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The Politics of Public
Administration
Reform in Italy
Sabrina Cavatorto
Antonio La Spina
The Politics of Public Administration
Reform in Italy
Sabrina Cavatorto • Antonio La Spina
The Politics of Public

Administration
Reform in Italy
Sabrina Cavatorto Antonio La Spina
University of Siena Luiss Guido Carli, Free International
Siena, Italy University of Social Studies,
Rome, Italy
ISBN 978-3-030-32287-8 ISBN 978-3-030-32288-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32288-5
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Contents
1 Introduction: The Puzzle of Administrative Change 1

Sabrina Cavatorto and Antonio La Spina
2 Pressures to Reform and the Impact of the Fiscal Crisis 23

Sabrina Cavatorto
3 Restyling Public Management–Inspired Reforms 43

Sabrina Cavatorto
4 Fighting Corruption 75
Antonio La Spina
5 Obstacles to Performance Evaluation and Improvement 101

Antonio La Spina
6 Conclusions: Still Risking Implementation Gaps127

Index145
v
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Public employment in the Italian general government (N). For
obvious problems of definition and measurement, an ensured
level of comparison among OECD countries is that of
“general” government, which comprises state, central and local
authorities (OECD 1997). (Source: Own elaboration based on
https://www.contoannuale.mef.gov.it/)29
Fig. 2.2 Citizens attitudes towards the PA: Italians among Europeans
(%). (Source: Own elaboration based on Eurobarometer
Interactive “PA in [OUR Country]” (11/2018)) 35
Fig. 4.1 Control of Corruption (2017) (percentile rank 0–100).
Country’s rank among all countries in the world: 0 corresponds
to lowest rank and 100 corresponds to highest rank. (Source:
Own elaboration based on http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx#home)78
Fig. 4.2 Favouritism in decisions of government officials (2017 (1–7
best)). In your country, to what extent do government officials
show favouritism to well-connected firms and individuals when
deciding upon policies and contracts? 1 shows favouritism to a
great extent; 7 does not show favouritism at all. Italy’s rank in
2017 was 118/137. (Source: Own elaboration based on
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-
report-2018/)79
Fig. 5.1 Provision of public services (2017) (%). QA1a. “How would
you judge the current situation in each of the following? The
provision of public services in [OUR COUNTRY]”. Only in
Greece a higher percentage of respondents (85%) believe that
the provision of public services in their country is “total bad”.
vii
viii List of Figures
Seven countries follow Italy: Croatia (66%), Romania (63%),

Spain (58%), Bulgaria (54%), Portugal (53%), Slovakia and
Cyprus (50%). On the contrary, a majority of respondents think
their country’s public services are good in 19 EU member
states, with levels of satisfaction ranging from 46% in Poland
and 54% in France, to 90% in the Netherlands. Satisfaction
exceeds 80% in Luxembourg (87%), Finland (86%) and Austria
(81%). (Source: Eurobarometer Standard 88 (Autumn 2017)) 122
Fig. 5.2 Satisfaction and confidence on the national government (% of
citizens expressing confidence/satisfaction). Data for “national
government” refer to the percentage of “yes” answers to the
question: “In this country, do you have confidence in each of
the following, or not? How about national government?”
(Source Gallup World Poll). (Source: Own elaboration from
OECD Government at Glance (2013, 2017)) 122
Fig. 6.1 Compliance checks by the Inspectorate for the public function
and “severe” sanctions. (Source: Own elaboration from http://
www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/strumenti-e-controlli/controlli-
ispettorato/documentazione)133
Fig. 6.2 Total staff employed by public administrations per year
(thousands of units). The Annual Account shows the data on
the consistency and costs of PA personnel and constitutes the
official source of information for decisions regarding public
employment. (Source: General State Annual Account 2017) 135
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Implementation of CSRs to Italy in the PA field 34

Table 3.1 “Management-” and “governance-”oriented ideas from the
parliamentary narratives 60
Table 3.2 Delegations according to law 124/2015 reorganizing the PA 68
Table 6.1 Turn over quotas in central PA (% of expenditure equal to
that relating to personnel who left the previous year) 135
Table 6.2 Designing PA change through EU structural resources
(2014–2020)137
ix
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: The Puzzle of Administrative

Change
Abstract This introductory chapter develops the theoretical framework

of the book, placing the country case study of Italy on main trajectories of
administrative change in Europe. The variety of administrative traditions
and models of innovation are at the core of our reflection about possible
new policy trends: in the way reform options have been incrementally
shaped, we examine how New Public Management (NPM)-oriented
approaches have been taken into consideration, together with the devel-
opment of post-NPM narratives. The peculiarity of an empirical science of
public administration is put forward.
Keywords Policy change • New Public Management • Neo-Weberian

state • Public governance • Implementation • Italy
1.1 Administrative Reforms, Types of Public Policy

and the Empirical Science of Public Administration
The adoption and implementation of administrative reforms could be

thought of as being relatively smooth. Neither they imply the huge finan-
cial costs of social policies, nor do they focus on identitarian and ideologi-
cally divisive issues. Rather, they are based on the commonsensical idea
© The Author(s) 2020 1

S. Cavatorto, A. La Spina, The Politics of Public Administration
Reform in Italy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32288-5_1
2 S. CAVATORTO AND A. LA SPINA
that red tape is excessive and public bureaucracies are rigid, tardy and
inefficient. In principle, therefore, they could easily attract some consensus
among both citizens and members of the political elite. At the same time,
for the above reasons the decision making processes leading to their
approval could be expected not to be ridden with controversies and con-
flicts. According to the seminal taxonomy of public policies proposed by
Lowi (1970, 1972), administrative reforms seem to belong to “constitu-
ent policies”, which are in fact characterized by remoteness of coercion
and low levels of conflict.1
Gustavsson (1980) combined Wilson’s (1980) and Lowi’s taxono-
mies: administrative reforms can be seen as measures with diffused costs
and diffused benefits, being to some extent able to “determine” (in
Lowi’s vein), like any type of public policy, the way political interactions
(i.e. politics) develop. This would be consistent with their supposed rela-
tive “easiness”. One might guess that all that is actually needed is the
availability of certain technical policy instruments (which could be cre-
atively devised or, more frequently, imitated), whose application can be
credibly expected to reduce or solve certain problems plaguing existing
public bureaucracies. Imitation and learning would therefore be the main
factors in order to explain why certain historical phases apparently exhibit
“waves” of administrative reforms, which expand themselves across many
countries. This is what is supposed to have happened at first with the dif-
fusion of the neo-liberal version of new public management (NPM),
which stressed the need to cut costs and import efficient tools from the
private sector, and then with other more progressive approaches, which
rather emphasized service quality, involvement of citizens/users, open-
ness of governance and participation (the so-called “post-NPM” mod-
els). Such a picture, however, would be overly simplistic, and anyway is
contradicted by several hard facts. When they are really impactful,
1
When Lowi wrote about constituent policies, the examples he made were rather hetero-
geneous. He mentioned “reapportionment, setting up a new agency, propaganda”; then
“constituent or system maintenance policy” (Lowi 1972: 300, 310). Elsewhere, he was more
explicit in subsuming the organization of public bureaucracies under constituent policies
(Lowi 1985). When describing them, Spitzer (1987: 678, 680; see also Tolbert 2002) indi-
cated as an example of constituent policy “administrative/departmental reorganization”, or
a “agency reorganization”. Salisbury (1968) tried to fill the empty fourth cell of the taxon-
omy with self-regulation, which has to do with some of Lowi’s examples of constituent poli-
cies, but not with administrative reform.
1 INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 3
administrative reforms often modify, reduce or eliminate existing advan-

tages and opportunities for rent-seeking. Therefore, in such cases they
would rather imply concentrated costs and diffused benefits, hence a
much more adversarial and difficult decision path. Apart from the more
or less overt opposition of bureaucrats or other actors whose material
interests would be directly damaged by a reform, also the general culture,
the institutions or the policy style of each country are relevant in favour-
ing or obstructing the adoption and implementation of administrative
reforms (Lenschow et al. 2005; Stillman 2016; Gustafsson and Richardson
1980; Richardson 1982). It must also be remarked that the diffusion of
the various waves of public management reforms was not in fact so wide-
spread, homogeneous and uncontroversial (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017;
Goldfinch and Wallis 2010; Massey 2018). A public intervention in this
field could be merely or mostly symbolic, when it is devoid not only of
the necessary minimum of financial resources, but also of sanctions or
other tools that can alter bureaucratic structures and performances deeply
enough. It can also happen that, even if the innovation is explicitly
inspired by some foreign experience or managerial approach, it resorts to
choosing inappropriate instruments (e.g. performance evaluators that are
supposed to be independent, but actually are not).
Public administrations and the policies affecting them can be studied
from three different cognitive points of view: that of the jurists, who inter-
pret valid texts in order to derive from them legal obligations and conse-
quences; the managerial one, which is focused on the practical need of
performance improvement; that of empirical social scientists (who belong
to the science of administration, political science, sectoral sociology and
other relevant fields), who produce explanatory/predictive accounts based
on factual evidence, concerning the actual operation of real public bureau-
cracies, as well as the genesis, formulation, drafting, legitimacy and impact
(including unintended consequences) of reforms.2 The present study is to
2
A somewhat similar but actually different threefold distinction is proposed by Bauer
(2018), who sees public administration as surrounded by the three sides of a disciplinary
triangle: law, management and political science (the latter being focused on legitimacy and
unintended consequences). In this respect, Kingdom (1990) warns against the limitations of
managerialism and defines public administration a “peculiarly vulnerable discipline”.
According to Pollitt (2010), “what unifies public administration is his subject”. Kettl (2000)
shows how several social sciences and theoretical approaches address public administration
and can enhance its rigor. Wright (2011, 2015) speaks of “administrative management’s
nearly exclusive focus on efficiency and effectiveness”, too. In his opinion, an empirical and
be attributed to the third point of view. We examined Italian administra-

tive reforms against the background of the interface between external
pressures, isomorphic change, path dependency and domestic politics.
The framework is dynamic and reflects the balance of power relations
among the relevant actors and institutions involved in the administrative
policy as a subsystem. That is the way we see politics and the policy pro-
cesses interact, confirming that in order to understand administrative
reforms trajectories the “pure” dichotomy between politics (politicians)
and administration (bureaucrats) within the policy cycle (decision making
vs. implementation) is not enough.
1.2 Continuity and Changes Within

Public Administrations
There is wide convergence among scholars of public administration (PA)
that “administrative reform is a slow process of incremental small changes,
with radical changes occurring only occasionally” (Kickert 2011: 802),
often as a result of external shocks (the so-called critical junctures3).
Anyway, beyond the pessimistic view that administrative reforms “are
mostly piecemeal, gradual and incremental” and that “almost nothing
happened at all”, particularly in Southern European states, Kickert con-
cludes that “many small changes could add up to a substantial change”
(ibidem). In fact, modes of gradual, nevertheless transformative change,
were also taken into consideration by historical institutionalists,
traditionally more used to adopt an “all-or-nothing” dichotomous way of
thinking (the well-known “punctuated equilibrium” theory).
The heritage from the Napoleonic state model, dominated by formal-
ism and legalism, explains why in Southern European administrations new
public management reforms (such as privatization, contracting-out, pub-
lic–private partnerships, view of the citizen as a client, performance mea-
surement, results-based budgeting and decentralization) were mainly
rigorous “science of public administration” is not an easy accomplishment, but much prog-
ress was made in that direction since Dahl’s article (1947). On the one hand, Dahl already
spoke of generalizations, experiments and deduction. On the other, he argued that “the
study of public administration inevitably must become a much more broadly based discipline,
resting not on a narrowly defined knowledge of techniques and processes”. Therefore, it had
to include also societal contexts, cultural traits, historical roots and economic processes.
3
A useful literature review on the use of the “critical juncture” concept was provided by
Capoccia and Kelemen (2007). The potentialities and the limitations of the concept in com-
parative-historical analysis were further described by Capoccia (2015, 2016).
reframed in legal terms (Capano 2003)4 and often produced limited, or

even perverse, effects (Pollitt et al. 2007).
Studying the dynamics of public management reform in Italy, Ongaro
(2009) asked whether there was change of “a radical kind through disrup-
tion of the old equilibrium and transition to a new equilibrium” or whether
reforms of the public sector were “purely superficial”, that means that
“path dependency has prevailed and there has been no or limited change,
or else whether there has been change through accumulation of small
changes” (ivi: 10). He suggested a mixed interpretation, generally agreed
in the scholarly debate: by reason of an unfavourable environment for
paradigmatic reforms since the beginning of the 1990s—described by the
notion of “context in motion”, i.e. a scenario characterized by continuous
transformations of the political and institutional system (Ongaro 2011),
hence a context of political instability (Mele and Ongaro 2014)—there
was but only limited, “patchy” change. On the one hand, it was “partly in
the form of punctuated change occurring through disruption driven
mainly by political turmoil” in the 1990s (after the Tangentopoli corrup-
tion scandals); on the other hand, it was “partly through accumulation” in
the way of specific mechanisms, like layering and conversion (ivi: 30). A
process of “negotiated change” (Bull and Rhodes 1997; 2007) is strongly
characterized by path-dependent evolution.
This is also why, describing the types of national structures and pro-
cesses, and their link to patterns of management reforms, still in recent
times Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017) considered Italy as a “hard-to-classify”
case of modernizer: “Italy has been quite volatile on the surface—espe-
cially in the mid-1990s—but simultaneously exhibits some deeper cultural
and organizational continuities” (ivi: 118).
With the severe, systemic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, the iner-
tia of previous decades was “replaced by a permanent cycle of reform”
(Capano 2003: 787) aimed at developing a management-oriented pro-
gramme of change within the public sector. In discontinuity with the past,
from the early 1990s up to the eruption of the global crisis in 2008, three
major waves of administrative reform worked in substantial continuity
with respect to one another.5 These were promoted, first, by the
4
Explaining the Italian trajectory of administrative reforms during the 1990s, Capano
stressed how ideational variables are essential and argued the “hegemony” of administrative
law as a cultural paradigm governing the institutionalization of public organizations in all
European countries with Rechtstaat traditions (Capano 2003: 785–787).
5
Previous cycles of administrative reform in the Italian republic, immediately after World war
II ended and the democratic constitution was approved in 1948, are discussed by Capano (1992).
“technical”6 governments led in the 11th Legislature by Giuliano Amato

(1992–1993) and by Carlo Azelio Ciampi (1993–1994); then, in the 13th
Legislature, by the centre-left coalitions (1996–2001); finally, by the
centre-right Berlusconi IV cabinet (2008–2011), which did not resist the
impact of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis intensified in early 2010 and
thereafter and was then replaced by the president of the Republic Giorgio
Napolitano with a “fully technocratic” government headed by Mario
Monti (2011–2013).7
By reason of its economic and fiscal vulnerability, the impact of austerity
measures resulting from the great recession and its developments was in
fact for Italy particularly harsh and the implementation of further addi-
tional cuts in public spending was made possible by the technical executive
backed by a very large majority. Within this crisis-influenced context (Di
Mascio and Natalini 2014, 2015), still in an emergency climate despite the
worst peak of the crisis had passed, the new wide-ranging administrative
reform of the Renzi government (2014–2016) took place.
1.3 One Policy Design, More Trajectories

of Policy Reform
Following Capano (2003), we consider that a suitable way to understand

the logic and the content of policy reforms is through “the reformers’ own
words” (ivi: 789). Conveniently, in addition to literature review on Italian
administrative reforms during the 1990s and early 2000s, we directly took
6
In technical governments, parties are in principle largely excluded from the choice of
ministers. That is why, even if at a minimum degree, the Amato cabinet had not been con-
sidered a typical expression of the party government, being the party system substantially
collapsed at that time. More appropriately, the first “technocrat-led-government”, being
served by a non-parliamentarian as prime minister, was the Ciampi one (Ciampi was gover-
nor of the Italian central bank when he was asked by the president of the Republic to form a
government). Then, the Dini cabinet (1995–1996) followed, entirely composed of experts
and officials from outside Parliament. On the empirical variability of the concept applied to
the Italian case, see Verzichelli and Cotta (2018). The constitutional and parliamentary
effects of technical governments have been analysed by Lupo (2015).
7
According to Verzichelli and Cotta (2018: 78), the Monti government formed at the end
of 2011 was the “most extreme case of ‘party abdication’ has happened”. The authors com-
pare the Ciampi, Dini and Monti cabinets considering, on the one hand, the amount of
non-party personnel and, on the other hand, the scope of delegation conferred to the gov-
ernment. The potential of political autonomy granted to Monti and to his ministers resulted
to be much higher than in the two previous cases.
into account written evidences (interviews and articles) published over

time by key players of administrative reform processes: first of all ministers,
top bureaucrats and directly involved experts (mainly scholars of adminis-
trative law).
Strongly committed to overcome “maladministration” in a period of
severe crisis for the country, the minister of public function in the Ciampi
executive, the professor of administrative law Sabino Cassese,8 was able to
act as a policy entrepreneur and successfully “reframed the issue of public
sector reform in terms of efficiency and cost-effectiveness” (Ongaro 2009:
71). In a brief report of a year’s work (Cassese 1994), he reminded that
before 1993 the administrative reform was not on the political agenda;
administrative inefficiency was perceived in a “latent” way by citizens and,
to some extent, “administration was ‘left’ to exist” for itself; it was a very
“introflexed” system (ivi: 249). On the contrary, also taking into due con-
sideration the outcome of the 1993 referendums,9 the Ciampi govern-
ment stressed the administrative issue, “doing so much in such a short
time, like never before” (ivi: 250). Seven lines of action were promoted at
that time, choosing items from an NPM-inspired menu, as other European
countries already did and, in the South of Europe, were still doing: (1)
“put public offices at the service of citizens” (a consumer-oriented PA);
(2) “aim for a less centralized administration, conversely closer to the
communities to be served” (decentralization and simplification); (3)
“streamlined administrative structures” (downsizing and functional bun-
dling; modernization); (4) “a less expensive PA” (politics of cutbacks to
reduce the public debt, but also reduction of administrative burdens;
codes of conduct for civil servants; public procurement and anti-
corruption); (5) “a more efficient PA” (privatization of public employ-
ment; negotiation of labour contracts; recruitment and career paths;
8
He took part in the commission that drew up “the Giannini Report” about the reform of
public administration in Italy, prepared in 1979 (Capano 1992; Mele 2010). That report
“remained inoperative” (Cassese 2003: 134), also because it radically overturned the tradi-
tional approach to administrative reform of previous decades (Melis 2003). However, it
sowed those innovative ideas that would be then budded in the policy change of the early
1990s: private management models, concepts of planning and control, performance indica-
tors, unification of measurement methodologies and organization offices (http://www.tec-
nichenormative.it/RapportoGiannini.pdf).
9
In March 1993, seven abrogative referendums out of eight concerned the organization
of the state and a clear majority of voters called for the abolition of part of the administrative
apparatus.
measurement of workloads; training); (6) “more effective controls” (inter-

nal auditing added to the external system); (7) “a more European PA”
(EU citizens can access Italian public competitions). In just one year of
activity, the work of the Ciampi cabinet was of course “unfinished” but
transmitted as “a positive legacy” to successive governments (ivi: 255).
Further achievements were in fact strictly linked to the implementation of
already approved delegations by the parliament (as for the ministerial
reform contained in law 537/1993).
As predictable, nothing happened during the first right-wing Berlusconi
cabinet (May–December 1994), which was also very short, and not even
under the technical government led by Lamberto Dini (1995–1996),
which was in charge of leading the transition to a snap general election in
April 1996. In that occasion, the winner was “the Olive” centre-left coali-
tion: in the 17th Legislature, with the Prodi government (1996–1998),
the administrative reform season started again.
In full continuity with Cassese, the minister of public function in the
centre-left cabinets—after Prodi I, D’Alema I and D’Alema II (respec-
tively, 1998–1999 and, after a reshuffle, 1999–2000); Amato II
(2000–2001)—Franco Bassanini, professor of constitutional law, further
strengthened some pillars of previous policy reform cycle, namely admin-
istrative simplification and better regulation, a performance-oriented pub-
lic sector management, the development of horizontal and vertical
subsidiarity (administrative federalism), the e-government. The “first
government-wide reform since 1865”—as Bassanini himself defined it
(Bassanini 2002: 27)—was aimed at “rethinking and redrawing the perim-
eter of public intervention and public services, by focusing public admin-
istrations on its ‘core business’ and systematic outsourcing” (Bassanini
2010: 372). He acknowledged the reduction of the cost of the PA as “the
first objective from the early 1990s on” in order to consolidate the public
finances and enable Italy to join the European Monetary Union (EMU),
as indeed it happened. Thereafter, “since 2000 the problem of Italy’s PA
is not so much the cost of general government bodies, which naturally
must be contained and, if possible, reduced further, but the quality of the
goods and services that they supply to individuals and firms, together with
the quality of regulation and the regulatory and bureaucratic burden
imposed on individuals and firms” (ivi: 370). Of course, he found that a
“strong leadership” for the coordination of the change strategy was a fun-
damental determinant to make the reform successful: as minister of PA,
Bassanini was effectively delegated with ample powers of policy direction
and was responsible for all tools of reform. He admitted that “the whole
administrative culture” had to be changed (Bassanini 2000: 230), in the
sense of a new focus on results instead of procedures.
The third comprehensive reform is dated 2009 and was promoted by
the minister of PA and innovation (professor of labour economics) Renato
Brunetta, under the Berlusconi IV government. The Brunetta reform10
was particularly aimed at improving “the system of incentives and evalua-
tion of performance” by bringing “citizens themselves into the process of
evaluation and preference formation for the correct allocation of resources”
(Brunetta 2009: 351–352).11 Again, so that the competitive system of
incentives (both between individuals and between production units) could
properly realize its full innovative scope, it was evoked a “conceptual tran-
sition from the culture of mere formal compliance to that of substantial
results” (ivi: 361). Therefore the cultural dimension was explicitly con-
firmed as a crucial component of the extant reform strategy. Anti-
corruption through transparency was another dominant foundation. Such
a “revolution”, which was perceived, at least in the short-medium term,
with the appearance of a costly challenge for the recipients, was conversely
prospected by the reformers as a catalyst of more diffuse benefits in the
medium-long run, that is, “the” way for relaunching the economic growth
in Italy. Accordingly, updated e-government plans were mobilized too.
During the same Berlusconi IV cabinet, it is worth mentioning the
decision to delegate—for the first but, for now, even the last time—a spe-
cial minister for legislative simplification, additional to the minister for PA:
Roberto Calderoli,12 a leading member of the Northern league, was
10
The legislative decree 150/2009, implementing the enabling law 15/2009, was aimed
at improving labour productivity as well as efficiency and transparency of PA through the
recognition of the merits and shortcomings of executives and of all government employees
(OECD 2010).
11
Legislative decree 198/2009, also approved to further implement law 15/2009, estab-
lished that, in case of inefficient services, citizens and business may file a collective action
against public administrations and public services’ providers. Brunetta’s own words: “I want
from my side sixty million customers, who are also sixty million controllers, entitled to
express their own preferences, but also their anger” (speech to the students of the National
administration school, Rome, May 2010, http://sna.gov.it/www.sspa.it/wp-content/
uploads/2010/05/Brunetta-spiega-la-riforma-della-Pubblica-Amministrazione-
%E2%80%A6.pdf).
12
He also served as minister for reforms and devolution in the Berlusconi II cabinet
(2004–2006). At that time, administrative reform tasks and responsibilities were split in a
appointed to emphasize the legislative simplification process already

started by the Bassanini reform.
As a result, despite the alternation of governments, the substantial
homogeneity of the reforms’ policy design, that is, “the purposive attempt
by governments to link policy instruments or tools to the goals they would
like to realize” (Howlett and Mukherjee 2017: 1), was largely recognized
by the various reformers themselves. For instance, comparing the Brunetta
law with the previous 1996–2001 reform’s cycle, Bassanini found that
“the factors of continuity outweigh the few innovations” (…) and judged
continuity “not only positive as a method, but also commendable on its
merits” (Bassanini 2010: 369).
More in detail, when considering the specific “trajectories”13 of the
Italian public-sector reforms over time, in the period 1992–2012 they
were summarized as follows (Ongaro et al. 2016):
• As for the organization, a shift from homogeneity to differentiation:

regional and local decentralization (devolution14) became a major
political reform issue15; furthermore, independent administrative
number of actors, in fact a minister for information and technology was also appointed, and
some lack of coordination emerged.
13
According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017: 75), a trajectory “is more than a trend (…) is
an intentional pattern—a route that someone is trying to take”. They selected five main
“conventional” components: finance, personnel, organization and performance measure-
ment. Then they added transparency and open government. In Italy, public sector reform
concerned almost all components of public organizations.
14
After many years of debate, a significant wave of devolution started in 1997 with law
59/1997 (the law so called by Bassanini first), which profoundly altered the distribution of
administrative functions across levels of government, reallocating competences from the cen-
tral government to regional and local governments in different policy fields, although it did
not affect the Constitution. Then the notion of “concurrent legislation” between the central
and the regional governments was introduced by a constitutional reform in 2001 (Ongaro
2009, 2011). Bassanini himself described the way the reshaping of the government macro-
structure was pursued in Italy (Bassanini 2000: 232–235).
15
Albeit Capano (2003: 792) argued that “decentralization is one more thing that can
hardly be considered a novelty to Italian PA, and it is interpreted through the hegemonic
paradigm”, losing its meaning of “a strategy to adopt in drawing up public policy”, and just
conceived in terms of “mechanical division of duties” (ibidem). This interpretation confirms
the idea that many of the measures introduced were (reasonably) chosen because they were
compatible with the administrative tradition. The latter defined as “a historically based set of
values, structures and relationships with other institutions that defines the nature of appro-
priate public administration within society” (Peters 2008: 118) and, consequently, composes
elements of explanation for administrative behaviour. Administrative traditions may also be
authorities were established and public agencies increased in their

number; additionally, ministries adopted divisional, next to func-
tional, models.16
• As for the financial management, a move from an input-oriented,
highly fragmented, spending responsibility framework to an output-
oriented system of spending responsibility attributed to public man-
agers17; the new model was clearly inspired by the “management by
objectives” (MbO) perspective and aimed at integrating financial
and strategic planning.
• As for the personnel, the privatization18 of the working relationships
and labour conditions was introduced and a clear separation between
politics and administration19 was stated.
considered as just a restatement of the concept of “style” used to describe policymaking in

various states (Richardson 1982).
16
Law 50/1999 (another piece of the Bassanini reform), together with the legislative
decree 300/1999, also established the reduction of the total number of ministries to 12.
However, the reorganization design was soon reversed by the centre-right Berlusconi II
government through law 317/2001 and law 137/2002.
17
Closely linked to law 59/1997, law 94/1997 (the Ciampi law, from the name of the
minister of economy and finances in the centre-left Prodi government) reformed the state
budget and accounting system, reducing the number of line-items—which stood at about
7.000 at the time (Blöndal et al. 2016) and binding them, first, to the authorization by the
legislature, then to the responsibility of general directors in ministries: “the aims of that
measure were to reorganize government budgets according to mission and programme,
assign the resources required to implement each programme to the responsible administra-
tion as an aggregate, and give each organization and its administrators complete autonomy
in managing their financial and human resources, a precondition for making public bodies
and their administrators accountable for performance and results” (Bassanini 2010: 378).
The second wave of reform was launched in 2009 with a new budget structure based on
broader “missions” then articulated in “programmes” instead of aggregated “units” (law
196/2009).
18
The contractualization of public employment (i.e. the “de-legislation” of organizational
acts concerning human resources, instead regulated by private labour laws) was introduced
in 1993 by the legislative decree 29/1993 (Ciampi government), putting into effect the
enabling law 421/1992 (Amato government); the premises were further articulated in
1997–1998 by the Bassanini reform (the legislative decrees 396/1997, 80/1998 and
387/1998 modified the legislative decree 29/1993 in several points, for instance by estab-
lishing the possibility also for the PA to use flexible contractual arrangements to recruit per-
sonnel); all the subject was then codified in 2001, after the approval of the constitutional
reform (legislative decree 165/2001).
19
The legislative decree 80/1998 (Bassanini reform) allowed political bodies to make top
official appointments, introducing in that way a form of “spoil system”, which was further
strengthened in 2002 by the centre-right Berlusconi II government, with minister Franco
• As for audit and performance measurement, ex ante compliance con-

trols on administrative acts were shifted mainly to ex post controls
and performance indicators were developed.20
In conclusion, from the early 1990s Italy adopted managerial tools to a

significant extent, anyway not in such a radical way as to have changed the
overall administrative system. Moreover, if scholars agree that the 1992
crisis was perceived as a window of opportunity for administrative mod-
ernization which then continued during the rest of the decade (Capano
2003; Ongaro 2009, 2011; Ongaro et al. 2016), contrarily the response
to the 2008 crisis, and its politics of cutbacks, was considered a setback
which substantially hindered managerial modernization.
Accounting for the larger trajectory of administrative reform in Italy, Di
Mascio et al. (2013) interpreted the 2008 crisis as a part of the reform
sequence set in motion by the 1992 crisis. In particular, they interpreted
the politics of austerity strengthened after 2008 as partially influenced by
cutbacks already experienced by policymakers to deal with previous 1992
monetary crisis. In the framework of the global crisis, anyhow, “the mana-
gerial repertoire has been sidelined by cutbacks” (ivi: 29). Nevertheless,
“the principles and institutions disseminated by the previous waves of
reforms—i.e. managerial-oriented tools and structures—have not been
entirely reversed” (ibidem). As a consequence, Italy has been considered
in the midstream with respect to many components of the public manage-
ment reforms yet.
Actually, most European continental countries showed to be more
“interested in modernising their public administration in order to make it
more transparent, accountable and closer to citizens”, instead of “imple-
menting the ‘Anglo-American global reform package’ (Torres 2004: 109).
Besides, it has been well proved that “in terms of trajectories (…) not
every country has played the NPM game, and certainly not many are
doing so now” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017: 127). Last, but not least,
beyond trajectories, the “uncomfortably sharp question” has in fact to do
with the “slippery concept” of results (ibidem).
Frattini (law 145/2002). That system was strongly criticized by the former minister Cassese
(2002) and partially mitigated by a number of Constitutional Court’s rulings.
20
Evaluation mechanisms consistent with the new private-sector-type contracts for civil
servants were started by Bassanini through the legislative decree 286/1999. In 2009, the
Brunetta reform tightened the rules to enforce personnel performance rankings.
1.4 Results and Operational Challenges

On the basis of data collected by a top executive survey (realized in the
context of the Cocops21 project) aimed at analysing the impacts of recent
public sector managerial reforms, scholars described a picture of “a not
irrelevant penetration of managerial tools” in the Italian PA (…) at a level
higher than the Cocops average” (Ongaro et al. 2016: 188). However the
research demonstrated that the use of market-type mechanisms (NPM
inspired) were still combined, at least in the top managers’ perceptions,
with more traditional elements consistent with the so-defined Weberian
model of bureaucracy.
Indeed, scholars largely concurred to identify the mixed outcome of
administrative managerial reforms in most continental European states
with a neo-Weberian state (NWS) model,22 categorized as “an attempt to
modernize traditional bureaucracy by making it more professional, effi-
cient, and citizen-friendly” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017: 19). In the words
of minister Brunetta: “The notion of performance can, and must, embrace
more than just efficiency and effectiveness (…) and be broadened to
include the ability of the PA to embody such fundamental values as
transparency, integrity, equity, participation—in a word accountability”
(Brunetta 2009: 343).
Hence, interpretive schemes play a role when handling the puzzle of
policy change and its outcomes, particularly in the case of administrative
policy, for the sake of the legacy of traditional norms and values in the
organizational culture, as well as path-dependent dynamics. All in all, evo-
lutionary models of public policy presuppose more merging and sedimen-
tation than dismantling or demolition. Consequently, it makes a difference
when the concept of policy change is made operational (Capano 2009),
for instance distinguishing the phases of policy agenda and decision mak-
ing from the implementation.
Just so, questioning how policy frameworks are put into practice,
Cepiku and Meneguzzo (2011) underlined that in Italy “the contents and
tools of reform suggest the adoption of a pure NPM model to PA mod-
ernization (…) However, a closer look at the implementation approach
21
http://www.cocops.eu/.
22
Considering how Weber’s conception of the state is basic in the theory of the modern
state, it has been recently observed that “it makes more sense to talk about degrees of webe-
rianism rather than to distinguish between states that are (neo)-Weberian and those who are
not” (Byrkjeflot et al. 2018: 1006).
and the results of reforms invalidate this position pointing instead toward
a neo-Weberian model” (ivi: 23). Conclusively, Italy has been interpreted
as a neo-Weberian implementer of NPM-oriented reforms. Main failures
in the implementation of the managerial reforms had been therefore traced
back to this specific feature.
However, over time, implementation gaps were also addressed to limi-
tations of the NPM recipes themselves, especially for the excessive focus
on private sector and competition, ignoring organizational specificities
and the context-dependency of public administrations. Additionally, we
know that implementation always takes place in a dynamic environment
where different factors, even unintentionally, may influence outputs and
outcomes. Thus, between market and hierarchy, governance mechanisms
and the cooperation within complex public–private networks of actors
seemed to offer potential alternative solutions to administrative policy
problems. Indeed, a “more sophisticated understanding of public policy
implementation and public services delivery within a plural (with multiple
interdependent actors) and pluralist (with multiple processes informing
policy-making) state” was then suggested by the New public governance
(NPG) approach (Osborne 2010: 5 ff.).
From a normative stance, NPG-influenced administrative reforms are
inter-organizationally oriented, enhancing coordination between the gov-
ernment and multiple stakeholders. Civil servants are seen as network
managers and partnership leaders: they are crucial actors for change pro-
cesses. The plurality of inter-relations between state, non-state/private,
para-state agencies and civic society become a focal point for “co-
production” and “co-responsibility” of public service delivery and “pro-
duction of public value” (Liddle 2018). As Capano et al. (2015) properly
outlined: “Governments are still very much in charge, in every governance
mode (…) from hierarchical to market and network forms” (ivi: 319).
Hence, empirically, elements of each ideal type (PA, NPM, NPG) are
predicted to occur intertwined, resulting in increased complexity and
hybrid organizational forms, and conceivably producing recurring types of
dilemmas and contradictory effects (Christensen and Lægreid 2011).
These non-linearities would be able to direct the process of implementa-
tion towards failures. Nevertheless, scholars also observed that some con-
tradictions could only be apparent: for example, Pollitt and Bouckaert
(2017) wrote a shortlist which includes “some (seemingly) incompatible
paired statements and some complicated/less obvious combinations” (ivi:
191), such as “give priority to making savings/improving public service
quality”, or “promote flexibility and innovation/increase citizen trust and

therefore governmental legitimacy”, along with “develop more partner-
ships and contracting out/improve horizontal coordination” (ibidem).
As far as Italy is concerned, Bassanini already argued in 2010 that “since
2000 the problem of Italy’s PA is not so much the cost of general govern-
ment bodies, which naturally must be contained and, if possible, reduced
further, but the quality of the goods and services that they supply to indi-
viduals and firms, together with the quality of regulation and the regula-
tory and bureaucratic burden imposed on individuals and firms” (Bassanini
2010: 370). In that respect, new technologies had been universally
regarded as an indispensable ingredient to solve that contradiction which
seems to polarize “money-saving” vis-à-vis “services’ quality”. Besides,
under cutback management this challenge’s results are amplified, and it
should be considered, at the same time, that cutback management is any-
how about the long term. Yet it had been also considered that innova-
tions, unintentionally, do not produce egalitarian effects; then a narrower
scope of activities, in order to simplify and reduce public opinion’s mis-
trust, can emerge. Similarly, when relationships become multiple and hori-
zontal, as it happens through contracting-out and partnerships,
coordination is more difficult than in the case of hierarchy, which is verti-
cal and two-dimensional. Anyhow, it is not given that more hierarchical,
centralized systems do not endure fragmentation. Thus, once more, results
are sensitive to context specificity; and the same applies to the adaptation
of the “big reforms” to manifold theoretical/normative models.
We expect that the latest administrative reform cycle signed in Italy by
the Renzi government would fit more than its antecedents into this
extremely variegated repertoire, influenced by post-NPM models as well.
1.5 Structure of This Book

The book aims at providing a synthetic presentation of the Italian admin-
istrative system and an empirical as well as critical perspective on the pro-
cesses of administrative reform in Italy, focusing more in depth on some of
the most recent changes developed during the years of austerity and fiscal
crisis (a comprehensive overview which tends to cover all areas of admin-
istrative reform is given by Merloni 2018).
Literature review and secondary analysis were conducted to frame
research questions about models of administrative innovation, policy pref-
erences and options, implementation risks. These topics were developed
through new empirical data: process tracking and a qualitative methodol-

ogy had been at the basis of the comprehensive and up-to-date policy
analysis presented in the book. A number of primary sources were col-
lected from the parliamentary arena, from executive, administrative actors
and experts at the national level. We took into account written evidences
published over time by key players of the reform processes: the positions
adopted by the rulers were tracked, in such a way as to systematically
describe different components of the politics of administrative change in
Italy and explain its results.
Following this Introduction, Chap. 2 is devoted to clarifying to what
extent the austerity agenda adopted in the long run by most Southern
European states under the pressure of influential international actors, as
well as of authoritative EU institutions, resulted in Italy as an interplay
between external impositions and national constructions. In fact, we
assumed that to the transnationalization of policy frames through expert
knowledge and cross-national comparisons based on best practices, along
with the harmonization of regulations, howsoever domestication pro-
cesses correspond. Empirically, we took into consideration the interplay
between Italy and the EU in the frame of the European economic semes-
ter in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
Seeing therefore that the nature and contents of reforms are always
influenced by the structure of the arena of policy discourses, and the way
in which reformers frame innovation matters with regard to further devel-
opments in the policy cycle, Chap. 3 explores the agenda setting and pol-
icy formulation of the latest Italian administrative reform, that of the
Renzi government. In that regard, we found it useful to examine the nar-
ratives that emerged from crucial steps of the government policy cycle and
during the parliamentary debates. The executive–legislature relationship
and the role of party politics were examined.
Chapters 4 and 5 are dedicated to two specific topics, established as
decisive elements in the trajectory of public sector modernization particu-
larly in Italy, and both revised by the latest Renzi reform (through the
so-called Madia law): corruption and performance. In Chap. 4, we
reported, the pressures made by a multiplicity of actors, after decades of
political inattention, for an increasing expansion in the Italian regulation
of measures to fight corruption. Within this constellation, the National
Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC) entrepreneurship is in the long run
especially discussed, as well as the use of evidence-based knowledge and
orientation towards outcomes, which acquired specific relevance in the
most recent policy developments. Chapter 5 investigates advantages and

disadvantages of independent bodies as a lever of change studying the case
of performance planning, implementation and evaluation. In their real life,
the OIVs (Organismi indipendenti di valutazione) are appraised as a pol-
icy failure.
It is precisely to the implementation failures that the conclusive Chap. 6
is concerned. The vicious cycle of administrative reforms in Italy is explained
with a focus on the most recent developments from the 18th legislature
(started on 23 March 2018) and especially on the Five-Star Movement
(M5S)/League coalition which, after months of political deadlock, agreed
on an independent prime minister—the private law professor Giuseppe
Conte, almost unknown to the public—thus giving birth to the “govern-
ment of change”23. As for the PA, the government committed itself to
achieve the “concreteness” of existing regulation instead of changing it in
a comprehensive way. After all, the request for avoiding other waves of
comprehensive reform is nowadays largely diffused in the policy commu-
nity. Moreover it has been confirmed by the coalition government which
took over after the crisis of the Conte I cabinet24 and was formed by the
traditional rivals M5S and the centre-left Democratic Party (PD): they let
Prime Minister Conte surviving the collapse of his own first government
and, in the PA sector, the line of “concreteness” was understood with even
greater continuity with the Madia (PD) reform.
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CHAPTER 2
Pressures to Reform and the Impact

of the Fiscal Crisis
Sabrina Cavatorto
Abstract This chapter considers the role of external pressures vis à vis
administrative reforms. To what extent does the transnationalization of
policy frames through expert knowledge and cross-national comparisons
correspond to the processes of domestication? Is there a type of policy
learning that is observable? This chapter analyses the guidance given by
the OECD to Italy with regard to international standard setting and
benchmarking, and the actions of the European Union through the
European economic semester.
Keywords Transnationalization • Expert knowledge • Crisis-induced

change • Policy learning • OECD • European semester
2.1 Policymaking Under External Constraints

Revisiting the original concept of policy style, Richardson suggested a
reformulation of it which stresses a cross-national move towards a more
“impositional” approach to policymaking, with the decreasing influence
of interest groups vis-à-vis the executives, lastly pushed by the 2008 finan-
cial crisis. According to the author, such a trend implies a decline in the
capacity of policymaking systems to solve problems (Richardson 2018).
© The Author(s) 2020 23

S. Cavatorto, A. La Spina, The Politics of Public Administration
Reform in Italy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32288-5_2
Although he mainly focused on national contexts, we consider that shift

reinforced in the context of Europeanization and globalization: the
increasing of interdependencies and interconnectedness exposed nation
states to more intense complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity, forcing
them to deal with problems pressure under harsher external constraints.
The dynamics of administrative reforms did not remain uncovered from
these processes, influenced by policy transfer, policy diffusion, isomorphic
change and policy convergence (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Radaelli
2000; Knill 2005), stemming from both voluntary and coercive mecha-
nisms.1 Within this context, international organizations and the European
Union (EU) proved to be driving forces for domestic change. Learning
has been investigated as a dependent variable, and the connection between
learning and organizational capacity, therefore governance in the public
sector, has been recently made explicit by Dunlop and Radaelli (2018).2 In
accordance, although on the one hand, especially in critical junctures such
as crisis situations, most states intensify the perception of the need for
reforms and become to some extent policy “takers” rather than policy
“makers”, we also know from the literature that, on the other hand, coun-
tries react differently to external influences and that external impacts are
always domestically mediated (Wasserfallen 2018). As a matter of fact, in
Chap. 1 we discussed “trajectories” in administrative reforms, explainable
in terms of national configurations. Additionally, the literature on
Europeanization suggested an integrated perspective, where top-down
and bottom-up processes influence each other, positing executive actors
and administrations (more than legislatures or domestic groups) tightly at
the core of EU multilevel governance system.
This chapter is devoted to clarify to what extent the austerity agenda,
adopted in the long run by most states under the pressure of influential
international governmental or non-governmental actors and authoritative
EU institutions, resulted in an interplay between external impositions and
national constructions. We assume in fact that to the transnationalization
of policy frames through expert knowledge and cross-national compari-
sons, along with the harmonization of regulations, howsoever domestica-
tion processes correspond.
1
Regulatory policies were able to be diffused to a higher extent than policies involving
redistributive conflicts between domestic actor coalitions (see Chap. 1).
2
For a review on policy learning literature, see also Dunlop and Radaelli (2013). The link
between learning and policy failures was further explored by Dunlop (2017).
2 PRESSURES TO REFORM AND THE IMPACT OF THE FISCAL CRISIS 25
Incorporating neo-liberal recipes, international organizations like the

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or
the World Bank strongly encouraged public sector “modernization”3
being inspired by the new public management (NPM). This international
network of public management experts offered, and still offer, imaginative
opportunities to national policymakers to facilitate change dynamics at
home. In Italy, for example, the OECD’s best practices worked as a source
of legitimization of the first wave of administrative policy reforms in the
1990s. Nevertheless, the embracement of NPM ideas was rather selective
and differentiated, and not just in Italy (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017).
Although supranational, and thus with a higher degree of coercive poten-
tial, EU regulations also had differentiated impacts because of the distinc-
tiveness of national systems. Moreover, it is to be recalled that administrative
policy is not a competence delegated as such to the EU, so that harmoniz-
ing effects on the member states are limited.4 But yet, that lack of specific
competence has not prevented the EU from drawing up measures which,
indirectly and also directly, affected administrative policies of the mem-
ber states.
The impacting force of such external influences, even if transversal,
became sharper when the effects of the 2008 financial and economic crisis
became more evident within the Eurozone, consequently strengthening
EU fiscal coordination and adjustment. The convergence towards EU rec-
ommendations was especially monitored in those EU countries, like Italy,
which resulted more severely exposed to the risks of the crisis, due to their
high public debt.
In the next sections, we first consider what type of guidance for struc-
tural reforms specifically came to Italy from the OECD in the frame of
international standard setting and benchmarking; second, the EU action
3
Discussing modernization as a “tacit” concept, naturally (emphasis added) associated
with improvement, that is, increased rationality and effectiveness of the whole society,
Alasuutari (2011) argues that the diffusion of worldwide policy models is coupled with the
framework of state competition and uses cross-national comparative data to justify reforms.
However, this does not guarantee that transnational recipes are always put into practice: “the
introduction of a transnational idea typically triggers a process in which actors defend their
positions and interests in the changes that the potential reform causes to the existing status
quo” (ivi: 231).
4
According to the Treaty, the EU lacks any direct legislative competence on administrative
policy. Article 298 TFEU calls for an “open, efficient and independent” administration, but
for the European, not the national, level.
is taken into account especially in the aftermath of the Great Recession,

once the European economic semester was introduced as a tool to prevent
excessive macroeconomic imbalances and public debt.
2.2 The Role of the OECD

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development has
acted as a leading global actor contributing to the public sector reforms of
the last decades (Porter and Webb 2008). The global discourse about
what constitutes a well-functioning state and good governance was indeed
facilitated by transnational networks, where the OECD played a very
important role, together with the World Bank5 and the United Nations
Development Programme (UNPD).
In the 1990s, the OECD’s Public Management Committee (PUMA)—
then Public Governance Committee (PGC)—was particularly successful in
developing an NPM-oriented narrative about public administration (PA)
reforms which stimulated the dissemination of ideas for policy change and
expert knowledge at the level of member governments. Nowadays, the
OECD Directorate for Public Governance (www.oecd.org/gov) assists
countries on a broad number of topics, from anti-corruption and integrity
in the public sector, to digital government, regulatory policy and risk gov-
ernance. Since 2009, the “Government at Glance” series biannually deliv-
ers public service performance data6 and comparisons among OECD
members and beyond; the indicators are organized on 11 topics: signifi-
cant attention is devoted to the administrative activities of the central
governments, spending reviews are monitored as a specific tool to priori-
tize public expenditures but, primarily, reflecting on the critical effects of
austerity measures adopted in most OECD countries in response to the
5
The World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) are considered the most widely used
indicators for measuring PA worldwide (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/#home). Yet, as Van Dooren (2018) remarks observing the “government effectiveness”
dimension for the year 2016, WBGI is more useful to describe big differences that can be
found on a global scale, than for smaller distinctions within EU countries. Actually, also the
project team specifies that the composite indicators are useful as a tool for “broad cross-
country comparisons” and for evaluating “broad trends over time” (http://info.worldbank.
org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc). They themselves warn that specific governance
reforms country contexts “need to be informed by much more detailed and country-specific
diagnostic data” (ibidem).
6
Comparative information can be downloaded from the OECD database (http://www.
oecd.org/gov/government-at-a-glance-2017-database.htm).
2008 crisis, a new approach for public sector reforms is framed

(OECD 2017a).
The need for governments to prepare (and steer) their public adminis-
trations for “continuous change” is envisioned through “system thinking”
approaches, better suited to cope with the so-called wicked problems, that
is, problems characterized by uncertainty, complexity, divergent values
and interdependent processes, structures and actors (ivi: 327). On the one
hand, they “put great emphasis on the needs, opinions and mind-sets of
users, and enable an understanding of citizens as co-producers and co-
designers of government policies and services”; on the other hand, they
tend to overcome administrative silos by “involving actors and knowledge
from different policy fields and parts of government”, thus creating hori-
zontal, less-hierarchical structures and a more technologically rich envi-
ronment. Consequently, although one lesson from three decades of reform
experiences is that “modernization” efforts must be tailored to each indi-
vidual country’s context, the OECD Observatory for Public sector inno-
vation (OPsi) put forward a framework for system transformation in which
administrative capacity—reframed as “strategic ability”, first conceptual-
ized in the private sector organizations—depends on processes, that
should be more “open, evidence based, and iterative” (ivi: 34–35; OECD
2017b). The unique position of the “centre of government” in articulat-
ing priorities and supporting a less compartmentalized operative approach
to reform processes is deemed essential to ensure policy coherence and
avoid failures. However, this does not necessarily should imply greater
centralization. On the contrary, the gradual transformation of the public
workforce towards more professional, strategic and innovative skills can-
not be avoided. In this context, “it is crucial to have institutions that gen-
erate data and information that is not only valid and reliable, but also
legitimate and trustworthy” (Bouckaert in OECD 2017a: 11). As a matter
of fact, at the international level, the OECD fulfils this role of a legitimate,
and legitimating, knowledge producer.
Since 2015, country fact sheets and scorecards are provided online on
the OECD website, together with the entire data archive. Moreover,
OECD indicators are grounded in OECD recommendations subscribed
by member countries, thus providing normative elements to their design:
7
The main organizational and cognitive dimensions emerging from the research literature
on wicked problems, and the implications for public administration are usefully discussed by
Brian and Alford (2015).
for instance, in the case of the regulatory governance indicators, the 2012
OECD “Recommendation on Regulatory policy and governance” are
reflected. The same applies for the OECD “Going for Growth” recom-
mendations and the indicators about public finance and economics.8
Precisely with reference to the dimension “public finance and econom-
ics”, parallel-connected to the dimension “budgeting practices and proce-
dures”, six comprehensive spending reviews were classified between 2008
and 2016 in the case of Italy,9 even if the gross debt level remained persis-
tently high. In the period 2007–2015, expenditures for general public
services as percentage of GDP decreased more than the OECD average
(respectively −0.7 and −0.210). A system of accrual accounting resulted
not implemented yet.11 Concerning the “public employment and pay”
dimension, a careful workforce planning was recommended because, in
comparison to the OECD average (24.9%), in 2015 Italy had the highest
proportion of central government employees aged 55 or older (45.4%).
This percentage increased the most in Italy since 2010 (31% at that
time) (Fig. 2.1). Correspondingly, less than 10% of central government
employees are aged 18 to 34 (like in Greece, Spain, Poland and Korea).
Senior managers, who are the oldest (more than 60% are aged 55 or older)
and even the highest paid, are in Italy. As regard “human resources man-
agement” (HRM), data refer to practices in central government, and the
index12 on performance assessment ranks Italy on the OECD average.
Notwithstanding, Italy is not in the group of countries where there is no
8
Future effort has been also announced in order to develop new indicators measuring the
implementation of the 2014 OECD “Recommendation on Digital Government Strategies”.
9
http://www.oecd.org/gov/gov-at-a-glance-2017-italy.pdf.
10
Comparing the same “general public services” function from the structure of other
Southern EU governments’ expenditures during the same years 2007–2015, Greece and
France scored higher decreases (respectively −6.9 and −2.6); on the contrary, Spain and
Portugal increased their quotas (respectively +2.2 and +1.5) (OECD 2017a: 76–77).
11
On the basis of the 2016 OECD “Accruals Survey”, Italy did not appear among those
countries implementing or transitioning to accrual accounting, but maintaining cash finan-
cial reports.
12
The performance assessment index indicates the types of performance assessment tools
and criteria, and the extent to which performance assessments are used in career advance-
ment, remuneration and contract renewal. This index provides information on the formal use
of performance assessments in central government, and does not provide information on its
implementation or the quality of work performed by public servants. Data are based on
expert surveys.
3,500,000
3,400,000
3,300,000
3,200,000
3,100,000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fig. 2.1 Public employment in the Italian general government (N). For obvious
problems of definition and measurement, an ensured level of comparison among
OECD countries is that of “general” government, which comprises state, central
and local authorities (OECD 1997). (Source: Own elaboration based on https://
www.contoannuale.mef.gov.it/)
or very few turnovers of senior civil servants just after a change in govern-
ment, thus demonstrating a rather low level of professionalization.
Additionally, inasmuch as integrity emerged as a major issue, a country-
specific review was devoted to Italy on this specific topic (OECD 2013).
In fact, OECD “Public governance reviews” assess the capacity-building
across specific national administrations; trust in government, partnerships
with civil society and the quality of public services delivery; the implemen-
tation strategies. Advice is also offered through the sharing of good prac-
tices on bringing down the public deficit/debt. In trouble times for Italy
severely hit by the 2008 crisis, the integrity review was in effect requested
by the Italian Department of Public Administration to help the implemen-
tation of law 190/2012, known as the Anti-Corruption Law, by focusing
on the preventive aspects of the new regulation, not just on its repressive
provisions, however numerous. The general aim was to increase citizens’
trust in the government’s ability to control corruption. A peer review with
the participation of officials from other OECD member countries was
developed, and recommendations for the “institutionalisation of a culture
of integrity” in the Italian public sector were provided.
Not last, economic surveys about major challenges faced by a country
are also periodically carried out, comparing action taken year after year.
The last OECD economic survey on Italy published in February 2017 still
mentioned “PA inefficiencies” as a major obstacle to boost firms’ produc-
tivity; therefore, it addressed the recommendation of making progress on
e-services, and also giving full and “swift” implementation to the latest
comprehensive reform passed by the Renzi government (OECD 2017c).
In a complementary way, the “Going for Growth” series provides policy-
makers with concrete reform recommendations (http://www.oecd.org/
eco/going-for-growth.htm): taking stock of reforms enacted over the past

years, the 2018 Interim report on Italy highlighted once more the positive
link between progress on implementing an ambitious structural reform
agenda and the capacity to restore trust by improving the efficiency of the
PA through a better-skilled performance-based human resources system,
together with the reinforcement of the rule of law by fighting
corruption.13
It is well evident that the recurrence of the same, or very similar, recom-
mendations year after year, which testifies to their weak implementation, is
a symptom of the need to frame change processes—even during times of
crisis—in an ever-dynamic, not linear, perspective.
Can we expect the responsiveness rate to increase in the presence of
more binding mechanisms of coordination, as it should be the case of
recommendations delivered within the framework of the EU new eco-
nomic governance?
2.3 The EU Action

Bearing in mind the role of the transnational networks and expert groups
as knowledge producers and disseminators, hence potential drivers of pol-
icy innovation, as regards the EU context and administrative policy we
focused on the action promoted by the European Public Administration
Network (EUPAN), an informal network of the directors general respon-
sible for PA in EU member States. EUPAN is supposed to contribute to
the exchange of best practices for administrative reforms across the Union.
Additionally, drawing attention to “harder” forms of policy transfer,
the guiding function of the Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs)
elaborated in the frame of the European economic semester was analysed,
since a “public administration” priority was expressly mentioned within
the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) from 2012 onwards and numerous
CSRs were addressed to member states, pressing them to reform their
public services and administrations. Although the CSRs do not offer
detailed recommendations but just a list of top priorities, tending to be
unspecific on the measures then needed to attain them, the overall impor-
tance attributed to the need of administrative reforms increased.14
13
http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/going-for-growth-2018-italy-note.htm.
14
It was suitably pointed out that the reference to public administration was “changeable,
sliding from the broader notion of ‘public services’ in 2012 to the narrower one of ‘admin-
istrative modernisation’ in 2015” (Peña-Casas et al. 2015).
The pressure resulting from the financial and economic crisis accentu-
ated the cost containment approach already sponsored by NPM-oriented
frame. However, as we pointed out in Chap. 1, new nuances also emerged
supporting post-NPM perspectives, where market-type mechanisms
remain functional but normatively flanked by new elements, such as coor-
dination, collaboration, co-responsibility and co-production, participa-
tion, and digitalization. As literature identified, NPM ideas have been
integrated by post-NPM components, in an interplay between repertoires
of action respectively oriented to (market)-efficiency, as well as
(governance)-involvement.
With regard to EUPAN, in her capacity as the head of the department
for public administration during the Italian EU presidency in 2014, Pia
Marconi called the attention on the need of suggestions and proposals by
the network for a “whole-of-government” approach to address the chal-
lenges of PA and support “respective countries growth and thrive”.15
Although the challenges were considered “to remain the same”, the shift
in emphasis towards the need of a more integrated and collaborative per-
spective to administrative reforms emerged. Peer-to-peer-consultations
and knowledge transfer through networking have been experienced
among members, gathering together cultural and structural diversities of
administrations in the EU countries. An evaluation of EUPAN was
launched under the Italian presidency and conducted during 2015 by the
European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), already engaged by
ministers as a EUPAN partner with the purpose of methodologically
favouring organizational self-assessment.16 Anyway, criticism against
unsatisfactory results of EUPAN was significant and mainly had to do with
the tricky combination between informality (preferred by most members)
and formality (to some extent required to produce more visible products),
both embedded as EUPAN core principles (EIPA 2015a, b, EUPAN 2016).
Also the attitude of the European Commission towards EUPAN changed
over time (Demmke 2017), and it increased since when an emerging con-
sensus about the role of PA efficiency in favour of economic growth and
competitiveness was acknowledged, thus supporting an outcome-oriented
but also user-centred model, where vertical and horizontal coordination,
15
Welcome Letter 2014 by the Italian EU presidency (www.eupan.it).
16
The Common Assessment Framework (CAF) is a tool to improve management perfor-
mance inspired by total-quality models, but especially designed for public-sector
organizations.
together with formal and pragmatic interactions among actors should

have been improved.
That is why responding to the crisis in the context of EU new economic
governance (through the European Semester), the European Commission
identified national administrations, and Europe-wide PA networks as
EUPAN, not just as a component of EU sectoral policies implementation,
but as a specific object, requiring additional attention per se.17 The idea
that EU benchmarks and the specificity of contexts should be combined
with was more clearly envisioned by the European Commission: since
“synergy” never is an obvious process-result, in the AGS for 2015 the
Juncker Commission suggested an “integrated approach” to reinforce the
European Semester, making it less top-down, in pursuance of more posi-
tive interactions with the member states (European Commission 2014a).
In fact, experience has shown that beyond acute crisis, when cross-country
spillover effects tend to gradually reduce themselves, incentives for gov-
ernments to coordinate decrease as well (Alcidi and Gros 2017).
As for Italy, it has been classified as a “poor performer” according to
EU monitoring indicators, together with (in the Eurozone) Greece,
Slovakia, Slovenia and Cyprus and (non in the Eurozone) Bulgaria,
Romania and Croatia18 (Asatryan et al. 2016: 38). Actually, in the years
2014–2016, Italy resulted among those member states who got the maxi-
mum number of recommendations.19 And still in 2018, Italy remained
alone with Cyprus and Croatia (all of them experiencing “excessive”
imbalances under the Stability and Growth Pact20) in receiving
recommendations on the improvement of various aspects of PA efficiency
and quality (European Commission 2018a).
In the outset of the European Semester in 2011, the increasing of pub-
lic debt in the Euro area as a whole was primarily at the heart of EU
17
The Guide on the “Quality of PA”, first published in 2015 (fully updated in 2017) by
the newly established “European Commission Inter-service Group on Institutional Capacity
and Administrative Reform”, was devoted to operationally support national administrations
in delivering “successful” strategies through “inspirational” case studies, in order for them to
“create prosperous, fair and resilient societies” and “become fit for the future” (European
Commission 2017).
18
Croatia joined the EU in 2013, after the European Semester started. In the Eurozone,
Greece and Cyprus got financial assistance from EU economic adjustment programmes.
19
Data from the Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV) of the European Parliament
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/economic-governance.html).
20
It deserves to be also kept in mind that in 2018 the fiscal adjustment for Italy was judged
“inadequate”.
worries, given the combination of low potential economic growth and

unfavourable demographic developments (Council 2011a). Specific
efforts to enhance the PA, mostly vis-à-vis the business environment, were
requested to Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia and Italy.21 For Italy, initially the
prompt was for reducing disparities between subnational administrations
in the absorption of cohesion policy funds (Council 2011b). Simplification
was critically assessed owing to the complexity of the regulatory frame-
work for firms, deemed suffering of high administrative burdens, an inef-
ficient judiciary system and often ineffective public procurement practices
(European Commission 2012; Council 2012). Only later on, in the third
round of the ES, Italy was explicitly recommended to “reinforce the effi-
ciency of PA” by itself, also strengthening anti-corruption measures
(Council 2013). The results (Table 2.1) were considered of “limited prog-
ress”, namely announced measures appeared insufficient to address the
CSRs and/or their implementation was considered at risk (European
Commission 2013, 2014b). “Some” progress was recognized in 2015 for
the adoption of the enabling law to comprehensively reform the PA by the
Renzi government (see Chap. 3) and because the measures under the
2015–2017 simplification agenda were being implemented according the
timeline set out (European Commission 2015). In spite of this, the uncer-
tain path of enforcement of the enabling law, through the adoption of the
implementing decrees, led the Council to consider the Italian commit-
ments for medium term unattainable (Council 2017). The same held for
Italy’s challenges related to high-level corruption (see Chap. 4), as in the
case of public procurement22; “no” progress was made in revising the stat-
ute of limitations, with a bill pending since 2014; the national anti-
corruption authority (ANAC) was recognized to have limited financial
and human resources to effectively exercise its powers (ivi: 50).23 But
finally, assessing the implementation of 2017 CSRs in March 2018, the
European Commission recognized “substantial” progress in the anti-
corruption framework (European Commission 2018b).
21
Among non-Euro-area countries, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary and Poland were
addressed too.
22
Measuring member states’ performance per policy area, the EU Single Market
Scoreboard (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/index_en.htm) acknowl-
edged as “unsatisfactory” Italy’s public procurement performance in 2017.
23
Recommendations about PA also included, since the very beginning of the European
Semester, the enforcement of civil justice, resulting in the length of proceedings amongst the
highest in the EU. In 2018, it remained a priority (Council 2018), but the analysis of this
specific topic is beyond the contents of this book.
Table 2.1 Implementation of CSRs to Italy in the PA field

2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
CSR3 & CSR6 out of CSR3 & CSR 7 out of CSR2 out of 6 CSR2 and CSR6 out of
CSR2 out of 4 (2017) CSR2 out of 5 (2016)
6 (2015) 8 (2014) (2013) 6 (2012)
Full
implementation
Substantial Step up the fight
progress against corruption,
in particular by
revising the statute
of limitations
Some progress Complete reforms of Reduce the length of Adopt and implement Monitor in a timely Reduce the Implement the adopted
public employment civil justice the pending laws manner the impact of duration of case- liberalisation and
and improve the proceedings by aimed at improving the reforms adopted to handling and the simplification measures
efficiency of enforcing reforms the institutional increase the efficiency high levels of in the services sector
publicly-owned and through effective framework and of civil justice with a litigation in civil
enterprises case-management modernising the PA view to securing their justice
effectiveness and
adopting
complementary action
if needed
Promptly adopt and Ensure that the reforms Approve the pending Simplify further the
implement the adopted to improve the legislation or other regulatory framework
pending law on efficiency of civil equivalent measures for businesses and
competition justice help reduce the aimed at simplifying enhance
and address the length of proceedings the regulatory administrative
remaining environment for capacity
Implement the
restrictions to businesses and
simplification agenda
competition citizens and address
for 2015-2017 to ease
implementation gaps
the administrative and
in existing legislation
regulatory burden
Limited Reduce the trial Implement the Fight against Wider effort to Simplify the Implement the planned
progress length in civil reform of the PA by corruption and revise improve the administrative and reorganisation of the
justice through adopting and the statute of efficiency of PA, regulatory civil justice system,
effective case implementing all limitations by mid- clarify competences framework for and promote the use
management and necessary legislative 2015 at all levels of citizens and of alternative dispute
rules ensuring decrees, in particular government. Ensure business settlement mechanisms
procedural those reforming better management
discipline publicly-owned of EU funds
enterprises, local
public services and Adopt competition- Further enhance the Ensure timely
the management of enhancing measures effectiveness of anti- implementation
human resources in all the sectors corruption measures, of on-going
covered by the including by revising reforms by swiftly
competition law, and the statute of adopting the
take decisive action to limitations by the end necessary enacting
remove remaining of 2014, and legislation,
barriers strengthening the following it up
powers of the national with concrete
anti-corruption delivery at all
authority levels of
government and
with all relevant
stakeholders, and
monitoring
impact
Enhance the Strengthen the
efficiency of public legal framework
procurement for the repression
of Corruption
Adopt structural
measures to
improve the
management of
EU funds in the
Southern regions
with regard to the
2014-2020
programming
period
(continued)
Table. 2.1 (continued)

No progress Step up the fight Ensure that local In local public Pursue a durable
against corruption public services services, rigorously improvement of the
including by revising contracts not implement the efficiency and quality
the statute of complying with the legislation of public expenditure
limitations by the requirements on in- through the planned
end of 2016 house awards are spending review and
rectified by no later the implementation of
than end-2015 the 2011 Cohesion
Action Plan leading to
improving the
absorption and
management of EU
funds
Legend
comprehensive PA reform
anti-corruption
conpetition
civil justice
Source: European Commission, Country Reports on Italy (2013–2018)
80
60
Tend to trust
40 Tend not to trust
Don't know
20
0
Italy EU28
Fig. 2.2 Citizens attitudes towards the PA: Italians among Europeans (%).
(Source: Own elaboration based on Eurobarometer Interactive “PA in [OUR
Country]” (11/2018))
Even so, Italy’s PA is perceived to be less efficient and effective than it

is in other EU countries (Eurobarometer 2018): 68% of Italians think that
the provision of public services in their country is “total bad”. Among the
28 member states, only the Greeks are more pessimistic (85%). Distrust24
in the PA is indeed the strongest in Greece (81% of “tend not to trust”
responses), Italy (72%) and Croatia (67%) (Fig. 2.2).
24
Trust in PA has been less documented than changes in political trust, and fewer indica-
tors are available. Moreover, Raaphorst and Van de Walle (2018) deepen the subject distin-
guishing between two trust relationships: trust of citizens in the PA and trust of the PA in
citizens. Anyhow, they found both dimensions very scarcely investigated by academic litera-
ture so far.
A “growth-friendly” PA scoreboard was additionally constructed by the

European Commission as part of the “Member States’ Competitiveness
Report”, which yearly compares EU countries’ performance in a number
of areas important for the ease of doing business. As for Italy, the conclu-
sion was that, despite governments’ efforts, a competitive business envi-
ronment still had to emerge (European Commission 2014c). Late
payments by public authorities also resulted in a big issue, causing high
uncertainty for suppliers, particularly small businesses: Italy experienced a
considerable worsening of the situation since 2008, and, in 2013, it was
ranked as for payment times in the last EU28 position (ivi: 69–70). Of
course, the crisis was not helpful to increasing cash flow from the public
sector to suppliers, and in December 2017 the European Commission
decided to refer Italy to the Court of Justice of the EU because of the
systemic breaching of the Late payment directive (2011/7/EU), three
years after the launch of the infringement procedure.
Not least, the 2018 “eGovernment Benchmark” report (European
Commission 2018c) highlighted that “penetration” (i.e. the extent to
which use of the online channel is widespread among users of government
services) and “digitisation” (based on user-centricity, transparency, cross-
border mobility and key enablers such as electronic identification)25 are
positively correlated with the perceived quality of government perfor-
mance. That considered, Italy resulted in seriously underperforming on
penetration (22% vs. 53% EU28 average) and with a medium-low level of
digitisation (58% vs. 63% EU28 average26). Italy was therefore included in
the “non-consolidated eGov” scenario, where countries are not fully
exploiting information and communication technology (ICT) opportuni-
ties (ivi: 48).
That being the context, the need to further develop an even more sys-
tematic evidence-based knowledge about PA status and reform dynamics
in EU countries has been strategically addressed by the European
Commission, for instance through the 2016–2018 EUPACK project
(EUropean Public Administration Country Knowledge),27 besides to
25
The four top-level benchmarks cover the policy priorities of the EU eGovernment Action
Plan 2016–2020 (https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en).
26
The Italian PagoPA, a centralized node for public payments, was selected as a good
practice on the top-level benchmark “key enablers” (ivi: 50).
27
Funded by the European Commission and implemented by the consortium of the
European Institute for Public Administration (EIPA), Hertie School for Governance, and
Ramboll Management Consulting. EUPACK final results were presented in a closing partici-
ameliorate the impact of EU funding vis-à-vis administrative reforms.28

Beyond doubt, the adaptation of useful monitoring systems to member
states own needs, with only limited mandatory reporting requirements
connected to the funding (Attström 2018), is emphasized as a fertile oper-
ative suggestion for the European Commission to play an efficacious role.
In view of strengthening reform partnerships with the member states, a
Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS) was created in 2015 by the
Commission, designed to offer technical support on demand of EU coun-
tries, “tailor-made to the beneficiary and easy to use” (European
Commission 2018d: 4). Particularly, the SRSS was thought as a tool to
overcome the effects of the Euro crisis, following the example of the task
forces established to steer reforms in Greece (2011) and Cyprus (2013),
both entered the financial assistance package from the EU. At present,
CSRs addressed in the frame of the European Semester can be imple-
mented with the support of the SRSS. “Governance and public adminis-
tration” figure among those reform areas for which assistance can be asked
by the member states, also on reforms at their own initiative: in 2017,
requests from 16 EU countries were selected, and from 24 in 2018. Italy
presented 11 requests in 2017, of which 9 admitted to funding (European
Commission 2018e). Support was specifically demanded by Italy to fight
tax evasion, enhance transparency and business environment, design a
comprehensive accrual accounting system. In 2018, a project for the man-
agement of the whistleblowing mechanism was started. Although since its
inception scepticism was expressed about the SRSS potential (Asatryan
et al. 2016: 57), the development of the programme is demonstrating
interesting results, at least in terms of member states’ responses: the 2019
package provides resources for 263 measures to 26 member states, an
amount that has been increased in comparison to previous years. Of
patory seminar in March 2018: useful documentation is available from https://ec.europa.

eu/social/main.jsp?catId=88&eventsId=1308&langId=en (last accessed February 2019).
28
In 2014–2020, EU Cohesion policy funding invests in “institutional capacity of public
authorities and stakeholders and efficient public administration” under Thematic Objective
11 (TO11). As in the previous period 2007–2013, most of the resources comes from the
European Social Fund (ESF). The novelty of the 2014–2020 programming period is that the
use of funds has been conditioned on the elaboration of a policy strategic framework for
administrative reform. Whether the introduction of this ex ante conditionality can really
improve the use of EU funds for PA reforms has been critically discussed by Asatryan et al.
(2016: 42). Updated information about “TO11” are available from https://cohesiondata.
ec.europa.eu/themes/11.
course, the effectiveness of the implementation of this policy tool requires

longer time to be empirically investigated. Yet, in the medium term, we
can say that the interplay between national reforms and EU investments
has been institutionalized to a higher extent.
References
Alasuutari, P. (2011). Modernization as a Tacit Concept Used in Governance.
Journal of Political Power, 4(2), 217–235.
Alcidi, C. & Gros, D. (2017). How to strengthen the European Semester? CEPS
Research Report No. 2017/15.
Asatryan, Z., et al. (2016). Public Sector Reform: How the EU Budget Is Used to
Encourage It. In Policy Department on Budgetary Affairs. Brussels: European
Parliament.
Attström, K. (2018). Role and effect of external support to Public Administration.
Brussels, European Commission, KE-03-18-295-EN-N.
Brian, W.H. & Alford, J. (2015). Wicked Problems: Implications for Public Policy
and Management. Administration & Society, 47(6), 711–739.
Council. (2011a). Council Recommendation of 12 July 2011 on the
Implementation of the Broad Guidelines for the Economic Policies of the
Member States Whose Currency Is the Euro. Official Journal of the European
Union (2011/C 217/05).
Council. (2011b). Council Recommendation of 12 July 2011 on the National
Reform Programme 2011 of Italy and Delivering a Council Opinion on the
Updated Stability Programme of Italy, 2011–2014. Official Journal of the
European Union (2011/C 215/02).
Council. (2012). Council Recommendation of 10 July 2012 on the National
Council. (2013). Council Recommendation of 9 July 2013 on the National
Council. (2017). Council Recommendation of 11 July 2017 on the 2017 National
Reform Programme of Italy and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 2017
Stability Programme of Italy. Official Journal of the European Union
(2017/C 261/11).
Council. (2018). Council Recommendation of 13 July 2018 on the 2018 National
Reform Programme of Italy and Delivering a Council Opinion on the 2018
Stability Programme of Italy. Official Journal of the European Union
(2018/C 320/11).
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Title: Fifteen years of a dancer's life

With some account of her distinguished friends
Author: Loie Fuller
Author of introduction, etc.: Anatole France
Release date: November 29, 2023 [eBook #72257]
Language: English
Original publication: United Kingdom: Herbert Jenkins Limited,

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FIFTEEN

YEARS OF A DANCER'S LIFE ***
FIFTEEN YEARS OF
A DANCER’S LIFE
WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF HER
DISTINGUISHED FRIENDS
BY
LOIE
FULLER
WITH AN INTRODUCTION
BY
ANATOLE FRANCE
“SHE OUGHT TO WRITE OUT HER MEMORIES AND HER IMPRESSIONS.”—

Alexandre Dumas
HERBERT JENKINS LIMITED

ARUNDEL PLACE, HAYMARKET
LONDON, S.W. MCMXIII
Photo Langfier
LOIE FULLER
ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN FRENCH.
LONDON AND NORWICH PRESS, LIMITED, LONDON AND

NORWICH
INTRODUCTION
I HAD seen her only as she had been seen by multitudes from
every corner of the globe, on the stage, waving her draperies in
the first light, or transformed into a great resplendent lily, revealing
to us a new and dignified type of beauty. I had the honour of being
presented to her at a luncheon of the tour du monde at Boulogne. I
saw an American lady with small features, with blue eyes, like water
in which a pale sky is reflected, rather plump, quiet, smiling, refined. I
heard her talk. The difficulty with which she speaks French adds to
her power of expression without injuring her vivacity. It obliges her to
rely on the rare and the exquisite, at each moment to create the
requisite expression, the quickest and best turn of speech. Her
words gush forth, the unaccustomed linguistic form shapes itself. As
assistance she employs neither gestures nor motions, but only the
expression of her eyes, which changes like the landscapes that are
disclosed along a beautiful highway. And the basis of her
conversation, now smiling and now serious, is one of charm and
delightfulness.
This brilliant artist is revealed as a woman of just and delicate
sensibility, endowed with a marvellous perception of spiritual values.
She is one who is able to grasp the profound significance of things
that seem insignificant, and to see the splendour hidden in simple
lives. Gleefully she depicts, with keen and brilliant stroke, the humble
folk in whom she finds some ennobling and magnifying beauty. Not
that she is especially devoted to the lowly, the poor in spirit. On the
contrary she enters easily into the lives of artists and scholars. I have
heard her say the most delicate, the subtlest things about Curie,
Mme. Curie, Auguste Rodin and other geniuses. She has
formulated, without desiring to do so, and perhaps without knowing
it, a considerable theory of human knowledge and philosophy of art.
But the subject of conversation which comes closest to her is
religious research. Should we recognize in this fact a characteristic
of the Anglo-Saxon race, of the effect of a Protestant education, or
simply a peculiarity of temperament of which there is no
explanation? I do not know. At all events she is profoundly religious,
with a very acute spirit of inquiry and a perpetual anxiety about
human destiny. Under various guises, in various ways, she has
asked me about the cause and the final outcome of things. I need
not say that none of my replies were couched in a manner to satisfy
her. Nevertheless she has received my doubts serenely, smiling at
everything. For she is distinctly an amiable being.
As regards understanding? Comprehension? She is marvellously
intelligent. She is even more marvellously instinctive. Rich in so
many natural gifts she might have become a scholar. I have heard
her employ a very comprehensive vocabulary in discussing the
various subjects of astronomy, chemistry and physiology. But it is the
unconscious in her that counts. She is an artist.
I have been unable to resist the pleasure of recalling my first
meeting with this extraordinary and delightful woman. What a rare
chance! You admire afar off, as in a vision, an airy figure comparable
in grace to those dancers whom one sees on Pompeiian wall
paintings, moving in their light draperies. Some day you discover
once again this apparition in real life, softened in colour and hidden
under those thicker robes with which mortals cover themselves, and
you perceive that she is a person of good mind and good heart, a
soul somewhat inclined to mysticism, to philosophy, to religion, a
very deep, a very cheerful and a very noble soul.
There you have to the life this Loie Fuller, in whom our Roger
Marx has hailed the chastest and most expressive of dancers,
beautifully inspired, who reanimates within herself and restores to us
the lost wonders of Greek mimicry, the art of those motions, at once
voluptuous and mystical, which interpret the phenomena of nature
and the life history of living beings.
ANATOLE FRANCE
CONTENTS
PAGE
I. MY STAGE ENTRANCE 15
II. MY A PPEARANCE ON A REAL STAGE AT TWO YEARS AND A 20
HALF
III. HOW I CREATED THE SERPENTINE DANCE 25
IV. HOW I CAME TO PARIS 43
V. MY APPEARANCE AT THE FOLIES-BERGÈRE 51
VI. LIGHT AND THE DANCE 62
VII. A JOURNEY TO RUSSIA—A BROKEN CONTRACT 73
VIII. SARAH BERNHARDT—THE DREAM AND THE REALITY 84
IX. ALEXANDRE DUMAS 101
X. M. AND MME. CAMILLE FLAMMARION 111
XI. A V ISIT AT RODIN’S 122
XII. M. GROULT’S COLLECTION 128
XIII. MY DANCES AND THE CHILDREN 137
XIV. PRINCESS MARIE 151
XV. SEVERAL SOVEREIGNS 165
XVI. OTHER MONARCHS 184
XVII. SOME PHILOSOPHERS 192
XVIII. HOW I DISCOVERED HANAKO 207
XIX. SARDOU AND KAWAKAMI 217
XX. AN EXPERIENCE 223
XXI. AMERICAN A FFAIRS 232
XXII. GAB 250
XXIII. THE VALUE OF A NAME 267
XXIV. HOW M. CLARETIE INDUCED ME TO WRITE THIS BOOK 273
ILLUSTRATIONS
LOIE FULLER Frontispiece

PAGE
LOIE FULLER IN HER ORIGINAL SERPENTINE DRESS 29
THE DANCE OF FLAME 59
LOIE FULLER AND HER MOTHER 75
THE DANCE OF THE LILY 93
LOIE FULLER AND ALEXANDRE DUMAS 107
M. AND MME. CAMILLE FLAMMARION, AT JUVISY 115
THE DANCE OF FLOWERS 139
THE DANCE OF THE BUTTERFLY 143
DANCE TO GOUNOD’S “AVE MARIA” 159
THE DANCE OF THE BUTTERFLY 181
LOIE FULLER IN HER GARDEN AT PASSY 193
LOIE FULLER’S ROOM AT THE FOLIES-BERGÈRE 211
GAB 253
THE DANCE OF FIRE 261
THE DANCE OF FEAR FROM “SALOME” 283
FIFTEEN YEARS OF A
DANCER’S LIFE
I
MY STAGE ENTRANCE
“W HOSE baby is this?”

“I don’t know.”
“Well, anyway, don’t leave it here. Take it away.”
Thereupon one of the two speakers seized the little thing and
brought it into the dancing-hall.
It was an odd little baggage, with long, black, curly hair, and it
weighed barely six pounds.
The two gentlemen went round the room and asked each lady if
the child were hers. None claimed it.
Meanwhile two women entered the room that served as dressing-
room and turned directly toward the bed where, as a last resort, the
baby had been put. One of them asked, just as a few minutes before
the man in the dancing-hall had asked:
“Whose child is this?”
The other woman replied:
“For Heaven’s sake what is it doing there? This is Lillie’s baby. It
is only six weeks old and she brought it here with her. This really is
no place for a baby of that age. Look out; you will break its neck if
you hold it that way. The child is only six weeks old, I tell you.”
At this moment a woman ran from the other end of the hall. She
uttered a cry and grasped the child. Blushing deeply she prepared to
take it away, when one of the dancers said to her:
“She has made her entrance into society. Now she will have to
stay here.”
From that moment until the end of the ball the baby was the chief
attraction of the evening. She cooed, laughed, waved her little hands
and was passed round the hall until the last of the dancers was
gone.
I was that baby. Let me explain how such an adventure came
about.
It occurred in January, during a very severe winter. The
thermometer registered forty degrees below zero. At that time my
father, my mother, and my brothers lived on a farm about sixteen
miles from Chicago. When the occasion of my appearance in the
world was approaching, the temperature went so low that it was
impossible to heat our house properly. My mother’s health naturally
made my father anxious. He went accordingly to the village of
Fullersburg, the population of which was composed almost
exclusively of cousins and kinsmen, and made an arrangement with
the proprietor of the only public-house of the place. In the general
room there was a huge cast-iron stove. This was, in the whole
countryside, the only stove which seemed to give out an appreciable
heat. They transformed the bar into a sleeping-room and there it was
that I first saw light. On that day the frost was thick on the window
panes and the water froze in dishes two yards from the famous
stove.
I am positive of all these details, for I caught a cold at the very
moment of my birth, which I have never got rid of. On my father’s
side I had a sturdy ancestry. I therefore came into life with a certain
power of resistance, and if I have not been able to recover altogether
from the effects of this initial cold, I have had the strength at all
events to withstand them.
A month later we had returned to the farm, and the saloon
resumed its customary appearance. I have mentioned that it was the
only tavern in town, and, as we occupied the main room, we had
inflicted considerable hardship upon the villagers, who were deprived
of their entertainment for more than four weeks.
When I was about six weeks old a lot of people stopped one
evening in front of our house. They were going to give a surprise
party at a house about twenty miles from ours.
They were picking up everybody en route, and they stopped at
our house to include my parents. They gave them five minutes in
which to get ready. My father was an intimate friend of the people
whom they were going to surprise; and, furthermore, as he was one
of the best musicians of the neighbourhood he could not get out of
going, as without him the company would have no chance of
dancing. He accordingly consented to join the party. Then they
insisted that my mother go, too.
“What will she do with the baby? Who will feed her?”
There was only one thing to do in these circumstances—take
baby too.
My mother declined at first, alleging that she had no time to make
the necessary preparations, but the jubilant crowd would accept no
refusal. They bundled me up in a coverlet and I was packed into a
sleigh, which bore me to the ball.
When we arrived they supposed that, like a well-brought-up baby,
I should sleep all night, and they put me on the bed in a room
temporarily transformed into a dressing-room. They covered me
carefully and left me to myself.
There it was that the two gentlemen quoted at the beginning of
this chapter discovered the baby agitating feet and hands in every
direction. Her only clothing was a yellow flannel garment and a calico
petticoat, which made her look like a poor little waif. You may
imagine my mother’s feelings when she saw her daughter make an
appearance in such a costume.
That at all events is how I made my debut, at the age of six
weeks. I made it because I could not do otherwise. In all my life
everything that I have done has had that one starting-point; I have
never been able to do anything else.
I have likewise continued not to bother much about my personal
appearance.
II
MY APPEARANCE ON A REAL STAGE AT TWO
YEARS AND A HALF
W HEN I was a very small girl the president of the Chicago

Progressive Lyceum, where my parents and I went every
Sunday, called on my mother one afternoon, and
congratulated her on the appearance I had made the preceding
Sunday at the Lyceum. As my mother did not understand what he
meant, I raised myself from the carpet, on which I was playing with
some toys, and I explained:
“I forgot to tell you, mamma, that I recited my piece at the Lyceum
last Sunday.”
“Recited your piece?” repeated my mother. “What does she
mean?”
“What!” said the president, “haven’t you heard that Loie recited
some poetry last Sunday?”
My mother was quite overcome with surprise. I threw myself upon
her and fairly smothered her with kisses, saying,
“I forgot to tell you. I recited my piece.”
“Oh, yes,” said the president, “and she was a great success, too.”
My mother asked for explanations.
The president then told her: “During an interval between the
exercises, Loie climbed up on the platform, made a pretty bow as
she had seen orators do, and then, kneeling down, she recited a little
prayer. What this prayer was I don’t remember.”
But my mother interrupted him.
“Oh, I know. It is the prayer she says every evening when I put
her to bed.”
And I had recited that in a Sunday School thronged by free-
thinkers!
“After that Loie arose, and saluted the audience once more. Then
immense difficulties arose. She did not dare to descend the steps in
the usual way. So she sat down and let herself slide from one step to
another until she reached the floor of the house. During this exercise
the whole hall laughed loudly at the sight of her little yellow flannel
petticoat, and her copper-toed boots beating the air. But Loie got on
her feet again, and, hearing the laughter, raised her right hand and
said in a shrill voice: ‘Hush! Keep quiet. I am going to recite my
poem.’ She would not stir until silence was restored. Loie then
recited her poem as she had promised, and returned to her seat with
the air of having done the most natural thing in the world.”
The following Sunday I went as usual to the Lyceum with my
brothers. My mother came, too, in the course of the afternoon, and
took her seat at the end of a settee among the invited guests who
took no part in our exercises. She was thinking how much she had
missed in not being there the preceding Sunday to witness my
“success,” when she saw a woman rise and approach the platform.
The woman began to read a little paper which she held in her hand.
After she had finished reading my mother heard her say:
“And now we are going to have the pleasure of hearing our little
friend Loie Fuller recite a poem entitled: ‘Mary had a little Lamb.’”
My mother, absolutely amazed, was unable to stir or to say a
word. She merely gasped:
“How can this little girl be so foolish! She will never be able to
recite that. She has only heard it once.”
In a sort of daze she saw me rise from my seat, slowly walk to
the steps and climb upon the platform, helping myself up with feet
and hands. Once there I turned around and took in my audience. I
made a pretty courtesy, and began in a voice which resounded
throughout the hall. I repeated the little poem in so serious a manner
that, despite the mistakes I must have made, the spirit of it was
intelligible and impressed the audience. I did not stop once. Then I
courtesied again and everybody applauded me wildly. I went back to
the stairs and let myself slide down to the bottom, as I had done the
preceding Sunday. Only this time no one made fun of me.
When my mother rejoined me, some time after, she was still pale
and trembling. She asked me why I had not informed her of what I
was going to do. I replied that I could not let her know about a thing
that I did not know myself.
“Where have you learned this?”
“I don’t know, mamma.”
She said then that I must have heard it read by my brother; and I
remembered that it was so. From this time on I was always reciting
poems, wherever I happened to be. I used to make little speeches,
but in prose, for I employed the words that were natural for me,
contenting myself with translating the spirit of the things that I recited
without bothering much over word-by-word renderings. With my firm
and very tenacious memory, I needed then only to hear a poem once
to recite it, from beginning to end, without making a single mistake. I
have always had a wonderful memory. I have proved it repeatedly by
unexpectedly taking parts of which I did not know a word the day
before the first performance.
It was thus, for instance, when I played the part of Marguerite
Gauthier in La Dame aux Camélias with only four hours to learn the
lines.
On the Sunday of which I have been speaking, my mother
experienced the first of the nervous shocks that might have warned
her, had she been able to understand, that she was destined to
become the prey of a dreadful disease, which would never leave her.
From the spring which followed my first appearance at the Folies-
Bergère until the time of her death she accompanied me in all my
travels. As I was writing this, some days before her end, I could hear
her stir or speak, for she was in the next room with two nurses
watching over her night and day. While I was working I would go to
her from time to time, rearrange her pillows a little, lift her, give her

The Politics of Public Administration Reform in Italy 1St Ed Edition Sabrina Cavatorto Full Chapter

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The Politics of Public Administration

Reform in Italy 1st ed. Edition Sabrina

The Politics of Public

ISBN 978-3-030-32287-8 ISBN 978-3-030-32288-5 (eBook)

Cover illustration: Pattern © John Rawsterne/patternhead.com

1 Introduction: The Puzzle of Administrative Change 1

2 Pressures to Reform and the Impact of the Fiscal Crisis 23

3 Restyling Public Management–Inspired Reforms 43

5 Obstacles to Performance Evaluation and Improvement 101

6 Conclusions: Still Risking Implementation Gaps127

Seven countries follow Italy: Croatia (66%), Romania (63%),

Table 2.1 Implementation of CSRs to Italy in the PA field 34

Introduction: The Puzzle of Administrative

Sabrina Cavatorto and Antonio La Spina

Abstract This introductory chapter develops the theoretical framework

Keywords Policy change • New Public Management • Neo-Weberian

1.1 Administrative Reforms, Types of Public Policy

The adoption and implementation of administrative reforms could be

© The Author(s) 2020 1

administrative reforms often modify, reduce or eliminate existing advan-

be attributed to the third point of view. We examined Italian administra-

1.2 Continuity and Changes Within

reframed in legal terms (Capano 2003)4 and often produced limited, or

“technical”6 governments led in the 11th Legislature by Giuliano Amato

1.3 One Policy Design, More Trajectories

Following Capano (2003), we consider that a suitable way to understand

into account written evidences (interviews and articles) published over

measurement of workloads; training); (6) “more effective controls” (inter-

appointed to emphasize the legislative simplification process already

• As for the organization, a shift from homogeneity to differentiation:

authorities were established and public agencies increased in their

considered as just a restatement of the concept of “style” used to describe policymaking in

• As for audit and performance measurement, ex ante compliance con-

In conclusion, from the early 1990s Italy adopted managerial tools to a

1.4 Results and Operational Challenges

quality”, or “promote flexibility and innovation/increase citizen trust and

1.5 Structure of This Book

through new empirical data: process tracking and a qualitative methodol-

most recent policy developments. Chapter 5 investigates advantages and

Bassanini, F. (2010). Vent’anni di riforme del sistema amministrativo italiano

Cassese, S. (2003). The Age of Administrative Reforms. In J. Hayward &

Pollitt, C. (2010). Envisioning Public Administration as a Scholarly Field in 2020.

Pressures to Reform and the Impact

Keywords Transnationalization • Expert knowledge • Crisis-induced

2.1 Policymaking Under External Constraints

© The Author(s) 2020 23

Although he mainly focused on national contexts, we consider that shift

Incorporating neo-liberal recipes, international organizations like the

is taken into account especially in the aftermath of the Great Recession,

2.2 The Role of the OECD

2008 crisis, a new approach for public sector reforms is framed

eco/going-for-growth.htm): taking stock of reforms enacted over the past

2.3 The EU Action

together with formal and pragmatic interactions among actors should

worries, given the combination of low potential economic growth and

Table 2.1 Implementation of CSRs to Italy in the PA field

Table. 2.1 (continued)

Source: European Commission, Country Reports on Italy (2013–2018)

Even so, Italy’s PA is perceived to be less efficient and effective than it

A “growth-friendly” PA scoreboard was additionally constructed by the

ameliorate the impact of EU funding vis-à-vis administrative reforms.28

patory seminar in March 2018: useful documentation is available from https://ec.europa.

course, the effectiveness of the implementation of this policy tool requires

1 Introduction: The Puzzle of Administrative Change 1

2 Pressures to Reform and the Impact of the Fiscal Crisis 23

3 Restyling Public Management–Inspired Reforms 43

5 Obstacles to Performance Evaluation and Improvement 101

6 Conclusions: Still Risking Implementation Gaps127

Table 2.1 Implementation of CSRs to Italy in the PA field 34