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Digital International
Relations
Edited by
Andrey Baykov · Elena Zinovieva
Digital International Relations
Andrey Baykov · Elena Zinovieva
Editors
Digital International
Relations
Editors
Andrey Baykov Elena Zinovieva
MGIMO University MGIMO University
Moscow, Russia Moscow, Russia
ISBN 978-981-99-3466-9 ISBN 978-981-99-3467-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3467-6
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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Introduction
The past couple of decades have seen an exponential growth in digital

technologies, leading to dramatic change in the international political,
economic, and social landscape. The surge of cyberspace as a new domain
of global politics and its far-reaching implications have sparked heated
debates among scholars and policymakers. The book “Digital Interna-
tional Relations” serves as a comprehensive, yet reflective guide into the
ongoing digital revolution and its multifaceted ramifications for world
politics.
The advent of the digital era has imbued international relations with
previously unobserved dynamism. It has reshaped diplomacy, global
governance, and cybersecurity, extending its influence to non-traditional
areas like business models, payment systems, and taxation. It has brought
new actors into play and pushed existing ones to adapt to the digital
age, precipitating a paradigmatic shift in the theoretical and empirical
understanding of international relations.
The chapters of this book, grouped into six parts, encapsulate the
nuances and complexities of these transformations, with each part high-
lighting a unique characteristic of the digital dimension of contemporary
IR.
Part I sheds light on the role of Russia in Digital International
Relations, focusing on Russian businesses’ role in international cyberse-
curity, digital transformation of business models, the evolution of Russian
payment systems, and the development of artificial intelligence.
v
vi INTRODUCTION
In Part II, the book takes an analytical journey into the concept
of sovereignty in cyberspace. It discusses sovereignty as a practice in
the digital age, comparing American and Russian conceptions of cyber
sovereignty, and the implications of digital space for the principle of
sovereignty in international law.
Part III explores the interplay between the digital world and legal
norms. It elucidates the problems of legal regulation of digitalization,
with a special focus on artificial intelligence, and discusses the digitaliza-
tion of taxation in Russia and the implications of the digital economy for
financial law. It ends with an assessment of the risks associated with the
development of information and communication technologies in interna-
tional criminal law. As the book covers the legal aspects of digitalization,
it illuminates the issues of legal regulation of this emerging domain, espe-
cially with innovations like artificial intelligence. The authors provide an
refreshing look at how law and policy struggle to keep pace with techno-
logical advancement, addressing issues ranging from the digitalization of
the tax sphere in Russia to the evolving role of financial law in the era of
digital economy.
Part IV investigates the economic aspects of digital international
relations. It talks about digital employment platforms, the impact of digi-
talization on Eurasian industrial performance, and the role of “green”
investment in renewable energy in the context of digitalization. It also
presents an overview of the world robotics market’s key characteristics
and trends. With the exponential growth of digital platforms, the global
economy has experienced a seismic shift, a theme that the fourth part
of the book meticulously unpacks. This exploration is augmented by a
discussion on the new forms of digital employment, sustainable devel-
opment within the Eurasian industrial sphere, and the role of green
investments within the digital era.
Part V is devoted to the role of digital technologies in education and
research in international relations. With respect to digital education, it
offers an examination of hybrid learning, the evolution of digital educa-
tion, and the efficiency of distance and traditional academic activities in
teaching English language to students of international economic rela-
tions. Regarding the new dimensions of the digital research in the field
of international politics, it delves into the use of network data analysis
in researching political groups. The significance of digital technology in
transforming education and research is another pivotal theme that this
book touches upon. Hybrid learning, digital education, and the efficiency
INTRODUCTION vii
of distance learning are just a few aspects of this digital metamorphosis

in the field of education. The impact of these transformations on inter-
national relations studies and how they redefine ways in which academic
research and interaction are carried out is a crucial component of this
analysis.
Finally, Part VI is concerned with the digital transformation of diplo-
macy and international organizations. It discusses global cyberspace
governance from the perspective of the BRICS countries and looks at
the digital dimension of the Eurasian Economic Union’s financial inte-
gration. It also includes a unique chapter reviewing the use of video
games in diplomacy. By looking at the digital transformation of diplo-
macy and international organizations, the book helps readers understand
how the advent of digital technology has not only changed the methods
of diplomacy but also challenged the traditional structures of international
governance. From the BRICS’ perspectives on cyberspace governance to
the exploration of video games in diplomacy, this section offers a glimpse
into the future of international relations in the digital era. These chapters
underscore how traditional concepts and practices are being challenged,
reinvented, and sometimes, replaced.
Through these diverse yet interconnected chapters, this book stresses
the importance of understanding the various manifestations of digital
international relations. As digital technology continues to evolve at a rapid
pace, the need for a more comprehensive, nuanced, and future-oriented
understanding of its impact on international relations becomes all the
more crucial. The volume “Digital International Relations” contributes
to this essential understanding, providing readers with a rich, multi-
dimensional view of the transformations taking place in the international
arena. It not only broadens our understanding of the scope and impact of
digital technologies but also demonstates how the international commu-
nity can navigate this digital age more effectively and equitably.
In this hyper-connected reality, it becomes crucial to understand how
digital technologies are redrawing power dynamics, sovereignty, and
diplomacy. In a world fraught with challenges like cybersecurity threats,
disinformation campaigns, and the digital divide, understanding how to
navigate the digital landscape becomes a matter of national security,
economic prosperity, and social well-being. “Digital International Rela-
tions” brings this understanding into sharp focus, shedding light on the
strategies that nations like Russia employ in the face of international sanc-
tions, as well as how these digital strategies redefine the conceptions of
viii INTRODUCTION
sovereignty in cyberspace. This book is not just a reflection of our current

digital reality, but also a roadmap to navigate the future trajectories of
digital international relations.
As digital technologies increasingly permeate our lives, the distinction
between the physical and digital worlds blurs. “Digital International Rela-
tions” also poses vital questions that warrant further debate and research.
How will the ongoing digital revolution reshape global power structures?
How can nations maintain their sovereignty while navigating complex
digital landscapes? How will digitalization transform legal norms and
economic systems? And perhaps most importantly, how can we ensure
that the digital revolution fosters inclusive, equitable, and sustainable
growth?
This volumes equips readers with the analytical tools to come up with
some of the answers. As we turn the pages, we are invited to engage
with the complexities, challenges, and opportunities that the digital age
presents to international relations.
Andrey Baykov
Elena Zinovieva
Contents
Part I Russia in Digital International Relations

1 Russian Industrial Business in the New International
Cybersecurity Agenda 3
Dmitry Grigoriev and Anna Manakhova
2 Digital Transformation of Business Models:
International and Russian Experience 15
Maria Kozlova and Natalia Komarovskaia
3 Digital Transformation of the Russian National
Payment System 37
Svetlana Pertseva
4 Artificial Intelligence Politics and Sanctions:
Comparing the Cases of Russia and Iran 59
Radomir Bolgov
Part II Sovereignty in the Digital Space

5 Sovereignty as Practice in Digital Age 75
Elena Zinovieva and Sergey Shitkov
6 Principle of the Sovereign Equality of States
in the Digital Realm 91
Vera Rusinova
ix
x CONTENTS
Part III Digital Dimensions of International and

National Law
7 Problems of Legal Regulation of Digitalization
(the Case of AI) 109
Nikita Molchakov, Ekaterina Ryzhkova,
and Evgeniya Ryzhkova
8 Digitalization of the Tax Sphere in Russia 123
Gennadi Tolstopyatenko and Dina Osina
9 Financial Law in the Era of Digital Economy 139
Lana Arzumanova
10 International Criminal Assessment of the Risks
Associated with the Use of Digital Technologies
for Criminal Purposes 149
Elina Sidorenko and Zarina Khisamova
Part IV Digital International Economy

11 Digital Employment Platforms 165
Vera Gnevasheva
12 Eurasian Industrial Performance: Sustainable
and Digital Aspects 191
Maria Maksakova and Angelina Kolomeytseva
13 “Green” Investments in Renewable Energy
in the Context of Innovative Development
and Digitalization 215
Ekaterina Voronova, Marina Simonova, and Elvira Yarnykh
14 World Robot Market: Key Characteristics and Trends 235
Alexander Ulanov
Part V Digital Education and Research in International

Relations
15 Hybrid Learning as a Response to Modern Challenges
in Education 249
Oleg Pichkov, Kseniia Patrunina, and Yana Saltykova
CONTENTS xi
16 Evolution of Digital Education 259

Svetlana Ivanova
17 The Efficiency of Distance and Traditional Academic
Activities in Teaching English Language to Students
of International Economic Relations 271
Anna Shpynova and Nadezhda Andreeva
18 The Use of Network Data Analysis in Research
of Political Groups (The Case of Ukraine) 281
Dmitriy Karasyov, Nikolai Silayev, and Vasiliy Taran
Part VI Digital Transformation of Diplomacy and

International Organizations
19 Global Governance of Cyberspace: The BRICS Agenda 305
Alexander Ignatov
20 Innovative Digital Technologies for Ensuring
Financial Integration in the Eurasian Economic Union 329
Natalia Adamchuk
21 Gaming Goes IR: Reviewing Videogames in Diplomacy 345
Maria Urueva and Yevgeny Uchaev
Index 365
List of Contributors
Natalia Adamchuk is Doctor of Economics, Professor of the Department

of Risk Management and Insurance at MGIMO University, Moscow,
Russia.
Nadezhda Andreeva is Senior Lecturer in the English Language Depart-
ment No. 2 at MGIMO University. Her main subject areas and research
interests include English language for special purposes—professional
English in economics, business, finance, management and marketing, and
English for business correspondence and negotiations.
Lana Arzumanova is Doctor of Law, Professor of the Finance Law
Department at Kutafin Moscow State Law University, Moscow, Russia.
Andrey Baykov is an Associate Professor of International Affairs and
Vice-President for Research at MGIMO University, as well as a non-
resident Professor at Henley Business School (UK). Dr. Baykov is also the
editor of the International Trends, a leading Russian IR theory journal.
He has authored or co-authored more than 60 articles in refereed jour-
nals, four monographs, and over 10 textbooks for undergraduate and
graduate students reading International Politics.
Radomir Bolgov is Associate Professor at the School of International
Relations at Saint Petersburg State University, Russia. He graduated from
Saint Petersburg State University and Defended PhD thesis at the School
of International Relations of Saint Petersburg State University. His main
xiii
xiv LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
field of research interest includes digital aspects of international relations

and military and political threats to international information security.
Vera Gnevasheva is Doctor of Economics, Associate Professor, Professor
in the Department of Economic Theory at MGIMO University, Head
of the Department of Reproduction of Labour Resources and Employ-
ment of the Institute of Demographic Research of the Federal Research
Sociological Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IDI FNISTC
RAS).
Dmitry Grigoriev is Vice President of “Norilsk Nickel” for Information
Security. After graduation from Moscow State University, he worked as
a lecturer, researcher, served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation. In 2014 headed the Information Security Division in
MMC Norilsk Nickel, and later—the Department of Information Security
and IT-Infrastructure Protection, since it was established in 2016.
Alexander Ignatov is a Ph.D. student at MGIMO University, a research
fellow at the Centre of international institutions research at the Russian
Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
(RANEPA).
Svetlana Ivanova is a senior Lecturer in English Department 2 at
MGIMO University. She earned her Ph.D. in Philology from Ulyanovsk
State University. Information technologies and e-learning have been a
domain of her educational engagement since 2003. Her research inter-
ests include e-learning in language teaching, IT application in education,
and building functional competences in the classroom environment.
Dmitriy Karasyov is Ph.D., Research Fellow Laboratory of International
Trends Analysis Institute for International Studies Moscow State Institute
of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.
Zarina Khisamova Ph.D. in Law, Department of Planning and Coor-
dination of Scientific Activity, Krasnodar University of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Russia, Krasnodar, Russia.
Angelina Kolomeytseva is Ph.D. in Economics, Associate Professor at
the Department of International Economic Relations, MGIMO Univer-
sity. Her research interests include digital economy, foreign economic
relations of Russia and the impact of sanctions of foreign economic
relations of States.
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS xv
Natalia Komarovskaia is a senior lecturer in the Department of

Economics at MGIMO University. Her main research interests include
public choice theory, the labour market, consumer behaviour and the
green economy.
Maria Kozlova is an Associate Professor in the Department of
Economics, MGIMO University. She holds a Ph.D. in Economics from
MGIMO University. Her main research interests include national inno-
vation systems, global public goods, consumer behaviour and the green
economy.
Maria Maksakova is Ph.D. in Economics, Head of the Interna-
tional Economic Relations and Foreign Economic Affairs Depart-
ment, MGIMO University. Her research interests include international
economic integration, digitalization of the world economy and interna-
tional economic organizations.
Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow,
Russia.
Anna Manakhova is Councillor to the Vice President of “Norilsk Nickel”
for Information Security. She holds M.A. from MGIMO University and
her field of specialization is international information security.
Nikita Molchakov is a candidate of Law, an associate professor, at the
Department of Constitutional Law, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia.
Dina Osina is Law, Associate Professor in the Department of Legal
Theory and Comparative Law, International Law School, MGIMO
University.
Kseniia Patrunina is Deputy Dean of the School of International
Economic Relations and a Lecturer in the Department of Accounting,
Statistics and Audit at MGIMO University. She holds a Ph.D. in
Economics from MGIMO University. Her main research interests
include digital transformation, economic inequality, digital inequality, and
accounting.
Oleg Pichkov is Dean of the School of International Economic Relations,
Associate Professor in the Department of International Economic Rela-
tions and Foreign Economic Affairs, and Head of the Digital Educational
Technologies Development Team at MGIMO University. He earned his
Ph.D. in Economics at MGIMO University. His main research interests
xvi LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
include international economic relations, international relations, world

economy, and the digital transformation of the world economy.
Svetlana Pertseva Ph.D. in Economics is an Associate Professor in the
Department of International Finance at MGIMO University. Payment
systems and international settlements have been the focus of her research
expertise since 2005. Her main research interests include the digital
transformation of the payment industry, the development of the Russian
payment system and Fintech, and cross-border payments and international
settlements.
Vera Rusinova is a Doctor of Law, Professor, and Head of the School
of International Law at the Faculty of Law, National Research University
Higher School of Economics. The main fields of her research activities
comprise International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian
Law, the use of force, the theory of International Law, and the application
of International Law to information and communications technologies.
Vera Rusinova is a Co-Chair of the ILA Committee on Use of Force:
Military Assistance on Request. She is a member of the Editorial Groups/
Boards of “Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies”, and
“International Cybersecurity Law Review”. She also led the Research
project “Reshaping Public International Law in the Age of Cyber: Values,
Norms and Actors”.
Ekaterina Ryzhkova is Ph.D. in Law, Associate Professor, Department
of Legal Theory and Comparative Law, MGIMO University, Moscow,
Russia.
Evgeniya Ryzhkova, is a postgraduate student at the Department
of Legal Theory and Comparative Law, MGIMO University, Moscow,
Russia.
Yana Saltykova is Deputy Dean of School of International Economic
Relations and Lecturer at the Department of International Economic
Relations and Foreign Economic Affairs at MGIMO University. She holds
a Ph.D. in Economics from MGIMO University. Her main research
interests include international economic relations; the world economy;
digitalization of the world economy, trade policy, and industrial markets.
Elina Sidorenko is Doctor of Law, Department of Criminal Law, Crim-
inal Procedure and Criminology, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia.
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS xvii
Sergey Shitkov is Ph.D. in Law, Deputy Rector for Administrative and

Legal Issues, MGIMO University.
Anna Shpynova is Associate Professor in English Language Depart-
ment No. 2 at MGIMO University. She earned a Ph.D. in Economics
from MGIMO University. Her main subject areas and research interests
include English for Special Purposes—professional English in economics,
business, finance, the oil and gas sector and English for business corre-
spondence and negotiations.
Nikolai Silayev Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow Laboratory of Inter-
national Trends Analysis Institute for International Studies MGIMO
University.
Marina Simonova is Doctor of Economics, Professor of Accounting,
Statistics and Audit Department;
MGIMO University.
Vasiliy Taran, M.A., Analyst Laboratory of International Trends Analysis
Institute for International Studies MGIMO University.
Gennadi Tolstopyatenko is a Doctor in Law, Professor in the Admin-
istrative and Financial Law Department, International Law School,
MGIMO University.
Alexander Ulanov has done Ph.D. in Economics, Advisor to the Rector,
Deputy Vice-Rector for Legal and Administrative Affairs, Senior Lecturer,
Department of International Economic Relations and Foreign Economic
Affairs, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia.
Maria Urueva is an independent researcher specializing in the intersec-
tion between video games and politics, and an editor of the MGIMO
Review of International Relations. She holds an M.A. in Area Studies
(Asia & Africa) from MGIMO University.
Yevgeny Uchaev is a lecturer and Ph.D. student in the Department of
World Politics at MGIMO University. He holds an M.A. in International
Relations from MGIMO University. His main research interests include
constructivist approaches to the state in IR, temporality in world politics,
and normative foundations of international political theory.
Ekaterina Voronova is Doctor of Economics, Head of Accounting,
Statistics and Audit Department MGIMO University.
xviii LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Elvira Yarnykh is Doctor of Economics, Professor, Department of

Statistics, Plekhanov Russian University of Economics.
Elena Zinovieva in Doctor of Political Science, Professor of the Depart-
ment of World Politics, Deputy Director of the Centre of International
Information Security, Science and Technology Policy, MGIMO Univer-
sity.
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 The long tail model 23

Fig. 11.1 Share of persons included in digital employment (DE)
in different formats by employment status, % (Source
Based on the online survey of the urban population, ISP
HSE, 2021 [Platform Employment in Russia, 2022]) 178
Fig. 12.1 Industrial production index of the EAEU countries
(%) (Source Compiled by the authors based on data
from the Eurasian Economic Commission. Retrieved
from: https://eec.eaeunion.org/upload/files/dep_stat/
econstat/statpub/Brief_Statistics_Yearbook_2022.pdf?ysc
lid=lbnvdffzq6326804280) 197
Fig. 12.2 Industry Share of Total Manufactured Exports (%)
(Source compiled by the authors based on data
from the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization. Industrial Analytics Platform. Retrieved
from: https://iap.unido.org/data/competitive-industries?
p=ARM&s=RUS&t=EAEU) 199
Fig. 12.3 Share of intermediates in total manufacturing trade
of the EAEU countries (%) (Source Compiled
by the authors based on data from United Nations
Industrial Development Organization. Industrial Analytics
Platform. Retrieved from: https://iap.unido.org/data/
competitive-industries?p=ARM&s=RUS&t=EAEU) 201
xix
xx LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 13.1 Installed wind power capacity in the world and the global
volume of electricity production (Source IRENA Wind
Energy Data, https://www.irena.org/wind) 219
Fig. 13.2 Installed capacity of solar installations in the world
and the global volume of electricity production (Source
IRENA Solar Energy Data, https://www.irena.org/solar) 220
Fig. 14.1 Annual installations of industrial robots in the world,
2010–2020, thousand units (Source World Robotics
2021 Presentation. International Federation of Robotics.
October 28, 2021. https://ifr.org/downloads/press2
018/2021_10_28_WR_PK_Presentation_long_version.
pdf [accessed December 1, 2022]) 240
Fig. 14.2 Annual robot installations by customer industry,
2018–2020, thousand units (Source World Robotics
Fig. 14.3 Operational stock of industrial robots in 2010–2020,
thousand units (Source World Robotics 2021
Presentation. International Federation of Robotics.
pdf [accessed June 26, 2022]) 241
Fig. 14.4 Robot density in the manufacturing industry in 2020,
by Country (Source World Robotics 2021 Presentation.
International Federation of Robotics. October
28, 2021. https://ifr.org/downloads/press2018/
2021_10_28_WR_PK_Presentation_long_version.pdf
[accessed December 1, 2022]) 242
Fig. 14.5 Changes in the ratio of collaborative and traditional
industrial robots in 2018–2020, in thousands (Source
World Robotics 2021 Presentation. International
Federation of Robotics. October 28, 2021. https://ifr.
org/downloads/press2018/2021_10_28_WR_PK_Pres
entation_long_version.pdf [accessed December 1, 2022]) 243
Fig. 14.6 Service robots for professional use, unit sales in 2019
and 2020, thousands of units (Source World Robotics
LIST OF FIGURES xxi
Fig. 18.1 Extended network of “Kolomoyskyi’s people” in the 8th

Verkhovna Rada 291
Fig. 18.2 As a rule, “Kolomoyskyi’s people” work “in pairs” 293
Fig. 18.3 Comparison of the network and cluster analysis in one
of the groups of “Kolomoyskyi’s people” 294
Fig. 19.1 Level of implementation of BRICS’s commitments
in the field of ICT and digital economy in 2015–2017
and 2019–2021, the average level of implementation
in this area, and the overall average level
of implementation of BRICS’s commitments
(Notes Commitments on the development of ICT
and digital economy were not included in the selection
of commitments to be monitored in the 2018–2019
cycle following the Johannesburg Summit in South
Africa; in 2020 and 2021, two commitments for each
year were selected for monitoring, with an average
level of performance shown. For the full wording
of the commitments assessed, please refer to the following
sources. Source Compiled by the author based on BRICS
Research Group, CIIR [2016, 2017, 2018, 2020, 2021,
2022]) 316
Fig. 21.1 Online identity construction framework (Source Costa
Pinto et al., 2015: 407) 354
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Key milestones in the development of digital business

transformation 19
Table 2.2 SWOT analysis of business models in the context
of digitalization 29
Table 2.3 Top ten global companies in 2008 and 2018 31
Table 2.4 The world’s largest digital companies in 2022 32
Table 2.5 An example of digital ecosystems in Russia 32
Table 3.1 NSD indicators in 2022 42
Table 3.2 Quarterly traffic dynamics of the system for transfer
of financial messages (per cent) 44
Table 3.3 Dynamics of the share of international and national
card payment systems in Russia in 2016–2020 (per cent) 46
Table 3.4 Quarterly traffic dynamics of the Russian faster
payments system in 2019–2022 (tn RUB) 47
Table 3.5 Indicator of the effectiveness of payment systems
in selected countries 50
Table 3.6 SWOT analysis of cryptocurrency legalization
for foreign trade settlements 53
Table 3.7 SWOT analysis of the use of non-bank credit institutions
for the implementation of international settlements
by Russian companies 54
Table 3.8 SWOT analysis of the system for transfer of financial
messages for the implementation of international
settlements and payments 55
xxiii
xxiv LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1 Positions of China, Russia, and the United States

in the international rankings of AI development
(compiled by the author) 67
Table 4.2 Political initiatives on AI in China, Iran, Russia,
and the United States (compiled by the author) 68
Table 11.1 Indicators of fair work 182
Table 11.2 Comparative statistics of multiple regression estimates 182
Table 11.3 Individual indicators of labour force formation 183
Table 11.4 Correlation estimates of the main indicators of fair work 184
Table 12.1 Industrial production of the EAEU countries ($billion) 196
Table 12.2 Main priorities for the industrial development
of the EAEU countries 198
Table 12.3 GVC participation index (% of total gross exports), 2018 202
Table 12.4 SDG-9 industry tracker of the EAEU countries 204
Table 13.1 Types of investment in renewable energy development 223
Table 15.1 Hybrid and traditional learning experience (National
Education Association, 2021) 255
PART I
Russia in Digital International Relations

CHAPTER 1
Russian Industrial Business in the New

International Cybersecurity Agenda
Dmitry Grigoriev and Anna Manakhova
Introduction
Recent international developments have exacerbated the existing prob-
lems and intensified contradictions in the field of information security at
the global level. This has created an unprecedented situation for Russian
industry, which is faced with large-scale sanctions and new challenges and
threats in the digital space.
Protecting the information infrastructure, especially critical informa-
tion infrastructure, has always been a priority for business. Under the
current circumstances, the largest Western tech companies have decided
to leave the Russian market. Thus, Russian companies, which have been
building their information security systems for years primarily on the basis
of the leading and internationally recognized Western information and
D. Grigoriev (B) · A. Manakhova

Norilsk Nickel, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: dmitrgrig66@gmail.com
A. Manakhova
e-mail: manakhova.anna@gmail.com
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
A. Baykov and E. Zinovieva (eds.), Digital International Relations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3467-6_1
4 D. GRIGORIEV AND A. MANAKHOVA
telecommunication technologies (ICT) and solutions, have been pushed

into a corner. Foreign software and hardware have turned into a “time
bomb,” becoming less and less effective with each passing day and thus
threatening total collapse at any moment. This situation has inevitably
increased the vulnerability of information and communication systems,
including those responsible for the functioning of critical information
infrastructure (CII).
The last three decades have seen the development of a distributed inter-
dependent and interconnected global information infrastructure, where
each region and country plays a role as a producer of certain hardware
and software, generating new ideas for IT solutions and providing tech-
nical support or consulting (Creemers, 2022). On the one hand, the cyber
world is fragmented (Xuetong, 2020). On the other, all the fragments
represent pieces of a global ICTs system (Zinovieva, 2020). The latest
developments in the cyber sphere and the intensification of confrontation
have given an impulse to new trends—namely, digital self-sustainability,
regionalization and the protection of digital sovereignty.
In the context of the new international cybersecurity agenda, the
Russian industry faces new threats and challenges in ICTs and the
protection of critical information infrastructure. Given the unprecedented
situation and its dynamic development, there is no “cookie cutter”
solution.
The unparalleled increase in the number of cyberattacks and the
massive decrease in cyber trust between different stakeholders creates
new risks with regard to the information infrastructure itself and, as a
result, increases the likelihood of man-made disasters. The main idea
of this research is to determine the new framework that the Russian
industry has to consider when developing and implementing measures for
protecting its information systems, including new threats and challenges
in the digital sphere. We will also put forward a number of proposals for
a new international cybersecurity agenda which recon with the interests
of the industry.
Our research begins with a description of the new challenges facing
Russian industry in cyberspace. We then move on to the threats
emanating from the new international cybersecurity agenda. The current
situation in the sphere of international information security poses a
number of open questions that need to be studied and addressed, some
of which we will cover in this paper. Finally, we conclude with a list of
measures that, in our opinion, could become a subject for discussion on
1 RUSSIAN INDUSTRIAL BUSINESS IN THE NEW … 5
the next steps towards a unified, fair and efficient international informa-
tion security system, which serves the interests of both state and business
equally.
An analysis of the existing scientific and research base reveals a number
of methodological problems with regard to assessing the current situation
(Tikk & Kertunnen, 2018). We have studied multiple, interdisciplinary
approaches towards the constantly changing external situation in the
cyber sphere. It is hard to find a comprehensive research paper that
covers all the issues that the industry is dealing with when it comes
to protecting its information infrastructure and securing the continuity
of business processes. Methodologically, our research is based on the
neorealist approach to the role of transnational business in world politics,
according to which non-state actors advance the foreign policy priorities
of states in their activities (Waltz, 2004).
Empirically, the research is based on the widely recognized documents
and public declarations, which form the current ideology of co-existence
in cyberspace: the UN (1945) United Nations Charter, UN resolu-
tions on ICT security issues (UN, 2018), reports of the UN Group of
Governmental Experts on information security (UN, 2021b), reports and
working documents of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG)
(UN, 2021a, 2021b), the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace
(Paris Call…, 2018), and public documents and position papers of the
regional organizations and forums. We also carefully studied and consid-
ered input by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
(UNIDIR), primarily on supply chain security (Demidov & Paoli, 2020),
as well as well-known international initiatives regarding private sector
involvement in cybersecurity issues: Siemens Cybersecurity—Charter of
Trust (2018) publications by the Cybersecurity Tech Accord (2023),
Microsoft initiatives, including Digital Geneva Convention (Microsoft,
2017) and others. Our goal was to study the extent to which these docu-
ments can ensure the safety of the information infrastructure of industrial
companies and, consequently, the security and integrity of digital supply
chains around the world.
This is not the first time that business has been hostage to geopoli-
tics, but this is a unique case because it takes place in the sphere of ICT
and global cybersecurity (Krutskikh & Zinovieva, 2021). The roots of
this complex situation lie in the fact that the IT infrastructure of large
industrial holdings is built mainly on solutions, products and services of
a limited number of vendors registered in the jurisdiction of the United
States and several other Western countries. If we look at the operating

system market, Microsoft Windows dominates (it is used on 76% of desk-
tops), followed by Apple’s macOS (14.5%), Linux-based systems (2.5%),
and Google’s ChromeOS (1.7%) (Statista, 2022). Thus, approximately
95% of all desktop computers in the world run on operating systems
developed by US-based companies (Microsoft, Apple and Google). If
we look at the leaders in cybersecurity solutions, in the first quarter of
2020, Cisco accounted for 9.1% of the market share in the cybersecurity
industry, while Palo Alto Networks and Fortinet—US companies with a
wide global presence that stretches far beyond their countries of juris-
diction—accounted for 7.8% and 5.9%, respectively (Statista, 2020). For
example, 6% of Fortinet customers are from India, 3.5% are from Brazil,
and 2% from Mexico (Fortinet, 2022); 6% of Cisco customers are from
India, while approximately 900 companies that use Cisco are located in
Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (Cisco, 2022).
The major problem facing the industry is the decrease in the level of
security of critical information infrastructure facilities, which the business
owns or operates. The technical solutions used to guarantee the secu-
rity and continuity of business processes are now compromised and no
longer a viable option. With the number of cyberattacks directed against
the abovementioned infrastructure increasing dramatically by the day,
this threat becomes even more acute, especially considering its potential
consequences.
At the same time, in the context of unprecedented sanctions in the
technology sector, Russian business will inevitably face a drop-off in the
pace of digitalization, which may lead to a decrease in production volume,
changes in product quality, the disruption of supply chains, and the inter-
ruption of environmental programmes. All these consequences stem from
the sphere of the security and integrity of ICTs and spread far beyond,
influencing global processes in the development of the industrial sector.
Similar problems have arisen in the field of information and data
protection. Recently, we have been witnessing a steady trend of IT
vendors transferring their services to “clouds.” The largest global
providers of cloud services, whose complex platforms include products
and services with data processing technologies, artificial intelligence, the
Internet of Things and blockchain, have recently left the Russian market.
As a result, Russian companies need to either switch to Russian cloud
solutions or abort “clouds” altogether.
For large state-significant industrial holdings, it is of fundamental

importance to guarantee the security of information resources in accor-
dance with state regulations, which is difficult to provide in cloud
solutions. In addition, foreign “clouds” have proven themselves extremely
unreliable. With the absence of legally binding international regulations
in this sphere, the principles of trust and joint commitment to progress
are the key elements of effective cooperation. But the example of the
Charter of Trust (2018)—an international initiative uniting 17 techno-
logical companies, including those that offer cybersecurity solutions, such
as Siemens, Atos, IBM, DELL, etc.—offers responsibility throughout
the digital supply chain and commits to serve as a trusted partner that
provides products, systems and services based on the customer’s cyberse-
curity needs and risks (Charter of Trust, 2018). In reality, these principles
have been undermined.
Finally, in the current situation, responsible industrial companies expe-
rience difficulties with certification for compliance with international
information security standards. The risk of international certification
bodies discontinuing their work in Russia is quite high. Companies whose
certificates were issued by those bodies have to reshape their strategies
for demonstrating compliance with international standards following the
requirements of the market in which they operate.
In the context of the total violation of previously adopted agreements
and taking the possible and very real consequences of threats to industrial
information security into account, the following questions are pertinent:
1. How does this situation correspond with international law and
internationally recognized principles and goals?
For example, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015),
and Goal 9 in particular, states the need to “develop quality, reliable,
sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and trans-
border infrastructure, to support economic development and human
well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all;
promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization; significantly increase
access to information and communications technology.”
2. Do the decisions taken by Western companies go along with the
recommendations and principles of the main negotiating UN bodies on
security issues in the ICT sphere?
The final report of UN OEWG on developments in the field of infor-
mation and telecommunications in the context of international security
provides that “ICT activity contrary to obligations under international law
that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the

use and operation of critical infrastructure could pose a threat not only to
security but also to State sovereignty, as well as economic development
and livelihoods, and ultimately the safety and wellbeing of individuals”
(UN, 2021a, 2021b).
For the major industrial city- and region-forming companies, whose
activities are of strategic importance to the national economy, the protec-
tion of CII facilities under their control is one of the key priorities.
Business, in general, represents a concentration of CII objects, there-
fore business is mostly responsible for their protection. According to
the UN OEWG 2021 Final Substantive Report: “…there are potentially
devastating security, economic, social and humanitarian consequences of
malicious ICT activities on critical infrastructure (CII) and critical infor-
mation infrastructure supporting essential services to the public” (UN,
2021a, 2021b).
Illegal and malicious influence through electronic communication
means on the CII facilities of major industrial players that ensure techno-
logical processes and the integrity of supply chains may have a significant
socio-economic impact and negatively influence macroeconomic indica-
tors.
3. With the general agreement at the international level (UN, OSCE)
on the need to further develop and strengthen confidence-building
measures, what kind of signal does denying Russia access to technolog-
ical solutions send to the international community, especially developing
countries, which count on external support and assistance? This is a matter
of trust with regard to the common goal of building a globally transparent
and reliable information security system.
Considering all of the above, certain recommendations might help to
mitigate the abovementioned threats and challenges in ICT security for
businesses in the future.
The current situation rightfully creates the need to develop a special
international legal regime for products and services that constitute the
core of information security systems for the majority of industrial compa-
nies in the world. It is also necessary to consider, at the international
level, the possibility of removing companies that produce those products
and provide services from the jurisdiction of certain states in order to
ensure the reliability, integrity and efficiency of the global IT infrastruc-
ture and avoid possible adverse consequences, which can affect industrial
development, as well as the life of the civilian population.
The global community faces the urgent need to intensify the dialogue
on the rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour in global
cyberspace, taking the new realities into account (Krutskikh, 2019).
Not every country is able to withstand the onslaught of such pressure
in the use of information and communications technologies, and the
consequences will be visible at the global level.
Thus, a legally binding international agreement in the sphere of ICT
looks like the most viable, and indeed the most balanced, option (Tikk &
Kertunnen, 2020). It should guarantee the rights of all actors in the
sphere of ICT, considering the need to protect CII and create equal
conditions for all players, including industry.
International dialogue on security issues of technological cooperation
should actively engage business—both tech companies producing cyber-
security solutions and industry representatives using their products. It
is important to discuss the possibility of creating separate international
regulatory mechanisms to ensure the integrity and continuity of the
cybersecurity supply chain. The final report of the 2021 UN Group of
Governmental Experts (GGE) on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour
in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security (UN, 2021a,
2021b) says that “… states should continue to encourage the private
sector and civil society to play an appropriate role to improve the secu-
rity of and in the use of ICTs, including supply chain security for ICT
products” (UN, 2021a, 2021b).
It is of fundamental importance to include provisions that are crit-
ical for the industry in international documents on information security.
It would be also extremely useful to adopt a specialized regulatory
document that establishes the principles of protecting information infras-
tructure (including CII) at the international level. A draft of such a
document, the Information Security Charter for Critical Industrial Facili-
ties, was developed and introduced by Norilsk Nickel at the international
level in 2018 (OSCE, 2018). The main idea was to create a frame-
work document of a declarative nature for the international business
community, which does not impose any legal obligations, but at the
same time determines the framework of safe and respectful behaviour
in cyberspace. The Charter leaves out the political aspects of informa-
tion security, focusing on global industry, while its wording is universal
and does not contradict international documents already adopted in this

sphere. Among other provisions, the Charter calls for:
● criticizing any actions that undermine stability and cause threats to

the security of the public information and communication infrastruc-
ture involved in business processes of major industrial companies;
● opposing the intentionally negligent provision of information and
communications services for critical industrial facilities, and equally
disapproving of any actions encouraging developers, vendors and
suppliers of technical solutions for such actions;
● encouraging the efforts of states and the global community to
establish an effective international information security system; and
● developing internationally accepted legal security guarantees for
supply chains of products and services, shaping the technological
foundation of the critical information infrastructure.
In order to minimize the consequences of sanctions for informa-

tion security and critical information infrastructure, Russian industry has
taken a course towards substituting imported IT and information security
solutions with domestic alternatives (Russian Federation, 2022).
Unprecedented challenges in the field of information security require
businesses to respond quickly and develop flexible approaches and innova-
tive solutions. In conditions where the stability of the country’s economy
largely depends on the stability of its flagships, the importance of a well-
built system for protecting critical information infrastructure increases
manyfold and requires effective interaction between the public and private
sectors in this area.
Not only do the threats created by the new international cybersecurity
agenda jeopardize the information assets and business processes of certain
companies, but they also produce risks to the economies and populations
of regions where they operate, and sometimes to the entire countries.
The current situation in the sphere of international information secu-
rity poses a number of open questions that require further consideration
at the global level. Russian industry is a perfect case study for the whole
world, one that can help us find solutions for the future and benefit from
the lessons learned.
Finally, our research shows that the international situation in the use of
ICT is extremely unfavourable towards industrial players from countries
outside the Western bloc. And this contradicts the idea of establishing a
just, integrated and reliable global cybersecurity regime, which is being
discussed in the United Nations. Even those declarations and recommen-
dations made at the highest international level appear to be useless when
individual actors take measures that affect others without much consid-
eration of the consequences. This underlines the importance of adopting
a legally binding international agreement in the sphere of ICT, which
would create equal conditions for all players, including industry.
The list of measures could be the subject of a high-level discussion on
the next steps towards a unified, fair and efficient international informa-
tion security system that serves the interests of both state and business
actors. In order to achieve this, the voice of industrial business should be
heard and taken into consideration.
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CHAPTER 2
Digital Transformation of Business Models:

International and Russian Experience
Maria Kozlova and Natalia Komarovskaia
Introduction
Currently, digitalization influences all elements of corporate and indi-
vidual consumer activities, as well as those of the state. The American
scientist and publicist Nicholas Negroponte was one of the earliest
researchers of the digital economy, drawing a contrast between the
conventional “real” economy based on the movement of tangible prod-
ucts and the virtual economy of the future, where the key element would
be the exchange of digital goods (Negroponte, 1995). The Canadian
business exec and consultant Don Tapscott identified the key aspects of
M. Kozlova (B) · N. Komarovskaia

Department of Economics, MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: michandy@mail.ru
N. Komarovskaia
e-mail: n.komarovskaya@inno.mgimo.ru
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 15

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
A. Baykov and E. Zinovieva (eds.), Digital International Relations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3467-6_2
16 M. KOZLOVA AND N. KOMAROVSKAIA
the influence of digitalization on changing economic processes (Tapscott,

1997). He pointed out the following key trends in the growth of the
digital economy:
● The increasing digitalization of information in various sectors.

● The emergence of mechanisms for converting “real” material values
into virtual ones and vice versa.
● The elimination of intermediaries between producers and
consumers.
● The growing importance of innovative activity based on the creative
imagination of the individual.
● The individualization of products.
Not only has digital transformation affected the virtual space, but it
has also contributed to the digital transformation of enterprises through
the automation, digitization and informatization of current business
processes.
The transition of enterprises to a digital economy is reflected in
the legislation both at the international level and at the level of indi-
vidual states. The 2030 Sustainable Development Goals include building
resilient infrastructure, promoting inclusive and sustainable industrial-
ization, and fostering innovation and digital technologies will play an
essential part in this. The Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce
was adopted within the framework of the WTO in 1998, and the Digital
Single Market strategy was endorsed by the European Union in 2015.
Russia also places a high priority on digitalization development in the
framework of the national programme “Digital Economy of the Russian
Federation,” adopted in 2017.
Since the impact of digitalization on the economy is immense, this
paper will only focus on the impact of digitalization on changing company
business models, as well as on the main benefits and drawbacks of
emerging new business models.
2 DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS MODELS … 17
Literature Review
Before we go into greater detail on the impact of digitalization on
evolving business models, let us define the term “business model”
and how different researchers interpret it. The construction of busi-
ness models has been examined by such experts as David Teece (2010),
Alexander Osterwalder and Yves Pigneur (2010), Paul Timmers (1998),
Patrick Stähler (2002). Researchers that have studied the features of
modern business models and their digital transformation include Carsten
Linz et al. (2019), Nick Srnicek (2016), Ted Ladd (2021), Selsabila
and Linder (2022), A.E. Issaeva (2022), M.V. Khachaturyan (2022),
T.V. Sergievich (2021), Juan D. Carillo and Tan Guofu (2021), I.Z.
Geliskhanov et al. (2018), E.S. Kravchenko and V.V. Ovsyannikova
(2021) and others.
Yves Pigneur and Alexander Osterwalder define business model in a
very general way, characterizing it as follows: a business model serves to
describe the basic principles for the creation, development and successful
operation of an organization (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010). According
to another interpretation, business models can be understood as a plan
created by a company to maximize profits and minimize costs, a kind
of guideline in cooperation with market participants, as well as in the
provision of services and the production of goods (Selsabila & Linder,
2022). A business model can also be defined as the means by which a
business provides value to customers, attracts customers to pay for that
value, and converts the payments received into profit (Teece, 2010).
A detailed definition of the business model was provided by European
Commission Director Paul Timmers. It represents the following:
● The architecture of product, server and information flows, including

a description of the various business participants and their roles.
● A description of potential benefits for various business participants.
● A description of income sources (Timmers, 1998).
Business models take the following factors into consideration:
● The technologies and tools available to the company to achieve

goals.
● The sources of funding for the company’s current activities.
● Goals, deadlines, and methods for achieving them (Selsabila &

Linder, 2022).
Patrick Stähler identifies the following three components of the busi-

ness model:
● Value proposition, when the business model contains a description

of the benefits that customers or other business partners can obtain
by connecting to this business, that is, what value the company offers
to customers and strategic partners.
● Value-added architecture, which describes how benefits are gener-
ated for customers and strategic partners.
● Revenue model, i.e., the cost of the business model and hence its
sustainability (Stähler, 2002).
In this case, we will take a broad view of the business model as the
primary method used by companies, allowing them to build relationships
with customers and make a profit.
Methodology
The study involves analysing published materials and systemizing knowl-
edge in order to examine the impact of digitalization on changing
business models. We will also examine the impact of digitalization on
changing business models in a historical timeline.
A SWOT analysis will also be carried out to assess the impact of
digitalization on changing business models, highlighting the strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities and threats.
Further, we will examine successful and unsuccessful attempts to
implement digitalization in business operations.
Key Features of New Business

Models Driven by Digitalization
Before we talk about the impact of digitalization on changing business
models directly, let us consider the main stages in the evolution of digital
business transformation (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Key milestones in the development of digital business transformation
1970–1989 1990–2000 2001–2014 2015–present
The emergence of Access to local and The advent of Industry 4.0, which
integrated circuits global networks sensors integrated is characterized by
considerably The active into wireless the emergence and
simplified and development of web networks opened up development of
accelerated and cloud services new opportunities in artificial intelligence
calculations provides common the development of enables not only
(engineers began to computing patterns monitoring systems the analysis of data
use programs for The emergence of a Methods for arrays but also the
computer design, virtual economy of intelligent algorithms performance of
and managers were interconnected PCs, for pattern detection human functions
able to track stocks software, and and verbal with the help of
of materials and processes where information robots that can
goods in real time) physical actions can processing are being learn from previous
be performed actively developed experience
digitally
Sources Digital Transformation: A Roadmap for Billion-Dollar Organizations. Findings from Phase 1
of the Digital Transformation (2011) and Kravchenko and Ovsyannikova (2021)
The digital transformation of enterprises was propelled by internal and

external drivers. Internal drivers include business process optimization,
increasing the flexibility and efficiency of business models, developing new
innovative products, optimizing the value chain, improving the ability to
find partners, entering new markets, increasing revenues, and increasing
the motivation of top management and their interest in digital trans-
formation (Sergievich, 2021). External drivers of transformation include
competitive pressure; the emergence and spread of new digital technolo-
gies and new standards; customer expectations; the appearance of new
types of business models; and the growing dynamism of the external
environment.
The business processes and technologies used at enterprises, inter-
actions between product suppliers and manufacturers, and relationships
between firms and product consumers have all changed as a result of
digitalization. So too have business models.
The main features of new business models are the following:
1. Customization and Individualization

Individualization can also be referred to as customer centricity, as

firms strive hard to function more efficiently and quickly, and to serve
customers better. Customization gives customers the opportunity, among
other things, to participate in the creation and/or modification of the
product itself.
2. Increasing the speed of business scalability by using new growth

points
Traditional companies supply tangible goods, so they incur costs

related to the production of goods. Individual companies could cut costs
by exploiting economies of scale, but increased revenues from scale last
only for a limited time before being replaced by decreasing returns. At
the same time, because digital companies offer services that are intan-
gible, their growth opportunities are significantly higher. Companies do
not need to invest in the development of new plants, factories or hotels
in order to expand their network. Their growth opportunities are solely
defined by the inclusion of new members in the network. Digital compa-
nies gain an advantage because they can both offer their own services on
their platform and also act as intermediaries, providing access to services
available on the market.
3. Using Information and Big Data to Provide Feedback
Digital companies can quickly receive feedback from their customers.

They can swiftly monitor the reaction of participants and determine which
products are in demand and which are not. Big data also allows companies
to look at other options in order to create an offer that meets the needs
of customers.
4. Enhanced Functionality
Functionality can be defined as a set of capabilities provided by a given

system. The increased functionality of digital companies is determined by
the fact that the speed of all business processes is growing, the number of
available options is increasing, and the opportunity to establish business
contacts between residents of different cities or countries is growing.
5. Creating Positive Network Externalities
Network externalities can be classified as direct and indirect network

effects. Direct network effects include the direct impact of some platform
participants on others with an increase in connections between them and
an increase in the number of community participants. Indirect network
effects occur when an increase in the value of the primary product leads
to the emergence and growth of the values of secondary products.
6. Reducing Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are costs associated with the implementation of trans-

actions and they are not directly related to the production process.
Transaction costs include costs associated with the search for informa-
tion, the conclusion of contracts, checking the quantity and quality of
goods, the specification and protection of property rights, and protec-
tion against opportunistic (bad faith) behaviour. Digital companies, in
particular, can reduce the costs associated with searching for information,
since searching for information on the Internet is significantly faster than
visiting individual stores and comparing prices in them.
7. Environmental Friendliness
The activities of digital companies are more environmentally friendly

because they do not involve the physical production of goods, which
can lead to harmful substance emissions into the atmosphere and envi-
ronmental pollution. There is no manufacturing waste, something that
contributes to environmental degradation.
The Main Types of Business Models

Emerging as a Result of Digitalization
In recent years, competition has shifted from technology and processes
to business models. Carsten Linz, Günter Müller-Stewens and Alexander
Zimmermann, note that processes such as “phygital,” understood as the
balance between digital and physical assets, and “physicalization,” under-
stood as the emergence of new physical proposals with the help of new
knowledge derived from the digital environment, have been developed

(Linz et al., 2019).
The freemium model, the open-source model, the “long tail” model,
and the development of digital platforms and digital ecosystems are all
examples of digital business models.
1. The freemium model gets its name from the words “free” and
“premium.” This type of model is credited to Jarid Lukin, and was further
promoted by Fred Wilson. This model was initially used in computer
games in the 1980s, and it later began to be employed in other areas
of activity. Users in this case can first use the free version before being
offered additional services or features that enhance the user experience.
The game Homescapes can be considered as an example of a game
that can be played for free, but with extra money you can purchase
game currency, additional game bonuses, and so on. In some cases, the
premium product allows you to watch movies online without ads, whereas
the free product forces the user to watch a series of several commercials
every 10–20 minutes.
The Zoom video conferencing platform is free to use, although confer-
ence time is limited to 40 minutes. This format is inconvenient for
conducting lectures since you have to reconnect at least twice during a
single lecture, and this takes up valuable lesson time. In this case, a paid
subscription is available for purchase where the video conference time is
not limited.
The advancement of digital technologies has significantly increased the
number of game users. Although the number of paid users is often small
(no more than 10%), the steady increase in their numbers allows them to
actively develop.
Companies that use this model include Spotify, Skype, DropBox,
Linkedin, Xing, Canva, MailChimp and others.
2. Open-source models are based on a business model where the soft-
ware code is open for modification by any user. Because the code is free,
it can spread quickly, attracting more and more new users.
This model assumes that developers will make a profit by providing
paid access to new versions of the programme, support services, and
tuition fees.
Moodle, a free and open-source learning management system (LMS)
licensed under the GNU General Public License, is an example of this
system. This system is used in schools, universities, workplaces and other
sectors of the economy for hybrid learning, distance education, and other
e-learning projects.
Red Hat, which provides software based on the open-source Linux
operating system, is another example of an open-source system.
3. The concept of “long tail” was first used by Chris Anderson in
2004. In this model, all products are classified into hits, mass market
products, and “long tail” niche products (Fig. 2.1). With a traditional
physical product business model, store and warehouse space is limited,
so stores will focus on bestsellers and mass market products, while niche
products are less popular and could be left unsold and thus incur losses.
The use of digital technologies, on the other hand, has the potential to
significantly expand the list of possible goods offered. The “long tail”
model is adopted, in particular, by such companies as Amazon, Netflix
and eBay. Electronic searches allow customers to find a product that meets
their needs much faster, and the range of products is not limited to those
currently available in the seller’s warehouse.
4. Digital Platforms
Digital platforms are defined as digital infrastructures that allow two or

more groups to interact in a way that benefits all parties (Moazed &
Johnson, 2016; Srnicek, 2016). Consumers and producers can connect
online through digital platforms to exchange goods, services and informa-
tion. This is a new type of firm that, like traditional companies, exists for
profit, but differs in that its primary resource—a kind of “raw material”—
is data. The platform is, first and foremost, an intermediary between
Popularity The “Hits” (Head)
Mass production
Niche Products
(Long tail)
0 Degree of Customization
Fig. 2.1 The long tail model

users and, secondly, it is a platform on which they interact, giving them

privileged access to the registration of this interaction.
The primary functions of digital platforms are as follows:
● Attracting an audience to create a critical mass that allows you to

repeatedly increase the value of the network;
● Coordinating the actions of participants;
● Providing tools and services; and
● Defining the rules and standards of interaction.
The following main groups can be identified among the main participants
of the platforms:
● Owners (proprietors) of the platform;

● Managers (providers);
● Complementors (developers of the core and peripheral elements);
and
● End independent users (consumers, suppliers, etc.) (Geliskhanov
et al., 2018).
Digital platforms can be decentralized, centralized or hybrid. The

owner of a decentralized digital platform is not the owner of the asset
being sold. The owner provides an opportunity to use the platform they
have created to connect potential sellers and buyers, acting as an inter-
mediary and receiving a commission for his or her services (at the same
time, they can receive a commission only from one of the parties—for
example, only from sellers who are interested in offering their services). In
contrast, centralized platforms allow the owner of an asset to price their
own product and offer it to a significantly larger number of customers
than traditional stores. A hybrid form can also be used when decentralized
and centralized approaches are merged.
The prevalence of various platforms and their penetration into many

areas of life is evidenced by the classification of Nick Srnicek (2016),
which distinguishes the following types of platforms:
● Advertising platforms that create spaces for information activity and

provide the opportunity to collect user data and distribute adver-
tising in this space (these are search engines such as Google and
Yandex, and social networks, in particular, Facebook, Instagram and
TikTok).
● Cloud platforms rent out digital power in the form of hardware and
software (for example, cloud storage, computing and cloud gaming).
● Industrial platforms —the “Internet of things” in production, thus
optimizing production processes.
● Product platforms that offer goods and services “on-demand,” often
by subscription (streaming services, such as Spotify and Netflix).
● Thrifty platforms that use a hyper outsourcing model to satisfy
certain needs of people. The platform owns only data and software
(the digital infrastructure can be rented), and the needs are directly
satisfied by one or another economic agent from the many agents
offering their services on the platform. In this case, the platform
serves as an intermediary (examples are services for ordering a taxi
or food delivery).
5. Digital Ecosystems
The digital ecosystem is the next stage in the evolution of digital plat-
forms. A digital ecosystem can be defined as an interdependent group of
entities that use standardized digital platforms to achieve common goals.
Collaborations between various organizations are a characteristic of the
digital ecosystem, as a result of which various platforms join together and
form a single ecosystem.
There can be both ecosystems of one key participant (for example, the
ecosystem of Sberbank), as well as ecosystems of partners in one or several
industries.
When using digital ecosystems, users can access different services on
the same platform, which may not necessarily be connected to one
another. The Yandex Go ecosystem, for example, provides services in
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CHAPTER XVI.
(1776-1826.)
very fair instance of Jacobite sentiment
A PLEBISCITE
in London, in the year 1777, presents FOR THE
itself in a record by Boswell, in his ‘Life STUARTS.
of Dr. Johnson.’ The doctor, in argument
with the Whig Dr. Taylor, insisted that the popular
inclination was still for the Stuart family, against that of Brunswick,
and that if England were fairly polled, the present king would be sent
away to-night, and his adherents hanged to-morrow!’ Taylor
demurred, and Johnson gave this as the ‘state of the country.’—‘The
people, knowing it to be agreed on all hands, that this king has not
the hereditary right to the crown, and there being no hope that he
who has it can be restored, have grown cold and indifferent upon the
subject of loyalty and have no warm attachment to any king. They
would not, therefore, risk anything to restore the exiled family. They
would not give twenty shillings a piece to bring it about; but if a mere
vote could do it, there would be twenty to one; at least, there would
be a very great majority of voices for it. But, Sir, you are to consider
that all those who consider that a king has a right to his crown, as a
man has to his estate, which is the just opinion, would be for
restoring the king who certainly has the hereditary right, could he be
trusted with it; in which there would be no danger now, when laws
and everything else are so much advanced, and every king will
govern by the laws.’ It was in the same year, 1777, that Johnson
called the design of the young Chevalier to gain a crown for his
father ‘a noble attempt;’ and Boswell expressed his wish that ‘we
could have an authentic history of it.’ More than a generation had
passed away since the attempt had failed, but Johnson thought the
history might be written: ‘If you were not an idle dog, you might write
it by collecting from everybody what they can tell, and putting down
your authorities.’ It was shortly after that, hearing of a Mr. Eld, as
being a Whig, in Staffordshire, Johnson remarked, ‘There are rascals
in all counties.’ It was then he made his celebrated assertion that ‘the
first Whig was the Devil;’ but this Jacobite definition was provoked by
Eld’s coarse description of a Tory as ‘a creature generated between
a nonjuring parson and one’s grandmother.’ Lord Marchmont thought
Johnson had distinguished himself by being the first man who had
brought ‘Whig’ and ‘Tory’ into a dictionary.
‘Nonjuring parsons’ still existed; but the hierarchy was all but
extinguished.
In the last week of November 1779, reverential THE LAST OF
groups were assembled in Theobald’s Road, to THE
witness the passing to the grave of the last nonjuring NONJURING
bishop of the regular succession—Bishop Gordon. BISHOPS.
There was no demonstration but of respect. Yet there must have
been some Jacobites of the old leaven among the spectators;
though many Nonjurors were not Jacobites at all. To this record may
be added here the fact that in St. Giles’s churchyard, Shrewsbury, lie
the remains of another nonjuring bishop, William Cartwright, who is
commonly called ‘the Apothecary,’ because, like other bishops of the
sturdy little community, he practised medicine. Cartwright (who came
of the ‘Separatists,’ a division which started about 1734, with one
bishop) always dressed in prelatic violet cloth. Hoadley once
surprised a party at Shrewsbury by saying, ‘William Cartwright is as
good a bishop as I am.’ Cartwright hardly thought so himself, for in
1799, in which year he died, he was reconciled to the established
church, at the Abbey in Shrewsbury, by a clergyman who in his old
age revealed the fact to a writer who made it public in 1874, in the
‘Dictionary of Sects, Heresies, and Schools of Thought,’ edited by
the Rev. John Henry Blunt. No reason is given why the alleged fact
was made a mystery of for so long a period.
The very last of all the nonjuring bishops, one of the irregular
succession, died in Ireland in 1805, namely, Boothe. He was
irregularly consecrated by Garnet, who had been consecrated by
Cartwright, who had been consecrated by Deacon. Nonjuring
congregations, in London and elsewhere,—they generally met in
private houses,—diminished and dissolved. Here and there, a family
or an individual might be met with who would use no Prayer Books
but those published before the Revolution of 1688. Probably, the last
Nonjuror (if not the last Jacobite) in England died in the Charter
House, London, in 1875—the late Mr. James Yeowell, for many
years the worthy and well-known sub-editor of ‘Notes and Queries.’
To him, the true church was that of Ken, and his true sovereign was
to be looked for in the line of Stuart; but Mr. Yeowell acknowledged
the force of circumstances, and was as honest a subject of Queen
Victoria as that royal lady could desire to possess.
The Jacobite and Nonjuring pulpits were THE JACOBITE
unoccupied and silent, but the Muses manifested MUSE.
vitality. The tenacity, and one might almost say, the
audacity of Jacobite loyalty was well illustrated in 1779 by the
publication of a collection of songs, under the title of ‘The True
Loyalist, or Chevalier’s Favourite.’ In one of the ballads both Flora
Macdonald and Charles Edward are alluded to:—
Over yon hills and yon lofty mountain,
Where the trees are clad with snow;
And down by yon murm’ring crystal fountain,
Where the silver streams do flow;
There fair Flora sat, complaining
For the absence of our King,
Crying, ‘Charlie, lovely Charlie!
When shall we two meet again?’
At this period, the unhappy Charles Edward was neither lovely nor
loveable. His ballad poet, above, has paraphrased, or parodied, a
popular song, ‘Over Hills and high Mountains,’—but so ill, with
excess or lack of feet, indifferently, as to serve the measure with the
arbitrary despotism with which the Stuarts themselves would have
visited Church and Constitution.
It will be remembered that when Jacobite Johnson JACOBITE
was pensioned, the English language did not suffice JOHNSON.
to give expression to his feelings. He was obliged to
borrow a word from France: he was pénétré with his Majesty’s
goodness. In 1783,—weighing Stuart against Brunswick, Johnson
borrowed a word from the same foreign source, to disparage the
House of Hanover. It must be confessed that Dr. Johnson’s
Jacobitism had become a ‘sentiment,’ in 1783. He could then
indignantly denounce the factious opposition to Government, and yet
account for it on Jacobite principles. He imputed it to the Revolution.
One night, at Mrs. Thrale’s house in Argyle Street, where the
conversation turned on this subject, ‘Sir,’ said he, in a low voice,
having come nearer to me, while his old prejudices seemed to be
fermenting in his mind, ‘the Hanoverian family is isolée here. They
have no friends. Now, the Stuarts had friends who stuck by them so
late as 1745. When the right of the king is not reverenced, there will
not be reverence for those appointed by the king.’
In June of the following year, 1784, Johnson made
BOSWELL, ON
a remark which very reasonably struck Boswell ‘a ALLEGIANCE.
good deal.’—‘I never,’ said Johnson, ‘knew a Nonjuror
who could reason.’ On which observation and on the position of the
Nonjurors and their Jacobite allegiance, generally, Boswell makes
this comment:—‘Surely, he did not mean to deny that faculty to many
of their writers,—to Hickes, Brett, and other eminent divines of that
persuasion, and did not recollect that the seven Bishops, so justly
celebrated for their magnanimous resistance to arbitrary power, were
yet Nonjurors to the new Government. The nonjuring clergy of
Scotland, indeed, who, excepting a few, have lately, by a sudden
stroke, cut off all ties of allegiance to the House of Stuart, and
resolved to pray for our present lawful Sovereign by name, may be
thought to have confirmed this remark; as it may be said that the
divine, indefeasible, hereditary right which they professed to believe,
if ever true, must be equally true still. Many of my readers will be
surprised when I mention that Johnson assured me he had never in
his life been in a nonjuring meeting-house.’—Johnson’s disrespect
for the reasoning powers of the Nonjurors was still less intense than
his detestation of the Whigs. Of some eminent man of the party, he
allowed the ability, but he added, ‘Sir, he is a cursed Whig, a
bottomless Whig, as they all are now.’
Walpole was satisfied that the Stuart race was effete, and that the
family was incapable of exciting the smallest sensation in England.
He could not, however, pass over an incident in ‘the other family.’
In allusion to the Prince of Wales and the Roman Catholic widow
(of two husbands) whom he married,—Mrs. Fitzherbert, he says:
1786, ‘We have other guess matter to talk of in a higher and more
flourishing race; and yet were rumour;—aye, much more than
rumour, every voice in England—to be credited, the matter,
somehow or other, reaches from London to Rome.’ Happily, no new
‘Pretender’ arose from this extraordinary union.
In this year, in the month of July, the comedy of
A JACOBITE
‘The Provoked Husband’ was played at the ACTRESS.
Haymarket, ‘Lady Townley, by a Lady, her 1st
appearance in London.’ The lady and the incident had some interest
for those who held Jacobite principles. They knew she was the
daughter of an old Scotch Jacobite, Watson, whose participation in
the ’45 had perilled his life, ruined his fortune, and caused him to fly
his country. He died in Jamaica. His widow returned to Europe, and
brought up the family, creditably. In course of time; Miss Watson
married a paper-manufacturer, or vendor, named Brooks. His early
death compelled her to go on the stage; her success, fair in the
metropolis, was more brilliant in Dublin, Edinburgh, and other
important cities, especially where Jacobite sympathy was alive. It is
curious that in Boswell’s account of the tour to the Hebrides with
Johnson, under the date, September 7th, 1773, when they were at
Sir Alexander Macdonald’s, at the farm of Corrichattachin, in Skye,
among the things which he found in the house was ‘a mezzotinto of
Mrs. Brooks, the actress, by some strange chance in Skye.’ The
portrait, in 1773, was not that of an actress; nor was the lady then
Mrs. Brooks; but that was her name, and such was her profession
when Boswell published his Life of Dr. Johnson, in 1791; at which
time, however, he was not aware of her Jacobite descent. Some
persons, unpleasantly advanced in years, recollect old Mrs. Brooks’s
powerful delineation of Meg Murdockson, in T. Dibdin’s ‘Heart of Mid
Lothian,’ about the year 1820, at the Surrey Theatre, and they
suggest that she was the old Jacobite’s daughter.
In the year in which the Jacobite’s daughter made
BURNS’S
her first appearance in London, as ‘Lady Townley,’ ‘DREAM.’
Burns wrote the verses which he called ‘A Dream,’
with this epigraph:—
Thoughts, words, and deeds the Statute blames with reason,
But surely Dreams were ne’er indicted Treason.
The poet then dreams of being at St. James’s on the king’s birthday,
and addressing George III. in place of the Laureate. The feeling
expressed was no doubt one that had come to be universal,—
namely, of respect for a monarch and his family, about whom,
however, the poet could see nothing of that divinity which was
supposed of old to hedge such supreme folk. But Burns recognised
a constitutional king, from whom he turned, to attack his responsible
ministers:—
Far be’t frae me that I aspire
To blame your legislation,
Or say ye wisdom want, or fire,
To rule this mighty nation.
But, faith! I muckle doubt, my Sire,
Ye’ve trusted ’Ministration
To chaps who, in a barn or byre,
Wad better fill’d their station
Than courts, yon day.
In the following year, Burns still more satisfactorily BURNS ON
illustrated the general feeling as being one of loyalty THE
to the accomplished fact in the person of the king at STUARTS.
St. James’s, but with no diminution of respect for the
royal race that had lost the inheritance of majesty. This the Scottish
bard expressed in the ‘Poetical Address’ to Mr. W. Tytler. He
lamented indeed that the name of Stuart was now ‘despised and
neglected,’ but, he adds:—
My fathers that name have revered on a throne;
My fathers have fallen to right it.
Those fathers would spurn their degenerate son,
That name should he scoffingly slight it.
Still, in pray’rs for King George, I must heartily join
The Queen and the rest of the gentry:
Be they wise, be they foolish, is nothing of mine;
Their title’s avow’d by my country.
But why of that epocha make such a fuss,

That gave us the Hanover stem?
If bringing them over was lucky for us,
I’m sure ’twas as lucky for them.
But loyalty truce! we’re on dangerous ground,

Who knows how the fashions may alter?
The doctrine to-day, that is loyalty sound,
To-morrow may bring us a halter.
This sort of reserve was practised by many Jacobites, in London,

as well as in Scotland. There was no knowing what might happen. In
1770, the French minister, De Choiseul, was strongly disposed to
help Charles Edward to be crowned at Westminster, but that prince
was so helplessly drunk when he arrived at the minister’s house in
Paris that he was at once sent back. But the hapless adventurer
never lost all hope of finding himself in the Hall or the Abbey. In
1779, Wraxall says that Charles Edward exhibited to the world a very
humiliating spectacle. Mrs. Piozzi, on the margin of her copy, wrote
—‘Still more so at Florence, in 1786. Count Alfieri had taken away
his consort, and he was under the dominion and care of a natural
daughter who wore the Garter and was called Duchess of Albany.
She checked him when he drank too much or when he talked too
much. Though one evening, he called Mr. Greathead up to him, and
said in good English, and in a loud though cracked voice: “I will
speak to my own subjects in my own way, Sir; aye! and I will soon
speak to you, Sir, in Westminster Hall!”’
While the Count of Albany was thus dreamily THE COUNT
looking towards London, and the Scottish poet was OF ALBANY.
playfully hesitating in his allegiance, there was a
Jacobite whose neck was once very near the noose of the halter, but
who now was a man whom the Hanoverian king delighted to honour.
There is no more perfect illustration of the now utter nothingness
of Jacobitism than may be found in an incident which took place at
St. James’s this year, namely, the knighting of a man who had fought
at Culloden and forged notes in the service of Charles Edward,
whom he looked upon as his king, and which king was still existing in
Italy. That man was the celebrated engraver, Robert Strange.
Strange was an Orcadean lad, who was early ROBERT
destined to study law, but who, hating the study, STRANGE.
entered on board a man-of-war, out of intense love of
the sea, and grew sick of it in half a year. He turned to what he
hated, and seated himself on a high stool in the law office of his
brother David, in Edinburgh. But there the real natural bent of his
genius declared itself, and he was discovered, after drawing drafts of
deeds, leases and covenants, drawing portraits, buildings, and
landscapes, on the back of them. David was a sensible man: he
straightway articled his brother Robin to Cooper, the celebrated
engraver, for six years. Robin served his time with credit to himself.
The world of art still profits by Robin’s assiduity. He was out of his
time, and twenty-three years of age when, in 1744, bonnie Isabella
Lumisden’s beauty made prisoner of his soul. ‘No man may be lover
of mine,’ said Isabella, ‘who is not ready to fight for my prince.’
Strange, forthwith, became Isabella’s slave and Charles Edward’s
soldier. Isabella’s father, also her better known brother, Andrew
Lumisden, and herself, were uncompromising Jacobites. Robin
became as ultra as any of them. His first contribution to the cause
was an engraved likeness of Charles Edward. His second was his
plate of a promissory note, for the paper currency by which the
Jacobite army was to pay its way, the note to be duly cashed after
the Restoration of the Stuart dynasty! Robin became the prince’s
‘moneyer,’ and a gentleman of his Life Guards. Strange went through
it all, from the first fray to the overthrow at Culloden. He escaped
from the field, played a terrible game of hide-and-seek for his life,
and at last reached Edinburgh. His old master Cooper is quoted by
Robin’s biographer, Dennistoun, as his authority for saying that,
‘when hotly pressed, Strange dashed into the room where his lady
(Isabella Lumisden), whose zeal had enlisted him in the fatal cause,
sat singing at her needlework, and, failing other means of
concealment, was indebted for safety to her prompt invention. As
she quietly raised her hooped gown, the affianced lover quickly
disappeared beneath its ample contour; where, thanks to her cool
demeanour and unfaltering notes, he lay undetected while the rude
and baffled soldiery vainly ransacked the house.’ Strange escaped,
but he returned to Edinburgh, where he privately engraved portraits
of the chiefs in both factions, and drew designs for fans, which were
sold in London as well as in Edinburgh.
There is a mystery as to how such a double STRANGE’S
offender as Strange—rebel soldier and fabricator of ADVENTURES.
fictitious bank-notes—was allowed to live unmolested
in Edinburgh. He himself, though now never ‘wanted,’ in a police
sense, grew uneasy. He married Isabella Lumisden in 1747, and for
some years he was better known to the Jacobite colony at Rouen,—
and in other cities—than he was at home. Mrs. Strange devoted her
children to the Jacobite cause. In the cap of her first-born, a
daughter, she fastened a couple of white roses; and she wrote of her
second, Mary Bruce:—‘I have taken great care of her education. For
instance: whenever she hears the word whig mentioned, she grins
and makes faces that would frighten a bear; but when I name the
Prince, she kisses me and looks at her picture; and greets you well
for sending the pretty gumflower. I intend she shall wear it at the
coronation.’ The Jacobite lady hoped to see that, and to let her
windows at great profit when James III. should pass by there to
Holyrood.
Strange led a somewhat wandering life, but always STRANGE IN
for great purposes of art, while his family remained in LONDON.
Scotland. He was even in London, all Jacobite and
unpardoned as he was, in the year of the accession of George III.; in
which year Walpole wrote to Mann, at Florence:—‘I am going to give
a letter for you to Strange, the engraver, who is going to visit Italy. He
is a first-rate artist, and by far our best. Pray countenance him,
though you may not approve his politics. I believe Albano’ (the
residence of the Chevalier de St. George) ‘is his Loretto.’
In Italy, Jacobite Strange not only triumphantly pursued his career
as an engraver, but proved himself a far more profitable agent in
purchasing foreign pictures for English connoisseurs at home, than
Hanoverian Dalton. In 1765, he was applying to Lord Bute, as a loyal
subject, to be allowed to live without fear of molestation in London.
After the death of the old Chevalier, this liberty was granted to
whomsoever cared to apply for it. Strange and his family then settled
in fashionable Castle Street, Leicester Square. The Whigs in the
Society of Artists raised obstacles to his being elected a member;
but ultimately the Jacobite disappeared in the glory of the artist. The
somewhat ignoble scattering of the old Chevalier’s servants caused
Andrew Lumisden, his under-secretary of state, to look anxiously
towards the English metropolis. His sister was anxious he should
take leave with all becomingness. She wrote to him from, now dingy,
Castle Street:—‘I entreat the person whom I never saw’ (Cardinal
York) ‘but, even for his father and family’s sake, I ever loved, to, if
possible, patch up things so as, in the eyes of the world, you may bid
a respectful farewell. I could walk barefoot to kneel for this favour.’
Andrew Lumisden, however, was not among the NEW HOPES.
Jacobites who would venture to London on mere
word of mouth permission. His sister encouraged him in this
hesitation. In a letter from Castle Street, 1773, she alludes to the
subject, and also to the new hopes that fluttered the bosoms of her
Jacobite friends, and which were raised on the marriage, in the
preceding year, of Charles Edward with the Princess Louise of
Stolberg:—‘I have not yet heard of your letter of liberty. Col.
Masterton says it is lying in Lord North’s office, and he is sure you
will be safe to come here. But I say we must have better security
than that. Whatever I learn, you shall know without loss of time....
When will you write me of a pregnancy? On that I depend. It is my
last stake.... As my good Lady Clackmannan says: “O, my dear,
send me something to raise my spirits in these bad times!”
Remember me to the good Principle Gordon, and all our honest’
(that is, Jacobite) ‘friends.’
Five years more elapsed before the ultra-Jacobite
STRANGE AT
Andrew Lumisden was seen traversing Leicester ST. JAMES’S.
Fields, a free man, in safety. He owed his freedom, it
is said, to the zeal and judgment shown by him in executing a
commission (entrusted to him by Lord Hillsborough) to purchase for
George III. some rare books at a great sale in Paris. Strange himself
had become a great master of his art, the glory of the English school
of engravers. There was still some distance kept between Robin and
the Court of St, James’s. He had declined to engrave a portrait of
George II., and also one of George III., by Ramsay. His reason was
not ill-founded, namely, that no engraving could be creditably
executed where the original painting was very defective. Be this as it
may, the old Jacobite effected a reconciliation by engraving West’s
picture of the apotheosis of the young princes—Octavius and Alfred.
Strange’s untameable Jacobite wife, who had never spoken of
George III. but as ‘Elector of Hanover’ or ‘Duke of Brunswick,’ now
awarded him and his queen their full title, in a letter addressed to her
son Robert, in January, 1787, written in Strange’s new London
residence, ‘the Golden Head, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden,’ and
containing an account of the honours heaped on her husband, in
recognition of his last labours. ‘Your dear father has been employed
in engraving a most beautiful picture painted by Mr. West, which he
liked so much that he was desirous to make a print from it. The
picture was painted for his Majesty; it represented two
THE JACOBITE
of the royal children who died. The composition is an KNIGHTED.
angel in the clouds, the first child sitting by the angel;
and the other, a most sweet youth, looking up. There are two
cherubs in the top, and a view of Windsor at the bottom. This piece
was lately finished, and Friday, the 5th currt., was appointed for your
father’s presenting some proofs of it to his Majesty. He went with
them to the Queen’s house and had a most gracious reception. His
Majesty was very much pleased. After saying many most flattering
things, he said, “Mr. Strange, I have another favour to ask of you.”
Your father was attentive, and his Majesty—“It is that you attend the
levee on Wednesday or Friday, that I may confer on you the honour
of knighthood.” His Majesty left the room, but, coming quickly back,
said, “I am going immediately to St. James’s; if you’ll follow me I’ll do
it now; the sooner the better.” So, calling one of the pages, gave him
orders to conduct Mr. Strange to St. James’s, where, kneeling down,
he rose up Sir Robert Strange! This honour to our family is, I
hope, a very good omen. I hope it will be a spur to our children, and
show them to what virtue and industry may bring them. My dear Bob,
I hope you will equally share in our virtues as you do in our honours:
honours and virtue ought never to part. Few families have ever had a
more sure or creditable foundation than ours. May laurels flourish on
all your brows!’
It is a custom to speak in the present day of law SIR ROBERT
and justice being a mere farce, and of a rogue having AND LADY
a better chance than his victim, before a full bench of STRANGE.
judges splitting hairs and disagreeing in the
interpretation and application of the law. But the ‘handy dandy’ of law
and justice was as confusing in the London of the Jacobite times.
Cameron, young Matthews the printer, the thoughtless youths who
were ‘captains’ in the Manchester regiment, were harmless in what
they did, compared with Strange, the young Chevalier’s life-
guardsman, and forger of flash notes; but they were hanged and
Robin was knighted! Of course, Strange was not knighted for his
Jacobite doings, but for his distinction as an artist. One may at least
be sorry that the other Jacobites were strangled at Tyburn and on
Kennington Common.
Sir Robert was grateful. In future royal dedications the ex-Jacobite
spoke of the king’s mother as ‘that august princess.’ George, the
king, was ‘the auspicious patron of art.’ Sir Robert ‘presumed to
flatter himself’ that he might ‘humbly lay his work at his Majesty’s
feet;’ that ‘millions prayed for him,’—the ‘Arbiter of Taste and the
beloved Father of his people.’ And ‘the king over the Water’ was still
(though scarcely) alive. Robin survived Charles Edward, and died in
1791. His widow lived till 1806. With full recognition of the ‘happy
establishment,’ Lady Strange never doubted the superior rights of
the Stuarts, and was angry and outspoken when such rights were, in
any sense, questioned. At one of her gatherings in Henrietta Street,
one of her guests happened to refer to Charles Edward as the
‘Pretender.’ This stirred the old lady’s Jacobite blood, and with a
license not uncommon to aged Scottish ladies of the time, in
moments of excitement, she thundered out, ‘Pretender! and be
damned to you! Pretender, indeed!’—Flora Macdonald did not swear
at such provocation, but it once brought her fist in ringing
acquaintance with the offender’s ears.
In the year 1788 the poor prince, to designate DEATH OF
whom as a ‘Pretender’ was so offensive to all CHARLES
Jacobites, died in Rome, on the night of a terrible EDWARD.
anniversary for the Stuart family, the 30th of January.
In all the London periodicals he was treated with courtesy, but his
death moved London society much less than that of ‘Athenian
Stuart,’ whose decease left a void in scientific and social companies.
The funeral ceremony is detailed in brief common-places. A very
mild defender of the prince, ‘Anglicanus,’ in the ‘Gentleman’s
Magazine’ (Anno 1788, p. 509), adds to the confusion touching
Charles Edward’s religion, by asserting that he was converted to
Protestantism in Gray’s Inn Lane; and proving the assertion by
asking, ‘Did he not read the Church of England prayers to his
domestics when no clergyman was present?’
Soon after, London became an asylum to a fugitive THE
‘Queen.’ In 1791, the French revolution drove the COUNTESS
widow of Charles Edward to leave Paris and seek a OF ALBANY,
refuge in London. The Countess of Albany must have AT COURT.
felt some surprise at finding herself well received in St. James’s
Palace by the king and queen. She was there by force ‘of that tupsy-
turvy-hood which characterises the present age,’ as some wit
remarked, at a supper at Lady Mount-Edgcumbe’s. She was
presented by the young Countess of Aylesbury (of that Jacobite
family) as Princess of Stolberg. Walpole’s record is:—‘She was well-
dressed and not at all embarrassed. The King talked to her a good
deal, but about her passage, the sea, and general topics. The Queen
in the same way, but less. Then she stood between the Dukes of
Gloucester and Clarence, and had a good deal of conversation with
the former, who perhaps may have met her in Italy. Not a word
between her and the Princesses, nor did I hear of the Prince; but he
was there, and probably spoke to her. The Queen looked at her
earnestly. To add to the singularity of the day, it is the Queen’s
birthday. Another odd accident, at the Opera, at the Pantheon, Mme.
d’Albany was carried into the King’s box, and sat there. It is not of a
piece with her going to Court, that she seals with the royal arms.’
Walpole thought that ‘curiosity’ partly brought her to London; and
that it was not very well bred to her late husband’s family, ‘nor very
sensible, but a new way of passing eldest.’ He had not then seen
her, and when he did, at the end of May, his report was: ‘She has not
a ray of royalty about her. She has good eyes and teeth, but, I think,
can have had no more beauty than remains, except youth. She is
civil and easy, but German and ordinary. Lady Aylesbury made a
small assembly for her on Monday, and my curiosity is satisfied.’
On the old Chevalier’s birthday, the 10th of June,
IN THE HOUSE
Dr. Beilby Porteus, Bishop of London, escorted OF LORDS.
Hannah More to the House of Lords, to hear the king
deliver the speech by which he prorogued Parliament. On that once
famous day for defiantly wearing a white rose and risking mortal
combat in consequence, the Countess of Albany ‘chose to go to see
the King in the House of Lords, with the crown on his head,
proroguing the Parliament.’ ‘What an odd rencontre!’ says Walpole,
‘was it philosophy or insensibility?’ and he adds his belief, without
stating the grounds for it, ‘that her husband was in Westminster Hall
at the Coronation.’ Hannah More was being ‘very well entertained’
with the speech; but the thing that was most amusing, as she prettily
described it, ‘was to see, among the ladies, the Princess of Stolberg,
Countess of Albany, wife of the Pretender, sitting just at the foot of
that throne which she might once have expected to have mounted;
and what diverted the party when I put them in mind of it, was that it
happened to be the 10th of June, the Pretender’s birthday! I have
the honour to be very much like her, and this opinion was confirmed
yesterday when we met again.’
It has been seen what Walpole and others thought of the
Jacobites’ queen when she came to London. The lady kept a diary
during her sojourn here, from which may be collected her opinions of
the English and England of her day.
The widow of Charles Edward found England
THE
generally, and London in particular, much duller than COUNTESS,
even she had expected. She saw crowds but no ON ENGLISH
society. People lived nine months in the country, and SOCIETY.
during the three months in town they were never at home, but were
running after one another. They who were not confined half or all the
year with gout, went to bed at four, got up at midday, and began the
morning at two in the afternoon. There was no sun, but much smoke,
heavy meals, and hard drinking. The husbands were fond and ill-
tempered; the wives good from a sense of risk rather than
disinclination for their being otherwise, and they loved gaming and
dissipation. There was a family life, but no intimate social life; no
taste nor capacity for art. The most striking part of the judgment of
the Countess of Albany refers to English laws and constitution. ‘The
only good,’ she says in her Diary, ‘which England enjoys, and which
is inappreciable, is political liberty.... If England had an oppressive
government, this country together with its people would be the last in
the universe: bad climate, bad soil, and consequently tasteless
productions. It is only the excellence of its government that makes it
habitable.’ This judgment of England by a Jacobite princess or
queen, whose husband would have changed all but the climate, is at
least interesting. In England the Duchess of Devonshire and many
other ladies treated her as ‘queen.’ ‘The flattery’ (says the ‘Edinburgh
Review,’ July, 1861, p. 170), ‘which the writers probably regarded as
polite badinage, was accepted as rightful homage by the countess.’
Her sojourn in England was from April to August. HANOVERIAN
Her design to visit the scenes in Scotland which her JACOBITES.
late husband had rendered historical, was obliged to
be given up for lack of means; and she became, but not till the death
of the Cardinal of York, the recipient of an annuity from George III.
This king, like many of his family before him, and like all after him,
had a strong feeling of sympathy with the Stuarts. Indeed, the
recognised Jacobitism of the king, and of the royal family in general,
was the apology made by friends of the Stuart for holding office
under what they had once called ‘the usurping family.’ Hogg
(‘Jacobite Relics’) has recorded that a gentleman in a large company
once gibed Captain Stuart of Invernahoyle, for holding the king’s
commission while he was, at the same time, a professed Jacobite.
‘So I well may,’ answered he, ‘in imitation of my master; the king
himself is a Jacobite.’ The gentleman shook his head, and remarked
that the king was impossible. ‘By G—!’ said Stuart, ‘but I tell you he
is, and every son that he has. There is not one of them who, if he
had lived in my brave father’s days, would not to a certainty have
been hanged.’
The public learned, in 1793, how different the ‘family feeling’ had
been in the past generation. The ‘Monthly Review’ (in August of that
year), in a notice of the Memoirs of the Marshal Duke de Richelieu,
states that the temporary refuge offered to Charles Edward in
Friburg, after his expulsion from France, highly displeased the Court
at St. James’s. The British minister wrote in a very haughty style to
the magistrates of that State, complaining that it afforded an asylum
to an odious race proscribed by the laws of Great Britain. This was
answered by L’Avoyer with proper spirit. ‘This odious race,’ said he,
‘is not proscribed by our laws. Your letter is highly improper. You
forget that you are writing to a sovereign State; and I do not conceive
myself obliged to give you any further answer.’
In corroboration of the better feeling of the reigning
JACOBITE
family for that of the Stuarts, Hogg chronicles an act BALLADS.
of graceful homage to loyalty to the Stuarts (on the
part of the Prince Regent), which is graceful if it be true. He was
heard to express himself one day, before a dozen gentlemen of both
nations, with the greatest warmth, as follows: ‘I have always
regarded the attachment of the Scots to the Pretender—I beg your
pardon, gentlemen, to Prince Charles Stuart I mean—as a lesson to
me whom to trust in the hour of need!’
The feeling of regard for those who had been true to the Stuarts
was, no doubt, genuine. It was certainly shared by the regent’s
brothers, the Dukes of Clarence and Sussex. At a meeting of the
‘Highland Society of London,’ when the Duke of Sussex was in the
chair, a suggestion was made to Colonel Stuart of Garth, that it was
desirable to rescue from oblivion the songs and ballads of the
Jacobite period, by collecting and printing them. Colonel Stuart
readily adopted the suggestion, which may be said to have been
made by the royal family, in the person of one of its members; and
ultimately the task of collecting devolved on ‘the Ettrick Shepherd.’
Hogg published a first volume in 1819, the second in 1822. Some of
the songs were his own, after the old tunes and fashions. The
genuine Jacobite ballads excited much attention; old Jacobites were
amused rather than gratified by viewing Cumberland in Hell, and
younger people whose sympathies had first been awakened (in
1805) by ‘Waverley,’ were subdued to a sentiment of love and pity for
the Stuart whose sufferings are detailed in song, and the loyalty of
whose adherents is so touchingly illustrated in ardent, sometimes
ferociously attuned, minstrelsy. The republication of these ‘Jacobite
Relics,’ by Mr. Gardner, of Paisley, in 1874, is a proof that the old
interest has not died out either in London or the kingdoms generally.
Meanwhile, the French revolutionary wave reached ‘HENRY THE
Rome, and it ruined ‘Henry the Ninth, by the Grace of NINTH.’
God, but not by the will of men, King of Great Britain,
France, and Ireland,’ as it did his sister-in-law, the Countess of
Albany. Cardinal York did not seek refuge in London: he found one in
Venice. In London, however, Sir John Cave Hippisley, having been
informed of the venerable Cardinal’s destitute condition, submitted
the lamentable case of this Prince of the Church to the Ministry
(February, 1800). Almost immediately, in the king’s name, an offer by
letter was made to him of a pension of 4,000l. a year. ‘The letter,’
wrote the Cardinal to Sir John, in Grosvenor Street, ‘is written in so
extremely genteel and obliging a manner, and with expressions of
singular regard and consideration for me, that, I assure you, excited
in me most particular and lively sentiments, not only of satisfaction
for the delicacy with which the affair has been managed, but also of
gratitude for the generosity which has provided for my necessity.’
The Cardinal adds a touching statement of his utter destitution. Sir
John was right in informing the still illustrious prince that the king’s
action had the sympathy of the whole British nation, irrespective of
creeds and parties. ‘Your gracious Sovereign’s noble and
spontaneous generosity,’ rejoins the Cardinal, ‘filled me with the
most lively sensations of tenderness and heartfelt gratitude.’
In 1802, Cadell and Davies, in the Strand,
HOME’S
published the first regular history of the rebellion of HISTORY OF
1745, and the London critics expressed their surprise THE
that more than half a century had elapsed before a REBELLION.
trustworthy account of so serious an outbreak had been given to the
public. The key-note of Home’s book is in a paragraph which was
very distasteful to the Jacobites. There it was laid down that the
Revolution of 1688, which transferred the Crown ‘to the nearest
protestant heir, but more remote than several Roman Catholic
families, gave such an ascendant to popular principles as puts the
nature of the constitution beyond all controversy.’ The critics with
Jacobite tendencies were disappointed that Home cast no censure
on the Duke of Cumberland. They supposed this was owing to the
book being dedicated to the king. Jacobite disappointment found
ample compensation in 1805, when romance flung all its splendour
round the young Chevalier, in the novel by an anonymous author,
‘Waverley, or ’tis 60 years since.’
The last male heir of the royal Stuart line was then A JACOBITE
living. The good Cardinal York died in 1807 at Rome, DRAMA.
when he was eighty-two years of age. The
announcement of his death in the London journals shows sympathy
and respect, without stint. It was well deserved, for he was a
blameless prince of a not irreproachable line.
After this last male heir of the line of Stuart had died, with a
dignity that characterised no other of his race, and with the respectful
sympathy of his adversaries, if he had any, it might be supposed that
all danger springing from such a line had ceased. The last of the
race had abandoned the empty title of king, and had gracefully and
without humiliation accepted a pension, gracefully and delicately
offered, from George III. The peril, however, was not supposed to be
over. While the last of the Stuarts was dying, Mr. Charles Kemble
was translating a French drama (originally German, by Kotzebue),
entitled ‘Edouard en Ecosse.’ On presenting it in 1808 to the Lord
Chamberlain and the Licenser, they did not see treason in it, but
much offence. The piece, in fact, represented the chances,
mischances, adventures, and escapes of Charles Edward after the
battle of Culloden. A licence to play a three-act drama, tending to
keep up interest in ‘the Pretender,’ was refused point blank.
Ultimately, it was granted under absurd conditions.
THE DRAMA
Charles Kemble removed the scene to Sweden, and REVISED.
called his drama ‘The Wanderer, or the Rights of
Hospitality.’ Charles Edward (played by Kemble) became Sigismond,
Culloden figured as the battle of Strangebro, and everything suffered
silly change, except one character, which was overlooked—Ramsay
(Fawcett)—who throughout the play talked in the broadest Scotch.
When Sigismond’s perils culminated, he melodramatically escaped
them all, and those who had helped him were proud of their aid, and
not in much fear for having given it. More than twenty years elapsed
before the great official at St. James’s thought that the original
version might be acted without danger to the throne of George IV. In
November, 1829, it was produced at Covent Garden as the ‘Royal
Fugitive, or the Rights of Hospitality.’ Charles was played by the ex-
artillery officer, Prescott, whose stage name was Warde. Diddear
and Miss Tree acted the Duke and Duchess of Athol; Miss Cawse
represented Flora Macdonald; and the terrible Duke William was
roared through like a sucking dove by the milk-and-watery Horrebow.
The drama did not shake the ‘happy establishment.’ Of the
performers in 1829, one alone survives, the representative of the
Duchess of Athol, Mrs. Charles Kean.
But, five years previous to abandoning the timidity SATIRICAL
which saw danger in the stage dealing with a Stuart BALLAD.
drama, a total change came over the governing
powers in London. George IV. and Alderman Curtis had appeared in
Edinburgh, in Highland garb, in 1822, and this led to an act of grace
in 1824. The king’s visit to Scotland, however, did arouse a
slumbering Jacobite bard, who gave vent to his rough humour in a
satire, copies of which reached London in the king’s absence, and
the flavour of which may be gathered from the following extracts:—
Sawney, naw the King’s come,
Sawney, naw the King’s come,
Down an’ kiss his gracious—hand,
Sawney, naw the King’s come.
In Holyrood House lodge him snug,
An’ blarnyfy his royal lug (ear)
Wi’ stuff wud gar a Frenchman ugg (make sick),
Sawney, &c.
Tell him he is great an’ gude,

An’ come o’ royal Scottish blude,
Down, like Paddy, lick his fud (foot)!
Sawney, &c.
Tell him he can do nae wrang,

That he’s mighty high an’ strang,
That you an’ yours to him belang,
Sawney, &c.
Swear he’s great, an’ chaste, an’ wise,

Praise his portly shape an’ size,
Rouse his whiskers to the skies,
Sawney, &c.
Make pious folk in gude black claith,

Extol, till they run short o’ breath,
The great Defender of the Faith,
Sawney, &c.
Make your peers o’ high degree,

Crouching low on bended knee,
Greet him wi’ a Wha wants me?
Sawney, &c.
Let his glorious kingship dine,

On gude sheepheads an’ haggis fine,
Gi’e him whiskey ’stead o’ wine,
Sawney, &c.
Show him a’ your buildings braw,

Your castle, college, brigs, an’ a’
Your jail an’ royal Forty-Twa (an old institution),

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Digital International Relations Andrey

ISBN 978-981-99-3466-9 ISBN 978-981-99-3467-6 (eBook)

The past couple of decades have seen an exponential growth in digital

of distance learning are just a few aspects of this digital metamorphosis

sovereignty in cyberspace. This book is not just a reflection of our current

Part I Russia in Digital International Relations

Part II Sovereignty in the Digital Space

Part III Digital Dimensions of International and

Part IV Digital International Economy

Part V Digital Education and Research in International

16 Evolution of Digital Education 259

Part VI Digital Transformation of Diplomacy and

Natalia Adamchuk is Doctor of Economics, Professor of the Department

field of research interest includes digital aspects of international relations

Natalia Komarovskaia is a senior lecturer in the Department of

include international economic relations, international relations, world

Sergey Shitkov is Ph.D. in Law, Deputy Rector for Administrative and

Elvira Yarnykh is Doctor of Economics, Professor, Department of

Fig. 2.1 The long tail model 23

Fig. 18.1 Extended network of “Kolomoyskyi’s people” in the 8th

Table 2.1 Key milestones in the development of digital business

Table 4.1 Positions of China, Russia, and the United States

Russia in Digital International Relations

Russian Industrial Business in the New

Dmitry Grigoriev and Anna Manakhova

D. Grigoriev (B) · A. Manakhova

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

telecommunication technologies (ICT) and solutions, have been pushed

States and several other Western countries. If we look at the operating

For large state-significant industrial holdings, it is of fundamental

that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the

and does not contradict international documents already adopted in this

● criticizing any actions that undermine stability and cause threats to

In order to minimize the consequences of sanctions for informa-

Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace. (2018). https://pariscall.intern

Digital Transformation of Business Models:

Maria Kozlova and Natalia Komarovskaia

M. Kozlova (B) · N. Komarovskaia

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 15

the influence of digitalization on changing economic processes (Tapscott,

● The increasing digitalization of information in various sectors.

● The architecture of product, server and information flows, including

Business models take the following factors into consideration:

● The technologies and tools available to the company to achieve

● Goals, deadlines, and methods for achieving them (Selsabila &

Patrick Stähler identifies the following three components of the busi-

● Value proposition, when the business model contains a description

Key Features of New Business

Table 2.1 Key milestones in the development of digital business transformation

1970–1989 1990–2000 2001–2014 2015–present

The digital transformation of enterprises was propelled by internal and

1. Customization and Individualization

Individualization can also be referred to as customer centricity, as

2. Increasing the speed of business scalability by using new growth

Traditional companies supply tangible goods, so they incur costs

3. Using Information and Big Data to Provide Feedback

Digital companies can quickly receive feedback from their customers.

Functionality can be defined as a set of capabilities provided by a given

5. Creating Positive Network Externalities

Network externalities can be classified as direct and indirect network

6. Reducing Transaction Costs

Transaction costs are costs associated with the implementation of trans-

The activities of digital companies are more environmentally friendly