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PSIR · PALGRAVE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Japan’s Rush to
the Pacific War
The Institutional Roots
of Overbalancing
Lionel P. Fatton
Palgrave Studies in International Relations
Series Editors
Knud Erik Jørgensen, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
J. Marshall Beier, Political Science, McMaster University, Milton, ON,
Canada
Palgrave Studies in International Relations provides scholars with the best
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of study.
Knud Erik Jørgensen is Professor of International Relations at Aarhus
University, Denmark, and at Yaşar University, Izmir, Turkey.
Lionel P. Fatton
Japan’s Rush
to the Pacific War
The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing
Lionel P. Fatton
Department of International Relations
Webster University Geneva
Bellevue, Switzerland
Palgrave Studies in International Relations

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To Nozomi and Saya, may you learn from the past to build the future.
Foreword
Foreword to Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of

Overbalancing by Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki, Professor of International
Relations, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University.
I remember the day Dr. Lionel Fatton asked the question that underlies
this book, many years ago. “Why do states begin wars?” He went on to
say: “All wars are madness, but especially puzzling is why Japan began the
war against the United States.” Why, indeed? Japan’s decision to attack
Pearl Harbor and start a war against an enemy much stronger than itself
is a mystery. Scholars of International Relations have sought explanations
in the irrationality of Japanese thinking at the time. Some saw the source
of irrationality in the Japanese culture. Others found the source in the
malfunction of the state being hijacked by a small number of groups.
It was thus with great pleasure and excitement that I turned the pages
of this book to find out Dr. Fatton’s answer.
Dr. Fatton argues the cause was overbalancing—not madness. The
process of the war began when Japan turned its back to a naval arms
control regime in the 1930s. Japan was one of the victors of the First
World War and enjoyed a seat among the major powers. And yet, it walked
away from the international order and began its path to unilateralism.
Japan overbalanced, which led to reactions from the other countries,
resulting in a spiral. Security dilemma ensued. Japan seeking to achieve
security, in the end, decreased its security by walking away from the naval
treaty.
vii
viii FOREWORD
Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbal-

ancing traces the process through which Japan shifted from adequate
balancing to overbalancing. The book shows how certain domestic condi-
tions and international crisis allowed the military and the navy to convince
other groups in the foreign policy establishment and the nation of an
inflated threat perception, hence the necessity to prepare for war against
the United States. Overbalancing was rooted in the perceptual and policy
biases of the military institution.
The book begins the analysis in the 1910–1920s when Japan’s threat
perception toward the United States was benign, even though the rela-
tionship was sometimes tense. Japan correctly assessed the American
intention not to be malign and sought cooperation with the major
powers. This provided the Japanese government with the flexibility to
reach a compromise on naval arms control at the Washington Conference
of 1921–1922. The Manchurian crisis of 1931–1933 was the exogenous
shock that changed Japan’s threat perception. With the extensive use of
archival materials from both Japanese and English language sources, Dr.
Fatton describes the thinking and assessments different groups within
the Japanese and American foreign policy establishments had of the
Manchurian crisis. While the institutional biases of military services to
overbalance may not be unique to Japan, the book shows how the
Japanese navy, helped by dysfunctions in the structure of Japanese civil–
military relations, successfully disseminated its inflated threat perception
to other members of the foreign policy establishment. The Manchurian
crisis alarmed many Japanese policymakers as well as the public. The book
also illustrates how the economic crisis and the discontent of the Japanese
public toward the Japanese government and the distrust of the American
government paved the way for the navy to promote its views. The United
States was identified to have the capability and the intent to harm the
national security of Japan. A strong naval force was the solution to deter
and defeat American aggression. Japan overbalanced.
The book should be of great interest to many but especially to three
types of readers. First, readers interested in the causes and prevention of
war will learn greatly from this book. The book shows how international
conditions are combined with domestic conditions to produce a prefer-
ence for overbalancing. Second, readers interested in threat perception
will find a process through which certain versions of threat perception are
propagated to become the national threat perception. Third, those inter-
ested in the history of Japan leading up to the Pacific War will enjoy the
FOREWORD ix
detailed account of how the moderate and cooperative foreign policy of

Japan changed to a unilateral and non-cooperative one.
The question of why Japan moved away from international coopera-
tion and began the path to the war, sadly, is more relevant today than it
has been in decades. Will China choose to remain in the current inter-
national system? Can the United States and Japan accommodate China?
Are the United States, Japan and China balancing adequately? Or are they
overbalancing? Do the countries have the necessary institutions to make
the correct assessment of the situation? The readers of Japan’s Rush to the
Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing will find insights
into answering these questions. The hope is we will be wiser to make the
right choices for the future.
Tokyo, Japan Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki

Preface
As far as I remember, war has always intrigued me. Not because I grew
up isolated from human violence, quite the contrary. It did not take me
long to realize that human beings are aggressive, brutal and even cruel
not because of their nature, but because violence is sometimes perceived
as the only way to protect oneself and loved ones. The origin of human
violence cannot be condemned. It is rooted in human weaknesses, and
actually comes from a noble intention. In society, however, this intention
may transform human beings into predators. Homo homini lupus est. And
in the society of states, countries repeat the same behavioral pattern. Si
vis pacem para bellum. Human history is a tragedy, and war is a fatality.
This conclusion was, and still is, the bedrock of my fascination for armed
conflicts.
In investigating war, one question has particularly puzzled me: how
and why the sum of choices made by apparently rational actors can lead
to the formulation of irrational policies resulting in interstate conflict?
My interest in Japan’s rush to the Pacific War through unfettered naval
expansion emerged when I was attending Waseda University, working
on Tokyo’s decision to attack the United States in December 1941.
Although, after years of study, the reasons behind the decision appeared
clearer, I was still unable to understand how the country reached that
point where it had the choice between a desperate war and a slow death
by suffocation. I felt the need to dig into the topic, and to go back to
the origins of a road to ruin for Japan. The present book is the result of
xi
xii PREFACE
this intellectual struggle. I hope that it sheds light on some aspects of this
particular tragedy.
I would like to express my profound gratitude to the persons
who provoked my intellectual curiosity for this topic, Professors Ueki
Kawakatsu Chikako (Waseda University) and Karoline Postel-Vinay
(Sciences Po Paris). I also thank those who helped me in different ways
and at different stages of the journey, including Deguchi Tomohiro, Alain
Guidetti, Gil Honegger, Itō Hitoshi, Kondō Masaki, Joyce Lacroix, José
Lima, Matsuo Ichirō, Maxence Iida, Nuno Pinheiro, Hamilton Chase
Shields and Tsukamoto Katsuya. I want to express my sincere appreci-
ation of the support I received from the archive teams of the National
Institute for Defense Studies and of the National Diet Library in Tokyo,
and from Webster University Geneva in the form of a research grant.
Lastly, a special thanks to my friends and relatives who, despite not
having been directly involved in the book project, provided me with
support, comfort and joy along the way: to the RDF and Interstar
crews, Albert, Aubred, Aurèle, Bourbine, Damien, Djamil, Edi, Fabio,
Fawzi, Guillaume, Lorenzo, Malek, Marc, Milos, Nourdine, Olivier,
Scott, Shyaka, Tuan, Vache and Yann; to my sister and parents for their
devotion and backing throughout; to my mother-in-law, who took care
of me during my stays in Japan, and to my father-in-law, who put his trust
in me before leaving us so soon; to my wife and my daughters, who have
always been present for me, helped me understand the real meaning of
things and made me a better man.
Bellevue, Switzerland Lionel P. Fatton

Contents
1 Overbalancing as a Systemic Pathology 1

The Phenomenon of Overbalancing 1
Why Did Japan Rush to the Pacific War? 8
The Argument 16
Overview 21
2 Explaining Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War 25
Neorealism, Neoclassical Realism and Overbalancing 25
Neorealism and Overbalancing 25
Neoclassical Realism as a Complement to Neorealism 29
Neoclassical Realism, Domestic Factors and Identity Crisis 32
Putting Neoclassical Realism Back on Track 35
Mechanism of Contextual Adaption, Threat Perception
and Overbalancing 39
The Foreign Policy Executive and Its Advisors 39
The Mechanism of Contextual Adaption 41
Exogenous Shocks and Threat Perception 44
The Political Construction of Threat Perception 48
The Biases of the Military Institution 55
The Structure of Civil–Military Relations 61
Scope Condition and Paradigmatic Boundaries 66
xiii
xiv CONTENTS
3 Appropriate Balancing in the Naval Arms Control Era,

1920–1931 71
Improving Threat Perception: Making Peace
with the International Community 72
Tense Japan–United States Relations in the Early
Twentieth Century 72
Competing Naval Expansions Before the Washington
Conference 76
Japan and the League of Nations 80
The League of Nations and Arms Control 86
Prelude to the Washington Conference 89
The Washington Conference 93
Japanese Reactions to the Washington Conference 99
Appropriate Balancing and International Cooperation
During the 1920s and Early 1930s 107
Japanese Restraint Toward China 107
From Washington to the Geneva Conference 114
The Geneva Conference and Its Aftermath 119
Prelude to the London Conference 123
The London Conference 126
Japanese Reactions to the London Conference 133
4 The Manchurian Crisis as an Exogenous Shock,
1931–1933 139
Exogenous Shock: The Manchurian Crisis 140
The Mukden Incident and Its Aftermath 140
From Manchuria to Shanghai, and Back Again 146
The Settlement of the Manchurian Crisis 151
American Restraint During the Manchurian Crisis 154
American Naval Expansion in the First Half of the 1930s 167
The Construction of Threat Perception Through Securitization 170
Secondary Audience: Socio-economic Background 171
Secondary Audience: Ideological Background 174
The Army’s Securitizing Efforts 179
The Navy’s Securitizing Efforts 185
Primary Audience: Finance and Foreign Ministries 193
Primary Audience: Military Pressure on the Government 200
CONTENTS xv
5 Overbalancing and Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War,

1933–1941 207
Inflated Threat Perception and the End of Naval Arms
Control 208
The Navy’s Internal Unity Against Arms Control 208
Struggle Over Threat Perception: Drafting Foreign
Policy of Imperial Japan 213
Inflated Threat Perception and the Abrogation
of the Five-Power Treaty 222
Preparatory Talks for the Second London Conference 227
The Failure of the Second London Conference 235
Overbalancing Through Naval Expansion 240
Japan’s Shift Toward Unilateralism in Foreign Policy 240
Japan’s Overbalancing and the Road to Pearl Harbor 244
Back to the Beginning: The Structure of Japan’s
Civil–Military Relations 250
6 Beyond Japan and the Pacific War 259
Lessons on Overbalancing, Foreign Policy and International
Politics 260
On the Neoclassical Realist Agenda 272
Chronology 283
Bibliography 287
Index 305
About the Author
Lionel P. Fatton is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at

Webster University Geneva and a Research Collaborator at the Research
Institute for the History of Global Arms Transfer, Meiji University. His
research interests include international and security dynamics in the Indo-
Pacific, China-Japan-U.S. relations, China’s and Japan’s foreign/security
policies, civil–military relations and Neoclassical realism. He holds a
Ph.D. in Political Science, specialization in International Relations, from
Sciences Po Paris and two M.A. in International Relations from Waseda
University and the Geneva Graduate Institute.
His publications have appeared in International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific, Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, The Asia-Pacific Journal,
Contemporary Security Policy, among others. His previous book, Japan’s
Awakening: Moving toward an Autonomous Security Policy, was published
in 2019.
xvii
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 International challenge, threat perception and balancing

behavior 17
Fig. 1.2 Exogenous shock, inflated threat perception
and overbalancing 19
Fig. 2.1 Hypothesis on overbalancing and its scope condition 69
Fig. 6.1 Circular causation between international environment,
domestic politics and foreign policy 261
xix
Convention
This book uses the Modified Hepburn romanization system for Japanese
words. Macrons indicate long vowels, with the exception of words that
are in common use in English, like Tokyo.
The family names of Japanese scholars and historical figures appear
first, followed by their given names. The denomination of ships and
ideological/historical concepts is given in italics.
For the purpose of clarity, the Gregorian calendar is used instead of the
Japanese periodization of modern history made according to the name of
the reigning Emperor.
xxi
Quotations
“The League was a failure; disarmament was a failure. Perhaps the world
should revert to the old days of militarism and engage in armaments race.
The Japanese people should fight wars against America and Britain, for
unless they are baptized once more by modern warfare, they will not be
awakened to the importance of peace.”
Reserve Captain Mizuno Hironori
“Pour cesser de haïr, il m’a suffi de connaître.”

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
xxiii
CHAPTER 1
Overbalancing as a Systemic Pathology
The Phenomenon of Overbalancing

In the mid-1930s, Japan took a decision that would change the face of
the Asia–Pacific region for decades: it withdrew from a naval arms control
framework that had restrained military buildup on both sides of the Pacific
Ocean since the early 1920s. By doing so, Japan not only triggered a
naval arms race with the United States that exhausted its economy, it
also destroyed the last institutionalized structure regulating the relation-
ship between the two Pacific powers, the so-called Washington System.
Japan and the United States became caught in a spiral of tensions that
culminated with the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, an attack
followed by one of the biggest confrontations at sea in human history.
By rejecting arms control, Japan overbalanced and began its rush to the
Pacific War.
Thirty years ago, tragedies of this kind might have seemed features
of another era. The end of the Cold War was supposed to open a new
age for the international community, characterized by peace and stability,
multilateral cooperation, disarmament, the rule of law and economic
development. The last two decades have proven the optimists wrong.
The United States’ relations with China, Russia, Iran and some other
old foes as well as certain partners have deteriorated drastically. Russia
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
L. P. Fatton, Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War,
Palgrave Studies in International Relations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1_1
2 L. P. FATTON
infringed on the territorial integrity of two sovereign countries—Georgia

and Ukraine—in less than 10 years, intervened militarily in Syria, engulfed
in one of the most destructive civil wars ever, and launched a full-fledged
invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Libya became another failed state where
great power interests clash, similar to Yemen where Saudi Arabia and Iran
have fought each other through proxies. China has grown more assertive
in its periphery, threatening Southeast Asian and East Asian neighbors.
North Korea continues to militarize, whereas Cold War-era arms control
agreements are crumbling one after the other.
How could it have been otherwise? The myth of hegemonic peace
among middle and great powers was doomed to evaporate, and their rela-
tions to revert to their brutal dynamics. Conflict is a standard feature of
human history. Some scholars of international relations have explained
the tendency toward rivalry by emphasizing the nasty and greedy human
nature and the domestic characteristics of countries, such as their polit-
ical regimes and ideologies, their economic systems and their social
dynamics.1 Highlighting that throughout history wars have been fought
by a wide variety of organized socio-political entities, from tribes to
nation-states, and therefore that rivalry cannot be accounted for by
domestic attributes, others have identified the anarchic nature of the
international system and its consequences for countries’ behaviors as the
primary source of conflicts.2 In the absence of a global policeman able to
regulate relations between countries, the latter strive to survive by accu-
mulating power for protection, raising concerns about possible hostile
intentions and ultimately impacting international stability.
Both approaches, domestic and international, have merits. Both are
incomplete, however. Domestic arguments advanced by classical real-
ists and others have the advantage of being able to investigate the
micro-foundations of conflicts, but provide no clue to understanding the
recurrence of war across time and place. The international, or systemic,
1 Raymond Aron. 2004. Paix et guerre entre les nations. Huitième édition. Paris,
Calmann-Lévy; Hans J. Morgenthau. 1948. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power
and Peace. New York: A.A. Knopf.
2 Robert Gilpin. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; John J. Mearsheimer. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New
York: W. W. Norton & Company; Kenneth N. Waltz. 1979. Theory of International
Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing.
1 OVERBALANCING AS A SYSTEMIC PATHOLOGY 3
approach promoted primarily by neorealists possesses the opposite weak-

ness. Although it helps diagnose circumstantial elements common to
different conflicts, it fails to dig into countries’ rationale in using armed
forces against others. Kenneth Waltz recognized this saying:
The origins of hot wars lie in cold wars, and the origins of cold wars are
found in the anarchic ordering of the international arena. The recurrence
of war is explained by the structure of the international system. […] Any
given war is explained not by looking at the structure of the international-
political system but by looking at the particularities within it: the situations,
the characters, and the interactions of states.3
Neoclassical realism, which emanated from flaws in Neorealism,

including what was regarded as the latter’s inability to explain the peaceful
end of the Cold War, has attempted to reconcile the domestic and inter-
national levels of analysis.4 Alexander Reichwein notes that “neoclassical
realists accentuate systemic factors as well as cognitive and domestic
factors as a common set of intervening variables translating systemic
constraints into foreign policy.”5 Given its epistemological orientation
and its ability to bridge the two levels of analysis, I consider Neoclassical
realism as the most suitable approach for investigating the phenomenon
of overbalancing, a highly destabilizing state behavior on which this book
focuses. Classical realism cannot account for the recurrence of overbal-
ancing throughout history while, as shown in the next chapter, the main
variants of Neorealism fail to satisfactorily explain the phenomenon.
Overbalancing is a sub-category of balancing in international affairs.
Under anarchy, countries amass military power through the extraction
and mobilization of national resources and may forge alliances in order
3 Kenneth N. Waltz, 1988, The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory, Journal of

Interdisciplinary History 18(4): 620.
4 Another response to the loss of credibility of Neorealism was the emergence of an
elaborated form of the sub-paradigm that emphasizes the importance of “structural modi-
fiers,” such as geography and the offense-defense balance of military technology, to explain
international dynamics. Jacek Wi˛ecławski, 2017, Neoclassical Realism and the Crisis of the
Realist Paradigm in Contemporary International Relations, Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna
57(2): 199.
5 Alexander Reichwein, 2012, The Tradition of Neoclassical Realism, in Neoclassical
Realism in European Politics: Bringing Power Back in, ed. Asle Toje and Barbara Kunz,
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 34.
4 L. P. FATTON
to deter aggression or prevent being put in a position of submission vis-

à-vis stronger opponents.6 Waltz observes that “weakness may invite an
attack that greater strength would dissuade an adversary from launching.
Excessive strength may prompt other states to increase their arms and
pool their efforts. Power is a possibly useful means, and sensible statesmen
try to have an appropriate amount of it.”7
Inappropriate balancing stands for the failure to reach this amount
of power.8 Nonbalancing occurs when a country does not balance, and
underbalancing when it does but insufficiently to guarantee national
security. The behavior of the Soviet Union during the second half of
the 1980s, when General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev refrained from
entering the new arms race started by American President Ronald Reagan,
can be categorized as nonbalancing, while instances of underbalancing
include France and the United Kingdom’s restrained security policies
toward Germany in the 1930s. Overbalancing denotes the accumulation
of too much military power and/or the formation of too strong alliances
in view of the threat to a country’s national security.9 The endeavor
6 Kenneth Waltz calls unilateral military buildup and alliance formation “internal balanc-
ing” and “external balancing,” respectively. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 168.
See also: Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 156–7; Randall L. Schweller,
2006, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 9; Stephen M. Walt, 1987, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, 12–3.
On the advantages and disadvantages of these two balancing behaviors, see: Michael
F. Altfeld. 1984. The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test. Political Research Quarterly
37(4): 523–44; John A.C. Conybeare. 1994. Arms versus Alliances: The Capital Struc-
ture of Military Enterprise. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2): 215–35; Gerald L.
Sorokin. 1994. Alliance Formation and General Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Model
and the Case of Israel. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 38(2): 298–325.
7 Kenneth N. Waltz, 2008, Realism and International Politics, New York: Routledge,
79.
8 Randall L. Schweller, 2004, Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of
Underbalancing, International Security 29(2): 167–8.
9 Overbalancing, as understood here, is different from countries’ ad hoc overreaction
to specific international developments, typically during crises. Overbalancing pertains to
the formulation of a country’s foreign policy in reaction to the perceived behavior of
one or more other countries. Domestic factors revolving around institutional structures
and dynamics are central to any explanation of overbalancing. Ad hoc overreaction is
not directly associated with foreign policy, and relates more to small group dynamics,
constraints on information processing and psychological factors, such as the cognitive
biases of policymakers. Moshe Maor, Overreaction and Bubbles in Politics and Policy,
is illustrated by the military growth and expanding alliance network of

Wilhelm Germany in the early twentieth century, which triggered a naval
arms race with the United Kingdom and the formation of the Triple
Entente, and, as discussed in this book, by Japan’s naval buildup against
the United States during the second half of the 1930s and the early
1940s.10
Detrimental counteractions provoked by overbalancing are outlined by
a mechanism commonly called security dilemma. Overbalancing endan-
gers the security of other countries, which may respond by increasing their
military power, seeking new allies or both. This alarms the country that
initially overbalanced. The latter usually perceives its own security policy
as defensive, justified and reasonable and the counteractions from other
countries as suspicious or reflecting hostile intentions, and in turn reacts.
The outcome is a vicious action–reaction cycle of competing military
buildups, often dubbed arms race, and possibly of alliance formations that
magnifies international tensions and leads to an ever-worsening security
situation for all countries, and even to war.11
Overbalancing shares some similarities with the phenomenon of over-
expansion. Countries that overexpand project their military power outside
their territory, at the expense of others, in an attempt to bolster their
security through the absorption of resources, the acquisition or defense
of strategic peripheral areas and the like. Inversely to expansion, over-
expansion is self-defeating because it leads to overextension and/or
counteractions resulting in self-encirclement. Overextension refers to the
“persistent expansion into the hinterland beyond the point where costs
in The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Political Science, ed. Alex Mintz and Lesley
Terris, Oxford: Oxford University Press, https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/
35427/chapter-abstract/303188901?redirectedFrom=fulltext#no-access-message, accessed
19 October 2022.
10 Richard Sakwa views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s eastward expansion
from the end of the Cold War to the early 2010s as a “spectacular case of over-balancing.”
Richard Sakwa, 2018, The International System and the Clash of World Orders, in Multi-
polarity: The Promise of Disharmony, ed. Peter W. Schulze, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag,
27.
11 Robert Jervis claims that the security dilemma “appears once we realize that while
arming (or making alliances) can end up heightening tensions, making the state less secure,
and even producing an unnecessary war, the failure to take such precautions can endanger
the state if it is faced by adversaries who will take advantage of its weakness.” Robert
Jervis, 2011, Dilemmas about Security Dilemmas, Security Studies 20(3): 416.
6 L. P. FATTON
begin to outstrip benefits” and self-encirclement to the formation of an

“overwhelming coalition of opposing states.”12 Therefore, if the Russian
annexation of Crimea in 2014 can be considered an instance of expansion,
because it prompted only limited international retributions compared
with the gains made, Nazi Germany’s endeavor to conquer the Leben-
sraum was a flagrant example of overexpansion. By pushing into Central
and then Eastern Europe, Germany depleted its own resources in quag-
mires and triggered a counter-coalition made of the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom and the United States, eventually leading to its defeat
in 1945.
Overbalancing and overexpansion can be understood as belonging
to a broader pattern of international behaviors, which I call systemic
overreacting . Systemic overreacting are foreign policies that trigger
counteractions from other countries and detrimental consequences for
national interests, notably through competing military buildups and
self-encirclement.13 These behaviors are thus counterproductive, or sub-
optimal. They are also irrational in view of their outcomes.14
This book focuses exclusively on overbalancing, and despite similari-
ties in regard to repercussions on countries’ national interests, the latter
phenomenon must be kept analytically distinct from overexpansion. This
12 Jack L. Snyder, 1991, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 6.
13 The concept of systemic overreacting shares some similarities with Thomas Chris-
tensen’s “overactive policies.” The latter include “those that waste valuable resources on
areas of peripheral value to national security (e.g., American intervention in Vietnam and
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and those that needlessly either increase the number
and power of one’s enemies or decrease the number and strength of one’s allies (e.g.,
Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution).” Thomas J. Christensen, 1996,
Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict,
1947–1958, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 13.
14 The debate on what rationality means in international politics has been polarizing
and inconclusive. I here adopt the perspective of John Mearsheimer, who says: “To assume
that states are rational is to say that they are aware of their external environment and they
think intelligently about how to maximize their prospects for survival. In particular, they
try to gauge the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect
the actions of those other states, as well as how the behavior of those other states is likely
to affect their own strategy. When they look at the different strategies that they have to
choose between, they assess the likelihood of success as well as the costs and benefits of
each one. Finally, states pay attention not only to the immediate consequences of their
actions, but to the long-term effects as well.” John J. Mearsheimer, 2009, Reckless States
and Realism, International Relations 23(2): 244.
is because the impulse behind and the causal mechanisms underlying

these two instances of systemic overreacting are different. Overexpansion
usually occurs when the international environment offers initial opportu-
nities for expansion, in the form of a power vacuum or an advantageous
balance of power for example, whereas overbalancing is an inadequate
response to a perceived threat to national security. Moreover, for a
country to overexpand outside its borders is more demanding in terms
of resource mobilization, and consequently requires a higher degree of
political and social consensus, than overbalancing.
The central question I address in this book is: Why do countries
overbalance given the damaging consequences and the dangers associ-
ated with this endeavor? This is an important question. Not only does
overbalancing raise the risk of spiraling tensions and conflicts between
countries, the phenomenon can also be expected to remain an important
feature of international affairs in the twenty-first century.15 As argued in
the following pages, overbalancing is closely related to countries’ misper-
ception of their international environment, an inherent characteristic of
international politics, but particularly common during periods of systemic
stress. Overbalancing is a systemic pathology. If today scholars debate
about the degree and novelty of Beijing’s assertiveness amid the inten-
sifying strategic competition with Washington, in the next few decades
the debate will likely shift to whether China is overbalancing against the
United States.16
15 Inversely, the frequency of overexpansion will most likely continue to decline because,
among other reasons: economic wealth is increasingly generated by services and the
exploitation of new technologies, reducing the relative value of land and thus the incentive
for invasion; the world economy is highly interconnected and prospers on stable supply
chains, which are disrupted by territorial expansion; recent conflicts, such as the Russo-
Ukrainian War, have demonstrated that the era of nationalism and communitarianism is
not over, making difficult and costly for an invader to control local populations.
16 Dingding Chen, Xiaoyu Pu and Alastair I. Johnston. 2013–2014. Correspondence:
Debating China’s Assertiveness. International Security 38(3): 176–83; Björn Jerdén.
2014. The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought
into It. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7(1): 47–88; Alastair I. Johnston.
2013. How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness? International Security 37(4):
7–48; Yves-Heng Lim. 2015. How (Dis)Satisfied is China? A Power Transition Theory
Perspective. Journal of Contemporary China 24(92): 280–97; Camilla T.N. Sorensen.
2013. Is China Becoming More Aggressive? A Neoclassical Realist Analysis. Asian Perspec-
tive 37(3): 363–85; Chengqiu Wu. 2020. Ideational Differences, Perception Gaps, and
the Emerging Sino-US Rivarly. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 13(1): 27–68;
8 L. P. FATTON
Why Did Japan Rush to the Pacific War?

I investigate the phenomenon of overbalancing through an in-depth anal-
ysis of Japan’s foreign policy during the 1920s and 1930s. This case was
chosen for five main reasons. First, enough sources are available to track
the political construction of threat perception inside the Japanese state
apparatus. This is necessary because Neoclassical realism, which agenda
I aim at advancing, entails a “detailed historical analysis.”17 Second,
partly because Japan and the United States were members of an arms
control regime, the Japanese navy produced several studies on the amount
of naval power deemed necessary to guarantee national security. These
studies not only provide important information on the perception the
naval institution had of geostrategic realities, they also clearly identify
the United States as the main target of Japan’s balancing efforts. This
is necessary because, as Steven Lobell points out, “balancing requires a
target. Military spending not directed against another state or states is not
balancing.”18 Third, and related to the previous point, the acceleration of
Japan’s naval expansion in the mid-1930s was an obvious instance of over-
balancing in view of the country’s international environment, maximizing
experimental variance.
Fourth, refining our understanding of the phenomenon of overbal-
ancing through an analysis of the Japanese case, and from a neoclassical
realist perspective, contributes to the Global International Relations
research agenda. The latter emerged based on the recognition that “con-
temporary mainstream IR theory is not much more than an abstraction
of Western history interwoven with Western political theory,” the United
States enjoying a singular dominance among other Western countries
Minghao Zhao. 2019. Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US-
China Strategic Competition. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 12(3): 371–94;
Jianren Zhou. 2019. Power Transition and Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy: Why China and
the US March towards Strategic Competition? The Chinese Journal of International Politics
12(1): 1–34.
17 Gideon Rose, 1998, Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, World
Politics 51(1): 167.
18 Steven E. Lobell, 2018, A Granular Theory of Balancing, International Studies
Quarterly 62(3): 596.
in the discipline.19 In line with Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, and
contrary to post-Western and Postcolonialist approaches, I see Global IR
as a pluralistic and inclusive agenda that does not reject Western-centric
theories, but subsumes them and urges them to shed their ethnocen-
trism.20 One way to do so is by investigating non-Western cases to
uncover new variables or modify existing ones in light of empirical
realities, rendering Western theories more relevant to the non-Western
world.
Because Neoclassical realism operates domestic factors as intervening
variables between systemic stimuli and foreign policy outcomes, it fosters
contextualized research that, when conducted on non-Western cases, can
help to inductively dewesternize the theoretical construct.21 This is what
the analysis pursued in the following chapters does. As will be demon-
strated, Japan’s overbalancing against the United States was rooted in
institutional dynamics, and more precisely in those revolving around
civil–military relations. Neoclassical realists have largely failed to incor-
porate civil–military relations into their arguments and, when they do,
only superficially discuss their impacts on state-society interactions.22
Moreover, I argue that the structure of civil–military relations in Japan
favored undue military interventions in politics, and consequently over-
balancing, by over-depoliticizing the military institution, an assertion
that runs against the American-centrist “Normal School of civil-military
relations.”23 This in itself is puzzling, because the structure of Japan’s
19 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, 2019, The Making of Global International Rela-
tions: Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2.
20 Ibid., 300–9.
21 Michiel Foulon and Gustav Meibauer, 2020, Realist avenues to global International
Relations, European Journal of International Relations 26(4): 1213–4.
22 Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro and Steven E. Lobell, 2016, Neoclassical
Realist Theory of International Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 73–4.
Steven Lobell recognizes that civil–military relations may deviate countries’ behaviors
away from the expectations of the neorealist balance of power and balance of threat
theories. Steven E. Lobell, 2009, Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A
Neoclassical Realist Model, in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed.
Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 63.
23 Vasabjit Banerjee and Sean P. Webeck, 2022, Civil-Military Relations: Through
a Perilous Lens, Armed Forces & Society, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X2211
08198, accessed 19 October 2022.
10 L. P. FATTON
civil–military relations was specifically dedicated to prevent unwarranted

military interferences in politics. Something went tragically wrong. It is
important to shed light on what happened.
The fifth reason to investigate the case of Japan is the fact that the
existing literature fails to satisfactorily account for several of the country’s
decisions during the interbellum, calling for a novel explanation.
Japan’s behavior on the Asian continent in the early 1930s had
sparked American condemnations. Amid the growing influence of Chiang
Kai-shek’s Kuomintang in China, which threatened Japanese interests,
members of the Japanese army in Manchuria bombed a railroad in
September 1931 and blamed Chinese soldiers positioned nearby. The inci-
dent justified a military intervention that ultimately led to the creation,
in March 1932, of the puppet state of Manchukuo. In the meantime,
fighting had erupted in Shanghai in late January 1932 between Chinese
and Japanese residents, provoking another, although small-scale, military
expedition by Japan. Relations between Tokyo and Washington deteri-
orated, the latter being eager to uphold the political sovereignty and
territorial integrity of China.
The situation calmed down after the settlement of the Shanghai and
Manchurian crises, however. The former was resolved in May 1932
through a ceasefire agreement; the latter was buried by the Tangku Truce
of May 1933 between Japan and China. Although it had announced
its intention to withdraw from the League of Nations in early 1933,
Japan was keen to recover its status of responsible great power, with the
help of the United States and the United Kingdom, and to consolidate
the gains made in China. The two Anglo-Saxon countries were eager
to keep cooperating with Tokyo on a wide range of issues. No other
major international development took place before the Japanese govern-
ment declared, in late 1934, that it would by the end of 1936 disengage
from a naval arms control framework. Japan effectively chose unilateralism
over cooperation and military power replaced diplomacy. Tokyo took the
risk of a serious worsening of relations with the United States to boost
naval capabilities, a choice that would be fatal for Japan as war preparation
turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The rejection of naval arms control by the Japanese government and
the stunningly rapid reversal of its foreign policy, from international
cooperation to unilateral military expansion, are puzzling. The regional
environment in Asia was relatively stable at that time, including in China.
Tokyo knew that Washington wanted to maintain constructive relations
and work with Japan to prevent the situation from deteriorating once
again. Moreover, Japanese leaders were well aware that withdrawing from
the arms control regime would trigger a destabilizing arms race with the
United States and be highly damaging to Japan’s relationship with this
country, the biggest naval power in the Pacific and a key trading partner.24
In other words, Japan overbalanced.25 Why, given the rather stable inter-
national environment of the mid-1930s, did the Japanese government
decide to pursue unfettered naval expansion? What explains this flagrant
overbalancing against the United States?
The leading argument in the literature emphasizes the irrational and
spiritual dimensions of the Japanese military thinking to explain the
behavior of the Imperial Japanese Navy, which allegedly coerced the
government to withdraw from the arms control framework and undertake
naval expansion. This line of thought, dissected below, is problematic for
several reasons.
The Japanese navy’s willingness to disengage from the Washington
System, at the center of which lay the arms control framework, is some-
times attributed to an irrational appetite for naval expansion and the fact
that the inferior ratios of naval strength imposed upon Japan by the arms
control regime were regarded as “badges of dishonor” by naval officers.26
However, the naval status quo in the mid-1930s was not considered
advantageous by Japanese sailors. The ability of the navy to command the
sea in the Western Pacific and protect Japan against an American offensive
was weakening while the capacity of the U.S. Navy to project its supe-
rior naval power across the Pacific was improving. Moreover, the 1934
Vinson-Trammell Act aimed at bringing the American navy to treaty limits
24 Robert Jervis notes that the main negative aspect of focusing on unilateral military
expansion to guarantee national security is not the cost of arms buildup per se, “but rather
the sacrifice of the potential gains from cooperation […] and the increase in the dangers
of needless arms races and wars.” He adds that “the greater these costs, the greater the
incentives to try cooperation and wait for fairly unambiguous evidence before assuming
that the other must be checked by force.” Despite its soundness, this argument fails to
provide any clue to understanding the decision taken by Japan in the mid-1930s. Robert
Jervis, 1978, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, World Politics 30(2): 176.
25 In the same vein, Jack Snyder argues that Japan’s bid for empire during the 1930s
was irrational in view of its international environment. Snyder, Myths of Empire, 113.
26 Meredith W. Berg, 1992, Protecting National Interests by Treaty: The Second
London Naval Conference, 1934–1936, in Arms Limitation and Disarmament: Restraints
on War, 1899–1939, ed. Brian J.C. McKercher, Westport: Praeger, 208–9.
12 L. P. FATTON
within eight years. As the Washington System’s unequal naval ratios came
closer to be transposed to the battlefield, the Japanese navy approximated
the need for parity in naval strength. It was therefore strategically rational
for the institution to seek more favorable naval ratios by scrapping the
disadvantageous Five-Power Treaty, which enshrined the ratios, renego-
tiating naval limitations and, if rebuffed by Washington and London, to
leave the arms control framework.
Strategic considerations were decisive, naval officers’ feelings of
dishonor were not. Of course, some sailors resented the constraints
imposed upon Japan by the Washington System. But if this caused the
navy to reject arms control in the mid-1930s, then it must be explained
why these constraints had not tormented high-ranking naval officers
during the 1920s. Some of them were true sailors with a strong sense of
honor, who had fought wars and were highly respected inside and outside
the naval institution, such as Katō Tomosaburō, Saitō Makoto, Suzuki
Kantarō and Tōgō Heihachirō, the hero of the Battle of Tsushima.27
And regarding enthusiasm for naval buildup, this was a natural impulse of
naval officers trained to defend their country. A military institution that
looks for maximizing military power cannot be categorized as irrational,
although it can be considered shortsighted.
Other scholars point out the irrationality of the Japanese navy vis-à-
vis the prospect of winning a naval arms race against the United States
after withdrawing from the Washington System.28 They are correct in
that Japan had no chance in the contest if the Americans took the exer-
cise seriously, given the limited capacities of Japan’s shipyards, the lack of
access to strategic materials such as steel and the economic difficulties of
the country.
On the other hand, it was not the role of the naval institution to assess
the strength of these different elements of national power. It was rather
the responsibility of the government, the Prime, Finance and Foreign
Ministers in particular, to strike a balance between the fulfillment of
national security requirements and the protection of national interests
at large, including socio-economic and diplomatic interests. Moreover,
the Imperial Navy was focusing on devising an effective strategy against
27 Tōgō was initially a strong supporter of the Washington System, before revising his
position in the early 1930s.
28 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, 2012, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology
in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 369–70.
the U.S. Pacific Fleet, not on winning an arms race. This strategy, jeop-
ardized by the combination of new naval technologies and damaging
naval restrictions, required the right amount of specific vessels. To abro-
gate the Five-Power Treaty and request naval parity through a common
upper limit was not necessarily irrational, strategically speaking. At best,
the demand for revision would be accepted by the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. And if Japan had to leave the Washington System, the Japanese navy
would recover flexibility in naval expansion. This was at least preferable
to remaining passively constrained by unfavorable naval limitations.
Lastly, certain scholars interpret as irrational the trust placed by sailors
in their ability to defeat the U.S. Navy in case Japan withdrew from the
arms control framework. Ian Gow calls “a brand of spiritualism” the posi-
tion taken by Admiral Katō Kanji during a meeting of high-ranking naval
officers held on August 16, 1934, when he declared: “If it is possible
for us to decide our level of military power autonomously and to expand
and contract this according to the national economy, then our navy, on
the basis of increase of moral and self-confidence, which will be produced
by this, can expect victory no matter what percentage of national power
our potential enemy possesses.”29 In the same vein, Samuel Huntington
notes that “the [Japanese] military mind was thus subjective rather than
objective, involved rather than detached. Because it was imbued with
the national ideology it was difficult if not impossible for it to analyze
a military situation in a coldly realistic, scientific manner.”30
These assertions do not match historical facts. The Japanese naval
education put a premium on mathematics and physical sciences whatever
the department, the assignation and the rank of sailors. Indeed, “naval
experts were technical experts.”31 It is difficult to imagine that such
people could have discarded scientific and material concerns in fulfilling
their duties. Officers like Katō Kanji were not blind warmongers guided
by spiritual considerations. They were certainly shortsighted, but above all
naval experts determined to do the job for which they had been trained.
This is not to deny the spiritual dimension of the statements made by
several naval officers in the mid-1930s. However, it is important to keep
29 Ian Gow, 2012, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics: Admiral Katō
Kanji and the ‘Washington System’, New York: Routledge, 302.
30 Samuel P. Huntington, 1972, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of
Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 128.
31 Kiyoshi Ikeda, 2007, Kaigun to Nihon, Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 139.
14 L. P. FATTON
in mind that there was no prospect of armed conflict with the United
States at that time. What happened in the early 1940s should not blind
scholars to the fact that war across the Pacific was almost unthinkable
half a decade earlier. Officers eager to get rid of naval restrictions did not
run the risk of being proven wrong by events in claiming that, partially
due to a superior spirit, the Japanese navy would be able to defeat the
U.S. Navy whatever the circumstances. Spiritualism was a tool to prevent
other domestic actors from attacking the arguments of those ready to
compromise the Washington System. And as shown in this book, it is not
certain that the level of preparedness of the Imperial Navy on the eve of
the Pacific War was worse than in the mid-1930s.
All in all, the decision to disengage from the arms control regime and
pursue unfettered naval expansion was rational from the viewpoint of the
Japanese navy, an institution tasked with defending national security and
interests through the use of naval forces. It is also true that, at the national
level, the drastic reorientation of Japan’s foreign policy from coopera-
tive to unilateral security is barely understandable based on the rationality
assumption, in view of the anticipated adverse diplomatic and economic
consequences. The new policy was neither balanced, sound, realistic, fore-
sighted, wise, nor any other synonym of rationality. Indeed, overbalancing
is, by definition, an irrational endeavor.
To explain why the Japanese government lost sight of the costs associ-
ated with a withdrawal from the Washington System and aligned with the
navy’s preferred course of action, the literature emphasizes the tremen-
dous influence the naval institution had on policymakers. Robert Hoover
goes as far as saying that, by 1934, the navy had gained “a virtual veto
power over government authority on future naval and related matters.”32
Such a claim distorts the facts.
Until at least 1936 and the so-called February 26 Incident, a large-scale
attempt of coup d’état mainly fomented by army personnel, the military
services were constrained by the Prime, Foreign and Finance Ministers,
as well as by important figures related to the Imperial Household such as
32 Robert A. Hoover, 1980, Arms Control: The Interwar Naval Limitation Agreements,
Denver: University of Denver, 53.
the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain.33 There-
fore, military influence on foreign policy was somehow restricted by the
political system at the time Japan actually disengaged from the Wash-
ington System, in January 1936, when the country definitively walked
away from arms control talks. Depicting the evolution of the military’s
political clout during the 1931–1945 period, Samuel Finer notes that “the
range of matters the military controlled was very limited at the beginning
of this period but grew more and more extensive after 1936, reaching its
maximum with the progress of the Pacific War.”34
In the mid-1930s, Japan was not under the thumb of a military regime.
The changing attitude toward naval arms control and the decision to
reorient foreign policy from cooperative to unilateral security were not
forced upon the government by the Imperial Navy. The government was
under pressure from the naval institution, but it was not hijacked. It was
rather brainstormed, gradually adopting the biased military perspective on
international affairs. Consensus on threat perception and foreign policy
line was reached among policymakers under the impulsion of the navy,
the significance of military influence in the formation of threat percep-
tion being demonstrated by the fact that the government did “something
they probably would not have done otherwise.”35 Tokyo denounced the
Five-Power Treaty in late 1934 and left arms control negotiations a bit
more than one year later because a majority in the decision-making circle
supported the initiative, considered necessary to protect Japan against
what was now perceived as an inherently hostile United States. The
government overbalanced in a myopic but conscious way.
33 Several personalities were targeted during the Incident, including Prime Minister
Okada Keisuke, Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantarō, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal
Saitō Makoto, former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino Nobuaki and genrō Saionji
Kinmochi. The fact that three admirals were targeted (Okada, Suzuki and Saitō) was a
major factor that led the naval institution to oppose the coup d’état, sending warships
in Tokyo Bay and dispatching sailors in the capital to protect the navy’s properties and
interests. The show of force by the two military services during the Incident subsequently
enhanced their political influence. Gow, Military Intervention in Pre-war Japanese Politics,
306.
34 Samuel E. Finer, 1962, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics,
New York: Praeger, 167.
35 Richard K. Betts, 1991, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, New York:
Columbia University Press, 5.
16 L. P. FATTON
The Argument
The literature emphasizes countries’ perception of their international
environment as a central factor in accounting for the phenomenon of
overbalancing. Indeed, the perception of a threat to national security is
the sine qua non condition for any kind of balancing, “for when threat is
not perceived, even in the face of apparently objective evidence, there
can hardly be a mobilization of defensive resources.”36 And because
countries “balance against threats rather than against power alone,” poli-
cymakers appraise the danger represented by another country based on
two main considerations: its ability to inflict harm using armed forces and
its intentions.37
A country’s ability to inflict harm depends on its military capabilities
and its capacity to project these capabilities. The latter is impacted by
geography and the state of military technology: primarily for logistical
reasons, a country’s capacity to project its military power declines with
distance from the homeland (or forward military bases), while the state
of military technology determines the effectiveness of power projection
efforts.38 The dimension of intentionality adds to this military compo-
nent of threat perception. A country recognizes the existence of a threat
to national security, and balances, only if it perceives another country as
aggressive and harboring hostile intentions.39
The simple hypothesis that comes out of the literature is the following:
A country overbalances when, facing an international challenge, it misper-
ceives another country as being more able to inflict harm and/or more
hostile than it actually is, a situation I term inflated threat perception.
Inversely, when a country underestimates another’s ability to inflict harm
and/or hostility, underbalancing ensues because of an understated threat
perception. Finally, appropriate balancing results from a correct perception
of the other country’s ability to inflict harm and intentions, or accurate
threat perception. The hypothesis is depicted in Fig. 1.1.
36 Raymond Cohen, 1979, Threat Perception in International Crisis, Madison: Univer-

sity of Wisconsin Press, 3.
37 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 5.
38 This is what Kenneth Boulding calls “the great principle of the further the weaker.”
Kenneth E. Boulding, 1963, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory, New York: Harper &
Row, 78–9.
39 Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 37.
Fig. 1.1 International challenge, threat perception and balancing behavior
This basic hypothesis categorizes Japan’s behavior in the mid-1930s as

an obvious case of overbalancing. Regarding the military component of
threat perception, the United States certainly had a tremendous poten-
tial in terms of naval power, given its industrial capacity. And as already
alluded to, the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 aspired to bring the U.S.
Navy to treaty limits by the early 1940s. This, combined with the fact that
the evolution of naval technology was reducing the strategic distance in
the Pacific, jeopardized the ability of the Japanese navy to deter a poten-
tial transpacific offensive. Nevertheless, due to the size of the ocean and
the lack of potent forward military bases, crossing the Pacific remained
an important logistical challenge for the American navy. Although the
strategic situation of the Imperial Navy was deteriorating, the ability of
the United States to inflict harm to Japan was limited in the mid-1930s.
It would take years of naval buildup for the U.S. Navy to be in a position
to do so.
Japan’s overbalancing is even more flagrant when the dimension of
intentionality is taken into account. The American military threat to Japan
in the mid-1930s was, in the words of Randall Schweller, “potential, that
is, inferred from factors or situations in the external environment or the
18 L. P. FATTON
capability of the opponent that may materialize into a danger.”40 In such

circumstances, a country waits for unequivocal evidence of hostile intent
before balancing, because of the risks associated with misperception and
overbalancing.
As discussed in depth in Chapter 4, when Japan began to overbal-
ance, there were few if any evidences of hostility from Washington. The
latter was eager to maintain constructive relations with Tokyo. Although
the United States had undertaken small-scale military maneuvers in the
Pacific and issued diplomatic condemnations of Japan’s behavior in China
during the Manchurian crisis of 1931–1933, Washington had taken care
to avoid being regarded as hostile by the Japanese. Moreover, the polit-
ical mood in the United States was isolationist, and President Franklin
D. Roosevelt and his administration were focusing on domestic issues,
not East Asia. Tellingly, the Vinson-Trammell Act resulted more from
domestic incentives than from a desire to keep Japan in check.
An objective analysis of the geopolitical situation would have led
Japanese policymakers to conclude that the United States would not
launch a transpacific offensive unless directly challenged or attacked. But
Tokyo came to perceive the United States as intrinsically hostile, an
inflated threat perception that spurred the government to overbalance. As
it stands, the literature accounts for the causality between threat percep-
tion and overbalancing. However, it falls short of explaining why, in view
of the geopolitical reality, the Japanese government developed an inflated
threat perception in the first place. My ambition is to fill this gap by
introducing domestic factors into the equation.
In line with Neoclassical realism, I show that Japan’s rush to the Pacific
War was caused by a combination of systemic and domestic factors. The
material characteristics of the international system, like the distribution of
power, impact the foreign policy of countries after having been filtered
by domestic variables. Balancing being inherently linked to threat percep-
tion, the domestic variables that affect the construction of the perception
governments have of their international environment are central to my
argument.
I argue that a country overbalances when, facing an exogenous shock,
an inflated threat perception leads its government to engage in unfettered
military buildup and/or in the creation of an extensive alliance network
40 Ibid., 38.
in line with the advice of the military institution, unduly empowered by

a structure of civil–military relations (i.e. national defense regime) that
provides no strong safeguards against unwarranted military interferences
in politics. As explained later, overbalancing usually takes the form of a
massive military buildup. Figure 1.2 illustrates the argument.
What I call exogenous shock, the independent variable, denotes the
materialization of a sudden and unexpected international challenge to
national security. An exogenous shock being, by definition, unpredictable,
it changes the nature of the formulation process of threat percep-
tion. Institutional routines, which normally sustain and perpetuate threat
perception through the publication of documents for example, are side-
lined because of their inertia. Indeed, exogenous shocks require a swift
assessment of a rapidly evolving international environment. The construc-
tion of threat perception reaches the political and governmental levels.
At this juncture, threat perception may become a major political issue
between domestic entities.
Fig. 1.2 Exogenous shock, inflated threat perception and overbalancing

20 L. P. FATTON
This is for two reasons. First, threat perception is inherently subjective,

and therefore differs among domestic actors.41 As Jonathan Steinberg
put it, “military and diplomatic policy-makers operate against a vision of
the world at least in part of their own making.”42 The perceptions held
by different entities often clash. Second, debates over the formulation
of foreign policy always start with a struggle to (re)define international
reality. Domestic actors who have a stake in foreign policy consequently
seek to influence their government’s perception in order to advance
their interests. The emergence of an exogenous shock provides a golden
opportunity to do so.
The intervening variable revolves around what I call mechanism of
contextual adaption. A government facing an exogenous shock needs
insights and advice from various entities to better understand, first, the
nature of the international challenge and, second, the policy options at its
disposal. The influence domestic actors summoned by the government to
share their views have on the formulation of threat perception and foreign
policy increases. If government leaders reach a consensus on the fact that
national security is endangered by the external challenge, they request
expert guidance from the military institution to address the threat. This
heightens military clout to a certain level, determined by the preexisting
structure of civil–military relations.43
If the structure that regulates civil–military relations, called national
defense regime, is weak in the face of undue military interventions in
politics, the increase in military influence that follows an exogenous shock
may eclipse the leverage other domestic entities have on the government.
41 The term “threat perception” is a pleonasm, because a threat is by definition

perceived, and hence subjective.
42 Jonathan Steinberg, 1966, The Copenhagen Complex, Journal of Contemporary
History 1(3): 24.
43 The concept of civil–military relations has been defined differently, and studied from
various angles, by historians, sociologists and political scientists. I here adopt the approach
of Risa Brooks, who understands civil–military relations as the “relations between political
elites and the senior military leadership at the state’s apex.” As detailed in the next chapter,
these political elites form the foreign policy executive, responsible for ensuring national
security and defending national interests abroad. The military leadership runs the military
institution, dedicated to safeguarding national security and interests through the threat or
use of force. Civil–military relations are regulated and structured by a national defense
regime. Risa A. Brooks, 2019, Integrating the Civil-Military Relations Subfield, Annual
Review of Political Science 22: 380–1.
In such circumstances, the government absorbs the perceptual and policy

biases of the military institution. I argue that overbalancing takes its roots
in these institutional biases.
A country’s ability to inflict harm and, in particular, its intentions
are intrinsically difficult to assess, because the assessment is only partly
based on tangible clues. Therefore, threat perception is inferred from
scattered, limited and sometimes discrepant evidences as well as through
predispositions specific to each domestic actor.44 The most pronounced
predispositions, or biases, of the military institution are a profound
distrust of other countries’ intentions and worst-case analyses of inter-
national dynamics. In the other words, the military tends to exaggerate
both the hostility and the ability to inflict harm of other countries. If,
in the wake of an exogenous shock, the military institution’s leverage
on the government heightens substantially, the latter may develop an
inflated threat perception. And if so, the government absorbs another and
closely related military bias: an appetite for maximizing military power.
Overbalancing ensues.
As discussed in the next chapter, the scope of application of my
hypothesis is restricted by one important condition. When a government
develops an inflated threat perception and, in line with the advice of
the military institution, decides to boost military power, overbalancing
ensues if, and only if, it possesses the ability to extract the national
resources necessary to implement the decision. In other words, a govern-
ment having the motivation to overbalance may lack the capacity to do
so.
Overview
This book is structured as follows. The second chapter lays down the
theoretical background that underlies my hypothesis. It discusses the
inability of Neorealism to explain overbalancing, how Neoclassical realism
can complement Neorealism in order to do so, and the strengths and
flaws of Neoclassical realism. It also shows that the incorporation of
domestic variables in an ad hoc manner and the formulation of sui generis
arguments have been particularly problematic for the neoclassical realist
44 Dean G. Pruitt, 1965, Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International

Action, in International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. Herbert C. Kelman,
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 399–407.
22 L. P. FATTON
agenda. The chapter then turns to my argument. After a depiction of the

most important domestic actors in neoclassical realist analysis, I provide
detailed explanations of the mechanism of contextual adaption, of the
way exogenous shocks impact threat perception and domestic dynamics,
and of the political construction of threat perception. I then extract from
the literature the biases of the military institution and the structure of
civil–military relations most likely to spark overbalancing. Lastly, I discuss
the scope condition of resource mobilization and how my hypothesis sits
within the paradigmatic boundaries of Neoclassical realism.
Chapter 3 reviews the evolution of Japanese domestic politics and
foreign policy from the early twentieth century to the early 1930s.
It begins by discussing the lead-up to the Washington Conference of
1921–1922, during which the naval arms control framework at the
center of the case study was established. Despite tense relations with
the United States, the absence of exogenous shock and of consensus on
threat perception prior to the conference provided the Japanese govern-
ment with the necessary flexibility to reach a compromise on naval arms
control. Tokyo’s threat perception subsequently improved. The United
States being accurately perceived as harboring relatively benign inten-
tions, the political clout of the Japanese military institution declined,
in line with the mechanism of contextual adaption. Japan consequently
pursued an accommodating foreign policy during the 1920s, character-
ized by commitment to arms control and restraint on naval expansion,
appropriate balancing vis-à-vis the United States and cooperation with
Western countries on issues related to China, the main bone of contention
between great powers.
The fourth chapter focuses on the exogenous shock provoked by
the Manchurian crisis of 1931–1933, and its consequences for Japanese
threat perception, domestic politics and foreign policy. After a discus-
sion of the events in China, it is demonstrated that Western countries
displayed restraint vis-à-vis Japan during the crisis, being eager to maintain
constructive relations with Tokyo. Inside Japan, however, certain actors
used the Manchurian crisis to shape the political construction of threat
perception and advance their vested interests. Through an intense propa-
ganda campaign, the army succeeded in depicting Manchuria as a matter
of life and death for Japan. This increased its influence on the formula-
tion of foreign policy, the latter becoming more unilateral and coercive
toward China. The navy, for its part, tried to portray the United States
as intrinsically hostile to Japan, thus requiring a drastic revision of, and
if necessary withdrawal from, the naval arms control regime to better

protect the country. Given the American policy of accommodation toward
Tokyo, the navy initially failed to convince the Japanese government, and
Japan continued to balance in an appropriate manner.
Chapter 5 discusses how the Imperial Navy internally united around
the rejection of the Washington System, enhancing its ability to promote
its views to the Japanese government. The perceptual and policy biases
of the navy gradually penetrated the decision-making process on foreign
policy. The government developed an inflated threat perception, the
United States being regarded as inherently hostile, thereby reducing
the attractiveness of international cooperation and diplomacy as tools to
defend Japan’s national interests and security. The maximization of naval
power became the priority. This resulted in the country’s withdrawal
from the naval arms control regime. Japan shifted to unilateralism in
foreign policy and overbalanced against the United States through unfet-
tered naval expansion. The chapter ends by showing how dysfunctions in
the structure of Japanese civil–military relations, engendered by an over-
depoliticization of the military, allowed the navy to reach a dominant
position and convince policymakers of the threat posed by the United
States, and of the necessity to prepare for war.
The closing chapter extrapolates from the Japanese case to extract
more general conclusions about the phenomenon of overbalancing and
foreign policy and, more broadly, international politics. It is first shown
that non-democratic countries evolving in tense and unstable interna-
tional environments have the highest propensity to overbalance, and that
countries where the military institution possesses high political influ-
ence tend to pursue coercive and unilateral foreign policies. In terms
of international politics, a circular causation between the international
environment, domestic politics and foreign policy allows comprehending
peculiar regional dynamics. Lastly, the chapter highlights how my theo-
retical construct helps advance the neoclassical realist agenda, including
by establishing a hierarchy between domestic factors, threat perception
taking methodological precedence over states’ motivation and their ability
to mobilize national resources for foreign policy purposes. I close by
laying down avenues for future research on overbalancing, and empha-
size the necessity for neoclassical realists to identify relevant theoretical
frameworks to navigate the high complexity of domestic dynamics, and
avoid falling into Innenpolitik.
CHAPTER 2
Explaining Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War
Neorealism, Neoclassical
Realism and Overbalancing
Neorealism and Overbalancing
Neorealism struggles to account for the phenomenon of overbalancing.
This is due to the sub- paradigm’s assumption that countries are rational
egoists seeking security/survival, and its focus on systemic regularities
rather than on countries’ specific behaviors.1 Overbalancing, on the
other hand, is irrational and sub-optimal because prejudicial to national
interests. And although an important feature of international affairs,
overbalancing remains the exception rather than the rule. Consequently,
the two main sub-groups of neorealist scholars, offensive and defensive
(neo)realists, face challenges in explaining overbalancing. For the same
1 Jack Donnelly, 2000, Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 64–5; Colin Elman, 1996, Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist
Theories of Foreign Policy? Security Studies 6(1): 43; Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew
Moravcsik, 1999, Is Anybody Still a Realist? International Security 24(2): 6–7 and 12–3;
Jack S. Levy, 1989, The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence, in Behavior,
Society, and Nuclear War. Volume I , ed. Philip E. Tetlock et al., Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 225.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 25

Switzerland AG 2023
L. P. Fatton, Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War,
Palgrave Studies in International Relations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1_2
26 L. P. FATTON
reasons, this is also the case for overexpansion, the other instance of
systemic overreacting.
Starting from a similar understanding of the anarchic nature of the
international system, the two sub-groups of scholars come to different
conclusions regarding countries’ behaviors. For offensive realists, the
most important consequence of anarchy is the pervasive uncertainty
surrounding countries’ intentions.2 Although one might be convinced
that other countries do not have any aggressive motives at the present
time, it is impossible to be certain that they will not develop such hostile
intentions in the future. Countries are thus constrained to be prepared
for the worst. Because they cannot count on others to guarantee their
national security, being condemned to a self-help situation, they accu-
mulate as much power as possible even if satisfied by their current level
of security and convinced of the peaceful intentions of others. As John
Mearsheimer points out, “the system encourages states to look for oppor-
tunities to maximize their power vis-à-vis other states.”3 Great powers, for
their part, strive for regional hegemony, extraregional hegemony being
made impossible by geographical distances between regions.
The offensive realist country does not pursue power blindly, however.
Because they are rational entities, countries do not arm themselves if they
expect this would unnecessarily trigger arms races or the formation of
counter-coalitions, but only if bandwagoning by other countries is the
most likely outcome.4 Similarly, countries refrain from projecting mili-
tary power outside their territory if this could lead to overextension or
self-encirclement. In other words, they expand only if the international
environment provides opportunities to do so at reasonable risks and costs.
Mearsheimer notes that “status quo powers are rarely found in world poli-
tics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states
to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to
2 Dale C. Copeland, 2000, The Origins of Major War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
200; Dale C. Copeland, 2003, A Realist Critique of the English School, International
Studies 29(3): 434–5; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 31.
3 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 29.
4 A country bandwagons when it aligns with a superior opponent perceived as aggressive
in the hope that its hostility would be diverted elsewhere. Countries may also bandwagon
with the strongest side in wartime to share the spoils of victory. Randall L. Schweller.
1994. Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. International
Security 19(1): 72–107.
2 EXPLAINING JAPAN’S RUSH TO THE PACIFIC WAR 27
take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs.”5
As such, offensive realists tend to understand instances of overbalancing
and overexpansion as systemic mistakes and exceptions that prove the rule
of rational behavior.
The Hobbesian perspective Offensive realism has of international
affairs is not shared by defensive realists. Countries do cooperate under
anarchy, being capable of self-restraint. Although the anarchic nature
of the international system constrains their behaviors and somehow
impedes their ability to collaborate, anarchy “is also permissive in terms of
providing an environment in which a degree of shared security might be
achieved.”6 One of the main arguments leading these scholars to provide
a greater place to restraint and cooperation in world politics is countries’
sensitivity to the functioning and dangers of the security dilemma.7 Band-
wagoning is rare, and especially among great powers, so that attempts
at maximizing power often result in spiraling tensions and competing
military buildups and alliance dynamics.8
Because of policymakers’ sensitivity to the security dilemma, defen-
sive realists assert that while countries strive to amass enough power
to protect themselves, they are aware that the acquisition of too much
power may lead to a deterioration of their security situation due to
the formation of counter-coalitions and/or military buildups by other
countries.9 The defensive realist country should not overbalance. In the
same vein, countries seldom seek hegemony, even regionally, and are
5 Emphasis added. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 21.

6 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 2008, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation
and Trust in World Politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 83.
7 Other arguments include the declining benefits of territorial expansion amid increas-
ingly interconnected and service-oriented economies, the risks posed by nuclear weapons,
the frequent domination of defensive military technologies over offensive ones and the
fact that countries are more secure than usually assumed by offensive realists, reducing
their anxiety and easing cooperation.
8 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 29.
9 According to Kenneth Waltz, “the excessive accumulation of power by one state
or coalition of states elicits the opposition of others.” Indeed, in the words of Helga
Haftendorn, Robert Keohane and Celeste Wallander, “states can and will co-operate to
deter or defeat powerful or threatening states.” Celeste A. Wallander, Helga Haftendorn
and Robert O. Keohane, 1999, Introduction, in Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions
over Time and Space, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4; Waltz, The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory, 625.
28 L. P. FATTON
doomed to fail if they do. Inversely to offensive realists, defensive real-

ists thus posit that countries’ main concern is not to maximize power,
but to maintain an appropriate position relative to others inside the
international system. Consequently, the defensive realist country, being
rational, rejects systemic overreacting and instead tries to find some sort of
arrangement with others in order to undermine hegemonic temptations,
maintain the relative positions of units inside the system and prevent some
from becoming militarily vulnerable and inviting aggressive designs from
others.10
Not all countries are rational, however. Kenneth Waltz recognizes it,
as throughout history some “dominant powers have behaved badly,” read
irrationally, by overbalancing or overexpanding.11 It remains that those
not emulating best practices and not respecting the rule of self-restraint
imposed on countries by the international system are punished and may
eventually be eliminated through a “process of selection.”12 Modern
examples include Napoleonic France, Wilhelm Germany, Nazi Germany
and Imperial Japan.
Despite their recurrence and far-reaching consequences, Defensive
realism does not address instances of overbalancing. They are consid-
ered exceptions to the principle of successful emulation of best practices,
born out of an irrationality rooted in domestic politics. Because Defen-
sive realism focuses on international politics and systemic regularities, and
refrains from investigating domestic dynamics, it cannot explain countries’
specific, and especially deviant, behaviors. As Randall Schweller notes,
“Waltzian neorealism makes no assertions about what domestic processes
look like, where they come from, and how they influence the way nations
assess and adapt to changes in their environment.”13 This has led Waltz
to argue that “any theory of international politics requires also a theory of
10 Waltz notes that “force is more useful than ever for upholding the status quo, though
not for changing it, and maintaining the status quo is the minimum goal of any great
power.” Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 191.
11 Waltz, Realism and International Politics, xii.
12 Kenneth N. Waltz, 1986, Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response
to My Critics, in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane, New York: Columbia
University Press, 330; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 118 and 127–8.
13 Randall L. Schweller, 2018, Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclas-
sical Realist Approach to the Future of US-China Relations, The Chinese Journal of
International Politics 11(1): 28.
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Yea, he reproved kings for their sakes;
21. he reproved kings] Genesis xx. 3‒7.
²²Saying, Touch not mine anointed ones,
And do my prophets no harm.

22. my prophets] Genesis xx. 7.
23‒33 (= Psalms xcvi. 1‒13).
²³Sing unto the Lord, all the earth;
Shew forth his salvation from day to day.
²⁴Declare his glory among the nations,
His marvellous works among all the peoples.

23. Sing unto the Lord] In Psalms xcvi. 1, 2 this exhortation is
thrice repeated; in Chronicles it is once given. Note that verse 2a of
the Psalm is also omitted here.
²⁵For great is the Lord, and highly to be praised:
He also is to be feared above all gods.

25. to be feared above all gods] i.e. to be feared as being above
all “that are called gods,” these being “things of nought” (verse 26,
Revised Version margin). The real existence of false gods is not
assumed.
²⁶For all the gods of the peoples are idols ¹:
But the Lord made the heavens.
¹ Or, things of nought.
26. made the heavens] A fine epithet. Compare Jeremiah x. 11,

The gods that have not made the heavens ... shall perish from the
earth.
²⁷Honour and majesty are before him:
Strength and gladness are in his place.

27. are before him] i.e. are His, belong to Him as His attributes.
Perhaps also before him refers to God’s abode in heaven, while the
parallel expression in his place (Psalms xcvi. 6, in his sanctuary)
refers to His temple on earth.
Strength and gladness] Psalms xcvi. 6, Strength and beauty. The

reference seems to be to the strength and gladness (or beauty)
which God bestows on Israel (Psalms lxviii. 35; Isaiah lxi. 3).
in his place] Read with Psalms xcvi. 6, in his sanctuary.

Compare the two preceding notes.
²⁸Give unto the Lord, ye kindreds of the peoples,
Give unto the Lord glory and strength.

28. of the peoples] An expectation that the Gentiles will turn to
the worship of the true God is expressed not rarely in the Psalms;
compare Psalms xxii. 27, Psalms lxviii. 31, 32; and is, of course, one
of the greatest contributions of Old Testament faith to the religious
aspirations of humanity.
²⁹Give unto the Lord the glory due unto his name:
Bring an offering, and come before him:
Worship the Lord in the beauty ¹ of holiness.
¹ Or, in holy array.
29. before him] Psalms xcvi. 8, into his courts.
Worship the Lord in the beauty of holiness] Render as margin,

worship the Lord in holy attire (see Kirkpatrick on Psalms xxix. 2,
Psalms xcvi. 9; and compare Exodus xxviii. 2). Compare 2
Chronicles xx. 21.
³⁰Tremble before him, all the earth:
The world also is stablished that it cannot be moved.

30. The world also is stablished, that it cannot be moved] In
Psalms xcvi. 10 this clause is preceded by the words, Say among
the nations, The Lord reigneth, and is followed by the words, He
shall judge the peoples with equity.
³¹Let the heavens be glad, and let the earth rejoice;
And let them say among the nations, The Lord

reigneth.
³²Let the sea roar, and the fulness thereof;
Let the field exult, and all that is therein;

31. And let them say] Psalms xcvi. 10, Say [ye]. The clause is
displaced in Chronicles; compare note on verse 30.
The Lord reigneth] i.e. the Lord is claiming His kingdom over the
earth by coming to judge the earth; compare verse 33. Contrast
Habakkuk i. 14, where the prophet complains that Jehovah is not
asserting Himself as the ruler of men.
³³Then shall the trees of the wood sing for joy before
the Lord,
For he cometh to judge the earth.

33. to judge the earth] The joy with which the coming judgement
is greeted arises from the fact that the Hebrews regarded a judge as
a champion of the oppressed and not as a precise interpreter of
statutes.
34‒36 (= Psalms cvi. 1, 47, 48).
³⁴O give thanks unto the Lord; for he is good:
For his mercy endureth for ever.

34. his mercy endureth for ever] Compare Exodus xx. 6,
“shewing mercy unto a thousand generations of them that love me”
(Revised Version margin).
³⁵And say ye, Save us, O God of our salvation,

And gather us together and deliver us from the
nations,
To give thanks unto thy holy name,
And to triumph in thy praise.

35. gather us together] A phrase which shows very clearly that
the standpoint of the Psalmist is post-exilic.
³⁶Blessed be the Lord, the God of Israel,
From everlasting even to everlasting.
And all the people said, Amen, and praised

the Lord.
36. said, Amen, and praised the Lord] In the Psalms (cvi. 48)
“say, Amen! Hallelujah! (i.e. Praise ye the Lord!).” This verse belongs
not properly to the Psalm, but is the doxology marking the conclusion
of the fourth “book” of the Psalms. Apparently then the Psalms had
already been arranged in the five collections or “books,” into which
they were finally divided, by the time of the Chronicler; but the
argument is not conclusive since (1) the doxology may be really part
of the Psalm, and (2) there is the possibility that verses 7‒36 are a
later insertion in Chronicles.
37‒43.
The Service before the Ark and the Service at Gibeon.
The description of the disposition of the Priests and Levites for

the worship in Jerusalem and in Gibeon which was begun in verses
4‒6 is here resumed. verses 37, 38 summarise verses 4‒6.
³⁷So he left there, before the ark of the
covenant of the Lord, Asaph and his
brethren, to minister before the ark continually,
as every day’s work required: ³⁸and Obed-
edom with their brethren, threescore and
eight; Obed-edom also the son of Jeduthun
and Hosah to be doorkeepers:
38. Obed-edom with their brethren] A name or names seems to
be missing after Obed-edom. The LXX. cuts the knot by reading
simply “and his brethren.” Probably we should insert after Obed-
edom the words “and Hosah” from the last part of the verse: see the
following note.
Obed-edom also the son of Jeduthun] If the view of xv. 19‒21

and xvi. 5 taken above be correct, these words also may be deleted
as a harmonising gloss, added by someone who wished to insist on
Obed-edom as a singer, and hence gave him a place in the line of
Jeduthun, one of the three great choral guilds.
³⁹and Zadok. the priest, and his brethren the

priests, before the tabernacle of the Lord in
the high place that was at Gibeon,
39. Zadok the priest] As Zadok alone is here mentioned as
“before the tabernacle,” the Chronicler perhaps implies that Abiathar
(Ahimelech) the other high-priest was in charge of the Ark in
Jerusalem. On Zadok and Abiathar, see xv. 11, note.
the tabernacle of the Lord in the high place that was at Gibeon]
See prefatory note to chapter xiii.; and 2 Chronicles i. 3.
⁴⁰to offer burnt offerings unto the Lord upon

the altar of burnt offering continually morning
and evening, even according to all that is
written in the law of the Lord, which he
commanded unto Israel;
40. the altar of burnt offering] 2 Chronicles i. 5, 6.
morning and evening] Exodus xxix. 38, 39 (= Numbers xxviii. 3,

4).
⁴¹and with them Heman and Jeduthun, and the

rest that were chosen, who were expressed by
name, to give thanks to the Lord, because his
mercy endureth for ever;
41. Jeduthun] Psalms xxxix., lxii., lxxvii. (titles). In vi. 33‒47, xv.
17, 19 the names of the leading singers are given as Heman, Asaph,
and Ethan. Here and in xxv. 1 ff. however Jeduthun seems to take
the place of Ethan. Probably there was a variation in the tradition as
to the third name, two families competing each for the honour of its
own ancestor.
⁴²and with them Heman and Jeduthun with

trumpets and cymbals for those that should
sound aloud, and with instruments for the
songs of God: and the sons of Jeduthun to be
at the gate. ⁴³And all the people departed
every man to his house: and David returned to
bless his house.
42. and with them, etc.] The words with them are possibly
repeated in error from verse 41. Render perhaps, And Heman and
Jeduthun had trumpets and cymbals. For trumpets compare xv.
24 (note).
sons of Jeduthun] Perhaps a gloss connected with the statement
in verse 38, where see note on Obed-edom also the son of
Jeduthun.
to be at the gate] David’s organisation of the doorkeepers is

given in xxvi. 1‒19.
Chapter XVII.
1‒27 (= 2 Samuel vii. 1‒29).
God’s Answer to David’s expressed desire to build a Temple.
David’s Thanksgiving.
This passage is a reproduction with some omissions and

variations of 2 Samuel vii. The text is generally smoother in
Chronicles, and in some cases (e.g. in verse 6) we cannot doubt that
the Chronicler has preserved an older and better reading than the
present text of Samuel, whilst in other instances the Chronicler has
consciously emended his text of Samuel.
¹And it came to pass, when David dwelt in

his house, that David said to Nathan the
prophet, Lo, I dwell in an house of cedar, but
the ark of the covenant of the Lord dwelleth
under curtains.
1. in his house] Samuel adds, and the Lord had given him rest
from all his enemies round about. The Chronicler omits these words
probably because his next three chapters (xviii.‒xx.) are devoted to
wars (compare 2 Samuel viii. and x.).
Nathan] The prophet of the court in the reign of David: see e.g. 2
Samuel xii.; 1 Kings i.
the ark of the covenant] So called because it contained the two

tables of the covenant, 1 Kings viii. 9.
²And Nathan said unto David, Do all that is in

thine heart; for God is with thee.
2. in thine heart] The heart according to Hebrew thought is the
seat of intention and purpose.
³And it came to pass the same night, that the

word of God came to Nathan, saying, ⁴Go and
tell David my servant, Thus saith the Lord,
Thou shalt not build me an house to dwell in:
3. the same night] Genesis xx. 3; 1 Samuel iii. 2, 3; 1 Kings iii. 5;
Job iv. 12, 13.
⁵for I have not dwelt in an house since the day

that I brought up Israel, unto this day; but have
gone ¹ from tent to tent, and from one
tabernacle to another.
¹ Hebrew have been.
5. I brought up Israel] i.e. out of Egypt (so Samuel).
but have gone from tent to tent, and from one tabernacle to
another] Samuel but have walked in a tent and in a tabernacle. The
Hebrew text of Chronicles defies translation; that of Samuel is better.
⁶In all places wherein I have walked with all
Israel, spake I a word with any of the judges of
Israel, whom I commanded to feed my people,
saying, Why have ye not built me an house of
cedar?
6. the judges] A better reading than the tribes (Samuel).
⁷Now therefore thus shalt thou say unto my

servant David, Thus saith the Lord of hosts, I
took thee from the sheepcote ¹, from following
the sheep, that thou shouldest be prince ² over
my people Israel: ⁸and I have been with thee
whithersoever thou wentest, and have cut off
all thine enemies from before thee; and I will
make thee a name, like unto the name of the
great ones that are in the earth.
¹ Or, pasture. ² Or, leader.
7. sheepcote] Better as margin pasture.
⁹And I will appoint a place for my people

Israel, and will plant them, that they may dwell
in their own place, and be moved no more;
neither shall the children of wickedness waste
them any more, as at the first,
9. I will appoint, etc.] i.e. will establish them in Canaan with
complete ascendancy over their enemies.
waste them] Samuel afflict them.
¹⁰and as from the day that I commanded

judges to be over my people Israel; and I will ¹
subdue all thine enemies. Moreover I tell thee
that the Lord will build thee an house.
¹ Or, have subdued.
10. build thee an house] Samuel make thee an house, the house
meant being a dynasty, and not a building.
¹¹And it shall come to pass, when thy days be

fulfilled that thou must go to be with thy
fathers, that I will set up thy seed after thee,
which shall be of thy sons; and I will establish
his kingdom.
11. that thou must go to be with] Samuel and thou shalt sleep
with, the usual euphemism for “to die.”
¹²He shall build me an house, and I will

establish his throne for ever.
12. me an house] Samuel an house for my name.
¹³I will be his father, and he shall be my son:

and I will not take my mercy away from him,
as I took it from him that was before thee:
13. my son] Here Samuel adds, If he commit iniquity, I will
chasten him with the rod of men and with the stripes of the children
of men: this the Chronicler omits in order that not even a suggestion
of the coming evil days might at this stage rest on David and his line.
from him that was before thee] Samuel from Saul whom I put
away before thee. The reading in Chronicles is to be preferred.
¹⁴but I will settle him in mine house and in my

kingdom for ever: and his throne shall be
established for ever. ¹⁵According to all these
words, and according to all this vision, so did
Nathan speak unto David.
14. I will settle him in mine house and in my kingdom for ever]
Samuel And thine house and thy kingdom shall be established for
ever before thee (but read before me). The reading in Samuel is no
doubt the original. The change made in Chronicles neatly expresses
the Chronicler’s conviction that the kingdom of Israel was not a
human but a Divine institution, its true ruler being God Himself.
in mine house] Numbers xii. 7; compare 1 Timothy iii. 15.
¹⁶Then David the king went in, and sat

before the Lord; and he said, Who am I, O
Lord God, and what is my house, that thou
hast brought me thus far?
16. went in] i.e. into the tent which he had pitched for the Ark; xvi.
1.
sat before the Lord] So LXX. and 2 Samuel vii. 18. The Targum
rightly paraphrases, “and tarried in prayer before Jehovah.”
¹⁷And this was a small thing in thine eyes, O

God; but thou hast spoken of thy servant’s
house for a great while to come, and hast
regarded me according to the estate of a man
of high degree, O Lord God.
17. and hast regarded me according to the estate of a man of
high degree] In 2 Samuel vii. 19, and this too after the manner of
men, or rather and this is the law for men (an exclamation), but the
text both in Samuel and Chronicles is certainly corrupt. The Hebrew
phrase is not quite the same in the two passages, and there is
nothing in Samuel corresponding with the words of high degree, but
the text of Chronicles seems to be derived from that of Samuel An
emendation “and hast let me see the generations of men for ever,”
i.e. the fortunes of my distant descendants, has met with some
approval, but no really satisfactory translation or explanation has yet
been given of the Hebrew.
¹⁸What can David say yet more unto thee

concerning the honour which is done to thy
servant? for thou knowest thy servant.
18. concerning the honour which is done to thy servant] Again an
obscure text. Following Samuel we should probably omit these
words.
thou knowest] Approvest, acceptest; compare Psalms i. 6,

Psalms ci. 4; Jeremiah i. 5.
¹⁹O Lord, for thy servant’s sake, and

according to thine own heart, hast thou
wrought all this greatness, to make known all
these great things. ²⁰O Lord, there is none
like thee, neither is there any God beside
thee, according to all that we have heard with
our ears.
19. for thy servant’s sake] 2 Samuel vii. 21, for thy word’s sake,
but the LXX. of 2 Samuel agrees with the text of Chronicles.
²¹And ¹ what one nation in the earth is like thy

people Israel, whom God went to redeem unto
himself for a people, to make thee a name by
great and terrible things, in driving out nations
from before thy people, which thou
redeemedst out of Egypt? ²²For thy people
Israel didst thou make thine own people for
ever; and thou, Lord, becamest their God.
¹ Or, And who is like thy people Israel, a nation that is alone in
the earth &c.
21. what one nation in the earth is like thy people Israel] Better as
margin, who is like thy people Israel, a nation that is alone in the
earth. Compare Targum a people unique and chosen in the earth.
²³And now, O Lord, let the word that thou hast

spoken concerning thy servant, and
concerning his house, be established for ever,
and do as thou hast spoken.
23. be established] Literally be made Amen (i.e. “sure”).
²⁴And ¹ let thy name be established and

magnified for ever, saying, The Lord of hosts
is the God of Israel, even a God to Israel: and
the house of David thy servant is established
before thee.
¹ Or, Yea, let it be established, and let thy name be magnified
&c.
24. And let thy name ... magnified] Better, as margin, Yea, let it
be established, and let thy name be magnified.
even a God to Israel] delete as a dittography.
²⁵For thou, O my God, hast revealed to thy

servant that thou wilt build him an house:
therefore hath thy servant found in his heart to
pray before thee. ²⁶And now, O Lord, thou art
God, and hast promised this good thing unto
thy servant:
25. hath ... found ... to pray] i.e. hath found words and courage to
pray.
²⁷and now it hath pleased thee to bless the

house of thy servant, that it may continue for
ever before thee: for thou, O Lord, hast
blessed, and it is blessed for ever.
27. hast blessed, and it is blessed for ever] 2 Samuel vii. 29,
thou, O Lord God, hast spoken it; and with thy blessing let the house
of thy servant be blessed for ever.
Chapter XVIII.
1‒17 (= 2 Samuel viii. 1‒18).
A Summary of David’s Foreign Wars. David’s Officials.
This chapter like the last is taken from 2 Samuel with a few
omissions and variations. The Chronicler paraphrases (verses 1,
17), omits (verse 2), has a different reading (verses 4, 8, 10, 12). In
some cases the better reading is in Chronicles.
The campaigns (except perhaps that against Moab) seem to be

narrated in chronological order. David first makes sure of his most
pressing enemy the Philistines (verse 1); then feeling safe towards
the south-west he turns towards the north-east secure on the
Euphrates (but see note verse 3) a station (valuable for trade) held
by the Syrians of Zobah (verse 3); the Syrians of Damascus fearing
to be excluded from the River by David’s success come to the help
of their kinsmen (verse 5); lastly the Edomites, urged perhaps by the
Syrians to make a diversion in their favour and thinking it safe to
attack Judah during the absence of David, join in the war, but are
signally defeated by a detachment under Joab and Abishai (verse
12).
The war with Moab (verse 2) is surprising, if it took place at an

early date in David’s reign, for he seems to have been on specially
friendly terms with the king of Moab during his exile; compare 1
Samuel xxii. 3, 4 and Kirkpatrick on 2 Samuel viii. 2.
1‒13 (= 2 Samuel viii. 1‒14).

A Summary of David’s Foreign Wars.
¹And after this it came to pass, that David
smote the Philistines, and subdued them, and
took Gath and her towns out of the hand of the
Philistines.
1. after this] The phrase is adopted from 2 Samuel viii. 1 and
probably came originally from a still earlier book of annals, in which
the context may have been different. We cannot therefore say at
what period of David’s reign the conquest of Gath took place.
took Gath and her towns] It is impossible to say for certain

whether this is the original text or only an interpretation of the
obscure reading in 2 Samuel viii. 1, took the bridle of the mother city
(Revised Version).
²And he smote Moab; and the Moabites

became servants to David, and brought
presents.
2. smote Moab] The Chronicler at this point omits, as he often
omits, some difficult words of Samuel. 2 Samuel viii. 2 seems to say
that David put two-thirds of the Moabites (presumably the warriors)
to death, but the meaning of the verse is uncertain.
brought presents] i.e. tribute, in acknowledgment of David’s

superiority. The same Hebrew phrase (translated “bring an offering”)
is used Psalms xcvi. 8 of sacrificing to Jehovah.
³And David smote Hadarezer king of Zobah

unto ¹ Hamath, as he went to stablish his
dominion by the river Euphrates.
¹ Or, by.
3. Hadarezer] So spelt in 2 Samuel x. 16‒19, but in 2 Samuel viii.
3‒12, Hadadezer, the right form (as inscriptions show).
Zobah unto Hamath] Render as margin Zobah by Hamath, the

position of Zobah being fixed by the note that it was near Hamath.
Hamath] The modern Hama on the Orontes, midway between

Antioch and Damascus, but somewhat further to the east than either.
See below verse 9; also xiii. 5 and 2 Chronicles viii. 3.
as he went to stablish his dominion] He may refer to Hadarezer

or to David; the latter, probably, is the Chronicler’s intention. The
reading in 2 Samuel viii. 3 (“to recover his dominion”—Revised
Version) should be emended to the text in Chronicles.
by the river Euphrates] The utter improbability that David

exercised any authority in regions so far north throws no doubt upon
the reading, for the Chronicler and the author of Samuel may easily
have believed that he did so.
⁴And David took from him a thousand chariots,

and seven thousand horsemen, and twenty
thousand footmen: and David houghed all the
chariot horses, but reserved of them for an
hundred chariots.
4. a thousand chariots, and seven thousand horsemen] Samuel a
thousand and seven hundred horsemen (so Hebrew but LXX. of
Samuel agrees with Chronicles). Houghed = “hamstrung.”
⁵And when the Syrians ¹ of Damascus ² came to

succour Hadarezer king of Zobah, David
smote of the Syrians ¹ two and twenty
thousand men.
¹ Hebrew Aram. ² Hebrew Darmesek.
5. Damascus] The name is variously written in Hebrew,

Darmesek (Chronicles), Dammesek (Genesis, 1 Kings), Dummesek
(2 Kings xvi. 10). See G. A. Smith, Damascus in Encyclopedia Biblia.
came to succour] By interposing between David and his own land

and so threatening his rear.
⁶Then David put garrisons in Syria ¹ of

Damascus ²; and the Syrians ¹ became servants
to David, and brought presents. And the Lord
gave victory ³ to David whithersoever he went.
¹ Hebrew Aram. ² Hebrew Darmesek.
³ Or, saved David.
6. put garrisons in Syria of Damascus] margin in Aram of

Darmesek, i.e. in the Aramean kingdom of which Damascus was the
capital. David’s purpose of course was to secure his rear in any
future operations towards Hamath or towards the Euphrates.
⁷And David took the shields of gold that were

on the servants of Hadarezer, and brought
them to Jerusalem.
7. shields of gold] “shields” = Hebrew shĕlātim. The meaning of
the Hebrew word is doubtful; most probably it does not mean
“shield,” for (1) a shield would not be described as “upon” the person
to whom it belonged, (2) the early authorities, i.e. the LXX.
translators, the Targum, and the Peshitṭa (on 2 Samuel viii. 7; 2
Kings xi. 10; Jeremiah li. 11; Ezekiel xxvii. 11) never give “shield,” but
either leave the word untranslated or give various conjectural
renderings. A later authority (Targum on 1 Chronicles xviii. 7; 2
Chronicles xxiii. 9) gives “shield,” while LXX. gives “collars” (κλοιούς)
here, and “arms” or “shields” (τὰ ὅπλα) in 2 Chronicles.
The most probable rendering of the word is “suits of armour” (see

Barnes, Expository Times, x. 43 ff.).
and brought them to Jerusalem] So Hebrew LXX. Targum, but the

Peshitṭa (all important MSS.) omits the words, and they may be a
gloss introduced from 2 Samuel viii. 7.
⁸And from Tibhath and from Cun, cities of

Hadarezer, David took very much brass,
wherewith Solomon made the brasen sea, and
the pillars, and the vessels of brass.
8. Tibhath] compare Tebah, the name of an Aramean family,
Genesis xxii. 24. Nothing is known certainly of the position of the city.
In 2 Samuel viii. 8 Betah (= Tebah).
Cun] 2 Samuel viii. 8, “Berothai.” Nothing is certainly known of a

city of either name; but “Berothai” may be the same as “Berothah”
(Ezekiel xlvii. 16).
very much brass] Compare xxi. 14, xxix. 2.
brass] Not the metal generally so called. Revised Version (margin

note to Genesis iv. 22) gives copper as an alternative rendering. The
“brass” of the ancients (χαλκός, LXX.) corresponds rather to bronze.
the brasen sea, etc.] Compare 2 Chronicles iv. 11‒18.
⁹And when Tou king of Hamath heard that

David had smitten all the host of Hadarezer
king of Zobah,

Japans Rush To The Pacific War The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing Lionel P Fatton Full Chapter

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Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War.

Palgrave Studies in International Relations

Cover illustration: abzee/getty images

Foreword to Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of

Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbal-

detailed account of how the moderate and cooperative foreign policy of

Tokyo, Japan Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki

Bellevue, Switzerland Lionel P. Fatton

1 Overbalancing as a Systemic Pathology 1

3 Appropriate Balancing in the Naval Arms Control Era,

5 Overbalancing and Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War,

Lionel P. Fatton is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at

Fig. 1.1 International challenge, threat perception and balancing

“Pour cesser de haïr, il m’a suffi de connaître.”

Overbalancing as a Systemic Pathology

The Phenomenon of Overbalancing

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

infringed on the territorial integrity of two sovereign countries—Georgia

approach promoted primarily by neorealists possesses the opposite weak-

Neoclassical realism, which emanated from flaws in Neorealism,

3 Kenneth N. Waltz, 1988, The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory, Journal of

to deter aggression or prevent being put in a position of submission vis-

is illustrated by the military growth and expanding alliance network of

begin to outstrip benefits” and self-encirclement to the formation of an

is because the impulse behind and the causal mechanisms underlying

Why Did Japan Rush to the Pacific War?

civil–military relations was specifically dedicated to prevent unwarranted

36 Raymond Cohen, 1979, Threat Perception in International Crisis, Madison: Univer-

Fig. 1.1 International challenge, threat perception and balancing behavior

This basic hypothesis categorizes Japan’s behavior in the mid-1930s as

capability of the opponent that may materialize into a danger.”40 In such

in line with the advice of the military institution, unduly empowered by

Fig. 1.2 Exogenous shock, inflated threat perception and overbalancing

This is for two reasons. First, threat perception is inherently subjective,

41 The term “threat perception” is a pleonasm, because a threat is by definition

In such circumstances, the government absorbs the perceptual and policy

44 Dean G. Pruitt, 1965, Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International

agenda. The chapter then turns to my argument. After a depiction of the

if necessary withdrawal from, the naval arms control regime to better

Explaining Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War

1 Jack Donnelly, 2000, Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 25

5 Emphasis added. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 21.

doomed to fail if they do. Inversely to offensive realists, defensive real-

²²Saying, Touch not mine anointed ones,

And do my prophets no harm.

23‒33 (= Psalms xcvi. 1‒13).

²³Sing unto the Lord, all the earth;

Shew forth his salvation from day to day.

²⁴Declare his glory among the nations,

His marvellous works among all the peoples.

²⁵For great is the Lord, and highly to be praised:

He also is to be feared above all gods.

But the Lord made the heavens.

¹ Or, things of nought.

26. made the heavens] A fine epithet. Compare Jeremiah x. 11,

²⁷Honour and majesty are before him:

Strength and gladness are in his place.

Strength and gladness] Psalms xcvi. 6, Strength and beauty. The

in his place] Read with Psalms xcvi. 6, in his sanctuary.

²⁸Give unto the Lord, ye kindreds of the peoples,

Give unto the Lord glory and strength.

Bring an offering, and come before him: