Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CARL T. BOGUS
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the
University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing
worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and
certain other countries.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in
writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under
terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning
reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same
condition on any acquirer.
ISBN 978–0–19–763222–2
eISBN 978–0–19–763224–6
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197632222.001.0001
For William and Dov
CONTENTS
Introduction
1. Showdown in Richmond
2. Debate in Richmond
3. Decision in Richmond
4. Southern Terror
5. The Militia—War in the North
6. The Militia—War in the South
7. Mr. Madison Goes to Congress
8. The Ghost of Patrick Henry
9. The English Declaration of Rights of 1689
10. Chimeras of Liberty
Conclusion
Author’s Note
Notes
Index
Introduction
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.
This book deals with these questions, and these questions only:
Why, in 1789, did James Madison write what became the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution? What did he want to
accomplish? Why, after making a few changes to his initial draft, did
Madison’s colleagues in the First Congress adopt the Second
Amendment and propose it to the states?
Although I am a lawyer, this book is about history, not law. In the
main, I shall avoid legal issues and arguments. For example, lawyers
debate whether, in interpreting either the main body of the
Constitution or its Amendments, courts ought to take into
consideration what the men who wrote the provisions intended.
Some argue that courts should focus on the text of the provisions
and ignore “original intent.” Others argue that courts ought to give
great weight to the intentions of the framers—in this case, Madison
and his colleagues in the First Congress. Still others believe that
courts should ignore the intentions of the framers and focus instead
on how those who ratified the provision—in this case, state
legislatures—understood the provision. And some maintain that what
matters more than any of that is how the people at large understood
the provision. These arguments can resemble debates about how
many angels can dance on the head of a pin. For example, those
who want to place the greatest weight on the intentions of the
ratifiers, or the understanding of the people, can wind up arguing
whether that should include legislators or people in the states of
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Georgia—three states that were
part of the Union when Congress proposed the Bill of Rights but did
not ratify the amendments (including the Second Amendment) until
1939. This book will not deal with such questions. If you are reading
this book, I assume that you care why James Madison and his
colleagues in the First Congress wrote the Second Amendment
without arguing why you should care.
Nor am I going to analyze or debate how courts or other legal
scholars have interpreted the Second Amendment. Suffice it to say
that historians often criticize judges, lawyers, and legal scholars for
doing “law office history,” which means picking and choosing
particular quotations and facts, and ripping them out of context to
reach a desired conclusion.22 I am proud that, years ago, when I
presented my thesis about the Second Amendment in a law review
article, Professor Don Higginbotham, then the leading historian on
military affairs in eighteenth-century America, held it up as an
exception to the rule; that is, it was a historically contextualized
argument by a lawyer.23 He also said my thesis was worthy of
additional research. This book is the product of many years of
additional thought and research, and I am committed to keeping
faith with the principles expressed by the late Professor
Higginbotham. I shall try to present history as it should be
presented: focusing on people and the circumstances that caused
them to think and act as they did. Happily, history is colorful, and
putting facts and statements in context means placing them in the
larger narrative in which they occurred—that is, to tell stories.
James Madison never explained why he wrote the Second
Amendment or what it meant. Nor did his colleagues in the First
Congress. That does not mean that we have embarked on a futile
quest. Nor does it mean that the Amendment is doomed to be a
Rorschach test on which everyone projects their own thoughts. The
most reliable method of deducing why people acted as they did is to
understand the imperatives that confronted them at the time. We do
this all the time, especially when listening to politicians. We don’t
have to be psychoanalysts or professional historians to do this
successfully. We are, after all, human beings, and by putting
ourselves in the shoes of other human beings, we can often
understand what motivated them to do what they did. This can often
lead us to a more reliable conclusion than simply accepting what
someone claims their motives were. But we have to understand—
truly understand—the times, circumstances, and imperatives of
James Madison and other key players. Moreover, Madison and his
contemporaries lived in a different time than do we. Their world—
eighteenth-century America—was not our world. So stepping into
their shoes will take time and care. We need to bear in mind that, as
one historian ably put it, “The Founders wrote the Second
Amendment to solve their own problems, not ours.”24
There is nothing special about the method we shall follow.
Historians agree that interpreting a text, statement, or idea—in this
case, the Second Amendment—requires understanding the context
in which it was made, who made it, and why. According to the
famous historian Quentin Skinner, it is not sufficient “to concentrate
simply on a given idea or a given text in itself.”25 Skinner stressed
that we must recognize that ideas and statements constitute a
response to immediate circumstances, and it is therefore essential to
study “the context of other happenings which explains them.”26
The absence of explanations from James Madison and his
colleagues means that there is no direct evidence about what the
Founders intended. There is, however, considerable circumstantial
evidence that bears upon the question. As someone who taught
Evidence for decades in law school, I know that there is a common
misperception about the relative strengths of direct and
circumstantial evidence. Many people assume circumstantial
evidence is weaker than direct evidence. Not so. One type of
evidence is not inherently stronger or weaker than the other. The
difference between the two is that direct evidence does not require
making an inference from the evidence itself to a conclusion drawn
from the evidence, whereas circumstantial evidence does require an
inference. Here is the classic law school example. Suppose the
question is whether it snowed last night. If Joe testifies that he went
outside at midnight to walk his dog, and during that walk he saw it
snowing, that is direct evidence. However, if Joe testifies that when
he walked his dog after supper there was no snow on the ground,
but that when he walked his dog again just before breakfast this
morning there was a foot of snow as far as the eye could see, an
inference must be made from the evidence—no snow last night, a lot
of snow this morning—to reach the conclusion that it snowed during
the night. That is circumstantial evidence.
In that example, the direct and circumstantial evidence are of
equal strength. (As sensible people, we can disregard outlandish
possibilities such as someone had thousands of truckloads of snow
delivered to play a practical joke on Joe.) In many instances,
circumstantial evidence is stronger than direct evidence. We used to
assume, for example, that eyewitness testimony was the gold
standard in evidence, but we have learned from painful experience
and rigorous studies that eyewitness testimony is often unreliable.
People are often mistaken about what they believe they saw, not to
mention that some people lie. So do not be put off by my telling you
that we will be relying on circumstantial evidence. In fact, having to
rely on circumstantial evidence is going to make our exploration
more interesting.
Historian David Hackett Fisher has some useful observations about
attempts to discern motives. He says that motives “are usually
pluralistic, in both their number and their nature.”27 By that he
means that people usually have a number of reasons for doing a
particular thing. “[A] man who does something does it for every
reason he can think of, and a few unthinkable reasons as well,”
Fisher writes. By this he means, people have conscious and
unconscious motivations, “which tend to coexist and interact.” I do
not take Fisher to mean that we cannot try to discern those
motivations and how much weight each had. A man asked a woman
to marry him. Was he motivated because he loved her, because she
was wealthy, because he was on the rebound from being jilted by a
previous lover, or because of a combination of factors? In trying to
sort that out, we would consider circumstances such as whether he
treated the woman the way people treat those whom they love, how
materialistic he was, how long ago his former lover broke up with
him, and so on. We may have more faith in the inferences we draw
from circumstantial evidence of this kind than from what the man
himself claims was his reason for proposing marriage. Fisher puts
this even more starkly. He writes: “There can be no primary, direct
evidence of any past motive. But there is a tacit logic of inference
which can attain a high degree of probable accuracy.”28 We will not,
therefore, be doing anything unusual in deducing James Madison’s
motivations through circumstantial evidence.
In a sense, this is a mystery book. The mystery is why James
Madison decided to write the Second Amendment. In a classic
mystery, the author does not tell you who did it, and why they did it,
at the beginning of the tale. But while we will be engaged in an
exploration to solve a kind of mystery, it is not practical in this case
to save the solution to end. So let me describe my thesis.
On Monday afternoon on September 7, 1787, the delegates who
were still in attendance at the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia after four grueling months of difficult and sometimes
contentious debate, formed a line in accordance with the
geographies of their states—North to South, with the two New
Hampshire delegates going first, and the two Georgia delegates last
—to sign the product of their work: the proposed Constitution of the
United States. Of the fifty-five delegates who had attended some
portion of the Convention, forty-one remained. Of those, thirty-eight
signed. Three refused. It was three o’clock when they finished.
Some made their way from the building we today call Independence
Hall to City Tavern for a celebratory drink and to share a meal
together.29 It is said a woman in the street called out to Benjamin
Franklin to ask, “Doctor, what have we got? A republic or a
monarchy?” and Franklin replied, “A republic, if you can keep it.”30
But, by its own terms, the Constitution would not be adopted until
at least nine states ratified it. The Constitution required that each
state elect delegates for a convention to make that state’s decision.
Two of the three men who had refused to sign—Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts and George Mason of Virginia—vowed to do
everything in their power to prevent ratification.31 Over the next
year, a battle ensued between federalists, who favored ratification,
and antifederalists, who opposed it. As we know, three federalists—
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay—wrote a series
of newspaper articles supporting ratification, which were later
collected and published as The Federalist. Meanwhile, antifederalists
were writing their own newspaper articles denouncing the
Constitution and urging that it be rejected.32
When Virginia convened its Ratifying Convention in Richmond on
Monday, June 2, 1788, ratification was in doubt. Eight states had
ratified, but it looked as though if Virginia failed to ratify, there might
not be a ninth. Besides, without Virginia, could the Union even be
feasible? It was the largest state, the wealthiest state, and home to
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and other
nationally prominent figures. With everything on the line, the
Richmond Convention was an event of the highest drama. Moreover,
among the many prominent delegates were federalists James
Madison, John Marshall, and Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee, and
antifederalists Patrick Henry, George Mason, and James Monroe. So
many spectators showed up that the proceedings were moved to a
larger building. There is something else unusual about the Richmond
Convention for its time: We have a reasonably good transcript—
totaling nearly five-hundred pages—of the debates.
Patrick Henry, George Mason, and the other antifederalists raised
many arguments against ratification. One of the accusations they
flung at Madison was that he and his fellow delegates at the
Constitutional Convention had handed Congress a terrible weapon:
the ability to subvert the slave system by “disarming” the militia. It is
impossible to state how terrifying for Virginia, or for other states
with large slave populations, any prospect of rendering the militia
weaponless could be. The South was petrified about potential slave
insurrections. The militia was both a deterrent against rebellions,
and its defense should rebellions occur. Madison thought this was an
unreasonable fear. If Congress failed to arm the militia, the states or
the people themselves could arm the militia, he argued. But Henry
implied that Congress might not merely neglect to arm the militia; it
might deliberately disarm the militia. Why would it do this? Because,
Henry suggested, the North hated slavery, and the Constitution had
deprived Congress of the authority to abolish it directly. This may
have been a wild theory; but as we know too well, people can be
susceptible to such theories, especially if they are fearful. Patrick
Henry, moreover, was a powerful persuader. He was, in fact, widely
considered the greatest orator then living in America, and when
Madison suggested the states could also arm the militia, Henry
unmercifully, and effectively, ridiculed him.
Meanwhile, one of the antifederalists’ other objections to the
Constitution—and probably the objection with the widest appeal—
was that it did not contain a bill of rights. And Madison was then
opposed to a bill of rights.
By a thin margin, the federalists ultimately prevailed in the
Richmond Convention. Madison, however, had been bloodied by the
antifederalists. Seizing the opportunity to finish off an opponent
while he was weak, Patrick Henry devised a Machiavellian scheme to
end Madison’s political career. To save himself, Madison reversed his
previous position and promised Virginia voters that, if they sent him
to Congress, he would write a bill of rights. He followed through on
that promise; and when Madison wrote what became the Second
Amendment, he did so to solve the problem that Henry raised. That
is, Madison wrote the Amendment to assure his constituents in
Virginia, and the South generally, that Congress could not deprive
states of armed militia. Madison could not give states the authority
to arm the militia without contradicting the main body of the
Constitution, so, in effect, he provided that if Congress did not arm
the militia, the people could do so themselves. And, in fact, this is
how militias were generally armed. States simply decreed that
militiamen would furnish their own arms.
An interesting thesis, you might say, but where is your evidence?
That is what this book is: a presentation of evidence supporting that
thesis. I hope you will find the various pieces of evidence intrinsically
interesting in their own right and the entirety of the evidence
powerfully persuasive.
My thesis is, of course, controversial. If I asked you what image
you most associate with the Second Amendment, you might think of
the Minuteman at Lexington, with a musket in his hands. I am
arguing that the more accurate image is that of the musket in the
hands of the militiaman on slave patrol in the South.
Most professional historians will, at the outset, find my thesis
jarring. They agree that Madison wrote the Second Amendment to
guarantee an armed militia. That is undeniable from its text. But, by
and large, historians believe Madison wanted to protect an armed
militia to reduce the need for a standing army. They believe that the
Founders considered standing armies a potential tool of tyrants, and
therefore dangerous. I do not argue that view is flatly wrong. As
David Hackett Fisher said, people often act for a multiplicity of
motives. Nevertheless, I shall argue that the “No Standing Army!”
motive is exaggerated. The Revolutionary War destroyed faith in the
militia as a military force and an instrument of national defense.
Lexington and Concord were, in fact, the last clear militia victories of
the war. The militia repeatedly proved incapable of standing their
ground in battle. As we will see, the militia was so consistently
terrible that, in considering how to array their forces for battle,
Continental Army generals talked about surrounding militia with
Continental soldiers and ordering the Continentals to shoot the first
militiamen to bolt. And it was not just Continental Army officers who
considered the militia unsuitable for combat; the highest ranking
militia officers thought so, too. While some politicians continued to
make Fourth of July speeches glorifying the militia after the war, I
believe the evidence will persuade you that it is a mistake to take
those speeches at face value. Knowledgeable people knew this
rhetoric was nothing more than political cotton candy.
At the same time, everyone understood that the militias were
effective and essential for slave control. If we had to assign relative
values to these two motives for protecting an armed militia, the
slave-control motive would outweigh the “No Standing Army!”
motive by a factor of at least ten to one.
Here is how we will proceed. The first three chapters of this book
will take us to June 1789, and the Ratifying Convention in Richmond,
Virginia. We will not only examine the most relevant arguments, but
learn something about the backgrounds, personalities, and agenda
of the participants. As already mentioned, the Richmond Convention
had an unusually skilled and diligent person transcribing the
proceedings, so you will be able to hear much of what James
Madison, Patrick Henry, and other delegates said in their own words.
This chapter will also examine the Declaration of Rights adopted at
the very end of the Richmond Convention, which included a right to
bear arms provision and other closely related provisions. I believe
you will discover that these provisions have very different
connotations when you read them after listening to the debates that
immediately preceded them.
The next three chapters will step back in time to provide
background and insight about what was in the minds the delegates
at the Richmond Convention and the Founders as a whole. These
chapters provide a great deal of the context that is necessary to
understand their thinking, their statements, and their motives.
Chapter 4 will examine just how afraid people in the slaveholding
states were of insurrections. It will explore the reasons and
parameters of their fears, and the role the militia played in both
deterring insurrections and suppressing them, if and when they did
occur. Chapters 5 and 6 will describe some of the main battles of the
Revolutionary War. These chapters will demonstrate that when
Madison wrote the Second Amendment, he and his colleagues in the
First Congress believed that militias were worthless for national
defense and absolutely essential for slave control.
Chapter 7 will pick up the story after the Richmond Convention.
This part of the story deals with Patrick Henry’s scheme to
extinguish Madison’s political career, Madison’s contest against
James Monroe to win election to Congress, and the promise Madison
made to voters to write a bill of rights, should they choose him as
their representative. This chapter will also examine the right-to-bear-
arms provisions that then existed in four state constitutions. This,
together with the Virginia Declaration of Rights discussed at the end
of Chapter 3, will familiarize us with the most prominent right-to-
bear-arms provisions that Madison had in front of him when he sat
down to draft his own provision for the Bill of Rights.
Chapter 8 will recount what happened during the First Congress.
It will follow Madison’s original draft of what became the Second
Amendment through the process in both the House and the Senate,
to its ultimate adoption. The House then kept a record of debates,
so that we will be able to read what members said about the right-
to-bear-arms provisions they were considering. We will also be able
to gain additional insight from comments participants in these events
made in letters to friends and others at the time, including their own
thoughts about Madison’s motives.
Chapter 9 will take another and even longer step back in time. We
shall travel back almost exactly another one hundred years to the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, and the English Declaration of Rights
which grew out of that revolution. Although this may seem like a
long way to travel, in time and in distance, from the Richmond
Convention of 1788 or the First Congress in 1789, I think you will
find this last trip to be both intriguing and essential. The American
Founders were all born, raised, and educated as members of the
British Empire. The Glorious Revolution was as familiar to them as
the American Revolution is to us, and they understood and revered
the English Declaration of Rights as much as we revere our Bill of
Rights. Many of the Founders, in fact, thought of the American
Revolution as “a sequel to” the Glorious Revolution.33 The English
Declaration of Rights contains the original right-to-own-arms
provision—the provision that inspired American analogs, including
the Second Amendment. It is impossible to understand what James
Madison or the other American Founders thought about a right to
bear arms without taking this final trip.
Until this point, we shall have examined only events that occurred
before Madison and the First Congress wrote the Second
Amendment. After all, no one knows the future, and Madison’s
thinking in 1789 could not have been influenced by later events.
Chapter 10, however, will peer at bit into the future, that is, into
events that occurred after Madison wrote the Second Amendment.
There are two reasons to do this. First, sometimes what people do
later can throw additional light on their previous actions and
motives. Suppose we wish to know why Alice accepted Bruce’s
proposal of marriage. Was it for love? We can make a better guess
about Alice’s motives if we learn that she broke off the engagement
after learning that Bruce had given away most of his wealth to
charity. The second reason for peering a bit into the future is to
satisfy some natural curiosity. Our final chapter, therefore, will focus
on what the American Founders did—and did not do—with the militia
after adopting the Second Amendment. We will, fittingly, end with
James Madison in the White House. A short Conclusion will offer final
thoughts.
1
Showdown in Richmond
Por cierto que esta moral debe de ser muy antigua y corriente entre
la gente del rebusco, porque recuerdo haber leído, con referencia á
Barthélemy, que habiéndosele preguntado una vez cómo había
podido reunir la rica colección de medallas que poseía, respondió
con el candor de un niño:
—Me han regalado algunas; he comprado otras, y las demás las he
robado.
Dicho esto, lector (que, cuando menos, tendrás la manía de ser
buen mozo, por ruin y encanijado que seas), hago punto aquí,
apostándote las dos orejas á que siendo, como te juzgo, hombre de
bien, después de meter la mano en tu pecho no te atreves á tirar
una chinita á mi pecado.
1880.
LA INTOLERANCIA
Bien saben los que á usted y á mí nos conocen, que de este pecado
no tenemos, gracias á Dios, que arrepentirnos.
No van, pues, conmigo ni con usted los presentes rasguños,
aunque mi pluma los trace y á usted se los dedique; ni van tampoco
con los que tengan, en el particular, la conciencia menos tranquila
que la nuestra, porque los pecadores de este jaez ni se arrepienten
ni se enmiendan; además de que á mí no me da el naipe para
convertir infieles. Son, por tanto, las presentes líneas, un inofensivo
desahogo entre usted y yo, en el seno de la intimidad y bajo la
mayor reserva. Vamos, como quien dice, á echar un párrafo, en
confianza, en este rinconcito del libro, como pudiéramos echarle
dando un paseo por las soledades de Puerto Chico á las altas horas
de la noche. El asunto no es de transcendencia; pero sí de perenne
actualidad, como ahora se dice, y se presta, como ningún otro, á la
salsa de una murmuración lícita, sin ofensa para nadie, como las
que á usted le gustan, y de cuya raya no pasa aunque le desuellen
vivo.
Ya sabe usted, por lo que nos cuentan los que de allá vienen, lo que
se llama en la Isla de Cuba un ¡ataja! Un quídam toma de una tienda
un pañuelo... ó una oblea; le sorprende el tendero, huye el
delincuente, sale aquél tras éste, plántase en la acera, y grita ¡ataja!
y de la tienda inmediata, y de todas las demás, por cuyos frentes va
pasando á escape el fugitivo, le salen al encuentro banquetas,
palos, pesas, ladrillos y cuanto Dios ó el arte formaron de más duro
y contundente. El atajado así, según su estrella, muere, unas veces
en el acto, y otras al día siguiente, ó sale con vida del apuro; pero,
por bien que le vaya en él, no se libra de una tunda que le balda.
Como se deja comprender, para que al hombre más honrado del
mundo le toque allí la lotería, basta la casualidad de que al correr
por una calle, porque sus negocios así lo requieran, le dé á un
chusco la gana de gritar ¡ataja! Porque allí no se pregunta jamás por
qué, después que se oye el grito: se ve quién corre, y, sin otras
averiguaciones, se le tira con lo primero que se halla á mano.
Pues bien: á un procedimiento semejante se ajusta, por lo común,
entre los hombres cultos de ambos hemisferios, la formación de los
caracteres. No diré que sea la fama quien los hace; pero sí quien los
califica, los define... y los ataja.
Me explicaré mejor con algunos ejemplos.
Un hombre, porque tiene la cara así y el talle del otro modo, es
cordialmente antipático á cuantos no le conocen sino de vista, que
son los más.
—¡Qué cara! ¡qué talle! ¡qué levita! ¡qué aire!—dice con ira cada
uno de ellos, al verle pasar. Y si averiguan que se ha descalabrado,
por resbalarse en la acera,
—¡Me alegro!—exclaman con fruición,—porque ¡cuidado si es
cargante ese mozo!
Y si se habla de un ahogado en el baño, ó de un infeliz cosido á
puñaladas en una callejuela, ó de un desgraciado mordido por un
perro rabioso, dícense, con cierta delectación, pensando en el
antipático:
—¡Él es!
Pero llega un día en que se le ve del brazo de quien más le
despellejaba; pregúntase á éste cómo puede soportar la compañía
de un hombre tan insufrible, y responde con el corazón en la mano:
—Amigo, estábamos en un grandísimo error: ese sujeto es lo más
fino, lo más discreto, lo más bondadoso... lo más simpático que
darse puede.
Así es, en efecto, el fondo de aquel carácter que en el concepto
público, según la fama, es todo lo contrario, por lo cual se le niega la
sal y el fuego.
Ilustraré este caso con otro dato, que si no es enteramente
irrecusable, es, cuando menos, de una ingenuidad meritoria. No sé,
ni me importa saber, la opinión de que goza mi propio carácter entre
la gente; pero es lo cierto que hombres que hoy son íntimos y bien
probados amigos míos, me han dicho alguna vez:
—¡Caray, qué insoportable me eras cuando no te conocía tan á
fondo como ahora!
Jamás me he cansado en preguntarles el por qué de su antipatía.
Cabalmente la sentía yo hacia ellos en igual grado de fuerza.
—¡Qué hombre tan célebre es Diego!—dice la fama.—Es un costal
de gracias y donaires.
Y es porque Diego hace reir á cuantas personas le escuchan, y sus
burlas son celebradas en todas partes, y sus bromazos corren de
boca en boca y de tertulia en tertulia, y hasta las anécdotas más
antiguas y resobadas se le atribuyen á él por sus admiradores.
Ocúrresele á usted un día estudiar un poco á fondo al célebre
Diego, y hállale hombre vulgarísimo, ignorante y sin pizca de ingenio
ni de cultura; capaz de desollar la honra de su madre, á trueque de
hacerse aplaudir de aquellos mismos que le han colocado con sus
palmoteos en la imprescindible necesidad de ser gracioso.
Al revés de Diego, Juan es ingenioso y prudente, seco y punzante
en sus sátiras, oportuno y justo al servirse de ellas; y, sin embargo,
Juan, según dicen, es una vulgaridad antipática.
Una dama espléndida y de buen humor, reúne en su casa, muy á
menudo, una escogida sociedad. La tal señora no tiene, en buena
justicia, prenda que digna de notar sea en su persona. En terreno
neutral, sería una completa vulgaridad. Pero hay lujo en sus salones
y gabinetes, variedad en sus fiestas, abundancia en sus buffets,
novedad en sus trajes, y siempre una sonrisa en su cara. Los
asiduos tertulianos se saturan de este conjunto; siéntense repletitos
de estómago en el elegante comedor, bien divertidos en el estrado
suntuoso, hartos de música y de danza, y todo de balde y cada día.
¿Cómo, á la luz de tantas satisfacciones, no ha de parecerles
encantadora, ó por lo menos distinguidísima, la persona que se las
procura, con celo y desinterés verdaderamente maternales?
Así nace la fama de esa distinción: pregónanla las bocas de los
tertulianos donde quiera que se baila y se cena de balde, y luego en
corrillos y cafés, y cátala proverbial en todo el pueblo, y á la dama,
autorizada para enmendar la plana á la moda reinante y acreditar
caprichosos aditamentos de su invención, como prendas de gusto
superfino.
Enséñansela en la calle á usted, que no baila, y dícenle los que la
saludan:
—¡Qué señora tan elegante, tan chic... y qué talento tiene!
Ni usted la halla elegante, ni eso que los elegantes llaman chic, no
sé por qué; ni ha visto usted una muestra del ensalzado talento;
pero tanto se lo aseguran, que antes duda usted de la claridad de su
vista y de la solidez de su juicio, que de la razón de la fama.
Al mismo tiempo pasa otra señora, bella á todas luces, elegante sin
trapos raros, y discreta á carta cabal; y usted, que es sincero, dice al
punto á los otros:
—¡Esto es lo que se llama un tipo elegante y distinguido!...
—Cierto que no es enteramente vulgo—le contestan con desdén;—
no es fea, no es tonta... pero le falta, le falta... vamos, le falta...
—¡Qué canario!—digo yo:—lo que le falta es dar un baile cada tres
días y una cena en cada baile, como la otra; pues la mayor parte de
los juicios que hacemos de las cosas, dependen, según afirmó muy
cuerdamente el poeta,