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AFRICAN HISTORIES
AND MODERNITIES
The History and

Political Transition of
Zimbabwe
From Mugabe to Mnangagwa
Edited by
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni · Pedzisai Ruhanya
African Histories and Modernities
Series Editors
Toyin Falola
The University of Texas at Austin
Austin, TX, USA
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Virginia Tech
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Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni
Pedzisai Ruhanya
Editors
The History and

Political Transition of
Zimbabwe
From Mugabe to Mnangagwa
Editors
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni Pedzisai Ruhanya
Archie Mafeje Research Institute University of Johannesburg
University of South Africa Johannesburg, South Africa
Pretoria, South Africa
African Histories and Modernities

ISBN 978-3-030-47732-5 ISBN 978-3-030-47733-2 (eBook)
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Foreword
Zimbabwe’s sole political leader since independence in 1980, Robert

Gabriel Mugabe, lost power after a military coup in 2017. For a fortnight
in November 2017, the coup was, for some observers in the academy and
media and for many Zimbabwean citizens, indeterminate and imbued
with potential for the emergence of a political leadership that would
reform the authoritarian and divisive nationalist politics that had come to
define the Zimbabwean state. Zimbabwe’s once efficient public service
provision, effective state bureaucracies and large formal sector had disinte-
grated significantly in the two decades preceding the coup. This decline
was a consequence of marked economic regression and rising state corrup-
tion. For many, the 2017 coup opened up possibilities for economic turn-
around and regeneration of state institutions.
This insightful edited volume by Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai
Ruhanya comes three years after the coup. It assesses the degree to which
the various openings that the coup created were indeed opportunities for
real political and economic reforms. Are the politics and governance of the
post-coup ZANU PF administration, led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, radi-
cally different from that of the ZANU PF government that Mugabe
headed? Have the values and practices of what Ndlovu-Gatsheni has else-
where referred to as ‘Mugabeism’ atrophied? Why is Zimbabwean politics
locked in interminable transitions? These are only a few of the critical
questions this book addresses.
Linda Thomas-Greenfield and Bruce Wharton’s “Zimbabwe’s Coup:
Net Gain or No Gain?” (2019) has endeavoured to evaluate the fate of the
v
vi FOREWORD
reform agenda following the 2017 coup. In the broader literature, Clayton
Thyne and Jonathan Powell’s “Coup d’État or Coup d’Autocracy: How
Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008” (2016), Ozan Varol’s The
Democratic Coup d’État (2017), Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans’
“Coups and Democracy” (2014) and Paul Collier’s “In Praise of the
Coup” (2009), among others, debate and reach some varying conclusions
about the impact of coups on political processes such as democratisation.
For example, whereas Collier is in praise of the coup for being a means of
liberating an oppressed people from dictatorship, Thyne and Powell warn
that in fact, personal dictatorships and misrule have often been post-coup
outcomes.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya’s book adds to the aforementioned lit-
erature. Like Thyne and Powell’s work, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya’s
study is not in praise of the coup, and, similar to Thomas-Greenfield and
Wharton, they strike a pessimistic tone with regard to the extent of politi-
cal reform since the 2017 coup. However, two crucial points distinguish
Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya’s study from competing works focusing on
Zimbabwe’s post-coup politics. The first is that it surpasses other studies
in terms of scope. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ruhanya have assembled an
ambitious book, which examines how post-coup national politics interacts
with, and is shaped by, themes such as nationalism, political economy and
gender. The result is a rich appraisal of politics after the coup that is use-
fully historicised, incorporates political economy and pays notable atten-
tion to gender, which so inscribed politics before and during the coup.
The 2017 coup represents a departure from some of the politics of old
because it was Zimbabwe’s inaugural coup, impacting civil–military rela-
tions for years to come, but a significant part of subsequent politics has
deep historical roots that this book enables the reader to grasp. A second
point that distinguishes Gatsheni and Ruhanya’s book is that it fore-
grounds arguments by young and older Zimbabwean scholars about their
distressed country’s politics.
In recent years, academic interest in coups and military rule has declined
in African Studies, owing to the marked reduction in the frequency of
coups and also because intellectual fashions come and go. Nonetheless,
coups continue to occur and, as the recent case of Zimbabwe shows, their
incidence is not the preserve of countries with a history of successful
coups. The study of coup motivations, dynamics and consequences
FOREWORD vii
remains an important and productive intellectual pursuit, even if it has

gone out of fashion for some scholars. This book, with its focus on post-
coup politics, substantiates my point through its remarkable range of
insightful contributions.
St Antony’s College, Oxford

Blessing-Miles Tendi
Acknowledgements
This book is founded upon the collective efforts of its editors and con-
tributors. As editors, we appreciate the commitment and cooperation of
all contributors to this project, and therefore take this opportunity to
thank them most sincerely. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni would like to thank
Professor Tshilidzi Marwala (Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the
University of Johannesburg) for facilitating his 2019 Visiting Professorship
at the Johannesburg Institute of Advanced Study (JIAS) and Dr Bongani
Ngqulunga (Director of JIAS) for accepting him as Visiting Professor at
the institute, which enabled completion of this book project. Ndlovu-
Gatsheni also extends thanks to Professor Mandla Makhanya (Principal
and Vice-Chancellor of the University of South Africa), under whom he
works, for giving him time off to work on this book project. The editors
also extend their thanks to Professor Blessing-Miles Tendi (University of
Oxford) and Mr Siphosami Malunga (Executive Director of the Open
Society Initiative for Southern Africa) for contributing foreword and post-
script respectively.
ix
Contents
1 Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe: From Robert

Gabriel Mugabe to Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa: A
Repetition Without Change 1
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai Ruhanya
Part I Colonialism, Nationalism and Political Culture 23
2 The Political Culture of Zimbabwe: Continuities and

Discontinuities 25
Rudo Gaidzanwa
3 The Zimbabwean National Question: Key Components

and Unfinished Business 51
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni
4 Opposition Politics and the Culture of Polarisation in

Zimbabwe, 1980–2018 85
Zenzo Moyo
5 Understanding Zimbabwe’s Political Culture: Media and

Civil Society117
Stanley Tsarwe
xi
xii Contents
Part II Identity, Militarisation and Transitional Politics 133
6 The Identity Politics Factor in Zimbabwe’s Transition

Politics135
Bekezela Gumbo
7 The Ethnicization of Political Mobilization in Zimbabwe:

The Case of Pro-Mthwakazi Movements155
Samukele Hadebe
8 The Militarisation of State Institutions in Zimbabwe,

2002–2017181
Pedzisai Ruhanya
Part III Social Media, Democracy and Political Discourse 205
9 The Media and Politics in the Context of the “Third

Chimurenga” in Zimbabwe207
Philip Pasirayi
10 Social Media and the Concept of Dissidence in

Zimbabwean Politics221
Shepherd Mpofu and Trust Matsilele
11 The Tabloidization of Political News in Zimbabwe: End

of Quality Press?245
Wellington Gadzikwa
Part IV Post-Mugabe Economy, Gender and Operation

Restore Legacy 273
12 Primitive Accumulation and Mugabe’s Extroverted

Economy: What Now Under the Second Republic?275
Toendepi Shonhe
Contents xiii
13 The Idea of a New Zimbabwe Post-Mugabe299

Sylvester Marumahoko and Tinashe C. Chigwata
14 Misogyny, Sexism and Hegemonic Masculinity in

Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy331
Lyton Ncube
15 Foreign Direct Investment in the Post-Mugabe Era359

Mkhululi Sibindi

Postscript: A Tale of Broken Promises389
Siphosami Malunga
Index399
Notes on Contributors
Tinashe C. Chigwata is a senior researcher at the Dullah Omar Institute

for Constitutional Law, Governance and Human Rights at the University
of the Western Cape in South Africa. He obtained a PhD in Public Law
from the University of the Western Cape in South Africa. His other quali-
fications are an MPhil in Local Government Law (University of the
Western Cape) and a BSc (Honours) in Administration (University of
Zimbabwe). His current research interests are in the areas of local govern-
ment law, decentralisation and constitutional law. Dr Chigwata has exten-
sive experience working in both the public and private sectors in Zimbabwe
and South Africa.
Wellington Gadzikwa is a lecturer in Journalism and Media Studies at
the University of Zimbabwe. He has been a senior lecturer at Harare
Polytechnic Division of Mass Communication (thirteen years), Information
Officer-Ministry of Information (six years). He is a media analyst and
consultant, and had published four books on the media as well as
various articles in academic journals and chapters in books. He com-
pleted his PhD at UNISA in 2018.
Rudo Gaidzanwa is Professor of Sociology at the University of
Zimbabwe. She specialises in social policy, land and gender studies and has
published on gender and land, extractivism and social policy. She is also a
gender and human rights activist. Her publications include Images of
Women in Zimbabwean Literature (1985), Speaking for Ourselves:
Masculinities and Femininities amongst University of Zimbabwe Students
xv
xvi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
(ed., 2001) and A Beautiful Strength: A Journal of Eighty Years of Women’s

Rights, Movements and Activism in Zimbabwe since 1936 (co-edited with
I. Matambanadzo, 2017). She is former Dean of the Faculty of Social
Studies at University of Zimbabwe (2008–2012) and a former Dean of
the College of Social Sciences at Zimbabwe Academy of Sciences. She
served on the Presidential Land Committee in Zimbabwe in 2003 and as
the Coordinator of Affirmative Action Programme at the University of
Zimbabwe, as well as lead researcher for the WoMIN and Centre for
Natural Resource Governance Study on Gendered Extractive Activities in
Zimbabwe, 2017.
Bekezela Gumbo is currently a DPhil student at the Centre for Africa
Studies at the University of the Free State. His research interests include
politics of transition, political institutional engineering for sustainable
political stability and socioeconomic and human development in Southern
Africa. He serves as a principal researcher at Zimbabwe Democracy
Institute, an independent research institute in Zimbabwe. As an under-
graduate, he studied political science, and his Master’s degree is in
International Relations from the University of Zimbabwe.
Samukele Hadebe is a senior researcher at Chris Hani Institute,
Johannesburg. He holds a doctorate in Linguistics awarded jointly by the
University of Zimbabwe and the University of Oslo. He was the chief edi-
tor of the Ndebele dictionary Isichazamazwi SesiNdebele (2001). The sub-
jects of his publications include language planning, translation, literature,
nationalism and labour issues. He has worked as a university lecturer,
a senior civil servant and in civil society organizations.
Siphosami Malunga is the Executive Director of the Open Society
Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) and a human rights lawyer with
extensive experience in justice and governance in Africa. He took the helm
at OSISA in August 2013; having previously worked with the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the senior governance
advisor and regional programme manager in the Regional Bureau for
Africa. He managed UNDP’s democratic governance programme for
Africa, providing policy analysis and intellectual leadership to governance
advisors in UNDP’s Africa offices. Malunga joined the Department
of Peacekeeping Operations in the UN’s Transitional Administration
in East Timor in 2000 as an advisor to the transitional minister of
justice, and later as senior defence trial attorney with the UN Serious
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xvii
Crimes Tribunal. Between 2003 and 2006 he worked with the UN in

Afghanistan to rebuild the justice sector, before moving to UNDP’s
Governance Centre in Oslo, where he led UNDP’s effort to integrate
conflict prevention in democratic governance policy and program-
ming. In 2008, he moved to Johannesburg to work in UNDP’s East
and Southern Africa office until 2011. Malunga earned his LLB at
the University of Zimbabwe in 1994 and a Master’s in International
Law (Cum Laude) from the University of Oslo, Norway, in 2007. He
is a regular contributor, writer, commentator and contributor to
leading continental and global publications on political, social and
economic issues in Africa.
Sylvester Marumahoko is a Global Excellence and Stature Scholar with
the School of Post Graduate Studies (Research and Innovation) at the
University of Johannesburg in South Africa. He obtained a PhD in Public
Law from the University of the Western Cape in South Africa. His other
qualifications are MPhil in Local Government Law (University of the
Western Cape), MSc in Rural and Urban Planning (University of
Zimbabwe), MPA (University of Zimbabwe) and BSc (Honours) in
Politics and Administration (University of Zimbabwe). His current
research interests are in the areas of electoral reform in Southern
Africa (with a special focus on Zimbabwe), constitutional law, the
civil society–state relationship and intergovernmental relations. Dr
Marumahoko has extensive experience working in both the public
and private sectors in Zimbabwe and South Africa.
Trust Matsilele recently completed his PhD at the Department of
Communication Studies, University of Johannesburg. He studied
Zimbabwe’s social media dissidence with an interdisciplinary approach
that encompassed media, anthropology and history. Matsilele’s research
interests include the use of social media by voices on the margins, the use
of artificial intelligence and big data in contemporary newsrooms and
whistleblower citizen journalism.
Zenzo Moyo is a South Africa-based Zimbabwean researcher, who has
practised both as a school teacher and as a university lecturer. Dr Moyo
completed his MA (2013) and PhD (2018) in Development Studies at the
University of Johannesburg. His PhD thesis was on state–civil society rela-
tions, and how these have moderated processes of democratisation in
Zimbabwe. One of his recent publications is a 2018 article titled ‘“What
xviii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Would We Be Without Them?” Rural Intellectuals in the State and NGOs

in Zimbabwe’s Crisis-Ridden Countryside”, which is based on his MA
research and was published by the Critical Sociology Journal. Currently, Dr
Moyo works as a researcher at the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic
Reflection in Johannesburg. His research interests are in civil society, social
movements, democracy, African and opposition politics, human rights and
the links between education and development.
Shepherd Mpofu holds a PhD in Media Studies from the University of
the Witwatersrand and is currently a Senior Lecturer in Communication
Studies at the University of Limpopo. He is a former Global Excellence
Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg. His research and
teaching interests are in media and identity, politics, digital media, citizen
journalism and comparative media systems. He is currently working
on two books, on social media and identity in South Africa and dia-
sporic media and identity in Zimbabwe.
Lyton Ncube is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Communication
Studies Department, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. He holds
a PhD in Cultural and Media Studies from the Centre for Communication
Media and Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal (2015). Lyton Ncube’s
Doctoral thesis shows the nexus of football, power, identity and develop-
ment discourses in modern Zimbabwe. Using Zimbabwe’s two prominent
football clubs, Dynamos FC and Highlanders FC, the study demonstrates
how football is intricately intertwined with the daily exigencies of exis-
tence of the people of Zimbabwe. His research interests are in the political
economy of the media, critical theory, cultural studies and the sociology of
sport, particularly the nexus of football, nationalism and social identities.
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni is Research Professor and Director of
Scholarship in the Department of Leadership and Transformation in the
Principal and Vice-Chancellor’s Office at the University of South Africa
(UNISA) and is also the 2019 Visiting Professor at the Johannesburg
Institute of Advanced Study at the University of Johannesburg. He holds
a DPhil in Historical Studies from the University of Zimbabwe. He has
taught at the University of Zimbabwe, Midlands State University,
Monash University (South Africa/Australia), the Open University
(United Kingdom, UK) and the University of South Africa. He is a
member of the Academy of Science of South Africa, a Fellow of the
Centre of African Studies in the Netherlands and a Research Associate
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xix
of the Ferguson Centre for African and Asian Studies at the Open
University; he is also highly rated as a social scientist by the National
Research Foundation of South Africa. He has published over 100
academic works, including seven sole-authored books, and seven
edited volumes. His latest major publications are books entitled
Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization
(2018) and Decolonization, Development and Knowledge in Africa:
Turning Over a New Leaf (2020, forthcoming).
Philip Pasirayi is a Zimbabwean human rights activist and researcher.
He holds a DPhil in International Development from the University of
Oxford (UK). His research interests are in media, democracy, governance
and human rights. He is currently working as Executive Director of a local
Zimbabwean NGO, the Centre for Community Development in
Zimbabwe, based in Harare.
Pedzisai Ruhanya is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the University
of Johannesburg’s School of Communication, Faculty of Humanities. He
is the director of the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (ZDI). He studied
journalism, sociology, human rights and media and democracy at the
Universities of Zimbabwe, Essex (UK) and Westminster (UK).
Toendepi Shonhe is a political economist and Research Fellow at Thabo
Mbeki African Leadership Institute, University of South Africa. He holds
a Master’s in public policy management from the University of
Witwatersrand in South Africa and PhD in Development Studies—
Agrarian Relations from the University of KwaZulu Natal. His research
interest is in agrarian change and economic development. He recently
published a book on reconfigured agrarian relations in Zimbabwe. His
current research work focuses on the agrarian transition in Zimbabwe as
well as land reform, food security and capital accumulation in Africa.
Mkhululi Sibindi is a doctoral student in International Business,
Economics and Trade at the University of South Africa. He completed his
MBA at Zimbabwe Open University. His academic and professional
engagements have included appointments at Richfield Graduate Institute
(South Africa) Trust Academy (Bulawayo). He currently serves as
Senior Lecturer at Richfield Graduate Institute of Technology in
Pretoria. He is a specialist in international capital flows, expansion
strategies and multinational firms’ heterogeneity. His research inter-
ests focus on developing markets, with specific emphasis on Africa. He is
expert in advanced econometrics and quantitative research.
xx NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Stanley Tsarwe is a senior lecturer in Journalism and Media Studies at

the University of Zimbabwe. He holds a PhD in Journalism and Media
Studies from Rhodes University, South Africa. He also holds an MA in
Journalism and Media Studies from the same institution. He has research
interests in media and democracy; African radio and democratisation; and
media, conflict and peace in Africa.
List of Figures
Fig. 6.1 A systems analysis of identity politics in Zimbabwe transition

politics139
Fig. 6.2 Conceptualising identity politics as a dominant political
culture in Zimbabwe 144
Fig. 12.1 Zimbabwe trade 1995–2016. Notes: Imports, exports.
(Source: Simoes 2018) 288
Fig. 12.2 Balance of payments developments: 2009–2017. (Source:
RBZ 2018) 289
Fig. 12.3 Diamond exports and imports from partners for Zimbabwe,
2000–2016. (Source: Various Sources, Adopted from TMALI,
UN COMTRADE) 290
Fig. 12.4 Interconnectedness of Africa’s Regional Economic Blocks.
Notes (Abbreviations): AMU, Arab Maghreb Union;
CEMAC, Central African Economic and Monetary
Community; CMA, Common Monetary Area; CEN-SAD,
Community of Sahelo-Saharan States; CEPGL, Economic
Community of the Great Lakes Countries; IOC, Indian Ocean
Commission; IGAD, Intergovernmental Authority on
Development; MRU, Mano River Union; SACU, Southern
African Customs Union; WAEMU, West African Economic
and Monetary Union; WAMZ, West African Monetary Zone.
* Members of CEN-SAD. (Source: Ncube and Mokoti
(2019), figure updated from UNESC (2009), Economic
Development in Africa 2009: Strengthening Regional
Economic Integration for Development. United Nations
publication. Sales No. E.09.II.D.7. New York and Geneva) 291
xxi
xxii List of Figures
Fig. 14.1 Demonstrators gathered outside State House after the long
march to and from the Highfields suburb. (Source: Author) 340
Fig. 14.2 A manipulated WhatsApp picture of Grace Mugabe bent
over, General Chiwenga fucking from behind. (Source:
WhatsApp meme) 345
Fig. 14.3 A tweet allegedly from the ZANU–PF handle claiming that
there was no coup, but military action that aimed to help
Mugabe, who had been taken advantage of by his wife 349
Fig. 14.4 Tweet by prominent Zimbabwean musician Mapfumo
suggesting that Grace’s character had triggered Operation
Restore Legacy. (Source: Thomas Mapfumo’s Twitter handle) 350
Fig. 14.5 Trevor Ncube’s tweet, sarcastically commending Grace’s
contribution in the downfall of her husband. (Source: Trevor
Ncube’s Twitter handle) 351
Fig. 14.6 A manipulated WhatsApp image of Robert Mugabe blaming a
miserable-looking Grace for their demise. (Source: WhatsApp
meme)352
Fig. 14.7 A WhatsApp meme that trended on 24 November 2017, on
the inauguration of President Emmerson Mnangagwa.
(Source: WhatsApp meme) 353
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Results of the top three candidates in presidential elections

conducted between 1990 and 2018 100
Table 12.1 Land grabs in Zimbabwe 286
Table 15.1 Taxonomy of market failures impeding internationalization 371
Table 15.2 Trade policy objectives 377
xxiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe:

From Robert Gabriel Mugabe to Emmerson
Dambudzo Mnangagwa: A Repetition
Without Change
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai Ruhanya
It would seem that the age of revolutions is over, to be succeeded by the

age of transitions. These transitions were expected to be less violent than
revolutions; liberal democracy was expected to enable peaceful change.
Illiberal regimes are worse off. The authoritarian of Egypt, Algeria,
Zimbabwe and Sudan have witnessed military interventions in transitional
politics. Military forces embody violence, and their political interventions
tend to block rather than enhance transitions. This book is about the
problematic history of Zimbabwe and its politics of transition. At least six
problematic transitions have been discernible in the country, something
S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (*)
Archie Mafeje Research Institute, University of South Africa,
Pretoria, South Africa
P. Ruhanya
University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
© The Author(s) 2020 1

S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political
Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_1
2 S. J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND P. RUHANYA
that led Thandika Mkandawire (2016) to write of ‘transition overload’.

The first was the decolonisation transition of 1980, which was expected to
deliver a sovereign Zimbabwe inhabited by free citizens who would enjoy
restored land that had been stolen by white settler colonisers. The reality
is that the land remained in the hands of minority white citizens, and at
the end of two years’ independence (in 1983), Zimbabwe plunged into
Operation Gukurahundi, which left over 20,000 mostly Ndebele-speaking
people dead as a ‘party-state’ and ‘party-nation’ was constructed (Kriger
2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009a).
During the second transition, white dominance in the economy was
dismantled. This entailed affirmative action, indigenisation and deraciali-
sation of the economy, which took place in an environment of constraint
that was based on an unwritten policy of reconciliation and the regulatory
framework of the Lancaster House Constitution. For an agreed period of
ten years (1980–1990), the Zimbabwean government could not amend
the constitution. The third transition involved economic liberalisation.
This began in 1990 in accordance with the demands and conditions of the
notorious Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed by the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Mlambo 1997). This neo-liberal
transition not only destroyed the progress that had been made in the social
spheres of education and health, but also provoked protests from workers
and students who were hard hit by a combination of retrenchment, with-
drawal of subsidies on basic commodities and privatisation.
The fourth transition was the agrarian transformation that took place
under the banner of the Third Chimurenga and the radical Fast-Track Land
Reform Programme, which was meant to deliver land to Zimbabwe’s land-
less black people. The consequence of this was the collapse of the national
economy, partly because the implementation of land reform was chaotic
and partly because it led to Zimbabwe being ostracised by the interna-
tional community (Moyo and Yeros 2005; Alexander 2006; Sadomba
2011). The fifth transition was democratisation, which was fought for
under the leadership of the labour movement (the Zimbabwe Congress of
Trade Unions), the National Constitutional Assembly and the Movement
for Democratic Change (MDC) with the overarching themes of democ-
racy, constitutionalism and human rights. The culmination of its partial
success was the Inclusive Government of 2009–2013. The challenges of
this period were highlighted in The Hard Road to Reform: The Politics
of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement by Brian Raftopolous (2013).
Michael Aeby (2015) depicted this period, in which a ‘power-sharing’
1 INTRODUCTION: TRANSITION IN ZIMBABWE… 3
government was in charge, as ‘Zimbabwe’s gruelling transition’. This was

not only because of the politically complex situation that was carried over
into it, but also because of the attempts being made behind the scenes
by the ruling party to outmanoeuvre the opposition. Violence decreased
and the economy stabilised slightly, but power did not shift from the
Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). If any-
thing, ZANU–PF used the five years of the government of national unity
to recover and consolidate its power, and in the 2013 elections the party
emerged stronger and in charge of government once more.
The sixth and the latest transition, at the time of writing (2020), was
the so-called ‘military-assisted transition’ of November 2017, which led to
the fall from power of the long-serving president Robert Gabriel Mugabe,
paving the way for the rise to power of Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa
(International Crisis Group 2017; Moore 2018; Rutherford 2018).
Mugabe died in Singapore on 6 August 2019; he was buried at his rural
home in Zvimba district of Mashonaland West province. This book is an
attempt to comprehend the difficulties that surround successful political
transition in Zimbabwe, with the primary focus on understanding political
cultures and the role of the military in civilian politics, as well as how the
Mnangagwa regime remains entangled in so-called Mugabeism. This is a
term used to describe a nationalist matrix of power that is underpinned by
party-state and party-nation constructions, and is held hostage by those
who claim to have liberated the country from colonialism (see Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2009b, 2012b, 2015).
It is clear that the political, economic and social quagmire in Zimbabwe
since political independence was attained, which deepened in the 2000s
with the long presidential incumbency of Mugabe and the ‘repetition
without change’ represented by the ascendance to power by Mnangagwa
on the back of a military coup, require proper framing and historical con-
textualisation. The situation is caused by a complex political culture, which
has arisen through the entanglement of many different strands: the physi-
cal conquest of settler colonialism, the Cold War’s ideological inflexibili-
ties, African nationalist patriarchal models of liberation (Campbell 2003),
regimental/warrior traditions that lead to the prosecution of a liberation
war, and the postcolonial legacy of personality cults and their geronto-
cratic tendencies, excluding women and young people, and indeed all
those who are deemed to have not participated in the liberation struggles,
from the corridors of power and ownership of strategic resources (see
Hammar et al. 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009a; Tendi 2010).
The concept of entanglement, as articulated by Sarah Nuttall (2009:

11), ‘is a means by which to draw into our analysis those sites in which
what was thought of as separate—identities, spaces, histories—come
together or find points of intersection in unexpected ways’ and ‘It is an
idea which signals largely unexplored terrains of mutuality, wrought from
common, though often coercive and confrontational, experience.’ For
Zimbabwe, Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopolous (2003: 17) high-
lighted the entanglement of historicised and racialised assertions of land
reclamation not only with technocratic and ahistorical liberal notions of
private property protection, but also with developmentalism and notions
of good governance on the one hand and emergent forms of indigenous
nationalism underpinned by national sovereignty on the other.
With specific reference to current politics in Zimbabwe, one can posit a
Mugabe–Mnangagwa entanglement at a basic level. The Mnangagwa
regime is a direct child of Mugabeism; indeed, Mugabeism is its recurrent
theme. What emerged as the ‘Second Republic’ is deeply interpellated by
the immanent logics (even the poverty of logics) of Mugabeism (for details
of Mugabeism see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009b, 2012a, 2015). Mnangagwa is
Mugabe’s political protégé. This Mugabe–Mnangagwa entanglement is
clearly manifested in the contradictory political discourses of Operation
Restore Legacy, which was used to legitimise the military coup of
November 2017, and the mantra of ‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’,
which purported to be setting out a new politics that was predicated on
neo-liberalism and market-determined economic logic. The elephant in
the room of Zimbabwe’s transitional politics is the nationalist matrix of
power (otherwise known as Mugabeism) that is partly built on the colo-
nial legacy of violence and authoritarianism and was partly invented by
nationalists to safeguard postcolonial power. At least ten interrelated and
overlapping coordinates for ZANU–PF’s nationalist matrix of power are
discernible:
• The invention of a ‘party-state’ and a ‘party-nation’ (see Kriger 2003);

• Pedagogical ‘Chimurenga’ nationalism backed up by a constructed
‘patriotic history’(Ranger 2004);
• Reduction of elections to a mere ritual to validate legitimised power;
• Assumed warrior tradition cascading from anti-colonial liberation
wars and the privileging of the gun as the guardian of attained power;
• Executive lawlessness known as ‘kutonga’ (to rule, not to govern);
• Neo-traditional patriarchal political culture of gerontocratic rule;
• Naturalised and routinised rule by violence and coercion;

• Practices of sorcery, witchcraft and poisoning of enemies and
competitors;
• The fetishising of academic qualifications to reinforce the right to
political office;
• Securocracy, plutocracy and predatory state politics based on primi-
tive accumulation (see Shumba 2018; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2019).
This is the political terrain within which the Mnangagwa regime has
emerged and finds itself. How do we make broader sense of it? Where
does the potential for people’s freedom lie? In considering these ques-
tions, we have to reflect deeply on the legacy of the liberation struggles
and their implications for freedom. The sociologist Roger Southall, in
Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa (2013),
posited that the liberation movements of southern Africa moved into gov-
ernment by embodying the hopes of those who supported them both
domestically and internationally, but their performance in governmental
terms was deeply disappointing. Michael Neocosmos’s Thinking Freedom
in Africa: Towards a Theory of Emancipatory Politics (2016) provides the
most extended critique of national liberation politics. The liberation
movements were clear on what they were against (anti-racism, anti-
colonialism and anti-imperialism) and very unclear on what they were for.
Neocosmos (2016) was very critical of the idea of attainment of freedom
under the aegis of the state. This is why he concluded that the politics of
the liberation movements ‘was based on a contradiction that it found
impossible to overcome: the struggle for freedom was a struggle not only
against the colonial state, but to a certain extent against the state itself, like
all struggles for freedom; yet at the same time freedom was said to be
attainable only under the aegis of an independent state, as it had been
frustrated by colonial domination’ (Neocosmos 2016: 130).
Even such luminaries of the liberation movements as Joshua Nkomo,
who led the Zimbabwe African People’s Union and commanded the
Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army, expressed disappointment with
the performance of liberation movements in government. ‘Freedom Lies
Ahead’ is the title of the concluding chapter of Nkomo’s autobiography,
Nkomo: The Story of My Life (1984). In this chapter, Nkomo, who after
death was declared by ZANU-PF as the ‘Father of Zimbabwe’, reflected
deeply on liberation and freedom in Zimbabwe while taking advantage of
a life in exile in the United Kingdom. He posited that ‘The hardest lesson
of my life has come to me late. It is that a nation can win freedom without
its people becoming free’ (Nkomo 1984: 245). Most, if not all, former
colonies gained ‘political independence’ one after another as the ‘physical
empire’, with its direct colonial administration (direct juridical administra-
tion), was universally condemned after the end of the Second World War
in 1945. The key signatures of this political independence became a new
national anthem, a new flag, the faces of black/African leaders in parlia-
ment, the faces of black/African prime ministers or presidents at state
house, the changing of countries’ names (with the exception of South
Africa) to the vernacular and admission of the newly ‘sovereign’ states into
the lowest echelons of the United Nations (Meredith 1984; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2012b).
Yes, the elites in charge of the state gained the freedom to accumulate
resources ahead of everyone else, through a process known as bureaucratic
state parasitism. Yes, Nkomo was correct: freedom of the state did not
automatically translate into freedom for the people. What eventually hap-
pened in Zimbabwe under Mugabe is well articulated by Issa G. Shivji
(2003: 15): ‘National question turns into state-building. Nation-building
is substituted by party and party by leader, the founder of the nation.’
Mugabe and his wife (Grace Mugabe), as the first family, ended up being
the centre of national politics. This is a bane of, if not the underside of, the
decolonisation of the twentieth century.
Neo-colonialism exacerbated the lack of freedom for both the state and
the people in Africa, and on another level, it gave some African leaders an
excuse to blame external factors for their failure to deliver freedom. This
was articulated by Kwame Nkrumah in Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of
Imperialism (1965):
The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it, in

theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sov-
ereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed
from outside. […]. Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism.
For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for
those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. (Nkrumah
1965: ix–xi)
Blaming and railing against imperialism became a key trope of

Mugabeism. Nkomo also reflected on the problem of neo-colonialism as
he meditated on questions of liberation and freedom in Zimbabwe. But

his take was different from Mugabe’s:
I refuse to accept that we cannot do better than we have so far done, or to

reach for the easy excuse that all our mistakes are simply a colonial inheri-
tance that can conveniently be blamed on the invaders. Of course our his-
tory has made us what we are, and the recent period of that history was
distorted first by the influence of remote empires, then for ninety years by
direct colonial rule. It is up to us to do better now. (Nkomo 1984: 245)
Like the Mugabe regime, the Mnangagwa regime is using the discourse
of sanctions to justify all its limitations. Indeed, sanctions must be removed
because they always hurt the poor and they also give failing regimes a con-
venient excuse to blame external factors. It would seem Nkomo again had
a different take: he strongly believed that African leaders were duty bound
to deliver freedom to the people even within the constraining environ-
ment of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. Nkomo rejected easy
excuses for the non-delivery of freedom and services to the people. He
suggested that ‘African leaders must improve their record of human rights,
and African peoples too must have greater regard to their responsibilities’
(Nkomo 1984: 247). Nkomo (1984: 252) concluded his autobiography
with a positive note: ‘It is not too late to change all that, to muster the
collective energy of our people and build the new Zimbabwe we promised
through all those long years of suffering and struggle.’
Perhaps Nkomo was able to reflect on liberation and freedom in
Zimbabwe in these terms because he was not in power! But his medita-
tions indicated the strong potential for reconstituting the political and
transcending the scourge of Mugabeism. Mugabeism itself failed to rise
above intolerant and repressive political cultures of Rhodesian settler colo-
nialism. Instead of breaking with colonial settler traditions of brutality and
repressive political practices, Mugabeism innovated and ‘improved’ on the
Rhodesian settler colonial Leviathan, adding the logic of governance by
military operations, with devastating implications for democracy, human
rights and people’s freedoms (see Rupiya 2005). To racism and patriarchy,
Mugabe added tribalism. What emerged was a complex ‘securocratic state’
with a party, military and parasitic business complex at its helm (a
Chimurenga aristocracy in power) (see Shumba 2018). The ‘right of con-
quest’ that was used by Rhodesian settler colonialists was succeeded by
Mugabeism’s mantra of ‘I died for you’ (by ‘right of liberating you’),

which became the main basis of his claim for leadership of Zimbabwe.
Mugabeism’s political longevity was predicated on the strong national-
ist–military alliance that was forged during the anti-colonial armed libera-
tion struggle (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006). In fact, Mugabe was installed
at the helm of ZANU–PF by the military during the course of the libera-
tion struggle (Sadomba 2011). However, as noted by Norma Kriger
(2003), the nationalist–military alliance was always unstable and tension-
ridden, with those in uniform and those who were demobilised (the war
veterans) making continuous demands on the civilians in power.
Throughout the postcolonial period, the guerrilla veterans and ZANU–
PF colluded with and manipulated each other to build power and privilege
in the army, police and bureaucracy, and among workers (Kriger 2003).
Liberation war discourse united the civilian leadership and the guerrilla
veterans, although ‘war credentials’ became a site of contestation—being
bestowed and taken away depending on one’s fall from political grace with
ZANU–PF. The paradigmatic case was that of Joice Mujuru, who rose to
the level of vice-president of the country on the basis of strong liberation
credentials and being a woman. In 2014, Joice Mujuru was politically
disparaged and removed from power and the party in a whirlwind of polit-
ical events, with Grace Mugabe accusing her of plotting to unseat Robert
Mugabe. Joice Mujuru’s liberation credentials were questioned and rub-
bished as she was thrown into political oblivion. This sheds light on the
political context of the military coup that culminated in the fall of Mugabe
and the rise of Mnangagwa to power in 2017.
By the time of the military coup, Mnangagwa had been enduring verbal
assaults from Grace Mugabe for some time. He had survived poisoning;
he had been expelled from the government; his long political career was
hanging by a thread. By the time the coup took place, Mnangagwa was in
exile in South Africa. From there, he gave Mugabe a warning, indicating
that something was being organised:
I will go nowhere. I will fight tooth and nail against those making mockery
against ZANU-PF founding principles. You and your cohorts will instead
leave ZANU-PF by the will of the people and this we will do in the coming
weeks. (Mnangagwa 2017)
The November 2017 Military Coup and the Rise

of Mnangagwa to Power
In an ironic political twist, the veteran leader of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe,

who had been in power since 1980, was removed from office by his own
military. For over thirty-seven years, Mugabe had ruled Zimbabwe in alliance
with the military, but he finally became the victim of what he had created.
The coup was distinctive because of the political discourse of its organisers
and practitioners, who were at pains to make the military takeover constitu-
tional. For example, on 13 November 2017, when the Commander of the
Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Constantine Chiwenga, called for a press state-
ment surrounded by ninety senior military and security officers, following
the expulsion of Mnangagwa from government and party, the Zimbabwean
constitution was quoted widely. Section 212 in particular was used to explain
the intervention of the military in civilian politics. Secondly, and ironically,
those who were staging the military coup continued to express their loyalty
to Mugabe. Thirdly, participants harked back to the anti-colonial liberation
history, and defined military intervention in politics as part of a patriotic duty
to protect this history’s legacy (Chiwenga 2017; Raftopolous 2019).
While the broader context of the military intervention was the liberation
struggle and postcolonial history, the immediate terrain was factionalism
and ructions within ZANU–PF, pitting the Lacoste faction against the G40
faction.1 Mnangagwa’s liberation war credentials were useful in attracting
the army and war veterans to his camp. The G40 became ‘criminals around
the president’, who were blamed for the deteriorating security situation as
well as the social and economic meltdown by those who had staged the
military coup. In announcing the military coup, Major General Sibusiso
Moyo carefully crafted his language to speak of calming a degenerating
political, social and economic situation, as well as propping up the authority
of the president and buttressing his constitutional roles (Raftopolous 2019).
1
The Lacoste faction supported Emerson Mnangagwa. It wanted Mugabe to be succeeded
by Mnangagwa who was one of the two deputy presidents of Zimbabwe. It was not clear who
the G40 supported as successor to Mugabe. It was composed of what could be termed the
‘Young Turks’ within ZANU-PF. These were a younger generation of politicians without
liberation credentials. But they had managed to form a close circle around Mugabe and
Grace Mugabe. Its most vociferous member was Professor Jonathan Moyo who was opposed
to Mnangagwa succeeding Mugabe. Grace Mugabe openly sided with the G40. Immediately
before the military coup of November 2017, Professor Moyo openly put forward the name
of Sydney Sekeramayi as the senior ZANU-PF politician to succeed Mugabe. But Sekeramayi
never rose to the occasion.
Brian Raftopolous (2019) summarised the three-pronged strategy that

aimed to finish off what the military coup had set in motion, removing
Mugabe and putting Mnangagwa in power. The first element entailed
avoiding any reference to a military coup, maintaining that Mugabe
remained the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and seeking the
High Court to constitutionalise the takeover. The second involved mobili-
sation of the civilian population by war veterans to give the takeover popu-
lar support. The third was to give a constitutional veneer to the military
intervention through the use of ZANU–PF party processes and proce-
dures. This entailed convening a ZANU–PF Central Committee meeting
on 13 November 2017, at which the military were thanked for bringing
stability to the party and to government. As noted by Raftopolous (2019:
7), the Central Committee took several decisions, including the formal
expulsion of twenty members of the G40 faction from the party, removing
Mugabe from the position of president and first secretary of the party and
recommending his resignation as state president, relieving Grace Mugabe
of her post of secretary for the Women’s League, removing Phelekezela
Mphoko from his position of vice-president, bringing back into the party
all those who had been pushed out by the G40 and, finally, electing
Mnangagwa as new interim president of ZANU–PF and nominating him
as candidate to fill the vacancy of state president.
At parliamentary level, the ZANU–PF Parliamentary Caucus began to
move the process of impeachment of Mugabe on 20 November 2017, and
the process was put in motion in parliament the next day. Mugabe was left
with no option but to write a letter of resignation on 21 November. This
paved the way for the inauguration of Mnangagwa as new state president
on 24 November.
The Mnangagwa Regime: Second Republic or

Repetition Without Change?
For a Zimbabwean people who had endured Mugabeism for over thirty-
seven years, the military coup and the ascendance to power of Mnangagwa
brought hope that life would be different; and inevitably, Mnangagwa
tried to position his regime as a force for change. In his first presidential
address, Mnangagwa made a number of pledges. The first was that he
would put Zimbabwe on a path to economic recovery by promoting a
market economy that was predicated on attracting foreign investment and
ensuring its safety. Indeed, changes were made to the indigenisation legis-
lation. The second was to compensate white farmers who had lost land
under the radical land reform programme. The third was to return
Zimbabwe to the ambit of international community (re-engagement).
The fourth was to be a president of all Zimbabweans (nation-building and
national healing). The fifth was to deal decisively with corruption (see
Raftopolous 2019).
The main hurdle for Mnangagwa was to gain full legitimacy as the state
president of Zimbabwe. This meant he had to call for national elections.
His advantage was that the opposition was in disarray, rocked by factional-
ism following the death of Morgan Tsvangirai on 14 February 2018. The
key disadvantage was that ZANU–PF was also in disarray. But Mnangagwa
had no option but to organise elections if he was to ‘move beyond the
shadow of the coup and seek a new legitimacy through an election that was
perceived to be peaceful and credible’ (Raftopolous 2019: 18). The elec-
tions were held in July 2018, with Mnangagwa facing the youthful Nelson
Chamisa of the MDC Alliance in the presidential contest. Mnangagwa
emerged the winner with 50.6 per cent, while Chamisa had 44.3 per cent.
While the campaign period was very peaceful, on 1 August 2018, the mili-
tary shot and killed six protesters in Harare who were protesting over the
delayed announcement of presidential results. Secondly, Chamisa and his
party disputed the results of the presidential elections and built a case that
was heard at the Constitutional Court. The court upheld Mnangagwa as
the winner, but Chamisa’s challenge raised the long-standing question of
political legitimacy that has been haunting Zimbabwe since 2000.
But what really dented the image of the Mnangagwa regime, which was
desperate for international engagement, was the killing of civilians by the
army in Harare. This meant that the ‘second republic’ was born with what
could be termed a very bad birthmark. What made matters even more
complicated was that it was not clear who deployed and ordered the mili-
tary to intervene in civilian political protest. Was the ‘second republic’ a
military junta, where political disputes would always be resolved through
violent military intervention? Mnangagwa was forced to institute a
Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances of 1 August in order to deal
with the regime’s image, but like all government instituted commissions
its outcomes were disappointing, and its value was not clear. It was purely
and simply a public relations exercise.
As the Mugabe regime was, Mnangagwa’s regime is besieged by numer-
ous challenges. The pledge to put Zimbabwe on an economic recovery
and growth path predicated on a neo-liberal framework has provoked
social turmoil, which manifested itself in a second round of public protest
in 2019. Once again, the army had to intervene with its usual violence
following an increase in the price of petrol. The health sector is character-

ised by strikes. The regime’s monetary policy and overall macroeconomic
turnaround strategy, predicated on notions of ‘austerity for prosperity’,
appear to be the previous regime’s structural adjustment programme, and
its problems, in another guise. The second challenge is the long-standing
one of national healing and national unity. The consequences of Operation
Gukurahundi are haunting the Mnangagwa regime, and the National
Peace and Reconciliation Commission has not resolved anything, while
Mnangagwa dithered when given an opportunity to apologise for the
Gukurahundi atrocities. He seems to be fast losing the opportunities that
were offered him by popular antipathy towards Mugabe.
The third serious challenge cascades from the regime’s failure to suc-
cessfully return Zimbabwe to the ambit of the international community.
Violence and intolerance of political dissent has escalated since Mnangagwa
came to power, and democratic reforms are nowhere to be seen. The fourth
challenge is the continuing tensions within ZANU–PF, emanating from
the factional conflicts that rocked the Mugabe regime. What is particularly
dangerous is that since the removal of Mugabe the security sector has not
been free of tensions and the ripple effects of factionalism (see Raftopolous
2019). It would seem that Mnangagwa is busy consolidating his personal
power and has not committed himself to any reform agenda, including
what he promised in his first presidential national address. Zimbabwe is not
yet beyond Mugabeism; indeed, Mnangagwa seems to be a poor copy of
Mugabe. By bringing the military directly into civilian political structures,
Mnangagwa has not demilitarised the state; instead he has deepened mili-
tarisation. The military is now officially part of political culture. This book
grapples with the question of political culture(s), the so-called national
question, the consequences of a militarised politics, patriarchal and sexist
tendencies, gridlocked and blocked democratic transitions, challenges of
economic recovery and growth, and many other problems, all of which
rocked Mugabeism and are being repeated under the Mnangagwa regime.
Organisation of the Book

The chapters in this book are grouped in four sections: Part 1, Colonialism,
Nationalism and Political Culture; Part 2, Identity, Militarisation and
Transitional Politics; Part 3, Social Media, Democracy and Political
Discourse,’ and Part 4, Post-Mugabe Economy, Gender and Operation
Restore Legacy. Together they constitute a transdisciplinary academic
study of the gridlocked and problematic transition from Mugabe to
Mnangagwa, which has turned out to be nothing but repetition without
change. Chapter 2 is by Rudo B. Gaidzanwa—a leading Zimbabwean

sociologist and feminist. She explores the complex issue of political cul-
tures in Zimbabwe and explains their entanglement with colonialism,
nationalism, patriarchy and sexism. At the centre of the chapter are issues
of hegemony and resistance as well as discontinuities and continuities.
Chapter 3 is by Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni. It explores the perennial
and complicated ‘national question’ and how it sits at the centre of com-
plex political cultures. Embodied by the national question are a key set of
issues that Zimbabwean citizens have to prioritise in their current strug-
gles for transition, inclusivity, equality, prosperity, democracy and develop-
ment; the connections, disconnections, gaps and opportunities among
these in terms of citizen priorities and contemporary civil society advocacy
for democracy and development; the constitutive parts of some ‘big ideas’
that would help civil society and citizens to coalesce towards a common
agenda for democracy and development; and finally, the practical interven-
tion mechanisms and strategies needed in order to develop a national con-
sensus/common vision/agenda among Zimbabweans that is built around
identified citizen demands, priorities, ideals and aspirations, including
those being articulated in the ongoing citizen protest movements.
Chapter 4 is by Zenzo Moyo. It studies the key question of political
cultures, and posits that if democracy is indeed about opening closed
political systems, then opposition politics becomes the avenue by which
participation, inclusivity and accountability can be realised. Together with
other aspects of civil society, opposition parties are responsible for creating
and developing public opinion, which in turn feeds into the political cul-
ture of a society. In developing states, especially those whose organic
development has been disrupted by both colonialism and anti-colonialism
struggles, the exercise of opposition politics faces an extra burden—that is,
justifying its connection with the often exclusive politics of liberation. The
chapter delineates political cultures that have fashioned the repertoire of
opposition politics since independence was attained in Zimbabwe, and
demonstrates how these cultures, together with the construction of a
party-state, have combined and broadened, in the process perpetuating
themselves.
Part 1 is completed by Stanley Tsarwe, who takes the question of politi-
cal cultures into the domain of media and society. Chapter 5 broadly
examines how Zimbabwean political practices over many years have shaped
the country’s current democratic institutions, values and practices, with a
particular focus on relationships between the state, civil society and the
media. Deploying the notion of political culture, the chapter examines the
state of civil society and its role in Zimbabwe’s transition to democracy. It
views the media as part of civil society, sketching its development and cur-
rent state as a stakeholder in democratic transition. At the centre of the
discussion are the practices and political values that have arguably contrib-
uted to a narrowing democratic culture over the years. It boldly argues
that this can be located in the centralist tendencies of the state, the limited
involvement of diverse civil society groups, a restrictive media environ-
ment and the conflation between state and party politics.
Part 2 opens with Bekezela Gumbo’s interrogation of the role of iden-
tity politics in Zimbabwe’s transitional politics. Chapter 6 offers a concep-
tual construction of the three group identifiers upon which identity politics
has manifested as a dominant political culture, positing that the past and
future of transition lie in its nature and extent and how it is harnessed and
utilised in the transition process. Gumbo maps out three basic clusters that
seem to vary as national transition questions bedevil the nation from time
to time. These three overriding ‘group-coalescing’ and/or ‘group identi-
fier’ strands are racist nationalism, the politics of tribal/ethnic hegemony
and the politics of liberation entitlement. It is Gumbo’s thesis that these
three group identifiers have nurtured and prolonged the existing political
culture in Zimbabwe, which has in turn shaped political transition in the
country.
Chapter 7 is by Samukele Hadebe, who posits that the ethnicisation of
politics in Zimbabwe has reached levels that both academics and policy-
makers continue to ignore—at great peril to the stability and even territo-
rial integrity of the country. Hadebe gives a historical context of ethnic
rivalry and conflict in Zimbabwe, with a particular emphasis on the ethni-
cisation of liberation movement narratives in the first instance, and also
delves deeply into perception of the pro-Mthwakazi movements. The
author is of the view that it is useful to try and understand how these
groups perceive issues, as their perceptions have a material basis. Like
Gumbo, Hadebe is concerned with exploring political mobilisation on
ethnic and regional grounds, and the possible implications for Ndebele-
speaking communities in particular and Zimbabwean politics in general.
Part 2 closes with Pedzisai Ruhanya’s examination of the challenges
brought about by the militarisation of state institutions. Militarism has
become a political culture in Zimbabwe in the same way as politicised
ethnicity. Chapter 8 posits that the overthrow of President Robert Mugabe
cannot be explained adequately by the combined military intervention
and public protests in November 2017. The story is more complex than
this, and requires careful analysis of the distinct and organised militarisa-
tion of key state institutions from 2002 to 2017 that facilitated Mugabe’s
fall. Ruhanya deploys the competitive authoritarian analytic lens to under-
stand events, while at the same time critiquing it for not enabling him to
fully address the distinct role of the military and its liberation connection
to the ruling elites. Ironically, the politicisation of the military that served
Mugabe well from 1980 until November 2017 was the same infrastruc-
ture that devoured him. He unwittingly constructed a de facto military
state led by a de jure civilian authority under his authoritarian tutelage.
The chapter shows that when military interests were threatened by Mugabe
and his wife, the security apparatus played its hand to block the rise of
dynastic and familial politics. Four zones in which power was contested
were calculatedly infiltrated by the military, thereby capturing both party
and state over the long term. The roles of the media, judiciary, electors
and legislature are examined.
Part 3 opens with Philip Pasirayi’s analysis of the intersections of media
and politics during the ‘Third Chimurenga’ in Zimbabwe. This issue was
introduced in Part I by Stanley Tsarwe—who explored the entanglement
of media, society and political culture. Chapter 9 specifically explores the
hidden strategies of media control that were deployed by ZANU–PF dur-
ing the violent seizure of white-owned farms in Zimbabwe from 2000.
The media was central in the ruling party’s efforts to justify this controver-
sial exercise. In the state media, this land redistribution was justified as the
‘Third Chimurenga’, meaning the third and final phase of the war against
colonial rule in which land was a central grievance. The chapter explores
how Professor Jonathan Moyo, the newly appointed Minister of State for
Information and Publicity, managed to manipulate journalists from the
state press through meetings, money, threats to jobs, and the creation and
dissemination of content via routine briefings, which resulted in a commit-
ted, self-policing journalistic team and a pliant state press. At the centre of
the chapter are the media briefings that were held by Moyo with journal-
ists and editors from the state press, which were a kind of political re-
education that explained what constituted the ‘national interest’ and how
this was supposed to be framed in the state media. Moyo established a
hard-working and hands-on style of management, and considered history
and culture to be an important part of the media. The chapter gives an
insight into the inner workings of the ZANU–PF media machine, showing
how it was carefully designed both institutionally and ideologically to
achieve set objectives from the perspective of hybrid regimes, and the
means and mechanisms of media control in these contexts.
Chapter 10 by Shepherd Mpofu and Trust Matsilele looks at social
media and the concept of dissidence in Zimbabwean politics. Their depar-
ture point is that most media studies in Zimbabwe since 2000 have tended
to focus on questions about politics and the economy, with much empha-
sis on how the media, both private and public, mediated state–opposition–
civil society relations. The focus has seen a dramatic shift following the
Arab Spring uprisings, from 2010 onwards, which saw social media being
credited for the toppling of most of the North African strongmen. Mpofu
and Matsilele posit that these reports failed to appreciate the human and
social relations constituted by the social media. Their argument pivots on
the relations between online and offline worlds, and the chapter demon-
strates how relations since 2000 have been mischaracterised because of a
failure to appreciate the anthropological view of state–opposition–civil
society relations. The authors note that social media comments were not
protests, juvenile insults as some scholars have argued, but rather dissi-
dence. This dissidence, they argue, has a history and is part of Zimbabwean
cultural expression that has simply morphed into social media as forms of
mediation and dariro (playground) have changed over time. Social media,
the authors say, is the same as other cultural gatherings where dissidence
has been allowed in Zimbabwean society. While focusing on the period
post-2013, they draw strong connections with earlier periods to demon-
strate the long-running thread of dissidence.
Part 3 closes with Wellington Gadzikwa’s exploration of the ‘tabloidisa-
tion’ of political news in Zimbabwe and the question of press quality.
Chapter 10 posits that the media is indispensable to the functioning of a
democracy as it is the pre-eminent vehicle for public debates in the mod-
ern public sphere(s). The conduct of the press and the ethical virtues it
projects are directly linked to its ability to enhance democracy. In
Zimbabwe, after more than two decades of political turmoil and unprec-
edented economic decline, journalistic standards have plummeted for vari-
ous reasons. The author argues that this decline in standards has taken
place owing to a process of tabloidisation of the mainstream broadsheet
newspapers. This tabloidised media negates the natural function of the
media in terms of democracy through diversion, trivialisation and sensa-
tionalisation of important issues. The core argument of this chapter is
predicated on a qualitative content analysis of and in-depth interviews
about the media coverage of the expulsion of Joice Mujuru from
ZANU–PF. Three national dailies with different owners, The Herald,

Daily News and Newsday, are studied, from October 2014 to January
2017. The chapter reveals the stark reality that news outlets have been
contaminated, and are now championing a tabloid news agenda that is
inimical to rational political debate and needs a serious rethink if it is going
to be restored to its previous function.
Part 4 opens with a chapter by Toendepi Shonhe that uses documen-
tary and historical data analysis to reveal how primitive accumulation con-
figures economic development under neo-liberalism and proposes an
inclusive transformative social policy to attain development from below.
Chapter 12 demonstrates empirically how the disarticulated pattern of
accumulation configures periphery economies, such as Zimbabwe, subsi-
dising capital by exporting wealth. This aids the further development of
the centre at the expense of the periphery. Shonhe posits that the
‘Zimbabwe is Open for Business’ economic development path exposes the
structurally disarticulated economy to intensified removal of its productive
capacity by global monopoly capital, through financialised capital accumu-
lation. Inviting speculative monopoly capitalism, unaccompanied by a
conscious attempt to reverse uneven development in the periphery, deep-
ens extroverted economic development, Shonhe argues. The new ruling
class imposed by the military coup is inclined towards promoting global
capital interests, which perpetuate imperialism and dependency. In alliance
with monopoly finance capital, the ruling class extracts considerable prof-
its by intensifying the extraction of natural mineral and agricultural
resources, adding surplus value, royalties and rents, and interest on loans
that undermine sovereign accumulation. By opening Zimbabwe for busi-
ness, under the disguise of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), but
without a deliberate plan to reverse uneven development, the ruling capi-
talists have become an extension of global capital, if not captured agents
of the latest form of imperialism. Opening Zimbabwe for business there-
fore allows the transference of surplus value through international trade,
unequal exchange in trade and unequal rewards.
Chapter 13, by Tinashe C. Chigwata and Sylvester Marumahoko, reit-
erates the point that Zimbabwe has gone through serious political, eco-
nomic and social challenges for over two decades. Once known as the
shining light of Africa, the country has dominated international headlines
for the wrong reasons. In November 2017, Zimbabwe experienced a radi-
cal change to the constitutional and political order, bringing to an end the
Mugabe era. Chigwata and Marumahoko benchmark Mnangagwa’s
regime on his promises to reform the political, economic and social fabric
of the country, including government, which is characterised by corrup-
tion, among other forms of abuse of public power. At an international
level, President Mnangagwa has initiated efforts to end Zimbabwe’s isola-
tion from the international family of nations. For Chigwata and
Marumahoko, the key question is whether the idea of a new Zimbabwe is
possible. If so, under what conditions can Zimbabwe be reborn again?
Their chapter posits that the fall of Mugabe is only the first step towards
building a new Zimbabwe, and argues that the overriding task is to dis-
mantle the Mugabe system of governance that epitomises not only the
public sector but also non-state sectors. With the right kind of leadership,
Zimbabwe has the potential to set the development and democratic pace
on the African continent.
Chapter 14 is by Lyton Ncube. It focuses on how Zimbabwe’s
Operation Restore Legacy reflected misogyny, sexism and hyper-
masculinity. Ncube posits that Zimbabwean political culture is punctuated
by (hetero)gendered traditions and tendencies, and as such pivots on the
construction of hegemonic masculinity. This reproduces and reinforces
male-gendered domination, gender exclusion, sexism and misogyny.
Theoretically, the chapter is guided by Raewyn Connell’s hegemonic mas-
culinity concept. Hegemonic masculinity refers to ‘the configuration of
gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the
problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guar-
antee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women’
(Connell 2005: 77). The chapter therefore explores gendered and sexist
discourses that manifested and played out both in the streets and digital
spaces during Operation Restore Legacy. Empirically, it reflects on the
political fates of female political figures such as Joice Mujuru and
Grace Mugabe.
Chapter 15 by Mkhululi Sibindi draws the book to a conclusion. It
deals with the Mnangagwa regime’s drive to bring Zimbabwe back to the
ambit of the international community. This re-engagement question is
examined from the specific vantage point of the endeavours made to
attract FDI in the post-Mugabe era. Sibindi argues that given the nature
of Zimbabwe’s economic and political scenarios there is no doubt that the
political competence of the new Zimbabwe government will be measured
on how a failed economy can be returned to productivity. In this context,
the new government has made an effort to reach international communi-
ties in search of FDI. What Sibindi examines is the compatibility of
Zimbabwean economy as an FDI host market. Central to his discussion is

the realisation of what FDI is and motives of multinational enterprises
(MNEs), which are agents of FDI. In view of MNEs’ motives, the discus-
sion illuminates the path dependency of investment motives from FDI and
aspects in host markets that influence the decision to invest in a specific
host market, together with the role of government in the internationalisa-
tion process.
Going Forward
A regime born of a military coup, even if it attempts to ‘civilianise’ itself
through appointing an unelected civilian figure as president and organis-
ing elections (post facto) to cover its illegitimate footprints, remains a
progeny of violence. The civilianisation process has seen key military fig-
ures, including the Commander of the Zimbabwe National Army, chang-
ing military fatigues for civilian designer suits to assume political and
government positions. The implication of all this is the direct and open
invasion of the political by the military. Thus, despite the elections of
2018, Zimbabwean politics has remained volatile and characterised by
intrigues, plots and counter-plots within the ruling party. The political
culture has become even more complex and violent.
A number of writers in this volume therefore wrestle with the funda-
mental question of the political culture of Zimbabwe and its sub-questions
of identity, militarism, patriarchy, masculinity, sexism and disdain for
democracy and human rights. These were the hallmarks of Mugabeism.
What is emerging clearly is that the Mnangagwa regime is a product of this
political culture, and because of this genealogical affinity it is very difficult
for the so-called Second Republic to make a clear break with Mugabeism.
The very act by Mnangagwa of moving the old politicians who were
Mugabe’s lieutenants for over thirty-seven years into the headquarters of
ZANU–PF to continue with the administrative aspects of the party, and to
plot its future political strategy, indicates beyond reasonable doubt that
genuine democratic reforms are not on the horizon for the
Mnangagwa regime.
Worse still, it is under the Mnangagwa regime that the military has
formally and overtly asserted its authority in the party and government.
On an economic level, the regime’s acceptance of a crude neo-liberal
framework reminiscent of the notorious Structural Adjustment
Programmes of the 1980s and 1990s reveals desperation, and surrender to
the mantra of market forces as the silver bullet for economic recovery and
economic growth. On a political level, the way the Mnangagwa govern-
ment has handled political and social protest has amounted to scoring an
own goal. Using the military to deal with civil disputes at a time when the
country’s citizens and the wider world have questions about the nature of
the Mnangagwa regime—particularly whether it is a military junta mas-
querading as a civilian government—is a sign of folly, if not a failure to
cover up the influence of the military on governance issues. Having come
to power at a time when previous ways of thinking about progressive gov-
ernance (ranging from Marxism and Third World nationalism to neo-
liberal visions) have become obsolete, the Mnangagwa regime is bound to
fall into repetition on all fronts. It is indeed not clear whether we are see-
ing old wine in new goatskins or new goatskins containing old wine.
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PART I
Colonialism, Nationalism and Political

Culture
CHAPTER 2
The Political Culture of Zimbabwe:

Continuities and Discontinuities
Rudo Gaidzanwa
Introduction
Pye and Verba (1965) defined political culture as the totality of basic val-
ues, feelings and knowledge that underlie the political process in a specific
country or environment. The manner in which citizens interact with and
experience governance institutions shapes their participation in civic and
political affairs. Thus the beliefs, opinions, emotions and experiences of
citizens, residents and members of communities are shaped by the behav-
iours of governance institutions at all levels. When governance structures
are remote and inaccessible, citizens may become alienated from them,
resulting in disconnection between the governed and the governors. In
some instances, governance structures and personnel may be authoritar-
ian, coercive and intolerant of dissent, also resulting in the alienation of
citizens from their governments. Such governance systems generate dis-
sent, protest and opposition, resulting in their destabilization, as well as
that of the structures and societies concerned. Ideally, citizens desire the
freedom to engage with those who preside over their governance systems
R. Gaidzanwa (*)
Department of Sociology, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe
© The Author(s) 2020 25

S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, P. Ruhanya (eds.), The History and Political
Transition of Zimbabwe, African Histories and Modernities,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47733-2_2
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layer"; these are the "collencytes" and "scleroblasts"; secondly, it
contains "archaeocytes," cells of independent origin.
Collencytes are cells with clear protoplasm and thread-like

pseudopodial processes; they are distinguished as stellate or bipolar,
according as these processes are many or only two. Scleroblasts or
spicule cells are at first rounded, but become elongated with the
growth of the spicule they secrete, and when fully grown are
consequently fusiform.
Fig. 65.—Diagrammatic section of a siliceous Sponge. a.p, Apopyle; d.o, dermal

ostia; ex.c, excurrent, or exhalant canal; in.c, incurrent canal; o, osculum.
(Modified from Wilson.)
Each spicule consists of an organic filamentar axis or axial fibre

around which sheaths of silica hydrate are deposited successively by
the scleroblast. Over the greater length of the spicule the sheaths
are cylindrical, but at each end they taper to a point. The axial canal
in which the axial fibre lies is open at both ends, and the fibre is
continuous at these two points with an organic sheath, which invests
the entire spicule. From this structure we may conclude that the
spicule grows at both ends—i.e. it grows in two opposite directions
along one line—it has two rays lying in one axis, and is classed
among uniaxial diactinal spicules. Being pointed at both ends it
receives the special name oxea. The lamination of the spicule is
rendered much more distinct by heating or treatment with caustic
potash.[197]
Fig. 66.—Cut end of a length of a siliceous spicule from Hyalonema sieboldii,
with the lamellar structure revealed by solution. × 104. (After Sollas.)
The archaeocytes are rounded amoeboid cells early set apart in the
larva; they are practically undifferentiated blastomeres. Some of
them become reproductive elements, and thus afford a good
instance of "continuity of germ plasm," others probably perform
excretory functions.[198]
Fig. 67.—Free-swimming larva of Gellius varius, in optical section. a, Outer

epithelium; pi, pigment; x, hinder pole. (After Maas.)
The reproductive elements are ova and spermatozoa, and are to be

found in all stages in the dermal jelly. Dendy states that the eggs are
fertilised in the inhalant canals, to which position they migrate by
amoeboid movements, and there become suspended by a peduncle.
The larva has unfortunately not been described, but as the course of
development among the near relatives of H. panicea is known to be
fairly constant, it will be convenient to give a description of a
"Halichondrine type" of larva based on Maas' account of the
development of Gellius varius.[199] The free-swimming larvae escape
by the osculum; they are minute oval bodies moving rapidly by
means of a covering of cilia. The greater part of the body is a
dazzling white, while the hinder pole is of a brown violet colour. This
coloured patch is non-ciliate, the general covering of cilia ending at
its edge in a ring of cilia twice the length of the others. Forward
movement takes place in a screw line; when this ceases the larva
rests on its hinder pole, and the cilia cause it to turn round on its
axis.
Sections show that the larva is built up of two layers:—
1. "The inner mass," consisting of various kinds of cells in a

gelatinous matrix.
2. A high flagellated epithelium, which entirely covers the larva with

the exception of the hinder pole.
Fig. 68.—Longitudinal section through the hinder pole of the larva of G. varius. a,
Flagellated cells; ma1, undifferentiated cell; ma2, differentiated cell; pi,
pigment; x, surface of hinder pole. (After Maas.)
The cells in the inner mass are classified into (1) undifferentiated
cells, recognised by their nucleus, which possesses a nucleolus;
these are the archaeocytes; (2) differentiated cells, of which the
nucleus contains a chromatin net; these give rise to pinacocytes,
collencytes, and scleroblasts. Some of them form a flat epithelium,
which covers the hinder pole. Some of the scleroblasts already
contain spicules. Fixation occurs very early. The front pole is used
for attachment, the pigmented pole becoming the distal end (Fig.
69). The larva flattens out, the margin of the attached end is
produced into radiating pseudopodial processes. The flagellated
cells retreat to the interior, leaving the inner mass exposed, and
some of its cells thereupon form a flat outer epithelium. This is the
most important process of the metamorphosis; it is followed by a
pause in the outward changes, coinciding in time with
rearrangements of the internal cells to give rise to the canal system;
that is to say, lacunae arise in the inner mass, pinacocytes pass to
the surface of the lacunae, and form their lining; the flagellated cells,
which have lain in confusion, become grouped in small clusters.
These become flagellated chambers, communications are
established between the various portions of the canal system, and its
external apertures arise. There is at first only one osculum. The
larvae may be obtained by keeping the parent sponge in a dish of
sea water, shielded from too bright a light, and surrounded by a
second dish of water to keep the temperature constant. They will
undergo metamorphosis in sea water which is constantly changed,
and will live for some days.
We have said that the young sponge has only one osculum. This is
the only organ which is present in unit number, and it is natural to
ask whether perhaps the osculum may not be taken as a mark of the
individual; whether the fistular specimens, for example, of H. panicea
may not be solitary individuals, and the cockscomb and other forms
colonies in which the individuals are merged to different degrees.
Into the metaphysics of such a view we cannot enter here. We must
be content to refer to the views of Huxley and of Spencer on
Individuality.
But it is advisable to avoid speaking of a multi-osculate sponge as a

colony of many individuals, even in the sense in which it is usual to
speak of a colony of polyps as formed of individuals. The repetition
of oscula is probably to be regarded as an example of the
phenomenon of repetition of parts, the almost universal occurrence
of which has been emphasised by Bateson.[200] Delage[201] has
shown that when two sponge larvae fixed side by side fuse together,
the resulting product has but one osculum. This, though seeming to
bear out our point of view, loses weight in this connexion, when it is
recalled that two Echinoderm larvae fused together give rise in a
later stage to but one individual.
Fig. 69.—Larva of Gellius varius shortly after fixation. The pigmented pole,
originally posterior, is turned towards the reader. R, Marginal membrane
with pseudopodia; x, hinder pole. (After Maas.)
Ephydatia fluviatilis.
In the fresh water of our rivers, ponds, and lakes, sponges are
represented very commonly by Ephydatia (Spongilla) fluviatilis, a
cosmopolitan species. The search for specimens is most likely to be
successful if perpendicular timbers such as lock-gates are examined,
or the underside of floating logs or barges, or overhanging branches
of trees which dip beneath the surface of the water.
The sponge is sessile and massive, seldom forming branches, and is

often to be found in great luxuriance of growth, masses of many
pounds weight having been taken off barges in the Thames. The
colour ranges from flesh-tint to green, according to the exposure to
light. This fact is dealt with in a most interesting paper by Professor
Lankester,[202] who has shown not only that the green colour is due
to the presence of chlorophyll, but that the colouring matter is
contained in corpuscles similar to the chlorophyll corpuscles of green
plants, and, further, that the flesh-coloured specimens contain
colourless corpuscles, which, though differing in shape from those
which contain the green pigment, are in all probability converted into
these latter under the influence of sufficient light. The corpuscles,
both green and colourless, are contained in amoeboid cells of the
dermal layer;[203] and in the same cells but not in the corpuscles are
to be found amyloid substances.
The anatomy of Ephydatia fluviatilis is very similar to that of
Halichondria panicea, differing only in one or two points of
importance. The ectosome is an aspiculous membrane of dermal
tissue covering the whole exterior of the sponge and forming the roof
of a continuous subdermal space. This dermal membrane is
perforated by innumerable ostia, and is supported above the
subdermal cavity by means of skeletal strands, which traverse the
subdermal cavity and raise the dermal membrane into tent-like
elevations, termed conuli. The inhalant canals which arise from the
floor of the subdermal cavity are as irregular as in H. panicea, and
interdigitate with equally irregular exhalant canals; these latter
communicate with the oscular tubes. Between the two sets of canals
are the thin folds of the choanosome with its small subspherical
chambers provided with widely open apopyles (Fig. 70). The soft
parts are supported on a siliceous skeleton of oxeas, which may
have a quite smooth surface or may be covered in various degrees
with minute conical spines (Fig. 72, a, b). These spicules are
connected by means of a substance termed spongin deposited
around their overlapping ends, so as to form an irregular network of
strands, of which some may be distinguished as main strands or
fibres, others as connecting fibres. In the main fibres several
spicules lie side by side, while in the connecting fibres fewer or
frequently single spicules form the thickness of the fibre. The fibres
are continuous at the base with a plate or skin of spongin, which is
secreted over the lower surface of the sponge and intervenes
between it and the substratum. Of the chemical composition of
spongin we shall speak later (see p. 237). It is a substance which
reaches a great importance in some of the higher sponges, and
forms the entire skeleton of certain kinds of bath sponge. Lying loose
in the soft parts and hence termed flesh spicules, or microscleres,
are minute spicules of peculiar form. These are the amphidiscs,
consisting of a shaft with a many-rayed disc at each end (Fig. 72).
Fig. 70.—Ephydatia fluviatilis. Section of flagellated chamber, showing the
choanocytes passing through the apopyle. (After Vosmaer and
Pekelharing.)
In addition to its habitat the fresh-water sponge is worthy of attention

on account of its methods of reproduction, which have arisen in
adaptation to the habitat. A similar adaptation is widespread among
fresh-water members of most aquatic invertebrates.[204]
Ephydatia fluviatilis normally produces not only free-swimming larvae

of sexual origin, but also internal gemmules arising asexually. These
bodies appear in autumn, distributed throughout the sponge, often
more densely in the deeper layers, and they come into activity only
after the death of the parent, an event which happens in this climate
at the approach of winter.
Fig. 71.—Portion of the skeletal framework of E. fluviatilis. a, Main fibres; b,

connecting fibres. (After Weltner.)
Fig. 72.—Spicules of E. fluviatilis. a. b. c. Oxeas, spined and smooth; d. e,
amphidiscs, side and end views. (After Potts.)
Weltner[205] has shown that on the death and disintegration of the

mother sponge some of the gemmules remain attached to the old
skeleton, some sink and some float. Those which remain attached
are well known to reclothe the dead fibres with living tissue. They
inherit, as it were, the advantages of position, which contributed to
the survival of the parent, as one of the selected fittest. The
gemmules which sink are doubtless rolled short distances along the
bottom, while those which float have the opportunity of widely
distributing the species with the risk of being washed out to sea. But
even these floating gemmules are exposed to far less dangers than
the delicate free-swimming larvae, for their soft parts are protected
from shocks by a thick coat armed with amphidiscs.
The gemmules are likewise remarkable for their powers of resistance

to climatic conditions, powers which must contribute in no small way
to the survival of a species exposed to the variable temperatures of
fresh water. Thus, if the floating gemmules or the parent skeleton
with its attached and dormant offspring should chance to be included
in the surface layer of ice during the winter, so far from suffering any
evil consequences they appear to benefit by these conditions. Both
Potts and Weltner have confirmed the truth of this statement by
experiments. Weltner succeeded in rearing young from gemmules
which had suffered a total exposure of 17 days to a temperature
"under 0° C."
Of important bearing on the question of the utility of the gemmules
are certain instances in which E. fluviatilis has been recorded as
existing in a perennial condition.[206] The perennial individuals may
or may not bear gemmules, which makes it evident that, with the
acquisition of the power to survive the winter cold, the prime
necessity of forming these bodies vanishes.
The perennial specimens are described as exhibiting a diminished

vegetative activity in winter, the flagellated chambers may be absent
(Lieberkühn), or present in unusually small numbers (Weltner), the
entire canal system may be absent (Metschnikoff), or, on the other
hand, it may be complete except for the osculum.
Fig. 73.—Gemmule of E. fluviatilis. b, Amphidisc. (After Potts.)
In tropical countries gemmulation occurs as a defence against the

ravages caused by the dry season when the waters recede down
their banks, exposing all or most of their sponge inhabitants to the
direct rays of the sun. The sponges are at once killed, but the
contained gemmules being thoroughly dried, become efficient
distributing agents of the species; they are light enough to be carried
on the wind. It is probable that those individual sponges which
escape desiccation survive the dry season without forming
gemmules.
It has been shown experimentally that gemmules are not injured by

drying—Zykoff found that gemmules kept dry for a period of two
years had not lost the power of germination.
The mature gemmules consist of a more or less spherical mass of

cells, which we shall refer to as yolk cells, and of a complex coat.
The latter is provided with a pore or pore tube (Fig. 74) which is
closed in winter by an organic membrane.
There are three layers in the coat: an inner chitinous layer

surrounded by an air-chamber layer, which is finely vesicular,
showing a structure recalling plant tissue, and containing amphidiscs
arranged along radii passing through the centre of the gemmule.
One of the discs of each amphidisc lies in the inner chitinous coat,
while the other lies in a similar membrane which envelopes the air-
chamber layer and is termed the outer chitinous coat.
Marshall has suggested that one function of the amphidiscs is to

weight the gemmules and thus protect them against the force of the
river current; and no doubt the sinking or floating of individual
gemmules depends on the relative degree of development of the air-
chambers and of the amphidiscs.
A study of the development of Ephydatia gemmules vividly illustrates

various characters of the inner processes of sponges. Specially
noteworthy are the migrations of cells and the slight extent to which
division of labour is carried: one and the same cell will be found to
perform various functions.
Fig. 74.—Part of a longitudinal section of a gemmule of Ephydatia sp. passing

through the pore (a). (After Potts.)
The beginning of a gemmule is first recognisable[207] as a small

cluster of amoeboid archaeocytes in the dermal membrane. These
move into the deeper parts of the sponge to form larger groups.
They are the essential part of the gemmule, the yolk cells, which,
when germination takes place, give rise to a new sponge. They are
followed by two distinct troops of actively moving cells. Those
forming the first troop arrange themselves round the yolk cells and
ultimately assume a columnar form so that they make an epithelioid
layer. They then secrete the inner chitinous coat. The cells of the
second troop are entrusted with the nutrition of the gemmule.
Consequently they pass in among the yolk cells, distribute their food
supplies, and make their escape by returning into the tissues of the
mother sponge, before the columnar cells have completed the
chitinous coat. Yet another migration now occurs, the cells
—"scleroblasts"—which have been occupied in secreting amphidiscs
at various stations in the sponge, carry the fully formed spicules to
the gemmules and place them radially round the yolk cells between
the radially lying cells of the columnar layer. The scleroblasts
themselves remain with the amphidiscs, and becoming modified,
contribute to the formation of the air-chamber layer. The columnar
cells now creep out between the amphidiscs till their inner ends rest
on the outer ends of these spicules. They then secrete the outer
chitinous coat and return to the mother sponge.
Carter gives directions[208] for obtaining young sponges from the

gemmules. The latter should be removed from the parent, cleaned
by rolling in a handkerchief, and then placed in water in a watch-
glass, protected with a glass cover and exposed to sunlight. In a few
days the contents of the gemmule issue from the foramen and can
be seen as a white speck. A few hours later the young sponge is
already active and may be watched producing aqueous currents. At
this age the sponge is an excellent object for studying in the living
condition: being both small and transparent it affords us an
opportunity of watching the movements of particles of carmine as
they are carried by the current through the chambers.
Potts[209] describes how he has followed the transportal of spicules

by dermal cells, the end of each spicule multiplying the motion,
swaying like an oscillating rod.
In E. fluviatilis reproduction also occurs during the warmer months in

this climate by means of sexual larvae. These are interesting for
certain aberrant features in their metamorphosis.[210] While some of
the flagellated chambers are formed in the normal way from the
flagellated cells of the larva, others arise each by division of a single
archaeocyte. This, it is suggested, is correlated with the acquisition
of the method of reproduction by gemmules, the peculiarities (i.e.
development of organs from archaeocytes) of which are appearing in
the larvae.
Definition.—We may now define sponges as multicellular, two-

layered animals; with pores perforating the body-walls and admitting
a current of water, which is set up by the collared cells of the
"gastral" layer.
Position in the Animal Kingdom.—Sponges are the only

multicellular animals which possess choanocytes, and their mode of
feeding is unique. Since they are two-layered it has been sought to
associate them with the Metazoan phylum Coelenterata, but they are
destitute of nematocysts or any other form of stinging cell, and their
generative cells arise from a class of embryonic cells set apart from
the first, while the generative cells of Coelenterata are derived from
the ectoderm, or in other cases from the endoderm. These weighty
differences between sponges and that group of Metazoa to which
they would, if of Metazoan nature at all, be most likely to show
resemblance, suggest that we should seek a separate origin for
sponges and Metazoa. We naturally turn to the Choanoflagellate
Infusorian stock (see p. 121) as the source of Porifera, leaving the
Ciliate stock as the progenitors of Metazoa.
That both Porifera and Metazoa are reproduced by ova and

spermatozoa is no objection to this view, seeing that the occurrence
of similar reproductive cells has been demonstrated in certain
Protozoa (see pp. 100, 128).
Let us now see which view is borne out by facts of embryology.

Suppose, for the moment, we regard sponges as Metazoa, then if
the sponge larva be compared with the Metazoan larva we must
assign the large granular cells to the endoderm; the flagellated cells
to the ectoderm; and we are led to the anomalous statement that the
digestive cells in the adult are ectodermal, the covering, outer cells
endodermal; or conversely, if we start our comparisons with the
adults, then it follows that the larval ectoderm has the characters of
an endoderm, and the larval endoderm those of an ectoderm.
Thus both embryology and morphology lead us to the same point,

they both show that in the absence of any fundamental agreement
between Porifera and Metazoa it is necessary to regard the two
stocks as independent from the very first, and hence the name
Parazoa (Sollas) has been given to the group which contains the
Porifera as its only known phylum.
Interesting in connexion with the phylogeny of Parazoa is the

Choanoflagellate genus Proterospongia (Fig. 75), described by
Saville Kent, and since rediscovered both in England and abroad.
[211] This is a colony of unicellular individuals embedded in a
common jelly. The individuals at the surface are choanoflagellate,
while in the interior the cells are rounded or amoeboid, and some of
them undergo multiple fission to form reproductive cells. This is just
such a creature as we might imagine that ancestral stage to have
been of which the free-swimming sponge larva is a reminiscence: for
we have seen that the flagellated cells of the larva are potential
choanocytes.
Fig. 75.—Proterospongia haeckeli. a, Amoeboid cell; b, a cell dividing; c, cell with
small collar; z, jelly. × 800. (After S. Kent.)
CHAPTER VIII
PORIFERA (CONTINUED): FORMS OF SPICULES—CALCAREA—

HOMOCOELA—HETEROCOELA—HEXACTINELLIDA—DEMOSPONGIAE—
TETRACTINELLIDA—MONAXONIDA—CERATOSA—KEY TO BRITISH
GENERA OF SPONGES
Sponges fall naturally into two branches differing in the size of their
choanocytes: in the Megamastictora these cells are relatively
large, varying from 5µ to 9µ in diameter; in Micromastictora they
are about 3µ in diameter.[212] For further subdivision of the group the
spicules are such important weapons in the hands of the
systematist that it is convenient to name them according to a
common scheme. This has been arrived at by considering first the
number of axes along which the main branches of the spicules are
distributed, and secondly whether growth has occurred in each of
these axes in one or both directions from a point of origin.[213]
I. Monaxons.—Spicules of rod-like form, in which growth is directed

from a single origin in one or both directions along a single axis. The
axis of any spicule is not necessarily straight, it may be curved or
undulating. The ray or rays are known as actines.
Biradiate monaxon spicules are termed "rhabdi" (Fig. 76, a). A

rhabdus pointed at both ends is an "oxea," rounded at both ends a
"strongyle," knobbed at both ends a "tylote." By branching a rhabdus
may become a "triaene" (Fig. 110, k, l).
Uniradiate monaxon spicules are termed "styli."

II. Tetraxons.—Spicules in which growth proceeds from an origin in
one direction only, along four axes arranged as normals to the faces
of a regular tetrahedron. Forms produced by growth from an origin in
one direction along three axes lying in one plane are classed with
tetraxons.
III. Triaxons.—Spicules in which growth is directed from an origin in

both directions along three rectangular axes. One or more actines or
one or two axes may be suppressed.
IV. Polyaxons.—Spicules in which radiate growth from a centre

proceeds in several directions.
V. Spheres.—Spicules in which growth is concentric about the origin.
A distinction more fundamental than that of form is afforded by the

chemical composition: all sponges having spicules composed of
calcium carbonate belong to a single class, Calcarea, which stands
alone in the branch Megamastictora.
Fig. 76.—Types of megascleres. a, Rhabdus (monaxon diactine); b, stylus

(monaxon monactine); c, triod (tetraxon triactine); d, calthrop (tetraxon
tetractine); e, triaxon hexactine; f, euaster.
BRANCH I. MEGAMASTICTORA
CLASS CALCAREA
Calcarea are marine shallow-water forms attached for the most part
directly by the basal part of the body or occasionally by the
intervention of a stalk formed of dermal tissue. They are almost all
white or pale grey brown in colour. Their spicules are either monaxon
or tetraxon or both. The tetraxons are either quadriradiate and then
called "calthrops," or triradiate when the fourth actine is absent. The
triradiates always lie more or less tangentially in the body-wall;
similarly three rays of a calthrop are tangentially placed, the fourth
lying across the thickness of the wall. It is convenient to include the
triradiate and the three tangentially placed rays of a calthrop under
the common term "triradiate system" (Minchin). The three rays of
one of these systems may all be equal in length and meet at equal
angles: in this case the system is "regular." Or one ray or one angle
may differ in size from the other rays or angles respectively, which
are equal: in either of these two cases the system is bilaterally
symmetrical and is termed "sagittal." A special name "alate" is given
to those systems which are sagittal in consequence of the inequality
in the angles. Thus all equiangular systems whether sagittal or not
are opposed to those which are alate. This is the natural
classification.[214]
Sub-Class I. Homocoela.
The Homocoela or Ascons possess the simplest known type of canal
system, and by this they are defined. The body is a sac, branched in
the adult, but simple in the young; its continuous cavity is
everywhere lined with choanocytes, its wall is traversed by inhalant
pores, and its cavity opens to the exterior at the distal end by an
osculum. The simple sac-like young is the well-known Olynthus of
Haeckel—the starting-point from which all sponges seem to have set
out. Two processes are involved in the passage from the young to
the adult, namely, multiplication of oscula and branching of the
original Olynthus tube or sac. If the formation of a new osculum is
accompanied by fission of the sac, and the branching of the latter is
slight, there arises an adult formed of a number of erect, well
separated main tubes, each with one osculum and lateral branches.
Such is the case in the Leucosoleniidae. In the Clathrinidae, on
the other hand, branching of the Olynthus is complicated, giving rise
to what is termed reticulate body form, that is, a sponge body
consisting of a network of tubules with several oscula, but with no
external indication of the limits between the portions drained by each
osculum. These outward characters form a safe basis for
classification, because they are correlated with other fundamental
differences in structure and development.[215]
As in Halichondria, and in fact all sponges, the body-wall is formed of

two layers; the gastral layer, as we have said, forming a continuous
lining to the Ascon tube and its branches. The dermal layer includes
a complete outer covering of pinacocytes, which is reflected over the
oscular rim to meet the gastral layer at the distal end of the tube; a
deeper gelatinous stratum in which lie scleroblasts and their
secreted products—calcareous spicules; and finally porocytes.[216]
These last are cells which traverse the whole thickness of the thin
body-wall, and are perforated by a duct or pore. The porocytes are
contractile, and so the pores may be opened or closed; they are a
type of cell which is known only in Calcarea. It will be noticed that the
fusiform or stellate "connective tissue cells" are absent. The layer of
pinacocytes as a whole is highly contractile, and is capable of
diminishing the size of the sponge to such an extent as quite to
obliterate temporarily the gastral cavity.[217]
The choanocytes show certain constant differences in structure in

the families Clathrinidae and Leucosoleniidae respectively. In the
former, the nucleus of the choanocyte is basal; in the latter, it is
apical, and the flagellum can be traced down to it (Fig. 77).
Fig. 77.—The two types of Asconid collar cells. A, of Clathrina, nucleus basal; B,
of Leucosolenia, nucleus not basal, flagellum arising from the nuclear
membrane. (A, after Minchin; B, after Bidder.)
The tetraxon spicules have "equiangular" triradiate systems in the

Clathrinidae, while in Leucosoleniidae they are "alate." Finally, the
larva of Clathrinidae is a "parenchymula" (see p. 226), that of
Leucosoleniidae an "amphiblastula."
The fact that it is possible to classify the Calcarea Homocoela largely

by means of histological characters is in accordance with the
importance of the individual cell as opposed to the cell-layers
generally throughout the Porifera, and is interesting in serving to
emphasise the low grade of organisation of the Phylum. The organs
of sponges are often unicellular (pores), or the products of the
activity of a single cell (many skeletal elements); and even in the
gastral layer, which approaches nearly to an epithelium, comparable
with the epithelia of Metazoa, the component cells still seem to
assert their independence, the flagella not lashing in concert,[218] but
each in its own time and direction.
Sub-Class II. Heterocoela.
Fig. 78.—Transverse section of the body-wall of Sycon carteri, showing articulate

tubar skeleton, gastric ostia (a.p), tufts of oxeas at the distal ends of the
chambers (fl.ch), and pores (p). (After Dendy.)
Fig. 79.—Sycon coronatum. At a a portion of the wall is removed, exposing the
paragaster and the gastric ostia of the chambers opening into it.
The Heterocoela present a series of forms of successive grades of

complexity, all derivable from the Ascons, from which they differ in
having a discontinuous gastral layer. The simplest Heterocoela are
included in the family Sycettidae, of which the British representative
is Sycon (Fig. 79). In Sycon numerous tubular flagellated chambers
are arranged radially round a central cavity, the "paragaster," into
which they open (Figs. 78, 79). The chambers, which are here often
called radial tubes, are close set, leaving more or less quadrangular
tubular spaces, the inhalant canals, between them; and where the
walls of adjacent chambers come in contact, fusion may take place.
Pores guarded by porocytes put the inhalant canals into
communication with the flagellated chambers. The paragaster is
lined by pinacocytes; choanocytes are confined to the flagellated
chambers.
The skeleton is partly defensive, partly supporting; one set of

spicules strengthens the walls of the radial tubes and forms
collectively the "tubar skeleton." It is characteristic of Sycettidae that
the tubar skeleton is of the type known as "articulate"—i.e. it is
formed of a number of successive rings of spicules, instead of
consisting of a single ring of large spicules which run the whole
length of the tube.
Fig. 80.—Sycon setosum. Young Sponge. × 200. d, Dermal cell; g, gastral cell; o,
osculum; p, pore cell; sp1, monaxon; sp3, triradiate spicule. (After Maas.)
The walls of the paragaster are known as the "gastral cortex"; they
contain quadriradiate spicules, of which the triradiate systems lie
tangentially in the gastral cortex, while the apical ray projects into the
paragaster, and is no doubt defensive. The distal ends of the
chambers bristle with tufts of oxeate spicules, and the separate
chambers are distinguishable in surface view. It is interesting to
notice that in some species of Sycon, the gaps between the distal
ends of the chambers are covered over by a delicate perforated
membrane, thus leading on, as we shall see presently, to the next
stage of advance.[219] The larva of Sycon is an amphiblastula (see
p. 227). Fig. 80 is a drawing of the young sponge soon after fixation;
it would pass equally well for an ideally simple Ascon or, neglecting
the arrangement of the spicules, for an isolated radial tube of Sycon.
Figs. 81, 82 show the same sponge, somewhat older. From them it is
seen that the Sycon type is produced from the young individual, in
what may be called its Ascon stage, by a process of outgrowth of
tubes from its walls, followed by restriction of choanocytes to the
flagellated chambers. Minute observation has shown[220] that this
latter event is brought about by immigration of pinacocytes from the
exterior. These cells creep through the jelly of the dermal layer and

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The History and Political Transition of

Zimbabwe: From Mugabe to

The History and

More information about this series at

The History and

African Histories and Modernities

Cover illustration: Getty images

Zimbabwe’s sole political leader since independence in 1980, Robert

remains an important and productive intellectual pursuit, even if it has

St Antony’s College, Oxford

1 Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe: From Robert

Part I Colonialism, Nationalism and Political Culture 23

2 The Political Culture of Zimbabwe: Continuities and

3 The Zimbabwean National Question: Key Components

4 Opposition Politics and the Culture of Polarisation in

5 Understanding Zimbabwe’s Political Culture: Media and

Part II Identity, Militarisation and Transitional Politics 133

6 The Identity Politics Factor in Zimbabwe’s Transition

7 The Ethnicization of Political Mobilization in Zimbabwe:

8 The Militarisation of State Institutions in Zimbabwe,

Part III Social Media, Democracy and Political Discourse 205

9 The Media and Politics in the Context of the “Third

10 Social Media and the Concept of Dissidence in

11 The Tabloidization of Political News in Zimbabwe: End

Part IV Post-Mugabe Economy, Gender and Operation

12 Primitive Accumulation and Mugabe’s Extroverted

13 The Idea of a New Zimbabwe Post-Mugabe299

14 Misogyny, Sexism and Hegemonic Masculinity in

15 Foreign Direct Investment in the Post-Mugabe Era359

Tinashe C. Chigwata is a senior researcher at the Dullah Omar Institute

(ed., 2001) and A Beautiful Strength: A Journal of Eighty Years of Women’s

Crimes Tribunal. Between 2003 and 2006 he worked with the UN in

Would We Be Without Them?” Rural Intellectuals in the State and NGOs

Stanley Tsarwe is a senior lecturer in Journalism and Media Studies at

Fig. 6.1 A systems analysis of identity politics in Zimbabwe transition

Table 4.1 Results of the top three candidates in presidential elections

Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe:

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Pedzisai Ruhanya

It would seem that the age of revolutions is over, to be succeeded by the

© The Author(s) 2020 1

that led Thandika Mkandawire (2016) to write of ‘transition overload’.

government was in charge, as ‘Zimbabwe’s gruelling transition’. This was

The concept of entanglement, as articulated by Sarah Nuttall (2009:

• The invention of a ‘party-state’ and a ‘party-nation’ (see Kriger 2003);

• Naturalised and routinised rule by violence and coercion;

The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it, in

Blaming and railing against imperialism became a key trope of

he meditated on questions of liberation and freedom in Zimbabwe. But

I refuse to accept that we cannot do better than we have so far done, or to

Mugabeism’s mantra of ‘I died for you’ (by ‘right of liberating you’),

The November 2017 Military Coup and the Rise

In an ironic political twist, the veteran leader of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe,

Brian Raftopolous (2019) summarised the three-pronged strategy that

The Mnangagwa Regime: Second Republic or

following an increase in the price of petrol. The health sector is character-

Organisation of the Book

change. Chapter 2 is by Rudo B. Gaidzanwa—a leading Zimbabwean

ZANU–PF. Three national dailies with different owners, The Herald,

Zimbabwean economy as an FDI host market. Central to his discussion is

Mkandawire, T. 2016. Zimbabwe’s Transition Overload: An Interpretation.

Rupiya, M. 2005. Zimbabwe: Government Through Military Operations. Africa

Colonialism, Nationalism and Political

The Political Culture of Zimbabwe:

1 Introduction: Transition in Zimbabwe: From Robert

Part I Colonialism, Nationalism and Political Culture 23

2 The Political Culture of Zimbabwe: Continuities and

3 The Zimbabwean National Question: Key Components

4 Opposition Politics and the Culture of Polarisation in

5 Understanding Zimbabwe’s Political Culture: Media and

Part II Identity, Militarisation and Transitional Politics 133

6 The Identity Politics Factor in Zimbabwe’s Transition

7 The Ethnicization of Political Mobilization in Zimbabwe:

8 The Militarisation of State Institutions in Zimbabwe,

Part III Social Media, Democracy and Political Discourse 205

9 The Media and Politics in the Context of the “Third

10 Social Media and the Concept of Dissidence in

11 The Tabloidization of Political News in Zimbabwe: End

Part IV Post-Mugabe Economy, Gender and Operation

12 Primitive Accumulation and Mugabe’s Extroverted

13 The Idea of a New Zimbabwe Post-Mugabe299

14 Misogyny, Sexism and Hegemonic Masculinity in

15 Foreign Direct Investment in the Post-Mugabe Era359