Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Neo-Assyrian
Empire in the Southwest
Imperial Domination and Its Consequences
AVRAHAM FAUST
1
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Contents
List of Figures ix
Acknowledgements xi
1. Introduction 1
2. Before the Empire: The Southern Levant in the Eighth
Century 35
3. ‘Ah, Assyria, the Rod of My Anger’: The Assyrian
Takeover of the Southwest 60
4. Under the Empire: Settlement and Demography in the
Southwestern Periphery of the Assyrian Empire in the
Seventh Century 73
5. Prosperity, Depression, and the Empire: Economic
Developments in the Southwest during the Seventh
Century 116
6. Assyrians in the Southwest? The Evidence for Assyrian
Administration and Presence 139
7. The Empire in the Southwest: Reconstructing Assyrian
Activity in the Provinces 181
8. Local Responses to the Empire: From Armed Resistance to
Integration 214
9. ‘They Make a Desolation and They Call It Peace’:
Re-Examining the Nature of the Imperial Peace 239
10. Empire by Design? Imperial Policies and Planning and
the Conquest of the Southwest 259
11. A Province Too Far? The Assyrian Empire, Its Southwestern
Margins, and the Dynamics of Imperial Expansion,
Conquest, and Rule 282
Bibliography 301
Index of names 347
Index of places 355
Index 362
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List of Figures
1.1 Map of the Southern Levant, with the main the geographical sub-units 7
1.2 Map of the Assyrian Empire, noting ‘the Assyrian triangle’, and
highlighting the extent of the empire in the middle of the eighth
century , and the areas conquered in the second half of this century
(mostly by Tiglath-pileser III) 9
2.1 Map of sites mentioned in Chapter 2 39
2.2 Settlement hierarchy in the kingdoms of Israel and Judah 52
2.3 Socioeconomic stratification in the kingdom of Judah 57
2.4 Socioeconomic stratification in the kingdom of Israel 57
3.1 Schematic map detailing the Assyrian expansion in the Southern Levant 66
3.2 An Assyrian destruction: a photo depicting the destruction in one of
the rooms in building 101 (room 101D), at Tel ‘Eton 68
4.1 Map of sites mentioned in Chapter 4 74
4.2 A comparison of eighth- and seventh-century settlement
hierarchies in the territories of the kingdom of Israel 104
5.1 Schematic map outlining the production zones in the land of Israel
in the seventh century 120
5.2 Schematic chart of the distribution of olive oil surpluses production
centres in time and space (rounded dates) 137
6.1 Map showing the main sites mentioned in the text 142
6.2 Plans of various structures that were interpreted as Assyrian residencies
in the Southern Levant: (a) ʾAyyelet ha-Šahar;
: (b) Hazor, building 3002;
(c) Megiddo, structures 1052, 1369 152
6.3 Plan of Assyrian Megiddo 155
6.4 Photos of the Assyrian palace at Ad Halom, near Ashdod 156
6.5 Plate with Assyrian Palace Wares 160
7.1 Schematic map of the southwestern provinces, indicating areas of actual
Assyrian activity 183
7.2 The wedged-impressed bowls 189
7.3 (left) A general map of the country (with the location of the detailed map
indicated on it); (right) Detailed map of the Apehk-Gezer area 196
10.1 A schematic map describing the advance of the Assyrian army in
the Southern Levant, and the devastation of many regions, especially
those annexed by the empire 265
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Acknowledgements
This book was a long time in the making. My interest in the Assyrian empire
grew out of my work on the Iron Age II, but my first explicit discussion of the
Assyrian policies in the southwest grew from my joint research with Ehud
Weiss on the economy of the 7th century (Faust and Weiss 2005, later
developed into Faust and Weiss 2011). This research was, unintentionally,
initiated in 2002 when we were both carrying out postdoctoral research (on
completely different topics) at Harvard. We began our collaboration in an
attempt to understand the botanical finds at 7th century Ashkelon, but we
quickly realized that the city was embedded within a much larger economic
system and could not be studied in isolation. Understanding the larger econ-
omy of the 7th century exposed a major discrepancy between the common
scholarly perception of the Assyrian involvement in the Southern Levant and
the actual evidence “on the ground”.
My later work on the period of Neo-Babylonian rule in the region, culmin-
ating in the book Judah in the Neo-Babylonian Period: The Archaeology of
Desolation (Faust 2012b) did not directly discuss the period of Assyrian rule,
but it forced me to study this era which served as background to the changes
created by the Babylonian conquests. The more I studied the 7th century data
in the areas annexed by the Neo-Assyrian empire, the more it appeared that
the difference between the policies of the two empires was not as great as they
were often described. Comparing the 6th and the 7th centuries BCE (i.e. the
periods of Neo-Babylonian and Neo-Assyrian control) forced me to see that
the reality in the 7th century, when the region was supposed to have prospered,
was more complex, and while the clients flourished the Assyrian provinces
were devastated. This resulted with a few more articles (such as Faust 2011a;
Faust 2015a, and more).
By that time it was clear to me that the economic and demographic reality
under Neo-Assyrian rule, at least the way I understood it, was very different
from most common interpretations (not all). I summarised some of the data in
a few large articles (such as Faust 2018c; 2018d), and (with Shawn Aster)
organised an international workshop on this topic which resulted with an
edited volume. I realised, however, that a much more detailed and systematic
treatment was needed—a treatment that would not only expand the discussion
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xii
of the evidence from the Southern Levant, but would also put it within the
context of the Neo-Assyrian empire at large and even within a broad study of
ancient empires.
In the summer of 2016 I was granted a Summer Visiting Fellowship at
St. John’s College at the University of Oxford with the explicit aim of begin-
ning a book project on this topic. While staying in Oxford I carried out some
of the basic research for this study, outlined its structure, and wrote the book
proposal which I submitted to Oxford University Press.
While working on the book ever since, most of the research and writing was
carried out during four subsequent academic breaks which I spent abroad. The
first of these was in the Oriental Institute (OI) in the University of Chicago (in
February 2018), and the other three were in Oxford.
I am grateful to St. John’s College for granting me the Fellowship that
initiated the research, to Prof. David Schloen for inviting me to the
University of Chicago, to the OI for providing me with library services and
office space, to Oxford libraries (especially the Sackler and the Bodleian), and
to Bar-Ilan’s libraries.
Thanks are also due to the many colleagues and friends who over the years
discussed many of the issues addressed in this book with me, supplied advice
and references, and helped in other ways, including David Schloen (University
of Chicago), Daniel Master (Wheaton College), Shawn Zelig Aster, Joshua
Schwartz, Zeev Safrai, Ehud Weiss, Eyal Baruch (Bar-Ilan University), Peter
Machinist, Jason Ur, (the late) Larry Stager (Harvard University), Shlomo
Bunimovitz, Zvi Lederman (Tel-Aviv University), Jan Joosten (Oxford
University), Peter Dubovský (Pontifical Bible Institute), Chaim Ben-David,
Hayah Katz (Kinneret College), Baruch Brandl (Israel Antiquities Authority),
Gunnar Lehmann (Ben-Gurion Univeristy), Sandra Jacobs (King’s College
London), and Peter Zilberg (the Hebrew University of Jerusalem). Special
thanks are due to my former students Gilad Itach and Yair Sapir whose
work on related topics are quoted in this book.
I would also like to thank the participants of the workshop “The Assyrian
Period in the Southern Levant”, which took place in Yad Ben-Zvi Institute in
Jerusalem in November 11-12 2005, for their insightful papers and comments
during the meeting.
The book contains a vast amount of information, and not all of it is
published (or, in the least, was not published when it was supplied to me),
and I am very thankful to many colleagues who supplied me with this
information, including Hagit Torge (IAA), Gilad Itach (BIU and IAA), Amit
Shadman (IAA), Ron Tueg (IAA), Zvi Lederman (TAU), Jimmy Hardin
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1
Introduction
Developing from a small core area in what is today northern Iraq, the
Neo-Assyrian empire (tenth–seventh centuries ) was the first large empire
of the ancient world, and some have even defined it as the first world empire
(Bagg 2013; Radner 2015: 1). Its historical importance cannot be overesti-
mated, as it initiated what is sometimes called the ‘Age of Empires’ (Altaweel
and Squitieri 2018), i.e. a sequence of empires that ruled the Near East (and
beyond) in tight succession until the twentieth century. The detailed descrip-
tions of the Assyrian empire and its actions in the Hebrew Bible, followed by
the spectacular discoveries of imperial palaces, royal inscriptions, and other
impressive remains, had captured the public imagination, and resulted in a
large number of studies that were devoted to this empire, its history, and
structure.
The Southern Levant—the lands of the Bible—formed the southwestern
margins of the empire, and both the empire and the region have received a fair
amount of research. Only a few, however, have until recently examined the
empire within a large-scale comparative, or anthropologically oriented per-
spective, perhaps as a result of the strong historical bias of the region’s
archaeology (e.g. Moorey 1991; Bunimovitz 1995; Bunimovitz and Faust
2010; Flannery 1998; Davis 2004). While this is gradually changing (see e.g.
Bagg 2011; MacGinnis et al. 2016; Tyson and Rimmer Herrman 2018; Altaweel
and Squitieri 2018), the potential of the empire to contribute to the study of
empires and imperialism is greatly underutilized.
The Southern Levant, moreover, has a number of advantages for the study
of both Assyrian imperialism, and even empires at large. (i) The availability
of a very large archaeological dataset—probably the largest in the world:
while the area is quite small in geographical terms, hundreds of planned
excavations have been carried out in it over the years, along with thousands
of salvage excavations and detailed surveys. Hundreds of these excavations
revealed remains from the periods discussed in this book, providing scholars
with an unparalleled archaeological dataset. This wealth is augmented by
(ii) a relatively large number of ancient texts that relate to the period under
discussion, unearthed both in the region itself and in Mesopotamia. These
The Neo-Assyrian Empire in the Southwest: Imperial Domination and Its Consequences. Avraham Faust,
Oxford University Press (2021). © Avraham Faust. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198841630.003.0001
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3
Background
Empires have received a great deal of study,¹ and this brief introduction is only
intended to present some of the basic concepts.
The word ‘empire’ is derived from the Latin term imperium, originally
meaning ‘to command, order, power, rule, or sovereignty’. The term, initially
used to describe ‘the powers of rule and conquest granted to a Roman consul’,
developed to denote the relevant territory, even if the nature of the control was
not always clearly defined (Cline and Graham 2011: 3–4; see also Howe
2002: 13).
The literature on empires is vast, and although definitions vary slightly in
emphasis,² most have similar variables. Sinopoli (1994: 159), for example,
noted that ‘Empires are geographically and politically expansive polities,
composed of a diversity of localized communities and ethnic groups.’ Stark
and Chance (2012: 194) offered a similar definition, emphasizing the large size
of empires, and stating that empires are ‘expansionist states that incorporate
diverse societies well beyond immediate neighbors’ (see also Schreiber 1992: 3).
Altaweel (2008: 16) also notes that one of the characteristics of empires is
control over foreign regions and population that were not originally part of it
(also Cline and Graham 2011: 3–7). Howe (2002:15) suggested that ‘Empires,
then, must by definition be big, and they must be composite entities, formed out
of previously separate units. Diversity—ethnic, national, cultural, often
religious—is their essence.’ Howe, however, added that ‘in many observers’
understanding, that cannot be a diversity of equals’. Indeed, many have stressed
that the nature of the interaction is part of the definition of an empire (below).
Sinopoli (1994:160) summarized that many definitions ‘share in common
a view of empire as a territorially expansive and incorporative kind of state,
¹ E.g. Doyle 1986; Sinopoli 1994; Cline and Graham 2011; Alcock et al. 2001; Parsons 2010; Howe
2002; Morris and Scheidel 2009; Smith 2012.
² E.g. Sinopoli 1994: 159–60; Doyle 1986: 12; Liverani 2017: 1; Stark and Chance 2012: 194; Cline
and Graham 2011: 3–7; Howe 2002: 13–15; Altaweel and Squitieri 2018: 4, and more.
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four interacting sources account for the imperial relationship: the metropol-
itan regime, its capacities and interests; the peripheral political society, its
interests and weakness; the transnational system and its needs; and the
international context and the incentives it creates.
In order to understand the nature of imperial dynamics and the forces that
shape them, many scholars adopt Mann’s (1986: 2) view of the sources of
social power, i.e. ideology, economics, the military, and politics (or IEMP) (e.g.
Cline and Graham 2011: 5; Bagg 2013: 121), with different scholars stressing
the importance of different types of power and control according to circum-
stances. Some view economic strategy as the most important one (Berdan and
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5
Smith 1996), while others stresses political control (Altaweel 2008: 16–17), or
the ideological component, i.e. that proper empires use ideology (often in the
form of religion) to justify their expansion and conquest. Sinopoli (1994: 167),
for example, noted that ideology motivates action, especially imperial expan-
sion, and is ‘providing legitimation for and explanations of extant and emer-
ging inequalities’. Indeed, at times it is the appropriate ideology that enables
empires to expand (Liverani 2017: 8), and Howe (2002: 83) noted that ‘The
rulers of every major empire at least since the Romans . . . offered arguments
and justifications for what they did.’ This, of course, applies to the Assyrian
empire (e.g. Howe 2002: 36; Grayson 1995: 966; Liverani 2017).
Empires use their power in different ways and Berdan and Smith (1996), for
example, articulated a number of strategies that the Aztec empire used to
further its interests, including political strategy, economic strategy, frontier
strategy, and elite strategy. These were used to maintain the imperial control
(see also Stark and Chance 2012: 197–9; see also Chapter 10).
While control of the centre over the periphery is an essential part of being
an empire,³ the nature of imperial control, or integration, varies greatly, and
there is a continuum between ‘weakly integrated to more highly centralized
polities’ (Sinopoli 1994: 160). Indeed, empires always employ some combin-
ation of both, direct and indirect control (Howe 2002: 15; also Altaweel 2008:
16). Various scholars use different terms to refer to the degree of integration of
the peripheral areas into the empire, or the level of centralization exercised
over remote territories. Thus, many refer to a more direct control as territorial,
whereas an indirect control is seen as hegemonic (e.g. Luttwak 1976), and
others use ‘formal’ versus ‘informal empire’ in what for our purposes can be
used in a somewhat similar way (Doyle 1986). No matter which ‘binary’
system (as noted, the poles are part of a continuum) we prefer to use, it is
important to stress that different methods of control often operate simultan-
eously in different parts of the empire, and that imperial policies varied across
time and space, in accordance with the different, and changing, circumstances
(e.g. Sinopoli 1994: 163–4; Howe 2002, and see Chapters 10–11). In many
imperial contexts, the areas that were ruled directly by the empire are referred
to as provinces, whereas the territories that were ruled indirectly are viewed as
client or vassal kingdoms.
In most cases, empires initially preferred indirect control, since the con-
quests required to obtain direct control are costly, and necessitate spending
³ Sinopoli 1994:161 noted the influence of the world system perspective on the study of empires
(and see also Chapter 5).
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resources and lives, often leading to major destructions and upheavals that
minimize the production capabilities in the conquered territories. The con-
quest, moreover, requires investing in administration and military in order to
rule these territories. Diplomacy, even gun-boat diplomacy—i.e. the threat of
power—is therefore usually preferred (Sinopoli 1994: 162–3, 167; Luttwak
1976). Conquest or destruction might result from the need to decimate a
powerful enemy (Sinopoli 1994: 162–3), but in most cases the transition to
direct rule was a result of continuous revolts.
7
Figure 1.1 Map of the Southern Levant, with the main the geographical sub-units
Source: After A. Curtis (2009) Oxford Bible Atlas, 4th edn, courtesy of Oxford University Press;
additions made by Charles Wilson).
Since precipitation declines as one moves southward, and combined with the
existence of large fertile valleys in the north, the latter had a much greater
agricultural potential. The fact that the major roads crossed the north, as well
as the latter’s proximity to Tyre, made its economic potential by far greater
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than that of the southern parts, and indeed, throughout history the north was
politically and economically more important than the south.
The latter part of the ninth and first half of the eighth centuries did not see a
significant expansion, and Assyria was (among other things) confronted by
large powers (e.g. Urartu), which sometimes even defeated it and threatened
the loyalty of its clients (Radner 2014: 103–4; for a different view of Adad-
nīrārī III’s rule, see Siddal 2013). The unrest following the defeat of Ashur-
nīrārī V by Urartu led to Tiglath-pileser III (747 ) seizing the throne, and
soon after he embarked on campaigns in all fronts, greatly increasing the
empire’s holdings. As Hunt (2015: 29) noted, in only twenty-two years, ‘the
Neo-Assyrian empire doubled its territorial holdings and sphere of influence’.
Not only did Tiglath-pileser III significantly expanded the empire, but
he also made some substantial administrative changes, aiming to weaken the
power of the governors and to strengthen that of the king. Thus, in addition to
creating new provinces in the conquered territories, he reorganized the older
provinces, replacing them with smaller ones, and hence increasing their
number from twelve to twenty-five (e.g. Radner 2014: 108–9). Similarly, he
divided some of the main military and administrative positions, and two
individuals shared the responsibility, which had been heretofore held by one.
The institution of eunuchs in some positions also supported these efforts, as it
decreased the chances of officials establishing power and passing it to their
sons (Van de Mieroop 2007: 248; see also Perčírková 1987: 173).
This period is regarded as one of expansion (despite the crisis at the time of
Shalmaneser V), lasting until the death of Sargon II in 705 . Most of the
client kingdoms, as well as additional areas, were conquered and turned into
provinces, and this was followed by another phase of consolidation (beginning
after Sennacherib re-established imperial rule). In the period covering mainly
the seventh century, the empire was at the height of its power, and as Parker
(2012: 867) noted, it ‘claimed dominion over almost the entire Middle East,
from the Persian Gulf to the Taurus mountains and from the Zagros moun-
tains to the Mediterranean Sea. For a short period during the 7th century ,
the Assyrians even captured Egypt’ (see also Van de Mieroop 2007: 247). Most
of the conquered areas were turned into provinces, and were regarded as part
of Assyria. The territorial consolidation was accompanied by political changes.
Sennacherib’s great investment in Nineveh, and the massive resettlement of
deportees in this area (Radner 2014: 109; cf. Oded 1979: 28, and see more in
the section ‘The Assyrian Deportation Policy: Causes and Consequences’
below) led to additional changes, as it shifted the distribution of power
between the royal family and court on the one hand, and the officials in the
provinces on the other. This strategy was continued by Sennacherib’s succes-
sors. Essarhadon twice ordered mass executions of state officials, and the fact
that during the reign of Assurbanipal (and onwards) courtiers and palace
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Phases 1–2, as well as 7, are not of concern here, and will be rarely mentioned.
The earlier phases of Assyrian expansion and rule (phases 3–4) will be
addressed in various parts of the book, mainly for comparative purposes, but
the book mainly focuses on phases 5 and 6.
At its peak, the empire was an enormous polity, controlling areas from
modern Iran to the Mediterranean, and from the Zagros to the Persian Gulf,
the Arabian desert, and Egypt.
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Most of this area was divided into provinces and was ruled by Assyrian
governors. Economically, this area paid taxes.⁴ On its edges were some semi-
independent client states, buffering Assyria from the areas beyond it, paying
tribute to the empire and, nominally at least, subordinated to it (e.g. Grayson
1995: 964; Postgate 1992; Van de Mieroop 2007: 248–50; see also Bagg 2013:
125). Similar phenomena are known from the fringes of many empires, and in
the ‘Background’ section we referred to the distinction between areas of direct
and indirect control, or between territorial and hegemonic empires. Most
empires preferred indirect control, which although a less effective form of
exploitation, was much cheaper, and did not require much investment (see
also Akkermans and Schwartz 2003: 378). The Assyrian empire was no
exception. Grayson (1995: 964) noted that ‘the Assyrians preferred to receive
without actually conquering’, adding that the empire ‘preferred to gain control
over a foreign territory through diplomatic means’. This, however, was actu-
ally ‘gunboat diplomacy’ (Grayson 1995: 964), and the Assyrians used ‘psy-
chological warfare to make the enemy submit without a fight’ (Grayson 1995:
960). According to Parker (2012: 871), ‘Vassalage was compromise between
degree of control and cost’, and Bagg (2013: 11) noted that as long as the
clients did not revolt, the system was very efficient. If it failed, however, then
the empire waged war, leading to massive destruction (Grayson 1995: 961; also
Van de Mieroop 2007: 250). Reasons for such conquests include mainly what
the Assyrians considered disloyalty or rebellions, and this is seen also in the
southwest, for example by the final annexation of the kingdom of Israel
(Samaria).
The area directly controlled by the Assyrians was apparently also not treated
uniformly. Liverani (1988: 85) noted that there wasn’t necessarily any physical
continuity between the different zones of direct and indirect control, and the
empire was composed of ‘islands’ or ‘outposts’, adding (p. 86) that ‘the empire
is not a spread of land but a network of communications over which material
goods are carried’. This was supported by Parker (2012: 875), who stressed
that, in contrast to the impression one might get from maps or verbal
description in modern scholarly works, the empire was not ‘made up of a
contiguous stretches of land’, and that much of the empire was made of a
‘patchwork’ of territories annexed to Assyria (provinces), client states, and
buffer states.
⁴ We follow the common, even if schematic, distinction between taxes, paid by people within a
polity on a regular basis, and tributes, paid by ‘foreign’ rulers (cf. Smith 2014; see also Bedford 2009:
35–6).
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13
The above distinction between direct and indirect control fits nicely with
Assyria’s treatment of its empire. The term māt Aššur (‘the Land of Assur’)
refers to the areas officially annexed by Assyria (sometimes called ‘Assyria
proper’) (Hunt 2015: 20–2; Van de Mieroop 2007: 242–4). It was apparently
coined in the Middle Assyrian period, initially denoting the ‘Assyrian triangle’
(Postgate 1992: 252; see also Radner 2014: 102). Following the conquests of the
thirteenth century (phase 1 in ‘The Neo-Assyrian Empire: Brief Summary of
Its Development and Basic Periodization’ above), the term was expanded to
incorporate also the Habur region. From this time onward, however, this was
the term used to designate Assyria. Thus, ‘Territories freshly added to Assyria,
or reclaimed, are said to be “turned into” or “returned to the land of Assur”’
(Postgate 1992: 252). Māt Aššur, therefore, included the Assyrian core (some-
times called the home provinces or the heartland of Assyria) and all the
territories that were later annexed. They were all officially the Land of Assur,
and their inhabitants became Assyrians. Thus, ‘to the land of Assur I added
land, to its people I added people’ (Postgate 1992: 252; see also Radner 2015:
108; Liverani 2017: 207–8). Still, this ‘citizenship’ involved only ‘fiscal subjec-
tion’ (Liverani 2017: 187).
The mere usage of the name ‘Assur’ for this purpose reflects the importance
of Assur (the god) in Assyrian imperial ideology. Unlike other gods, Assur had
only one temple, in Assur, underlining his significance as personification of
the city and later state of Assur. Their incorporation within the land of Assur is
symbolized by the fact that all provinces brought offerings to the temple, and
all the annexed regions were forced to submit to the national god, Assur,
although they did not have to abandon their own gods (Postgate 1992: 252–3;
see also Van de Mieroop 2007: 243).
The Yoke of Assur refers to the areas that were subjugated by Assyria, but
not formally annexed, or in other words, to the client kingdoms. These regions
were regarded as independent, and the local ruler, even if only a puppet placed
by the Assyrian empire, was regarded as a king of his country, and the
Assyrians interacted with him concerning his kingdom. Postgate (1992: 255)
noted that the relations between the clients and the Assyrian kings were
underlined by oaths, witnessed by Assur and the local gods, and their breach,
therefore, constituted a major sin against Assur, and justified punishment by
the Assyrian king. Such a breach could cause the empire to conquer the
kingdom and annex it. Still, until this happened the Assyrians were not
interested in the internal affairs of the client kingdoms, and they were not
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viewed as the land of Assur (Postgate 1992: 255; see also Hunt 2015: 22–4; Van
de Mieroop 2007: 242–4). Accordingly, these regions were treated differently.
They did not have Assyrian governors, nor did they usually bring offerings to
the temple of Assur (Postgate 1992: 255). Rather, at least since the time of
Tiglath-pileser I, the client states—those who bore the yoke of Assur—were
expected to pay an annual tribute. Since this was not the Land of Assur, this
was paid to the king, and not to Assur’s temple (Postgate 1992: 253–5).
The provinces provided taxes, mainly the corn and straw tax, some of which
remained in the provinces and supplied the army, and other parts of which
were shipped (when possible), to the Assyrian heartland. The clients provided
tribute, mostly in metals, luxury goods, Horses, and exotic items (Postgate
1992: 254; see also Grayson 1995: 962; Postgate 1974: 189; Eph’al 2010: 55–60).
The taxes and tribute were paid annually (Grayson 1995: 96). A third form of
income came from duties from trade. In theory, this could be taken from both
provinces and client kingdoms, but Radner (2007: 225) claims that governors
did not pay this tax (although there might have been exceptions). Corvée
labour, too, was provided by both provinces and clients.
Some kingdoms were left independent, and in practice served as a buffer
area between the Assyrian empire and its enemies. Parker (2012: 871) believes
that this was done on purpose. However, since an independent kingdom has
no advantages in terms of ‘buffering’ over a client state, it is possible that
kingdoms retained such status only when the Assyrian empire was not
effectively able to turn them into full clients.
Assyria’s success was not only a result of its military capability to conquer new
territories, but also of its ability to administer them (Parker 2012: 867). This
was the responsibility of the empire’s administrators. In contrast to some other
administrative systems in the ancient Near East, however, it appears that the
Assyrian administration was quite thin and not very fixed, and the way it
functioned remained ‘obscure’ (Postgate 2007: 331; see also Postgate 2016;
Hunt 2015: 29). Neo-Assyrian administration appeared not to have been
bureaucratic, and therefore did not leave much in the way of remains (see
also Hunt 2015: 29; Ponchia 2012: 213). Postgate (2007: 331) called it ‘invisible
hierarchy’, and Grayson (1995: 963) noted that ‘the chain of command was not
entirely consistent’.
While certain aspects of Assyrian administration are quite illusive, some
observations, pertaining to both its development and function, can be made.
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