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Different Histories,
Shared Futures
Dialogues on
Australia-China
Edited by
Mobo Gao · Justin O’Connor · Baohui Xie ·
Jack Butcher
 Different Histories, Shared Futures

“A timely, wide ranging and well informed contribution to the currently vexed
and turbulent relationship between Australia and China. This collection presents
the balanced but forcefully argued views of some of the best qualified scholars
on this issue at a moment when such a book is crucial. An essential primer.”
—Kerry Brown, Professor, King’s College

“If you just want fast food off the China threat production assembly line,
this is not the book for you. What this book delivers is that extremely rare
commodity: a patient, dispassionate, cool-headed analysis drawing on insights
from the authors’ life-long, dedicated research on China. If you want to see
Australia-China relations improve, and if Australia’s public debate is to have
any hope of going beyond media headlines and think-tank reports, this book is
essential reading.”
—Wanning Sun, Professor, University of Technology Sydney

“As the world seems to be spiralling toward a new Cold War with China, this
edited volume offers a useful corrective to what has been, at times, a hysterical
over-reaction to the growth of Chinese global power. Featuring a number of
Australia’s leading China specialists discussing the two country’s relations, this
volume could not be more timely or more necessary.”
—Michael Dutton, Professor, University of London

“This book is a timely stocktake of the spectacular collapse of Australia-China

relations, and a strong riposte to the narrative that this was all China’s doing.
With informed perspectives on questions of Australian security and identity, and
the nature of today’s PRC, the authors pick apart simplistic depictions of an
ideological stand-off and offer more compelling explanations for today’s rivalries
and antagonisms. Anyone looking for an alternative to rising tensions and the
reckless contemplation of war will find much to draw on in this volume.”
—David Brophy, Senior Lecturer, University of Sydney
Mobo Gao · Justin O’Connor · Baohui Xie ·
Jack Butcher
Editors

Different Histories,
Shared Futures
Dialogues on Australia-China
Editors
Mobo Gao Justin O’Connor
Department of Asian Studies Creative Industries
University of Adelaide University of South Australia
Adelaide, SA, Australia Magill, SA, Australia

Baohui Xie Jack Butcher

Department of Asian Studies Department of Politics
University of Adelaide and International Relations
Adelaide, SA, Australia University of Adelaide
Adelaide, SA, Australia

ISBN 978-981-19-9190-5 ISBN 978-981-19-9191-2 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9191-2

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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 Acknowledgements

Much of the discussion in this book is based on an online conference in

which we collaborated the resultant joint findings with colleagues across
three continents—Australia, Asia and Europe. We would like to thank
all the conference participants, even though some of the papers initially
presented have not been included here. We would like to acknowledge
the support of the School of Social Sciences under then Head Professor
Melissa Jane Nursey-Bray at the University of Adelaide and the Univer-
sity of South Australia Creative for the support provided in getting this
book to publication. We are also grateful for the valuable input of each
of the international team members towards this project, which has taken
much of their time, effort and patience, especially Jacob Dreyer and Arun
Kumar Anbalagan, with whom we have been in frequent communication.

v
 Contents

1 Different Pasts: The Panda and the Kangaroo 1

Mobo Gao, Baohui Xie, Justin O’Connor, and Jack Butcher
2 China Threat, Australian Challenge: Recognising
Differences, Building Futures 15
David S. G. Goodman
3 The Role of National Security in Australia–China
Relations 31
Colin Mackerras
4 Australia’s China Discourse: Equivalential Identities
and Bilateral Relations 49
Yingjie Guo
5 Australia’s Narrative on Beijing’s Economic Coercion:
Context and Critique 65
James Laurenceson
6 Geopolitical Contest in the South Pacific: Are
Australia and China Destined to Compete? 89
David Morris
7 The Securitisation of Australia’s China Policy and Its
Reasons 109
Rujie Chen and Yujia Shen

vii
viii CONTENTS

8 The Strange “Bed-Fellows” with Different Dreams:

The System-Unit Dynamics in China–Australia
Strategic Partnership 121
Lei Yu and Sophia Sui
9 Australia’s China Literacy and China’s Australia
Literacy: Misassumptions and Implications
for Bilateral Relations 137
Dan Hu and Ying Li
10 Grassroots Perceptions of Australia in China During
Diplomatic Tensions: A Lens Through “We-Media”
Framing 159
Jack Butcher
11 Minzhu in the People’s Congress: Understanding
the Chinese Way of Understanding Representative
Democracy 179
Baohui Xie
12 Australia’s Higher Education and the Future
of the Common Good 203
Greg McCarthy and Xianlin Song
13 Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Interference: Some
Reflections on Australia–China Relations 223
Jocelyn Chey
14 Is Common Destiny with Australia Possible When
the CCP Still Rules China: From the Perspective
of Values and Ways of Life 241
Mobo Gao
15 Shared Futures? 269
Justin O’Connor

Index 287
 Notes on Contributors

Jack Butcher is a Ph.D. student at the University of Adelaide. He has

extensive experience working, living and studying in China. He speaks
highly fluent Mandarin among five other languages. He received both
the Westpac and New Colombo Plan scholarships in 2017. His research
interests include security studies and strategic culture in the Asia Pacific.
Rujie Chen is a Master’s student at the School of International Studies
at Sichuan University. His research focuses on Asia-Pacific politics.
Dr. Jocelyn Chey is Adjunct Professor at Western Sydney University
and UTS and Visiting Professor at the University of Sydney. She was
a career diplomat, her last posting being as Consul General to Hong
Kong and Macau. She was awarded the Australia-China Council Medal
in 2008 and the Medal of Australia (AM) in 2009. She is a Fellow of the
Australian Institute of International Affairs. Her current research fields
include Australia-China and Australia-Hong Kong relations and Chinese
humour.
Dr. Mobo Gao is Professor and Chair of Chinese Studies at the Depart-
ment of Asian Studies at the University of Adelaide. He was the founding
Director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Adelaide from
2008 to 2018, and he has working experience at various universities
in China, UK and Australia. He is known as a prolific author and for
his insight into Chinese politics, culture as well as Chinese migration to
Australia and the mass media.

ix
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. David S. G. Goodman is Director, China Studies Centre, Univer-

sity of Sydney, where he is also Professor of Chinese Politics in the
Department of Government and International Relations. A Fellow of the
Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, he is also an emeritus professor
in the Department of China Studies at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool Univer-
sity in Suzhou, China; and the Australia-China Relations Institute at
University of Technology, Sydney.
Dr. Yingjie Guo is Professor in Chinese Studies at the Faculty of Arts
and Social Sciences, the University of Sydney. His research is related
to discourses of nation and class in contemporary China with a focus
on China’s cultural nationalism and Chinese cultural identities, and the
discourse of class in post-Mao China.
Dr. Dan Hu is Assistant Professor and Deputy Director at the Australian
Studies Centre of Beijing Foreign Studies University, and Research
Fellow at the Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of
Melbourne.
Dr. James Laurenceson is Professor and Director of the Australia-China
Relations Institute (ACRI) at UTS.
His research has been published in leading scholarly journals. He also
provides regular commentary on contemporary developments in China
economy and the Australia-China relationship.
Ying Li is a Master’s student at the Australian Studies Center of Beijing
Foreign Studies University.
Dr. Colin Mackerras is a Professor Emeritus from Griffith University,
where he worked from 1974 to 2004. He is a Fellow of the Australian
Academy of the Humanities and an Officer in the Order of Australia.
He has published widely on (1) Chinese traditional theatre and drama;
(2) Chinese history; (3) China’s ethnic minorities; (4) Western images of
China; and (5) Australia-China relations.
Dr. Greg McCarthy is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the
University of Western Australia. He was the BHP Chair of Australian
Studies at Peking University from 2016 to 2018. He has published widely
on both China and Australia relations and higher education.
David Morris is former Australian and multilateral diplomat. He is Vice
Chair of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xi

and the Pacific Sustainable Business Network. He represented the Pacific

Islands Forum Secretariat as Pacific Trade and Investment Commissioner
in China, 2015–2018. He is currently completing a Ph.D. in international
relations at Corvinus University of Budapest.
Dr. Justin O’Connor is Professor of Cultural Economy at the Univer-
sity of South Australia. He’s been involved as researcher, teacher and
policy-advocate in the cultural/creative industries in the UK and East
Asian regions since 1989. He has also been involved, as a member of
UNESCO’s international ‘Expert Facility’, in missions developing cultural
industries strategy in various countries as well as convening a Global
Cultural Economy Network.
Dr. Yujia Shen is Associate Professor at the School of International
Studies at Sichuan University. Her research interest is on Asia Pacific
region with a special focus on China and South Pacific relations and
China-Australia relations.
Dr. Xianlin Song is Adjunct Research Fellow at the School of Social
Sciences at the University of Western Australia. She is active in quite
a number of related but cross-disciplinary areas in arts and humanities
including Chinese women’s literature and international higher education
mobility.
Dr. Sophia Sui is a Research Fellow at the Deakin University, Australia.
Dr. Baohui Xie is Scholarly Teaching Fellow at the Department of Asian
Studies at the University of Adelaide. He is an advanced level interpreter
and NAATI certified translator of Chinese and English in both directions.
Apart from his expertise in translation studies, he researches into Chinese
politics, media and religion.
Dr. Lei Yu is Professor at the Center for Pacific Studies, Liaocheng
University and Guest Professor at Beijing University of Foreign Studies.
 List of Tables

Table 4.1 Opposed camps in the International Arena 51

Table 4.2 The Antagonistic poles 52
Table 4.3 Equivalential identities within self and other 53
Table 9.1 Primary enrolments, by language and year level, 2020 144
Table 9.2 Secondary enrolments, by language and year level, 2020 144
Table 9.3 Number of students who completed a VCE Unit 4
language course, by year level undertaken, and eligible
to graduate in 2020 145
Table 9.4 Number of Schools Offering Chinese Courses
in Australian States of New South Wales, Victoria,
Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia 147

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

Different Pasts: The Panda

and the Kangaroo

Mobo Gao, Baohui Xie , Justin O’Connor ,

and Jack Butcher

Different Histories
This book is the direct outcome of an online conference held jointly
by the University of Adelaide and the University of South Australia in

M. Gao (B) · B. Xie

Department of Asian Studies, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia
e-mail: mobo.gao@adelaide.edu.au
B. Xie
e-mail: baohui.xie@adelaide.edu.au
J. O’Connor
Creative Industries, University of South Australia, Magill, SA, Australia
e-mail: Justin.oconnor@unisa.edu.au
J. Butcher
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Adelaide,
Adelaide, SA, Australia
e-mail: jack.butcher@adelaide.edu.au

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
M. Gao et al. (eds.), Different Histories, Shared Futures,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9191-2_1
2 M. GAO ET AL.

September 2021. Amid the depths of the COVID-19 pandemic, 2021

was the year when the diplomatic relationship between Australia and
China was at its worst since 1972. We, Mobo Gao, Justin O’Connor,
Baohui Xie and Jack Butcher from the two universities mentioned above,
thought that we should perhaps do something to lift our spirits during
the gloomiest of times. We wanted to examine whether there was a possi-
bility of a way forward in which Australia and China could have a shared
future, even if the histories between the two countries were profoundly
different.
Australia and China could not be any more different. Australia is a
country of a little more than 25 million people, a continent scarcely popu-
lated in its middle and northwest but with abundant natural resources. It
has developed excellent health care, education, agriculture, mining and
service industries but hardly any industrial capacity. On the other end
of the spectrum, China is a country of 1.4 billion people with minimal
natural resources, a country that is nicknamed the “world’s factory” due
to its extensive manufacturing capabilities. The population of Shanghai,
or any one of the half a dozen megacities in China, is more than all the
people in Australia combined. Just imagine if all of Australia’s residents,
from Darwin to Perth, across the outback and towards the eastern states,
moved to Tasmania to live. That is what an average Chinese province is
like in terms of land size but double or even triple the number of people
living there.
But these are only the visible physical and material differences between
the two countries. There are many more. Politically, Australia is a multi-
party, one-person, one-vote democracy. China is a one-party state ruled
by the Communist Party of China (CCP), which has been there not
because of the ballot, but due to what is more broadly known as
a communist revolution. Although both countries are geographically
located in the Asia–Pacific, Australia’s cultural values and ways of life are
largely shaped by European traditions that were planted by white settlers
at the expense of the first nations peoples. On the other hand, Chinese
cultural values and ways of life, whatever they are, a matter discussed in
this book, have been shaped by the indigenous peoples themselves.
Geopolitically, Australia and China have one commonality: that is inse-
curity. Although Australia is a continental country at ease with itself in
terms of territorial integrity, it feels insecure as a European outpost in
the Asia–Pacific region and, therefore, canonically seeks alliances with
“great and powerful” Western powers for protection, formerly the United
 1 DIFFERENT PASTS: THE PANDA AND THE KANGAROO 3

Kingdom (UK) and now the United States (US). On the other hand,
China has had territorial disputes with most of its neighbours. Although
settling land disputes with 13 of its 14 neighbours, except for India,
China still has maritime disputes with several countries. Furthermore, the
Taiwan issue, in particular, unsettles China.
Traditionally, China was not a nation-state in the sense that originated
in the West. The China that was between and around the Yellow River
and Yangtze River basins has been fluid in size, bigger or smaller both
in population and land, depending on outcomes of brutal and constant
tribal warfare, with different ethnic groups intermingling while fighting
against each other. While the Confucian-influenced Chinese were later
called the Han Chinese (because of the name of the Han Dynasty), Han
was never meant to be ethnic or national. The two biggest empires in
Chinese history were the so-called Yuan Dynasty and Qing Dynasty, the
former established by the Mongolians from the north and the latter by
the Manchus from the northeast, who invaded and conquered China
proper. Whether those two empires can be categorised as Chinese dynas-
ties might be debatable, but the fact that they became Chinese, even
though the Mongolians were not as thoroughly as the Manchus, is less
under dispute. When the Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1911, the Republic of
China, established in 1912, inherited its territories. And when the Kuom-
intang (KMT), headed by Chiang Kai-shek, took the Republic of China
government to Taiwan after his defeat at the hands of the communists
led by Mao Zedong, the CCP established the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) and took over the Republic of China’s territories, without much
of an internationally recognised and legalised demarcation of its borders.
After years of give-and-take negotiations, the PRC has settled its disputes
with most of its land-based neighbours and has accepted a territorial size
smaller than what the Republic of China in Taiwan would entertain.
Nevertheless, China does not feel secure. Memories of colonial occu-
pation by Western powers and Japanese invasions and occupations linger
vividly, particularly images of war-time atrocities, such as the Nanking
Massacre and the Japanese 731 Unit Chemical warfare experiment.
Furthermore, looking at the map to locate how many US military bases
surround China in its periphery, it is not hard to imagine that a Chinese
leader would always have sleepless nights. It may surprise many Australians
that the Chinese, like them, do not feel secure. China’s fear is even worse
because China does not have anyone to fall back on for protection.
4 M. GAO ET AL.

It is not just the fear of war and violence but there is also the fear
of hunger and starvation. Although China has improved greatly in terms
of feeding its people, the food/land and water resources versus people
ratio is still precarious, even after such brutal and inhumane population
control imposed by the Chinese on themselves for a couple of decades.
The two most recent famines occurred in 1942 under the Republic of
China regime during the Japanese occupation and 1958 upon the after-
math of the Great Leap Forward. On the other hand, though much of
the land in Australia is barren desert, there is enough arable land to feed
not only a smaller population in Australia but with surplus to export, to
China for instance.
So far, we have only presented an outline of some of the differences
and one commonality between China and Australia. There are more,
of course, stereotypical differences, perhaps as a result of their different
histories. Australians are laid back and fun-loving, keen and good at
sports, who would like to indulge in the myths of larrikinism and mate-
ship, while the Chinese are much more reserved and serious in worldly
pursuit, perhaps precisely because of the scarcity of it. Let us repeat the
scenario of all the Australians multiplied by two or three living on the
small island of Tasmania: it would be hard to imagine then that if you
took your children to a park, there would be a swing available for them
to jump on. It would also be hard to imagine there would be ovals here
and there with large expanses of green grass for sports.
Australians love animals and probably have more pet animals per capita
than anywhere else in the world. Some would like to proudly claim that
it is because we Australians are humane and civilised towards animals,
unlike the cruel Chinese. But imagine how difficult it would be even to
walk your dog if you had to live in a flat on the fiftieth floor among what
seems like a forest of high-rise apartment blocks.

Common Interests
Despite all the differences, Australians and Chinese have been living
together quite nicely since 1972 and until recently, let’s say before the
US elected Donald Trump as its president in 2016. In fact, the very
differences between the two countries meant that one could complement
the other. For example, China could supply Australia with manufactured
goods at throwaway prices while Australia could supply China with its
excellent agricultural goods such as fruit, wheat, barley, beef, wine and,
 1 DIFFERENT PASTS: THE PANDA AND THE KANGAROO 5

of course, mineral dirt, plus world-class education. It is a proven fact that

since the 1990s, whatever China supplies, the prices tend to decrease, and
whatever China demands from Australia, the prices most likely increase.
China, for decades, has imported pollution by producing commodities at
the lower end of the value chain and exports deflation by depressing the
prices in the market. In the process, China has made a leap in its GDP
and wealth among its people, albeit at the cost of the environment and the
welfare of the millions and millions of migrant workers. It was a win–win
relationship, as the Chinese would like to say.

What is the Problem?

Spectacularly and apparently suddenly, the bilateral relationship between
the two countries started to deteriorate until 2022, when Australians
voted out the Liberal-National Coalition government led by Scott
Morrison. The newly installed labour government seems to have put a
brake on any further slide. However, it may not be totally fair to blame
the Morrison-led government for the deterioration. To start with, it is not
just Australia that has problems with China. So have Japan, South Korea,
and many European countries, not to speak of the US under Trump or
not. Secondly, surveys in these countries seem to suggest that negative
opinions of China form a popular majority.
So, the fault must be with China. In the words of the newly elected
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese: “Australia has not changed,
but China has”. There had been tit-for-tat exchanges between Australia
and China on trade issues, official rhetoric and media reporting. The
details of these exchanges have been dealt with in this book. But the broad
issue to be noted in this introduction is this: What has China under Xi
Jinping done to arouse such hostility from the US and its allies? The ban
of the Chinese telecommunication giant Huawei and, the arrest of one
of Huawei’s top executives Meng Wanzhou, the imposition of tariffs on
Chinese imports valued at billions and billions of dollars by the Trump
administration, just to name a couple of examples, are the West’s reaction
to China’s aggression and its behaviour of not observing “the rules-based
international order”, as the consistent and frequent news headlines in the
mainstream media claim in Anglo-Saxon societies. So what exactly is it
that Xi has done?
6 M. GAO ET AL.

China Prior Xi as a Comparison

First, let us take a step back to look at China before Xi actually came
to power in 2013. The two events that should have assaulted the sense
of justice and keenly felt values seemingly held by Western countries
happened in China under the firm grip of Deng Xiaoping. The first was
the army crackdown with tanks in the streets of Beijing in 1989. The
second was the brief invasion of Vietnam in 1979 to, in the words of
Deng Xiaoping, “teach the Vietnamese a lesson”. Both of those would
not have taken place without the explicit instruction of Deng Xiaoping.
Deng was one of the most ruthless and autocratic leaders, if not the most,
of the CCP. Deng dismissed almost single-handedly two General Secre-
taries of the CCP, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, the two most “liberal”
CCP leaders, still worshipped by the liberal Chinese intelligentsia. The
General Secretary of the CCP in post-Mao China was and still is officially
and formally supposed to be the number one boss in the Chinese polit-
ical and bureaucratic hierarchy, but Deng could lecture the two General
Secretaries as if they were his children.
Nevertheless, Deng has not been feared or demonised as much as Xi
Jinping as a dictator. When Hong Kong was in the middle of turmoil in
2019, many predicted, and some actually anticipated, that China would
send tanks into the street, like in 1989. But Xi did not order such a crack-
down and the Chinese PLA troops remained in their barracks, except
when they came out to clean up the rubbish left behind in the street by
the protesters and rioters.
Regarding the South China Sea issue, Xi Jinping did not do anything
out of the ordinary of what China had been doing under his predecessors.
The first armed exchange between China and Vietnam over the South
China Sea dispute took place in 1974 and then the second in 1988. The
first Chinese armed exchange with the Philippine naval forces in the South
China Sea took place in 1995 and the last one in 2012 before Xi came
to power one year later. It is possible to attribute the artificial build-up of
islands by dredging sand to Xi as his initiative since these projects began in
2013. But quite possibly, these projects were planned some years ahead of
Xi assuming the leadership. It has to be pointed out, though, that China
under Xi did push through the National Security Law in Hong Kong and
that China under Xi has built up a military presence in the South China
Sea after some rocks were expanded into island-like existences.
 1 DIFFERENT PASTS: THE PANDA AND THE KANGAROO 7

The three most prominent programmes or policies that are more or less
definitely pushed by Xi Jinping are the stronger and more thorough anti-
corruption campaign within the CCP and the Chinese government, the
Made in China initiative to upgrade China’s value chain of production and
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, if one examines carefully,
none of them were really Xi Jinping’s original ideas. Anti-corruption was a
consistent issue within the CCP for years on end. The difference, if there
is any, is that Xi has had the guts to tackle corrupted officials at the very
top partly because of his princeling credentials.
Upgrading the value chain of production is almost as natural as
day turning into night. With the increased development of technology,
coupled with heightened demand for higher salaries against the back-
ground of decreased labour supply, industries of lower technological value
in China have started to move to countries that have been lately catching
up, just like those industries that moved from Hong Kong, Taiwan and
the West to China during the 1980s and 1990s. China has moved towards
a direction of development with or without Xi Jinping, just as Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan have.
The BRI looks like a signature programme by Xi Jinping to project
China’s power and influence. But, again, this may not be what it appears.
The geographical differences and developmental gaps between the south-
east coasts and inland provinces have always been an issue for modern
Chinese governments, not just since the PRC was established in 1949.
For the description of this regional disparity, there is a standard refer-
ence of the first-tier cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and provinces of Jiangsu
and Zhejiang, Fujian, second-tier cities like Xi’an, Taiyuan, Zhengzhou,
Nanchang or Chengdu and provinces like Anhui and Jiangxi and Sichuan
and third tier provinces further to the west, and northwest of China.
During the era of Mao, when China felt threatened by the US/Taiwan
from the south and the former USSR from the north, Mao designed a
strategy called the “Third Front”, in which a massive amount of invest-
ment and human resources were mobilised to set up industries in the
second and third tier areas to avoid military attacks.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, regional gaps were even
more keenly felt. As a result of this perception and necessity, there
emerged a programme of developing the “west” before Xi came to power.
For the Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao, there was already a focus on
Tibet and Xinjiang. China could not leave the “west” underdeveloped
for geopolitical reasons. Moreover, Chinese policymakers felt increasingly
8 M. GAO ET AL.

more intensely that ethnic or political unrest in conjunction with reli-

gious extremism could be dealt with more effectively if and when there is
economic development in these areas. Finally, Chinese policymakers also
believed that China relies too much on maritime routes for imports and
exports, a risk to be anticipated given the unsettled South China Sea and
Taiwan issues and encirclement by the increasingly less friendly US and
its allies. Therefore, a road network for trade and development inspired
by the Ancient Silk Road was on the agenda before Xi came to power.
Regarding the Taiwan issue, again, Xi Jinping has not so far said
anything that has not been repeated many times before: that Taiwan is
a province of China, that the current split between the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait was a result of a civil war between the KMT and the CCP
that has not finished, that China will try every means possible to unite
Taiwan peacefully, but will resort to military force if the red line of inde-
pendence is about to be crossed. Just as we are writing now, the army,
the navy and air forces of the PLA have been carrying out what they call
“military drills” surrounding Taiwan in reaction to US House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. This can easily be seen as evidence of the
aggressive nature of Xi Jinping. However, again, it is not that simple.
China, under Xi’s predecessor Jiang Zemin, also ordered missile drills
over Taiwan in 1995. The only difference is that China’s willingness to
take risks has increased, and its willingness to deal with provocations has
gone down.

The Problem with China Under Xi

Basically, Xi Jinping’s sin is that he is leading a China that is wealthier,
more confident and more assertive in defending what it considers its
interests. In a nutshell, the issue is this: The Western-dominated world
has to deal with a rising China that is not only racially different but also
politically different from the West headed by the US. The US wants to
maintain its dominance, and China seems not only able to but also aims
to challenge this dominance.
In today’s “progressive” world, we cannot openly articulate racist senti-
ments that occasionally occur when the rise of China is a topic along the
lines of “the first non-Caucasian rising power”. It is better to talk down
to China regarding values and ways of life because it is politically correct
and we can hold the moral high ground. The most popular and often
 1 DIFFERENT PASTS: THE PANDA AND THE KANGAROO 9

cited argument is that it is not the Chinese people we are up against but
the Chinese government that is ruled by a communist party.
What is referred to as Chinese in what is called China consists of 20% of
humanity. The Chinese might argue that they have the right to develop,
including cutting-edge technology and the right to have a higher standard
of living. The Chinese might also argue that based on their own experi-
ence, the development of infrastructure through the BRI would lead to
economic growth that is good for everyone, even though the BRI is not
without China’s self-interest in supplying manufactured commodities and
demanding raw materials. At least China provides a suitable alternative
for the formerly colonised countries. Surely, if Fox News, the BBC, the
VOA, the Murdoch press, Reuters and all the dominating Western media
could spread the soft power of the West, China can also do some of its
own, the Chinese would think.
Yes, but no. To start with the media, Western media cannot get into
China because it blocks them. There is no freedom of speech in China.
There is no level field for competition with China regarding tech devel-
opment because the Chinese state directs its big companies. There is
no transparency in how Chinese enterprises operate, and they are not
rule-based commercial operations. The US could vote Trump out by an
election, and so did Australians with Scott Morrison, but you could not
do that in China. What is worst of all, China practices forced labour and
even “genocide” against the Uighurs in Xinjiang. So the story goes.
It was hoped, as often touted, that with the opening up of China to
Western values and ways of life, which are universally accepted as the best
in any possible world, China would change. But China has not. Worse
still, Xi came along who completely ruined any hope for change in China
because Xi is less hesitant, more assertive, more articulate and more in
control. To the outrage of those who wished for China to change, Xi
even abolished limitations on presidential terms, meaning that Xi wants
to rule for life.

Is a Shared Future Possible?

This book aims to tackle these issues to see whether there can be a shared
future between Australia and China, and by extension a shared future
between China and the West. To explore this possibility, we will ask the
following questions:
10 M. GAO ET AL.

• Is China a national security threat to Australia?

• Are the Chinese different from Australians in terms of values and
ways of life?
• How do the Chinese see democracy?
• Does people-to-people exchange in cultural activities make a differ-
ence?
• How do the Chinese perceive Australia on social media?
• How does the literacy of each country measure up?
• Are Australia and China destined to compete in the South Pacific?
• Is a pattern of economic partnership but geopolitical rivalry sustain-
able?
• Is Australia securitising Australia–China relationship?
• Is there a common good in education across the two countries?
• Is good-will between China and Australia possible?
• Is it possible to understand China?
• Is Australia’s narrative on Beijing’s economic coercion too simplistic?
• What are the domestic dynamics for the West’s hostility towards
China?

Contents of the Chapters

To answer these questions, this book is divided
into two parts—Chapters 1–8 examine the Australia–
China relationship in general, while Chapters
9–15 focus on more specific topics. The first and foremost question
following the introductory chapter, of course, is whether China poses
any threat to Australia given that the dominance of the China Threat
discourse in Australia’s public affairs suggests poor prospects for any
continued Australia–China relations, let alone positive interactions of
mutual benefit. To address this question, David Goodman explores,
in Chapter 2, alternative ways to approach Australia’s relationship with
China and argues that the recognition of differences and the development
of ways to mediate differences through building on complementarities
can be beneficial for both Australia and China, not just through economic
but also through social interactions. He believes that the development
of mutual understanding of other peoples, their cultures, and their social
and economic systems is a precursor not simply to respect and the
avoidance of unwarranted prejudice but to cooperation for a wider public
good.
 1 DIFFERENT PASTS: THE PANDA AND THE KANGAROO 11

Colin Mackerras, in Chapter 3, examines the role of national security

in Australia–China relations, arguing it as particularly being a factor in
the decline of the relationship after 2015. Focusing non-exclusively on
the prime ministership of Scott Morrison (2018–2022), Mackerras anal-
yses national security concerns and responses of both the Australian and
Chinese sides and points out that neither side has shown any sympathy for
the national security concerns of the other. While criticising the Morrison
government for making China an enemy by treating it as such, the author
also discusses the potential impact of a more diplomatic approach on
Australia–China relations in the post-Morrison years.
In Chapter 4, Yingjie Guo debunks the logic of equivalence in the
China discourse of the so-called China threat industry, which gives rise
to three notable consequences. One is the discursive dichotomisation of
the international community and the resultant erosion of global socia-
bility. Another is the hardening of the Australian Self vis-à-vis the Chinese
Other. The third is the simplification and homogenisation of China. Each
of these has a ripple effect that combines to perpetuate and escalate
negative perceptions of and hawkish reactions to China. The logic of
difference, however, provides an alternative perspective on Australia and
China and is likely to lead to a better understanding and improvement of
bilateral relations.
In Chapter 5, James Laurenceson provides a detailed analysis on
an emerging narrative of economic coercion surrounding the Australia-
China trade tensions in the early 2020s. The narrative attributes China’s
campaign of disruption targeting Australian exports to China’s authori-
tarian political system and presents the local predicament as unsurprising
given past attempts by Beijing at economic coercion affecting other coun-
tries. This fiction of economic coercion also suggests that Australia should
join its allies to seek economic decoupling from China. Laurenceson
contends that this narrative is substantially incomplete, misses relevant
context and fails to acknowledge evidence that challenges its key claims.
To substantiate his argument, the author provides a more comprehen-
sive account of context and evidence for an assessment of Australia’s
predicament.
In light of the deterioration of China–Australia relations in recent
years, with distrust and threat narratives concerning the South Pacific
region contributing to Western discourse on the risks of the Belt and
Road Initiative, David Morris analyses the geopolitical narratives in
Chapter 6, to comprehend whether Australia and China are destined
12 M. GAO ET AL.

to compete for power, or whether the geopolitical imperatives of both

could be satisfied—as well as risks reduced and opportunities for regional
sustainable development realised—through mutually beneficial coopera-
tion.
Yujia Shen and Rujie Chen discuss Australia’s securitisation of China
in Chapter 7. They have observed that the “national security” framing
of economic investment from China in Australia has increasingly perme-
ated the fields of economy, politics, science, technology, and even cultural
exchanges and shaped Australia’s foreign policy towards China since the
mid-2010s. The change of government, the interest-interaction game of
its actors, massive mobilisation of the media as well as regional geopolit-
ical influences have all contributed to Australia’s increasing securitisation
of China.
In Chapter 8, Lei Yu and Sophia Sui provide an empirical review of the
Australia-China strategic partnership and identify an ambivalent pattern
of economic interdependence and political and security mistrust. The
authors argue that some factors at the systemic and unit levels advance
their economic interdependence whereas others alienate the two states
and lead to an ambivalent pattern of relations. The authors hold that this
ambivalent pattern can remain in the foreseeable future given the growing
clash of interests driven by systemic and unit-level constraints.
Part II of this book moves from discussion of challenges to opportuni-
ties in more specific terms, looking at how Australia and China can better
understand, communicate and work with each other for a better future.
In Chapter 9, Diane Hu and Ying Li highlight misconceptions on the
part of both Australia and China when formulating and implementing
their foreign policy regarding each other: both assume that they know
perfectly well about the other. The authors examine key indicators of
literacy and further illustrate the low level with a case study of Turn-
bull’s “stand up” speech. The authors argue that misconceptions on both
sides could drive and keep the current low of bilateral relations since the
mid-2010s and need to be corrected if the two countries are to navigate
through major power rivalry and ideological differences.
In Chapter 10, Jack Butcher presents a frame analysis of Chinese
language “we-media” contents through four media frames to explore
how Australia has been portrayed and perceived at the grassroots level
in China. He finds that we-media users generally depict Australia as
lacking an independent foreign policy, strategically anxious and increas-
ingly xenophobic in the conflict frame, a laid-back immigrant society
 1 DIFFERENT PASTS: THE PANDA AND THE KANGAROO 13

with wide-open spaces, good quality of life and unique flora and fauna
in the human-interest frame, highly dependent on China and resource-
rich in the economic consequences frame and co-opted by the US to
contain China in the responsibility frame. This chapter aims to inform a
non-Chinese speaking audience regarding the diversity of views communi-
cated about Australia in China at the grassroots level and promote mutual
understanding for a shared future.
To debunk value narratives that have led to increasingly polarised
and oversimplified perceptions about China, Baohui Xie explains, in
Chapter 11, how democracy is understood and practised in China
through its parliamentary system. He argues that democracy is more
often taken as a conceptual aspiration for realisation of such ideas
as minquan (sovereignty of the people), minyi (public opinion) and
minsheng (people’s livelihood) rather than a particular form of govern-
ment. All these ideas are pre-fixed by min—the people, demanding much
space allowing for dynamics of democracy at local levels, which in turn
feeds into democratic satisfaction and popular support. While simplistic
democracy-autocracy dichotomies lend space to suspicion and fear and
shut down dialogues and interactions, the author believes that a healthy
Australia–China relationship can benefit from mutual understanding and
engagement and calls for wisdom and creativity in negotiating differences.
Greg McCarthy and Xianlin Song are particularly concerned with
Australia’s higher education and the future of the common good and,
in Chapter 12, examine the issue of common good through the historical
lens of Australian higher education, from colonial outposts of Western
modernity to post-World War II nation building and then to the contem-
porary shift to commercialisation and national security. This chapter
contests that the future of Australian higher education lies in addressing
the issue of global common good by building its international engage-
ment to global concerns facing humanity. The authors also point to the
barriers to an educational common good caused by geopolitical tensions
between Australia and China, which have compromised Australian univer-
sity autonomy in the name of national security.
In Chapter 13, Jocelyn Chey shares her first-hand experiences to illus-
trate how the Australian government has sought to introduce Australian
culture to China through cultural diplomacy, and how China has also
engaged in similar activities in Australia over the past 40 years. As both
countries’ trade and political relations matured, people-to-people cultural
exchanges gathered pace. The author uses particular cultural events and
14 M. GAO ET AL.

programmes to shed some light on the aims and results of this half century
of cultural diplomacy.
In Chapter 14, Mobo Gao asks the question whether a common
destiny with Australia is possible even when the CCP still rules China. The
answer is positive. Refuting assumptions that Australia and China cannot
get along due to fundamental differences in values and ways of life, Gao
demonstrates, by fact-checking values and ways of life in analytical cate-
gories, such as democracy, market capitalism, individualism, law and order
and governance with evidence-based reality, that the differences between
China and Australia as well as between the Chinese and the Australians
are far from fundamental. He argues that the tension between the two
countries is actually rooted in the geopolitics dictated by the US.
Lastly, Justin O’Connor presents a conclusion in Chapter 15. He
further addresses the China Threat rhetoric and presents a discussion that
draws out the underlying geometry of such claims as economic coercion
and ideological orthodoxy beyond pure economic issues, “national inter-
ests”, value narratives, and Australia’s new defence stance. He argues that
there is a connection between Australia’s hollowed-out democracy and
the lurch into a China war, with the hawks combining a deep identifica-
tion with the US with a distrust of domestic democracy. He warns that a
sudden suspension of constructive conversation and a swerve into mutual
antagonism can come at great cost to us all.
This book, therefore, broadens the discussion on Australia–China rela-
tions and presents a core argument that the Panda and the Kangaroo
can share a common future despite the differences and challenges they
have to confront, understand and negotiate. Australia and China have
never been enemies in history, and there are no substantial reasons why
they should become adversaries now because enmity, the bad fruit of a
cold war mindset, is not in the interest of either party by any means.
For the bilateral relationship to move ahead so that both Australia and
China can benefit from engaging each other on the basis of mutual respect
and understanding, dialogues and exchanges at multiple levels are needed.
This is exactly why we put our thoughts together in this book, exploring
the possibility of a shared future.
 CHAPTER 2

China Threat, Australian Challenge:

Recognising Differences, Building Futures

David S. G. Goodman

Oceania was at war with Eastasia: Oceania had always been at war with
Eastasia. A large part of the political literature of five years was now
completely obsolete. Reports and records of all kinds, newspapers, books,
pamphlets, films, sound−tracks, photographs all had to be rectified at
lightning speed. (Orwell, 1949, p. 87)

George Orwell’s pointed satire about totalitarian regimes seems surpris-

ingly somewhat apposite to the contemporary Australian public discourse
about China. Since 2017, there has been not just a sudden about-face in
Australian attitudes towards China but the development of an increasingly
hostile attitude in public discourse, driven not just by government and
politicians but also by opinion leaders of all kinds, including Think Tanks
and journalists. The causes of this change are attributed to the China

D. S. G. Goodman (B)
China Studies Centre, University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia
e-mail: david.goodman@sydney.edu.au

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 15

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
M. Gao et al. (eds.), Different Histories, Shared Futures,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9191-2_2
16 D. S. G. GOODMAN

Threat: an existential threat to Australia from the People’s Republic of

China (PRC) and the Communist Party of China (CCP).
Clearly, there are paradoxes and tensions in the changes in the
Australian public discourse of the last few years, as well as generally
the more longer term in Australia’s relationship with the PRC. Simply
put, the PRC and Australia have complementary economies but very
different and largely opposed political systems. The PRC is essentially a
one-party state with great power aspirations; it has been and remains to a
large extent a developing economy, which introduced a major economic
reform programme in 1978. Even now, after forty years of economic
growth, China is still just about the world average for GDP per capita,
and even in terms of Purchasing Power Parity calculations [PPP] only at
a level 27.2% that of the USA (World Bank, 2021). Nonetheless, since
the late 1970s, the PRC’s changed economic development strategy has
led it to reach an overall GDP greater than 60% of that of the USA and
become the second largest economy in the world with all that implies for
governmental capacity domestically and internationally. Part and parcel of
that process has been China’s economic integration with the rest of the
world, eventually becoming the world centre of manufacturing through
technology transfer, trade and investment.
In contrast, Australia is a medium-sized developed economy, with a
relatively high GDP per capita—82.7% of the level of the United States
of America (USA) in terms of PPP (World Bank, 2021). Australia prides
itself on its liberal democratic values and political system, and has come
in the era of globalisation to see itself as especially open in trade and
investment. As a result of economic openness, while it now has compar-
atively little manufacturing, it is a great supplier of primary products and
services, especially to China. From the Australian standpoint, it is not just
that China rapidly became this country’s main trade partner, as has now
become the case for the majority of the countries in the world, but that
Australia is by any measure heavily dependent on its economic relationship
with the PRC. By value, 27% of Australia’s imports come from China; and
32.6% of Australian exports go to China: Australia’s most substantial trade
partner in both categories by a long way (Australian Bureau of Statistics,
2020).
Managing the ambiguities inherent in Australia’s relationship with
China is never likely to be easy (Goodman, 2017). Declaring a China
Threat would though seem to be misguidedly foreclosing on that rela-
tionship rather than building towards a sustainable future. At the same
 2 CHINA THREAT, AUSTRALIAN CHALLENGE: RECOGNISING … 17

time, there are always options way short of constant and regular appease-
ment. The idea of a China Threat suggests that it is primarily the result of
a conflict between the USA and the PRC in terms of their aspirations and
own particular views of the world, and their respective roles in it. As Zhao
Suisheng (2021) has recently pointed out, this is a conflict moreover that
the USA cannot win if it wishes to maintain its position as the sole domi-
nant political economy. He also highlights that neither the USA nor the
PRC are going to back down from their stated (if somewhat different)
positions of leadership and great power aspirations, and in the latter’s
case this would be so regardless of CCP leadership and presumably by
extension of whether China was a liberal democracy.
The language of existential threat is more likely to lead to war and open
hostility rather than conflict resolution. This would seem not to be in
Australia’s interests not simply economically but given the PRC’s contin-
uing role in the Asia Pacific Region in which, needs must, this country
operates. Better perhaps to recognise the challenge that the PRC poses
to Australia, particularly the differences in social and world views, where
these exist, and to develop ways to mediate those differences. It may then
be possible to build on the complementarities for the benefit of both, not
just economically, but also socially, difficult though that may be.

Understanding the PRC

The idea of a China Threat has the potential to be a self-fulfilling
prophecy and highly destructive. Armed conflict and economic disrup-
tion are only the most obvious consequences. Polarised approaches to
social and political problems may sell well in the political marketplace
and on social media. At the same time, they require individuals to adopt
extreme positions, as indeed was often the case during the Cold War,
where anti-establishment figures in Europe and the UK had far more
comfortable views of the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
than was realistic. When as in the case of Australia, the object of enmity
(China) may be equated with a substantial portion of the country’s popu-
lation (Chinese-Australians) regardless of the attitudes the latter may hold
such polarisation not only has the potential to be socially divisive (and
worse) but actually to push the latter towards the former. The Australian
opposition spokesperson on foreign affairs, Penny Wong, has forcefully
18 D. S. G. GOODMAN

emphasised that domestic fear-mongering is not just socially and econom-

ically irresponsible, it is also politically counterproductive, internationally
always and domestically in the long term (Wong, 2021).
Polarisation also results in even more increased misunderstandings
about China in Australia, particularly as evidenced in the recent discussion
of the contemporary China Threat (Goodman, 2021). Only if Australia
starts to put some of those misunderstandings aside can a more sustain-
able framework for interaction with China develop. In particular, there
have been three major misunderstandings: about the role of Communism
in the contemporary PRC; about the social and political consequences of
economic development; and about the totalitarian nature of the state.
Given that the PRC is a Communist Party-state, it would be conve-
nient for those who wish to pursue the theme of China representing an
existential threat if the major difference between China and Australia (or
for that matter the liberal democracies elsewhere in the world) could be
expressed in terms of the contrasting ideologies of international commu-
nism and liberal democracy, and their battle for world supremacy. This
was what provided the Cold War with its cutting edge (in both directions)
and justified hostility beyond a “you can’t tell me what to do attitude to
international politics”. There were then different visions (however flawed)
of present and future societies. Liberal democracy and capitalism versus
the Communist Party-states, world revolution and socialism. There clearly
are differences in the approach to politics of Australia and China, not
least since Australia remains a Liberal Democracy with competing polit-
ical parties and independent social and legal institutions while the PRC
still has an institutionalised ruling party. The CCP, though, has come a
long way since its embrace of proletarian world revolution, both before
and for the decades immediately after 1949. This shows not only in its
international stance but also in its domestic approach. These days, the
membership of the CCP is very different to its Mao-era days. Half of the
members are now college-educated, and a greater percentage are officials,
professionals, technicians and managers than are workers and peasants
(Xinhua, 2019; Zhang, 2021). Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP,
spoke at length on the 100th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Party.
In his celebratory speech, there was no mention at all of the proletariat,
workers were only mentioned twice, and peasants once. Not surprisingly,
members of the CCP were mentioned eleven times, and there were many
and frequent references to “the people” and “the nation” (Xi, 2021). The
CCP certainly has an international strategy, but this is to remove the USA
Another random document with
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several thousands every year, but in 1902 they sank to the
comparatively small total of 600. But whilst every endeavour is made
to govern the country on lines acceptable to and understood by the
people, there are, of course, some points on which the policy of a
civilized government is necessarily in opposition to very deep-rooted
customs and habits to such a degree as to completely upset the old
basis of social life. In a minor degree this is true of the partial
application of the game laws to natives, but of far greater importance
is our attitude towards the institution of slavery and the slave-trade.
The occupation of the Soudan has been a tremendous blow to
slavery; one of the principal recruiting-grounds for slaves has
practically been closed. A certain amount of slave-raiding goes on
along the Abyssinian frontier. Descents are periodically made by
parties one to two hundred strong, well armed, from the south-
western districts of Abyssinia. They raid the Barun negroes, and
carry off the women and children. The same kind of thing is apt to
happen on the Darfur frontier, and some of the remote tribes in the
same quarter sometimes raid each other with the object of getting
slaves. Some of these, but not many, find their way to Dongola, or
the Ghezireh; others are taken to Tripoli. Special steps have now
been taken by the Anti-Slavery Department of the Egyptian
Government, which now has its headquarters at Khartoum, to put
down this traffic. Two extra English inspectors have been posted,
one at Rosaires, on the Blue Nile, the other at El Obeid. They are to
form small mounted corps of the best Arabs and patrol the disturbed
districts.
Apart from the actual work done, it will be a great thing to enlist
the best of the Arab tribesmen in the Government service, and it is
hoped that they will in time form the nucleus of an effective native
police. These men have been in the past some of the principal
exponents of slave-catching themselves; they ought to be very adept
at their new business. With these exceptions the slave-trade within
the borders of the Soudan has practically disappeared. During the
first year or two captures were occasionally made of small caravans,
but very heavy penalties were imposed. There is still a constant
demand for slaves in Arabia, and once a slave is shipped over the
Red Sea a good profit is assured. But it is too dangerous now for
anyone to try to make a regular livelihood by it. There are still,
however, about twenty cases a year of trials for offences against the
slavery laws, mostly isolated cases of kidnapping a woman or a
child, and probably there is besides a fair proportion of undetected
cases. But the regular trade is pretty well stamped out.
The benefits of the abolition of slave-raiding and kidnapping are
immediate and obvious to everyone. Even the Arab can understand
them, but he finds it very difficult to appreciate our attitude—which,
needless to say, is uncompromising enough—towards slavery as a
domestic institution. It is the one serious complaint which he has
against the new government. His domestic habits and customs have
been completely based on slavery for centuries. Slavery is permitted
and recognised by the Koran. In most cases the slaves themselves
have been treated more like members of the family than as slaves,
and no doubt many of them have had far happier lives than they
would have had in their own villages. Nor is it difficult to point to evils
which have arisen from the emancipation of the slaves. It is a
melancholy fact that many of the towns in the Soudan are crowded
with freed slaves, too lazy to do anything but steal, while the women
have recourse to an even less reputable occupation. It is easier to
break down the social system of centuries than to build up a sounder
fabric in its place. But the thing had absolutely to be done if the
Soudan was to have a real regeneration. Even when the slaves have
been well treated, the demoralization caused by slavery has been
great. The Arabs have all the vices of a slave-owning people. It was
a good time to make an absolutely fresh start. All changes of such
magnitude are bound to produce dislocations. The evils of the
change will die out with the present generation. The good must be
waited for patiently, but it is sure to come.
 CHAPTER XIX
EDUCATION AND THE GORDON COLLEGE

Probably the last thing that a military government might be

expected to take an interest in is education, and yet few educational
establishments are so widely famous as the Gordon College at
Khartoum. As yet it owes its reputation to the fact that it was founded
by one great soldier in memory of another, not to its achievements; it
was born great. But already it has justified its founders; its mere
existence marks an extraordinary contrast between the character of
the present régime in the Soudan and that of any preceding.
Whenever the Soudan is mentioned, the first question asked is,
‘How is the Gordon College getting on?’ and the question cannot be
answered in a word. The actual building is indeed for the present
complete. It is a handsome structure of native red brick, built in the
Moorish style, but retaining the collegiate character. It occupies two
sides of a square, the front facing on the river. In the centre is the
principal entrance, and over it a tower. If the original design is finally
carried out, the whole quadrangle will be completed. Along the inside
runs a cool and airy cloister, with winding stairs leading to the upper
story; the class-rooms are spaciously designed. Its commanding
position at the east end of the town makes it a conspicuous
landmark for many miles round. From no point is this so remarkable
as from the hill of Surgham, which overlooks the battlefield of Kerreri.
Here is summed up much of the past and the future of the Soudan.
On the one hand is the scene of the final overthrow of the forces of
darkness and ignorance by war; on the other the symbols of that
longer contest for the conquest of the Soudan by the peaceful arts of
science and learning.
With the eye of faith it is easy to look forward into the future, and
to imagine the time, generations hence, when the Gordon College
will be a true centre of learning for all these vast territories. Then it
will stand, a completed quadrangle, in the middle of large gardens,
its own territory, as green and cultivated as they are now arid and
dusty. Its halls and class-rooms will be crowded with picked students
from all the provincial centres, not vainly pursuing a dry and vain
scholasticism, as in the other degenerate Universities of the
Mohammedan East, but eagerly following in the paths of living
science, and learning by practical teaching in the laboratory and
workshop to wrest from Nature her secrets, and to absorb the
principles underlying practice in the departments of chemistry and
medicine, mechanics, agriculture, and the arts. Perhaps once more,
in years to come, the culture and science of the Arabs will be as
famous as they were in the great days of Arab dominion.
It is a long way to travel from such stimulating forecasts to the
actual state of learning and education in the Soudan to-day. There
was not much learning under the Egyptians, but at least a certain
amount of theological study went on. Under the Khalifa even that
was sedulously discouraged, and the books were ordered to be
destroyed because he feared that they might tend to discredit the
unorthodox doctrine of Mahdism. Reading and writing were not likely
to flourish under a ruler who, possessing neither of these arts
himself, and entertaining strong suspicions of those who did, was
wont to give drastic expression to his views. As a consequence,
there never was a country more absolutely and wholly illiterate.
Writing is practically an unknown art, and reading hardly less so. It is
perfectly useless to post a Government Proclamation unless a
competent person is stationed by it to read it out to any passer-by. At
the same time, there flourishes the most exaggerated respect for a
written document, which is regarded as a kind of magic book, and
cases have been known in which swindlers have extorted large
sums of money by going round exhibiting a paper professing to be
an order to pay issued by the Government. Obviously, education has
had to be on very humble lines at first, and must continue so for
some time.
Was, then, the Gordon College a too ambitious attempt to
anticipate the future? Is it a mere white elephant, doomed to be a
vain monument of an ill-directed wave of enthusiasm? Such a view is
far from the truth. It would be strange indeed if a project so dear to
the heart of Lord Kitchener was of such a nature. Certainly, it is
impossible to start a complete University right away with a building
and an endowment of some £4,000 a year. Time is of the essence of
the question. It is possible to argue that the money used in the
building might have been more advantageously expended in other
ways. But, apart from the fact that the subscribers doubtless wished
to see some immediate result for their munificence, I am sure that it
was the right policy to build at once.
For the Gordon College, though not yet a University, is much
more than a college. It is the centre of all the new educational and
intellectual influences in the Soudan. Its director is also head of the
Education Department; the activities of both are inseparably
connected. It acts as an extraordinary stimulus upon the authorities
in the direction of education. It would have been so easy and so
natural for a Government so hard beset for money to neglect
education for other objects, apparently more practical and more
immediately pressing. The actual material presence of the college
makes it impossible for its claims to be overlooked. Very likely
without it there would not have been an Education Department at all.
Secondly, but for the existence of the building, the Soudan would
certainly never have obtained such valuable gifts as those of Mr.
Wellcome’s bacteriological laboratory and Sir W. Mather’s complete
technical workshop apparatus, containing all that is necessary for the
establishment and organization of departments for manual training
and technical instruction. Thirdly, the building itself has been already,
and will be to an increasing extent, of the greatest use; and,
moreover, there is still about £100,000 of the original endowment
remaining, the income from which is playing a great part, as will be
shown, in providing the beginnings of education in the Soudan, and
so laying the foundations for the future work of the college itself. Lord
Kitchener was wiser than his critics. Among his many claims to fame,
none is greater than the clearness with which he saw that a sound
educational system is one of the fundamental requirements of the
Soudan, as well as a substantial foundation for our rule.
 In 1901 the Soudan Government spent £1,421 on education, in
addition to the Gordon College endowment; in 1902, £3,577; and in
1903 something over £6,000. With such resources as these, it is
obvious that nothing heroic could be attempted. Only the more
immediate needs could be attended to. Looking to the necessity for
the education of a class of native public servants, it was most
important to establish some sound primary schools, in which the
boys should be given a fair general education in reading, writing, and
arithmetic, besides a certain amount of history and geography and
English. Four of these schools are now in existence; two of them,
those at Halfa and Suakin, were established some eight or nine
years ago by the Egyptian Government, and have only recently been
handed over to the Soudan; they are in an efficient condition. The
most interesting, considering their recent establishment, are those at
Khartoum and Omdurman. That at Omdurman was the first, the
direct offspring of the Gordon College. It now numbers over 200
pupils, and is in a most flourishing condition. There are constant
applications for admission, partly, no doubt, from the reason that
pupils of the school are thought likely to obtain Government
employment, but partly also from a real appreciation of the
advantages of education.
The school course is divided into four years, and the curriculum is
based on the Egyptian one—modified to the extent that no subjects
are taught in English, except English itself. An inspection of the
school made it clear to me that, at any rate, in the subject which I
could understand—the teaching of English—the methods were
thoroughly sound, and the results good. Pupils in their last year are
also taught land-measuring. The reason is the great demand which
comes from every province for land-measurers—a most important
thing in view of the assessments for the land-tax—while no trained
men are available. This part of the work is taught both in the class-
room and practically in the field. I am certain that in a very short time
there will be land-measurers available of very good ability, so
excellent was the quality of some of the work done.
Some, of course, of these boys are the sons of Egyptians in the
Government service, to whom it is a great blessing to be able to get
a good education for their children on the spot. But far the majority of
them—at least 90 per cent.—are genuine Soudanese, some of them
members of good Arab families, whose fathers were prominent in the
service of the Khalifa. Originally it was intended that this school
should be transferred to Khartoum, and housed in the college as
soon as the general exodus took place. But as Omdurman shows no
signs at present of diminishing, and is, indeed, once more
increasing, the school has been kept on, and another started on
similar lines in Khartoum itself. This school is also flourishing, but it
naturally contains a larger proportion of the Egyptian-born pupils;
altogether it has about 120 scholars. This school is now housed in
the Gordon College itself.
Book-learning is not the only channel of instruction employed. I
had the good fortune to be umpire in the first football match between
Khartoum and Omdurman schools, in the mosque square at
Khartoum. It was a hot afternoon, and I felt as though I should get a
sunstroke whilst umpiring; but these boys, all hatless as they were,
played with great energy, and appeared to derive nothing but benefit
from the heat. They played a good game, and it was pleasant to see
that what they lacked in experience they made up in courage and
determination. All the players, of whatever shade of black or brown,
and the shades were very various, showed a spirit which augurs well
for the future. Anybody who can play football with energy in Central
Africa must have good stuff in him. The match was drawn.
In another direction also an encouraging start has been made.
There is at present in the Soudan no skilled native labour;
blacksmiths, tinsmiths, carpenters, and bricklayers, are all in
demand, and have to be imported from outside at great trouble and
expense. In the hope of meeting this demand, an industrial school
has been established at the Dockyard Works, which are now on the
river at Omdurman, but which will eventually be moved to Halfaya.
The head of the Steamboat Department agreed to take in sixty boys
as apprentices. These are divided into two shifts of thirty each, and
they alternately receive a day’s schooling and do a day’s practical
work at their separate trades as carpenters, fitters, or riveters. In
school their time is divided between reading, writing, and arithmetic,
and also drawing. The plan has been found to answer admirably. Not
only does the education they receive improve their intelligence as
workers, but some of the boys have shown such proficiency in
drawing that they are able to copy engineering and building designs
with such accuracy as to be able to relieve the English
superintendents of a good deal of work. Many of these boys are
sons of men employed in unskilled labour at the works, who take the
greatest interest in seeing their sons advance so far beyond
themselves. Many applications for admission have to be refused,
and there is little doubt that when Sir W. Mather’s technical school at
the Gordon College is in full swing, it will fill a great need in the
requirements of the country.
On the whole, the most difficult task which the Director of
Education has to face is that of diffusing the elements of knowledge
among the masses of the people. The great distances to be covered
alone impose a tremendous obstacle. But it is extremely important
that at least a portion of the population should be able to understand
the outlines of the machinery of government as laid down in notices
and proclamations, so as to be able to protect themselves against
the exactions of minor officials and the frauds and deceits practised
on them by wandering rogues. It has wisely been determined to
proceed along the lines laid down by Mohammedan tradition. The
kuttabs, or preliminary schools, are a well-known part of the ordinary
religious organization. They are supposed to give instruction in
reading and writing and the Koran, and there are many of them
scattered over the Soudan, as in other Mohammedan countries.
They are, in fact, a sort of private elementary school, something like
the old dames’ schools once existing in parts of England.
Unfortunately, they are almost entirely useless at present. The
teachers are incredibly ignorant. What little instruction they give is
confined to teaching by rote certain passages from the Koran, the
meaning of which is understood by neither pupil nor teacher. The
buildings are usually filthy to the last degree. The idea is to establish
model kuttabs in different parts of the Soudan, and to make them as
efficient as possible, so as to improve the others by their example.
To quote the words of the Director:
 ‘The process of formation has been in all cases the same. With the help of the
Mudir, a suitable building is put up; then the least incompetent sheikh that can be
procured is installed. After confidence has been established, and the nucleus of a
school formed, he is superseded by a trained teacher from Egypt, who, under the
local supervision of the Mudir and occasional supervision from my office, begins to
reduce chaos to order.’

Progress has not been very rapid. Lack of money and lack of
competent schoolmasters sadly hamper all operations. But kuttabs
are now established, attached as a sort of junior class to the schools
at Khartoum, Omdurman, Halfa, and Suakin. A model kuttab has
been established at Berber, which is reported to be doing well, and
another is being built at Dongola. The like is also being attempted at
Wad Medani, a populous town on the Blue Nile, capital of the
province of Sennar, with about 40,000 inhabitants. Reference has
been made to the lack of trained schoolmasters. Egypt itself feels
this difficulty, and Egypt is at present the only source of supply on
which the Soudan can draw. It was to meet this demand—at least,
so far as the kuttabs are concerned—that a small training college for
native sheikhs was opened in the beginning of 1901 in connection
with the school at Omdurman. At first this interesting experiment was
not very successful. The students, who all belonged to the best Arab
families, were all proud, ignorant, and lazy; and as Arabs they were
inclined to despise the Egyptian schoolmasters, whose task it was to
teach them. But now there is a great improvement. They have
increased in number to about thirty, and only lack of room prevents a
further increase. I watched them doing their own lessons, and also
receiving practical instruction in teaching by taking a class of the
school under the guidance of a master. It was impossible to doubt
the value of the experiments. They were nearly all fine-looking,
intelligent young men, some of them really handsome, with the keen,
clear-cut features that mark the pure-bred Arab. Three of them had
come from distant Kassala, where at present there are no means of
education whatever. The course lasts three years. At the end of it
they are to be examined as to their fitness, and they will then be
drafted off either to teach in their kuttabs or else to some posts in
connection with the native Courts. Whether as schoolmasters or
Cadis, they will be most useful elements in the development of the
Soudan.
In the negro portion of the Soudan, inhabited by the pagan tribes,
the people are so backward in civilization that the question of
education does not at present arise, or, if it does arise, assumes a
totally different aspect. Here is the field for the missionary. Two
missions are already established—one, the American Medical
Mission, on the Sobat; and the other, the Austrian Roman Catholic
Mission at Taufikieh, on the White Nile. Both are doing good work,
and both are to be encouraged and assisted by the Government. In
other parts of the Soudan it must be remembered that we are
dealing with a fanatically Mohammedan population, and any
suspicion that the Government was trying to proselytize would
immediately wreck all schemes of education, and probably be the
signal for grave disorders.
It will be a long time before the schools turn out sufficient pupils to
fill the Government Civil Service, and there does not seem to be any
danger of producing mere ‘babus,’ hanging about and relying on a
certain knowledge of English to procure them a job. The teaching of
English is entirely confined to those boys who are going to make use
of it in the Government Service or in commercial pursuits, where its
knowledge is required. For the ordinary mass of the population
nothing is to be gained by an imperfect knowledge of English. The
authorities are unquestionably right in discouraging such teaching;
the supposed political advantages of it are small, if not entirely
imaginary. The Soudan can never be a real white man’s country; its
rulers must always be speakers of Arabic, and its people will do far
better to employ their time in more useful ways than struggling with a
foreign language.
The Gordon College is the centre of education, but even now its
activities are not confined to mere teaching. It is proposed to form a
collection of books dealing with the Soudan, its peoples, its natural
history, and its various productions, accompanied by specimens to
illustrate them, and some progress has been made. Mr. Wellcome’s
valuable bacteriological research laboratory is in full working order,
and a skilled expert from Scotland has been in charge of it for some
months. He is doing a work of great importance, not only to the
Soudan, but also to the scientific world in general. The Soudan is a
land where strange diseases both of men and animals abound.
There is a wide field for research. The scientific and systematic
examination of these obscure subjects is already bearing fruit, and
cannot fail to ameliorate the conditions of life in these tropical
regions for the European as well as for the native.
Lord Cromer has promised that more shall be done for education
in the future. There is no need for hurry; indeed, it is essential that
the educational system shall be built up slowly with caution and
patience. But in time each province will have its own primary and
technical schools, whose pupils will be selected from the elementary
kuttabs. Afterwards, when all this has been carefully organized, the
provincial schools will in their turn pass on their more promising
students to Khartoum to receive the higher education which will then
be demanded. Then the Gordon College will at last become a real
college. In it the germ of a most hopeful future is contained. If the
work proceeds on the same sound lines as hitherto—which there is
no reason to doubt—great days are coming. The Arab is capable of
a very high degree of civilization, and has a great intelligence, which
has as yet had no chance of development. And in those days, I
doubt not, those who founded the Gordon College, and first kindled
the fire of learning, will be praised by its students as sincerely and as
deservedly as the benefactors of any of our own Western
foundations.
 CHAPTER XX

TRADE AND COMMERCE

Sir Rudolf von Slatin, Inspector-General of the Soudan, who

possesses an unrivalled experience of the country, reports that ‘the
whole situation in the country is very satisfactory. Everywhere I went,
from north to south and from east to west, I found that villages and
cultivation had increased. The population is larger and wealthier;
flocks and herds are more numerous; security prevails, and general
satisfaction is expressed with the present rule.’ Once more, or,
rather, nearly for the first time, life and property are safe. Relieved
from the scourge of war and tyranny, people are everywhere
resuming their old occupations. They have even recovered from the
shock of finding themselves under just and settled government, and
are no longer content merely to exist. New wants are being felt, and
with the advance of material prosperity trade and commerce are
springing up.
There are, however, considerable obstacles to the development of
trade. First of all there is a lack of labour. Partly this is due to lack of
population, but partly also to other causes. Slavery has left its mark,
and many of the Arabs are too proud and too lazy to take part in
manual labour; in laziness, though not in pride, many of the negro
tribes are fully their equals. Secondly, there is the difficulty of
communications in so vast a country, and the lack of transport.
Thirdly, the Soudan is very poor, and capital is wanting. Still, every
year shows an improvement in these respects.
The population is steadily growing, partly by natural increase, and
partly by immigration from neighbouring countries of people who had
fled during the rebellion. Attempts have also been made to assist the
increase by colonization. A number of old soldiers from the
Soudanese battalions, who are enlisted for life, were permitted to
retire, and with their wives and children were established in villages
on the Nile and at Kassala. The villages were organized on a more
or less military basis, with a well-known non-commissioned officer as
chief. Each colonist was allotted two or three acres of good rain or
pasture land, or an acre of Nile foreshore. He was given grain for
sowing, besides a quantity of dhurra sufficient to support him until his
crops grew. Markets were also started. Unfortunately, the
experiments were generally unsuccessful. The colonies at Dongola
and Berber failed altogether. It was found that the black when
released from the strict discipline of the regiment was more anxious
to enjoy doing nothing, after the manner of his ancestors, than to
work, and if he saw a chance of living by begging or stealing he was
apt to leave his cultivation alone, and go off to some town.
At Hellet Abbas, on the White Nile, it was found that if the rains
were good the colonists would prepare the ground and sow the crop,
but if it came to artificial irrigation and shadoof work they soon tired
of this heavier labour and left the crops to wither. Happily, a much
better account comes from Kassala. The Mudir of that province
reported:

‘The colony of blacks established at Kassala continues to thrive, and in every

way justifies its existence. They have a well-laid-out village, and are eager to
cultivate along the Gash, and have also a fair amount of rain crops. Labourers can
nearly always be obtained from amongst them for public works, and there are
some very fair masons who are permanently employed. I wish we had the means
of teaching some of them carpentry and blacksmith’s work as well. They have
acquired a good deal of small stock.
‘Those of Gedaref are not so thrifty, and are lazy; they do not cultivate so much
or so well, but I hope for improvement.’

Transport and communications are indeed vastly better than they

were in Egyptian days. The railway from Halfa to Khartoum makes
an all-important difference. It has already given an immense stimulus
to the export trade; without it there would have been quite another
tale to tell of the last five years. But except in the province of Berber
it does not tap any local resources. Great part of it lies in an
uninhabited desert. Every train leaving Halfa has to carry with it
1,520 cubic feet of water. And there are 200 miles of river between
Halfa and the outer world at Assouan, and then 700 miles more to
the sea. Carriage of goods over such a mileage, with its necessary
transhipments, is a long and costly business, nearly prohibitive for
bulky articles. Coal, for example, is seldom less than £4 a ton at
Khartoum, and often nearer £6. No one who had to build a railway in
the Soudan for commercial purposes only would think of crossing the
desert to Halfa; his first thought would be to connect Khartoum with
the sea-board at Suakin.
There is also the railway from Halfa to Kerma, thirty miles from
Dongola. But this, too, was laid down in haste for military purposes.
It is laid so badly, with such sharp curves and such steep gradients,
owing to the nature of the country, that no heavy trains can run on it,
and with the present rolling-stock an engine has sometimes to make
three or four starts before it can master an ascent. It is worked at a
loss of about £20,000 a year, and it has become a serious problem
whether the money so spent could not be employed much more
advantageously elsewhere, so many are the claims on the Soudan
Exchequer. It would be far better to take up the whole line, and relay
it from Dongola to connect with the main-line at Abu Hamed. For not
only is this a much easier country, but the southern part of the
province, which is the richer, and inhabited by a more industrious
and hard-working population, would be opened up. But at present no
money is forthcoming either for this or for the complete repair of the
existing line. So poor Dongola is in the tantalizing position of having
a railway, and yet not being able to take full benefit of it. It is actually
suffering from a surplus of foodstuffs, and is a year behindhand in its
exports.
The province is famous for its dates; not only is it a great exporter
of the ordinary fruit, but it also produces a golden date, which is said
to be the best in the world, better, even, than the Algerine date, so
well known in Europe. It has also abundance of irrigable land as
good as Upper Egypt, which it very much resembles in general
climatic conditions. As its numerous and interesting antiquities show,
it once supported a very large population; but now a great deal of
land is lying waste, and the population, though increasing very fast,
is still not more than about 100,000. With better communications its
prospects are very good. When Egypt becomes overcrowded, as it
must in time if the present rate of increase is maintained, Dongola
will offer a fair field to Egyptian immigration. The conditions of life are
so similar to those in Egypt that it cannot fail to be the most attractive
part of the Soudan. Even as things are, owing to the partial
advantage afforded by the railway and facilities of transport by boat-
carriage on the Nile, the trade of the province is increasing. Cotton
goods and luxuries like tea, sugar, coffee, and perfumeries, are the
principal imports, and cereals are exported as well as dates. The
people are wealthier, and anxious to buy such goods as cutlery,
crockery, soap, agricultural implements, and hardware, but well-to-do
traders have not as yet exploited the field, as they would do if the
railway difficulty were solved.
Once Khartoum is connected with the sea by railway, the principal
obstacle in the way of trade will have been removed, and,
fortunately, this is no longer a mere vision of hopeful men. Practically
the railway has already been begun. It will strike across the desert to
the Atbara, crossing the mountains near Sinkat, and then run along it
to join the main-line near where it crosses that river. If the railway
does not come to Berber itself, Berber will probably travel up the Nile
to meet it. Arab towns are not very difficult to shift. The whole route
has been carefully surveyed, and a good deal has been spent in
improving the port of Suakin. Materials are being rapidly collected.
This time careful preparations are being made; there will be none of
those kaleidoscopic changes of policy which were so fatal in 1885. It
may confidently be expected that in two or three years’ time there
will be something to show very much more substantial than a tennis-
court at Dover built of much-travelled material, the only result of our
former exertions. For the construction of the line the Government will
be its own contractor. The Soudan Railway Department has a very
capable staff, and they will be able to do the work as efficiently as
any outside contractor, and much more cheaply. It is hoped that as
far as possible native labour may be made use of. It is a hopeful
indication of a change of spirit among the Arabs that the local
sheikhs have agreed to bring their tribesmen to work; the experiment
is worth trying even if it fails. No such thing has ever happened in the
Soudan before.
 Meantime Suakin is looking eagerly forward. Its inhabitants have
naturally suffered by the complete diversion of trade to the Nile
Valley route. Very few of them can even afford to repair their houses,
and the town shows signs of decay. Most of the people are
unemployed, and labour is very cheap. There was formerly a good
deal of trade with India and the Red Sea ports, but most of this has
fallen away, and nearly all the Indian merchants who formerly had
their headquarters there have left. But now that the desert which
shuts off the Soudan from the sea is really to be bridged over, there
will be a great change. The one seaport of these immense territories
cannot fail to be a busy and prosperous place.
Once the new line is completed, the distance from Khartoum to
the sea will be reduced by about two-thirds, to some 450 miles, with
a proportionate reduction in expense of carriage, and it will then be
possible to think of building other feeder lines in various parts of the
Soudan. A branch line to Kassala and on to Gedaref and Gallabat
along the Abyssinian frontier will tap a very rich district and open up
the Abyssinian trade. Possibly in the distant future such a line may
be continued southwards so as to connect with Uganda. In the
recent agreement with Abyssinia, powers have been taken to build in
Abyssinian territory for this purpose. But this is still a long way
outside practical politics. Of far more importance for the immediate
development of the country would be a light railway from Omdurman
or Duem to El Obeid, or across the rich Ghezireh from Duem to Wad
Medani on the Blue Nile, or, again, from near Wad Medani to
Gedaref. Easy communication with the sea will render it possible to
bring the necessary plant into the country at a reasonable cost, and
the experience gained as to material and labour in building the
Suakin line will also be invaluable.
Meanwhile the provincial Governors are doing all they can to
improve the caravan routes and roads. In great part of the Soudan
this is simply a question of increasing the number of wells; metalled
roads are scarcely necessary as yet, outside a few towns. Wheel
traffic is almost non-existent; the camel and the ass are the great
public carriers. It is rather strange that the camel has not been more
used for pulling wheel transport than he has. One camel can pull
three or four times as much as he can carry. All the heavy machinery
of the Nile Valley Gold Mining Company, working in Nubia, has been
transported in this way from the river, a distance of sixty miles.
Rarely a camel may be seen hauling a plough in Egypt. But there are
limits to the use of camels. They cannot breed successfully south of
parallel 13°, and in all the country south of this the serut fly makes it
almost impossible for either them or horses to live at certain seasons
of the year.
Above all, access to the sea will greatly stimulate the use made of
water carriage within the country. In the Nile and its tributaries the
Soudan possesses a system of natural trade-routes unequalled in
Africa for internal commerce. The river traffic, though already
growing, is merely in its infancy. The Government has a considerable
fleet of steam and sailing vessels between Wadi Halfa and Assouan,
and also on the Blue and White Niles. They are also encouraging an
English company which has placed some steamers and steam-
barges on both rivers. On the Blue Nile there is regular steamer
communication with Rosaires, 426 miles from Khartoum, during high
Nile, about six months in the year, and even in low Nile most of the
river is navigable by native boats. On the White Nile, now that the
sudd has been cleared, steamers and native boats can ply the whole
year round up to Gondokoro. In time the Sobat may prove a very
good route for trade with Abyssinia. And the Bahr el Ghazal, with its
network of waters, is in this respect the most fortunate of all the
provinces. Many of its waterways are still blocked by sudd, but every
year the navigation is improving. A serviceable channel is now
available on the Jur River as far as Wau, and large steamers will
eventually be able to get up even much further than this. The other
rivers will in time be opened up. In a country where at present
everything has to be carried on men’s heads, this will be an
extraordinary benefit from every point of view, and if the province
answers at all to its old reputation as one of the most fertile spots of
Africa, it will do very well, in spite of mosquitoes, serut flies, malaria,
guinea worm, and all its other plagues.
As for the lack of capital both for private enterprise and public
works, that, like the lack of population, can only be cured by time.
Overhasty development could only do harm, even if it were possible.
As trade improves and agriculture develops, the people will become
more wealthy, and the two will react upon each other. That large
sums will be invested by private capitalists or firms is not to be
expected for years to come. But even now an Englishman is erecting
flour-mills at Wad Medani, and if his venture succeeds it may be
followed by others. The Government is doing all in its power to
encourage agriculture by small loans for the purchase of seeds,
water-wheels, and cattle to work them. Perhaps some form of State-
supported Agricultural Bank will be established.
The Soudan is an agricultural country; in that direction alone can
real progress be made, and the progress depends mainly upon
irrigation. Between the Atbara and the Blue Nile, and between the
Blue Nile and the White Nile, there is, as has been pointed out, a
great field for irrigation works on a large scale, but the amount of
crops now grown by direct irrigation is very small. Along the Blue
Nile water-wheels are numerous for the first ten miles above
Khartoum. There used to be 3,000 between Khartoum and Berber,
but in 1898 there were no more than seventy; and though the
number has increased, it has yet nothing like reached the old level.
The same is true of the rest of Berber Province and of Dongola.
There is also a certain amount of irrigation on islands in the White
Nile above Khartoum. When the river is falling, large mud flats
appear in the centre of the stream. To these the people transport
their cattle and belongings; they sow their seed in the mud, build
themselves huts, and set up shadoofs to water the growing crops of
wheat, barley, dhurra, and onions. They begin operations towards
the end of January, and in good soil the crops are harvested by May.
What perennial irrigation can do is shown by the gardens at
Khartoum, where lemons, figs, oranges, pomegranates, bananas,
vines, and all kinds of vegetables, grow in profusion all the year
round. But at present nearly all the crops are rain crops. The height
to which water has to be raised out of the Blue Nile is too great for
extended irrigation by mere lift. For the first 150 miles from Khartoum
the banks are 26 to 30 feet over the summer level, and further south
33 to 39 feet, the difference between summer and flood level being
about 23 feet. The soil of the Ghezireh is a rich alluvial deposit
sometimes 150 feet deep. The inhabitants build small dykes across
the general slope of the country so as to prevent the rain running off
too quickly, and sow their seed as soon as the rain has fallen. The
result as described by Sir R. Wingate a year or two ago is as follows:

‘I recently rode from Wad Medani on the Blue Nile to opposite Duem on the
White Nile, eighty miles across a perfectly flat plain sown almost throughout its
entire length with dhurra, which was standing 6 to 8 feet high. As there is only one
crop sown during the short rainy season, and as this is planted and harvested
within a period of sixty to eighty days, it follows that, if a system of irrigation were
possible in the Ghezireh it would become a huge granary capable of supplying, not
only the whole Soudan, but other countries as well.’

But, of course, any schemes for utilizing the waters of the Nile
have always to be considered in reference to the prior claims of
Egypt. It is only to Egypt that the Soudan can look for the money
necessary to carry out great works, and, naturally, Egypt would not
allow irrigation to be developed in the Soudan unless her own needs
were amply safeguarded. Whenever Egypt undertakes the great
works contemplated on the Upper Nile, the Soudan will share in the
benefit. That will not be for a long time to come, and meanwhile the
Soudan has opportunity to develop her resources and her population
so as to be able to seize the chance when it comes. There seems to
be no reason, however, why works on a small scale should not be
undertaken, subject always to the question of expense, to utilize in
the Soudan, by means of basin irrigation on the Blue Nile or the
Atbara, some of the flood-water during July, August and September,
which is only an embarrassment to Egypt now that perennial
irrigation is adopted so universally in that country. It is only in the
preceding summer months, when the Nile is low, that Egypt is forced
to watch the proceedings of her neighbour with such a jealous eye. It
would be rash to prophesy exactly when irrigation works will be
undertaken, or what form they will take; but it is certain that they will
come, and when they do, their effect upon the Soudan will be
immense. The subject is of peculiar interest to England; the lands in
question are capable of producing other crops than cereals, and, as
will presently be shown, for none are they more suitable than for
cotton.
Quite apart from any such speculations upon the future, the
external trade of the Soudan is capable of great expansion under
present conditions. An examination of the returns of imports and
exports during the last years before the rebellion is a very useful
guide to the capacities of the country. The figures are taken from
Colonel Stewart’s report.
There are no returns of imports except for the port of Suakin, but
these embrace practically the whole. Of course, a certain amount
came in by the Nile Valley route, just as now a certain amount comes
in by Suakin instead of by the railway. The position has been
practically reversed, and for purposes of comparison it is fair to take
the imports formerly entering the port of Suakin and those now
carried by the railway. The most important item was cotton goods,
which amounted to about 25,000 to 30,000 kantars annually. Linens
were about 200 to 300 kantars, and woollens 100 to 300 kantars.
There was also a certain amount of silks and silk thread and sewing
cotton. The Indian trade brought in a good deal of grain and tobacco.
In 1881 the import of Indian rice amounted to 20,000 kantars.
Petroleum (6,000 kantars), oil, zinc, copper, and iron, appear in the
list, as well as flour and provisions of various kinds in large
quantities, and candles, boots, and clothes. The peculiar tastes of
the Soudanese in luxuries are reflected in the large imports of
sandal-wood, and scents and perfumery, especially fish-scent (700
tons, or 15,400 kantars, a year). Both men and women are
particularly fond of strong, greasy scents. In all native festivities and
entertainments these scents are a very prominent feature, and a
native marriage can be smelt a very long way off. Last, but not least,
comes a very peculiar item: in one year no less than 11,000 dozen
umbrellas were imported. There is certainly enough sunshine in the
Soudan, and in parts of it rain also, to justify a large number of
umbrellas, but it is difficult to believe that 132,000 umbrellas would
find a ready sale in the Soudan to-day. Perhaps the Khalifa
particularly disliked the umbrella-carrying class.