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Immersion, Identification, and the Iliad
Immersion, Identification, and the
Iliad
J O N AT H A N L . R E A DY
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For
1 – – – – – καὶ ἐμέ.
Inscriptiones Graecae IV² 2, 757
Preface
1. Introduction
1.1. Overview
1.2. Terminology
1.3. Previous Scholarship
1.4. Outline of Chapters
Works Cited
Index of Greek Passages
Index of Terms
1
Introduction
1.1. Overview
Section 1.2 offers definitions of narrative, storyworld, immersion,
identification, and recipient. Section 1.3 orients this investigation of
Homeric immersion and identification in relation to prior scholarship
in Homeric studies. Section 1.4 provides a brief outline of the
following chapters.
1.2. Terminology
I start with some fraught definitions. We will be talking about
narrative, a tricky term to define and one that we perhaps want to
be careful not to define too narrowly (Ryan 2007). Jonas Grethlein
posits that a narrative is “the representation of a temporal sequence
involving human or human-like characters in a sequential medium”
(2017a: 34; cf. Grethlein, Huitink, and Tagliabue 2020: 8). John Frow
goes into a bit more detail, discerning three essential components of
a narrative (2018: 106):
But there are other ways to think about the term. Fritz Breithaupt
proposes that a narrative is an account that audiences understand as
one possible version of what happened (2011, esp. 109, 120).
Let us move on to working definitions of storyworld, immersion,
and identification. We have general agreement on a definition of
storyworld: “The storyworld has two components. First, there is the
setting, the place and time in which the events occur. Second, there
are characters, the human or non-human agents that initiate or
experience events” (Hogan 2018: 133); storyworlds are “totalities
that encompass space, time, and individuated existents that undergo
transformations as the result of events” (Ryan 2019: 63). Immersed
recipients get wrapped up in a narrative and the storyworld it depicts
and lose track to some degree of their real-world surroundings.
Identification occurs when recipients interpret the storyworld from a
character’s perspective, feel a character’s emotions or at least
emotions congruent with those of the character, and/or root for a
character to succeed. I will go into the components of immersion
and identification in much greater detail over the course of this
book.
Adopting these three definitions and utilizing these three concepts
is already to make choices, to take a stand, and to maneuver
carefully between opposed scholarly positions. For instance, Marie-
Laure Ryan aims to rebut Richard Walsh’s assertions (2017) that the
concepts of world and immersion are not useful for the study of
fictional narrative (2018: 236–7). Note too that media scholars have
applied the term “immersion” to a range of phenomena and
experiences (Nilsson, Nordahl, and Serafin 2016) or that many prefer
a different word entirely, speaking of absorption, aesthetic illusion,
enchantment, engagement, engrossment, entanglement,
involvement, or transportation. Or, as a final example, observe the
hedge in my formulation “the character’s emotions or at least
emotions congruent with those of the character,” a response to a
dispute over the nature of our emotional engagement with
characters (see section 2.5, pp. 49–50).
Less fraught but worth explicit consideration is the following.
Recipients respond differently to fictional and nonfictional narratives
(e.g., Vaage 2016: 26–34), but whether a narrative is fiction or
nonfiction is irrelevant when it comes to these three concepts.
Whereas much of the literature on storyworlds, immersion, and
identification pertains to fictional narrative, it is also true that we can
speak of nonfiction storyworlds, be immersed in nonfiction
storyworlds, and identify with the characters in nonfiction
storyworlds.1 I make this point because I want to forestall an
objection to my use of these concepts by those who think that
Homeric poetry is not fiction (see section 2.4, p. 34). The debate
over the fictional or nonfictional status of Homeric epic does not
affect this project (cf. Scodel 2021: 56–7).
Finally, I highlight here at the start how the word “recipient” that
I have already used several times contributes to the presentation. It
helps one avoid the cumbersome phrase “hearer, viewer, or reader,”
but, more important, its capaciousness signals my concern with
features of immersion and identification that do not depend on a
specific medium. No doubt the nature of immersion and
identification vary depending on media (e.g., Grethlein 2017a), but I
target components of those experiences that arise whether one is
watching, reading, or listening to a tale (e.g., Carpenter, Green, and
Fitzgerald 2018: 231; cf. Budelmann 2000: 15–16; Lovatt 2013: 21).
Only in Chapter 9 do I ponder how listening to and watching an oral
performer of Homeric epic shaped the audience’s experience of the
storyworld.
Conversely, Nancy Felson saves for the penultimate page of her book
on the Odyssey the following comment: “I conclude by depicting the
events that occur when I as a reader envision the action of the
poem…. I am lulled to silent awe and complacent satisfaction that
the characters who have become my companions have finally
reached home…. A provisional satisfaction overcomes me…” (1994:
143, emphasis in original). The final sentence of Leonard Muellner’s
1996 book on the meaning of mēnis also stands apart in tenor and
point from what comes before: “Achilles bequeaths to us the self-
perpetuating artistic representation of an idealistic, disturbing, and
consoling definition of the human condition” (175).
Aristotle’s attention in his Poetics to pity, fear, and catharsis as
essential components of the audience’s reaction to Greek tragedy
created a permission structure for twentieth-century scholarship in
that subfield to attend to the audience’s affective engagement,
discussions that point up by way of contrast the general occlusion of
such matters in Homeric studies.2 But Homeric studies had good
company: wittingly or not, it joined other branches of literary studies
in limiting, even suppressing, if not exiling, discussions of how
readers respond, especially emotionally, to and become immersed in
narratives.3
Fittingly, then, we were told that to consider audience response
to the Homeric epics properly one should ask after the “assumptions
and responses which the works themselves seem to expect” as
opposed to “the assumptions and responses which we, as
contemporary readers, tend to provide” (Gill 1990: 8). Our own
reactions are to be segregated and then (presumably) ignored. Or
one could recognize that the characters prompt “our sympathetic
interest” (Gill 2002: 97), our “sympathetic engagement” (99), and
“our sympathetic involvement” (105), but this connection arises as a
result of (“is a reflection of” (105), “inheres in” (152)) the careful
and rigorous intellectual analysis that they compel us to perform: we
become “engaged in their reasoning” (117; cf. 105, 152, 172–3) as
they wrestle with “certain fundamental issues of human life” (119)
and “with the questions or ‘problems’ which the poem as a whole
explores” (97; cf. 173). A clinical, rational engagement is allowed.
Those more willing to explore how the epics generate a range of
affective dynamics often viewed such dynamics with suspicion.
Consider Lillian Doherty’s assessment of the end of the Odyssey: “I
have not stopped taking pleasure in the reunion of Odysseus and
Penelope; rather, my pleasure has become infused with an
awareness that it invites me to be reconciled to an androcentric view
of the world, a view in which Penelope’s happiness is subordinate to
and indeed defined by that of Odysseus” (1995: 40; cf. 192).
In keeping with broader trends inside and outside of classical
studies,4 priorities have shifted in the subfield of Homeric studies.
Jon Hesk asks us to confront “the difficult issue of the audience’s
pleasure” and how the Iliad “deliver[s] prurient thrills and
entertaining forms of terror” (2013: 33; cf. 43). Lynn Kozak’s
Experiencing Hektor explores how and why “the Iliad has caught me
with its Hektor” (2017: 1)—that is, how and why the poem enables
audience members to connect with and care about its characters
and engage with the tale more generally. Kozak attends to a number
of factors that bring “pleasure” to recipients, from a challenge to
their expectations (119), to a resolution of a storyline (121), to a
“callback” (cross-reference) to an earlier episode (130), to their
recognizing the typical pattern of a battle scene (137). Kozak
introduces to Homeric studies the notion of “allegiance” wherein
recipients judge the characters and experience like or dislike as a
result (5–6, 8; cf. section 7.3, p. 211). This experience is one
manifestation of our “engagement” with the characters (62, 111,
157; cf. 22). They also deploy the notion of “melodramatic alignment
structure” wherein recipients “know more than any one character
knows” (6; cf., e.g., Rengakos 1999: 323 on dramatic irony). This
knowledge “increases emotional investment and anticipation of the
events to come” (Kozak 2017: 92; cf. 100, 137–8, 140–1, 151, 170,
198). And Kozak traces still other ways in which the poem builds
anticipation, suspense, curiosity, and even anxiety in its audience (8–
9, 27, 29, 31, 82, 95, 102, 115, 143, 147, 195, 218). Focusing on the
Iliad’s divine apparatus, Tobias Myers queries “the emotional impact
[on the audience] of the devastation at Troy,” “the intensity of their
[the audience members] experience as they listen to the telling,” and
how “the poet understands himself to be hooking his listeners”
(2019: 3, 33, 175). He writes, “While the Iliad responds wonderfully
to analysis, it is aimed not at analytical critics but at audiences ready
to be swept away by wonder, pleasure, terror, and tears” (59; cf. 91,
93). At the same time, Myers argues, the Iliad poet urges his
audience to consider their emotional reactions to the tale (124, 210).
Rachel Lesser discerns a triad of desires felt by the Iliad’s audience
(2022, esp. 12–22). They experience narrative desire (wanting to
learn how the story will turn out), sympathetic desire (feeling for a
character and hoping all goes well for them), and empathetic desire
(taking on a character’s “urges, wishes, and longings” (18)). The
audience can sympathize and empathize with a range of characters
—Chryses, Achilles, Hera, Helen, Menelaus, Agamemnon, Odysseus,
Andromache, Patroclus, Priam, Hecuba; they can sympathize and
empathize with a specific character at one moment but not at
another (178, 189, 213, 228). Sympathetic and empathetic desires
can go hand in hand with and even enhance narrative desire (21,
30, 107, 189, 195, 200, 203, 215, 221, 229, 241), or they can
conflict with it, causing at times feelings of dissonance or even dread
(99, 128, 153, 178, 181, 199, 215). Liberating too is Joel
Christensen’s study of the therapeutic work afforded (or not) by
storytelling to the characters and external audiences of the Odyssey
(2020; cf. Grethlein 2017b: 118, 271–82). Homerists, then, have
answered Gregory Hutchinson’s call for “thinking more about how
the poem affected listeners” (2017: 168).
This book builds on these interventions as well as on additional
scholarship by investigators of the ancient world—both in Greek
studies and Roman studies and in biblical studies—that starts from
two facts now well-established in disciplines outside classical studies
devoted to the exploration of narrative. When people read a story or
when they watch a play, movie, or television show, many find
themselves immersed in the tale and its world and many identify
with the characters (cf. de Bakker, van der Berg, and Klooster 2022:
15–17). More than that, many consume media in order to immerse
themselves in the tale and its world and to identify with the
characters: they “choose” and “allow” themselves these experiences
(Plantinga 2018: 195, 249) and “strive to be overcome by the
objects of their passion” (Felski 2020b: 65). We can shift priorities
and think about narratives as more than a series of puzzles for the
critic to solve.
One can find these propositions in traditional sites of literary
criticism. From her perch in English, for example, Rita Felski points
to the necessity of taking seriously the majority of readers who read
in an apparently “unseemly or inappropriate fashion—identifying
with characters, becoming absorbed in narratives, being struck by
moments of recognition” (2015: 29; cf. 191; 2008: 14, 17–18;
2020b: 25; Moi 2019: 59). We critics, she writes, should overcome
our fear “of being contaminated and animated by the words we
encounter” (2015: 12), and whereas our training prompts us to ask
colleagues, “‘But what about power?’,” we should now ask, “‘But
what about love?’ Or: ‘Where is your theory of attachment?’” (17–
18). Drawing especially on Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory to
argue that texts “make things happen” (168, 180; cf. 2020b: 21–4),
Felski proposes a “postcritical reading.” This approach “treat[s]
experiences of engagement, wonder, or absorption not as signs of
naïveté or user error but as clues to why we are drawn to art in the
first place” (2015: 180). It asks, “How do works of art move us, and
why? Are certain features of texts more likely to trigger empathy or
recognition, absorption or disorientation? What does it mean to talk
about identifying with a character?” (181; cf. Anker and Felski 2017;
Felski 2020a).
Felski’s clear articulations of the matter at hand and of its stakes
inspire (cf. Docherty 2021), but I concentrate for the most part on
other research in communications, literary studies, media studies,
and psychology that provides accessible and precise definitions and
models of immersion and identification as well as actionable findings
on how immersion and identification come about. This project
represents the first book-length application of that research to the
Iliad. It thereby helps explain why people care about this epic poem
and its characters (cf. B. Vermeule 2010) and how they actually
respond to the poem. Put differently, those of us in Homeric studies
who want to think about narrative immersion and identification
should take as our guides researchers in those aforementioned fields
who study narrative immersion and identification and especially
those researchers who do so in an empirical fashion. By empirical,
one refers to controlled experiments with results subject to
falsification (Hakemulder and van Peer 2016: 192; differently,
Margolin 2008: 9).
To be sure, several relevant contributions in classical studies that
address issues of immersion and/or identification do not choose this
route. Studying “images of song” found within the Homeric epics,
Stephen Halliwell notes the poems’ concern with an audience’s
“intense absorption,” “rapt concentration and engagement,” and
“total immersion” (2011: 45; cf. Liebert 2017: 48–62; Ready 2018:
170–84; Giordano 2022: 177–83). In an earlier intervention, Halliwell
addresses Plato’s Republic: performers experience “self-likening,
absorption, and identification” and “full psychological immersion”
with characters (2002: 54, 79) whereas audience members
experience “‘sympathy’ rather than ‘identification’” (81; cf. 93).
Nancy Felson’s influential article, “Vicarious Transport: Fictive Deixis
in Pindar’s Pythian Four,” finds “Pindar uses deixis with expertise and
subtlety, primarily to make his audiences ‘travel’ across space and
time…. He transports them along carefully demarcated pathways”
(1999: 5; cf. Sobak 2013: 111 n. 10, 115 n. 21; Weiss 2016: 250;
Neer and Kurke 2019: 37, 204, 276). Pauline LeVen queries how
Timotheus’s Persians “immerses its audience” such that it “is brought
to the scene” (2014: 201–2) and experiences “mental transport” or
“mental displacement” (217–18; cf. 242). A deictic shift (see section
6.3, p. 188) enacted by the use of the imperfect tense contributes to
this effect (197–204). What is more, intertextual citations in the
direct speech of characters endow the characters with “fictional
weight” (216) and make them into entities “whom the audience can
not only observe directly but also project into, in [a] form of wish-
fulfillment fantasy” (209; cf. 232). Jonas Grethlein argues that
ancient prose writers—Thucydides in his History of the
Peloponnesian War, Xenophon in his Anabasis, Plutarch in his
Alexander, Tacitus in his Annals, Polybius in his Histories, and Sallust
in his The War with Catiline—deploy a range of techniques that
make us feel as if we experience the narrated events or as if figures
from the past come before us (2013). The use of the imperfect tense
and the historical present “let the reader follow the battle as if it was
unfolding right before her eyes” (34; cf. 63). Internal focalization
renders the action “present” (34), gives the recipient “a sense of
witnessing history as it unfolds” (36), and “puts the reader right on
the spot of the action” (56; see section 6.3, pp. 182–7). Speeches by
characters suggest “unmediated access to the past” (36) and
“contribute to making the past of the narrative present” (64; cf.
section 6.3, p. 190). Techniques for creating suspense (see section
7.2) help us feel what “the historical agents must have felt” (44).
“Sideshadowing” raises the specter of something happening that
does not ultimately transpire, and these potentialities put us in the
shoes of the characters who do not know what the future holds (14,
45, 69). When a recipient fills in “blanks” about what happened to a
character, this act of supplementing “deepens the immersion of the
reader” (88). Second-person address to the implied reader “deepens
the immersive quality” of a passage (99; see section 6.3, p. 187). A
“spatial deixis” that tracks the movement of a character can make
“the scene highly graphic” (122). Highlighting ambiguities and
uncertainties regarding cause and effect and the course of events
recreates for the recipient what it felt like to live through the
narrated period (154–6, 165–7). Recipients can feel themselves
addressed when a character addresses in the imperative mood an
internal audience: “the blending together of internal and external
audiences raises the immediacy of the narrative” (260–1). A
conclusion that resists closure “binds the reader into the world of the
narrative” (303).
We can approach the topics of immersion and identification in
various ways. Nevertheless, I take my inspiration from: Michael
Power’s 2006 doctoral dissertation, Transportation and Homeric Epic,
which employs Richard Gerrig’s model of transportation (1993) and
Melanie Green and Timothy Brock’s expansions of that model (2000;
2002) to explore how recipients respond to Odyssey 9 and, more
precisely, to the “ambiguous” characterization of Polyphemus and
Odysseus; from Rutger Allan, Irene de Jong, and Casper de Jonge’s
2017 article on the Homeric epics, “From Enargeia to Immersion:
The Ancient Roots of a Modern Concept,” which looks to Ryan’s 2001
book, Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and Interactivity in
Literature and Electronic Media (cf. Clercx 2018); and from five
pieces by Rutger Allan that deploy a range of research on immersion
from outside classical studies—the work of Ryan features as does
that of Green and Brock, of Kaitlin Fitzgerald and Green (2017), of
Anneke de Graaf et al. (2012), and of Werner Wolf (e.g., 2013)—to
explore immersion (and identification, to a lesser extent) in ancient
texts, including the Homeric epics: “Construal and Immersion: A
Cognitive Linguistic Approach to Homeric Immersivity” (2019a);
“Herodotus and Thucydides: Distance and Immersion” (2019b);
“Narrative and Immersion: Some Linguistic and Narratological
Aspects” (2020), which studies some passages in the Iliad and in
Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War; “Metaleptic
Apostrophe in Homer: Emotion and Immersion” (2022a); and
“Persuasion by Immersion: The narratio of Lysias 1, On the Killing of
Eratosthenes” (2022b).
I also tip my hat to Jonas Grethlein and Luuk Huitink’s article,
“Homer’s Vividness: An Enactive Approach.” To get at how Homeric
epic “transports listeners and readers,” “captivates the audience,”
and casts its “spell…on listeners” (2017: 83–4), they leave the
friendly confines of classical studies and utilize an enactive approach
from cognitive (literary) studies (or more properly an approach from
the branch of enactivism called “sensorimotor enactivism” (Ward,
Silverman, and Villalobos 2017: 370–2)). In his 2021 book, Grethlein
uses the same tools to illuminate the immersive potential of the
paedagogus’s false report of Orestes’s death in Sophocles’s Electra
(2021a: 53–67). Finally, I single out two monographs in biblical
studies. Eric Douglass’s Interpreting New Testament Narratives:
Recovering the Author’s Voice (2018) constructs an idiosyncratic but
detailed model of identification that overlaps in several of its
particulars with the empirical studies of identification I will use.
Douglass cites publications by Keith Oatley (1994) and Jonathan
Cohen (2001), two scholars whose extensive bibliographies feature
prominently in my own presentation. In Identifikationspotenziale in
den Psalmen: Emotionen, Metaphern und Textdynamik in den
Psalmen 30, 64, 90 und 147 (2019), Sigrid Eder also interacts with
early formulations of Werner Wolf (1993) and Oatley (1994) and
makes use of research from still other scholars whose work will
appear in what follows, such as Ed Tan (1994), David Miall and Don
Kuiken (2002), and Suzanne Keen (2007).
I would urge sticking to the work of researchers in narrative
studies. In a chapter that culminates in an analysis of Hermes’s
arrival on Ogygia in Odyssey 5 (2019a), R. Allan turns to Rolf
Zwaan’s “Immersed Experiencer Framework” (2003; cf. Grethlein
2021a: 102; 2021b: 226–7). As Allan stresses, Zwaan aims to
explain how we comprehend language: he does not aim to explain
narrative immersion (2019a: 66). This feature of Zwaan’s model
presumably justifies its application to the study of narrative: if
language comprehension is a matter of immersion and we are
studying immersion in narratives that involve language
comprehension, then we should be looking at research on language
comprehension as immersive. I grant that the study of literary texts
benefits from the application of embodied theories, such as Zwaan’s,
of how one processes language. In this case, however, I worry that
if we focus on how linguistic activity writ large involves immersion,
we lose sight of what is distinctive about recipients’ immersion in
narratives: as Wolf opines—using aesthetic illusion, his preferred
term for what others call immersion—“there is a special relationship
between aesthetic illusion and narrative” (2014: section 3.4). To wit,
the immersed reader understands that the storyworld is not the real
world; this “bifurcation” (Felski 2008: 74) or “twofoldness” (Plantinga
2018: 31) does not concern Zwaan’s immersed experiencer.
This attribute of immersion in narratives has important
implications. For example, one can speak of temporal immersion.
Temporally immersed recipients attend to a character’s past, present,
and future: they focus on the relationships between events in the
character’s past to their present circumstances and between events
in their present to possible outcomes in the future (Ryan 2015a: 99–
106). In keeping with the idea that narrative offers a safe space for
emotional (Oatley 2012: 51, 140; Menninghaus et al. 2017; cf.
Oatley and Gholamain 1997: 267) and empathetic (Keen 2006: 220;
Caracciolo 2016: 42–3, 45; Lesser 2022: 20) engagement—an idea
ventured by Plato (Republic 605c9–606c9; Halliwell 2005: 400) and
discernable in eighteenth-century writers too (Gallagher 2006: 351)
—Grethlein reflects on the attraction of temporal immersion (2017a:
52–3; cf. 56):
They [readers] confront time in the same way as in the everyday world,
however, without any pragmatic strains. As in their own lives, readers have
re- and protentions and harbour expectations as well as memories. Yet, the
memory of what has happened is without the weight it has in real life, the
anticipation of what will come without the anxiety of everyday expectations.
Narrative permits us to undergo an experience without being directly
affected by it. It allows us to experience the force of time and
simultaneously keeps it at a safe distance…. Narrative subjects us to, and
simultaneously lets us overcome, the force to which we are exposed in the
everyday world…. Readers experience time but free from its real-life
implications, notably death.
1 Chen, Bell, and Taylor 2016; 2017; Fitzgerald and Green 2017: 56; Roberts
2018; R. Allan 2019b; 2020; Ryan 2019: 62–3, 66; Alam and So 2020; Fernandez-
Quintanilla 2020; Maloney 2020; Tyrell 2020: 48; Grethlein 2021a: 49, 55–6, 264;
Goffin and Friend 2022: 135.
2 E.g., Stanford 1983; Heath 1987; Griffin 1998: 54–61; 1999: 91–2; Griffith
1999b: e.g., 43; Budelmann 2000: e.g., 23, 91; cf. Wohl 2015: 12, 168 n. 6.
3 M. Smith 1995: 188–9; Robinson 2005: 143; Davis 2007: 20; Felski 2008:
54; 2015: 12–13, 54; 2020b: 30, 62; Ryan 2015a: 107; Grethlein 2017a: 4, 123;
2021a: 154; 2021b: 228; Douglass 2018: 112; Hogan 2018: 4; Plantinga 2018:
211; Kuzmičová and Bálint 2019: 430; Knox 2021: 12; cf. Sedgwick 2003: 144,
150.
4 Inside: e.g., Wohl 2015: 28, 106–9, 135–6; Cairns and Nelis 2017: 10–11;
Olsen 2017; Meineck 2018; Weiss 2020: 333; de Bakker, van der Berg, and
Klooster 2022: 10–15. Outside: e.g., Robinson 2005; Plantinga 2009; Hogan 2018;
Grethlein 2021a: 103.
PART I
I D E N T I F I C AT I O N A N D T H E ILIAD
2
The Study of Identification
2.1. Overview
The literature on identification stresses its complex relationship to
immersion. One can identify with a character but not experience
immersion, and one can be immersed without identifying with a
character.1 For instance, I might at one moment identify with a
character by adopting their goals but not simultaneously experience
a sense of being present in the world of the tale; conversely, I can
feel spatially immersed in a setting that lacks characters with whom
to identify.
Nevertheless, points of contact abound. Anneke de Graaf and
Lonneke van Leeuwen understand transportation (defined as
“cognitive and emotional investment in the narrative”) and
identification (defined as “cognitive and emotional investment in the
character”) as two “absorption processes” (2017: 284). Jonas
Grethlein avers, “The immersion of the reader can gain force from
sympathy with the characters and becomes even more intense in the
case of identification” (2017a: 65). Birte Thissen, Winfried
Menninghaus, and Wolff Schlotz postulate that absorption and
identification “presumably often coincide in fiction reading” (2018:
5). Jacqueline Thompson et al. find that “transportation also
correlated with identification” (2018: 212), and Mary Beth Oliver et
al. write, “Though these concepts [transportation and identification]
are conceptually distinct, their empirical covariance makes them
difficult to disentangle” (2019: 193): they are “empirically
correlated” in one of their experiments (188; cf. Budelmann et al.
2017: 239, 245; Ma 2020: 867). Indeed, for Helena Bilandzic and
Rick Busselle, one first needs to identify with a character before one
can enter the storyworld (2011: 34; cf. 2017: 20; Hoeken and
Sinkeldam 2014: 937). Conversely, Lena Wimmer et al. suggest,
“Transportation is thought to reduce the psychological distance
between readers and story characters, which in turn facilitates the
reader’s ability to take the character’s perspective, share their
emotions, and understand their (inter-) actions” (2021, my
emphasis). When Rita Felski links with identification items typically
studied under the heading of immersion—“Identifying with a
character can also be a matter of cathecting onto a plot, a situation,
a mise-en-scène, a setting, a style…. To what extent can an impulse
to identify with Thelma and Louise be disassociated from the
sublime landscape that surrounds and enframes them?” (2020b: 87)
—one again sees the difficulty in separating the concepts. Our
investigation of immersion can start with an investigation of
identification.
Section 2.2 surveys the components of identification. Section 2.3
delves deeper into the factors that researchers outside classical
studies see as triggers for identification. Section 2.4 investigates the
precedents we find in ancient scholarship for a study of
identification. Section 2.5 wraps up the chapter with comments on
the terms “character” and “emotional identification.”
Audiences can sometimes root for a character to carry out a task or finish a
job simply because spectators are goal-oriented or have completion
compulsions. But to claim that most viewers have allegiance with Norman
Bates at this point goes too far…. It cannot be the case…that simply
because a character does something we have full-blown allegiance to the
character.