The Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics 1St Edition Andrew Linzey Full Chapter

The Palgrave Handbook of Practical
Animal Ethics 1st Edition Andrew

Linzey
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-palgrave-handbook-of-practical-animal-ethics-1st-
edition-andrew-linzey/
THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK
OF PRACTICAL ANIMAL ETHICS
Edited by
Andrew Linzey and Clair Linzey
The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series
Series Editors
Andrew Linzey
Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics
Oxford, UK
Priscilla Cohn
Pennsylvania State University
PA, USA
Associate Editor
Clair Linzey
Oxford, UK
More information about this series at
http://www.springer.com/series/14421
Andrew Linzey · Clair Linzey
Editors
The Palgrave Handbook of

Practical Animal Ethics
Section Editors
Lisa Johnson
Thomas I. White
Mark H. Bernstein
Kay Peggs
Editors
Andrew Linzey Clair Linzey
Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics
Oxford, UK Oxford, UK
The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series

ISBN 978-1-137-36670-2 ISBN 978-1-137-36671-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-36671-9
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017952825
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse
of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and
transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or
dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does
not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective
laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or
omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Cover credit: Cover photograph © Harry Borden 2017
Printed on acid-free paper
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
part of Springer Nature
The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom
For Jake Linzey,
practical and artistic genius,
and to Loki the friendly wolf,
moral exemplars of the human–animal bond
Series Editors’ Preface
This is a new book series for a new field of inquiry: Animal Ethics.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the ethics of our
treatment of animals. Philosophers have led the way, and now a range of
other scholars have followed from historians to social scientists. From being
a marginal issue, animals have become an emerging issue in ethics and in
multidisciplinary inquiry.
In addition, a rethink of the status of animals has been fuelled by a range
of scientific investigations which have revealed the complexity of animal
sentiency, cognition and awareness. The ethical implications of this new
knowledge have yet to be properly evaluated, but it is becoming clear that
the old view that animals are mere things, tools, machines or commodities
cannot be sustained ethically.
But it is not only philosophy and science that are putting animals on
the agenda. Increasingly, in Europe and the USA, animals are becoming a
political issue as political parties vie for the “green” and “animal” vote. In
turn, political scientists are beginning to look again at the history of political
thought in relation to animals, and historians are beginning to revisit the
political history of animal protection.
As animals grow as an issue of importance, so there have been more
collaborative academic ventures leading to conference volumes, special jour-
nal issues, indeed new academic animal journals as well. Moreover, we have
witnessed the growth of academic courses, as well as university posts, in
Animal Ethics, Animal Welfare, Animal Rights, Animal Law, Animals and
Philosophy, Human-Animal Studies, Critical Animal Studies, Animals and
Society, Animals in Literature, Animals and Religion—tangible signs that a
new academic discipline is emerging.
vii
viii Series Editors’ Preface
“Animal ethics” is the new term for the academic exploration of the moral
status of the nonhuman—exploration that explicitly involves a focus on
what we owe animals morally, and which also helps us to understand the
influences—social, legal, cultural, religious and political—that legitimate
animal abuse. This series explores the challenges that animal ethics pose,
both conceptually and practically, to traditional understandings of human–
animal relations.
The series is needed for three reasons: (i) to provide the texts that will
service the new university courses on animals; (ii) to support the increasing
number of students studying and academics researching in animal-related
fields; and (iii) because there is currently no book series that is a focus for
multidisciplinary research in the field.
Specifically, the series will
• provide a range of key introductory and advanced texts that map out ethi-
cal positions on animals;
• publish pioneering work written by new, as well as accomplished, schol-
ars; and
• produce texts from a variety of disciplines that are multidisciplinary in
character or have multidisciplinary relevance.
The new Palgrave Macmillan Series on Animal Ethics is the result of a

unique partnership between Palgrave Macmillan and the Ferrater Mora
Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics. The series is an integral part of the mis-
sion of the Centre to put animals on the intellectual agenda by facilitating
academic research and publication. The series is also a natural complement
to one of the Centre’s other major projects, the Journal of Animal Ethics. The
Centre is an independent “think tank” for the advancement of progressive
thought about animals and is the first Centre of its kind in the world. It
aims to demonstrate rigorous intellectual enquiry and the highest standards
of scholarship. It strives to be a world-class centre of academic excellence in
its field.
We invite academics to visit the Centre’s website www.oxfordanimalethics.com
and to contact us with new book proposals for the series.
General Editors
Andrew Linzey
Priscilla Cohn
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Palgrave Macmillan for commissioning this work and espe-
cially to editors Brendan George, Esme Chapman, and April James for their
support and encouragement. Also, we would like to thank Veeramanikandan
Kalyanasundaram, his colleagues (Katrin Liepold, Balaji Varadharaju, Sridevi
Purushothaman), and the Production Team for their painstaking and expert
help with the text. This book would have been impossible without the assis-
tance of the four section editors, Lisa Johnson, Mark H. Bernstein, Thomas I.
White, and Kay Peggs, who have worked diligently in compiling the sections
and selecting the chapters. Our debt to them is considerable. Our heartfelt
thanks go to Stephanie Ernst for her wise and exemplary copyediting, which
has vastly improved the text. Special thanks to Jo Linzey for putting up with
Andrew and Clair during this drawn-out process. Our thanks also to Toby,
whose barking punctuated the editing of this volume, and to Rufus the cat,
whose paws are responsible for any typos in the text.
ix
Contents
1 Introduction: The Challenge of Animal Ethics 1

Section I The Ethics of Control
2 Introduction: The Ethics of Control 25

Lisa Johnson
3 Animal Justice as Non-Domination 33

Valéry Giroux and Carl Saucier-Bouffard
4 Rethinking the Ethic of Human Dominance 53

Grace Clement
5 Chain of Fools: The Language of Power 71

Les Mitchell
6 Our Moral Duties to Ill and Aging Companion Animals 95

Faith Bjalobok
7 Speciesism and the Ideology of Domination in the Italian

Philosophical Tradition 109
Leonardo Caffo
xi
xii Contents
8 Bioengineering, Animal Advocacy, and the Ethics of Control 125

Jodey Castricano
Section II The Ethics of Captivity
9 Introduction: The Ethics of Captivity 147

Thomas I. White
10 Incarceration, Liberty, and Dignity 153

Lori Gruen
11 Speciesism and Zoos: Shifting the Paradigm,

Maintaining the Prejudice 165
Elizabeth Tyson
12 Elephants in Captivity 181

Catherine Doyle
13 The Marine Mammal Captivity Issue: Time

for a Paradigm Shift 207
Lori Marino
14 Whales, Dolphins and Humans: Challenges in Interspecies

Ethics 233
Thomas I. White
Section III The Ethics of Killing
15 Introduction: The Ethics of Killing 249

Mark H. Bernstein
16 Religious Slaughter: Science, Law, and Ethics 255

Jordan Sosnowski
17 Fishing for Trouble: The Ethics of Recreational Angling 277

Max Elder
18 What Is Morally Wrong with Killing Animals

(if This Does not Involve Suffering)? 303
Carlos Naconecy
Contents xiii
19 Killing Animals—Permitted by God? The Role of Christian

Ethics in (Not) Protecting the Lives of Animals 315
Kurt Remele
20 Smoke and Mirrors: An Analysis of Some Important

Conceptions Used to Justify Hunting 333
Priscilla N. Cohn
21 Comparing the Wrongness of Killing Humans

and Killing Animals 349
Mark H. Bernstein
Section IV The Ethics of Causing Suffering
22 Introduction: The Ethics of Causing Suffering 365

Kay Peggs
23 Animal Suffering Matters 373

Kay Peggs
24 Human Duties, Animal Suffering, and Animal Rights:

A Legal Reevaluation 395
Darren Sean Calley
25 Suffering Existence: Nonhuman Animals and Ethics 419

Kay Peggs and Barry Smart
26 Suffering of Animals in Food Production: Problems

and Practical Solutions 445
Akisha Townsend Eaton
27 Suffering for Science and How Science Supports the End of

Animal Experiments 475
Aysha Akhtar
28 The Ethics of Preservation: Where Psychology and

Conservation Collide 493
Mark J. Estren
xiv Contents
29 Bullfighting: The Legal Protection of Suffering 511

Lidia de Tienda Palop
30 Free-Roaming Animals, Killing, and Suffering:

The Case of African Elephants 525
Kai Horsthemke
31 The Dog that is Willing to Die: The “Ethics”

of Animal Fighting 545
Randall Lockwood
Index 569
Notes on Contributors
Aysha Akhtar, M.D., M.P.H. is a fellow of the Oxford Centre for Animal
Ethics; a double board-certified neurologist and preventive medicine special-
ist, US Food and Drug Administration; and a lieutenant commander, US
Public Health Service. She writes in her individual capacity. Her publica-
tions include Animals and Public Health: Why Treating Animals Is Critical to
Human Welfare (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); “Animals and Public Health;
The Complexity of Animal Awareness” in The Global Guide to Animal
Protection, edited by Andrew Linzey (University of Illinois Press, 2013);
and “The New Laboratories for Deadly Viruses” in Rethink Food, edited by
S. Castle and A.-L. Goodman (Two Skirts Production, 2014).
Mark H. Bernstein, Ph.D. (section editor), is the Joyce and Edward E.
Brewer chair in applied ethics at Purdue University. He is one of the found-
ing fellows of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics and a consultant editor
to the Journal of Animal Ethics. He specializes in animal ethics and more spe-
cifically in the issues of animals’ moral status and the extent, scope and con-
tent of human obligations to nonhuman animals. He has published three
books on animal ethics: On Moral Considerability (Oxford University Press,
1998), Without a Tear (University of Illinois Press, 2004), and The Moral
Equality of Humans and Animals (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
Faith Bjalobok, Ph.D. graduated summa cum laude from Chatham
University with a B.A. in philosophy. She also graduated from Indiana
University of Pennsylvania summa cum laude with a master’s in crimi-
nology. She earned a master’s and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Duquesne
University. Her academic interest is in applied ethics, specifically animal
xv
xvi Notes on Contributors
rights, environmental ethics, health care ethics and theories of justice.

Dr. Bjalobok is currently an adjunct professor at Duquesne University,
where she teaches philosophy of law, biomedical ethics, philosophy of ani-
mals and philosophy of technology. She is also employed by Waynesburg
University, where she teaches both as an adjunct at the undergraduate
level and as a facilitator in the M.B.A. programme. Dr. Bjalobok is a fel-
low of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics and a judge for the BBB Torch
Awards (ethics in the workplace). She recently had three articles published
in The Global Guide to Animal Protection (University of Illinois Press,
2013). She has also had various articles published by the Pennsylvania Bar
Institute’s Animal Law Conference, including “A Commitment to Justice Is
a Commitment to Ending Animal Violence” (2011). In addition to her aca-
demic interests, Dr. Bjalobok runs the Fluffyjean Fund for Felines, a low- or
no-cost TNVRc (trap-neuter-vaccinate-return to cat keeper) programme for
colony cats.
Leonardo Caffo, Ph.D. received his doctorate in philosophy from the
University of Turin in Italy. He is a research member of LabOnt: Laboratory
for Ontology at the University of Turin. He is a columnist for Huffington
Post Italia, codirector of Animot and founder of Gallinae in Fabula Onlus,
Animal Studies: Rivista italiana di antispecismo and Rivista Italiana di
Filosofia Analitica Jr. His most recent publications include Il maiale non fa
la rivoluzione (Sonda, 2013); Naturalism and Constructivism in Metaethics
(Cambridge Scholars, 2014); Only for Them (Mimesis International, 2014);
A come Animale (Bompiani, 2014) and An Art for the Other (Lantern Books,
2015). He is currently working on realism, animal studies and cognition,
applied ethics, and philosophy of anarchism and architecture (in both ana-
lytic and continental traditions).
Darren Sean Calley, Ph.D. is a senior lecturer in the School of Law at
the University of Essex. He is a fellow of the Oxford Centre for Animal
Ethics, a fellow of the European Group for Animal Law Studies, a mem-
ber of the Association of Lawyers for Animal Welfare, and a senior fellow
of the Higher Education Academy. His recent publications include Market
Denial and International Fisheries Regulation: The Targeted and Effective Use
of Trade Measures against the Flag of Convenience Fishing Industry (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2011); “Developing a Common Law of Animal Welfare: Offences
Against Animals and Offences Against Persons Compared” (Crime, Law
and Social Change, 2011); and “The International Regulation of the Food
Market: Precedents and Challenges” in The Ethics of Consumption, edited by
Röcklinsberg and Sandin (Wageningen Academic, 2013). The predominant
Notes on Contributors xvii
theme of his research is the manner in which the law can minimize and—in
theory—bring to an end the exploitation of animals. Much of his research
has focused on how trade measures and restrictions on the access to market
of “goods” and “products” can be used to prevent the worst excesses of ani-
mal exploitation. In addition, his research focuses on how the theories of
animal protection can be applied in law.
Jodey Castricano, Ph.D. is an associate professor in the faculty of crea-
tive and critical studies at the University of British Columbia, Okanagan,
where she teaches in the English and cultural studies programs. In English,
her specializations are nineteenth-century literature (gothic) and cultural
and critical theory. In the case of the latter, her primary area of expertise
and ethical concern is in posthumanist philosophy and critical animal stud-
ies with extended work in ecocriticsm, ecofeminism and ecotheory. The
author of Cryptomimesis: The Gothic and Jacques Derrida’s Ghost Writing and
Gothic Subjects: Literature, Film, Psychoanalysis (University of Wales Press,
forthcoming), she has published essays in critical animal studies and is a
contributing editor to Animal Subjects: An Ethical Reader in a Posthuman
World (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008). A second collection of
essays, Animal Subjects: 2.0, was also published in 2016 by Wilfred Laurier
University Press. Professor Castricano’s research aims to call into question
the epistemological and ontological boundaries that divide the animal king-
dom from humanity, focusing on the medical, biological, cultural, philo-
sophical and ethical concerns between nonhuman animals and humans.
Grace Clement, Ph.D. is a professor of philosophy at Salisbury University
in Maryland and a fellow of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics. She has
written the book Care, Autonomy, and Justice: Feminism and the Ethic of Care
(Westview, 1996) as well as a number of articles on moral relations between
humans and other animals. Her current research is primarily in ethics and
focuses on questions of moral status, moral boundaries and moral methods
in animal ethics.
Priscilla N. Cohn, Ph.D. is a professor emeritus from Penn State
University and is presently an advisor to the Càtedra Ferrater Mora de
Pensament Contemporani, University of Girona, and the associate director
of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics. For four years, Cohn was the direc-
tor of the Complutense University Summer School Courses in El Escorial.
Dr. Cohn is presently a coeditor of the Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics
Series and an editor of the Journal of Animal Ethics. She was on the editorial
board of the Edwin Mellen Press, the Van Gorum Press (the Netherlands)
xviii Notes on Contributors
and Routledge Press. She was an advisor for the Denver Wildlife Research
Center (US Department of Agriculture) and for a special edition of the
journal Teorema. She has given numerous radio and TV interviews in the
USA and Spain, including for Animals Today and ARZone. Among her com-
mendations are Royal Honours from Queen Sophia of Spain. Dr. Cohn
has published over fifty chapters and scholarly articles as well as columns in
newspapers. Included among her seven books are Etica aplicada: Del aborto
a violencia (Alianza Editorial, first edition, 1981; enlarged edition, 1988;
editions del Prado, 1994); Contraception in Wildlife (Edwin Mellen Press,
1996); and Ethics and Wildlife (Edwin Mellen, 1999).
Lidia de Tienda Palop, Ph.D. is a researcher at the University of Valencia.
She holds degrees in both philosophy and law and received her Ph.D. in
philosophy from the University of Valencia. She has published various arti-
cles in peer-reviewed journals and book chapters in academic books, includ-
ing “How to Evaluate Justice?” in Applied Ethics: Old Wine in New Bottles?,
“Measuring Nussbaum’s Capabilities List” in The Capabilities Approach on
Social Order and “La noción plural de sujeto de justicia” in Daimon. Her
main areas of research are the philosophy of emotions, the capabilities
approach and animal ethics. She is deeply interested in examining the epis-
temological role of compassion in relation to justice for especially vulnerable
groups, in particular nonhuman animals.
Catherine Doyle is the director of science, research and advocacy for the
Performing Animal Welfare Society (PAWS), which cares for elephants and
other exotic animals at three sanctuaries in California. She holds an MS
in anthrozoology from Canisius College, where her research focused on
keeper–elephant relationships. She is currently conducting the first long-
term behavioral study of female African elephants living in a US sanctuary.
Catherine also conducts advocacy efforts for PAWS, providing expert testi-
mony at government hearings on legislation concerning captive animals and
educating the public about the use of “wild” animals for display, for enter-
tainment, and as exotic “pets”, as well as the conservation of threatened and
endangered species. She has published essays and lectured on the ethics of
keeping elephants in captivity.
Max Elder has a B.A. in philosophy from Kenyon College in Gambier,
Ohio, where he was the recipient of the Virgil C. Aldrich Prize awarded
for dedication to, and excellence in, the study of philosophy. He spent a
year studying philosophy and animal ethics at Mansfield College, Oxford
University, and was also a committee member of the Oxford University
Notes on Contributors xix
Animal Ethics Society. He has worked as a policy analyst intern at the

International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), where he focused on the
source of lion meat sold in the USA as well as noise pollution in the ocean
and its effect on whale communication and migration. He has multiple pub-
lications in the Journal of Animal Ethics covering topics such as the fish-pain
debate, the use of fish during the Persian New Year, and a book review of
Timothy Pachirat’s Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the
Politics of Sight. He is interested in questions about normativity, the way
humanity views animals, and the philosophy of religion.
Mark J. Estren, Ph.D. is a psychologist, herpetologist and reptile educa-
tor in Fort Myers, Florida. He holds doctorates in psychology and English
(University at Buffalo) and an M.S. in journalism (Columbia University).
He is the author of six books, including Statins: Miraculous or Misguided?
(Ronin, 2013) and Healing Hormones: How to Turn On Natural Chemicals
to Reduce Stress (Ronin, 2013), and the editor of and/or a contributor to
numerous others.
Valéry Giroux, Ph.D. is the coordinator of the Centre for Research
in Ethics (CRE) housed at the Université de Montréal. A member of the
Quebec Bar, Dr. Giroux has a master of laws degree, with a thesis on the
reform of the Canadian criminal code dealing with cruelty to animals, and
a doctorate in philosophy, with a dissertation on the importance of grant-
ing fundamental individual legal rights to all sentient beings. Dr. Giroux
has given many presentations on animal ethics and taught a seminar on
that subject at the Université de Sherbrooke. Her publications include “Des
droits légaux fondamentaux pour tous les êtres sensibles” [Fundamental legal
rights for all sentient beings] (Klesis, 2010) and “Du racisme au spécisme:
l’esclavagisme est-il moralement justifiable?” [From racism to speciesism: can
slavery be morally justifiable?] (Argument, 2007). She has published a book
chapter on the right of animals to liberty (Autrement, 2015) and a book on
the legal status of animals (L’Âge d’Homme, 2016).
Lori Gruen, Ph.D. is a professor of philosophy, feminist, gender and sex-
uality studies, and environmental studies at Wesleyan University, where she
also coordinates Wesleyan Animal Studies. Her work lies at the intersection
of ethical theory and practice, with a particular focus on issues that impact
those often overlooked in traditional ethical investigations (e.g. women,
people of color and nonhuman animals). She has published extensively on
topics in animal ethics, ecofeminism and practical ethics more broadly. She
has published eight books, including Ethics and Animals: An Introduction
xx Notes on Contributors
(Cambridge University Press, 2011); The Ethics of Captivity (Oxford

University Press, 2014); and Entangled Empathy (Lantern Books, 2015).
Kai Horsthemke, Ph.D. teaches philosophy of education at KU Eichstätt-
Ingolstadt in Germany. He is also a visiting professor in the School of
Education at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa, and a fellow
at the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, UK. He is the author of The Moral
Status and Rights of Animals (Porcupine Press, 2010), Animals and African
Ethics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), and the co-editor of the first two editions
of Education Studies (Oxford University Press Southern Africa, 2013 and
2016, respectively).
Lisa Johnson, Ph.D., J.D. (section editor), is an associate professor at the
University of Puget Sound, where she teaches environmental law and ani-
mal law. She is also a fellow of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics. She is
the author of “The Religion of Ethical Veganism” (Journal of Animal Ethics,
2015); Environmental Law with F. Powell (Cengage, 2015); and Power,
Knowledge, Animals, which is a contribution to the Palgrave Macmillan
Animal Ethics Series, edited by Andrew Linzey and Priscilla Cohn. She
is a member of the Washington State Board of Bar Examiners. She serves
as a consultant editor for the Journal of Animal Ethics. Her current area of
research is focused on the status of ethical veganism as a religion in the USA.
Andrew Linzey, Ph.D., D.D., Hon.D.D. (editor), is director of the Oxford
Centre for Animal Ethics, an honorary research fellow at St Stephen’s
House, Oxford, and a member of the Faculty of Theology in the University
of Oxford. He is a visiting professor of animal theology at the University
of Winchester and a professor of animal ethics at the Graduate Theological
Foundation, Indiana. He is the author or editor of more than twenty books,
including Animal Theology (SCM Press/University of Illinois Press, 1994);
Why Animal Suffering Matters (Oxford University Press, 2009); and The
Global Guide to Animal Protection (University of Illinois Press, 2013). In
2001, he was awarded a D.D. (doctor of divinity) degree by the archbishop
of Canterbury in recognition of his “unique and massive pioneering work at
a scholarly level in the area of the theology of creation with particular refer-
ence to the rights and welfare of God’s sentient creatures”. This is the highest
award that the archbishop can bestow on a theologian, and the first time, it
has been awarded for theological work on animals.
Clair Linzey (editor) is the deputy director of the Oxford Centre for
Animal Ethics. She holds an M.A. in theological studies from the University
of St Andrews and an M.T.S from Harvard Divinity School. She is currently
Notes on Contributors xxi
pursuing a doctorate at the University of St Andrews on the ecological theol-

ogy of Leonardo Boff with special consideration of the place of animals. She
is associate editor of the Journal of Animal Ethics and associate editor of the
Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series. She is also director of the Annual
Oxford Animal Ethics Summer School.
Randall Lockwood, Ph.D. is senior vice president for anti-cruelty spe-
cial projects at the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals and affiliate assistant professor in small animal clinical sciences at
the University of Florida College of Veterinary Medicine. He is co-editor
of Cruelty to Animals and Interpersonal Violence (Purdue University Press,
1998) and co-author of Forensic Investigation of Animal Cruelty: A Guide for
Veterinary and Law Enforcement Professionals (Humane Society Press, 2006),
and Animal Cruelty and Freedom of Speech: When Worlds Collide (Purdue
University Press, 2014). He regularly trains law enforcement and veterinary
professionals on the investigation and prosecution of animal cruelty.
Lori Marino, Ph.D. is the founder and executive director of the Kimmela
Center for Animal Advocacy and is a neuroscientist and expert in animal
behavior and intelligence. She is internationally known for her work on the
evolution of brains and intelligence in dolphins and whales and in compar-
ison with primates. In 2001, she co-authored a groundbreaking study offer-
ing the first conclusive evidence for mirror self-recognition in bottlenose
dolphins (Reiss and Marino, 2001), after which she decided against further
research with captive animals. She has also published numerous empirical
and review papers on human–nonhuman animal relationships, including the
psychological and philosophical bases of animal exploitation and, more spe-
cifically, critiques of dolphin-assisted therapy and other captivity issues.
Les Mitchell, Ph.D. is the director of the Hunterstoun Centre of the
University of Fort Hare, a fellow of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics
and a member of ICAS Africa. He has published articles in a range of aca-
demic journals as well as contributing chapters to a number of books relat-
ing to animals. His research interests include critical realism, ethics and
nonhuman animals, discourses, power, genocide, moral disengagement, rele-
vant education, open education, and alternatives to violence.
Carlos Naconecy, Ph.D. is a Brazil-based philosopher, independent
researcher and author. He is a fellow of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics
and director of the animal ethics department of the Brazilian Vegetarian
Society. Naconecy received his doctorate in philosophy from the Pontificia
Universidade Catolica do Rio Grande do Sul in Porto Alegre, Brazil. His
xxii Notes on Contributors
thesis was titled “The Life Ethic: Moral Biocentrism and the Concept of
Bio-Respect”. Previously, he gained a master of philosophy degree at the
same university with a thesis on contemporary environmental ethics and a
bachelor’s degree in philosophy at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande
do Sul, which included a dissertation on the moral status of nonhuman ani-
mals. In 2006, he obtained a grant from the Brazilian governmental funding
agency to become a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge, UK.
Naconecy has presented papers in Brazil, Peru, the United Arab Emirates,
India, Portugal, and Cambridge. In addition to his scholarship, he has made
numerous appearances in popular media on the topic of applied ethics in
Brazil. His publications include a book (in Portuguese) titled Ethics and
Animals (Edipucrs, 2006). His areas of interests are animal ethics and envi-
ronmental ethics.
Kay Peggs, Ph.D. (section editor), is a fellow of the Oxford Centre for
Animal Ethics and honorary professor at Kingston University. She is a mem-
ber of the advisory board of the Palgrave Macmillan Series on Animal Ethics
and is a consultant editor of the Journal of Animal Ethics. Her books include
Animals and Sociology (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Experiments, Animal
Bodies and Human Values (Ashgate, 2015), and the major reference work
Critical Social Research Ethics with Barry Smart and Joseph Burridge (SAGE,
forthcoming). Her research approaches issues associated with discrimination
and power from a range of social perspectives. She is particularly interested
in exploring what social perspectives (such as critical sociology, standpoint
sociology and feminism) have to offer to the study of oppressions related to
species. Her current research interests include the human/nonhuman divide,
intersectionality and complex inequalities, and social ethics and moral con-
sideration. She is also a research methods specialist. Dr. Peggs is a member of
the British, American and International Sociological Associations.
Kurt Remele, D.Theol is an associate professor of ethics and social thought
in the department of Catholic theology at Karl-Franzens-University in Graz,
Austria, where he has taught since 1992. He was a Fulbright scholar at the
Catholic University of America in Washington, DC (2003), and a visiting
professor at the University of Minnesota (2007) and at Gonzaga University
in Spokane, Washington (2011–12). His doctoral dissertation dealt with the
ethics of civil disobedience (Ziviler Ungehorsam, Aschendorff, 1992). His
postdoctoral habilitation dissertation, for which he received the Leopold
Kunschak-Award and the Kardinal Innitzer-Award, examined the rela-
tion of psychotherapeutic self-actualization to the common good (Tanz um
das goldene Selbst?, Styria, 2001). For a considerable time, one of his main
Notes on Contributors xxiii
research interests has been animal ethics, in particular animal protection and
religion; he has chapters, for example, in the books Tierrechte. Eine interd-
isziplinäre Herausforderung (Harald Fischer, 2007) and Tier—Mensch—Ethik
(LIT, 2011). He has voiced his concern for animals in numerous lectures
and newspaper articles, on the radio and on TV. He is a fellow of the Oxford
Centre for Animal Ethics. His book Die Wiirde des Tieresist unantastbar Eine
neue Christlicne Tierethik (Bntzon Bercker Verlag) was published in 2016.
Carl Saucier-Bouffard is a professor in the humanities department at
Dawson College in Montreal, Canada, where he teaches courses in environ-
mental and animal ethics. He is an associate fellow of the Oxford Centre for
Animal Ethics. He won a British Chevening scholarship to the University
of Oxford, gaining an M.Phil. in political theory in 2007. His M.Phil. dis-
sertation examined the different modes of political communication used
by Peter Singer and Martin Luther King Jr. in delineating the boundaries
of the moral community. He subsequently completed a research intern-
ship at the Martin Luther King, Jr., Research and Education Institute at
Stanford University in 2008, where he provided research assistance for two
of Professor Clayborne Carson’s publications. His main research interests are
the moral status of nonhuman animals and the social movements working
towards the expansion of our sphere of moral consideration, including the
animal rights movement. He is the author of an article on the legal rights of
great apes published in The Global Guide to Animal Protection (University of
Illinois Press, 2013). In his efforts to educate the public about the impor-
tance of making ethical food choices, Saucier-Bouffard co-launched the
Quebec Meatless Mondays campaign in 2010. He has also coproduced edu-
cational videos on issues relevant to animal ethics, which can be found on
Vimeo and YouTube.
Barry Smart, Ph.D. is a professor of sociology at the University of
Portsmouth. His editorial work includes membership of the editorial advi-
sory board of Open Access Books in Sociology published by Versita; the
associate editorial board of Theory, Culture and Society; and the international
advisory boards of the Journal of Classical Sociology, the European Journal of
Social Theory, and the International Journal of Japanese Sociology. Barry is a
member of the American and International Sociological Associations. His
books include Facing Modernity: Ambivalence, Reflexivity and Morality (Sage,
1999); Consumer Society: Critical Issues and Environmental Consequences
(Sage, 2010); and the major reference work Observation Methods with Kay
Peggs and Joseph Burridge (SAGE, 2013). His areas of research interest and
expertise include classical and contemporary social thought, critical theory,
xxiv Notes on Contributors
fiscal sociology and economic transformation of modernity, cultural and

economic analyses of consumption, environmental consequences of con-
sumerism, and social and historical analyses of sport.
Jordan Sosnowski, J.D. received her law degree from Monash University.
She was awarded a B.A. from the University of Queensland, having majored
in philosophy and English literature and studied animal law as a visiting stu-
dent at Bond University. She is currently undertaking her Ph.D. in animal
law at the Australian National University. In 2012, Jordan was awarded first
prize in the NSW Young Lawyers Animal Law Essay Competition and was
admitted as an Australian lawyer to the Supreme Court of New South Wales
in 2013. Jordan’s research and publication topics include free-range labelling
and consumer-law rights, international law and whaling in the Antarctic,
and empathy in the human and animal rights movements. She currently
works as advocacy director for Australia for Dolphins, a non-profit organiza-
tion working to better protect small cetaceans from cruelty through the legal
system.
Akisha Townsend Eaton, O.F.S, J.D. is an associate fellow of the Oxford
Centre for Animal Ethics and a consultant editor of the Journal of Animal
Ethics. In her professional capacity, she is the senior policy and legal resource
advisor to World Animal Net and an independent animal protection legis-
lative attorney. She advocates for animal protection interests at the United
Nations and has drafted successful animal protection legislation at the local,
state and federal levels. Her former roles include positions as assistant legis-
lative counsel at the Humane Society of the USA and as an animal welfare
fellow in the US Senate. She is an active subcommittee chair and former
law-student vice chair in the Animal Law Committee of the American Bar
Association’s Tort, Trial and Insurance Practice Section. She received her
juris doctorate from Georgetown University Law Center and her BA from
Stanford University with distinction. She is currently a candidate for the
Secular Franciscan Order and was named a Young Adult Eco-Justice Fellow
by the National Council of Churches. Her research has been published in
the Journal of Animal Ethics.
Elizabeth Tyson is a doctoral candidate at the School of Law in the
University of Essex. Her research addresses the efficacy of regulatory licens-
ing regimes as a means of guaranteeing effective animal protection in the
UK. The research considers the growing concern that animal welfare law in
the UK is held up as an example for other countries to follow despite its
practical inadequacy. She obtained her bachelor of laws (Hons) from the
Notes on Contributors xxv
Open University in 2006. Elizabeth is the former director of the Captive

Animals’ Protection Society (CAPS), a leading animal protection charity
in the UK whose work focuses specifically on ending the use of animals in
the entertainment industry, with a major focus on the circus and zoo indus-
tries. She sits on the board of the primate conservation charity Neotropical
Primate Conservation and is a member of the Management Committee of
the Palestinian Animal League, based in the occupied Palestinian territories.
Thomas I. White, Ph.D. (section editor), is the Conrad N. Hilton profes-
sor in business ethics and director of the Center for Ethics and Business at
Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles, California. Professor White
received his doctorate in philosophy from Columbia University and is the
author of six books: Right and Wrong (Prentice Hall, 1988); Discovering
Philosophy (Prentice Hall, 1991); Business Ethics (Macmillan, 1993); Men
and Women at Work (Career Press, 1994); In Defense of Dolphins: The
New Moral Frontier (Blackwell, 2007); and Socrates Comes to Wall Street
(Pearson, 2015). He also has authored numerous articles on topics rang-
ing from sixteenth-century Renaissance humanism to business ethics and
environmental ethics. His primary research focuses on the philosophical
implications—especially the ethical implications—of scientific research
on cetaceans. Professor White is a fellow of the Oxford Centre for Animal
Ethics, has served as US ambassador for the United Nations’ Year of the
Dolphin programme and is one of the authors of the “Declaration of Rights
for Cetaceans: Whales and Dolphins”. He is also a scientific advisor to the
Wild Dolphin Project, the research organization supporting Dr. Denise
Herzing’s long-term study of a community of Atlantic spotted dolphins in
the Bahamas.
1
Introduction: The Challenge of Animal Ethics
In Brigid Brophy’s novel Hackenfeller’s Ape, a scientist called Professor

Clement Darrelhyde faces a dilemma. He has moral qualms about the treat-
ment of apes in his laboratory, including one ape in particular, called Percy,
who is to be used in a rocket experiment. The following dialogue with his
colleague—called Post—illustrates Darrelhyde’s concern:
“My dear fellow,” Post began. “I had no idea you took it so seriously. But you
must adapt yourself to life. You must accept things.”
“Accept what things?”
Post shrugged. “You should know. The oldest adage in natural history—nature
red in tooth and claw.”
Darrelhyde did not answer.
A. Linzey · C. Linzey
Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, Oxford, UK
e-mail: director@oxfordanimalethics.com
C. Linzey
e-mail: depdirector@oxfordanimalethics.com
© The Author(s) 2018 1

A. Linzey and C. Linzey (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics,
The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series,
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-36671-9_1
2 A. Linzey and C. Linzey
“Correct me if I am wrong,” Post continued, “but isn’t that how Evolution

works? The strong exploiting the weak all the way up the line?”
The Professor examined himself. His Evolutionary belief had itself been evolv-
ing in these last months. It no longer seemed to him that Evolution proceeded
by strengthening the strong: rather it used as its vessel the weak and inade-
quate, as though they possessed some special felicity that was more fertile than
strength.1
That developed evolutionary sense, what might be termed “moral evolu-

tion,” is the subject of this handbook. It was indeed unusual in 1953 (when
Brophy’s book was first published) for experimental scientists to include ani-
mals within their moral purview, even more so to risk a distinguished aca-
demic reputation as Darrelhyde did. But since the 1950s, a great deal has
changed about the world, not least of all our moral attitudes toward ani-
mals. Once a neglected topic on the periphery of moral concern, the “animal
movement” (for want of a better term) now has taken root in almost every
country in the world.
Brophy knew what she was doing, of course. She was a committed anti-
vivisectionist or, in more modern terms, was opposed in principle to using
animals in harmful research. Darrelhyde’s words represent her own thoughts.
She was a convinced atheist (a patron of the British Humanist Association),
a fellow believer in evolution, and also a patron of the National Anti-
Vivisection Society. And her role in the emergence of the modern animal
movement was not insignificant.
Her 1965 Sunday Times article titled “The Rights of Animals”2 brought
the issue to public prominence after years of neglect. Although there were
certainly other important voices, such as Justus George Lawler,3 her fame
and skill as a writer made people sit up and take notice. But it was the 1971
book Animals, Men and Morals: An Enquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-
Humans,4 edited by three Oxford graduate students, to which she contrib-
uted, that really put animals on the intellectual agenda. It was later dubbed
by Peter Singer as “a manifesto for an Animal Liberation movement.”5
1B. Brophy, Hackenfeller’s Ape (Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1968), 46–47.

2B. Brophy, “The Rights of Animals,” in Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology, ed. A. Linzey and P. B.
Clarke (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 156–62.
3J. G. Lawler, “The Rights of Animals,” Anglican Theological Review, April 1965.
4S. Godlovitch, R. Godlovitch, and J. Harris, eds., Animals, Men and Morals: An Enquiry into the
Maltreatment of Non-Humans (London: Victor Gollancz, 1971).

5P. Singer, “Animal Liberation,” New York Review of Books, April 5, 1973.
The book was one result of the so-called Oxford Group, composed largely
of students and academics. The term “Oxford Group,”6 coined by Richard
D. Ryder, is something of a misnomer since the various individuals never
met all together and had no plan, strategy, or program as such. But it was a
time of intellectual ferment, and from that rather unlikely collection of peo-
ple (philosophers, a sociologist, a psychologist, and a theologian) emerged
a cluster of pioneering books, including Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation,7
Richard D. Ryder’s Victims of Science,8 Andrew Linzey’s Animal Rights:
A Christian Assessment,9 and Stephen R. L. Clark’s The Moral Status of
Animals.10
The title of Brophy’s 1965 article, “The Rights of Animals,” became the
title of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animal’s (here-
after “RSPCA”) symposium held at Trinity College in Cambridge in 1977,
organized by Linzey (then, with Ryder, a council member of the RSPCA).
Both Ryder and Linzey were members of the RSPCA Reform Group that
sought to change the society’s policies in a progressive direction and, not
least of all, to move the society on from its tacit support for foxhunting. The
symposium brought together most of the emerging thinkers and intellectuals
concerned with animal protection and provided a catalyst for change. The
“Declaration against Speciesism” signed by 150 people at the conclusion of
the symposium set the intellectual scene for subsequent decades:
Inasmuch as we believe that there is ample evidence that many other species
are capable of feeling, we condemn totally the infliction of suffering upon our
brother animals, and the curtailment of their enjoyment, unless it be necessary
for their own individual benefit.
We do not accept that a difference of species alone (any more than a dif-
ference in race) can justify wanton exploitation or oppression in the name of
science or sport, or for food, commercial profit or other human gain.
We believe in the evolutionary and moral kinship of all animals and we
declare our belief that all sentient creatures have rights to life, liberty and the
quest for happiness.
6R. D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989),
5ff.
7P. Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (London: Jonathan Cape,
1976).
8R. D. Ryder, Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research (London: Davis-Poynter, 1975).
9A. Linzey, Animal Rights: A Christian Assessment (London: SCM Press, 1976).
10S. R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
We call for the protection of these rights.11
Brophy’s contribution to the symposium, interestingly enough, was titled

“The Darwinist’s Dilemma.” She explained the origin of her 1965 article by
saying she intended to deliberately associate the case for animals with that
“clutch of egalitarian or libertarian ideas which have sporadically ... come
to the rescue of other oppressed classes, such as slaves, or homosexuals or
women.” And she invoked the notion of rights specifically because they are
“a matter of respect and justice, which are constant and can be required of
you by force of argument; they are not a matter of love, which is capricious
and quite involuntary.”12
Then she turned directly to her dilemma or (as she later called it)
“conundrum”:
When I feed the pigeons, I shut my cat out of the room. This is a small
infringement of his rights, imposed on him by me by main force. I think it
justified, in the interest of the pigeons’ rights, because if I didn’t he would
surely have one of my plump, peanut-fed pigeons for his lunch.
If I lunched on the pigeon, I should think myself immoral. If you do
so, I must in all honesty say I think you immoral. But I don’t think my cat
immoral. I think him amoral. The whole dimension of morality doesn’t apply
to him, or scarcely applies to him.
Here then is the conundrum. Am I setting up my species as morally supe-
rior to the cat species? Have I torn down the old class barrier only to rebuild it
in moral terms?13
Brophy here delineates one important feature of animal ethics: it concerns

humans’ treatment of animals and not the treatment of animals by other
animals. “Do animals really need ethics?” is a usual, if erroneous, comment
sometimes made by those who are new to the subject—erroneous because
it muddles (as many commentators still do) the realm of nature with the
realm of morality. Nature is not a moral textbook either for animals or for
11D. Paterson and R. D. Ryder, eds., Animals’ Rights—A Symposium (London: Centaur Press, 1979),
viii.
12B. Brophy, “A Darwinist’s Dilemma,” in Animals’ Rights—A Symposium, ed. D. Paterson and R. D.
Ryder (London: Centaur Press, 1979), 63–72.

13Ibid., 68.
humans. We shall return to this point later. But for now, the key thing is to
grasp that humans are moral agents in a way that animals cannot be. Even
if, as some have claimed, animals have moral sense or are capable of some
forms of altruism, they are not moral agents responsible for their actions.14
This means that animal ethics are essentially human ethics, and their remit is
human actions, individually or collectively, intentionally or half-intention-
ally, toward animals. That does not mean, of course, that animal ethicists
are indifferent to the sum total of suffering and death in the natural world,
and if there are ways to alleviate that death and suffering, caused through
human or even sometimes natural agency, then animal ethicists should be
in the forefront of championing them. But animal ethicists, whether they
be Darwinian or religious, cannot change the natural world as we experi-
ence it with its complex biological systems of parasitism and predation. Like
Brophy, we have to conclude that although we cannot change the (natural)
world, we can change ourselves—and that is the moral point.
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that sensitivity to animals is a
post-1970s phenomenon. There have been ethical voices for animals as far
back as the pre-Socratics. However, that sensitivity has been characterized
by moments of intellectual advancement and social embodiment. One good
example of the latter was the foundation in 1824 of the RSPCA, which pio-
neered legislation and sought to enforce it through a system of inspectors.
And probably the best example of intellectual advancement was the move-
ment from the 1970s.
II
How then should we characterize animal ethics? We collect here some of

the essential elements. For clarity, we need to begin with what animal ethics
rejects, which can be classified under three headings.15
The first is anthropocentrism. By “moral anthropocentrism,” we mean
the assumption that human needs, wants, or desires should have absolute or
near absolute priority in our moral calculations. As already noted, there have
14See A. Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical Ethics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 22–25.

15The following sections on anthropocentrism and instrumentalism come from A. Linzey and
C. Linzey, eds., Normalising the Unthinkable: The Ethics of Using Animals in Research (Oxford Centre for
Animal Ethics, March 2015), which has subsequently been published in A. Linzey and C. Linzey, eds.,
The Ethical Case Against Animal Expereiments (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2018).
been thinkers who have challenged moral anthropocentrism in almost every

age, but such ideas have often lacked any organizational or institutional
backing and have therefore had limited social influence.
Perhaps the most obvious example of moral anthropocentrism stems from
the perceived relation between justice and friendship. Aristotle was clear that
there could be no friendship between the ruler and the ruled—“for where
there is nothing in common to ruler and ruled,” he writes, “there is not
friendship either, since there is no justice.”16 Aristotle provides examples of
how there is no justice between humans and inanimate (“lifeless”) objects,
since “each case is benefited by that which uses it.” He further explains
that “neither is there friendship towards a horse or an ox, nor to a slave qua
slave.”17 Aristotle avers that perhaps owners and slaves can be friends insofar
as they can “share a system of law or be a party to agreements” and inso-
far as they are humans, but animals are not obviously included within those
stipulations.18
St. Thomas Aquinas develops this line of thought by proposing that char-
ity (which is defined as a kind of friendship) extends only to God and fel-
low humans. We cannot have friendship with “irrational animals.” He does
stipulate that “we can love irrational creatures out of charity” but only “if
we regard them as good things for others ”—namely, “as we wish for their
preservation, to God’s honour and man’s use.”19 Put more simply, animals are
considered “irrational,” and because of their lack of reason, humans cannot
be friends with them, and neither can animals in themselves deserve justice or
charity. This Aristotelian-Thomist core, despite various challenges, remains
at the heart of much philosophical and theological thought about animals.
The obvious weakness of moral anthropocentrism is that it fails to take
account of the interests of animals, or if it accepts that animals have interests,
it denies that these interests have any moral weight. Unsurprisingly, Albert
Schweitzer likened the history of Western philosophy to that of a person
who cleans the kitchen floor, only to find that the dog comes in and muddies
it with paw prints.20 The problem of how to square obligations to humans
16Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” in The Works of Aristotle, trans. W. D. Ross (London: Oxford
University Press, 1915), vol. 9, 1161a–b.

17Ibid., original emphasis.
18Ibid.
19T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. the English Dominican Fathers (New York: Benzinger Brothers,
1918), part 1, question 65.3, our emphases.

20A. Schweitzer, Civilisation and Ethics, trans. C. T. Campion (London: Allen and Unwin, 1923), 119.
with obligations to other sentient beings is resolved by not addressing the

latter. Thus conceived, morality becomes a humans-only affair in which ani-
mals are locked out. The arbitrariness of moral anthropocentrism can be
shown by selecting some other feature or characteristic of human beings, or
of a particular race or nation, and then erecting a system of exclusion based
on that feature or characteristic alone. There is an obvious self-serving aspect
to all such exclusions, which belies the supposed objectivity of the exercise.
Most importantly, such exclusions most usually overlook the common ability
of humans and animals to experience pain and suffering.
The second idea rejected by animal ethics is instrumentalism. By “instru-
mentalism,” we mean the assumption that animals exist for human beings,
to serve their interests and wants. This idea also has a long intellectual his-
tory and has become one of the dominant lenses through which humans
perceive other species. The notion that we “own” animals has been a direct
result of this assumption and has been codified in almost all legislation
worldwide.
Instrumentalism, like moral anthropocentrism, has both philosophical
and religious roots. Some believe that the religious root can be found in the
first creation saga in Genesis chapter one, where God gives humans “domin-
ion” over animals. While there is good reason to suppose that dominion in
its original context did not mean despotism, it cannot be doubted that his-
torically this view has provided a kind of biblical proof-text to justify human
exploitation of animals.
The philosophical root of instrumentalism reaches as far back as Aristotle
(if not earlier), who famously wrote, “Since nature makes nothing with-
out some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has
made them [animals and plants] for the sake of man.”21 St. Thomas’s use
of Aristotle’s view (which he combined with the earlier idea of dominion)
baptized the notion within the Christian tradition. Compare the preceding
quotation with St. Thomas’s view in the Summa Contra Gentiles: “By divine
providence, they [animals] are intended for man’s use according to the order
of nature. Hence it is not wrong for man to make use of them, either by
killing or in any other way whatever.”22 What was thought “natural” or
“according to nature” in Aristotle becomes in Aquinas a matter of “divine
providence” as well.
21Aristotle,
The Politics, trans. T. A. Sinclair (London: Penguin, 1985), 1, viii, 79.
22T.Aquinas, “Summa Contra Gentiles,” in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans. A. C. Pegis
(New York: Random House, 1945), vol. 2, 221–22.
Aquinas also argues that “dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life
of reason whereby to set themselves in motion.” He continues, “They are
moved, as it were by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is
that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others.”23
Notice the development of the argument: animals are on the same level as
plants in being non-rational (or “irrational” as St. Thomas actually puts it).
Rationality is a sphere entirely reserved for the human species; everything
else within creation is “devoid of the life of reason.” What directs or “moves”
animated beings (animals and plants) is not rational direction or any
self-chosen goal (because animals cannot rationally choose anything), but the
movement of others or “a kind of natural impulse.” Animals, in other words,
act “naturally” or as occasioned by others, rather than through deliberate
will. And the proof of this is that they are “naturally enslaved” and “accom-
modated to the uses of humans.” The logic is plainly circular, of course: how
do we know that animals, like plants, are slaves for human use? The answer is
because we can enslave them.
Again, the obvious weakness in instrumentalism is its circularity. We
know that animals are slaves because they are enslaveable. As such, the argu-
ment seems to be little more than the working out of the notion that might
is right—that power is its own justification. Both anthropocentrism and
instrumentalism reject the idea that we have direct duties to animals and
that we should consider their interests independently of human wants or
needs.
Moreover, it is not obvious (as it was for Aristotle and Aquinas) that there
exists (or should exist) a rational hierarchy in the world such that the ration-
ally “inferior” should exist for or serve the “superior.” At the very least, the
contrary implication should be enjoined—namely, that the species blessed
with greater rationality should demonstrate that “superiority” (if such there
be) by a particular regard for the weak of all species. As Alexander Pope
argued, “I cannot think it is extravagant to imagine that mankind are no
less, in proportion, accountable for the ill use of their dominion over crea-
tures of the lower rank of beings, than for the exercise of tyranny over their
own species.”24
The third concept that animal ethics rejects is reductionism. By “reduc-
tionism,” we mean the way in which our moral obligations to animals are
23Aquinas,Summa Theologiae, question 64, article 1.

24A.Pope, “Of Cruelty to Animals,” in A Hundred English Essays, ed. R. Vallance (London: Thomas
Nelson, 1950), 159–65.
reduced to other (non-moral) terms or subsumed under other categories.

As anthropocentrism generally obliterates duties to animals, and instrumen-
talism envisages animals as resources for humans, so reductionism avoids the
moral question by placing animals in other discourses in which harm to ani-
mals ceases to be a moral issue. There are many forms of reductionism, but
we select just two. The first concerns evolutionary theory—the very same
issue that concerned Professor Darrelhyde in Brophy’s Hackenfeller’s Ape.
Obligations to animals are rejected on a naturalistic basis. Since nature is
judged to be red in tooth and claw, it is inappropriate to extend to other ani-
mals the obligations they do not extend to us. By this reasoning, our moral
sense of fairness or justice to all but human subjects is eclipsed. The survival
of the fittest means in practice that we should just shrug off the suffering
we inflict on animals, as we should the suffering that is apparently unavoid-
able in natural processes of life. There is no doubt that this is a persuasive
approach for many, but it has many problems. The most obvious is the one
that Brophy herself identified and put in the words of Professor Darrelhyde.
If there is evolutionary change in a biological sense, can there not also be
moral evolution as well? As Brophy describes it, Professor Darrelhyde’s “evo-
lutionary belief had itself been evolving in these last months. It no longer
seemed to him that Evolution proceeded by strengthening the strong: rather
it used as its vessel the weak and inadequate, as though they possessed some
special felicity that was more fertile than strength.”25
Brophy’s words are tantalizingly obscure here, but it seems that “the weak”
as much as the strong are envisaged as vital to the evolutionary impulse and
therefore that altruism or concern for the weak is being advanced as a vehicle
of evolution. Perhaps the real feat of evolution is that it gives rise to a species
that is capable of rejecting the moral basis of the very system that has cre-
ated it. If that is so, we must distinguish (as many Darwinists do) between
Darwinism (the belief in evolution) and social Darwinism (the belief that
natural processes of life provide a moral textbook for how humans ought to
behave).
The other popular form of reductionism concerns ecological theory. On
this account, animals also become morally invisible, at least as individuals.
This perspective is perhaps best expressed by Aldo Leopold in his famous
work A Sand County Almanac.26 Based on his observations of nature, Aldo
proposes a new definition of what is good and bad. “A thing is right,”
25Brophy, Hackenfeller’s Ape, 47.

26A. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949).
Leopold states, “when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty
of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”27 This
approach has greatly influenced contemporary conservationists who seek
to “manage” nature in such a way that it conforms to how they understand
Aldo’s dictum. The result is that conservationists are now in the forefront
of justifying the killing of one species and individuals within that species
in order to “save” others, such as killing gray squirrels in order to suppos-
edly help red ones. What is most striking, of course, is the way in which
this approach ignores the moral value of individual sentients and concen-
trates solely on what is deemed to be “the biotic whole,” or “ecological bal-
ance” or “biodiversity” (the latter is an especially favorite word but is in fact
philosophically vacuous). Not without justification, this ecological approach
has been dubbed “environmental fascism” by Tom Regan in its neglect of
individuals.28
But there are also deeper moral muddles inherent in ecological and envi-
ronmental theory. We cannot adequately treat them now, but they should
at least be noted. The first is that ecological theory is only one of many
attempts to reduce moral terms to non-moral ones. At first glance this might
seem a plausible way of trying to explain what moral terms mean, but in
practice it involves displacing, or rather subsuming, specifically moral ques-
tions to other-than-moral questions and thus dispensing with ethical termi-
nology altogether. The only way moral discourse can be maintained is by
accepting that terms such as “good” and “bad” and “right” and “wrong” are
unique non-reducible terms.
The second muddle is that both evolutionary and ecological theories are
guilty of what G. E. Moore once famously described as “the naturalistic fal-
lacy”, —that is, the fallacy of trying to deduce an “ought” from an “is.” As
he points out, “if everything natural is equally good, then certainly Ethics,
as it is ordinarily understood, disappears: for nothing is more certain, from
an ethical point of view, than that some things are bad and others good; the
object of Ethics is, indeed, in chief part, to give you general rules whereby
you may avoid the one and secure the other.”29 And he continues with this
devastating question: “What, then, does ‘natural’ mean, in this advice to live
naturally, since it obviously cannot apply to everything that is natural?”30
27Ibid., 217.
28T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), 362.
29G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 94.
30Ibid., 94.
In simpler terms, if living according to nature (conceived as living according

to either human nature or nature itself ) were self-evidently good, then we all
would be naturally good. Ethics would be redundant because there would be
no discernment necessary.
III
Now we turn to the principles that animal ethics embraces. These can be clas-
sified under four headings.
The first is that animals have worth in themselves, what may be termed
“inherent” or “intrinsic” value. Sentient beings, or sentients, are not just
things, objects, machines, or tools; they have their own interior life that
deserves respect. This view extends worth to sentients as individuals, not just
as collectivities or as part of a community. According to one leading theorist,
Regan, sentiency is one requirement (among others) of individual animals
being “subjects-of-a-life”31—that is, beings with interests, self-awareness,
and a desire not to be harmed. Regan argues, “Those who satisfy the sub-
ject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value—inherent
value—and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles.”32 In short,
animals bring subjectivity into our world. As one of us has written, “this is
a moral and spiritual discovery as objective or and as important as any other
fundamental discovery, whether it be the discovery of the stars and planets
or the discovery of the human psyche.”33
By “sentient” we mean a being capable of pleasure and pain or, more gen-
erally, animals who are capable of suffering. And by suffering here we mean
not just physical pain but the whole gamut of mental and emotional aspects
associated with suffering, such as trauma, shock, anticipation, stress, terror,
foreboding, and distress. There is now ample evidence in peer-reviewed sci-
entific journals and books that sentients experience many if not all of these
aspects of suffering.34
31Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 243.

32Ibid.
33A. Linzey, “Foreword: Voyage to the Animal World,” in On God and Dogs: A Christian Theology of
Compassion for Animals, ed. S. H. Webb (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), xi.
34See, for example, D. DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996); B. E. Rollin, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain
and Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, Chaps. 1
and 2.
The second position embraced by animal ethics is that given the

c onceding of sentience, there can be no rational grounds for not taking ani-
mals’ sentience into account or for excluding individual animals from the
same basic moral consideration that we extend to individual human beings.
In his sectional introduction, Mark H. Bernstein makes the issue clear:
“Possessing the capacity for sentience suffices for a creature’s inclusion in our
moral community; since animals are sentient, they have ways of being made
better and worse off, and morality seems to require that we take these inter-
ests into account when we act. It matters—it has moral significance—that
we cause animals to suffer, and it matters that we kill them.”35
Including individual animals within the sphere of moral considerabil-
ity does not mean that animal ethics treats sentients as atomistic individu-
als unrelated to their communities or family relations. Animal ethics is at
least as much concerned with those factors as well. Keeping animals in iso-
lation or in captivity, destroying natural habitats, and depriving individuals
of social relations are all examples of offenses against this principle. Against
those who would argue that we have only indirect duties to animals, or that
animals should be valued only as far as they are part of a human or natu-
ral community, animal ethics insists that sentients are valuable in themselves
and of themselves. This recognition of the objective value of other-than-
human individuals is what defines animal ethics in the public sphere.
It is perhaps worth outlining the rational factors that undergird this posi-
tion.36 These considerations for granting sentients moral solicitude are as
follows:
• Animals cannot give or withhold their consent.

• They cannot represent or vocalize their own interests.
• They cannot understand or rationalize their suffering.
• They are morally innocent or blameless.
• They are vulnerable and relatively defenseless.
The presence of just one of the factors would form the rational basis for a
compelling case for further discussion about moral consideration for ani-
mals, and all these considerations make the infliction of harm on animals
not easier but harder to justify.
35See page 249.

36Much of this is adapted from Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters, Chap. 1.
The third position embraced by animal ethics is that it follows that

c ausing harm to individual sentients (except when it is for their own indi-
vidual good—for example, in a veterinary operation) requires strong moral
justification, if it can be justified at all. As the aforementioned factors illus-
trate, there are in fact exceptional difficulties in justifying harm inflicted on
animals.
For example, if animals are not moral agents (as Brophy and most animal
ethicists agree), then they must be morally innocent or blameless. This must
follow if they have no consciousness of right and wrong, no free will, or no
moral accountability. That animals are innocent in this sense is commonly
recognized (as the argument itself demonstrates), but the implications of this
are not so commonly recognized.
Consider that some people hold that the infliction of pain can sometimes
be justified as a means of moral reformation. For example, some parents
believe that smacking children can be justified if it checks morally regres-
sive behavior. And some judge that it is right to punish those people who
have committed serious offenses—simply on the basis that that is what they
deserve. But a moment’s reflection will tell us that these justifications cannot
apply to animals: they cannot merit pain as part of a plan to reform behavior
(because they are not morally responsible) and cannot deserve pain as part
of a policy of retributive justice (because they do not consciously commit
moral acts).
The inability, then, of the infliction of suffering to morally benefit ani-
mals must tell against all such activity. In the words of C. S. Lewis, “so far
as we know beasts are incapable either of sin or virtue; therefore they can
neither deserve pain nor be improved by it.”37 That means that most of the
explanations and justifications extended to human subjects cannot apply to
animals. It is conceivable, for example, that a human being incarcerated in
a prison as a result of being found guilty of a crime could endure the pain
of captivity as a means of learning the wrongness of his or her actions and
the need to change behavior. However unlikely this is (given what we know
about most prisons), it is at least a possible scenario. Again, a parent may
try to justify violence (however mild) meted out to a child as an attempt to
improve character or (perhaps paradoxically) to stamp out antisocial behav-
ior, such as bullying. But whatever we may make of these justifications, we
cannot properly use these, or similar ones, to justify the infliction of suffer-
ing on animals.
37C. S. Lewis, Vivisection (Boston: New England Anti-Vivisection Society, 1947), 3.

The absence of moral agency, then, renders the infliction of suffering on

animals problematic. It is the unmerited and undeserved nature of their
suffering, and our inability to justify it by most traditional reasoning, that
strengthens the case for animals. It is because of this factor, inter alia, that
some would argue that such acts of harming innocent (i.e., morally blame-
less) sentients are wrong in themselves, and such acts are usually termed
“intrinsically wrong” or “intrinsically evil.”
The fourth position of animal ethics is that it follows from the preceding
that there must be profound moral limits to what humans are entitled to
do to animals. Precisely what these limits are, and how they apply in spe-
cific situations, is the subject of practical animal ethics, but that there are
such limits (as there are with our treatment of fellow humans) cannot be
doubted. But the key thing is that we are in the middle of a welcome and
necessary paradigm shift. The paradigm shift can be easily described (and
we have often described it38): it is the move away from the idea that sentient
animals are things, tools, commodities, means to human ends, and resources
here for our use to the idea that animals have intrinsic value, dignity, and
rights.
So the challenge of animal ethics is to help people change their think-
ing and actions toward animals in ways that begin to address the positions
we have outlined. As such, animal ethics should be properly distinguished
from other cognate disciplines, such as human–animal studies, where the
emphasis is usually on the disinterested study of human–animal interac-
tions. Animal ethics is interested not just in studying the phenomena of
such interactions, but in asking the moral question. In that sense, animal
ethics is not a neutral discipline any more than the now established field of
human rights is a neutral discipline. Perhaps the best analogy is with the aca-
demic subject of theology: Many practitioners are committed to the subject
(God or the divine) but are also equally committed to objective scrutiny and
a critique of religious claims. “Committed yet critical” are the watchwords
for theology and so should be for animal ethics.
It follows that within the academic community of the committed, there
will be many viewpoints, differing perceptions, and strategies. Anyone who
is familiar with the now voluminous literature on animal ethics will be
only too aware of how argument and debate characterize published work.39
38See, for example, Linzey and Linzey, Normalising the Unthinkable.

39See, for example, M. Bekoff with C. A. Meaney, eds., Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal
Welfare (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998); S. J. Armstrong and R. G. Botzler, eds., The Animal
Ethics Reader, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2008).
Animal ethicists come from a wide range of philosophical and religious

positions. No one philosophical theory, whether it be rights theory, utili-
tarianism, virtue ethics, contractualism, or feminist care theory, can claim
to be the only language or discourse possible for animal ethics. Similarly,
with religious theories, whether they be Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Jain, or
Buddhist, none can claim a monopoly or to be the only position possible.
In our view, many positions, both philosophical and religious, can help illu-
minate the morality of our relations with animals. But this book goes even
further in providing an additional multidisciplinary perspective as well, uti-
lizing a range of perspectives from disciplines as diverse as history, law, biol-
ogy, and the social sciences. Without reductionism, the authors show how
ethical approaches can be illustrated and reinforced by other perspectives.
Of course, animal ethics is still in its infancy within the academic com-
munity. It has still a long way to go before it gains universal acceptance. But
it is worth recalling how important sub-branches of ethics, such as “business
ethics,” “feminist ethics,” “bioethics,” or even “environmental ethics,” would
have been scarcely heard of fifty or so years ago. There have been remarkable
developments within the last forty years, such that would have astonished
the so-called Oxford Group in the 1970s. Academic posts have emerged
along with elective courses and even university centers and departments. The
journal we edit, the Journal of Animal Ethics, published by the University
of Illinois Press, and the book series on animal ethics published by Palgrave
Macmillan (of which this book is an example) are but two instances of this
growing field.
IV
Animal ethics often provokes a range of reactions, some perceptive, mostly

not so. Before we conclude, we now turn, briefly, to considering some of the
common objections.
Humans have a metaphysical privilege over animals; we should value them
more than animals.
Depending on how one defines the term, it can be argued that animal
ethics requires humans to possess this metaphysical privilege over animals,
in the sense that ethics requires free will, rational choice, and most impor-
tantly, moral agency. It seems very unlikely that other sentient beings pos-
sess all these abilities or possess them in a way that is analogous to human
beings. That accepted, the second part of the objection—namely, that we are
therefore of more value than animals—does not follow. All kinds of species
have unique abilities and characteristics that are peculiar to their own. That
does not of itself make them more or less valuable (except, of course, for
the importance of sentience). Our moral agency makes us special in that we
have the power and the duty to serve other creatures, but it does not fol-
low that our interests should always have moral priority. Indeed, quite the
reverse. We should use our moral superiority by acknowledging duties to
animals that they cannot acknowledge toward us. As Brophy herself argues,
“The whole case for behaving decently to animals rests on the fact that we
are the superior species. We are the species uniquely capable of imagination,
rationality, and moral choice—and that is precisely why we are under the
obligation to recognise and respect the rights of animals.”40
There is also a parallel debate in theological circles, which has increas-
ingly moved away from seeing human moral superiority in crude “domin-
ionist” terms. Almost no theologian today thinks that dominion in Genesis
1 means simply that might is right.41 Indeed, the (much-overlooked) evi-
dence from the text shows this to be true: humans are made in God’s image
(Genesis 1:26), given dominion (Genesis 1:26), and then commanded to
follow a vegetarian (actually vegan) diet (Genesis 1:29). Herb-eating domin-
ion can hardly be a license for tyranny.42
Animal ethics is simply a form of misanthropy. Some people prefer animals to
humans.
Some people may prefer some animals to humans, as some humans may
prefer some humans to some animals. After all, our preferences are precisely
that: our preferences to which we have an individual right. But the general
charge that animal ethics results tout court from misanthropy is misplaced,
for three reasons. The first is that the ethical theories that emerge from ani-
mal ethics so obviously include human beings as well. Human beings are
also classed as sentient and as subjects of a life, and they are likewise deserv-
ing of respect as individuals. Animal ethics theories in no way diminish
human dignity, value, or rights; indeed, the assumption of all such theories
is that these very things that humans already (and rightly) possess should
be extended to others. Second, the objection fails to grasp that historically,
concern for animals and concern for poor and weak humans were part of
the same movement of sensibility. The luminaries of the humanitarian
40Brophy, “The Rights of Animals,” 161–62.

41See, for example, G. A. Jónsson, The Image of God: Genesis 1:26–28 in a Century of Old Testament
Research (Lund, Sweden: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1988).
42See A. Linzey, Animal Theology (London: SCM Press, 1994), 126.
movement of the nineteenth century, such as William Wilberforce and Lord

Shaftsbury, were as much concerned for humans as they were for animals.
Indeed, it was members of the English Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals (as it then was) who helped found (and financially support) the
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. This is all well
documented in a variety of books.43 Third, there is a strong link between
cruelty to animals and violent and antisocial behavior. We now know (in
a way in which previous thinkers could only suppose) that there is empiri-
cal evidence of this connection. A great many books have detailed this link.
Although it is impossible to adequately treat the subject here, we invite peo-
ple to examine the evidence.44
Caring about animals is just a matter of feeling.
Almost the reverse is the case. Although some people may have strong
emotional reactions to animal cruelty and abuse (and understandably so),
the theories that emerge from animal ethics are founded on rational consid-
erations (only some of which we have outlined here), buttressed by empiri
cal science relating to animal cognition, awareness, and sentience. Indeed,
as many animal ethicists have remarked, the whole intellectual move-
ment, especially since the 1970s, can be seen as a reaction to the erroneous
assumption that animal protection is simply a matter of taste or emotional
disposition. The voluminous amount of philosophical literature that has
accrued is testimony to the rational debate that has occurred at the high-
est levels of scholarship. Arguably, no other moral issue during the last forty
years has received so much rigorous intellectual inquiry and analysis.
Animals cannot have rights since they do not have responsibilities.
One ethical theory—namely, contractualism—holds variations of this
view by tying together moral status and rights. But it should be noted that
not all contractualists are in agreement. One important exception is Mark
Rowlands, who maintains that since humans can speak for and represent the
interests of animals, then animals ought to be included within the sphere of
43See,for example, A. W. Moss, Valiant Crusade: The History of the R.S.P.C.A (London: Cassell, 1961).
44See,for example, F. R. Ascione and P. Arkow, eds., Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, and Animal Abuse
(West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1999); P. Beirne, “For a Nonspeciesist Criminology:
Animal Abuse as an Object of Study,” Criminology 37, no. 1 (1999): 117–47; A. Linzey, ed., The Link
between Animal Abuse and Human Violence (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009); E. Gullone,
Animal Cruelty, Antisocial Behaviour, and Aggression: More Than a Link (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012).
moral considerability.45 But if a thoroughgoing contractualist view is held, it

is certainly true that animals are excluded from (at least direct) moral con-
sideration. But by the same standard, so too are infants, the comatose, and
the mentally challenged. In other words, under this theory, some of the most
vulnerable humans in our midst also would be deemed to be without moral
rights. This is just one of the reasons contractualism is sometimes judged to
be an inadequate moral theory. Most animal ethicists would maintain that
we need a strong deontological defense of the weak, the vulnerable, and the
innocent of all species, which is why the language of justice (including the
notion of rights) is often judged appropriate.
Even if animals have some moral status, they are still a marginal issue.
But the question has to be asked: why? Unless one buys into anthro-
pocentrism, instrumentalism, or sheer reductionism, one has to ask, what
rational ground can there be for refusing to include animals within the same
sphere of moral obligation that we extend to fellow humans? Many peo-
ple in the past used to defend speciesism by referring to the “differences”
between animals and humans. Well, differences there are, both between
and within species, but the crucial issue is this: are they morally relevant
differences? The point has been widely discussed in the literature,46 but a
consensus has emerged that characteristics such as race, nationality, sexual
orientation, gender, and species are morally irrelevant. The key point is
whether the being concerned is sentient, not what race, nationality, sexual-
ity, gender, or species the being happens to be.
This is a handbook of practical animal ethics. That does not mean that the
following sections and chapters are oblivious to ethical theory. Rather, they
demonstrate the relevance of ethical theory by focusing on practical issues.
“There is nothing so practical as a good theory,” as one American intellectual
reminds us. The issues are sectionalized under the headings of control, cap-
tivity, killing, and causing suffering, and each section is selected and intro-
duced by a leading authority in the field. Although other books have focused
solely on killing or causing suffering, we have also addressed the arguably
45M. Rowlands, Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009).
46See Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters.
more fundamental issues of control and captivity. The topics range through
a wide variety of issues, including killing for food, angling, zoos, genetic
manipulation, sport hunting, keeping cetaceans in aquariums and dolphi-
nariums, elephant killing, bullfighting, animal experimentation, and indus-
trial farming.47 Of course, the list of topics covered is not exhaustive, but
the book does cover many of the practical issues that arise in animal ethics.
There is no one living who is not affected by one or more of the issues raised
in this volume.
We have, as editors, had to pay special attention to the question of ethical
language. So much of our historic language denigrates animals as “beasts,”
“brutes,” “subhumans,” or “dumb brutes” or deploys negative metaphors
about animals, such as “snake in the grass,” “cunning as a fox,” “greedy as a
pig,” and “stupid cow.” With these terms we libel animals, and not only ani-
mals, of course. Therefore, we have found it essential to pioneer an ethical
or at least more objective terminology. We have used “he” or “she” instead
of “it” for individual animals. We have used “free-living,” “free-roaming,” or
simply “free” instead of “wild” because wildness has negative connotations.
We have also used the term “companion animal” rather than “pet.” None of
these choices are without controversy, of course. Arnold Arluke and Clinton
Sanders note a problem with this alternative terminology. “Companion ani-
mal,” they say, implies mutuality in the relationship between the human
and the nonhuman animal, whereas “pet” implies a relationship that sub-
ordinates the nonhuman animal.48 The point is well made and is elaborated
by Kay Peggs in her excellent chapter, “Animal Suffering Matters.”49 But we
have still opted for the use of the word “companion animals” as at least a
gesture of hope that ethical language may, in this one case, precede ethical
action. Needless to say, exceptions to ethical language have been made in the
quotation of texts, particularly historical writings.
This book is a project of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics. All the sec-
tion editors and most of the contributors are fellows of the Centre. The aim
of the Centre is to pioneer ethical perspectives on animals through academic
research, teaching, and publication, and the Centre has a worldwide fellow-
ship of more than ninety fellows. All royalties from the sale of this book will
go the Centre to further its work.
47A wide range of practical topics are also addressed in A. Linzey, ed., The Global Guide to Animal
Protection (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013).

48A. Arluke and C. R. Sanders, Regarding Animals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996). We
are grateful to Peggs for this reference.

49See pages 373–394 in this volume.

www.oxfordanimalethics.com
July 2017
Acknowledgements Since this is an introductory essay, it inevitably utilizes and
adapts some material found in previous writings by the editors over a period of
twenty years (and in much the same language). We have indicated our indebtedness
to our previous work in the text.
Bibliography
Aquinas, T. “Summa Contra Gentiles.” In Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas,

translated by A. C. Pegis, vol. 2, 221–22. New York: Random House, 1945.
———. Summa Theologiae. Edited by the English Dominican Fathers. New York:
Benzinger Brothers, 1918.
Aristotle. “Nicomachean Ethics.” In The Works of Aristotle, translated by W. D. Ross.
London: Oxford University Press, 1915.
———. The Politics. Translated by T. A. Sinclair. London: Penguin, 1985.
Arluke, A., and C. R. Sanders. Regarding Animals. Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1996.
Armstrong, S. J., and R. G. Botzler, eds. The Animal Ethics Reader. 2nd ed. London:
Routledge, 2008.
Ascione, F. R., and P. Arkow, eds. Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, and Animal Abuse.
West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1999.
Beirne, P. “For a Nonspeciesist Criminology: Animal Abuse as an Object of Study.”
Criminology 37, no. 1 (1999): 117–47.
Bekoff, M., with C. A. Meaney, eds. Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal
Welfare. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998.
Brophy, B. “A Darwinist’s Dilemma.” In Animals’ Rights—A Symposium, edited by
D. Paterson and R. D. Ryder, 63–72. London: Centaur Press, 1979.
———. Hackenfeller’s Ape. Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1968.
———. “The Rights of Animals.” In Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology, edited
by A. Linzey and P. B. Clarke, 156–62. New York: Columbia University Press,
2004.
Clark, S. R. L. The Moral Status of Animals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.
DeGrazia, D. Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Godlovitch, S., R. Godlovitch, and J. Harris, eds. Animals, Men and Morals: An
Enquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-Humans. London: Victor Gollancz, 1971.
Gullone, E. Animal Cruelty, Antisocial Behaviour, and Aggression: More Than a Link.
Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Jónsson, G. A. The Image of God: Genesis 1:26–28 in a Century of Old Testament
Research. Lund, Sweden: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1988.
Lawler, J. G. “The Rights of Animals.” Anglican Theological Review, April 1965.
Leopold, A. A Sand County Almanac. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949.
Lewis, C. S. Vivisection. Boston: New England Anti-Vivisection Society, 1947.
Linzey, A. Animal Rights: A Christian Assessment. London: SCM Press, 1976.
———. Animal Theology. London: SCM Press, 1994.
———. “Foreword: Voyage to the Animal World.” In On God and Dogs: A
Christian Theology of Compassion for Animals, edited by S. H. Webb. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998.
———, ed. The Global Guide to Animal Protection. Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 2013.
———, ed. The Link between Animal Abuse and Human Violence. Brighton, UK:
Sussex Academic Press, 2009.
———. Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical Ethics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Linzey, A., and C. Linzey, eds. Normalising the Unthinkable: The Ethics of Using
Animals in Research. Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, March 2015.
———, eds. The Ethical Case Against Animal Expereiments. Urbana, IL: University
of Illinois Press, 2018.
Linzey, C. “Animals in Catholic Thought: A New Sensitivity?” In The Animals in
Us: We in Animals, edited by S. Wrόbel, 187–202. Frankfurt, Germany: Peter
Lang, 2014.
Moore, G. E. Principia Ethica. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993.
Moss, A. W. Valiant Crusade: The History of the R.S.P.C.A. London: Cassell, 1961.
Paterson, D., and R. D. Ryder, eds. Animals’ Rights—A Symposium. London:
Centaur Press, 1979.
Pope, A. “Of Cruelty to Animals.” In A Hundred English Essays, edited by
R. Vallance. London: Thomas Nelson, 1950.
Regan, T. The Case for Animal Rights. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983.
Rollin, B. E. The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Rowlands, M. Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice. 2nd ed. Basingstoke, UK:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Ryder, R. D. Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989.
———. Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research. London: Davis-Poynter,
1975.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
back
back
back
back

The Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics 1St Edition Andrew Linzey Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Palgrave Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics 1St Edition Andrew Linzey Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Palgrave Handbook of Practical

Animal Ethics 1st Edition Andrew

The Palgrave Handbook of

The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017952825

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover credit: Cover photograph © Harry Borden 2017

Printed on acid-free paper

Specifically, the series will

The new Palgrave Macmillan Series on Animal Ethics is the result of a

1 Introduction: The Challenge of Animal Ethics 1

Section I The Ethics of Control

2 Introduction: The Ethics of Control 25

3 Animal Justice as Non-Domination 33

4 Rethinking the Ethic of Human Dominance 53

5 Chain of Fools: The Language of Power 71

6 Our Moral Duties to Ill and Aging Companion Animals 95

7 Speciesism and the Ideology of Domination in the Italian

8 Bioengineering, Animal Advocacy, and the Ethics of Control 125

Section II The Ethics of Captivity

9 Introduction: The Ethics of Captivity 147

10 Incarceration, Liberty, and Dignity 153

11 Speciesism and Zoos: Shifting the Paradigm,

12 Elephants in Captivity 181

13 The Marine Mammal Captivity Issue: Time

14 Whales, Dolphins and Humans: Challenges in Interspecies

Section III The Ethics of Killing

15 Introduction: The Ethics of Killing 249

16 Religious Slaughter: Science, Law, and Ethics 255

17 Fishing for Trouble: The Ethics of Recreational Angling 277

18 What Is Morally Wrong with Killing Animals

19 Killing Animals—Permitted by God? The Role of Christian

20 Smoke and Mirrors: An Analysis of Some Important

21 Comparing the Wrongness of Killing Humans

Section IV The Ethics of Causing Suffering

22 Introduction: The Ethics of Causing Suffering 365

23 Animal Suffering Matters 373

24 Human Duties, Animal Suffering, and Animal Rights:

25 Suffering Existence: Nonhuman Animals and Ethics 419

26 Suffering of Animals in Food Production: Problems

27 Suffering for Science and How Science Supports the End of

28 The Ethics of Preservation: Where Psychology and

29 Bullfighting: The Legal Protection of Suffering 511

30 Free-Roaming Animals, Killing, and Suffering:

31 The Dog that is Willing to Die: The “Ethics”

rights, environmental ethics, health care ethics and theories of justice.

Animal Ethics Society. He has worked as a policy analyst intern at the

(Cambridge University Press, 2011); The Ethics of Captivity (Oxford

pursuing a doctorate at the University of St Andrews on the ecological theol-

fiscal sociology and economic transformation of modernity, cultural and

Open University in 2006. Elizabeth is the former director of the Captive

Andrew Linzey and Clair Linzey

In Brigid Brophy’s novel Hackenfeller’s Ape, a scientist called Professor

“Accept what things?”

Darrelhyde did not answer.

© The Author(s) 2018 1

“Correct me if I am wrong,” Post continued, “but isn’t that how Evolution

That developed evolutionary sense, what might be termed “moral evolu-

1B. Brophy, Hackenfeller’s Ape (Middlesex, UK: Penguin, 1968), 46–47.

Maltreatment of Non-Humans (London: Victor Gollancz, 1971).

We call for the protection of these rights.11

Brophy’s contribution to the symposium, interestingly enough, was titled

Brophy here delineates one important feature of animal ethics: it concerns