present.

Steps towards this path must include sincere attempts at dialogue between all relevant
stakeholders, political or otherwise, in order to put the people first. This can help with healing
among the general public too. Provincial elections should be held as soon as possible to restore
democratically elected governments in Punjab and KP and, thus, faith in the system. The
authorities must conduct their investigations and application of the law consistently and
without political motivation, regardless of the political affiliation of the involved parties.
Otherwise, the integrity of the government and police will remain shattered. Consistency and a
rules-based process, as advised by the lawyers above, is also necessary within the judiciary to
maintain its independence, ensure justice is done and prevent judicial overreach. The general
public should not resort to violence, vandalism and intimidation, while the right to peaceful
protest should be protected. Finally, the military courts are not the appropriate place to try
civilians involved in the unrest, who should instead be tried through the criminal legal system.

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Why is Pakistan government trying to clip Supreme Court’s powers?
The government presents a bill in the National Assembly as PM Shehbaz Sharif accuses the top
court of creating ‘political instability’.

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A general view of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in capital Islamabad [File: Akhtar Soomro/Reuters]

By Abid Hussain
Published On 29 Mar 202329 Mar 2023

Islamabad, Pakistan – A new constitutional crisis has emerged in Pakistan, which for months
has been engulfed in another political crisis that shows no signs of abating.

On Tuesday, the government presented a bill in the National Assembly, the lower house of
parliament, seeking to limit the powers of the Supreme Court, which, Prime Minister Shehbaz
Sharif alleged, was creating “political instability” in the country.

The legislation, called the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, came after the
top court took a “suo motu” notice of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) delaying
provincial elections in Punjab, the country’s most populous province.

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A suo motu is when a court itself takes cognisance of a matter which it deems is in the public
interest and commences proceedings on it.

What has the government done?

The National Assembly on Tuesday passed a resolution accusing the Supreme Court of “judicial
activism” and demanding its “non-interference” in matters related to the ECP.

“This house believes that an unnecessary intrusion of the judiciary in the political matters is the
main cause of political instability,” said the resolution.

The draft bill presented in parliament seeks to amend laws regarding the conduct of the top court and
suggests setting up a three-member panel headed by the chief justice to take up suo motu cases.

What triggered the gov’t-court tussle?

The genesis of the clash is the removal of former Prime Minister Imran Khan from power
through a parliamentary vote of confidence in April last year.

Khan, who heads the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, launched a countrywide campaign to
demand immediate national elections, otherwise scheduled later this year.

As the government rejected his demand, the 72-year-old cricketing icon-turned-politician

decided to dissolve the provincial assemblies in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces in
January.

The move was a part of Khan’s bid to force the elections, since Pakistan historically holds the
provincial and national elections together.

However, according to Pakistan’s constitution, elections must be held within 90 days of the
dissolution of a legislative assembly.

But a deadlock emerged when the ECP did not announce an election schedule, forcing
President Arif Alvi, a member of Khan’s PTI, to unilaterally declare April 9 as the poll date in the
two provinces.

Three days later, as observers questioned the legality of Alvi’s announcement, Chief Justice of
Pakistan Umar Ata Bandial on February 23 decided to take a suo motu notice of the issue and
initiated a hearing on his own.

After four judges recused from the original nine-judge bench constituted to hear the issue, the
Supreme Court on March 1, in a 3-2 verdict, ordered the ECP to fulfil its constitutional
obligation and announce an election schedule for Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.

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Two days later, on March 3, the ECP said the vote in Punjab province will be held on April 30.

But the poll body last week withdrew its schedule, saying it was impossible to hold the vote in
April due to security and financial concerns. It announced October 8 as the new poll date in
Punjab.

A furious PTI approached the Supreme Court, which is now debating whether the ECP’s move is
legal. That forced the government to move a resolution against the court itself.

What do legal experts say?

Some legal experts are of the opinion that while the proposed amendments by the government
to cut the Supreme Court’s powers are welcome, the way the parliament is doing it is
questionable.

“What the government is trying to do is something that should have been done a long time ago.
However, the way they are doing it is problematic,” Abuzar Salman Niazi, a Lahore-based
lawyer and constitutional expert, told Al Jazeera.

Niazi said most of the changes proposed by the government are constitutional amendments,
which require a two-thirds majority in parliament, which the Sharif government lacks.

He also questioned the timing of the bill. “It appears they are solely doing this to pressurize the
chief justice of Pakistan,” he said.

“A simple act of parliament to regulate judiciary with respect to procedural and substantive law
might be in conflict with the independence of judiciary which is a basic structure of our
constitution. The courts may strike it down if reviewed or challenged by court,” he added.

However, Salaar Khan, an Islamabad-based lawyer and constitutional expert, told Al Jazeera he
did not believe the proposed amendment will curtail the Supreme Court’s powers.

“This bill is just about restructuring of power. It is currently the sole prerogative of the chief
justice of the court to take suo motu notices. One could argue that the proposal is about
expanding the role for other judges as well since the Supreme Court is not defined as just the
chief justice, but other judges too,” he said.

Niazi said the government should have tried to put pressure on the court to make the changes
it wants instead of tabling a bill in parliament.

“The government is proposing to amend the rules of the Supreme Court which is the job of the
apex court itself. What if the court takes up a matter of parliamentary rules and procedure
tomorrow and starts dictating how the parliament should conduct its affairs? It would have
been better to let the Supreme Court amend its own rules and procedures,” he added.

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