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The Oxford Handbook of State
Capitalism and the Firm 1st Edition

Mike Wright
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The Oxford Handbook of State Capitalism and the Firm
Mike Wright (ed.) et al.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198837367.001.0001
Published: 2022 Online ISBN: 9780191874062 Print ISBN: 9780198837367
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Published: July 2022
Subject: Politics
Series: Oxford Handbooks
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Dedication 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198837367.002.0004 Pages v–vi

Subject: Politics
✝
p. vi Dedicated to Mike Wright (1952—2019)
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Foreword 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198837367.002.0008 Pages vii–CP.P139
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Subject: Politics
✝
MIKE Wright (1952–2019) was the driver of this Handbook. In November 2016, he initiated this intellectual
project by getting in touch with Editor Dominic Byatt at Oxford University Press and pitching the
importance of this topic and the need to publish a Handbook. Mike also organized the editorial team.
Although it appeared to be large with six editors, he believed it was necessary due to the broad geographic
scope and cross-disciplinary nature of this volume. Besides, Mike was convinced that the editors, having all
worked previously together, would be well-coordinated. He was proved right.
In the summer of 2017, the editors met during the Annual Academy of Management Conference in Atlanta,
USA, to shape a full proposal for this volume. The big push for the work on the volume came in September
2018, when Anna Grosman, Ilya Okhmatovskiy, and Mike Wright organized an extension of the Strategy
Management Society annual conference on State Capitalism at Loughborough University London, UK, with
funding from the Society for the Advancement of Management Studies. The conference helped promote the
importance of the topic and create a network of scholars that had been working separately on this topic.
Many contributors to this volume presented their draft chapters during this event and received detailed
feedback on how to improve the arguments.
The second event organized to present the work of the contributors to this volume took place at
Northeastern University, Boston, during the “State Capitalism and the Firm” mini-conference on August 11,
2019. This event was organized by Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Anna Grosman, Aldo Musacchio, and Ilya
Okhmatovskiy and funded by Brandeis University, Loughborough University, Northeastern University, and
the Society for the Advancement of Management Studies. The agenda of the conference re ected the
advances that the conversations had made since the beginning of the project and the strong interest in the
topic from a wide set of participants.
Mike continued to work on this project until his untimely death on November 25, 2019 after a short battle
with lung cancer. The last email from Mike on this project was on October 18, 2019, where Mike was
commenting on the chapter by James Foreman-Peck, “I’m happy with it—it was good to get James as a big
name.” In fact, Mike was instrumental in attracting most of the scholars, who are leading thinkers in their
respective elds, to contribute to this volume. We are hugely indebted to Mike.
The COVID-19 pandemic and Mike’s untimely death disturbed the Handbook project. However, the editors
and authors persevered, and the volume cannot have been more timely in 2022 when governments are ever
more present in the running of their economies.
We would like to acknowledge the editorial support of Oxford University Press and nancial support from
Loughborough University London, Northeastern University, Nova SBE, Society for the Advancement of
Management Studies, University of Manchester, and Western University. Ruth V. Aguilera, Jonathan P. Doh,
p. viii Cheng Li, William L. Megginson, Aldo Musacchio, Gerhard Schnyder, and Paul Vaaler contributed to
professional development workshops and symposiums on State Capitalism at the Academy of Management,
Strategic Management Society, and Academy of International Business conferences, which greatly
stimulated the development of this volume. Ben Kingscott provided excellent editorial assistance. Finally,
we thank our families for their love, support, and understanding that our priorities did not always align with
theirs while we were working on the handbook.
We dedicate this volume to Mike to acknowledge his immense scholarly legacy.
Geo rey T. Wood, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Pei Sun, Ilya Okhmatovskiy, and Anna Grosman.
London, ON, Brookline, MA, Manchester, Lisbon, and London.

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Structure of this Handbook1 

https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198837367.002.0100 Pages ix–xx

Subject: Politics
Part I. The History and Logics of State Capitalism
This part aims to provide an overview of the history of state capitalism from di erent disciplinary
1
perspectives. It also considers di erent logics that characterize state involvement according to country-
level factors. The editors of this volume, Mike Wright, Geo rey T. Wood, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Pei Sun,
Ilya Okhmatovskiy, and Anna Grosman, provide an overview of state capitalism, its evolution, diversity, and
theoretical implications in Chapter 1. They document how state capitalism followed a pendulum between
periods of high dominance of the state over the economy and periods of retrenchment, which have
transformed the literature over time. They review the varieties of state capitalism that manifested across
countries and time. This chapter also outlines the diversity in the theorization of state capitalism as a
phenomenon and the implications of the cross-border expansion of state capitalism.
In Chapter 2, “State Capitalism: A Comparative and Historical Outlook,” Robert Boyer provides a panorama
of past and present state capitalism varieties. In his quest for state capitalism theorization, Boyer addresses
whether state capitalism replaces market capitalism to correct its ine ciencies. Boyer contrasts liberal
capitalism with state capitalism on wage labor, forms of competition, nancial system, state-economy
nexus, and integration into the world economy. Further, Boyer provides a nuanced taxonomy of state
capitalist models, from the Soviet Union through to the post-Second World War regimes, to Latin America
and East Asia. Finally, Boyer provides an account of the French state capitalism trajectory, its speci cities,
and how the opening to the European and global competition has destabilized this perfectly oiled machine.
The making of it in the 1970s relied on the three fundamental pillars: a virtuous circle among numerous
public entities, indicative national planning, and a variety of complementary policy instruments. His work is
grounded in Régulation theory which explains both growth and crisis periods within the same endo-
metabolic framework, where the existence of instability and rupture is the precondition of success for any
institutional structure. Beyond France, Boyer questions whether the nation states and the transnational
platform capitalism are trading places. Boyer concludes with a comparison of France to China’s state
capitalism. The model of China, with its multilevel complex state governance, intense competition,
overinvestment, dual rural/urban worker wage status, could not have been more di erent from the French
state capitalism.
Chapter 3—“The Origins of the Developmental State: The European Experience”—by Sophus A. Reinert
approaches state capitalism from a deeper historical perspective, by tracing it back to the strategies and
p. x policies of the city-states of Medieval and Renaissance Italy. He relates the concept of state capitalism to
the concept of a developmental state, previously identi ed with the regulatory regimes of postwar
economies, and modern China. He focuses on earlier manifestations of state strategic involvements during
the Medici era. Reinert masterfully illustrates his arguments by referring to the political economy of the
Grand Duke Cosimo I of Tuscany. Cosimo’s structural reforms aimed to centralize and strengthen the
Tuscan state in domestic and international arenas, rather successfully. Reforms included the development
of speci c national industries, which supported domestic production against foreign competition. Another
ingenious move was to establish a public-private partnership of 25 years for new production of saltpeter, a
main ingredient of gunpowder, which led to a creation of a high value-added industry and primacy of
Tuscany’s state security. Reinert concludes that the past importance of state capitalism remained a core
element of historical schools of economics, but that we should be wary of both positives and negatives of
state capitalism. He refers to Scott’s idea of successful public policy as coming from “mētis” or “knowledge
that can come only from practical experience.”
In “State Capitalism: Means and Dimensions” (Chapter 4), Matthew M. C. Allen, Geo rey T. Wood, and
Matthew R. Keller focus on the varieties of state capitalism. It explores the increased interest in state
capitalism, following the rise of China and other countries not following the liberal market formula. The
chapter reviews the many di erent de nitions of state. By doing so, it aims to rede ne what state capitalism
is, proposing a range of Weberian ideal types of state capitalism. This enables the authors to highlight the

many dimensions of capitalism, opening avenues for interdisciplinary dialogue and inquiry.
“State Logic and Governance: A Taxonomy” (Chapter 5) by Saul Estrin and Aleksandra Gregorič discusses
the emergence and impact of state capitalism and proposes a novel view on state-owned rms that takes
into account the logics of driving state involvement in the rms—welfare, developmental, or predatory
state, and the quality of corporate governance and managerial labor markets. Their approach hinges on the
argument that the existing literature concerning the ine ciency of state-owned rms is insu ciently
nuanced, the latter stemming from the accountability and agency problems. The authors come up with a
taxonomy containing six categories, each generating distinct outcomes in terms of the relative performance
of state-owned enterprises and broader implications in terms of national economic performance, such as
for product-market monopoly power and new venture creation, income inequality, and employment.
Finally, Estrin and Gregorič illustrate their conceptual framework with empirical evidence based on
indicators of country-level economic outcomes for the six con gurations. In particular, they focus on EU
members as exemplary welfare states, South Korea and Vietnam as developmental states, and Bulgaria and
Bosnia as predatory states. Their ndings suggest that state ownership has clear consequences for economic
outcomes such as income inequality and employment, but its impact is conditional upon state logic and the
quality of governance institutions.
Part II. State Capitalism and Finance
The involvement of the government in nancing and supporting the private sector has been gaining
momentum since the nancial crisis, but also as the governments became increasingly interested in
increasing returns from unused reserves or in diversifying their risks away from dominant domestic
p. xi industries, such as natural resources. The second section analyzes the crucial in uence of nance
thinking and studies on our understanding of state capitalism. This takes multiple dimensions, such as
ownership of rms through sovereign wealth funds and state-owned rms, funding through government
venture capital, state-owned development banks, and project nancing and through regulation as was
highlighted during the nancial crisis.
Chapter 6 “State Ownership and Corporate Performance” by William L. Megginson and Xia Liu provides a
state-of-the-art literature review on state ownership and corporate performance since the year 2000. The
authors discuss the factors that led to the resurgence of state ownership. They focus on how di erent types
of state owners can lead to di erent outcomes for corporate governance and performance of state-owned
entities. The authors conclude, from the studies reviewed, that state ownership often negatively a ects
corporate investment, while the e ect on corporate valuation is not so pronounced. From the reviewed
literature, the authors conclude that state capitalism is a suboptimal economic model.
“Sovereign Wealth Funds” (Chapter 7) by Christine Bischo and Geo rey T. Wood deals with an important
category of state-owned entities: sovereign wealth funds. This chapter presents sovereign wealth funds and
how governments use them in di erent institutional settings. Sovereign wealth funds have become major
players in the alternative investor ecosystem and a variety of state capitalism. This chapter di erentiates
sovereign wealth funds from other state investment funds, on account of their intergenerational savings
brief. Through illustrative evidence, the chapter highlights how sovereign wealth funds vary according to
scale, scope, and governance, and also di erentiates between the externally focused funds and those which
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List of Figures and Tables 

https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198837367.002.0006 Pages xxv–xxx

Subject: Politics
Figure 1.1 The reliance on markets versus state control and the “pendulum” movements along the
e ciency frontier 7
Figure 1.2 The reliance on markets versus state control and shifts of the e ciency frontier 8
Figure 2.1 A brief survey of the long run transformation of the state/capitalism nexus 27
Figure 2.2 A large part of economic coordination operates within the public sector 36
Figure 2.3 Planning as an ex-ante exploration of economic coordination 38
Figure 2.4 State capitalism: a full range of tools in order to deliver satisfactory outcomes 39
Figure 2.5 The three structural transformations that explain the crisis of French state capitalism 40
Figure 2.6 The present con guration of French capitalism is no more a typical State capitalism 42
Figure 2.7 A synoptic view of one century long evolution of economic systems and ideologies 47
Table 2.1 The state capitalism versus liberal capitalism30
Table 2.2 The various brands of state/capitalism nexus in historical comparative analysis32
Table 2.3 The French capitalism is still di erent from others43
Table 4.1 Di erent ideal types of “state capitalism” 85
Figure 5.1 Classi cation of economies: Welfare, developmental, predatory states and institutional
quality 116
Figure 5.2 Impact of state orientation and institutional quality on broader economic performance:
Market dominance; entrepreneurial activity; size of shadow economy; unemployment;
income inequality (Gini coe cient) 121
Table 5.1 Corporate governance institutions106
Table 5.2 Combining state logic and governance institutions: A classi cation of private and state
rms109
Table 5.3 Comparison of indicators by state120
p. xxvi Figure 6.1 Growth in estimated assets under management in sovereign wealth funds 137
Figure 7.1 World’s largest SWFs (billion US$) 172
Figure 7.2 Most active SWFs 2018–2019 (% deals) 173
Table 7.1 Four broad features of theorizing SWFs 183
Figure 8.1 General orientation of development banks 200
Table 8.1 Sample of development banks analyzed by country development and level of government
involvement189
Table 8.2 Program and services comparison by each bank (circa 2016)194
Figure 10.1 Typical project structure, players, and agreements 229
Figure 10.2 Typical project development stages, agreements, and timeline 233

Figure 10.3A Announced value (in US$) of all project nanced-based investments by country, 2000–
2010 235
Figure 10.3B Announced value (in US$) of all project nanced-based investments with some state
ownership by country, 2000–2010 236
Figure 10.4 Signals of assurance and interference for increasing state ownership in countries where
policy stability is low 241
Figure 10.5 Four scenarios (e.g., Credible State Ownership) based on whether there is minority or
majority state ownership in a project (x-axis) and whether there is low or high host-
country policy stability (y-axis) 242
Figure 10.6 Percentages of projects with delayed nancing across six categories based on state
ownership and host-country policy stability 249
Figure 10.7 Trend-line analyses of minority state ownership (1–49 percent) (x-axis) and days (logged)
from initial project announcement to nancing (y-axis) for 153 projects with some state
ownership, 1990–2007 250
Figure 10.8 Impact of increasing host-country policy stability on likelihood of delayed nancing for
projects with some minority state ownership (Zelner, 2009) 254
Figure 10.9 Announced value (in US$) of all project nanced-based investments in the renewable
energy sector, 2000–2010 259
Figure 10.10 Investment risk for announced projects with and without Chinese sponsors, 2000–2010
261
Table 10.1 Financing and operational di erences between corporate and project- nanced
investments231
Table 10.2 Variable names and descriptions, data sources, descriptive statistics, and expected impact on
delayed nancing, 1990–2007246
Table 10.3 Results from regression analysis of delayed nancing on policy stability, state ownership, and
related variables, 1990–2007252
p. xxvii Figure 12.1 Drivers of the variation in the internationalization level of state-owned rms from the
same home country 291
Table 12.1 Types of state in uence in rms289
Figure 13.1 The moderating e ect of bilateral political relations on the relationship between Chinese
MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance and home-country diplomatic support 319
Table 13.1 Descriptive statistics and variable correlations316
Table 13.2 Measurement model and CFA results317

Table 13.3 Discriminant validity317
Table 13.4 Results of regression analysis318
Table 13.5 Results of robustness checks—sample selection bias 320
Table 14.1 Characteristics of industries and dedicated industrial policies 339
Table 15.1 Export expansion and exports/GDP of Korea 353
Table 15.2 Five-year economic development plans (1962–1996) 353
Figure 17.1 Policy cycle 389
Figure 18.1 Critiques of outsourcing state functions 414
Table 18.1 Motivations to outsource state functions409

Figure 19.1 Contract price and risk transfer 433
Figure 19.2 Comparison of hypothetical PFI project with conventional procurement costs at di erent
discount rates 442
Table 20.1 Theoretical perspectives on SOE governance 462
Table 21.1 Types of states 488
Table 21.2 Features of di erent types of states 491
Table 21.3 A summary of CSR across state types 493
Table 21.4 Future research agenda 499
Table 22.1 Summary of selected papers on the role of the state in CSR in China 507
Figure 23.1 Corporate political ties: Forms, theories, and implications for strategy, governance, and
performance 525
p. xxviii Table 25.1 Military-owned enterprises 585
Figure 26.1 SOE ownership network in Latin America 603
Figure 26.2 Indirect state ownership network—BNDESPAR 606
Table 26.1 Overview of state ownership in Latin America599
Table 26.2 Active members of the Latin American Association of Development Financing Institutions (as
of Dec. 2020)601
Table 26.3 Listed SOEs in Latin America605
Table 29.1 Canadian Federal Crown Corporations (2010) 663
Table 29.2 Examples of current (2018) Provincial Crown Corporations 670
Table 30.1 Stock markets and state ownership 682
Table 30.2 Sovereign wealth funds 685
Figure 31.1 Pro t/loss distribution of CPSEs (2016–2017) 704
Figure 31.2 India’s billionaire wealth in “rent-thick” and other sectors (US$ billion) 710
Table 31.1 Select Indian SOEs: key indicators, 2018–19701
Figure 32.1 Cassa depositi e prestiti. Ownership structure 729
Figure 32.2 Landesbank Baden-Württenberg. Ownership structure 731

Figure 32.3 A2A. Ownership structure 732
Figure 32.4 Alliander N.V. Ownership structure 732
Figure 32.5 ST Micoelectronics holding NV. Ownership structure 733
Figure 32.6 Airbus SE. Ownership structure 734
Figure 32.7 A Taxonomy of internationalization strategy and ownership - companies from the sample
mentioned as examples 739
Table 32.1 Centrally majority owned SOEs in Western Europe (2011) 722
Table 32.2 The breakdown by sector 730
Figure 33.1 The political transactions of state capitalism, and their bene ciaries 760

Figure 33.2 The share of state-controlled companies in the WIG20 capitalization (in %) 769
Table 33.1 Features of state capitalism and their bene ciaries759
Table 33.2 State-owned enterprises among the 20 largest non nancial companies in Poland (measured
by revenues), as of December 31, 2019768
Table 33.3 State-owned enterprises among the 20 largest non nancial companies in Hungary
(measured by revenues), as of December 31, 2018 776
Table 33.4 Features of state capitalism in Hungary and Poland 777
p. xxix Table 33.5 Tools of state capitalism in Poland and Hungary (as of December 2021) 778
Figure 34.1 Economic changes in the Russian Federation 787
Figure 34.2 Share of state/public enterprises in Russia 790
Figure 34.3 Composition of the state sector in GDP (%) 790
Table 34.1 Structure of population’s monetary income 797
p. xxx
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The Editors 

Subject: Politics
✝
Mike Wright (1952–2019) was Professor of Entrepreneurship at Imperial College Business School. He held
an honorary doctorate from the University of Ghent, was a visiting professor at ETH Zurich and INSEAD,
and a member of the BCVA’s Advisory Board. Mike Wright was also Director of the Centre for Management
Buyout Research, the rst center to be established devoted to the study of private equity and buyouts, which
was founded in March 1986 at the Nottingham University. Mike has published around 1300 pieces of work
according to Google Scholar, including 40 books and around 400 articles in scholarly journals on
entrepreneurship, management buyouts, venture capital, emerging markets, and strategy. Mike Wright was
a Fellow of the British Academy, Academy of Social Sciences, and The British Academy of Management.
Mike Wright made an outstanding contribution to the business and management research community and
was one of Britain’s best-known academics. At the time of preparing this volume for publication, Mike’s
research was cited over 95,000 times (Google Scholar), and he had an h-index of 148.
Geo rey T. Wood is DanCap Private Equity Chair and Head of DAN Management at Western University in
Canada, and Visiting Professor at Trinity College, Dublin. Previously, he served as Dean and Professor of
International Business, at Essex Business School and before then as Professor of International Business at
Warwick Business School, UK. He has authored/coauthored/edited eighteen books, and over one hundred
and eighty articles in peer-reviewed journals. He has an h-index of 41, and an i10-index of 163. He holds
honorary positions at Gri th and Monash University in Australia. Geo ’s research interests center on the
relationship between institutional setting, corporate governance, rm nance, and rm-level work and
employment relations. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences, and a Fellow of the British Academy
of Management, and is also in receipt of an Honorary Doctorate in economics from Aristotle University,
Greece.
Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra is a Professor of International Business and Strategy at Northeastern University and
coeditor of Global Strategy Journal. He studies the internationalization of rms, with a special interest in
emerging market multinationals; capability upgrading, particularly technological capabilities; and
governance issues, focusing on state ownership and corruption in international business. He is a Fellow of
the Academy of International Business and was elected to the Executive Committee of the International
Management Division at the Academy of Management. He has served as a consultant on global strategy to
rms and governments in emerging markets. He received an honorary doctorate from Copenhagen Business
School and was awarded a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. For more information,
please visit www.cuervo-cazurra.com or contact him at a.cuervocazurra@neu.edu.
p. xxxii Pei Sun holds Chair of International Business at Alliance Manchester Business School, University of
Manchester, UK. He received his PhD in business economics and strategy from Judge Business School,
University of Cambridge. His research interests include corporate governance and nonmarket strategy, with
a particular focus on how foreign and domestic rms manage and exploit institutional complexity and
changes in emerging economies and how their strategies and corporate governance arrangements impact
upon rm outcomes, stakeholders, and wider society. He has published papers in renowned academic
journals such as Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Perspectives, Journal of
International Business Studies, Journal of Management, and Journal of Management Studies. He is an associate
editor of British Journal of Management and a guest editor of Journal of Management Studies, and served as a
senior editor of Asia Paci c Journal of Management (2019-2021). He serves on the editorial boards of Academy
of Management Perspectives, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Journal of International Business
Studies, Journal of Management Studies, and Journal of World Business.
Ilya Okhmatovskiy is Associate Professor at Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de
Lisboa. Previously he taught at McGill University and at the University of Southern California, where he
obtained a PhD degree in business administration. His research interests focus on corporate governance and
business-government relations, mostly in the context of emerging economies. He has published in
Organization Science, Organization Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, and other
journals. Ilya is a member of the Editorial Boards at Corporate Governance: An International Review and

Strategic Organization. He served as Guest Editor for the Journal of World Business and as Senior Editor for
Management and Organization Review.
Anna Grosman, PhD Imperial College, is Reader (US eq. Professor) in Innovation and Entrepreneurship at
Loughborough University London. Her research falls at the intersection of corporate governance, corporate
nance and international business, with a special emphasis on contemporary state capitalism, and
corporate governance issues of state-a liated organizations, and Russia. She has published on state
capitalism and corporate governance in journals such as the Journal of International Business Studies, Journal
of World Business, British Journal of Management, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Environment
and Planning A: Economy and Space, Journal of Comparative Economics and Economic Modelling, among others.
Anna is also on the editorial board of the Journal of World Business, Global Strategy Journal and Annals of
Corporate Governance. Prior to her academic career, she worked for the US multinational Georgia-Paci c
(part of Koch Industries) as a Director of Corporate Strategy and M&A for four years. Before that
engagement, she worked for six years in investment banking and corporate nance for CIBC World Markets,
Citigroup, and Close Brothers.
The Contributors
Matthew M. C. Allen is Professor in Management and Head of the Business, Management and Marketing
Group in Bangor Business School, Bangor University, UK. His research focuses on the institutional
p. xxxiii structuring of rms’ innovation activities, examining organizations in Europe, North America and
Asia. He has published his work in leading journals, such as the Journal of International Business Studies,
the British Journal of Management, Sociology, The International Journal of Human Resource Management, and
Work, Employment and Society. The German Academic Exchange Service, the Hans Böckler Foundation and
the Economic and Physical Sciences Research Council have funded his research.
Maciej Bałtowski is Professor of Economics, the Head of the Department of Economic and Regional Policy
at the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin. He is an author and coauthor of eight books and
numerous scienti c and press articles devoted to privatization, economic transition, and ownership
changes in Poland, published in ISI-cited journals. His research interests also cover problems of the role

of the state and state ownership in contemporary economies. With Grzegorz Kwiatkowski, he coauthored
a book State-owned enterprises in the global economy (2022).
Christine Bischo is a Researcher in the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment at the
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg (Wits University). She completed her PhD in Sociology at
the University of Pretoria and her Master of Arts in Industrial Sociology at Wits University. She has
published widely and is a research team member of a longitudinal study on labor and democracy in post-
apartheid South Africa.
Robert Boyer is a French Economist trained at Ecole Polytechnique, Sciences-Po Paris and Paris 1
University. Previously senior research at CNRS and professor at EHESS, he is now fellow at Institut des
Amériques, Paris. He has developed a historical and comparative analysis of the institutional
transformations of capitalism, under the label of Régulation Theory. Systematic international
comparisons converge toward a taxonomy of contemporary socioeconomic regimes and their growing
interdependence within an unprecedented con guration of the world economy. Among his publications
are Régulation Theory: the State of the Art (with Yves Saillard), Routledge, 2001, Economie politique des
capitalismes, La Découverte, 2015, Evolving Diversity and Interdependence of Capitalisms.Transformations of
Regional Integration in EU and Asia, Springer Nature, 2020, coedited with Hiroyasu Uemura, Toshio
Yamada and Lei Song. See the web site <URL>http://robertboyer.org.
Alan Brejnholt is a PhD Candidate at the Institute for International Management at Loughborough
University London. His current research revolves around the orchestration of CSR of Brazilian companies.
More broadly, his interest concerns the political economy of global business regulations, comparative
CSR, and corporate social and environmental engagement in developing economies. At this time, he has
contributed to a publication in Sustainability.
John Campbell is the Class of 1925 Professor and Professor of Sociology at Dartmouth College. His most
recent books are American Discontent: The Rise of Donald Trump and Decline of the Golden Age (Oxford
University Press, 2018) and What Capitalism Needs: Forgotten Lessons of Great Economists (Cambridge
University Press, 2021).
Richard W. Carney is in the Department of Strategy and Entrepreneurship at the China Europe
International Business School (CEIBS). His research primarily focuses on business-government relations.
He is the author of Authoritarian Capitalism: Sovereign Wealth Funds and State-Owned Enterprises in East
Asia and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, 2018), which won the Masayoshi Ohira Prize in 2019. He has
p. xxxiv published in journals such as the Journal of International Business Studies and the Journal of Financial
Economics. He is also the author of Contested Capitalism: The Political Origins of Financial Systems (2009)
and is the editor of Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis (2009).
Rohit Chandra is an Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Indian Institute of Technology—Delhi and a
Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. He is a political scientist and economic
historian focusing on energy, infrastructure and capitalism in India, with a particular interest in coal and
power. Over the last decade, he has worked and published in the policy space on coal sector reforms, the
politics of state power distribution, public nance decisions behind large infrastructure projects, and the
enablers and bottlenecks of energy transitions in India. He is currently completing a book on the political
and economic history of India’s coal industry.
Elizabeth Chatterjee is Assistant Professor of History and the College at the University of Chicago, and a
Fellow of the Initiative for Sustainable Energy Policy at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies. Her research explores the environmental history of India, with a focus on the energy sector from
independence in 1947 to the present. She has published extensively on state-led development and
liberalization in India, most recently editing the collection Class and Con ict: Revisiting Pranab Bardhan’s
Political Economy of India (Oxford University Press, 2020). She is currently completing a book manuscript
on the energy history of modern India, Electric Democracy.
Andrea Colli is Professor of Business History at Bocconi University, Milan. His research interests range
from the history of family rms, to small and medium-sized enterprises, to the role played by
international entrepreneurs and rms in the global economy, to corporate governance. Has published
several articles in business history, family business, and corporate governance research. He has
published with Cambridge University Press The History of Family Business (1850–2000). Currently he is
doing research on the persistence of state capitalism in Europe and on the role of state-owned

enterprises in European capitalism. On this topic he has published in 2019 a chapter in the Routledge
Companion to the Makers of Global Business (with Pasi Nevalainen) titled “State-owned Enterprises.”
Douglas Cumming, JD, PhD, CFA, is the DeSantis Distinguished Professor of Professor of Finance and
Entrepreneurship at the College of Business, Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton, Florida. Douglas is
also a Visiting Professor of Finance at Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, UK.
Douglas has published over 200 articles in leading refereed academic journals (including 38 in Financial
Times top 50 journals) in nance, management, and law and economics, such as the Academy of
Management Journal, Economic Journal, Journal of Business, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of International Business Studies, and the
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. His work has been cited over 20,000 times according to Google Scholar.
He is the Managing Editor-in-Chief of the Review of Corporate Finance (2021–current) and British Journal
of Management (2020–current). Douglas has published 21 academic books. Douglas’ work has been
reviewed in numerous media outlets, including The Economist, The New York Times, the Chicago Tribune,
the Wall Street Journal, the Globe and Mail, Canadian Business, the National Post, and The New Yorker.
p. xxxv Daniel J. D’Amico is the Associate Director at the Political Theory Project and lecturer in economics at
Brown University, where he teaches and coordinates student programs dedicated to the study of
institutions and ideas that make societies free, prosperous, and fair. His current research is focused upon
the political economy of punishment and incarceration throughout history and around the world.
Rodrigo B. DeMello is an Associate Professor of Strategy at the Girard School of Business, Merrimack
College, in Massachusetts, USA. Rodrigo is also Visiting Professor at the University Paris Dauphine and
Lyon III, in France, and, previously, he was Associate Professor at Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in Sao
Paulo, Brazil and Visiting Scholar at the Political Science Department of the MIT and at the Wharton
School. His research interests include the relationship between rms and governments, and its e ects on
competitive advantage and internationalization.
Wilfred Dolfsma is Professor and Chairholder of Business Management and Organization at Wageningen
University. Trained as an economist and philosopher, his research is mostly on how companies
collaborate, and how people collaborate within them. The approach taken for this is a blend of
institutional theory, social exchange theory and social network analysis. Visit
<URL>www.wilfreddolfsma.net to nd much of the research published.
Jiyang Dong, PhD, INSEAD is an Assistant Professor in Entrepreneurship and Strategy at Nazarbayev
University Graduate School of Business, Kazakhstan. His research focuses on corporate social
responsibility and corporate political activity in the context of emerging markets. His research has been
selected at the Academy of Management Annual Conference as a nalist for the OMT Best Dissertation
Based Paper Award.
Saul Estrin is a Professor of Managerial Economics and Strategy and the founding Head of the
Department of Management at LSE. He was formerly Adecco Professor of Business and Society at LBS.
Saul’s research has long focused on the microeconomics of comparative economic systems, with early
interests in state owned and labor-managed rms, as well as the transition economies. In recent years,
he has concentrated on ownership in di erent institutional contexts, especially with reference to
entrepreneurship and foreign direct investment. Papers on these topics have appeared, among others, in
Review of Economics and Statistics, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of World Business and Journal of
Business Venturing.
James Foreman-Peck is Emeritus Professor of Economics at Cardi University. He was awarded his PhD
at the London School of Economics and has been an Economic Adviser at H M Treasury concerned with
microeconomic policy issues, particularly public service delivery and procurement. He has also worked in
the electricity supply industry and taught at a number of universities, including the University of
California, Davis and Oxford University.
Renfei Gao is a Presidential Fellow at Alliance Manchester Business School, the University of Manchester.
Previously, he worked at the University of Melbourne, Australia, as a Melbourne Early Career Academic
Fellow. He obtained PhD in management at the University of Melbourne. His research interests include
behavioral strategy, corporate governance, nonmarket strategy, and international business, with a
special focus on emerging markets. His papers have appeared in leading journals and conference

proceedings, such as Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal and Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings.
p. xxxvi Aleksandra Gregorič, PhD University of Ljubljana is Associate Professor at the Department of Strategy
and Innovation, Copenhagen Business School. She also holds an a liation with the Center for Corporate
Governance at Copenhagen Business School. Her research focuses primarily on the design and
functioning of corporate governance mechanisms, including how corporate governance mechanisms and
their impact on corporate outcomes depend on the characteristics of the wider societal context in which
the rms operate. Her current research involves various topics concerning boards of directors and
director labor markets, such as employee participation and gender inequality in the upper echelons. Her
work has been published in the Journal of International Business Studies, Industrial Relations, British Journal
of Industrial Relations, and Journal of Business Ethics, among others.
Amanda M. Girth, PhD, is Associate Professor of Public A airs, Director of Washington Studies, and
Enarson Fellow at the John Glenn College of Public A airs at The Ohio State University. Dr Girth is a policy
expert in government contracting and a public management scholar who studies implementation and
accountability challenges at the intersection of the public and private sectors. Her research is published in
the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Journal of Supply Chain Management, and Public
Administration Review. She was previously a manager at a global management consulting rm supporting
information technology initiatives for federal clients.
Xia Han is a Lecturer in International Business at the University of Manchester. Her research looks at the
international expansion of multinational enterprises from emerging markets with focus on China,
political risk, and global political economy. Before joining Manchester Business School, Xia obtained her
PhD at Loughborough University.
Hiroaki Hayashi is Professor of Economics at Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan. He holds a PhD in
Economics from Kyoto University. He held a Visiting Associate Professor position at Kyoto Institute of
Economic Research, Kyoto University, and an Honorary Research Fellow position at the Centre for
Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham. His research has been in the area of
comparative economics, especially social issues of Russia and other transition countries such as standard
of living, social strati cation and labor motivation and others. He is a review editor of ISI-cited Journal Of
Comparative Economic Studies by The Japanese Society for Comparative Economic Studies. He is a
managing board member of Japan Association for Comparative Economic Studies and Japan Association
for the Comparative Studies of Management. His recent book is Transformation of Russian Society: Focusing
on Changes in Social Strati cation, Kokusai Shoin, 2021 (in Japanese), and his selected papers in English
are in the Journal of Northeast Asia Development, Journal of Comparative Economic Studies, and Annals of
Corporate Governance.
Kirk Helliker is a post-retirement Research Professor in the Department of Sociology at Rhodes

University in Makhanda, South Africa. He is the Founder and Head of the Unit of Zimbabwean Studies in
the Department of Sociology. He focuses on the supervision of PhD students, mainly on Zimbabwean
topics, and he has published widely about Zimbabwean history and society. His two most recent books
are: co-editor of Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe (2022) and co-editor of Capital
Penetration and the Peasantry in Africa: Neoliberal Restructuring (2022), both published by Springer.
p. xxxvii Robert Hockett is Edward Cornell Professor of Law, Cornell University. He is also Adjunct Professor of
Finance, Georgetown McDonough School of Business. In his professional capacity, he is part of Senior
Counsel, Westwood Capital, LLC; Advisory Board at Public Banking Institute; Advisory Board, Stanford
Digital Currency Lab; and Founding Board, Digital Fiat Currency Institute. Previous positions were held at
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and International Monetary Fund.
Xiuping Hua is Professor of Finance at Nottingham University Business School China, Director of UNNC-
NFTZ Blockchain Laboratory, and Executive Deputy Director of Centre for New Structural Economics at
University of Nottingham Ningbo China. Her research interests include nancial technology, innovation
nance, inclusive nance, and new structural economics. She has published articles in such academic
journals as Journal of International Money and Finance, European Journal of Finance, Review of Quantitative
Finance and Accounting, Journal of Association for Information Systems, Business History, and International
Business Review. She has also worked as Principal Investigators for many research grants or consultancy
programs of domestic and international government agencies, research institutes, universities,

companies, and nancial organizations. She obtained her PhD degree in Finance from the University of
She eld Management School.
Barclay E. James is Associate Professor of International Business at St. Mary’s University’s Greehey
School of Business where he has been a faculty member since 2018. Prior to that, he was on faculties at
Universidad San Francisco de Quito and Louisiana State University. He writes and teaches on how
multinational corporations manage political risk in developing countries. He has a special interest in
MNC political risk management for project nanced-based investments.
So a Johan, LLB, LLM, PhD, is an Associate Professor of Finance at the College of Business, Florida
Atlantic University and a Phil Smith Fellow at The Phil Smith Center for Free Enterprise at the College of
Business. Also, So a is a Chair in Entrepreneurial Finance at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland and an
Extramural Research Fellow at Tilburg Law and Economics Center in the Netherlands. So a has published
over 75 articles in leading journals, such as the Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Financial
Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, and Journal of International Business Studies, and
has been cited over 4000 times. So a is a Coeditor of Venture Capital: An International Journal of
Entrepreneurial Finance (2021), and an Associate Editor of the British Journal of Management, Emerging
Markets Review (2018–), and Finance Research Letters. So a has published six academic books, including
The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds (2021), Crowdfunding: Fundamental Cases, Facts, and Insights (2019),
and The Oxford Handbook of IPOs (2018).
Matthew R. Keller is an Associate Professor at the Southern Methodist University, USA. His research
focuses on innovation, institutional change, and the role of government. He is co-editor, with Fred Block,
of State of Innovation: the US Government’s Role in Technology Development. Recent works have explored
innovation and industrial policies in an era of “networked” innovation, and the operations and durability
of networked developmental state programs. He has received funding for his research from, amongst
others, the prestigious National Science Foundation’s Science of Science and Innovation Policy Program.
p. xxxviii His work has been published in leading journals, including Competition and Change, and Socio-
Economic Review.
Gilton Klerck is an Associate Professor of Economic and Industrial Sociology, and Head of Department,
Sociology and Industrial Sociology at Rhodes University, South Africa. He is also an advocate of the High
Court and an editorial board member of local and international employee relations and human resource
management journals. Gilton’s research interests are centred around employee relations and labour law,
and he has published on topics in these areas, both locally and internationally. His most recent
publications include Employment relations in South Africa, with J. Maree and A. Benya, in Bamber, G.J.,
Cooke, F.L. Doellgast, V. and Wright, C.F. (eds.), International and Comparative Employment Relations:
Global Crises and Institutional Responses (2021, SAGE Publications); and Neoliberalisation and regulatory
restructuring in South African’s commercial agriculture, in F. Mazwi, G. Mudimu and K. Helliker (eds.),
Capital Penetration and the Peasantry in Africa: Neoliberal Restructuring. (2022, Springer).
Piotr Kozarzewski is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Economics at the Maria Curie-Skłodowska
University in Lublin. He has Habilitation in Political Science and Economics. He is a Member of the CASE
Supervisory Council and a Participant of many research and advisory programs in Poland, the former
Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern European countries on institutional reform, ownership
transformation, and state corporate control. He is the author and coauthor of over 120 publications
including a book State corporate control in transition: Poland in a comparative perspective (2021).
Sergio G. Lazzarini, PhD 2002, Washington University in St. Louis, is the Cha Haddad Professor of
Management at Insper Institute of Education and Research. He does research on how public and private
actors interact and organize their activities to improve economic and social performance. He is Founder
and Director of Insper Metricis, a center for the study of impact measurement and investing. Sergio has
held Visiting Positions at Harvard University (2010, 2012), University of St Gallen (2009), HEC Paris
(2014), INSEAD (2015), Brandeis (2016), Imperial College (2017), and the University of Utah (2019). In
2014, he published the book Reinventing State Capitalism: Leviathan in Business, Brazil and Beyond (Harvard
University Press, with Aldo Musacchio).
Professor Yong-Shik Lee is a Lawyer, Economist, and International Relations Scholar with
Internationally Recognized Authority in Law and Development and International Trade Law. He is
currently Director and Professorial Fellow of the Law and Development Institute. He has also taught and

conducted academic research at prominent universities throughout the US, Europe, and Asia for 20 years.
He has over one hundred academic publications with leading publishers in North America, Europe, and
Asia. He graduated in economics with academic distinction from the University of California at Berkeley
and received law degrees from the University of Cambridge, BA, MA, PhD.
Cheng Li is a PhD Candidate in General Management and International Business at the Ivey Business
School, Western University, Canada. Her research interests are government-business relations, global
strategy, and emerging economies. Her work focuses on state-owned multinational enterprises and
investigates whether and how government involvement in uences rm internationalization and how
p. xxxix stakeholders respond to the rise of state capitalism. Cheng holds an MSc in Financial Economics from
Cardi University. She has published research in the eld of international business.
Xia (Summer) Liu is a PhD Candidate in Finance from the Michael F. Price College of Business at the
University of Oklahoma. She earned a Bachelor’s degree in Finance from South China University of
Technology in 2013, a Master of Science degree in nance from the Johns Hopkins University in 2014, and
a Master of Science degree in quantitative nance from the University of Texas at Arlington in 2018. Her
research interests lie in the elds of empirical corporate nance and state ownership. Summer also
passed all three levels of the CFA exam.
Xiaohui Liu is Professor of International Business at the Birmingham Business School, University of
Birmingham, UK. Her main research interests include international knowledge spillovers, labor mobility,
innovation and the political environment of emerging market MNEs. She has published widely in journals
such as Journal of International Business Studies, Strategic Management Journal, Research Policy, Organization
Studies, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, and Journal of World
Business. She is senior editor of International Business Review and former senior editor of Management and
Organization Review. She also serves on the editorial boards of Journal of World Business, Strategic
Entrepreneurship Journal, and Journal of International Business Policy.
Xiaowei Rose Luo, PhD, Stanford is The Rudolf and Valeria Maag Professor in Entrepreneurship in the
Area of Entrepreneurship and Family Business, INSEAD, France. Her current research interests are
organizational response to institutional complexity, the role of the state in rm behavior, and corporate
political strategies in emerging markets. Her research has been published on Administrative Science
Quarterly, Academy of Management Journal, Organization Science, Strategic Management Journal, among
many others.
Pedro Makhoul is a PhD Candidate in the Strategy group at the UCLA Anderson School of Management.
He holds an MA in International Economics and Finance from Brandeis University and a BA in Economics
from Insper, in Brazil. Pedro’s research interests lie in the frontier of strategy, international business,
and corporate nance. His current work looks at two sides of rms’ global strategies. On the one hand, he
investigates how rms organize themselves in terms of ownership structures, and how such structures
may be used strategically. On the other hand, Pedro is interested in understanding how certain
stakeholders react to foreign rms, where such reactions come from, and how much they impact foreign
companies.
Łukasz Mamica is an Associate Professor and the Head of Department of Public Economics, Cracow
University of Economics. He is the Coordinator of Research Area Industrial Policy and Development at the
European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy (EAEPE). He has coauthored all the regional
innovation strategies for the Malopolska region and has served as an expert in several projects funded by
OECD, the EU, Polish government departments, and regional administration units.
William L. Megginson is Professor and Price Chair in Finance at the University of Oklahoma’s Michael F.
Price College of Business and Visiting Professor at the University of International Business & Economics
(Beijing). Professor Megginson has published refereed articles in several top academic journals, including
p. xl the Journal of Economic Literature, the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Journal
of Law and Economics, the Review of Financial Studies, and the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
As of March 2022, his research has been downloaded almost 70,000 times from the Social Sciences
Research Network and cited over 24,000 times (according to Google Scholar). From 2002 to 2007, he was
a voting member of the Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance’s Global Advisory Committee on
Privatization, and was the Saudi Aramco Chair Professor in Finance at King Fahd University of Petroleum

and Minerals from 2014 to 2019. He has served as a privatization consultant for the New York Stock
Exchange, the OECD, the IMF, the World Federation of Exchanges, and the World Bank.
Tomasz Mickiewicz is Fiftieth Anniversary Professor of Economics at Aston Business School,

Birmingham, UK. He has Habilitation in Economic Theory from Maria Curie Skłodowska University in
Lublin. His research is on how rule of law, regulation, social capital, and corruption a ect
entrepreneurship and foreign investment, and on impact of ownership structures on performance. He
published in three Financial Times listed journals and others. He serves as an editor of Entrepreneurship
Theory and Practice.
Anupriya Misra is an Applied Econometrician/Quantitative Modeller currently working as a Quantitative

Analyst for one of the Big Four consultancies. Previously she has worked for UK Debt Management o ce
(HM Treasury) as a Quantitative Analyst focusing on risk/econometric modelling. She has a PhD from
University of Essex and a Master’s degree from Queen Mary University of London. She has also taught as a
Lecturer at the University of Essex. She has keen interest in machine learning techniques and developing
advanced econometrics models. Her PhD focused on developing an Agent Based Model to study
entrepreneurship in the UK rural labor markets.
Satoshi Mizobata is Professor at the Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Japan. He is
Council member of Science Council of Japan. He was awarded PhD in Economics at Kyoto University. He
has investigated planned economies and transition economies based on the rm structure and corporate
governance. From the angle of comparative economics, he analyzed the behavior and motivation of
emerging multinationals and socioeconomic structure of Russia based on social capital. He has also been
working on meta-analysis and eldwork concerning these research topics. He is Chief Editor of ISI-cited
Journal of Comparative Economic Studies. He is President of Japan Association for Comparative Economic
Studies, and a Member of the Executive Board of the European Association for Comparative Economic
Studies. His selected recent publications in English are as follows: Melting Boundaries, Kyoto University
Press, 2008; “Comparative analysis of innovation policy and market quality: Lessons from Russia and
Japan,” in Bruno Dallago and Ermanno Tortia eds., Entrepreneurship and Local Economic Development: A
Comparative Perspective on Entrepreneurs, Universities and Governments, Routledge, 2019; “State-led
innovation and uneven adaptation in Russia,” in Steven Rose elde ed., Putin’s Russia: Economy, Defense
and Foreign Policy, World Scienti c, 2020, and others.
Aldo Musacchio is a Professor of Management and Economics at the Brandeis International Business
School and a Faculty Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. He has a PhD from
Stanford University. He has a series of academic papers in top management journals and the book
p. xli Reinventing State Capitalism, in which he examines the performance implications of di erent
governance arrangements in state-owned enterprises and the e ects that investments and loans from
development banks have on the performance of private rms. He advises governments in Latin America
and the Caribbean on state-owned enterprise reform and is a consultant for the World Bank on state-
owned infrastructure companies.
Saule T. Omarova is the Beth and Marc Goldberg Professor of Law and Director of the Jack Clarke Program
on the Law and Regulation of Financial Institutions and Markets at Cornell University. Professor
Omarova’s research focuses on systemic risk regulation and structural trends in nancial markets,
banking law, and political economy of nance. Prior to joining academia, she served at the US
Department of the Treasury as a Special Advisor for Regulatory Policy to the Under Secretary for Domestic
Finance. She holds a PhD degree in political science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a JD
degree from Northwestern University.
Sophus A. Reinert is T.J. Dermot Dunphy Professor of Business Administration and of History in the
Business, Government, and the International Economy Unit at Harvard Business School and in the
Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University. He is the editor of numerous books and journal special
issues and the author of Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy (Harvard, 2011)
and The Academy of Fisticu s: Political Economy and Commercial Society in Enlightenment Italy (Harvard,
2018). He has published widely on the histories of business, capitalism, and political economy; his articles
have appeared in The American Historical Review, The Journal of Modern History, Business History Review,
and many other venues.
Jukka Rintamäki is a Lecturer at the Institute for International Management at Loughborough University
London. His research interests include collective memory, corporate (ir)responsibility, resistance, and

identity. More generally, he is interested in questions of (in)justice related to organizations and their
interactions with the rest of the society, and the dark sides of organizations. His research has been
published in journals such as Academy of Management Review, Business & Society, and Organization Studies.
Krislert Samphantharak is Professsor of Economics at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at
University of California San Diego. His research focuses on households, rms, and public policies in
emerging economies. He has extensive experience in working in policy-making institutions and served as
Executive Director of Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research at the Bank of Thailand.
Samphantharak’s book Households as Corporate Firms: An Analysis of Household Finance Using Integrated
Household Surveys and Corporate Financial Accounting was published by Cambridge University Press and is
now also available in Chinese edition. His recent publications include the studies of nance and taxation
of small and medium enterprises, household debts, decentralization, public goods provision, and
economic development of Southeast Asian economies.
Gerhard Schnyder, PhD (Lausanne) is a Professor of International Management and Political Economy at
Loughborough University London and a Research Associate at the Centre for Business Research,
University of Cambridge. His current research focusses on state-business relations, the political economy
of populism, and the institutional embedding of business activity in developing economies. His recent
work was published in Organization Studies, Business & Society, New Political Economy, and Journal of
p. xlii
International Management, and Global Strategy Journal, among others.
Vania Sena works in the area of Innovation and Business Analytics. She is a Professor in Entrepreneurship
and Enterprise at the University of She eld. Her rst Degree was awarded with Laude by the University
of Naples, Federico II, Naples, Italy; her Postgraduate studies in economics were carried out at the
University of York, UK, where she was awarded both the MSc and the DPhil in economics. Her research
focuses mainly on the econometric analysis of the determinants of productivity growth, both at the micro
and macro level with an emphasis on innovation, human capital and intellectual property. She also has an
interest into the use of alternative methods (based on linear programming analysis) to the measurement
of productivity. Her work has been funded by several bodies including ESRC, Nu eld, NESTA,
Leverhulme Trust, IPO, UKTI, and British Academy. She is a member of the Operational Society General
Council and of the OR Analytics Development Group.
Yusuf Sidani, is the Dean of the Suliman S. Olayan School of Business, American University of Beirut and
Professor of Leadership and Business Ethics. He has vast experience in the academic eld including
development of academic programs at the undergraduate, masters, and doctoral programs in addition to
executive degree programs. His research focuses on leadership, business and employee ethics, and
international human resource management. Dr. Sidani was awarded the prestigious 2015 Abdul Hameed
Shoman Award for Arab Researchers. He is the author of Business Ethics in the Middle East (Routledge). Dr.
Sidani is a frequent speaker at local, regional, and international conferences on topics of leadership,
ethics, and business higher education.
Emily Simmons is Operations Manager for Remerge, a nonpro t advancing reconciliation in the historic
Sweet Auburn neighborhood of Atlanta, GA. Emily graduated from Charleston Southern University with a
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration and holds a Master’s degree in International Finance and
Economics from Brandeis International Business School. Her interests lie at the intersection of
development economics and social innovation. She has previously worked for the International Monetary
Fund and Habitat for Humanity International. While investing in her local community, she continues to
consult with leading housing organizations on a ordable housing nance strategies for developing
markets.
Liudmyla Svystunova is a Visiting Fellow in International Management at Loughborough University

London, UK. Her research focuses on the various forms of interaction between business and society,
especially in non-Western contexts, and has been published in Journal of International Business Studies,
Management International Review, and Human Relations.
Paul M. Vaaler is Professor and John and Bruce Mooty Chair in Law and Business at the University of
Minnesota’s Law School and Carlson School of Management where he has been a Faculty Member since
2007. Prior to that he was on Faculties at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Tufts
University. He writes and teaches on how foreign investing rms and individuals manage risks in
developing countries undergoing policy reforms. More information on Professor Vaaler is available here:

<UR>https://carlsonschool.umn.edu/faculty/paul-vaaler.
p. xliii Lucien van der Walt is Professor of Economic and Industrial Sociology, and Director of the Neil Aggett
Labour Studies Unit (NALSU), at Rhodes University, South Africa. He has published widely on labour, the
left and political economy and is involved in workers’ and union education. His books include Anarchism
and Syndicalism in the Colonial and Postcolonial World, 1870–1940: The Praxis of National Liberation,
Internationalism, and Social Revolution (Brill, 2010), with Steve Hirsch, Negro e Vermelho: Anarquismo,
Sindicalismo Revolucionário e Pessoas de Cor na África Meridional nas Décadas de 1880 a 1920 (Editora Faísca,
2014) and Politics at a Distance from the State: Radical and African Perspectives (Routledge, 2018), with Kirk
Helliker.
Yong Wang is an Associate Professor of Economics and Academic Deputy Dean of the Institute of New
Structural Economics at Peking University. His research elds are growth and development,
macroeconomics, political economy, and Chinese and Indian economies. He publishes academic papers
on Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Monetary Economics, and so on and serves as a coeditor for
China and the World Economy and an associate editor for Economic Modeling. He is the author of four books
including Thinking and Debates on New Structural Economics and Industrial Policies: Summary, Re ection and
Prospect (both by the Peking University Press). He was a Resident Research Fellow at the World Bank and
was invited to present his research at policy institutions such as IMF, World Bank, Asian Development
Bank, US Department of State, US Department of Treasury, US Trade Commission, Federal Reserve Bank,
and People’s Bank of China. He obtained PhD in economics from University of Chicago.
Heather Whiteside is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo and Fellow at
the Balsillie School of International A airs, Canada. Her research on the political economy of
privatization, nancialization, and austerity has been published in journals such as Review of
International Political Economy, Economic Geography, Environment and Planning A, and Studies in Political
Economy, and through several books including Purchase for Pro t (2015), Canadian Political Economy
(2020), Capitalist Political Economy (2020), and Varieties of Austerity (2021).
Minjie Zhang, BA, MBA, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of Windsor Odette
School of Business. Minjie has published papers on entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial nance, and law
and nance in leading journals that include the Journal of International Business Studies, the Journal of
Business Ethics, Emerging Markets Review, Corporate Governance: An International Review (CGIR), and the
International Journal of Managerial Finance. Minjie has presented his work at the Academy of International
Business Annual Conference, the Financial Management Association, the Eastern Finance Association,
the Midwest Finance Association, and the Darden and Cambridge Judge Entrepreneurship and Innovation
Research Conference, Washington, DC, among others. Minjie has received the Best Reviewer Award from
the British Journal of Management (2017), and a Best Paper Award (2nd Place) for his work published in
CGIR.
p. xliv
invest domestically. Again, the authors compare the fortunes of di erent sovereign wealth funds and why
some have been depleted. The chapter concludes by exploring how sovereign wealth funds may be theorized.
In Chapter 8, “State-owned Development Banks,” Aldo Musacchio, Sergio Lazzarini, Pedro Makhoul, and
Emily Simmons draw attention to another crucial tool of state capitalism—state-owned development
banks. Such banks may be seen as a way of solving market failure, as a way of dispensing political
patronage, and as crowding out private lenders. The chapter studies six development banks—Chile’s Corfo,
Brazil’s BNDES, Canada’s BDC, Germany’s KfW, Korea’s KDB, and China’s CDB, examines how they seek to
alleviate market failures and create a typology based on their strategic orientation. The authors identify two
general strategic directions—national-champion oriented (orientated towards large rms; direct
nancing) and entrepreneurship-oriented (small rm orientated, indirect nancing, such as the
guaranteeing of credit). The authors contend that as capital markets evolve, development banks should
become more entrepreneurship-oriented. From a research standpoint, the authors suggest analyzing
conditions and mechanisms through which private capabilities may be engendered in development banks,

and how the banks’ internal organizational forms may be rendered more e cient.
In Chapter 9, “State Capitalism and the Financial Crisis,” John L. Campbell reviews the neoliberal origins of
the 2008 nancial crisis and the di erent responses between liberal and coordinated market economies.
Campbell also makes the connection between the 2008 nancial crisis and the rise of populism in the US and
Europe. The roots of the crisis in the US go back many years and involve multiple moves to lighten up the
regulation on nancial institutions. The US government, precisely the Bush and Obama administrations,
p. xii dealt with the crisis in various manners, ranging from nationalization to social policies to monetary
policy and the Dodd-Frank Act that regulated the nancial institutions more stringently. The US eventually
came out of crisis primarily due to the supremacy of the US dollar enabling the Federal Reserve to execute
capital injections and quantitative easing programs successfully. Campbell then masterfully analyzes the
unique setting of another liberal market economy, Ireland, and its way out of the nancial crisis, before
focusing on several coordinated market economies, such as Denmark, Iceland, and Switzerland. The chapter
concludes with bank consolidation and transnational response.
In “State Ownership and Project Financing” (Chapter 10), Barclay E. James and Paul M. Vaaler study how
partial state ownership in large infrastructure projects a ects investment risk. This chapter argues and
explains the conditions under which partial state ownership serves as a helping rather than hindering hand
to private investors and the projects they fund and govern. The authors propose that state ownership
increases investment risk, but not so when there is low state policy stability in the host country, in which
the project is located. In those cases, substantial but noncontrolling minority state ownership is a second-
best assurance against adverse policy changes that diminishes investment risk. The authors report that
minority state ownership decreases the probability that nancing is delayed for projects located in host
countries with low policy stability. Minority state ownership signals assurance against hindering policy
changes and against potential interference within existing policies.
In “Government Venture Capital Programs” (Chapter 11), Douglas Cumming, So a Johan and Minjie Zhang
focus on how governments o er venture capital support programs around the world, with particular
attention to the US, Israel, Canada, the UK, and Australia. The authors also discuss the evaluation tools for
such programs. After reviewing the literature, the authors nd that the evidence on the e ectiveness of
government venture capital is quite mixed, and not all government venture capital is crowding out the
private venture capital. There are several pitfalls in measuring the e ectiveness of government venture
capital programs. These pitfalls include mis-speci ed variables, improper or insu cient data, and the
application of limited econometric tools that fail to consider nonrandom matching and causality. The
authors suggest ways for future research to avoid these pitfalls by asking the appropriate questions.
Part III. State Capitalism and International Business
The third part studies the international dimension of state capitalism. Although much of the focus of state
capitalism is con ned to the nation’s boundaries, in which the government has the right and responsibility
to facilitate economic well-being, there is also an international dimension of state capitalism when
governments use economic ows as means to achieve foreign policy aims. This is re ected in the
internationalization of state-owned rms and the use of government support as a means of diplomacy.
In “The Internationalization of State-owned Firms: Within Country Drivers” (Chapter 12), Alvaro Cuervo-
Cazurra and Cheng Li analyze how state ownership a ects rm internationalization. They focus on within-
country drives of the di erences in the level of internationalization of state-owned rms and suggest four:
industry, type of government owner, level of state ownership, and managerial independence. First, in terms
of industry, they argue that state-owned rms created to provide public services are less likely to expand
p. xiii abroad. At the same time, those founded to facilitate industrial upgrading are more likely to
internationalize. Second, in terms of the type of government owners, the authors propose that state-owned
rms owned by lower-level governments like provinces, states, municipalities, or cities are less likely to go
global, while those controlled by higher-level governments such as the federal or central administration are
more likely to expand abroad. Third, they suggest that when analyzing the level of state ownership, those
state-owned rms with high levels of state ownership tend to expand overseas less. In contrast, those with
low levels of state ownership are more likely to internationalize. Finally, in regard to managerial
independence, the authors propose that state-owned rms with managers that enjoy lower independence
are less likely to expand abroad. In comparison, those with higher managerial independence tend to

internationalize.
In Chapter 13 titled “State Capitalism and Diplomacy,” Xia Han and Xiaohui Liu use survey data on Chinese
multinational enterprises to analyze how home-government diplomacy helps Chinese rms’ overseas
performance. They nd that the home government’s degree of diplomatic support is positively related to
the performance of Chinese multinationals abroad. Solid political relations between the governments of
China and the host country additionally strengthen the e ect of home-country diplomatic support on the
subsidiary performance of Chinese multinationals. The chapter helps resolve the debate on why emerging
market multinationals operate in politically risky countries. State capitalism appears to play a key role in
empowering emerging market multinationals to operate in countries where strong political relations with
the rm’s home government are in place.
Part IV. State Capitalism, Law, and Development
This part considers one of the most important tools that governments use to intervene in the economy,
namely industrial policy. The chapters assess the impact and e ectiveness of industrial policy instruments,
taking stock of prior literature and empirical evidence. Government support of innovation and technology is
a type of industrial policy gaining momentum in recent years. Industrial policy tools contribute to the
development of state capitalism. On the contrary, outsourcing of state functions is a tool that has been used
by the states to move away from statism and towards markets.
Chapter 14, “Industrial Policy” written by Łukasz Mamica and Wilfred Dolfsma focuses on industrial policy.
It shows that the viability of practical industrial policy solutions requires considering geographical and
sectoral aspects. Of particular signi cance are activities in the area of research and development support
policy. These contribute to increased competitiveness of industry and determine its transformation towards
climate neutrality, especially in the renewable energy sector. There are potential threats associated with the
spending of public funds because these interfere with the free market. However, with an appropriate
industrial policy, the bene ts can overweight the costs. Considering the geographic areas where rms
source their inputs and the geographic areas where they sell their products and services, the authors
propose categorizing rms into four groups. For each category, the authors then suggest a range of
industrial policy tools. Only interventions that re ect the speci city of rms stand a chance of delivering
the planned results. From an institutional economic point of view, the authors suggest a conceptual
framework to analyze government policy in general and industrial policy in particular.
p. xiv In Chapter 15 on “State Capitalism and the Law,” Yong-Shik Lee investigates the role and impact of the law
in state capitalism. Laws provide the regulatory frameworks for state’s participation in the economy and
regulate the extent and manner of such participation. The law acts simultaneously as a facilitator and
regulator of the state’s involvement in the economy and determines its e ectiveness in stimulating
economic development. This chapter illustrates these ideas by analyzing the developmental success of
South Korea, which used state capitalism extensively and investigates how the government used the law to
enable economic development. Building on the General Theory of Law and Development, the chapter nds
that law, legal frameworks, and institutions were crucial implementation mechanisms of state capitalism
and its success in enabling development in South Korea.
Chapter 16 titled “The State as a Facilitator of Innovation” by Yong Wang and Xiuping Hua provides a
holistic assessment of the state’s role in facilitating corporate innovation, technology upgrading, and
industrial development. After reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the state intervention in
innovation activities, the chapter undertakes a detailed survey of the empirical works studying the
facilitating roles played by the state in nurturing emerging high-technology sectors and innovation across
the world. The authors use the case of China to illustrate the e ectiveness of state-led industrial
development initiatives over the last several decades. The chapter concludes that, despite the theoretical
ambiguity on the state’s role in fostering corporate innovation, the empirical evidence on balance suggests
a robust facilitating function that moves beyond merely overcoming market failures.
In Chapter 17 discussing “State Capitalism and Big Data,” Anupriya Misra and Vania Sena explore the
relation between big data and state capitalism. The chapter analyzes the bene ts that big data provides to
reduce the liability of stateness and the challenges they present. They suggest that big data is crucial for
state-owned rms. Similar to other organizations, state-owned rms generate large volumes of data as

they undertake their operations. Therefore, their stored data, with multiple types and complexity, can
enhance the understanding of the performance drivers and help governments and managers improve the
performance of state-owned rms.
Part V. State Capitalism and Public Administration
The section on public administration explores how the tension between the government and the market
a ects the usual government functions of providing public goods and facilitating development.
Chapter 18, titled “Outsourcing State Functions” by Amanda M. Girth discusses the outsourcing of state
functions to the private sector. Through waves of market-oriented reforms since the 1970s, governments
have moved away from statist policies and towards markets. Across the world, the public sector has
increasingly outsourced the provisioning of goods and services to the private sector. This outsourcing is
driven by economic arguments that indicate the value of competition and using the market to reduce the
ine ciencies of monopolistic public institutions. Political and ideological motives lead to outsourcing.
Conservative governments prefer smaller government workforces and diminished union power. Pragmatic
reasons, such as controlling private sector innovation and exiting from noncore functions, also drive
p. xv outsourcing. Opponents of public sector outsourcing note a misplaced faith in markets and an
underemphasis of market e ciencies. The outsourcing of state functions questions the role of the public
sector in the economy and the legitimacy of public institutions.
In Chapter 19, “Public-Private Partnerships,” James Foreman-Peck revisits the case of public-private
partnerships and contracting out since the 1980s. He argues that after such a long experience, the British
experience of increasing disenchantment with private nance and outsourcing in recent years is of
considerable interest. He concludes that private contractors have not proved necessarily better at managing
services that governments traditionally supplied. James Foreman-Peck suggests that private nance has
been an expensive way to massage the national debt to gross domestic product ratio, when less than 10
percent of government investment is at stake. He points out that considerable experience has been obtained
in controlling whole life government project costs with other more straightforward procurement routes.
Finally, in “Hybrid Governance of State-owned Enterprises” (Chapter 20), Ilya Okhmatovskiy, Anna
Grosman, and Pei Sun consider the governance of state-owned enterprises that combines mechanisms of
public administration, informal political interference, and standard corporate governance. Recent studies
often describe social enterprises as hybrid organizations and evaluate hybrid characteristics of social
enterprises positively, while hybrid characteristics of state-owned rms are usually viewed as their
vulnerability. Discussions about state-owned rms’ governance tend to focus on standard corporate
governance mechanisms and treat distinct characteristics of corporate governance in state-owned rms as
deviations from standard governance practices. Through acknowledging the hybrid nature of state-owned
enterprises’ governance, this chapter brings attention to alternative governance mechanisms that the state
can rely on. The authors look at governance hybridity from various theoretical perspectives used in prior
research about corporate governance of rms with state ownership and discuss how hybrid governance
arrangements in such rms vary within and across countries.
Part VI. State Capitalism: Corporate Social Responsibility and
Corporate Political Activity
This part considers social and political context, in which state-a liated rms operate. The rst two
chapters focus on implications of state capitalism for corporate social responsibility. The following chapter
o ers a review of the literature on corporate political ties. It sheds further light on this persistent
mechanism of rm response to the institutional challenges posed by the governments in both developed
and emerging economies.
In “State Capitalism and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Comparative Typology” (Chapter 21), Alan
Brejnholt, Gerhard Schnyder, Jukka Rintamaki, and Luda Svystunova study corporate social responsibility.
Traditionally, the relationship between corporate social responsibility and state action is considered as
complementing or substitutive. However, growing numbers of governments consider corporate social
responsibility as a potential policy tool and attempt to shape organizational corporate social responsibility

policies and outcomes actively. Yet, di erent types of states exhibit di erent levels of interventionism and
p. xvi di erent preferences regarding the means and ends of state intervention. This suggests that corporate
social responsibility policies and outcomes vary across di erent types of states. In this chapter, the authors
systematically explore the relationship between varieties of states and corporate social responsibility by
constructing a typology of corporate responsibilities in di erent types of states. They combine existing
typologies of states and government-corporate social responsibility con gurations to answer how di erent
types of states lead to di erent rm-level corporate social responsibility practices and overall outcomes.
They nd that a regulatory state seeks a minimum role in facilitating corporate social responsibility, largely
leaving corporate social responsibility to the market for self-regulation. A welfare state takes an active role
in shaping corporate social responsibility practice through direct a liations in cross-sector collaboration
and mandatory corporate social responsibility policy. A developmental state also has direct involvement in
corporate social responsibility practice through frequent partnerships involving social projects, through
subsidies, and through corporate social responsibility as a form of government. Lastly, they posit that
predatory states have little interest in corporate social responsibility. When they do, it is mainly in an
opportunistic way with limited social and environmental outcomes.
Chapter 22 by Jiyang Dong and Xiaowei Rose Luo, “State Capitalism and Corporate Social Responsibility:
State In uence on the Firm” undertakes a comprehensive review of existing studies on how both state-
owned enterprises and private sector rms engage in strategic corporate social responsibility activities
under China’s state capitalist regime. Under the dual in uences of the Chinese state and the civil society,
business rms are involved in developing various corporate social responsibility activities to manage their
relationships with social and political stakeholders. The chapter unveils the complex interactions between
rms and government agencies in shaping corporate social responsibility activities through multifaceted
institutional linkages in the rst two decades of the twenty- rst century. It concludes by o ering future
research directions to understand further the complexity and evolution of the Chinese state’s in uence on
corporate social responsibility and the corresponding rm responses.
In Chapter 23, “Corporate Political Ties and State Capitalism,” Renfei Gao, Pei Sun, Anna Grosman, and Ilya
Okhmatovskiy provide an updated overview of the extant research on a salient feature of state capitalism:
corporate political ties. They caution against a popular view that corporate political ties serve primarily as a
rm response to weak institutions by showing their ubiquity in both developed and emerging economies.
Particular emphasis is placed on the governance, strategy, and performance implications of corporate
political ties around the world. Speci cally, the chapter reviews how corporate political ties a ect corporate
governance, risk-taking activities involving internationalization or innovation, and strategic corporate
social responsibility. It highlights the double-edged sword nature of corporate political ties in shaping the
long-run organizational performance. The chapter concludes by o ering several crucial avenues for further
theory development and empirical investigations that can enhance our understanding of the role played by
corporate political ties.
Part VII. State Capitalism: Country and Regional Analyses
The nal part provides an in-depth analysis of state capitalism in various countries and regions of the
p. xvii world. This part is organized by continents in alphabetical order, and within continents, we present
studies of regions and then narrower analyses of state capitalism in particular countries.
In Chapter 24, titled “State Capitalism in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Lucien van der Walt, Gilton Klerck, and Kirk
Helliker address the underexplored topic of state capitalism in Africa. This chapter examines the period
from the late nineteenth century to the present, covering the modern European colonial, early post-
independence, and contemporary, neo-liberal periods. Based on this examination of African experiences,
the authors suggest rethinking standard typologies of state capitalism to include colonial capitalism (such
as étatiste-peasant regimes and regimes of competitive exploitation) and militarized forms of state
capitalism exercised in the past by colonial charter companies and, more recently, by independent
predatory states. African experiences exhibit no simple sequences in the evolution of state capitalism—

instead, we observe overlaps, co-existences, and re-occurrences of di erent forms of state capitalism. The
existing typologies of state capitalism can be enriched by attention to African variants, such as racialized
forms of import-substitution-industrialization under apartheid. The variation in political regimes, state
capacities, class structures, and political economies within this region is re ected in the multitude of state
capitalism forms found in Africa.
In “State Capitalism in the Middle East” (Chapter 25), Yusuf M. Sidani addresses state capitalism in the
Middle East by investigating military capitalism and how it operates within Egypt. Throughout its recent
history, the military has emerged as a skillful institution, leveraging its status within Egyptian society. The
military became the institution that sustains peace and ensures stability and the one much needed to ll the
void left by weak societal and governmental institutions. In that process, the military accumulated
substantial political and economic interests, clearly signaling its intention to protect those interests. The
chapter presents the historical progression of military capitalism and explains what this means for the
future of Egyptian society and economy.
Rodrigo B. DeMello in “State Capitalism in Latin America” (Chapter 26) demonstrates how state capitalism
can be useful for politicians. State capitalism in Latin America has survived the re-democratization in the
1980s. It remains relevant because it has been instrumental for the political survival of both left- and right-
wing governments. The author suggests a framework to describe how governments may use state
capitalism tools to distribute private and public goods. This facilitates the process of building and managing
coalitions in multiparty presidential systems of Latin American countries.
In “State Capitalism in the United States: Development Finance State” (Chapter 27), Robert Hockett and
Saule Omarova argue that “The American Plan” of state capitalism was developed by Treasury Secretary
Alexander Hamilton in the early years of the American republic. The authors describe Development Finance
State as the powerful American tradition of hybrid public-private nancing of continuous economic
progress. Tracing this tradition through two centuries down to the present, the authors argue that the
rediscovery and rebirth of Development Finance State is the key to the country’s ability to meet the many
challenges it faces today.
In Chapter 28, “State Capitalism in the United States: The Military and Prison Industrial Complexes,” Daniel
D’Amico describes the unique incentives at play within state produced and managed military and prison
industries under democratic regimes. In contrast to competitive market economies, wherein competition
guides productive and allocative e ciency, centrally managed state industries deviate from the e cient
p. xviii allocation of resources insofar as discretion holders perceive value from growth, and voting electorates
exhibit bias. Thus, the tendency for deviating from the e ciency equilibrium is present in both
authoritarian and democratic regimes missing e ective monitoring in the military and criminal justice
spheres.
In “State Capitalism is Capitalism in Canada” (Chapter 29), Heather Whiteside proposes that state
capitalism in Canada is a subset of capitalism, and that liberal, particularly neoliberal, discourse of distinct
private markets reinforced by the public sector laissez-faire is largely a ction. Various historical and
contemporary trends indicate that state-owned enterprises supported capitalist development and re ected
changes within the capitalist system; thus, the neoliberal era may be market-led but is highly reliant on and
enabled by the state. This chapter reviews the literature on state capitalism and summarizes neoliberal era
tendencies, focusing on the relationship between state capitalism and state-owned enterprises in Canada
through case studies over various periods of economic development.
In “State Capitalism in East Asia” (Chapter 30), Richard Carney and Krislert Samphantharak examine the
relationship between political regimes and state capitalism. They categorize national political systems into
narrow authoritarian regimes, single party authoritarian regimes, dominant party authoritarian regimes,
and democracies. The authors describe how state capitalism is manifested in state ownership of listed rms
and the role played by sovereign wealth funds. The case studies of Brunei, China, Singapore, and Taiwan
illustrate the impact of political regimes on the manifestations of state capitalism, including changes in
state capitalism triggered by changes in the structure of a political regime.
In “State Capitalism in India” (Chapter 31), Rohit Chandra and Elizabeth Chatterjee discuss how state
intervention in the Indian economy remains extensive but substantively di erent from the old central
planning. This chapter surveys these changes, examining the reinvention of state-owned rms in the
liberalization era. It uses rm-level case studies from the electricity, coal, and aviation sectors to explain

the variation in state-owned rm performance, showing this to be inextricable from the political economies
in which individual rms are embedded. Finally, it assesses new tools of state intervention, especially the
channeling of state resources to favored private rms. Overall, the political and economic coherence of
Indian state capitalism as a system should not be overstated, illustrating the di culties of governing state
capitalism in a fractious federal democracy.
In “State Capitalism in Western Europe” (Chapter 32), Andrea Colli demonstrates that governments in
Western Europe are still holding sizeable ownership stakes in companies operating in industries of strategic
importance, even though their holdings sometimes have been reduced to the minimum threshold of control.
Floating a considerable part of the companies’ shares on international stock markets attracted institutional
investors and impacted these companies’ corporate governance practices by subjecting them to scrutiny. As
a consequence of this process, domestic-oriented market strategies have given room to aggressive
internationalization. The chapter presents a taxonomy of state-owned companies that re ects their
strategic orientation and the degree of state ownership.
In Chapter 33, titled “State Capitalism in Poland and Hungary: Populist Varieties,” Maciej Bałtowski, Piotr
Kozarzewski, and Tomasz Mickiewicz discuss the economic systems of Poland and Hungary using the state
capitalism lens. They de ne state capitalism in the broad and narrow senses, and propose six major
manifestations of state capitalism of the populist variety, and ve major state capitalism tools. Applying
this framework to the post-Soviet, transition economies context, the authors discuss the origins of state
p. xix capitalism formation in Poland and Hungary. They focus on speci c features of state capitalism of the
populist variety in these countries, including the relative importance of political ties, oligarchy, and the use
of state-owned enterprises as the source of rents, as well as di erent tools of state control over the business
sector. The authors indicate that the speci c economic policies implemented in the two countries are path
dependent. They also underline the contradictions between the features resulting from the post-communist
past and the contemporary in uences, mainly related to the membership of both countries in the EU.
In “State Capitalism in Russia” (Chapter 34), Satoshi Mizobata and Hiroaki Hayashi explain how Russian
state capitalism works and a ects business and society. Since the beginning of market reforms, the
government–business relationships in Russia have transformed from the “state capture” and the
“grabbing hand” to the “give-and-take” model. This chapter highlights ve characteristics of Russian
state capitalism. First, the Russian economy heavily depends on natural resources and is led by a strong
central authority characterized by rent-seeking behavior. Second, the governmentalization of strategic
sectors to attain corporate control has been in e ect since the 2000s, and the state has strengthened control
over key corporations in the prioritized economic sectors ever since. Third, Russia’s innovation policy has a
state-led character. Fourth, regarding state-society relations, the state has provided increased support to
ordinary people, mainly using sources of funds coming from the oil and gas revenues. This enhances the
public support for the Putin’s regime. Fifth, the Russian middle class heavily depends on the government,
p. xx implying that the former has weak incentives to reform the current shape of state capitalism.
Notes
1 We are grateful to the authors for providing the abstracts of their chapters which were used for writing this section.
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CHAPTER
1 State Capitalism and the Firm: An Overview 

Mike Wright, Geo rey T. Wood, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Pei Sun, Ilya Okhmatovskiy, Anna Grosman
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/45223/chapter/387222501 by Medical library, Aker Hospital user on 13 April 2023
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198837367.013.1 Pages 3–C1.P164
Published: 19 December 2022
Abstract
In this introduction to The Handbook of State Capitalism and the Firm, we provide an overview of state
capitalism, its evolution, diversity, and theoretical implications. We clarify the tension between the
market and the government that drives state intervention in the economy. A brief historical overview
of state capitalism provides a much-needed background to explicit and implicit discussions of the
diversity of dimensions of state capitalism. We document how state capitalism seems to have followed
a pendulum between periods of high dominance and periods of retrenchment that have resulted in the
transformation of the literature over time. We also explain the variety of state capitalism that has been
implemented across countries and time. We then outline the diversity in the theorization of state
capitalism as a phenomenon and the implications of the cross-border expansion of state capitalism.
We conclude with an overview of the potential avenues for future research on state capitalism and the
rm.
Keywords: government, capitalism, state ownership, regulation, sovereign wealth funds, state-owned
multinationals
Subject: Political Economy, Politics
Introduction
THIS handbook assesses, develops, and extends the debates on how rms are in uenced by and respond to
state capitalism, which we understand as the government’s direct in uence on economic relationships in
capitalist economies. It is a timely volume given the changing role of the state in economies around the
world in recent decades and the evolution of research on this topic.
Governments’ active participation in the economy characterized much of the middle of the twentieth
century. However, the worldwide adoption of pro-market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s led to
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, reducing the state’s role in the economy. In parallel, much of
the literature praised markets as the most e cient form of economic organization and led to a boom in
their studies. However, the 2000s saw the emergence of state-owned multinationals as credible global
competitors and some governments’ apparent success in facilitating economic growth and avoiding
economic turmoil brought back state capitalism as a topic of interest. This apparent swing of the pendulum
manifests itself in responses to the global pandemic that highlights the state’s deep involvement in tackling
socioeconomic challenges across the globe.
In view of this renewed interest in state capitalism that has resulted in a burgeoning, multidisciplinary
literature, we bring together contributors from various academic disciplines and viewpoints. The
contributing authors have diverse academic backgrounds that include established social sciences (e.g.,
history, sociology, economics, and political science) and applied disciplines (such as management and data
science). By bringing together di erent disciplinary perspectives, this handbook o ers a comprehensive
analysis of how rms operate under state capitalism. At the same time, even a comprehensive handbook
format would not allow us to cover all aspects of state capitalism in one volume. Hence, as the title of this
p. 4 handbook indicates, we have chosen to focus our attention on business rms operating under conditions
of state capitalism: how the state as an economic agent a ects rms—those businesses that are directly or
partially state-owned, and those private sector businesses that depend on active or covert state largesse and
support. This choice explains why some topics are treated at length while other topics are addressed brie y,
if at all, by the chapters included in this volume. For example, we consider the implications of state
ownership for rm performance and outcomes but pay much less attention to society-level and individual-
level performance indicators (such as individual income, life expectancy, education level) that are related to
the extent and forms of state intervention in the economy. Of course, our rm-level focus does not imply
that we ignore the context where the rm operates—just the opposite is true: the chapters included in this
handbook place great emphasis on sociopolitical and institutional contexts.
In this introductory chapter, we provide an overview of state capitalism, concentrating on its evolution,
diversity, and theoretical implications. We start with an in-depth discussion of state capitalism to clarify
the tension between the market and the government that drives state intervention in the economy. From
there, we brie y outline a historical evolution of state capitalism to provide a much-needed background to
explicit and implicit discussions of the diversity of dimensions of state capitalism discussed in the
handbook. We document how state capitalism seems to have followed a pendulum between periods of high
dominance and periods of retrenchment that have resulted in the transformation of the literature over time.
We also explain the variety of state capitalism that has been implemented across countries and time, with a
rich set of empirical settings to analyze. We then outline the diversity in the theorization of state capitalism
as a phenomenon and the implications of the cross-border expansion of state capitalism. We conclude with
an overview of the potential avenues for future research on state capitalism and the rm.
Understanding State Capitalism
Our de nition of state capitalism as the government’s direct in uence on economic relationships in
capitalist economies implies that the role of the state is not limited to performing traditional scal,
regulatory, social welfare, and security functions in service of the citizens of the nation. The state is also
assuming an active role as an economic agent and exercises in uence over rms and markets through a
variety of formal institutional arrangements (including ownership, loans, subsidies, guarantees, diplomatic
support, and so on) and informal in uence mechanisms. This understanding is consistent with the recent
literature on state capitalism (e.g., Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014; Wood and Wright, 2015; Wright et al.,
2021).
Some thinkers consider the state and capitalism as essentially antithetical constructs. The traditional
discussion in many economic textbooks is to present capitalism (the market) as the invisible hand that
facilitates the achievement of e cient outcomes and the state (the government) as the visible hand that
intervenes in the functioning of the market. However, capitalism is not always about market primacy. There
are many situations of imperfect markets that require government intervention to ensure e cient
outcomes. As Adam Smith (1776 [2010]) cautioned, there are strong tendencies by economic agents to nd
mechanisms to restrict competition. Indeed, in his classic economic histories, Braudel (1992) highlighted
p. 5 how, through much of the history of capitalist development, there are strong tendencies toward
oligopolies and monopolies. Under conditions of market externalities and noncompetitive markets,
governments are seen as needing to intervene in the workings of the market to ensure e ciency. Market
primacy is not always the same as the primacy of private interests, and this explains why deregulation and
statism may go hand in hand (Wood, 2019). As the literature on state capture alerts us (see Chapter 13),
states may be active in pursuit of private interests rather than public interests. As he was writing in the
heyday of fascism, Polanyi (1944) was acutely aware that the state does not always serve society (Wood,
2019).
Even though if traditional economic textbooks view the government as an impartial umpire or one that
regulates for a fairer competition to counteract such tendencies, there are also plenty of situations of
government imperfections. Government imperfections emerge not only because of the state’s (often)
limited capacity to monitor and enforce regulations on the market but also because of the in uence that
corporate interests can have on the creation and content of regulations in the rst place. Many governments
in capitalistic countries promote the interests of well-connected rms and industries where oligopolies
predominate. A manifestation of this tendency appeared in the UK and the US, where the state has actively
nurtured and sustained oligopolies in key strategic industries, such as defense, and outsourced state
functions, such as parts of health and aged care and penal services (Wood and Wright, 2015). The rise of
oligopolies in technology platforms re ects not only regulatory negligence, but the political clout of such
players both direct and through mobilizing consumers’ tacit allegiance (Culpepper and Thelen, 2020).
In addition to regulation, the government can intervene in economic relationships directly as a provider
through state-owned enterprises. As economic agents, state-owned rms have as nominal owners the
citizens of the country, but they are in e ect controlled by politicians and in many cases run for the latter’s
bene t (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, and Ramaswamy, 2014). State-owned rms su er from
signi cant agency problems; such problems can take di erent forms, from simple ine ciencies in
articulating the public interest and will of the owners through to serving the political interests of
government agencies and the personal interests of politicians, senior civil servants, and their clients at the
expense of wider society. Meanwhile, some private enterprises that are closely enmeshed with the
government can draw on the latter’s much greater economic and political resources to their advantage and,
at the same time, are in uenced by the desires and objectives of politicians. In this perspective, such rms
derive advantages from their links to the state but also become dependent upon the state. This creates
complexity in the study of state capitalism: not only does the state act as an economic agent directly
through state-owned enterprises, other economic agents within and external to the state also exploit close
relations with client politicians or civil servants and are in uenced by them. The latter can be motivated by
the potential for serving the broader societal good or by personal rent seeking (Sun, Mellahi, and Wright,
2012; Sun, Mellahi, Wright, and Xu, 2015).
In short, state capitalism should be conceived as a phenomenon that presents mixed bene ts and costs.
Capitalism is not always about markets prevailing; some market actors have become increasingly reliant on
state intervention, a phenomenon that has accelerated subsequent crises. State intervention is not always
about public goods; indeed, the state may actively undermine collective goods if it transfers functions to
insider rms interested mostly in extracting rents from the state with little concern about the wellbeing of
society. Accordingly, manifestations of state capitalism have proliferated, making even more critical the
p. 6 challenge of studying state capitalism in its various forms observed around the world (Wright et al.,
2021). Fixed ideological assumptions as to the relative desirability of this phenomenon are di cult to
sustain: if modern states cannot sustain themselves without markets, the converse is also true.
The Evolution of State Capitalism
State involvement in the economy, and with rms and industries in particular, has a very long history
(Casson and Casson, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2019). For example, the Chinese government of the Han Dynasty
established a salt monopoly as early as 119 BCE, which ended only in 2014 (Chien, 2020; Hornby, 2014). In
medieval England, although there were no state-owned enterprises as such, the state, in the guise of the
English crown, had an important role in encouraging urban development (including as an urban landlord
and town founder) and attempts to monopolize trade (Fryde, 1952). In the late Renaissance, European
powers created state-owned trading monopolies, such as the Portuguese Casa da Índia or the Spanish Casa
de Contratación, or granted state-sanctioned monopolies to private rms, including the English East India
Company, the Danish East India Company, or the Dutch United East India Company, that followed the early
Renaissance example of the Venetian spice monopoly. However, in practice, many of these monopolies
balanced trade with outright plunder; primitive expropriation formed a central part of their activities. As
economies developed, states oftentimes created and owned monopolistic organizations that provided public
services or facilitated tax collection such as postal services, telecommunications, currency mintage, tobacco
monopolies, and so on. In contrast to the early trading monopolies, these new monopolies were inward-
looking and developmental, aiming to promote both social/economic development and internal revenue
ows.
In many countries, the government took an active role in accelerating industrialization in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Gerschenkron, 1962). The economic collapse that accompanied
the Great Depression in the early 1930s led even governments in liberal markets to take more active control
of the economy via regulation and direct ownership of rms (Yergin and Stanislaw, 2002). Developing
countries adopted an import substitution model to facilitate industrialization (Bruton, 1998). This increase
in state intervention in the economy was reinforced after the Second World War as governments in Europe
aimed to aid reconstruction and promote more inclusive institutions, at least partially prompted by the
desire to present a viable alternative to communism. Meanwhile, in Eastern and parts of Central Europe,
state socialist experiments were imposed, to a lesser or greater extent, following the Soviet model. As
developing countries became independent, many governments exercised control in the economy to enable
development.
The rise of state capitalism in the twentieth century has not been a linear trend, and there has been a
pendulum of government control of the economy (Cuervo-Cazurra, Gaur, and Singh, 2019). There were
occasional reversals of these policies, such as, for example, the switching to and from the state sector of
steel in the UK from the 1940s according to the political color of the government of the day or the
nationalization of shipbuilding in the UK. Government policy, through sponsoring ministries and industry
boards, was oftentimes directed at stemming the losses of many state-owned enterprises in an attempt to
p. 7 enable them to break even. It also used economic and nancial approaches to pricing and investment,
such as marginal cost pricing (Heald, 1980) and adjustments to accounting policies to portray reported
pro ts or losses that were acceptable to policymakers and commentators (Wright, 1979, 1985).
In the 1980s, a process of retrenchment from earlier statism that had dominated most world economies
since the 1940s started, with state-owned enterprises becoming partially and fully privatized, industries
becoming deregulated, and economies becoming liberalized by governments (Yergin and Stanislaw, 2002;
Liu, Sun, and Woo, 2006). However, in the 2010s, the process saw a reversal, both in advanced economies
(with governments regulating industries and nationalizing banks and rms to deal with the aftermath of
the global nancial crisis that started in 2008) and in emerging economies (with governments using
domestic rms as extensions of economic policy and supporting the international expansion of state-
owned rms) (Copestake, 2010; Economist, 2012; Hultén, Barron, and Bryson, 2012; Vail, 2014). This trend
has resulted in new and more complex realities of the in uence of the governments on rms. For example,
governments share ownership with private investors, state-owned rms have become multinationals,
governments have taken on new roles as global asset managers (e.g., through sovereign wealth funds), and
there has been a rise of rms that have secured oligopolistic status through state concessions and by
capturing outsourced public functions (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014; Dolfsma and Grosman, 2019; Grosman,
Okhmatovskiy, and Wright, 2016; Musacchio, Lazzarini, and Aguilera, 2015; Sun, Deng, and Wright, 2021;
Wood and Wright, 2015). Contractions and expansions of the state-controlled assets can be considered as a
manifestation of long-term historical uctuations of countries between laissez-faire marketization at one
end of the spectrum and close state control over the economy at the other end (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019).
Figure 1.1
The reliance on markets versus state control and the “pendulum” movements along the e iciency frontier
This dynamic of privatizations and nationalizations can be depicted as a pendulum movement along the
p. 8 e ciency frontier in Figure 1.1; this would represent a subdimension of the famous “double movement”
described by Polanyi (1944), as any attempts to “dis-embed” society from the economy will lead to e orts
to re-embed the economy within society (Campbell, 2021). These swings of the pendulum between the
reliance on markets versus state control for coordinating the economy can be triggered by political factors
(e.g., a rise of nationalism), economic factors (e.g., a nancial crisis), natural shocks (e.g., the global
pandemic), or changes in public opinion regarding the e ectiveness and fairness of reliance on markets
versus state control of the economy. The shape of the e ciency frontier re ects the negative correlation
between the degree of reliance on markets and the degree of reliance on state control.
Figure 1.2
The reliance on markets versus state control and shi s of the e iciency frontier
Countries di er in the e ectiveness of market-based coordination and the e ectiveness of coordination

through state control. For example, if we compare the oligarch-dominated Russian economy in the 1990s
with the Singapore economy in the 2010s, we have to acknowledge that in the latter, markets are much more
developed, and, at the same time, the degree of state control over the economy was higher in Singapore than
during Yeltsin’s rule in Russia. Such cross-national comparisons, demonstrating that in country A both
market coordination and state coordination can be higher than in country B, suggest that these countries
are located on di erent e ciency frontiers, as depicted in Figure 1.2.
Shifting the e ciency frontier toward the upper-right corner is a much more di cult task than moving
along the existing e ciency frontier between the lower right corner and the upper left corner. Such a shift
can re ect an increase in state coordination by enhancing the state capacity to manage its assets without
increasing the assets under state control. Similarly, a shift toward the upper right corner could represent an
increase in the market-based coordination of the economy through enhanced functioning of markets
without reducing the degree of state control. Moving along the e ciency frontier and shifting this frontier
in the upper-right direction are not mutually exclusive processes, and successful market reforms would
p. 9 combine privatization (moving along the e ciency frontier) with the development of market
institutions (shifting the e ciency frontier) (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019; Ramamurti, 2000).
The Diversity of State Capitalism across Countries
Whilst there are no pure market economies where the state does not play any role as an economic agent, the
scale, scope, and form of state capitalism vary greatly from country to country. Although it was commonly
assumed that state-owned rms are associated with inferior performance (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009),
the evidence is mixed (Liu, Beirne, and Sun, 2015; Szarzec and Nowara, 2017). All national economies relied
on the state as an active economic agent during key phases of industrial development; this might range
from the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century colonialism in search of markets and raw materials by
European powers to serving as an integral component of the active industrial policies followed by the East
Asian economies (cf. Braudel, 1979; Haggard, 2018).
Transition economies are obvious examples of state capitalism at play. The implosion of the Soviet Union in
the mid-1980s led to the independence of countries and the rapid adoption of capitalism. However, the
transition proved not only challenging but, in many cases, led to the conversion of state monopolies into
private monopolies and the transfer of state assets to some selected individuals. These led to the emergence
of an oligarchic class that depended on the government to ensure its continued dominance, resulting in a
symbiotic system in which the government and oligarchs supported each other and with many governments
reinstating their dominance of the economy through state-owned rms and the expropriation of
unsupportive oligarchs. In China, the government sought to secure continuous growth that was su ciently
broad-based so as to solve sociopolitical problems, or in any event, render them less pressing to maintain
power. Although there is much debate surrounding China’s path since then, the fact that several of the
mature liberal markets have seen declining real wages for much of the population for some thirty years,
followed on by right-wing populist backlashes (Cumming, Wood, and Zahra, 2020), represents an obvious
point of re ection, as does the stagnation of the physical infrastructure in many advanced economies. In
practice, Chinese state capitalism incorporates many elements: state ownership at di erent levels of
government, with a strong regional development focus (Grosman et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2006; Xu, 2011), the
development of an ecosystem of rms encompassing outright state-owned enterprises, enterprises with
close government/political linkages, subject to close regulation in some areas and little or no regulation in
others (Boyer, 2016; Chen and Rithmire, 2020; Lin and Milhaupt, 2013). It also focused on exports as a driver
for growth but without the same coherent emphasis on value chain upgrading as characterized the Asian
tiger economies (Chen, Luo, and Zhao, 2019). Other communist countries in Asia such as Vietnam and Laos
imitated the Chinese model of economic liberalization under state control and support for state-owned
rms (Perkins, 2001).
However, on the other extreme of liberal market economies, which are assumed to be paragons of markets,
there are elements of state capitalism. In the US, the state is prominent in actively sustaining a vast military
p. 10 industry and subsidizing weapons exports (Bajusz, 2019; D’Amico, 2021). A wide range of justi cations
are given for this, from sustaining jobs to furthering diplomatic objectives (Bajusz, 2019). Again, there is an
ecosystem of private military companies that serve both as an indirect arm of the state and as pro t-
generating entities (Wood and Wright, 2015). Once more, the penal complex encompasses both public and
private prisons, with the latter operating under fundamental con icts of interest: on the one hand, they may
be contractually bound to provide a service that reduces the burden of administrating incarceration, and yet
may have a nancial interest in reo ending and ever-longer sentences on the basis of enhancing revenues.
The links between the high-tech and public sectors are extensive, encompassing spillovers from public
universities, defense spending, regional authority support, and active state backing on the global stage
(Block and Keller, 2009; Wood and Wright, 2015). The rise of political strategies within key industries and
their increased reliance on state intervention for survival seems to be driving this process (Faccio, Masulis,
and McConnell, 2006). One spectacular example has been the hydrocarbon industry, where there has been a
progressive ratcheting up of subsidies in Australia, the UK, and the US (He ron, 2013; Metcalf, 2018).
Traditionally, it was assumed to be the sunrise industry of renewables that would be more reliant on
subsidies; however, over time, these have been pared away, and, in some cases, stringent planning
restrictions (in the UK) or charges (various states in the US) have been promulgated to reduce the latter
competitive base (Moore, 2020; Van de Graaf, 2018). In other words, the hydrocarbon industry has become
increasingly reliant on political strategies, involving both the securing of direct state resources and
patronage as well as seeking to constrain emerging competitors from the renewable energy industry
(Brown, 2018; Moore, 2020).
In between these two extremes, state capitalism exists in a variety of forms around the world. In the
coordinated market economies, there is a long tradition of the government providing guidance and actively
participating in the economy. This was not just the economic plans to facilitate reconstruction after the
devastation of the Second World War in Europe and Japan. It continued in response to crises and part of the
sustaining of the welfare state under the assumption that the state would provide a wide range of public
services and assist rms in cases of need. Even after the liberalization and privatization processes of the
1990s, most developing countries still have a signi cant level of state intervention in the economy through
regulations and controls on prices aimed at achieving social development or through state-owned
companies directed at supporting the preferred desires of politicians. Within developing countries, there is a
vast diversity in the state capitalism, from countries that are relatively laissez-faire like Chile but still retain
state-owned companies like the copper mining giant Codelco to highly interventionist countries like
Venezuela that renationalized much of the companies that were once private rms or sold to private
investors.
Theorizing State Capitalism
The theorization of state capitalism has gone over a long evolution of thinking regarding the role of the
government and markets in the economy worldwide. An extensive body of literature on the corporation
suggests that, during the period of growth and asset accumulation in the 1950s and 1960s, there was a
p. 11 certain embedded sense of obligation to the whole corporation by managers and investors (Toms and
Wilson, 2012). In other words, sustaining the corporation was a desirable outcome in its own right, which
involved husbanding resources and carefully managing any borrowing (Chandler, 1986). With this came
implicit obligations to a wider community of stakeholders (Post, Preston, and Sauter-Sachs, 2002). From
the 1970s onward, such viewpoints became increasingly unfashionable in the US, the UK, and many other
settings: instead, the corporation was perceived simply as a nexus of contracts serving as a vehicle for
releasing value to investors—the residual claimants (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If this process led to the
corporations’ demise, this was treated as a regrettable but potentially necessary outcome, facilitating the
reallocation of capital to the most productive outlets. In the aftermath of the 2008 nancial crisis, there
were growing questions as to the advisability of this model (Mader, Mertens, and van der Zwan, 2020).
However, the subsequent recovery, fueled by the moral hazard of the bailouts, seemed to have led to further
excess. Importantly, in the lead up to the crisis, there was much evidence of a lack of sense of duty to, or
empathy with, other stakeholders; it seemed too often associated with a lack of sense of any obligation to
wider society or the home government (cf. Krauss et al., 2012). It could be argued that such empathy was
unnecessary or even undesirable if rms are to maximize returns. However, an excessive focus on the latter,
and over usage of debt-funded share buybacks and dividends by companies to respond to continuing
investor pressure (Driver, Grosman, and Scaramozzino, 2020), meant many were unable to cope with the
exogenous shock of economic crises. This culminated in a new round of handouts to overborrowed rms,
and indirectly, their investors, including private equity and hedge funds, following the COVID-19 pandemic
(Wiggens, van der Velde, and Wigglesworth, 2020). In e ect, the state assumed the role of a lender of last
resort, and in doing so, actively revived large numbers of rms that were dangerously overborrowed to fund
share buybacks and dividends. Yet, the decisions as to whom to bail out were politically informed,
suggesting strategic priorities in the con guration of national economies postcrisis.
An alternative approach to the diversity in theorization over time is the diversity in theorization on state
capitalism across locations. Comparative institutional analysis has become increasingly popular as an
analytical tool for understanding di erences in state capitalism (Allen, Allen, Saqib, and Liu, 2020; Hall and
Soskice, 2001; Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Ciftci, Tatoglu, Wood, Demirbag, and Zaim, 2019). What
distinguishes this approach is that it focuses not only on the e ects of formal regulations but also embedded
informal conventions and the nature and density of ties between key actors. As more than one set of rules
and relations may make for coherent and sustained growth, this would suggest that there is not a single
optimal mix between state and market. Indeed, given the inability of markets to sustain themselves without
regular bouts of state intervention at times of crisis—encompassing the state acting as an economic agent
—this would indicate it is not so much a question of the desirability of statism but its form, scope, and
appropriateness to the setting. However, if politicians and senior civil servants play a role at the
commanding heights of the state, private sector elites play this role in representing the interests of private
market actors. Any dysfunctional outcomes in the interplay of the market and the state are often blamed on
the latter, and more speci cally, on dysfunctional institutions that allow space for corruption (Whyte,
2015). In every instance, behavior can constitute a mix of altruism and opportunism. In particular, public
servants may be bound by a sense of public interest or seek to maximize private rents. The relative attention
accorded to each will depend not only on the individual but also on embedded societal rules and conventions
p. 12 (Allen, Wood, and Keller, 2021). Yet, every corrupt transaction has two parties, and if politicians and civil
servants may react opportunistically, or even corruptly, so may private individuals. Nor do the latter
necessarily only do so when institutional restraints are ine ective, or the incentives they provide are
perverse (Hoang, 2018).
A third theorization approach is the analysis of the drivers of the evolution of state capitalism within a
country. The literature on institutional entrepreneurship notes how individuals may actively seek to push
back or remake institutional rules to serve their interests (Becker-Ritterspach, Lange, and Becker-
Ritterspach, 2017). This may be simply to level the playing eld, to gain preferential advantages, or to
capture state resources for short-term gain, even if it leaves much of society worse o . The pursuit of
personal bene ts by economic actors thus results in the transformation of state capitalism. States may be
predatory in their activities toward the private domain, but the converse is also true (Galbraith, 2006). This
results in many pathologies within state capitalism. These range from simply serving as a mechanism for
directing state resources to insiders, be they royals or local compradors, to misguided e orts to promote
national development by unrealistic or inappropriate means (Hyden, 1983); it is quite common that these
two elements overlap. Although a pathological relationship between business and states is often held to be
the case in emerging markets, there has been an increasing body of evidence that would suggest that this
distinction is less clear-cut (Economist, 2014). Rather, it seems that, if in emerging markets, it is states that
are weakly embedded in society (Hyden, 1983), it is in mature liberal markets that there has been a tendency
for business and investor elites to su er from this shortcoming (Krauss et al., 2012). In both cases, this
would make for forms of state capitalism that transfer wealth to insiders, rather than promoting more
general development. However, just as it would be mistaken to assume that mature economies are
intrinsically less state capitalist or have the balance between state and market right, the same is true for
emerging economies. In the latter case, a common distinction is between states that successfully ful ll an
active developmental role and those that do not (Evans, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999). This is often ascribed
to long institutional legacies, in some instances de ned by the nature and role of the former colonial power
(Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier, 2017), and to speci c con gurations of domestic institutions and
interest groups that shape the e cacy of government policies (e.g., Allen et al., 2020; Sun, 2007). However,
it is also molded by the role of external agents, be they foreign governments seeking to institute systems
particularly to their liking (whether on the grounds of ideology or expediency), multinational enterprises,
or other transnational actors (Koning, Mertens, and Roosenboom, 2018). In both mature and emerging
markets, it is important to consider that there are two bases for generating returns: the rst is through the
generation and sale of goods and services, and the second is what is referred to as predatory value
extraction, the capture and reallocation of accumulated value (Lazonick and Shin, 2019; Sun, Hu, and
Hillman, 2016). As with private economic agents, state capitalist enterprises may generate returns through
either of these paths; in the case of the latter, it may enrich politicians, civil servants, and private
individuals (Sun, Wright, and Mellahi, 2010).
Hence, in theorizing state capitalism, there is a need for a closer understanding of the role of elites in
actively intervening and molding the role of the state as an economic agent, rather than simply seeing the
latter as acting autonomously or internally driven by the logic of speci c state traditions (Evans, 1995; Sun,
2019). Rather than seeing it as a simple interplay between structure and action, with di erent actors
p. 13 molding and being impacted by the cluster of institutions associated with the state, it is essential to
consider how speci c actors may secure su cient in uence to place themselves in an oligopolistic position
in terms of policy impact and institutional redesign. This should be viewed within the context of oligarchic
tendencies present in all societies (Mayville, 2018). However, these tendencies are likely to be particularly
pronounced in national systems that are challenged in reconciling growth with broad-based upliftment or
simply sustaining existing material conditions for the bulk of the population. While it is often assumed that
national institutional orders change when they apparently stop working in terms of generating broad
growth and reconciling competing interests, it is worth re ecting that such systems may be highly
functional for small groups of insiders (Wood and Frynas, 2006). In turn, this may result in a strong focus
on sustaining those very features that mostly bene t insiders, even if it results in wider social or economic
harm or leads to a destruction of democratic institutions. Indeed, the triumph of populist extremism in
mature economies highlights that stable democratic institutions and associated politics are not necessarily
associated with market development; rather, what matters is whether and which mature institutions can
sustain a basic social contract (Cumming et al., 2020). Finally, if actor behavior may re ect, at least in part,
elite composition and their agendas and ideologies, the relationship between action and structure is not
simply a dichotomous one, as suggested by structuration theory (Giddens, 1991). A third dimension may be
that of events, whether a product of the unforeseen consequences of past composite actions and rules or the
e ects of the national environment, whether cyclical or blowback as a result of human interventions (Wood,
2018). The recon guration and extension of state capitalism are partially in response to past decisions (such
as unsustainable corporate borrowing), even if precipitated by economic disruptions.
The Internationalization of State Capitalism
Although the traditional view of state capitalism is that it is a feature of a country and its associated
government, the cross-border expansion of state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds is
questioning the boundaries of the phenomenon. State-owned enterprises are increasingly becoming
multinationals, ful lling a range of purposes from capturing strategic assets to generating new revenues to
furthering diplomatic purposes (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2018a; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014), with government
ownership providing both hindering and helping hands on the internationalization level (Kalasin, Cuervo-
Cazurra, and Ramamurti, 2020). On the one hand, state ownership of foreign investors is subject to
additional evaluation and in some cases outright exclusion by host country governments (Cuervo-Cazurra,
2018b). On the other hand, state-owned multinationals may rely on the diplomatic support of the parent
government to secure concessions to import materials at less than standard customs duties (Li,
Newenham-Kahindi, Shapiro, and Chen, 2013). In entering other markets, practices will necessarily have to
adapt from the original intentions, resulting in a diversity of approaches to local actors, from outright
competition to forging symbiotic relationships (Guo, Clougherty, and Duso, 2016). The degree of insertion
into local product regimes by state-owned multinationals tends to be much greater than by private
p. 14 multinationals (Morgan, Kristensen, and Whitley, 2003). They may even import semi- or unskilled labor
to perform a signi cant component of production, as is the case with Chinese state-owned multinationals
in Africa (Cooke, Wood, and Horwitz, 2015).
State capitalism’s in uence across borders is also achieved indirectly through the foreign investments of
sovereign wealth funds. Sovereign wealth funds are intergenerational savings devices designed to husband
foreign exchange windfalls, most commonly from oil and gas (Cumming, Wood, Filatotchev, and Reinecke,
2017). National governments may also assume the role of transnational investors via sovereign wealth
funds. This may be simply to maximize returns in terms of their intergenerational savings (especially, when
they are prohibited from domestic investments), to help the parent government and allied rms to access
proprietary technology and strategic assets, to further diplomatic ends, and/or to promote home country
values abroad (Cumming et al., 2017). Sovereign wealth funds are also used as vehicles to discreetly nudge
the governments of host countries in which they are investing in order to promote political objectives
abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra, Grosman, and Megginson, 2022). For example, in the case of Norway, although
the state is quite actively involved in mediating the labor market and other areas of economic life, the role of
the Norwegian Government Pension Fund-Global (NGPF-G), the country’s sovereign wealth fund, deserves
particular attention, with the fund owning almost 2.5% of all shares in listed companies in the world (NBIM,
2021). What sets the NGPF-G apart is that it has a strong emphasis on promoting “Norwegian values,” and
this has translated into linking investment to corporate ethical behavior (Vasudeva, Nachum, and Say,
2018), either by selectively choosing investment targets or by engaging in shareholder activism. Despite
diplomatic pressure from the US to abandon this stance, NGPF-G has persisted in its e orts and seems to
have made a material di erence to the behavior of target rms (Goergen, O’Sullivan, Wood, and Baric,
2018).
Finally, state capitalism can follow an indirect internationalization through the overt or covert support of
the government to leading private rms. Oligopolies occupying the domain of outsourced state functions
may seek to replicate their role in an ever-increasing number of markets. As they expand, they may become
indispensable guardians of information, knowledge, and resources, making them hard to replace even if the
quality of the services provided are poor and/or expensive (O’Keefe, 2011; Foreman-Peck, 2021). They may
rely on diplomatic support from their country of origin to leverage concessions and maintain their position.
This indirect internationalization is more evident in certain industries linked to security and defense.
Although traditional, a core function of the state was to secure and retain a monopoly on armed force.
Domestically, this role has been eroded with the rise of private security companies ful lling o cial duties,
including prison security. Internationally, private military companies, often with close ties to their parent
government, have leveraged the latter’s support to obtain business abroad, whether to outsource the human
costs of military adventures and to support client governments or to resist movements abroad (Tonkin,
2011). Penal and military complexes often operate on the basis of informal old boys’ networks with close
personal ties to serving members of national military services and security agencies, and may regularly
disband in the face of scandal, only to reemerge in a reconstituted and renamed form. As such, it would be
incorrect to conceive their relations with parent governments purely in organizational terms; it is also about
entrepreneurial individuals (both within and formally outside states) who maximize personal returns
(D’Amico, 2021) and, in doing so, also impel the state (or at least those serving within it) toward an
economic agency path.
p. 15
The Future of Research on State Capitalism and the Firm
There are many ways for the state to intervene in markets. These range from the traditional support
functions of creating a reliable setting that facilitates market transactions by setting laws and rules that
govern contracts and managing monetary and scal policy, to addressing market imperfections through
targeted regulation for or against particular behaviors, and to achieving control of market relationships as
producer and employer. State capitalism concerns the state acting as an economic agent, driven by
e ciency, ideology, national development, patronage, or a combination of these. In acting in this manner,
it may sustain private oligopolies, compete with private rms, or supplement the activities of the latter.
This handbook highlights the many manifestations and contradictions of state capitalism. What is evident is
that the interplay between state and markets is a complex and dynamic one, in which each sustains the
other. If markets often incorporate strong oligopolistic tendencies, these may be alleviated or exacerbated
through state capitalism. The latter may be the product of rational and strategic decision making, or
precipitated or remolded by events, which may worsen existing systemic contradictions or yield
serendipitous outcomes. In each instance, outcomes may further re ect the relative interest of elites in
sustaining the basis of a social contract, promoting national development, or personal enrichment:
although it has commonly been held that the latter was su cient, the social dimension to economic life has
again been highlighted in terms of its scale and scope during crises.
This would suggest the need for further evidence-based re ection on the role of state capitalism looking
forward, and the extent to which many desirable—and undesirable—manifestations of state capitalism may
coexist, without one necessarily representing a superior recipe, or good practice driving out bad. While the
handbook chapters were largely written before the COVID-19 pandemic, future research can build upon the
insights conveyed in them and explore how state capitalism further evolves with the persisting pandemic.
For instance, the interactions between the state and corporations (e.g., large pharmaceutical rms and e-
commerce giants) can be studied in various contexts, such as the development and distribution of vaccines
and the regulation of the retail sector.
From the rm’s perspective, strategies devised to navigate the various state capitalist institutions warrant
more scholarly attention. The extant nonmarket strategy research (Gao, Sun, Grosman, and Okhmatovskiy,
2022; Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, and Siegel, 2016) needs to develop a deeper understanding of the underlying
state capitalist institutions before informing focal rms of potential ways of organizing their social and
political engagement activities. This is particularly so in the face of the COVID-19 challenges, in that the
advancement of government interventions and the deepening of sociopolitical clashes may persist even
after the pandemic (Lawton, Dorobantu, Rajwani, and Sun, 2020). As such, rms shall formulate integrative
social and political strategies to tackle the increasingly pressing and contradictory demands from distinct
sociopolitical stakeholders. Unearthing the institutional foundations and traits of state capitalism goes a
long way toward enriching the conventional wisdom on corporate political activity and strategic corporate
social responsibility (Brejnholt, Schnyder, Rintamaki, and Svystunova, 2022).
p. 16 While state capitalism as a phenomenon is approached in this handbook from a variety of disciplines and
regional perspectives, little research to date went beyond the comparative capitalism literature (Hall and
Soskice, 2001) in attempting to systematically represent the models of state capitalism, its varieties, and
variations spanning on a continuous spectrum from minimal to excessive state interventions (Wright et al.,
2021). Further, research conducted on varieties of capitalism (Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, and Smith, 2018)
often treated state capitalist countries as a separate category of regimes. Yet, capitalism and the state are
consubstantially linked, not opposed, and capitalism would not have existed without a state (Durand and
Vergne, 2012; Ferguson, 2012). We hope that this handbook will guide future research in rethinking
capitalism in conjunction with the “state.”
Along these lines, future research could revisit the ever-popular “double movement” between states and
markets by Polanyi (1944). In Polanyi’s view, the pendulum swings between pure markets and pure statism.
Firstly, as shown in this handbook, this is no longer the case, as the pendulum can stop anywhere along the
e ciency frontier. The success of the coworking of state with markets hinges on the institutionalized
history of joining forces (Dolfsma and Grosman, 2019). It is the imprint in the memory of practices tested in
the course of history that may help to reconcile the state and market logics. This is why renationalizations
in countries with a limited history of collaborative arrangements between state and markets may be
dangerous rhetoric. Hence, future research may test how the logics should be combined to be successful,
and how this combination is dependent on the institutional shape. Secondly, there is a great variety of forms
in which states intervene in the economy, well beyond the direct ownership of productive assets used by
Polanyi (1944), and future studies are encouraged to investigate more indirect forms of state capitalism
beyond ownership.
How powerful actors use markets and how that relates to state intervention are other interesting avenues
for future research. In recent years, the major liberal market economies have become quite statist in many
regards, with growing military and penal complexes, utilities, oil and gas quasi-monopolies, and
ecosystems of oligopolistic rms dependent on state subsidies and loans to operate outsourced state
functions (Campbell, 2021; Wood and Wright, 2015), and even more so with the recent post-COVID bailouts
(Wood, Onali, Grosman, and Haider, 2021). Whilst in sustaining the market position of such monopolies and
oligopolies, the state assumes the role of an active economic agent, but one often in the service of private,
rather than public interests (Wood and Wright, 2015). Future research can address their power dynamics,
and in relation to that, attempt at reconceptualizing the varieties of institutional systems, as advanced
economies have increasingly developed elements of crony capitalism traditionally associated with emerging
markets.
Technological giants exert strategic leadership in the redeployment of contemporary capitalism (Boyer,
2021), and they are in a position to impose to most governments their decisions, whether it is location
choice, tax exemption, or subsidies to public infrastructures. Future studies can address to what extent the
tech giants and other privately owned multinationals will shape the economic systems in the long-term
instead of states.
Conceptually, future research on state capitalism and the rm could bridge together the di erent streams of
literature. On the one hand, international business, political science, and law and nance literatures have to
some extent been driven by macrolevel studies, focusing primarily on emerging shapes and varieties of state
p. 17 capitalism in comparative aspects (Estrin and Gregorič, 2022; Cuervo-Cazurra and Li, 2022) or of a
particular national context (cf. country and regional analyses), and the political or social interference with
the rm (Brejnholt et al., 2022; Han and Liu, 2022). The nance literature, in addition, has been preoccupied
with the relevant metrics to measure country-level e ects on rm corporate governance and performance.
On the other hand, the management and public administration literatures have been increasingly focusing
on rm-level mechanisms, for instance, the utility function of state-owned enterprises and their
performance relative to privately owned rms, their organizational forms (Foreman-Peck, 2022; Girth,
2022) and governance structures (Okhmatovskiy, Grosman, and Sun, 2022), state-business interactions at
the organizational level (Gao, et al., 2022), with implications for corporate social responsibility (Brejnholt et
al., 2022) and innovation (Wang and Hua, 2022), amongst others. There needs to be a rethink about how
these perspectives on state capitalism and the rm can theoretically come together.
One possibility for a natural bridge between the streams of literature on state capitalism is to start at the
rm level and to rethink to what extent the purpose of the state-owned rm should converge with the
purpose of the private rm. While the theory of the rm tells us that the objective function of a rm is to
maximize shareholders’ value or market returns (Friedman, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), there is an
emerging debate on a purpose-driven organization (Hart and Zingales, 2017; Henderson, 2020; Mayer,
2020), framed as “a concrete goal that reaches beyond pro t maximization” (Henderson and Van den
Steen, 2015). More speci cally, proponents of this line of thought debate how organizations should take
part in addressing climate change, not necessarily as a consequence of their operating activities (e.g., reduce
plastic, recycle), but as powerful actors in the globalizing world (Economist, 2019).
State-owned rms have conventionally been charged with achieving nonbusiness goals, which tend to
con ict with pro t maximization, such as politically or socially motivated investments (Cuervo-Cazurra, et
al., 2020). But now that the norm of a private rm is shifting, future research can address to what extent the
essence of a rm is such that the mixture of objectives in a state-owned rm and in a private rm become
increasingly similar. On the one hand, governments are increasingly active shareholders seeking to achieve
performance objectives through the rms they own. On the other hand, private shareholders are
increasingly aware of the environmental and social impact their rms can have through their operating or
innovative activities. Future research can address how governments can guide rms toward speci c
purposes by regulating and monitoring the achievement of those promised purposes.
Conclusion
While it was fashionable in the 1990s to conclude that there was a historical trend to the diminishment of
the role of the state, by the early 2000s, there has been a renewed trend to resurgent statism, albeit often in
novel or unanticipated forms. In turn, this raises new challenges in documenting, explaining, and
theorizing these diverse and multifaceted phenomena. Blowbacks from the breakdown of humanity’s
relationship with the natural world, including climate change and global pandemics, have led to the further
p. 18 expansion of state capitalism in both scope and form. This collection represents an interim step in
understanding these phenomena, as both a consolidation and a map for future research agendas.
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RED OR GREEN MAYONNAISE SAUCE.
Colour may be given either to the preceding or to the following

Sauce Mayonnaise by mingling with it some hard lobster-coral
reduced to powder by rubbing it through a very fine hair-sieve: the
red hue of this is one of the most brilliant and beautiful that can be
seen, but the sauce for which it is used can only be appropriately
served with fish or fish-salads. Spinach-green will impart a fine tint to
any preparation, but its flavour is objectionable: that of parsley-green
is more agreeable. Directions for both of these are contained in the
previous chapter.
IMPERIAL MAYONNAISE.
(An elegant jellied sauce, or salad-dressing.)

Put into a bowl half a pint of aspic, or of any very clear pale jellied
stock (that made usually for good white soup will serve for the
purpose excellently); add to it a couple of spoonsful of the purest
olive-oil, one of sharp vinegar, and a little fine salt and cayenne.
Break up the jelly quite small with the points of a whisk of osier-
twigs, stir the ingredients well together, and then whisk them gently
until they are converted into a smooth white sauce. This receipt was
derived originally from an admirable French cook,[61] who stood
quite at the head of his profession; but as he was accustomed to
purvey for the tables of kings and emperors, his directions require
some curtailment and simplifying to adapt them to the resources of
common English life. He directs the preparation to be mixed and
worked—to use a technical expression—over ice, which cannot
always be commanded, except in opulent establishments, and in
large towns. It is not, however, essential to the success of this sauce,
which will prove extremely good if made and kept in a cool larder; or,
if the bowl in which it is mingled be placed in a pan of cold water, into
which plenty of saltpetre and sal-ammoniac, roughly powdered, are
thrown at the moment it is set into it. In this country a smaller
proportion of oil, and a larger one of acid, are usually preferred to the
common French salad-dressings, in which there is generally a very
small portion of vinegar. To some tastes a spoonful or two of cream
would improve the present Mayonnaise, which may be varied also
with chili, tarragon, or other flavoured vinegar. It should be served
heaped high in the centre of the salad, for which, if large, double the
quantity directed here should be prepared.
61. Monsieur Carême, to whose somewhat elaborate but admirable works,
published thirty years or more since, all modern cooks appear to be specially
indebted.
REMOULADE.
This differs little from an ordinary English salad-dressing. Pound

very smoothly indeed the yolks of two or three hard-boiled eggs with
a teaspoonful of mustard, half as much salt, and some cayenne, or
white pepper. Mix gradually with them, working the whole well
together, two or three tablespoonsful of oil and two of vinegar.
Should the sauce be curdled, pour it by degrees to the yolk of a raw
egg, stirring it well round as directed for the Mayonnaise. A spoonful
of tarragon, cucumber, or eschalot-vinegar, may be added with very
good effect; and to give it increased relish, a teaspoonful of cavice,
or a little of Harvey’s sauce, and a dessertspoonful of chili vinegar
may be thrown into it. This last is an excellent addition to all cold
sauces, or salad-dressings.
Hard yolks of 2 or of 3 eggs; mustard, 1 teaspoonful (more when
liked); salt, 1/2 teaspoonful; pepper or cayenne; oil, 3 tablespoonsful;
vinegar, 2. If curdled, yolk of 1 raw egg. Good additions: tarragon or
eschalot, or cucumber-vinegar, 1 tablespoonful; chili vinegar, 1
dessertspoonful; cavice or Harvey’s sauce at pleasure.
Obs.—A dessertspoonful of eschalots, or a morsel of garlic, very
finely minced, are sometimes pounded with the yolks of eggs for this
sauce.
OXFORD BRAWN SAUCE.
Mingle thoroughly a tablespoonful of brown sugar with a

teaspoonful of made mustard, a third as much of salt, some pepper,
from three to four tablespoonsful of very fine salad-oil, and two of
strong vinegar; or apportion the same ingredients otherwise to the
taste.
FORCED EGGS FOR GARNISHING SALAD.
Pound and press through the back of a hair-sieve the flesh of

three very fine, or of four moderate-sized anchovies, freed from the
bones and skin. Boil six fresh eggs for twelve minutes, and when
they are perfectly cold, halve them lengthwise, take out the yolks,
pound them to a paste with a third of their volume of fresh butter,
then add the anchovies, a quarter of a teaspoonful of mace, and as
much cayenne as will season the mixture well; beat these together
thoroughly, and fill the whites of egg neatly with them. A morsel of
garlic, perfectly blended with the other ingredients, would to some
tastes improve this preparation: a portion of anchovy-butter, or of
potted ham, will supply the place of fish in it very advantageously.
Eggs, 6; anchovies, 4; butter, size of 2 yolks; mace, 1/4
teaspoonful; cayenne, third as much.
ANCHOVY BUTTER.
(Excellent.)
Scrape the skin quite clear from a dozen fine mellow anchovies,
free the flesh entirely from the bones, and pound it as smooth as
possible in a mortar; rub it through the back of a hair-sieve with a
wooden spoon; wipe out the mortar, and put back the anchovies with
three quarters of a pound of very fresh butter, a small half-
saltspoonful of cayenne, and more than twice as much of finely
grated nutmeg, and freshly pounded mace; and beat them together
until they are thoroughly blended. If to serve cold at table, mould the
butter in small shapes, and turn it out. A little rose pink (which is sold
at the chemists’) is sometimes used to give it a fine colour, but it
must be sparingly used, or it will impart an unpleasant flavour, and
we cannot much recommend its use: it should be well pounded, and
very equally mixed with it. For kitchen use, press the butter down
into jars or pattypans, and keep it in a cool place.
Fine anchovies, 12; butter, 3/4 lb.; cayenne, small 1/2 saltspoonful;
nutmeg and mace, each more than twice as much; rose pink (if
used), 1/2 teaspoonful.
This proportion differs from potted anchovies only in the larger
proportion of butter mixed with the fish, and the milder seasoning of
spice. It will assist to form an elegant dish if made into pats, and
stamped with a tasteful impression, then placed alternately with pats
of lobster-butter, and decorated with light foliage. It is generally eaten
with much relish when carefully compounded, and makes excellent
sandwiches. To convert it into a good fish sauce, mix two or three
ounces of it with a teaspoonful of flour and a few spoonsful of cold
water, or of pale veal stock, and keep them constantly stirred until
they boil. The butter should not be moulded directly it is taken from
the mortar, as it is then very soft from the beating. It should be
placed until it is firm in a very cool place or over ice, when it can be
done conveniently.
LOBSTER BUTTER.
Pound to the smoothest possible paste the coral of one or two

fresh hen lobsters, mix with it about an equal proportion of fresh firm
butter, and a moderate seasoning of mace and cayenne, with a little
salt if needed. Let the whole be thoroughly blended, and set it aside
in a cool larder, or place it over ice until it is sufficiently firm to be
made into pats. Serve it garnished with curled parsley, or with any
light foliage which will contrast well with its brilliant colour. The coral
may be rubbed through a fine sieve before it is put into the mortar,
and will then require but little pounding.
An excellent preparation is produced by mingling equal
proportions of lobster and of anchovy butter in the mortar, or one-
third of the anchovy with two of lobster: to this some of the white
flesh of the latter can be added to give another variety, after it has
been prepared by the receipt for boudirettes, Chapter III.
TRUFFLED BUTTER (AND TRUFFLES POTTED IN BUTTER.)
(For the breakfast or luncheon table.)

Cut up a pound of sweet fresh butter, and dissolve it gently over a
clear fire; take off the scum which will gather thickly upon it, and
when it has simmered for three or four minutes, draw it from the fire,
and let it stand until all the buttermilk has subsided; pour it softly
from this upon six ounces of ready-pared sound French truffles, cut
into small, but rather thick, slices, and laid into a delicately clean
enamelled saucepan; add a full seasoning of freshly pounded mace
and fine cayenne, a small saltspoonful of salt, and half a not large
nutmeg. When the butter has become quite cold, proceed to heat the
truffles slowly, shaking the saucepan often briskly round, and stew
them as gently as possible for twenty minutes, or longer should they
not then be very tender. If allowed to heat, and to boil quickly, they
will become hard, and the preparation, as regards the truffles, will be
a comparative failure. Lift them with a spoon into quite dry earthen or
china pans, and pour the butter on them; or add to them sufficient of
it only to cover them well and to exclude the air, and pot the
remainder of the butter apart: it will be finely flavoured, and may be
eaten by delicate persons to whom the truffle itself would be
injurious. It may also be used in compounding savoury sauces, and
for moistening small croustades before they are fried or baked. The
truffles themselves will remain good for months when thus prepared,
if kept free from damp; and in flavour they will be found excellent.
The parings taken from them will also impart a very agreeable
savour to the butter, and will serve extremely well for it for immediate
use. They will also be valuable as additions to gravies or to soups.
We should observe, that the juice which will have exuded from the
truffles in the stewing will cause the preparation to become mouldy,
or otherwise injure it, if it be put into the pans either with them or with
the butter. The truffles must be well drained from it when they are
taken from the saucepan, and the butter must remain undisturbed for
a few minutes, when it can be poured clear from the juice, which will
have subsided to the bottom of the pan. We have given here the
result of our first experiment, which we found on further trial to
answer perfectly.
ENGLISH SALADS.
The herbs and vegetables for a salad cannot be too freshly

gathered; they should be carefully cleared from insects and washed
with scrupulous nicety; they are better when not prepared until near
the time of sending them to table, and should not be sauced until the
instant before they are served. Tender lettuces, of which the stems
should be cut off, and the outer leaves be stripped away, mustard
and cress, young radishes, and occasionally chives or small green
onions (when the taste of a party is in favour of these last) are the
usual ingredients of summer salads. (In early spring, as we have
stated in another chapter, the young white leaves of the dandelion
will supply a very wholesome and excellent salad, of which the slight
bitterness is to many persons as agreeable as that of the endive.)
Half-grown cucumbers sliced thin, and mixed with them, are a
favourite addition with many persons. In England it is customary to
cut the lettuces extremely fine; the French, who object to the flavour
of the knife, which they fancy this mode imparts, break them small
instead. Young celery alone, sliced and dressed with a rich salad
mixture, is excellent: it is still in some families served thus always
with roast pheasants.
Beet-root, baked or boiled, blanched endive, small salad-herbs
which are easily raised at any time of the year, celery, and hardy
lettuces, with any ready-dressed vegetable, will supply salads
through the winter. Cucumber vinegar is an agreeable addition to
these.
FRENCH SALAD.
In winter this is made principally of beautifully-blanched endive,

washed delicately clean and broken into small branches with the
fingers, then taken from the water and shaken dry in a basket of
peculiar form, appropriated to the purpose,[62] or in a fine cloth; then
arranged in the salad bowl, and strewed with herbs (tarragon
generally, when in season) minced small: the dressing is not added
until just before the salad is eaten. In summer, young lettuces are
substituted for the endive, and intermixed with a variety of herbs,
some of which are not generally cultivated in England.
62. Salad-baskets are also to be found in many good English kitchens, but they
are not in such general use here as on the continent.
FRENCH SALAD DRESSING.
Stir a saltspoonful of salt and half as much pepper into a large

spoonful of oil, and when the salt is dissolved, mix with them four
additional spoonsful of oil, and pour the whole over the salad; let it
be well turned, and then add a couple of spoonsful of tarragon
vinegar; mix the whole thoroughly, and serve it without delay. The
salad should not be dressed in this way until the instant before it is
wanted for table: the proportions of salt and pepper can be increased
at pleasure, and common or cucumber vinegar may be substituted
for the tarragon, which, however, is more frequently used in France
than any other.
Salt, 1 spoonful: pepper, 1/2 as much; oil, 5 saladspoonsful;
tarragon, or other vinegar, 2 spoonsful.
DES CERNEAUX, OR WALNUT SALAD.
This is a common summer salad in France, where the growth of

walnuts is generally abundant, but is not much served in England;
though the sweet flavour of the just-formed nut is very agreeable.
Take the walnuts when a pin will pierce them easily, pare them down
to the kernels, and toss them gently, just before they are served, in a
French or English salad-dressing (the former would generally be
preferred we think), and turn them into the salad-bowl for table.
SUFFOLK SALAD.
Fill a salad-bowl from half to three parts full with very tender
lettuces shred small, minced lean of ham, and hard-boiled eggs, or
their yolks only also minced, placed in alternate layers; dress the
mixture with English salad sauce, but do not pour it into the bowl
until the instant of serving. A portion of cold chicken (or veal), cut in
thin slices about the size of a shilling, may be added when
convenient; the ham and eggs also may be sliced instead of being
minced, and the whole neatly arranged in a chain or otherwise round
the inside of the bowl.
YORKSHIRE PLOUGHMAN’S SALAD.
Mix treacle and vinegar, in the proportion of one tablespoonful of

the first to two of the latter; add a little black pepper, and eat the
sauce with lettuces shred small (with an intermixture of young onions
when they are liked).
AN EXCELLENT SALAD OF YOUNG VEGETABLES.
Pare off the coarse, fibrous parts from four or five artichoke
bottoms, boiled quite tender, well drained, and freed carefully from
the insides; cut them into quarters, and lay them into the salad-bowl;
arrange over them some cold new potatoes and young carrots sliced
moderately thin, strew minced tarragon, chervil, or any other herbs
which may be better liked, thickly over the surface, and sauce the
salad with an English or French dressing just before it is sent to
table. Very young French beans cut into short lozenge-shaped
lengths, or asparagus points, can be added to this dish at pleasure;
or small tufts of cauliflower may be placed round it. When these
additions are made, the herbs are better omitted: a little of the liquor
of pickled Indian mangoes may be advantageously mixed with the
sauce for this salad, or in lieu of it some chili vinegar or cayenne
pepper. The Dutch or American sauce of the previous pages would
also make an appropriate dressing for it.
SORREL SALAD.
(To serve with Lamb-cutlets, Veal cutlets, or Roast Lamb.)

This, though a very agreeable and refreshing salad, is not to be
recommended when there is the slightest tendency to disorder of the
system; for the powerful acid of the uncooked sorrel might in that
case produce serious consequences.[63]
63. It should be especially avoided when dysentery, or other diseases of a
similar nature, are prevalent. We mention this, because if more general
precaution were observed with regard to diet, great suffering would, in many
instances, be avoided.
Take from the stems some very young tender sorrel, wash it
delicately clean, drain it well, and shake it dry in a salad-basket, or in
a soft cloth held by the four corners; arrange it lightly in the bowl, and
at the instant of serving, sauce it simply with the preceding French
dressing of oil with a small portion of vinegar, or with a Mayonnaise
mixed with chili instead of a milder vinegar. The sorrel may be
divided with the fingers and mingled with an equal proportion of very
tender lettuces; and, when it is not objected to,[64] mixed tarragon
may be strewed thickly upon them. To some tastes a small quantity
of green onions or of eschalots would be more agreeable.
64. The peculiar flavour of this fine aromatic herb is less generally relished in
England than in many other countries; but when it is not disliked it may be
used with great advantage in our cookery: it is easily cultivated, and quite
deserves a nook in every kitchen-garden.
LOBSTER SALAD.
First, prepare a sauce with the coral of a hen lobster, pounded and
rubbed through a sieve, and very gradually mixed with a good
mayonnaise, remoulade, or English salad-dressing of the present
chapter. Next, half fill the bowl or more with small salad herbs, or
with young lettuces finely shred, and arrange upon them spirally, or
in a chain, alternate slices of the flesh of a large lobster, or of two
middling-sized ones, and some hard-boiled eggs cut thin and evenly.
Leave a space in the centre, pour in the sauce, heap lightly some
small salad on the top, and send the dish immediately to table. The
coral of a second lobster may be intermingled with the white flesh of
the fish with very good effect; and the forced eggs of page 137 may
be placed at intervals round the edge of the bowl as a decoration,
and an excellent accompaniment as well. Another mode of making
the salad is to lay the split bodies of the fish round the bowl, and the
claws, freed carefully from the shells, arranged high in the centre on
the herbs; the soft part of the bodies may be mixed with the sauce
when it is liked; but the colour will not then be good.
Obs.—The addition of cucumber in ribbons (see Author’s Receipt,
Chapter XVII.), laid lightly round it, is always an agreeable one to
lobster salad: they may previously be sauced, and then drained from
their dressing a little.
A more wholesome and safer mode of imparting the flavour of the
cucumber, however, is to use for the salad vinegar in which that
vegetable has been steeped for some hours after having been cut up
small.
AN EXCELLENT HERRING SALAD.
(Swedish Receipt.)
Soak, skin, split, and bone a large Norway herring; lay the two
sides along a dish, and slice them slopingly (or substitute for this one
or two fine Dutch herrings). Arrange in symmetrical order over the
fish slices of cooked beet-root, cold boiled potatoes, and pickled
gherkins; then add one or two sharp apples chopped small, and the
yolks and whites, separately minced, of some hard-boiled eggs, with
any thing else which may be at hand, and may serve to vary
tastefully the decoration of the dish. Place these ingredients in small
heaps of well-contrasting colours on the surface of the salad, and lay
a border of curled celery leaves or parsley round the bowl. For
sauce, rub the yolk of one hard-boiled egg quite smooth with some
salt; to this add oil and vinegar as for an ordinary salad, and dilute
the whole with some thick sour cream.
Obs.—“Sour cream” is an ingredient not much approved by
English taste, but it enters largely into German cookery, and into that
of Sweden, and of other northern countries also. About half a pound
of cold beef cut into small thin shavings or collops, is often added to
a herring-salad abroad: it may be either of simply roasted or boiled,
or of salted and smoked meat.
TARTAR SAUCE.
(Sauce à la Tartare).
Add to the preceding remoulade, or to any other sauce of the
same nature, a teaspoonful or more of made mustard, one of finely-
minced shalots, one of parsley or tarragon, and one of capers or of
pickled gherkins, with a rather high seasoning of cayenne, and some
salt if needed. The tartar-mustard of the previous chapter, or good
French mustard, is to be preferred to English for this sauce, which is
usually made very pungent, and for which any ingredients can be
used to the taste which will serve to render it so. Tarragon vinegar,
minced tarragon and eschalots, and plenty of oil, are used for it in
France, in conjunction with the yolks of one or two eggs, and
chopped capers, or gherkins, to which olives are sometimes added.

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The Oxford Handbook of State

Capitalism and the Firm 1st Edition

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We dedicate this volume to Mike to acknowledge his immense scholarly legacy.

London, ON, Brookline, MA, Manchester, Lisbon, and London.

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Structure of this Handbook1 

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Part I. The History and Logics of State Capitalism

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Part II. State Capitalism and Finance

List of Figures and Tables 

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Figure 2.3 Planning as an ex-ante exploration of economic coordination 38

Table 2.1 The state capitalism versus liberal capitalism30

Table 2.3 The French capitalism is still di erent from others43

Table 4.1 Di erent ideal types of “state capitalism” 85

Table 5.1 Corporate governance institutions106

Table 5.3 Comparison of indicators by state120

Figure 7.2 Most active SWFs 2018–2019 (% deals) 173

Table 7.1 Four broad features of theorizing SWFs 183

Figure 8.1 General orientation of development banks 200

Figure 10.1 Typical project structure, players, and agreements 229

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Table 12.1 Types of state in uence in rms289

Table 13.1 Descriptive statistics and variable correlations316

Table 13.2 Measurement model and CFA results317

Table 13.4 Results of regression analysis318

Table 13.5 Results of robustness checks—sample selection bias 320

Table 14.1 Characteristics of industries and dedicated industrial policies 339

Table 15.1 Export expansion and exports/GDP of Korea 353

Table 15.2 Five-year economic development plans (1962–1996) 353

Figure 17.1 Policy cycle 389

Figure 18.1 Critiques of outsourcing state functions 414

Table 18.1 Motivations to outsource state functions409

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Table 20.1 Theoretical perspectives on SOE governance 462

Table 21.1 Types of states 488

Table 21.2 Features of di erent types of states 491

Table 21.3 A summary of CSR across state types 493

Table 21.4 Future research agenda 499

p. xxviii Table 25.1 Military-owned enterprises 585

Figure 26.1 SOE ownership network in Latin America 603

Figure 26.2 Indirect state ownership network—BNDESPAR 606

Table 26.1 Overview of state ownership in Latin America599