Normativity, Rationality, and Reasoning

: Selected Essays John Broome

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Normativity, Rationality and Reasoning
 Normativity,
Rationality and
Reasoning
Selected Essays

JOHN BROOME

1
 3
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 Contents

Introduction 1

PART A. NORMATIVITY
1. Reason fundamentalism and what is wrong with it 11
2. Giving reasons and given reasons 39
3. The first normative ‘reason’ 50
4. A linguistic turn in the philosophy of normativity? 53
5. Williams on ought 70

PART B. RATIONALITY
6. Rationality versus normativity 91
7. Motivation 118

PART C. REASONING
8. Normativity in reasoning 143
9. A linking belief is not essential for reasoning 156
10. Reasoning with preferences? 170

References 195
Index 201
 Introduction

Normativity, rationality and reasoning are the subjects of my book

Rationality Through Reasoning, published in 2013. By that time, I had
been writing about them for more than fifteen years. Most of the papers
I had written were eventually either subsumed into Rationality Through
Reasoning or superseded by it. Those papers are not reprinted in this present
collection.
In selecting papers for the collection, I aimed to minimize its overlap with
Rationality Through Reasoning, and also to avoid reprinting claims I no
longer believe. Naturally, as I learnt more about the subjects over the years,
I concluded that some of my earlier writings were inaccurate or mistaken.
One of my better-known papers, ‘Normative requirements’, published in
1999, is not reprinted here because I now think it contains significant
mistakes. It argues that, alongside ought and reason we should recognize
another fundamental normative concept, which I called normative require-
ment. This now seems to me pointlessly extravagant.
I made this proposal as a way of solving some problems that arise in the
philosophy of normativity. Many of them are so-called ‘bootstrapping’
problems. Some philosophical theories imply that a person can give herself
a reason for something just by acquiring an attitude of some sort, even if she
has no reason to have the attitude. These theories are generally put forward
in order to explain some feature of normativity that needs explaining. But it
is often implausible that a person can bootstrap a reason into existence just
by acquiring an attitude. So we need better explanations.
For example, if you intend some end, it seems you fail in some way if you
do not intend what you believe is a necessary means to the end. How should
that be explained; in what way do you fail, exactly? One possible answer is
that intending an end is a reason for intending a means to it and you fail
to respond to this reason. But that is an example of implausible bootstrap-
ping. You might have no reason to intend the end. If not, it is implausible
that just by intending it you can give yourself a reason to intend a means to
it. In ‘Normative requirements’ I claimed instead that intending an end

Normativity, Rationality and Reasoning: Selected Essays. John Broome, Oxford University Press.
© John Broome 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198824848.003.0001
2 

normatively requires you to intend the means. I meant in part that you
ought to intend the means if you intend the end, where the condition ‘if you
intend the end’ is to be read as falling within the scope of the ‘ought’. There
is no implication that you ought to intend the means or even that you have
any reason to do so. So this explanation implies no bootstrapping.
My claim that intending an end normatively requires you to intend a
means to it was not supposed to be simply the claim that you ought to intend
the means if you intend the end. It was supposed to be more than this, but
I did not explain clearly what more it was supposed to be. In any case, the
important work in ‘Normative requirements’ was done by claims that you
ought to satisfy some conditional proposition. My solution to the bootstrap-
ping problems was to recognize that ‘ought’ sometimes governs a condi-
tional. It has a ‘wide scope’, as we often say. I carried this point through into
Rationality Through Reasoning, but abandoned many of the other ideas in
‘Normative requirements’.
Still, wide-scope oughts do not on their own solve the various problems of
the philosophy of normativity. I was right to recognize in ‘Normative
requirements’ that more needs to be done, even though the more I did
there was not well worked out. Rationality Through Reasoning puts in place
a lot more apparatus beyond wide scope, which is aimed at solving the
problems.
An important part of the apparatus was to make a sharp distinction
between normativity and rationality. I did not make this distinction in
‘Normative requirements’, or for several years afterwards. I did not make
it in another of my better-known papers: ‘Are intentions reasons’ published
in 2001. For this reason, that paper is not included in this collection either.
Much of it is in any case superseded by sections 10.1 and 10.2 of Rationality
Through Reasoning.
The distinction between rationality and normativity is hard to make
because our language tends to be ambiguous between the two. ‘Ought’ is
our core normative word. Nevertheless, we often use it when presenting
requirements of rationality. I used to use it for that purpose myself. For
example, we say that, necessarily, you ought not to have contradictory
beliefs. But in this usage ‘ought’ does not have its normative meaning. It is
not true that, necessarily, you normatively ought not to have contradictory
beliefs. On some occasions it may be normatively permissible to have
contradictory beliefs—for example, if great good can be achieved by doing
so. However, rationality requires you not to have contradictory beliefs even
if great good can be achieved by doing so. You are definitely not fully
   3

rational if you have contradictory beliefs. When we say you ought not to
have contradictory beliefs, that is what we mean.
I now use ‘ought’ only in its normative sense, and I use ‘rationality
requires’ for requirements of rationality. I recommend this practice because
the important distinction between rationality and normativity cannot other-
wise be clearly made.
I hope that Rationality Through Reasoning illustrates the benefits of
distinguishing rationality from normativity. It gives us a clearer understand-
ing of both. However, in writing that book I underestimated the strength of
the philosophers’ tendency to merge the two. In part, I think this tendency is
just a misunderstanding caused by the ambiguity of the word ‘reason’, which
can refer to either rationality or normativity. But in part too, it is the pull of
the very popular doctrine that rationality consists in responding correctly to
reasons. Since reasons are a feature of normativity, and indeed normativity
may properly be said to consist in responding correctly to reasons, in effect
this doctrine identifies rationality with normativity. Two chapters of
Rationality Through Reasoning oppose this doctrine, but I now know that
was not enough. In this volume, ‘Rationality versus normativity’ fights the
same battle again.
The doctrine that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons is
one component of the ‘reasons-first’ movement, which has dominated the
philosophy of normativity in the last few decades. Rationality Through
Reasoning opposes this movement. But I have subsequently realized that
I did not give that negative aim enough stress in the book. I concentrated on
the positive aim of building up an alternative account of normativity,
rationality and reasoning, and left the negative implications implicit. Since
writing the book, I have given more time to making them explicit in some of
the papers reprinted in this volume.
The reasons-first movement sees reasons as fundamental, not only in
normativity itself, but also in rationality and in the activity of reasoning. It
sees reasons everywhere, which means it sees normativity everywhere. My
accounts of these things are less normative.

Part A

The volume starts with five papers that are principally about normativity
itself. The first three are about normativity’s metaphysical structure. There
are various normative properties: the property of being something that
4 

ought to be done, the property of being a reason for someone to do

something, and so on. How are these properties related to each other? Are
any metaphysically more fundamental than others? Can some be reduced to
others? Sadly, our normative vocabulary is confusing, and clarifying termin-
ology is a substantial part of the work required to answer these metaphysical
questions.
‘Reason fundamentalism and what is wrong with it’ compares the claims
of three properties to be the most fundamental. One is the property of being
a reason. The second is the property of being something there is reason for.
The third is the property of being something that someone ought to do.
The first task of ‘Reason fundamentalism and what is wrong with it’ is to
separate the property of being a reason from the other two. To be a reason is
to explain what may be called ‘a purely normative fact’, which is the fact that
one of the other two properties obtains in a particular case. For example, the
fact that someone is a national leader explains why she ought to behave with
discretion. The fact that she is a national leader is a reason for her to behave
with discretion because it explains the purely normative fact that she ought
to behave with discretion. Another purely normative fact is that there is
reason for her to behave with discretion. The same reason explains this fact
too. So a reason is what explains and the other two properties are what are
explained. To use a different term: a reason is what gives and the other two
are what are given.
Distinguishing what gives from what is given is crucial in understanding
the metaphysical structure of normativity. But sadly, it is a hard distinction
to make clear because of our confusing language. I have been using the count
noun ‘a reason’ for what gives and the mass noun ‘reason’ for what is given.
But it is very easy to miss this distinction of meaning and slide from one to
the other. This is particularly tricky because it is grammatically legitimate to
use the count noun for what is given. Derek Parfit does so consistently. The
paper ‘Giving reasons and given reasons’ describes Parfit’s usage, and traces
its conceptual and metaphysical consequences.
Having separated what gives from what is given, ‘Reason fundamentalism
and what is wrong with it’ goes on to give a definition of what gives in terms
of what is given. Actually, it offers two alternative definitions. The first is
conducive to the view that the property of being something there is reason
for is the fundamental property of normativity; I call this ‘reason funda-
mentalism’. The second is conducive to the view that the property of being
something that someone ought to do is the fundamental property of nor-
mativity; I call this ‘ought fundamentalism’. ‘Reason fundamentalism and
   5

what is wrong with it’ goes on to argue that ought fundamentalism is

preferable to reason fundamentalism.
The next paper in this volume, ‘The first normative reason’, reports a
discovery I made while investigating the origin of the word ‘reason’ in
English. It was originally used to denote an explanation of some sort,
including particularly a motivating reason. I wondered how it came to
acquire a normative meaning. I was amused and delighted to discover it
did so in exactly the way I predicted in Rationality Through Reasoning. My
prediction was not made seriously; it was a sort of speculative etymology.
But it turns out to have been historically correct.
‘A linguistic turn in the philosophy of normativity?’ repays a debt that
I incurred in writing Rationality Through Reasoning. I started writing that
book before the linguistic theory of modality—particularly Angelica
Kratzer’s work—had begun to penetrate the philosophy of normativity.
I should have taken note of it, but I did not. This paper aimed to correct
that lapse. However, my conclusion turned out to be that the linguistic
theory makes little difference to the philosophy. Indeed, I argued that the
linguistics has more to learn from the philosophy than vice versa. The
linguistics is too closely tied to a deontic logic that most philosophers of
normativity lost faith in long ago.
‘Williams on ought’ is focused on what I call the ‘ownership’ of oughts.
Compare the sentences ‘Alex ought to go to Brighton’ and ‘Alex ought to go
to prison’. In a typical context, the first ascribes ownership of the ought to
Alex; it ascribes responsibility for getting to Brighton to Alex. But in a typical
context, the second sentence does not ascribe ownership to Alex.
Presumably it is the judicial system that is responsible for getting Alex to
prison rather than Alex himself.
Ownership is an important feature of oughts and also of reasons. Reasons
are grammatically less opaque in this respect because their owner can be
made explicit. When we say ‘Alex has a reason to go to Brighton’, we report
that the reason is owned by Alex. Even if there is a reason for Alex to go to
prison, in a typical context it is not true that Alex has a reason to go
to prison, because in a typical context the reason is not owned by Alex.
In his paper ‘Ought and moral obligation’, Bernard Williams apparently
denied that oughts are ever owned. This is surprising if it is true, since
ownership seems clearly to exist. Nevertheless, Williams himself in later life
accepted this interpretation of his earlier paper. In ‘Williams on ought’,
I took the opportunity to explore and analyse the notion of ownership in
the course of working out the correct interpretation of Williams.
6 

Part B

Next in this volume are two papers that are principally about rationality.
One of their main underlying purposes is to sharpen up the distinction
between rationality and normativity.
That is the explicit aim of ‘Rationality versus normativity’. The reasons-
first movement offers an account, not just of normativity, but of rationality
too. Its account is encapsulated in the claim that rationality consists in
responding correctly to reasons. ‘Rationality versus normativity’ aims to
refute this claim. In the course of doing so, it gives a conceptual analysis
of rationality, taking a historical approach.
‘Motivation’ is about rational explanations of action. It is a response to
Thomas Nagel’s The Possibility of Altruism. Nagel explained action in terms of
what he called ‘motivations’. He thought that, when you make a normative
judgement to the effect that you have sufficient reason to do some act, that
judgement constitutes a motivation to do the act. (His view is these days known
as ‘normative judgement internalism’.) The motivation causes you to act.
My paper ‘Motivation’ takes this pattern of explanation, and modifies it
through a sequence of improvements and adaptations. An important
improvement is to distinguish normativity from motivation, which Nagel
explicitly declined to do. One of my schemes of explanation is similar to
Nagel’s. It starts from the normative judgement that you ought to do some
act. Through a process of reasoning that I call ‘enkratic reasoning’, this
brings you to form an intention to do the act. An intention is a specific sort
of motivation, which in turn causes you to act.
But this is only one scheme for the rational explanation of action. Another
important scheme is instrumental. It starts from a prior intention of yours to
achieve an end. From this, through instrumental reasoning, you derive an
intention to take a means, which in turn causes you to take the means. This
scheme is rational, but it does not involve normativity at all. It illustrates the
separation of rationality from normativity.

Part C

The last three papers in this volume are about the activity of reasoning.
A significant feature of human rationality is that we have the ability to
change our attitudes and acquire new attitudes by means of this activity. It is
a means we have of improving our rationality. But it is not easy to
   7

understand exactly how it works. In particular, it is hard to understand what

makes reasoning an act—something we do. Rationality Through Reasoning
gives an account of these matters. The last three papers in this volume
extend its account.
Many philosophers think that reasoning involves thoughts that have
normative contents. For example, some think that acquiring a new belief
by reasoning involves a normative judgement that you ought to have that
belief. This model of reasoning involves a judgement about a belief. I call it a
‘higher-order’ model. Rationality Through Reasoning argues against the
higher-order model. It argues that we reason with first-order attitudes.
Still, normativity might be involved in reasoning in a subtler way. In
reasoning with first-order attitudes we follow rules. A rule sets up a standard
of correctness that identifies when the rule is correctly followed. In following
the rule we are guided by this standard. We conform to the rule, not because
of some mechanical process, but because we recognize the rule and regulate
our behaviour in accordance with it. This is what makes reasoning some-
thing we do. It seems we could not be guided by a rule without thinking we
ought to follow it. So normativity gets in here.
In ‘Normativity in reasoning’ I argue against this conclusion: you can
indeed be guided by a rule without thinking you ought to follow it. You can
be guided by an intention in the course of implementing it, even when you
do not think you ought to implement it. Rule guidance is more like guidance
by an intention than like normative guidance.
‘A linking belief is not essential for reasoning’ corrects a mistake I made in
Rationality Through Reasoning. Theoretical reasoning is a mental process
that takes you from premises that you believe to a conclusion that you come
to believe as a result of the process. In Rationality Through Reasoning I tried
to describe what makes the process reasoning as opposed to a mental
process of some other sort. I said that a necessary condition for the process
to be reasoning is that the reasoner has a ‘linking belief ’, by which I mean a
belief that the premises imply the conclusion. This condition is similar to the
‘taking condition’ that Paul Boghossian says is necessary for a mental
process to be inference. It is a natural idea that a belief like this is what
makes a process genuine reasoning or inference.
However, that is a mistake. First, this idea cannot be extended to other
sorts of reasoning besides theoretical reasoning. In Rationality Through
Reasoning I said that a linking belief is necessary for other sorts of reasoning
too. However, I did not specify the content of a linking belief for other sorts
of reasoning. I realized later that actually there is nothing that could be the
8 

content of a linking belief in those cases. For example, practical reasoning is

reasoning that concludes in an intention. There is nothing that could be the
content of linking belief in the case of practical reasoning. So I was wrong.
This means that, when we try to work out in general what is the essence of
reasoning, a linking belief is not it. A linking belief may indeed be a
necessary condition for theoretical reasoning, but it is not what makes it
reasoning. And it is not even a necessary condition for other sorts of
reasoning. The essence of reasoning is something else, which turns out to
be following a rule. That is the message of ‘A linking belief is not essential for
reasoning’.
The last paper in this volume investigates one of these other sorts of
reasoning. I have mentioned theoretical reasoning, which concludes in a
belief, and practical reasoning, which concludes in an intention. These are
the two sorts that I concentrated on in Rationality Through Reasoning. But
there are others sorts too. ‘Reasoning with preferences’ describes one of
them. But its conclusion is non-committal. It is not clear that reasoning with
preferences is truly a distinct sort of reasoning. It may turn out to be simply
theoretical reasoning with beliefs about betterness.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 24/8/2021, SPi

PART A
NORMATIVITY
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 24/8/2021, SPi
 1
Reason fundamentalism and
what is wrong with it

1. Introduction

During the last half-century, a dogma has grown up in the philosophy of

normativity: the dogma of the primacy of reasons or ‘reasons first’. One part
of it is the metaphysical view that reasons are the fundamental element of
normativity. Normativity is ‘the domain of reasons’, to use John Skorupski’s
illuminating phrase,¹ and ‘the normativity of all that is normative consists in
the way it is, or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons’, as Joseph Raz
puts it.² This paper opposes this part of the dogma. I shall argue that reasons
are not the fundamental element of normativity. Indeed, I shall argue that
they are not a fundamental element of normativity at all.
In this paper, I speak of normative reasons only. The count noun ‘reason’
has several uses. For instance, we might say ‘The reason Elise is hurrying is
that she is late for dinner.’ This is to say that Elise’s hurrying is explained in
a particular way by the fact that she is late for dinner. The particular
way is, roughly, that the explanation passes through her rational faculty.
Philosophers call facts that explain a person’s behaviour in this way ‘motiv-
ating reasons’. We sometimes even use ‘reason’ to refer to a mere mechanical
cause. For instance, we say ‘The reason for that banging is that the main
bearing is failing.’ But in this paper, the count noun ‘reason’ always refers to
a normative reason, and never to a motivating reason or cause.
The view I oppose is that reasons are metaphysically fundamental within
normativity. The issue is whether reasons can be reduced to something else
normative. I am not concerned with whether normativity itself can be
reduced to non-normative features of the world. The view that it cannot is
given the name ‘reasons fundamentalism’ by T. M. Scanlon in Being Realistic
About Reasons. ‘Normative fundamentalism’ would have been a more

¹ The Domain of Reasons. ² Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason, p. 67.

Normativity, Rationality and Reasoning: Selected Essays. John Broome, Oxford University Press.
© John Broome 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198824848.003.0002
12        

accurate name for it, since Being Realistic About Reasons explicitly does not
defend the view that reasons are fundamental within normativity.³ This
paper is not about reasons fundamentalism in Scanlon’s sense.
The view that reasons themselves are fundamental elements of norma-
tivity can be quickly dismissed, and I do not think many philosophers really
hold it. Many reasons are natural facts. For example, the fact that apple pips
contain cyanide is a reason not to eat too many of them. Natural facts are not
features of normativity at all, so they cannot be fundamental elements of it.
What many philosophers think is that the property of being a reason is the
fundamental element of normativity. This is one version of the view I call
‘reason fundamentalism’.⁴ It is not the best version, and I shall argue in
section 6 that it is mistaken.
Reasons are not features of normativity, and nor is any other thing, so far
as I can tell. There are no normative things nor (I shall explain in section 2) is
there any normative stuff. The metaphysical domain of normativity is a
domain of properties and relations only. Things can have normative proper-
ties and stand in normative relations to each other. For example, it can be the
case that a particular person ought to do an act of a particular sort. But the
things—the person and the act in this case—are not themselves normative.
This paper is about what normative properties are metaphysically—
specifically ontologically—fundamental in normativity. It is not about
what things are explanatorily fundamental. Compare the property of being
a fertilizer. This is the property of causing plants to grow faster. So the
property of being a fertilizer is metaphysically reducible to other properties
and relations including causation, being a plant and growing. These are
metaphysically more fundamental. But causation itself goes in the opposite
direction: a fertilizer (not the property of being a fertilizer) causes plants to
grow more quickly. Similarly, in sections 6 and 8 I shall argue that the
property of being a reason is the property of explaining the obtaining of
other particular normative relations. So the property of being a reason is
metaphysically reducible to the relation of explanation together with these
other normative relations. It is therefore metaphysically less fundamental
than the other relations. But explanation goes in the opposite direction:

³ See Being Realistic About Reasons, p. 2. However, Scanlon does favour the view that reasons
are fundamental in normativity. In section 7, I shall analyse the statement of this view that
appears in his What We Owe to Each Other.
⁴ I take this term from Daniel Fogal’s ‘Reasons, reason, and context’, but my meaning is
rather different from his.
  13

a reason (not the property of being a reason) explains the obtaining of more
fundamental relations.
That the property of being a reason is the fundamental element in norma-
tivity is not the best version of reason fundamentalism. A substantial part of
this paper (much of sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9) is taken up with developing
what is the best version. Although I shall eventually reject reason fundamen-
talism, I intend this work to be a constructive contribution to it. Reason
fundamentalists fix their attention on reasons. But the property of being a
reason can easily be shown not to be fundamental. The property they should
take to be fundamental is the property something has when there is reason for
it. Unfortunately, there is no convenient English name for this property. It
may be merely this lack of a name that causes reason fundamentalists to focus
on reasons instead.
Roughly in parallel (in sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8), I shall develop an
alternative view in which ought is the fundamental element in normativity.
(‘Ought’ as I use it throughout this paper has its central, final, all-things-
considered, normative meaning.⁵) I call this view ‘ought fundamentalism’. It
too is a view about what is fundamental within normativity and not a view
about the metaphysical status of normativity itself. The parallels between
ought and reason need to be drawn out, since they are obscured by the very
different grammars of ‘ought’ and ‘reason’ in English.
In section 10 I shall argue against reason fundamentalism on the grounds
that it is not faithful to our normative concepts, and in section 11 I shall
conclude in favour of ought fundamentalism. We should accept that ought is
fundamental and reason is not.
This is a stronger conclusion than simply rejecting reason fundamental-
ism. Reason fundamentalism is the view that reason is the only fundamental
element of normativity. If there turned out to be two fundamental elements
of normativity—reason and ought, say—reason fundamentalism would be
false. But I shall show in sections 8 and 9 that reason can be successfully
reduced to ought. The arguments justify the stronger conclusion that ought
fundamentalism is true.
Reason fundamentalism is one component of the dogma of the primacy
of reasons. Other components are the view that rationality consists in
responding correctly to reasons, and the view that reasoning is a response
to reasons. I think these are mistaken accounts of rationality and reasoning,

⁵ See my Rationality Through Reasoning, chapters 2 and 3, and my ‘A linguistic turn in the
philosophy of normativity?’.
14        

and I have opposed them in my book Rationality Through Reasoning. They

draw support from reason fundamentalism, and rejecting reason fundamen-
talism helps to undermine them.
A last preliminary note. I use ‘normative’ in a sense that excludes the
evaluative. This paper is not concerned with the relation between the
normative and the evaluative. Whether the good is prior to the right or
the right prior to the good is not a question for this paper.

2. The reasoned property and the oughted property

Suppose there is reason for the lights to come on at dusk. This is to say that
the state of affairs consisting in the lights’ coming on at dusk has a particular
normative property. English has no convenient predicate to express this
property, so I shall introduce the artificial predicate ‘reasoned’. ‘The lights’
coming on at dusk is reasoned’ means just the same as ‘There is reason for
the lights to come on at dusk.’ I shall sometimes call the property of being
reasoned ‘the reasoned property’. (In common English, ‘reasoned’ means
something else, of course.)
You might think ‘reasonable’ is a common English equivalent to
‘reasoned’, but it is not. Suppose there is reason for the lights to come on
at dusk, but also much stronger reason for them not to. Then their coming
on at dusk is not reasonable, although it is reasoned.
When I wrote ‘There is reason for the lights to come on at dusk’, I used
the mass noun ‘reason’ in the course of ascribing the property of being
reasoned to a state of affairs. This use of the mass noun is unavoidable in
common English, but it can be misleading. Read literally, the mass noun
‘reason’ should refer to stuff of some sort. Read literally, ‘there is reason’
asserts that this stuff exists, just as ‘there is water in the lake’ asserts that stuff
of a particular sort exists in the lake. But the existence of the abstract stuff
‘reason’ is metaphysically dubious, and we need not be committed to it just
by using the expression ‘there is reason’.⁶ This expression is merely the
means we have in common English of saying that something is reasoned, in
the absence of a natural predicate. It commits us to the existence of the

⁶ Here I am withdrawing some of what I said in section 4.4 of Rationality Through Reasoning.
I am also disagreeing with some of Daniel Fogal’s ‘Reasons, reason, and context’. Nevertheless,
I have been greatly influenced by that paper.
  -  15

property but not the stuff. One merit of the artificial predicate ‘reasoned’ is
that it does not misleadingly suggest the existence of reason-stuff.
Suppose next that the lights ought to come on at dusk. (I mean this ought
to be normative; perhaps it is dangerous if they do not come on.) Then the
state of affairs consisting in the lights’ coming on at dusk has a different
normative property. English has no convenient predicate to express this
property either, so I shall introduce the artificial predicate ‘oughted’. ‘The
lights’ coming on at dusk is oughted’ means just the same as ‘The lights
ought to come on at dusk.’ I shall sometimes call the property of being
oughted ‘the oughted property’.
The reasoned property and the oughted property are properties of states
of affairs, which may be actual or merely possible. What about constructions
based on an infinitive, such as ‘There is reason to believe dinosaurs
were warm-blooded’? Do these ascribe the property of being reasoned to
whatever is denoted by the infinitival clause—in this case ‘to believe dino-
saurs were warm-blooded’? I think not; I take them to be elliptical. I take the
dinosaur sentence to mean ‘There is reason for you to believe dinosaurs were
warm-blooded’, or ‘There is reason for everyone to believe dinosaurs
were warm-blooded’, or something like that. In my artificial language: ‘Your
believing dinosaurs were warm-blooded is reasoned’, or ‘Everyone’s believing
the dinosaurs were warm-blooded is reasoned’, or something like that.

3. The reasoned-for relation and the oughted-for relation

Next suppose Caroline has reason to visit the bank. Then Caroline’s visiting
the bank stands in a particular normative relation to Caroline. I describe it
using the artificial dyadic predicate ‘reasoned for’. I say: Caroline’s visiting
the bank is reasoned for Caroline. I shall sometimes call this ‘the reasoned-
for relation’.
The sentence ‘Caroline has reason to visit the bank’ contains the mass
noun ‘reason’. Read literally, this sentence implies the existence of some
reason-stuff. But again, using the expression ‘has reason’ need not commit
us to the existence of such stuff. It is simply a way of saying in common
English that the reasoned-for relation obtains between a state of affairs and a
person. It commits us to the relation, not the stuff.
When Caroline has reason to visit the bank, the reason is commonly
said to be ‘agent-relative’ to Caroline. ‘Agent-relative’ is a useful term, but
inaccurate in some applications. For example, Caroline might have reason to
16        

believe the bank is closed, but Caroline is not an agent of her beliefs, so it
would be inaccurate to call the reason ‘agent-relative’. Furthermore, to say
the reason is agent-relative is too unspecific in one respect. It gives no hint
about the nature of the relationship that the reason bears to the agent.
I prefer to say the reason is ‘owned’ by Caroline. We could also say it
‘applies’ to Caroline. These terms are metaphorical, but at least they hint
at the nature of the relationship.
The previous paragraph contains the count noun ‘reason’. ‘The reason’ in
that paragraph refers to a particular obtaining of the reasoned-for relation—
a trope, as philosophers call it. In ‘The red in that photo is an artefact of the
lens’, ‘the red’ similarly refers to a trope. But the count noun ‘reason’ more
commonly refers to something quite different, which I shall define in
sections 6 and 8. To narrow the opportunities for confusion, from here on
I shall not use this count noun for a trope. Instead, I shall sometimes have to
use ungainly phrases such as ‘an obtaining of the reasoned-for relation’.
There is more than one way to report in common English an obtaining of
the reasoned-for relation. I used the sentence ‘Caroline has reason to visit
the bank’, which makes it very explicit that Caroline is the owner. But I could
instead have said ‘There is reason for Caroline to visit the bank.’ This
sentence can have the same meaning implying ownership. However, the
latter sentence can alternatively mean simply that Caroline’s visiting the
bank has the monadic property of being reasoned. Fortunately, the two
different meanings are registered in the sentence’s grammar. When the
sentence means that the reasoned-for relation obtains, so ownership is
implied, it can be parsed {There is reason}{for Caroline}{to visit the bank}.
When it means that the monadic reasoned property obtains, it can be parsed
{There is reason for}{Caroline to visit the bank}. The different parsings may
be distinguished by a simple test. If the sentence has the former parsing, it
can be rearranged to make ‘For Caroline, there is reason to visit the bank’
without changing its meaning. If it has the latter parsing, it cannot.
Suppose now that Caroline ought to visit the bank. This probably means
that Caroline’s visiting the bank stands in a particular normative relation to
Caroline. I describe it using the artificial dyadic predicate ‘oughted for’. I say:
Caroline’s visiting the bank is oughted for Caroline. I shall sometimes call
this ‘the oughted-for relation’.
When Caroline’s visiting the bank is oughted for Caroline, the ought may
be said to be ‘agent-relative’ to Caroline. I prefer to say it is ‘owned’ by
Caroline. ‘The ought’ here refers to a trope: a particular obtaining of the
oughted-for relation. Since the count noun ‘ought’ is already artificial, and
   17

we have no other use for it, there is no risk of confusion in using it this way.
I shall do so.
Unfortunately, the sentence ‘Caroline ought to visit the bank’ is ambigu-
ous. It probably means that Caroline’s visiting the bank stands in the
dyadic oughted-for relation to Caroline, so that the ought is owned by
Caroline. But it could also mean that Caroline’s visiting the bank has the
monadic property of being oughted. ‘Ought’ sentences in general have these
two alternative meanings. They may or may not ascribe ownership of the
ought. Compare ‘The lights ought to come on at dusk’. This sentence
probably means that the lights’ coming on at dusk has the monadic prop-
erty: that the lights’ coming on at dusk is oughted. It almost certainly does
not imply that the lights’ coming on at dusk is oughted for the lights, which
would mean the lights own the ought. There appears to be no grammatical
difference between ‘ought’ sentences that ascribe ownership of the ought and
those that do not. The difference is said to be marked in the deep grammar,⁷
but there is no easy test for it. The artificial expressions ‘oughted’ and
‘oughted for’ cut through the ambiguity.

4. Type relations

In this paper I shall argue that reason fundamentalists should take the
reasoned-for relation as fundamental and ought fundamentalists should
take the oughted-for relation as fundamental. Why do I choose these
particular relations? When Caroline has reason to visit the bank, a relation
obtains between whatever is denoted by the infinitival phrase ‘to visit the
bank’ and Caroline. Why not take this relation to be fundamental instead?
To see why not, suppose for the sake of argument that the infinitival
phrase denotes a type—in the example a type of act. When Caroline has
reason to visit the bank, the type denoted by ‘to visit the bank’ stands in a
normative relation to her. Let us call this ‘the type-reasoned-for relation’. In
general, whenever N has reason to F, the type denoted by ‘to F ’ stands in the
type-reasoned-for relation to N. (The participle ‘Fing’ can denote this
same type.)
Whenever N has reason to F, it is also the case that the state of affairs
consisting in N’s Fing stands in the reasoned-for relation to N. Moreover, for

⁷ Valentine Hacquard, ‘On the event relativity of modal auxiliaries’.

18        

Fing to stand in the type-reasoned-for relation to N just is for N ’s Fing to

stand in the reasoned-for relation to N. So the type-reasoned-for relation can
be reduced to the reasoned-for relation.
On the other hand, when a state of affairs p stands in the reasoned-for
relation to N, the type-reasoned-for relation need not hold between anything
and N, unless p is the state of affairs of N ’s Fing, for some type Fing. So the
reasoned-for relation cannot be reduced to the type-reasoned-for relation,
unless, whenever p stands in the reasoned-for relation to N, p is the state of
affairs of N’s Fing, for some type Fing. But it seems that some states of affairs
might stand in the reasoned-for relation to N even though they do not
consist in N’s Fing. For example, it seems that the state of affairs consisting
in Caroline’s bank account’s being in credit might stand in the reasoned-for
relation to Caroline. We might even say ‘Caroline has reason for her bank
account to be in credit.’ This seems to make sense, though I admit its
grammar is questionable.⁸
There might actually be no examples like this, despite appearances,
but there might be some. So the reasoned-for relation is a better candidate
for being fundamental than the type-reasoned-for relation. The latter is
definitely reducible to the former, but the former may not be reducible to
the latter.
For the same reason, the oughted-for relation is a better candidate for
being fundamental than the corresponding type-oughted-for relation.

5. Reducing the properties to the relations

The co-existence of the reasoned property and the reasoned-for relation

complicates reason fundamentalism, and the co-existence of the oughted
property and the oughted-for relation complicates ought fundamentalism.
These complications are diminished if the monadic properties can be reduced
to the corresponding dyadic relations. I assume this is indeed possible.
When there is reason for something to be the case, I assume there is
always someone who is responsible for its being the case. If there is reason
for the lights to come on at dusk, I assume someone owns this obtaining of
the reasoned property. In general, I assume that for it to be the case that p is

⁸ On the grammar, see Sæbø, ‘Possession and pertinence: the meaning of have’ and the
response by Daniel Fogal in Bad Attitudes, p. 41n.
       19

reasoned is for it to be the case that, for some N, p is reasoned for N. This
reduces the reasoned property to the reasoned-for relation.
Are there not some obtainings of the reasoned property that are agent-
neutral? Would these not resist reduction, because no one owns them?
I think that, when an obtaining of the reasoned property is agent-neutral,
this normally means it belongs to everyone rather than to no one.⁹ However,
I do not dogmatically rule out the possibility that there are indeed some
obtainings of the reasoned property that belong to no one. Suppose there is
reason for the lights to come on at dusk. Suppose this obtaining of the
reasoned property used to be owned by the manager, but she has retired and
not been replaced. The responsibility may now fall somewhere else, perhaps
on the landowner or the government, so that they now own the obtaining of
the reasoned property. But perhaps not. Perhaps the entire lighting system
has deliberately and rightly been abandoned to nature. If so, it is probably
now false that there is reason for the lights to come on at night. But possibly
there might be circumstances in which it remains true that there is reason
for the lights to come on at dusk, even though no one owns this obtaining of
the reason-property. It is plausible in a case like this that ‘There is reason for
the lights to come on at dusk’ has a special meaning and does not report an
obtaining of the reasoned property. It might be evaluative rather than strictly
normative, for example. But I do not wish to take a stand on this, so I accept
the possibility that there are genuine obtainings of the reasoned property
that belong to no one.
I am working towards an argument that reason fundamentalists should
recognize only the dyadic reasoned-for relation as a fundamental element in
normativity. If there are indeed obtainings of the monadic reasoned prop-
erty that belong to no one, they would have to recognize this monadic
property as a second fundamental element. That would make little differ-
ence to the conclusions of this paper. Given that it would make little
difference, for convenience I shall continue to assume that the monadic
property is reducible to the dyadic relation. If that is so, reason fundamen-
talists should recognize only the dyadic relation as fundamental.
The oughted property can be reduced to the oughted-for relation, but
the reduction is more complicated. It can happen that the oughted-for
relation obtains between one person and a state of affairs, and also obtains
between a different person and the opposite state of affairs. For example, in a

⁹ See my Rationality Through Reasoning, section 4.5.

20        

litter-collecting contest, it might be that Alf ought to collect more litter than
Beth, and Beth ought to collect at least as much litter as Alf, and in both
cases the ought is owned. Then Alf ’s collecting more litter than Beth is
oughted for Alf, and Alf ’s not collecting more litter than Beth is oughted for
Beth. Some first-order deontic theories are agent-neutral and would deny
that this sort of deontic opposition is possible, but we should not adopt a
metaphysics for normativity that commits us to such a strong first-order
theory. So let us assume the example is possible. Then we would not say ‘It
ought to be the case that Alf collects more litter than Beth’ and also ‘It ought
to be the case that Alf does not collect more litter than Beth.’ Those claims
seem conceptually incompatible. Given that, it would be a mistake to accept
a metaphysical theory that implies both that Alf ’s collecting more litter than
Beth is oughted and that Alf ’s not collecting more litter than Beth is
oughted. This would take the oughted property too far from our ordinary
concept of ought.
So its being the case that p is oughted is not the same as its being the case
that, for some N, p is oughted for N. This does not stop the monadic oughted
property from being reducible; it just requires a different reduction. For
example, that p is oughted might be reducible to: for some N, p is oughted
for N, and for no M is not p oughted for M. Or some other reduction might
be correct.¹⁰
I cannot rule out the possibility that some oughts are owned by no one.
For example, it may be true that lightning ought not to kill so capriciously. It
is plausible that ‘Lightning ought not to kill so capriciously’ has a special
meaning, and does not report an obtaining of the oughted property. It might
be evaluative rather than strictly normative, for example. But I do not wish
to take a stand on this, so I accept the possibility that there are genuine
oughts that belong to no one.
If there are, ought fundamentalists will have to recognize two fundamen-
tal elements: the oughted property and the oughted-for relation. Again, this
would make little difference to the conclusion of this paper. Given that it
would make little difference, for convenience I shall continue to assume that
the oughted property is reducible to the oughted-for relation. If that is so,
ought fundamentalists should recognize only the relation as fundamental.

¹⁰ In ‘Ought and moral obligation’, Bernard Williams made the opposite claim that the
oughted-for relation can be reduced to the oughted property. I responded to Williams in my
paper ‘Williams on ought’ and in Rationality Through Reasoning, pp. 19–20.
        21

6. The property of being a reason reduced

to the reasoned-for relation

We cannot get far with the ontology of normativity without asking what a
reason is. This is a question about what is referred to by the count noun
‘a reason’, whereas the reasoned property and the reasoned-for relation are
referred to in English using the mass noun ‘reason’. Both reason funda-
mentalism and ought fundamentalism need a place for reasons in their
ontology.
Thomas Nagel offers a definition of a reason that is conducive to reason
fundamentalism:
Every reason is a predicate R such that for all persons p and events A, if R is
true of A, then p has prima facie reason to promote A.¹¹

This definition may at first appear circular, because the word ‘reason’
appears in both the definiendum and the definiens. But the appearance is
spurious, because ‘reason’ is a count noun in the definiendum and a mass
noun in the definiens. The clause ‘p has prima facie reason to promote A’
describes the obtaining of the reasoned-for relation between p’s promoting
A and p. So Nagel defines a reason in terms of the reasoned-for relation.
I assume Nagel intends this to be a ‘real definition’—to say what a reason is,
rather than merely what ‘a reason’ means. He is defining the property of being
a reason, rather than a reason itself. He is saying that the property of being a
reason is the property of being a predicate R such that . . . . His definition
reduces the property of being a reason to the reasoned-for relation.
Daniel Fogal has pointed out to me that in his writing Nagel slips
capriciously between the mass noun ‘reason’ and the count noun ‘a reason’,
so it may be only by chance that he here writes ‘has prima facie reason’
rather than ‘has a prima facie reason’. However, Nagel is explicitly offering a
definition and, if he had made the second ‘reason’ a count noun, it would
have been hard for him to avoid the charge that his definition is circular. So
it is charitable to take him at his word. Possibly he does not deserve all the
credit I give him.
We anyway cannot adopt his definition as it stands. For one thing, Nagel
designed it for his own purposes in The Possibility of Altruism, and some of
its features are unsuitable for wider purposes. For example, Nagel implicitly

¹¹ The Possibility of Altruism, p. 47. On p. 48 Nagel says explicitly that this is a definition.
22        

assumes that the reasoned-for relation applies only to promoting an event,

whereas actually it is much more widely applicable than that. The restriction
to prima facie reason is also too narrow.
Moreover, the definition is incorrect in at least one respect: it is incorrect
to say that a reason is a predicate. A predicate is a feature of language,
whereas a reason is a feature of the world. We may take a reason to be a fact, as
we do in saying that a reason to stay indoors is that it is raining hard, or we may
take it to be the obtaining of a property, as we do in saying that the noisiness
of a restaurant is a reason to eat elsewhere. But in any case, it is not a predicate.
We also need to pay attention to the conditional connection that is
expressed by ‘if . . . then’ in the definition. Nagel cannot mean the connection
to be mere implication. Suppose the predicate ‘is an event that p has prima
facie reason to promote’ is substituted for ‘R’. If we interpret ‘if . . . then’ as
mere implication, the conditional ‘if R is true of A, then p has prima facie
reason to promote A’ is tautologously true. So under this interpretation, the
definition tells us that this predicate is a reason. Nagel cannot mean that. He
cannot think that the fact that p has prima facie reason to promote A is itself
a reason for p to promote A.
‘If . . . then’ sometimes expresses an explanatory connection. ‘If X then Y’
sometimes means that, if X, then X makes it the case that Y, or X explains
why Y is so, or Y is so because X. (I take all these to be different ways of
saying the same thing.) I think this is what Nagel has in mind. For example,
suppose R is the property of being beneficial. If A is beneficial, that makes it
the case that there is reason for p to promote A. And Nagel would indeed
think that R is a reason for p to promote A. So an explanatory connection fits
the definition well. At any rate, whatever Nagel means, a correct definition of
a reason must mention an explanatory connection.¹²
Taking all this into account, a definition in the spirit of Nagel’s is:
A reason is something that explains an obtaining of the reasoned
property or the reasoned-for relation.
Remember this defines the property of being a reason. It means:

¹² Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star deny this point in their paper ‘Reasons’. My response is in
my ‘Replies’.
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The property of being a reason is the property of being something that

explains an obtaining of the reasoned property or the reasoned-for
relation.
The definition can be made more specific by identifying what the reason is a
reason for. In general, reasons are reasons for states of affairs. From now on
in this paper, I shall concentrate on states of affairs of a particular type: those
that consist in a person N’s Fing. (Fing may be doing something, hoping for
something, believing something and so on.) This simplification allows me to
formulate definitions in common English. I deviate from English only in
using schematic letters.
A definition of a more specific reason is:
A reason for N to F is something that explains why there is reason for
N to F.
This is actually two definitions in one. It defines two different sorts of
reason: a property-reason, which explains an obtaining of the reasoned
property, and a relation-reason, which explains an obtaining of the
reasoned-for relation. It does so by exploiting the ambiguous parsing of
the English. The definition can be read either as
{A reason for}{N to F} is something that explains why {there is reason
for}{N to F},
which defines a property-reason, or as
{A reason}{for N}{ to F} is something that explains why {there is
reason}{for N}{to F},
which defines a relation-reason. I shall make shameless use of this ambiguity
to save space.
I give ‘explain’ a wide meaning. The explaining relation is simply the
inverse of the because relation; I shall not try to analyse it further than that.¹³
So my definition of a reason for N to F is equivalent to
A reason for N to F is something that makes it the case that there is
reason for N to F

¹³ There is more discussion of it in my Rationality Through Reasoning, pp. 47–9.d

24        

and to
A reason for N to F is something that provides reason for N to F.
For a relation-reason only, it is also equivalent to
A reason for N to F is something that gives N reason to F.
I have defined the property of being a reason in terms of the explaining
relation and either the reasoned property or the reasoned-for relation. No
reciprocal definition is possible. For instance, the reasoned-for relation
could not be defined as what is explained by a reason, because a reason
might explain all sorts of irrelevant things. The fact that it is raining might
explain why you have reason to take an umbrella, and it might also explain
why the streets are wet and why the cats are skulking in doorways. So my
definitions are reductive: they reduce the property of being a reason to more
fundamental properties or relations.
They reduce it specifically to the explaining relation and either the
reasoned property or the reasoned-for relation. Since I assume the reasoned
property can in turn be reduced to the reasoned-for relation, I have reduced
the property of being a reason to the explaining relation and the reasoned-
for relation. Since the reasoned-for relation is normative, the property of
being a reason is not a fundamental element of normativity.

7. Apparent disagreements

Following Nagel’s lead, I have given a reductive definition of the property

of being a reason. It is the property of explaining an obtaining of the reasoned
property or the reasoned-for relation. The concept of a reason can be defined
in the same way: the concept of a reason is the concept of something that
explains an obtaining of the reasoned property or the reasoned-for relation.
This puts me into apparent disagreement with some philosophers who
apparently deny that the concept of a reason can be defined. Derek Parfit writes:
Facts give us reasons, we might say, when they count in favour of
our having some attitude, or our acting in some way. But ‘counts in favour
of ’ means roughly ‘gives a reason for’. Like some other fundamental
concepts . . . the concept of a reason is indefinable.¹⁴

¹⁴ On What Matters, Vol 1, p. 31.

   25

T. M. Scanlon writes:
I will take the idea of a reason as primitive. Any attempt to explain what it is
to be a reason for something seems to me to lead back to the same idea: a
consideration that counts in favor of it. ‘Counts in favor how?’ one might
ask. ‘By providing a reason for it’ seems to be the only answer.¹⁵

But I do not think these philosophers mean to deny what I have affirmed.
I do not think they mean to say that the concept of a reason, as I have
defined it, is indefinable. I think they mean to say that the concept of the
reasoned-for relation is indefinable. The concept of a reason is completely
different from the concept of the reasoned-for relation. For one thing, they
apply to completely different things. Suppose there is reason for Caroline
to visit the bank, and this is because she needs a loan. Then the concept of a
reason—specifically of a reason for Caroline to visit the bank—applies to
the fact that Caroline needs a loan. But the concept of the reasoned-for
relation applies to the state of affairs of Caroline’s visiting the bank.
Caroline’s needing a loan is completely different from Caroline’s visiting
the bank.
Still, the distinction between the reasoned-for relation and the property
of being a reason can get lost in English. A lot can depend on how the
mass noun ‘reason’ and the count noun ‘reason’, whose plural is ‘reasons’,
are used.
Both Parfit and Scanlon take the phrase ‘counts in favour of ’ to mean
the same as ‘gives [or provides] a reason for’. What does ‘a reason’ mean
in this phrase? It refers to something that is given or provided, not to
what gives or provides—to what is explained rather than what explains.
As a count noun, ‘a reason’ must denote some thing, but neither author
tells us what sort of a thing that is. My interpretation of them is that, in
the phrase ‘gives a reason for’, ‘a reason’ denotes an obtaining of the
reasoned-for relation—a trope, that is. This is a perfectly good usage.
I used it myself briefly in section 3, but subsequently avoided it for the
sake of clarity.
When Parfit writes that a fact gives us a reason for having some attitude
or acting in some way, I think he means that the fact makes it the case that
our having the attitude or acting in that way is reasoned for us. The fact
explains an obtaining of the reasoned-for relation. Where Parfit uses the

¹⁵ What We Owe to Each Other, p. 17.

26        

count noun, I would prefer to use the mass noun. I would say that the fact
gives us reason for having that attitude or acting in that way. Alternatively,
the fact makes it the case that we have reason to have the attitude or act in
that way. When Parfit writes that the concept of a reason is fundamental and
indefinable, I therefore take him to mean that the concept of the reasoned-
for relation is fundamental and indefinable.
Whereas Parfit uses ‘a reason’ for what is given, he recognizes that
it could alternatively be used for what gives, which he takes to be a fact.
He writes:
Rather than saying that certain facts give us reasons, some people say
that these facts are reasons for us . . . . But these people’s claims do
not conflict with mine, since these are merely different ways of saying the
same things.¹⁶

Nevertheless, Parfit himself is consistent in using ‘a reason’ for what is given

and not for what gives. He uses ‘a reason’ for an obtaining of the reasoned-
for relation rather than for a reason in my terminology.
Scanlon is less consistent than Parfit. He uses ‘a reason’ both for what
provides and for what is provided. The second sentence of the paragraph of
his I quoted says ‘a reason for something [is] a consideration that counts in
favour of it.’ The third sentence defines ‘counts in favour of ’ as ‘provides a
reason for’. Substituting this definition into the second sentence, we get ‘a
reason for something is a consideration that provides a reason for it.’
A reason provides a reason. This is definitely confusing.
Scanlon could have distinguished what provides from what is provided by
using the mass noun ‘reason’ to refer to the latter, as I do. I doubt he meant
to put weight on his use of the count noun in that place. Had he switched to
the mass noun, he would have said in effect: ‘a reason for something is a
consideration that provides reason for it.’ This makes good sense. Indeed, it
can serve as a definition of a reason. It is a version of my definition, which is
a development of Nagel’s. Scanlon narrowly misses this definition through
using the count noun instead of the mass noun. He thinks his sentences go
in a circle, but read this way they do not. They provide a definition of a
reason. They reduce the property of being a reason to the reasoned-for
relation together with explanation. On my reading, Scanlon takes the
reasoned-for relation to be fundamental.

¹⁶ On What Matters, Vol 1, p. 32.

        27

In sum, I think both Scanlon’s and Parfit’s view is that the reasoned-for
relation, rather than the property of being a reason, is fundamental. In
section 1, I described one version of reason fundamentalism as the view
that the property of being a reason is the fundamental element of norma-
tivity. But I explained in section 6 that this is false, since the property of
being a reason can be reduced to the reasoned-for relation together with the
explaining relation. I have now attributed to Parfit and Scanlon the view that
the reasoned-for relation is fundamental. The best version of reason funda-
mentalism is the view that the reasoned-for relation is the fundamental
element of normativity.
This best version is not often clearly expressed. I think that is because
common English does not provide good materials for expressing it clearly.
English provides no predicate for either the property of being reasoned or
the reasoned-for relation. Consequently, philosophers find themselves writ-
ing about the property of being a reason instead. They end up saying this
property is fundamental, when they should say the reasoned-for relation is
fundamental.
I think Parfit and Scanlon believe that the reasoned-for relation is fun-
damental in normativity, but neither provides a strong argument for this
conclusion. They report that they cannot see how to reduce the reasoned-for
relation to another element of normativity. In section 9 I shall argue that the
reasoned-for relation is not fundamental by offering just such a reduction.

8. The property of being a reason reduced

to the oughted-for relation

I have something else to do first. In section 6, I described how the property of

being a reason is reducible to the reasoned-for relation and the explanation
relation. This reduction belongs to reason fundamentalism. In this section,
I shall present an alternative reduction that belongs to ought fundamental-
ism. The property of being a reason can be reduced to the oughted-for
relation and the explanation relation. Crudely: reasons are reducible to
ought. This reduction is more complicated.¹⁷
It retains a central feature of the previous reduction: a reason is something
that has an explanatory connection to a normative fact. In the previous

¹⁷ It is set out in more detail in my Rationality Through Reasoning, section 4.3.

28        

reduction, the connection was to an obtaining of the reasoned property or

the reasoned-for relation. In this reduction, the connection is to what I shall
call an ‘ought fact’. An ought fact is a fact that a particular state of affairs is
oughted or is oughted for a particular person, or a fact that it is not oughted
or not oughted for a particular person.¹⁸
In section 6 I simplified the language by concentrating on the particular
states of affairs that consist in a person N’s Fing. I shall do the same here. An
ought fact in this case is either the fact that N ought to F or the fact that it is
not the case that N ought to F.
To reduce reasons to ought, we must divide reasons into different classes.
One class is the pro toto reasons, which have the simple definition:
A pro toto reason for N to F is something that explains why N ought to F.
As well as pro toto reasons, there are reasons for N to F that do not explain
why N ought to F. Indeed, often there is a reason for N to F when it is not
even the case that N ought to F. There might be a reason for you to go to a
meeting that is outweighed by a stronger reason to have coffee with your
friends instead. If so, it is not the case that you ought to go to the meeting.
Reasons for N to F that do not explain why N ought to F I class as subsidiary
reasons. A subsidiary reason for N to F plays some role in explaining why N
ought to F or why it is not the case that N ought to F, but does not itself
explain why N ought to F.
However, not everything that plays a part in explaining an ought fact is a
reason. For example, an explanation of why Caroline ought to visit the
bank may include an arithmetical fact such as the fact that $2000 is less
than $2500. This fact might help to explain why Caroline is in debt and so
ought to visit the bank, but it might not qualify as a reason for her to visit
the bank.
To separate reasons from other things that play a role in explaining
an ought fact, we have to pay attention to the details of the explanation.
Explanations of ought facts come in various different forms. Different
normative theories explain ought facts in different ways, and some theories
may allow for more than one form of explanation. Not all forms of explan-
ation have a role for subsidiary reasons, but some do. A particular category
of subsidiary reason is defined by its role in one of the forms of explanation
that do.

¹⁸ Thanks here to Susan Wolf.

        29

Compare the definition of a force in mechanics. In a mechanical explan-

ation of why a body accelerates as it does, certain things play a particular
role. Direction and strength are attributed to these things. They combine by
the vector addition of directions and strengths, and the body’s acceleration is
given by their combined direction and their combined strength divided by
the body’s mass. That is the explanation of acceleration. Things that occupy
the role I described within the explanation are defined as forces.
Subsidiary reasons of one category are defined in a roughly analogous
way, by their role in explanations of a form I call ‘weighing explanations’. In
a weighing explanation of why N ought to F, or of why it is not the case that
N ought to F, certain things play a particular role. A weight is attributed to
each of them. So is a ‘direction’; some are for Fing and some are against Fing.
Their weights combine in some way. If the combined weight of those that
are for Fing is greater than the combined weight of those that are against
Fing, then N ought to F; otherwise it is not the case that N ought to F. That is
the explanation. Things that occupy the role I described are defined as pro
tanto reasons.
The analogy with forces may be helpful but it is not very tight. Pro tanto
reasons are more analogous to force-givers in mechanics, such as electric
and gravitational fields, rather than to the forces themselves, which are
created by these fields.
Weighing explanations call for a lot more detailed description. For one
thing, we need a fuller account of the arithmetic of weights, which allows
them to be combined. Among the difficulties is that weights are obviously
vague and they obviously need not combine in anything like an additive
fashion. I do not know whether a cogent account of weighing explanations
can eventually be given. Nevertheless, it is commonly assumed in philoso-
phy that ought facts are often explained in this way by pro tanto reasons.
Whether or not this is a correct assumption, weighing explanations give us
one category of subsidiary reasons—pro tanto reasons.
Weighing explanations are just one type of explanation of ought facts.
Ought facts can be explained in different ways that give different roles to
subsidiary reasons. An example is the account of reasons found in John
Horty’s Reasons as Defaults. Horty’s reasons fall into a different category of
subsidiary reasons. There may be other categories too.
On the other hand, some explanations of ought facts give no role to subsid-
iary reasons. For example, some oughts may be explained simply by deontic
rules. Take the deontic rule ‘Do not have contradictory beliefs’. On some
theories about what one ought to believe, this rule has to be set against other
30        

considerations, and might be outweighed. For example, it might be outweighed

if great good could be achieved by having contradictory beliefs. On these
theories the rule constitutes a subsidiary reason. But some philosophers think
that the rule against having contradictory beliefs is absolute: it cannot be
outweighed. The rule itself is enough to determine that you ought not to
have contradictory beliefs. The rule is then a pro toto reason for you not to
have contradictory beliefs, and there are no subsidiary reasons.
Another example is teleological explanation. A teleological explanation of
what N ought to do assumes that there is a number of ‘alternatives’, each
good or bad to some degree. If Fing is the best of the alternatives, that makes
it the case that N ought to F. There is a pro toto reason for N to F, which is
that Fing is the best of the alternatives. No subsidiary reasons are involved.
True, it may be possible to turn a teleological explanation into a weighing
explanation. It may be possible to treat the good and bad features of each
alternative as pro tanto reasons for or against Fing, which are weighed
against each other. But a teleological explanation does not treat them that
way. In a teleological explanation, the good and bad features of each
alternative contribute, often by weighing, to determining how good or bad
the alternative is. Then the goodness or badness of the alternatives deter-
mines whether or not N ought to F. N ought to F if and only if Fing is the
best of the alternatives. In a teleological explanation, goods are weighed, not
reasons.
This section has provided a reductive account of the property of being a
reason. It has explained how the property of being a reason can be reduced
to the oughted property or the oughted-for relation, together with the
explaining relation and whatever non-normative properties are involved in
particular explanations. Since I assume the oughted property can in turn be
reduced to the oughted-for relation, we have a reduction of the property of
being a reason to the oughted-for relation, the explaining relation and
whatever non-normative properties are involved in particular explanations.

9. Ought fundamentalism and reason fundamentalism

We now have all the materials we need to formulate ought fundamentalism

and reason fundamentalism.
According to ought fundamentalism, the oughted-for relation is funda-
mental within normativity. I assume the oughted property can be reduced to
the oughted-for relation, but if it cannot, it too is fundamental. The property
      31

of being a reason is not fundamental. In the way explained in section 8, it is

reducible to the oughted property or the oughted-for relation, together with
other elements that are not normative, including particularly the explaining
relation. All this is enough basic material for giving a full account of
normativity.
Ought fundamentalism does not need either the reasoned property or the
reasoned-for relation.¹⁹ However, for anyone who wants them, they can
easily be defined within ought fundamentalism. We can say that for it to be
the case that there is reason for N to F is simply for it to be the case that there
is a reason for N to F. This is a reductive definition of the reasoned property
or the reasoned-for relation in terms of the property of being a reason. This
latter property is already defined within ought fundamentalism, so we have
done what is needed.
That completes my description of ought fundamentalism.
According to the best version of reason fundamentalism, the reasoned-for
relation is fundamental within normativity. I assume the reasoned property
can be reduced to the reasoned-for relation, but if it cannot, it too is
fundamental. The property of being a reason is not fundamental. In the
way I explained in section 6 following Nagel, it is reducible to the reasoned
property or the reasoned-for relation and the explaining relation.
Next, ought needs to be defined within reason fundamentalism. We cannot
do without ought in an account of normativity; the whole point of normativity
is to determine what we ought to do, ought to believe and so on. True, the
word ‘ought’ is omitted from some recent works of normative philosophy, but
other expressions stand in its place. Examples are ‘has conclusive reason’, ‘has
sufficient reason’ or ‘has most reason’. These terms are intended to be
equivalent to ‘ought’; indeed, they express an implicit reduction of the ought
relation to reason. How can this reduction be spelled out?
To spell it out, we must elaborate the ontology by taking the reasoned-for
relation to be gradable—to have degrees. We must assume that, when N has
reason to F, so N stands in the reasoned-for relation to her Fing, this relation
may obtain more or less strongly. For example, N may have more reason to F
than she has to G.
The modifiers ‘more’ and ‘less’ are here attached to the mass noun ‘reason’.
Read literally, they refer to greater or lesser quantities of the reason-stuff. But
they should not be read literally. We use the mass noun ‘reason’ only as a

¹⁹ They are not mentioned in my Rationality Through Reasoning except in section 4.4, where
I mentioned them only to set them aside.
32        

means of referring to the reason property or relation, and using it does not
commit us to there being such a stuff as reason. Adding the modifiers to
‘reason’ commits us to different degrees of the relation, but still not to the
stuff. ‘More’ and ‘less’ should be thought of as terms of comparison rather
than terms of quantity.
Once we have degrees of the reasoned-for relation, we may define ought
by specifying particular degrees of it. They are specified by adding other
modifiers to ‘reason’. Two that appear in the literature are ‘conclusive
reason’ and ‘sufficient reason’. I start with those.
The modifiers ‘conclusive’ and ‘sufficient’ have an implicit argument
place for some objective—something they are conclusive or sufficient for.
For example, there is no such thing as conclusive evidence considered on its
own. Evidence may be conclusive for one conclusion but not conclusive for
another. It may be conclusive for manslaughter, say, but not for murder.
What is conclusive reason supposed to be conclusive for? It can only be for
ought. For N to have conclusive reason to F is for her to have reason to F that
is strong enough to make it the case that she ought to F.
The modifier ‘sufficient’ is instructive, because different authors give
different meanings to ‘sufficient reason’. This makes the implicit argument
place conspicuous. Take a case where N must either F or G, and where she
has no more reason to F than to G, and no more reason to G than to F. As
Parfit uses the term ‘sufficient reason’, N has sufficient reason to F and
sufficient reason to G.²⁰ As Skorupski uses the term, N has neither sufficient
reason to F nor sufficient reason to G.²¹ The difference is that these authors
are relating ‘sufficient’ to different objectives. By ‘sufficient reason for N to
F’, Skorupski means: sufficient to make it the case that N ought to F. Parfit
means: sufficient to make it permissible for N to F—in other words: suffi-
cient to make it not the case than N ought not to F. Only in Skorupski’s sense
is ‘has sufficient reason’ equivalent to ‘ought’.
For N to have sufficient reason in this sense to F or for N to have
conclusive reason to F is for her to have reason to F that is strong enough
to make it the case that she ought to F. This defines sufficient reason or
conclusive reason in terms of reason and ought. The modifiers ‘sufficient’
and ‘conclusive’ therefore cannot serve the purpose of reducing ought to
reason.

²⁰ On What Matters, Vol 1, p. 33. Parfit actually uses the phrase ‘sufficient reasons’ rather
than ‘sufficient reason’.
²¹ The Domain of Reasons, p. 38.
      33

‘Most’ does better. Once we have degrees of reason, we may say that N has
most reason to F when N has more reason to F than she has to G, to H and so
on, when Ging, Hing and so on are all the alternatives to Fing. Then we can
say that, for it to be the case that N ought to F is for it to be the case that N
has most reason to F. That is to say, for it to be the case that N’s Fing stands
in the oughted-for relation to N is for it to be the case that N’s Fing stands in
the reasoned-for relation to N more strongly than N’s Ging stands in the
reasoned-for relation to N, or N’s Hing stands in the reasoned-for relation to
N, and so on for all the alternatives to N’s Fing. This reduces the oughted-for
relation to the gradable reasoned-for relation.
That completes my description of the best version of reason fundamentalism.

10. The unfaithfulness of reason fundamentalism

Reason fundamentalism is not faithful to our ordinary concepts of ought

and reason. Our ordinary concept of ought is not our ordinary concept of
most reason. It is not the concept of the superlative of a gradable property.
The concept of ought is simple; it does not have that structure.
One feature of our ordinary concepts is that sometimes the fact that N
ought to F is explained by the balance of pro tanto reasons. In a case like this,
there is most reason for N to F, and this fact is part of the explanation of
why N ought to F. The connection between our ordinary concept of most
reason and our ordinary concept of ought is an explanatory one. That there
is most reason for N to F makes it the case that N ought to F. Not: that
there is most reason for N to F is that N ought to F.²²
Though our ordinary concepts of ought and most reason are not the
same, they may yet have the same extension. If they do not, that puts reason
fundamentalism in particularly serious conflict with our ordinary concepts.
So do they? Are there some things that, according to our ordinary
concepts, you ought to do but that you do not have most reason to do, or
some things you have most reason to do when it is not the case that you
ought to do them? This is most likely to happen in cases where what

²² Thomas Hurka’s British Ethical Theorists contains (pp. 75–7) an illuminating discussion of
this point in connection with the unpublished correspondence of H. A. Prichard. Prichard
appears to have accepted the concept of most reason (to use modern terminology rather than
his) but rejected the concept of ought, precisely because he realized they are not the same.
34        

you ought to do is not determined by the balance of pro tanto reasons. So let
us investigate a case of that sort.
Not everyone agrees there are such cases, but some first-order normative
theories imply there are. In section 8 I described the evidentialist view that the
deontic rule ‘Do not have contradictory beliefs’ determines by itself that you
ought not to have contradictory beliefs. It is absolute and does not need to be
weighed against any contrary reasons. Let us use that example.
Suppose you can either have a particular pair of contradictory beliefs, and
thereby achieve great good, or not have this pair of beliefs. The evidentialist
view is that you ought not to have them. Is it also the evidentialist view that
you have most reason not to have them?
On the evidentialist theory, the deontic rule makes it the case that you
ought not to have these beliefs. That means it is a pro toto reason not to have
them, as I defined a pro toto reason in section 8. The property of being a pro
toto reason is not gradable. Nor does it have a weight in the way pro tanto
reasons have. Given this, should we say that the rule gives you most reason
not to have the contradictory beliefs? Does it give you more reason not to
have them than to have them? Since it is not gradable and has no weight, it
seems strange to say that it endows the state of affairs of your not having the
beliefs with a gradable property, but one that automatically has a higher
degree than any alternative. This strangeness shows that the concept of most
reason is best suited to cases where what you ought to do is determined by
the weighing of pro tanto reasons.
Still, although it seems strange to apply this concept to the case of an
absolute deontic rule, I do not think that doing so is entirely unacceptable.
I conclude that our most ordinary concepts of ought and most reason do not
have the same extension, but that our concepts can be stretched to make
them do so, and the stretching is tolerable.
But the example illustrates a further strangeness. Using the concept of
most reason this way gets the direction of explanation wrong. According to
evidentialism, the deontic rule makes it the case directly that you ought not
to have these beliefs. If, as well, you have most reason not to have them, this
can only be because you ought not to have them. But according to our
concepts, most reason explains ought rather than the other way round.
I conclude that the sharpest mismatch between reason fundamentalism
and our ordinary concepts is over the matter of explanation. According to
our ordinary concepts, most reason explains ought; according to reason
fundamentalism, most reason is ought.
       35

How far is it an objection to reason fundamentalism that it is unfaithful to

our ordinary concepts? It means that either ‘ought’ or ‘most reason’ or both
are technical terms in reason fundamentalism, with meanings different from
their ordinary ones. We sometimes need to use technical terms in philoso-
phy for the sake of precision, so this in itself is no objection. But in the
philosophy of normativity especially, we should not stray unnecessarily
from our ordinary concepts, because our philosophy has ultimately to stay
in close contact with real life. Our ordinary concepts at least provide us with
default criteria for judging a metaphysical theory, and we should not depart
from them without good reason.
In the present case, I see no reason to depart from the ordinary concepts. In
setting up the ought ontology and the reason ontology, I said little about the
meanings of the oughted-for relation and the reasoned-for relation. I reduced
other things to them, and demonstrated a formal parallel between them, but
I said little substantive about what these two relations actually are, except that
they are both normative. There might be several normative properties that we
could arbitrarily identify with either of them, consistently with everything I said
about them. Now we come to filling in more concrete details, and in particular
to determining the connection between the two relations, we should match
them as well as we can to our ordinary concepts. We have nothing else to go on.

11. Conclusion in favour of ought fundamentalism

If there were no alternative, reason fundamentalism might be acceptable. But

ought fundamentalism is a better alternative. It sticks close to our ordinary
concepts. It has the merit of allowing naturally for different patterns of
explanation in explaining oughts, whereas reason fundamentalism is naturally
suited only to the weighing of pro tanto reasons. It is economical in that it has
no need for the reasoned-for relation, whereas reason fundamentalism does
need the oughted-for relation along with the reasoned-for relation.
I think we should therefore accept ought fundamentalism. This means
giving up reason fundamentalism, and also the weaker view that the
reasoned-for relation is a fundamental element in normativity. Reasons,
the property of being a reason, the reasoned property and the reasoned-
for relation are none of them fundamental elements of normativity.
36        

Note added in 2021

In section 6, I offered this definition of the property of being a reason for

N to F:
The property of being a reason for N to F is the property of being
something that explains why there is reason for N to F.
This defines a reason in terms of explanation and reason. I identified it as a
reductive definition because there is no reciprocal definition of reason. But
I ignored this putative reciprocal definition, which I myself stated in
section 9:
For it to be the case that there is reason for N to F is for it to be the case
that there is a reason for N to F.
Why?²³
The answer is that it leaves out the element of explanation, which must
be registered in an account of the metaphysical structure of normativity.
To put it crudely: reasons explain normative facts. There is a sharp
division between reasons on the one side, which are the explainers, and
normative facts on the other side, which are explained. An example of a
normative fact is the fact that N ought to F. For reason fundamentalists,
who takes reason as fundamental in normativity, another example is the
fact that there is reason for N to F. In section 6, I was describing reason
fundamentalism, so I was putting reason on the side of what is explained.
Therefore, the fact that there is reason for N to F cannot be the fact that
there is a reason for N to F. It is explained by the fact that there is a reason
for N to F.
This can be confusing because it all depends on using the count noun ‘a
reason’ and the mass noun ‘reason’ in a particular way. It uses the count
noun for what explains and the mass noun for what is explained. It is easy
to slide from one version of the noun to the other. Furthermore, the count
noun is sometimes deliberately used for what is explained and the

²³ Roger Crisp and Mikayla Kelley each put this pertinent question to me. The answer I am
about to give appears in my Rationality Through Reasoning, pp. 63–4, but I should have
repeated it in this paper.
       37

mass noun is sometimes deliberately used for what explains; I shall give
examples later.
‘Ought’ is less ambiguously on the side of what is explained, so the need to
register explanation can be shown more sharply by considering how ought
can be defined. Section 9 explains that the reason fundamentalist’s best
definition of ought is:
For it to be the case that N ought to F is for it to be the case that there is
more reason for N to F than for N not to F.
Adding in the putative definition of reason gives us that:
For it to be the case that N ought to F is for it to be the case that the
reasons for N to F outweigh the reasons for N not to F.
This implies that the fact that N ought to F has what I call a ‘weighing
explanation’,²⁴ which is the fact that the reasons for N to F outweigh the
reasons for N not to F. Since this explains the fact that N ought to F, it cannot
be the fact that N ought to F.
Since it is crucial to separate the normative facts that are explained from
what explains them, I should say some more about the linguistic difficul-
ties of making this separation clear. In presenting reason fundamentalism
in this paper, I used the count noun ‘a reason’ for what explains and the
mass noun ‘reason’ for what is explained. However, in presenting ought
fundamentalism in section 9, I adopted the putative definition stated
above, which identifies reason with reasons. The effect was that in that
section I put reason on the side of what explains. I did so carelessly
because reason plays no real role in ought fundamentalism, so it does
not matter how it is defined. But it added to the confusion and I should
not have done it.
Moreover, Derek Parfit’s practice is to use the count noun ‘a reason’ for
what is explained rather than what explains. In this terminology, he uses it
for what is given rather than what gives. This is grammatically legitimate,
but it adds to the confusion. His terminology and his view of the metaphys-
ical structure are explained in section 7 of this paper and more fully in my
paper ‘Giving reasons and given reasons’.

²⁴ See my Rationality Through Reasoning, section 4.3.

38        

Acknowledgements
This paper was originally published in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and
Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 297–318. It
developed out of my ‘Reason versus ought’, published in Philosophical Issues. I am
extremely grateful to Daniel Fogal for extensive and very useful comments on
two successive versions of the paper. I have also received valuable comments
from Roger Crisp, Jamie Dreier, Philip Ebert, Bahaeir Eker, Thomas Hurka,
Mikayla Kelley, Damien Melamedoff, Derek Parfit, John Skorupski, Daniel Star
and Jeremy Strasser. Research for this paper was supported by ARC Discovery
Grant DP140102468.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
república; pero pasad adelante en
tanto que esto se remedia.
Lerma.—Es tanta la iñorancia
desta gente de quien hablamos,
que en lo que decían saber más
es en lo que menos saben,
porque la principal parte que han
de tener es en el conocimiento de
las hierbas y plantas y raíces y
piedras; notorio está que la mayor
fuerza de la medicina consiste en
ellas, y tanto que, según dice
Rasis en el segundo de los
anforismos, trayéndolo por
auctoridad de aquel gran filósofo
Hermes, si se conociesen bien las
propiedades y virtudes de las
hierbas y plantas, curarían los
médicos con solas ellas, de
manera que pareciese que
curaban con arte mágica; pues si
esto es assí, al médico conviene
ordenar y á los boticarios poner
en efeto lo que ellos ordenassen,
lo cual pueden muy mal hacer si
no conocen destintamente las
plantas y las hierbas y las raíces y
piedras, y aun las condiciones y
propiedades dellas. ¡Oh cuántos y
cuántos boticarios de los buenos
se engañan en tener unas hierbas
por otras, y en no conocer y
entender muchas dellas! ¿Que
harán los que no lo son? ¿Y esto
de donde pensáis que procede?
De que no saben gramática para
entender los libros que tratan
dellas, ó si la saben, porque les
falta la experiencia, que ni nunca
las han buscado ni visto, y
cuando las buscan, hallan
algunas que se parecen unas á
otras en las hojas, en el tamaño y
en las flores y en el olor, y por
ventura son tan distintas y
diferentes en las propiedades,
que la una mata y la otra sana, y
los mezquinos de los enfermos
han de estar sujetos á la simpleza
de un boticario, si acierta ó no
acierta, y no solamente los
enfermos, pero los médicos, que
desto y de otras muchas cosas
nos ponen la culpa, sin tenerla.
D. Gaspar.—¿Y qué pueden
hacer para esso los
protomédicos?
Lerma.—Yo lo diré. Que al que
examinasen, no había de ser ni
en un día, ni en ocho, ni aun en
quince, y también le habían de
examinar de la teórica como de la
prática, y de la experiencia como
de la ciencia; mostrándole mucha
cantidad de hierbas juntas, á lo
menos de las que más le traen en
uso, para que apartasen las unas
de las otras, y las nombrassen
por sus nombres y dixesen los
efectos que tienen y en qué
pueden servir en las medicinas,
pues tienen á Dioscórides y á
Plinio y á Leonardo Susio, y á
otros muchos que tan buena
noticia les dan de todas ellas, si
ellos las hubiesen buscado y
tratado para conocerlas. Pero el
mal es que nunca las buscan sino
cuando tienen necesidad dellas, y
por esto caen en tantos yerros, y
tan perjudiciales como aquí he
dicho. Lo mismo habían de hacer
en las piedras y raíces y gomas y
licores, y en todas las otras
medicinas; y dexando los
pecados que hacen en esto por
iñorancia, líbrenos Dios de los
boticarios que no tienen respeto
sino adquirir y ganar haciendas,
que la avaricia y codicia les hace
dejar de usar fielmente sus
oficios, porque éstos son aquellos
de quien dice Jacobo Silvio en el
proemio de su obra que hizo de
las cosas que tocan á este arte,
que se pueden llamar carniceros
y verdugos los boticarios que no
saben ni usan bien su obligación,
porque de lo que aprovecha es de
matar los hombres sin ningún
respeto ni piedad.
Verdaderamente, si no tienen
conciencia y fidelidad, y si han ya
perdido el temor de Dios por el de
los dineros, no hay cosa más
cruel que sus manos, más sin
piedad que su intención ni más
abominable que sus hechos,
porque no dan medicina que sea
buena, ni que haga buena
operación. Lo que los médicos
hacen, ellos lo dañan, ellos
destruyen la buena cura. Y
porque más claramente se
entienda quiero decir algunas
particularidades, pues que para
decirlas todas sería menester
muy largo tiempo. Tienen por flor
una cosa que diré, y es que
cuando un médico quiere recentar
una purga ó píldoras, ó otra cosa,
y pide las medicinas que entran
en ella para verlas, suele decir:
¿Tenéis buen reubarbo ó buen
agárico? Mostradlo acá. Y
entonces el boticario saca tres ó
cuatro pedazos que no valen dos
maravedises, y entre ellos uno
que es muy bueno, y antes que el
médico hable le dice: Señor, todo
el reubarbo es tal que no hay más
que pedir; pero este boleto dél es
el mejor del mundo, y por tal me
ha costado á tanto precio; dél se
podrá gastar en esta purga lo que
vuesa merced mandare. El
médico le dice: Pues echad dél
una dracma, ó media dracma
como ves que es menester; y en
volviendo las espaldas, el
boticario guarda aquello bueno y
echa de lo malo, de manera que
con un pedazo bueno vende
cuanto reubarbo tiene que no vale
nada, porque después que lo
muele y se echa en la purga, mal
se puede ver si era de lo uno ó de
lo otro.
D. Gaspar.—Si no se pudiera ver,
á lo menos podráse sentir en la
disposición y salud del enfermo,
pues no hará tan buena operación
lo malo como lo bueno.
Lerma.—Lo mesmo que digo
hacen en la escamonea, en el
acíbar y en todas las otras
medicinas desta suerte.
Pimentel.—¿Y en la cañafístola
hay algún engaño desos?
Lerma.—Si sueltan la rienda al
deseo de la ganancia, no hay
medicina en sus tiendas con que
no puedan engañar á las gentes,
y en la cañafístola hay lo que
dice. Si se receuta dos onzas
della y es la cañafístola de la
buena, sácale la pulpa necesaria,
y si es de la mala y seca, todo el
peso tiene la caña, y la pulpa no
es casi nada ni hace operación
ninguna, y para engañar á los
médicos ó á los que la compran,
meten la cañafístola en las
cuevas y lugares muy húmedos
porque parezca mejor y pese
más, y así los enfermos con la
cañafístola que les ha de
aprovechar como medicina
benedita, toman la mitad de
humedad que no obra de otra
cosa sino de destruir la salud y el
cuerpo.
Pimentel.—Y en las otras
medicinas simples ¿qué pueden ó
suelen hacer los boticarios?
Lerma.—Lo uno no conocerlas
cuando las compran ó cogen del
campo ó de los huertos en que
nacen; y lo otro, si las conocen,
no entender cuáles sean las
mejores ni las peores para usar
dellas, y lo que peor es, que hay
tantos boticarios tan necios y
iñorantes, que no saben
gramática ni entienden los
nombres de las medicinas en
latín, y cuando les dan las
receutas, por no mostrar su
iñorancia, dexan de echar aquella
medicina simple en el compuesto,
y por ventura es la que en todas
más hace al caso; y éstos tienen
á Mesue y á la declaración de los
fraires, y Antonio Musa y Jacobo
Silvio, y otros cien libros muy bien
encuadernados que no sirven de
más que de auctorizar su botica,
estando obligados á entenderlos
tan bien como los médicos
mismos. Y para que vuestras
mercedes entiendan lo que pasa,
yo sé boticario que, receutando
un médico en su casa cierta
medicina en que hubo necesidad
de poner media onza de simiente
de psilio, él no lo entendió ni supo
qué cosa era, y para salir de la
duda que tenía fuesse á casa de
otro boticario y preguntóle si tenía
psilio. El otro le respondió que sí.
Pues dadme media onza dél y
ved lo que me habéis de llevar
por ella. El otro boticario, que era
astuto y avisado, entendió luego
el negocio y díxole: No os la
puedo dar un maravedí menos de
un ducado, porque por dos
ducados compré la onza, y no os
hago poca cortesía en dárosla sin
ganancia. Pues que assí es, dixo
el que compraba, veis aquí el
ducado y dádmela. El otro lo tomó
y le dió en un papel la media onza
de psilio, y cuando lo hubo
descogido y mirado, vio que era
zaragatona y dixo: ¿Qué me dais
aquí, que esta zaragatona es?
Assí es verdad, dixo el otro que
se le había dado. Pues por cosa
que vale un maravedí, dixo él,
¿me lleváis un ducado? Sí,
respondió el que le había
vendido, que yo no os vendí la
zaragatona, sino el nombre, que
no lo sabíades, y el aviso para un
boticario como vos vale más que
diez ducados. Y aunque sobre
esto hubieron barajas y fueron
ante la justicia, se quedó con el
ducado y reyéndose todos del
boticario nescio que se lo había
dado.
D. Gaspar.—Por cierto él lo
merecía bien por lo que hizo.
Lerma.—No es menos de oir lo
que agora diré, y pasa así de
verdad; que queriendo hacer un
boticario el collirio blanco de
Rasis que aprovecha para el mal
de los ojos, viό que al cabo de las
medicinas que habían de entrar
en él estaba escrito tere sigilatim,
que quiere decir que las moliese
cada una por sí, y él entendió que
le mandaba echar una medicina
que se llamaba tierra sellada, y
teniendo todo junto para
revolverlo, llegó otro boticario, y
conociendo la tierra sellada,
díxole: ¿Qué es esto que hacéis?
En el collirio de Rasis no entra
esta medicina. Y el que lo hacía
porfiaba que sí y que así estaba
en la receuta del collirio. Sobre
porfía lo fueron á ver, donde el
boticario que había llegado de
fuera, conociendo la causa de su
yerro, le desengañó, mostrándole
lo que quería decir tere sigilatim, y
así le hizo quitar la tierra sellada,
y lo que en ello iba era que todas
las medicinas de aquel collirio son
frías, y ésta era cálida y de tal
condición, que bastaba para
quebrar los ojos en lugar de
sanarlos. Otras muchas cosas
pasan cada día desta mesma
manera, porque boticarios hay
que, siendo el espodio de Galeno,
y de los griegos Tucia, y el de
Avicena y los árabes raíces de
cañas quemadas, y el que
nosotros comúnmente usamos
dientes de elefantes, que es
verdadero marfil, ellos hacen otro
nuevo espodio echando los
huesos y canillas, y aun plega á
Dios que no sean de la primera
bestia quo hallasen muerta, y con
esto les parece que tienen
cumplido con lo que deben. Y
cuando vienen á hacer algún
compuesto en que entren muchas
medicinas, algunas dellas les
faltan, otras están dañadas, otras
secas y que les falta la virtud y no
dexan de echarlas sin tener
respeto á que: improbitas unius
simplicis totam compositionem
viciat.
D. Gaspar.—No entendemos
muy bien latín; vuestra merced lo
diga en romance.
Lerma.—Digo que la maldad de
una medicina simple, cuando se
junta con otras, destruye y hace
que no valga nada toda la
composición. Pues si esto es
assí, qué hará en la composición
de los xarabes, y purgas, y
píldoras, que alteran y
descomponen los cuerpos
humanos y más adonde entran
medicinas furiosas, recias y
venenosas, que se desvelan los
médicos por no errar en la cuantía
y en el peso y medida, y los
boticarios, yendo envidada la vida
de un hombre en acertar ó en
errar, no se les da dos maravedís
que sea más ni menos ni que
obren bien que mal. Su atención y
intención es de ganar, y sea como
fuere, que la culpa ha de ser del
médico y no del boticario.
D. Gaspar.—Esso es en las
purgas; pero en los xarabes ¿qué
hacen que no sea bien hecho?
Lerma.—Antes creo que no hay
xarabe que se haga bien en las
boticas de los hombres desta
suerte que he dicho, porque ó no
tienen los zumos tan buenos
como son menester y tan
perfectos como han de ser, ni los
echan en la cantidad que el
xarabe ha de llevar; y en el
azúcar tienen una alquimia que
siempre compran y traen el más
vellaco y más sucio que hallan,
porque con ser para xarabes,
parésceles que es pecado gastar
azúcar bueno y limpio. Y entre
diez xarabes no hallaréis los dos
que tengan el punto necesario.
Pimentel.—En esso parece que
no va tanto, aunque lo mejor sería
que todo fuese perfecto.
Lerna.—En las píldoras hay
también las mesmas faltas que en
las purgas, y aun otras que
parecen mayores, porque demás
de lo que he dicho, hay una
massa de píldoras que se quieren
gastar en haciéndose, y otras que
duran cuatro meses, y otras seis y
ocho y un año y más, pero
cuando passan de su tiempo
sécanse y pierden la virtud y
fuerza las medicinas que allí
están incorporadas, y assí no son
para aprovechar; y los boticarios
avarientos, por no perder el
intereses que dellas se les ha de
seguir, ni gastar en hacer otras de
nuevo, ¿qué pensáis que hacen?
Visitan las cajas donde tienen las
píldoras y miran un rétulo ó
cédula que tienen dentro dellas
en que está puesta la hecha del
año, mes y día, y si es pasado el
tiempo quitan aquella cédula y
ponen otra, por la cual parece que
no ha dos meses que se hicieron,
habiendo por ventura más de un
año que estaban hechas, estando
ya perdidas y corrompidas; y assí
engañan al médico que las pide y
receuta, y al enfermo que con
ellas se cura; y donde han de
hacer evacuar los humores si
estuviesen en su perfición, no
tienen fuerza más de para
alterarlos y moverlos más de lo
que están, en grandísimo daño y
perjuicio de los enfermos y de su
salud y vida. Pues en las aguas
que venden, ¿no hay engaños?
Muchas veces al medio año
acaban todas cuantas han
destilado y hinchen las redomas
de agua de la fuente ó del río, y lo
que les costó una blanca hacen
della tres ó cuatro ducados, y
jamás pedirán cosa ninguna en su
botica que digan que no la tienen
ó por gran maravilla; y dan unas
cosas por otras, diciendo que
tienen la misma propiedad y que
hacen el mismo efecto, y á esto
llaman ellos dar quid pro quo,
mudando las medicinas sin la
voluntad y consentimiento de los
médicos, por no dexar de vender
y hacer dineros. Y por ventura no
halló el licenciado Monardis
tantas medicinas en un diálogo
que hizo que se podiesen poner
unas por otras cuantas hallan los
boticarios porque los que traxeren
dineros á sus tiendas no se
vuelvan con ellos. En los aceites,
si se les van acabando, con poco
que tenga el cántaro ó la redoma,
la tornan á henchir encima del
que se vende en la plaza; y assí
me dixeron á mí de uno que
vendió un gran cántaro de aceite
rosado no teniendo sino un poco
en el hondón, sobre el cual
tornólo á henchir, y revolviéndolo
todo, quedóle un poquito de olor
con que lo pudo vender,
afirmando que era el mejor del
mundo. Y en los ingüentos
también pecan, ó por iñorancia ó
por malicia, que pocas veces
salen en su perfición. Lo mesmo
hacen en los polvos, y finalmente,
no hay medicina ninguna que no
hagan de manera que justamente
se pudiese condenar por falsa si
se pudiesen averiguar los simples
que echan en la composición, á lo
menos si son costosos ó
dificultosos de haber ó de
conocerse. Si mandaren á estos
boticarios hacer una buena triaca,
muchos de ellos no conocerían la
mitad de las medicinas simples
que entran en ella, y plega á Dios
que conozcan las de la confeción
de Hamech, que son menos y
más usadas, y las que entran en
otras confeciones desta suerte.
La triaca de esmeraldas que
venden no creo más en ella que
en Mahoma, si no la viese hacer
por los ojos, y por más cierto
tendría que echan esmeraldas
contrahechas de alquimia ó de
vidrio ó de unas que vienen de las
Indias, que de las finas; y por mi
consejo nadie las tomaría, ni
daría á quien bien quisiese, si no
la hubiese visto cuando se hacía
ó si no fuesse de mano de
boticario de quien estuviese tan
saneado que no se tuviere duda
de su conciencia y virtud.
D. Gaspar.—Harto ha dicho
vuesa merced, señor licenciado,
para que estemos más avisados y
advertidos de lo que los boticarios
pueden hacer; pero no es posible
que todos pequen tan á rienda
suelta.
Lerma.—No digo yo que todos,
porque haría injuria á algunos
buenos que hay entre ellos,
aunque no sean muchos, y los
que son malos es, ó porque son
simples y iñorantes, ó porque son
malos cristianos y tienen poco
temor de Dios, ó porque son
pobres, que la pobreza es
ocasión de grandes males.
Pimentel.—Pues, ¿qué remedio
se podría poner en este
desconcierto que bastase para
estorbar tan gran daño como los
malos boticarios hacen?
Lerma.—El primero ya yo le he
dicho, que no habían de permitir
que ninguno usase el oficio que
no fuese muy docto y muy
experimentado; y lo principal que
ha de tener es ser muy buen
gramático, para entender los
libros de su arte, muy estudioso y
curioso de saber y aprender todos
los primores que hay en ella, y sin
esto, se requiere que hayan
estudiado alguna medicina para
que sepan mejor lo que hacen.
Los boticarios que son buenos
muchas veces aprovechan de
advertir á los médicos en algunos
descuidos y yerros que hacen, y
no holgaría yo poco de que todos
los boticarios con quien tratase
fuesen tan suficientes que
supiesen hacer esto.
D. Gaspar.—¿Pues por qué os
enojasteis de que Dionisio dixo
poco ha que la cura del hígado no
iba por los términos que
convenía?
Lerma.—No me enojé yo porque
me lo dixese, sino porque me lo
dixo en público, y no ha de ser
por vía de reprensión sino de
consejo, y en esto no me negará
él que tengo razón; y, aunque no
lo quisiera decir en su presencia,
sería mal que vuesas mercedes
pensasen que ninguna cosa de
las que he dicho aquí toca en su
honor, porque yo certifico que
ninguna falta tiene para que no
sea uno de los mejores boticarios
que hay en el reino y de quien
más sin sospecha puedan
confiarse los enfermos y los
médicos que los curaren.
Pimentel.—Bien me parece que
después de descalabrado le
untéis la cabeza; yo fiador que, á
lo que creo, no os vais, señor
licenciado, sin respuesta, que no
sin causa os ha escuchado sin
contradeciros en nada. Pero
pasad adelante y decidnos otros
remedios.
Lerma.—No habían de ser los
boticarios pobres, sino que
también les habían de pedir si
tenían patrimonio de donde
ayudarse á sustentar, como
hacen á los clérigos cuando van á
ordenarse; que recia cosa sería
fiarse de un hombre pobre
muchos dineros sin contarlos, y
sin pensar que se aprovecharía
del los en sus necesidades,
podiendo hacerlo, y lo mesmo de
un boticario con pobreza las
medicinas, sin pensar que
procurase remediarla con ellas; y
por esto hay autores que dicen
que en un tiempo se tuvo en
Roma tanta cuenta con este
oficio, que las medicinas estaban
depositadas en ciertas personas
de gran confianza; que llevaban
salario por ello, y que allí iban los
médicos á tomarlas y los
boticarios las gastaban así como
las llevaban, sin que en ello, ni
por iñorancia ni por descuido,
pudiese haber yerro ninguno. El
otro remedio que se podría tener
es en las visitas que les hacen,
para las cuales, habiendo buena
gobernación, había de haber
visitadores generales que no
entendiesen en otra cosa, y éstos
habían de estar proveidos en
cada provincia y pagados del
dinero público, de manera que no
se les siguiese interés particular
ni les cupiese parte de la pena ni
de otra cosa, para que más sin
afición ni pasión pudiesen juzgar,
y que los que no hallasen
suficientes los inhabilitasen y
privasen del oficio sin tener
advertencia á la honra ó bien
particular de uno en perjuicio y
daño de toda la república.
Pimentel.—Bien sería esso, si se
hallasen personas de quien se
pudiese tener tan buena
confianza, y el rey, con otros
cuidados que tiene mayores, no
puede tener tan particular cuenta
con este negocio.
Lerma.—Pues habríala de tener
él ó los que tienen cargo de la
gobernación de sus reinos, como
lo tienen con examinar á uno que
ha de ser escribano real, que
quieren que sepa hacer bien una
escritura en que va la hacienda
de un hombre; y sería más justo
que procurasen de que también
fuesen bien hechas las medicinas
en que va la salud y vida de los
hombres, porque no son pocos
los que mueren por culpa dellos.
Y conforme á este parecer es lo
que dice Jacobo Silvio hablando
desta gente que digo: Dios haga y
provea que la justicia real alguna
vez tenga cuenta con los que
primero usan esta arte que la
hayan entendido, siendo á los
cuerpos de los hombres tan
saludable cuando bien se hace y
tan dañosa cuando iñorantemente
se trata. Y, finalmente, habrían de
tener los boticarios fieles que les
mirasen las medicinas y se las
tasasen en precios convenibles,
averiguando la costa que tienen y
dándoles ganancia con que se
pudiesen sustentar, aunque fuese
más de la que agora llevan, pues
las medicinas serían mejores y de
más valor; porque si las que
agora venden son buenas, yo
digo que las venden muy baratas,
y si son malas, en cualquiera
precio, aunque den dinero por
que las lleven, son tan caras que
ninguna mercaduría hay que tanto
lo sea.
Pimentel.—Pues, decidme,
señor licenciado: ¿de que
aprovecha el visitar las boticas
cuando los regimientos de los
pueblos traen boticarios de fuera
para hacerlo?
Lerma.—Algún fruto hace,
aunque poco, porque si los
médicos se hallan presentes,
como siempre lo están, es para
ayudar á los boticarios, y ellos
que habían de acusar sus defetos
se los encubren, porque son sus
amigos, y cuando les preguntan
alguna cosa que no saben,
responden por ellos, tomándoles
la palabra de la boca, y también
defienden algunas cosas cuesta
arriba, y con otras disimulan todos
ellos; y aun plega Dios que no
haya algunas que ni los unos ni
los otros no las entiendan. Y
sobre esto, no hay botica tan bien
visitada que si veniesse otro día
alguno que entendiese bien el
oficio no hallase cosas nuevas
que reprender y enmendar. Y
cuando ya se viene á dar la
sentencia, nunca faltan amigos y
favores que con buena maña
bastan para procurar con solicitud
que sea muy moderada; y de
ciento que podrían privar, no
hallaréis dos inhabilitados, y ya
que lo sean luego hay mil
remedios para que la sentencia
no se execute y tornen á usar sus
oficios contra justicia y conciencia
suya y de los que se lo permiten y
consienten. Dios ponga remedio
en esto, que harta necesidad hay
de que lo provea de su mano.

Fin de la primera parte del

colloquio de los médicos y
boticarios.
 COMIENZA LA
SEGUNDA PARTE
del colloquio, en la cual se trata lo
que toca á los médicos.

INTERLOCUTORES

Los mesmos que en la primera.

Dionisio.—Hasta agora, señor

licenciado, no me ha faltado
atención para oir ni paciencia
para escuchar todo lo que vuesa
merced ha querido decir de los
boticarios, y, verdaderamente, no
sería justo que por hacer buenos
á los que son buenos yo quiero
que también lo sean los malos,
pues en todas las artes y oficios
que se usan en el mundo hay de
los unos y de los otros, y que los
haya en este oficio y arte de
boticario no es maravilla, aunque
yo confieso que tienen toda la
obligación que vuestra merced ha
dicho y que es muy mayor la
culpa que se les puede dar.
Porque va poco en que un platero
yerre una vasija, y un sastre una
ropa, y un pintor una imagen, y va
mucho en que un boticario y un
médico yerren la cura de un
hombre en que le va la salud y la
vida; el uno por falta de las
medicinas y el otro por faltarle la