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1
 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

THE ECONOMY OF CAMEROON

2
 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

THE ECONOMY OF CAMEROON

Edited by
CÉLESTIN MONGA

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 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
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ISBN 978–0–19–284852–9
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DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192848529.001.0001
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 CONTENTS

List of Contributors

Introduction: The Economics and Poetics of Sorrow

CÉLESTIN MONGA

PART I CONTEXT, LEGACIES, AND MINDSETS

1. The Cameroon Economy: Historical Overview
JOHN MUKUM MBAKU
2. Cameroon as Part of Central Africa’s Political Economy
ANDREAS MEHLER
3. The Interplay Between Colonial History and Postcolonial Institutions: Evidence from Cameroon
MARIE CHRISTELLE MABEU AND ROLAND PONGOU
4. The Political Economy of Ethnicity
CÉLESTIN MONGA
5. The Political Economy of Reform Consensus (or Lack thereof) in Cameroon
CONSTANT LONKENG
6. The Homo Economicus in Cameroon: A View from Below
AMBROISE KOM
7. Untold Perspectives about Cameroon’s Economy
FABIEN NKOT

PART II ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND STRUCTURAL

TRANSFORMATION
8. Monetary and Multidimensional Poverty in Cameroon: Measurements, Determinants, and Policy
Implications
FRANCIS ANDRIANARISON, BOUBA HOUSSEINI, AND CHRISTIAN OLDIGES
9. Cameroon’s Economic Assets and Production: Documenting and Analyzing a Mismatch
FULBERT TCHANA TCHANA
10. The Economics of Infrastructure in Cameroon: State, Challenges, and Policy Reforms
THÉOPHILE BOUGNA AND PAUL NOUMBA UM
11. Structural Transformation and Productivity Growth in Cameroon
DÉSIRÉ AVOM AND YSELLE FLORA MALAH KUETE
12. Economic Diversification in Cameroon: A Trade—DSM analysis
JEAN-MARC M. KILOLO, MARTIN CAMERON, ANTONIO PEDRO, AND JEAN-LUC N.
MASTAKI
13. Cameroon: Trade Costs, Trade Facilitation, and Regional Integration
ZAKARIA SORGHO
14. The Political Economy of Contemporary Youth in Cameroon
PARFAIT ELOUNDOU-ENYEGUE, SARAH C. GIROUX, AND MICHEL TENIKUE
15. Cameroon’s Labor Market Dynamics and Prospects
BOUBA HOUSSEINI AND BRAHIM BOUDARBAT

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 16. Cameroon’s Informal Labor Market
EBENEZER LEMVEN WIRBA, FIENNASAH ANNIF’ AKEM, AND FRANCIS MENJO BAYE
17. Drivers of Earnings Inequalities in Urban Cameroon
CHRISTIAN ZAMO-AKONO AND SIMON ALAIN SONG-NTAMACK
18. Education: The Hypothesis of Negative Returns
BERNADETTE DIA KAMGNIA AND CYRILLE BERGALY KAMDEM
19. Early Human Capital Accumulation and Decentralization
GUY TCHUENTE
20. Comments on Decentralization in Cameroon
ROGER B. MYERSON
21. Determinants of the Performance of the Education System: The Role of Institutions
ISSIDOR NOUMBA
22. Health Outcomes and Health Care Financing in Cameroon
AUGUSTIN NTEMBE
23. Economic Evaluations of Health Financing Programs
ERIC TCHOUAKET NGUEMELEU, STEPHANIE ROBINS, EMILIE BÉLANGER, DRISSA SIA,
AND ISIDORE SIELEUNOU
24. Agriculture Transformation
MARTIN FREGENE AND GRACIA KAHASHA

PART III MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONAL

PRACTICES
25. Fiscal Policy Effectiveness through the Lenses Useful of Government Consumption
JOHN NANA FRANCOIS AND ANDREA MATA
26. Fiscal Decentralization, Entrepreneurship, and Firm Productivity in Cameroon
THÉOPHILE BOUGNA AND PIERRE NGUIMKEU
27. Public Debt: Beyond Accounting
CÉLESTIN MONGA
28. Withholding Trust: Business Taxpayers and the Value-Added Tax in Cameroon
JOSÉ-MARÍA MUÑOZ
29. The CFA Franc: The Financial Sector and Economic Growth in CEMAC
ALOYSIUS AJAB AMIN
30. The Monetary and Financial Sector in Cameroon: Structure, Performance, and Vulnerabilities
JACQUES LANDRY BIKAI, GUY ALBERT KENKOUO, PATRICK-NELSON DANIEL
ESSIANE, AND MOUSTAPHA MBOHOU MAMA
31. Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Cameroon
REGINA NSANG TAWAH
32. Female Entrepreneurship in Africa: Characteristics and Determinants in Cameroon
AHMADOU ALY MBAYE, FATOU GUEYE, AND NANCY BENJAMIN
33. Models of Governance in Cameroon’s Public Administration
VIVIANE ONDOUA BIWOLÉ

PART IV LOOKING FORWARD

34. The Economy of Corruption in Cameroonian’s Cartoons
CHRISTELLE AMINA DJOULDÉ

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35. The Analytics of Natural Resource Management
ERIC BAHEL, OCTAVE KEUTIBEN, AND DIDIER TATOUTCHOUP
36. Testing the Dynamic Efficiency of Extraction of Nonrenewable Resources
FRANCIS DIDIER TATOUTCHOUP, OCTAVE KEUTIBEN, AND ERIC BAHEL
37. Oil Revenue Management: Cameroon’s Experience
OCTAVE KEUTIBEN, DIDIER TATOUTCHOUP, AND ERIC BAHEL
38. Comparing Nonrenewable Resources Stocks and Capital Goods
JOHNSON KAKEU
39. Electricity Supply and Manufacturing Exports
ISMAILA AMADU AND EPO BONIFACE NGAH
40. A Blueprint for Employment Creation
CÉLESTIN MONGA
41. The Economics of Migration and Remittances: New Opportunities
NADEGE D. YAMEOGO
42. Artificial Intelligence and Big Data Analytics in Cameroon: Challenges, Benefits, and Potential
Applications
SAMUEL FOSSO WAMBA AND MACIEL M. QUEIROZ
43. The Economy of Humanitarianism
CILAS KEMEDJIO
44. When Kamerun Will Awaken…
DANIEL ETOUNGA-MANGUELLE

Index

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 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Aloysius Ajab Amin, Clayton State University

Ismaila Amadu, Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation
Francis Andrianarison, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Fiennasah Annif’ Akem, University of Dschang
Désiré Avom, University of Yaoundé 2
Eric Bahel, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Émilie Belanger, University of Québec
Nancy Benjamin, University of Cape Town
Cyrille Bergaly Kamdem, University of Yaoundé 2
Epo Boniface Ngah, University of Yaoundé 2
Brahim Boudarbat, University of Montreal
Théophile Bougna, World Bank
Martin Cameron, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
Bernadette Dia Kamgnia, CIRES, University of Abidjan
Christelle Amina Djoulde, University of Ngaoundere
Parfait Eloundou-Enyegue, Cornell University
Patrick-Nelson Daniel Essiane, Bank of Central African States (BEAC)
Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, University of Yaoundé 1
Martin Fregene, African Development Bank
Sarah C. Giroux, Cornell University
Fatou Gueye, Cheikh Anta Diop University
Bouba Housseini, International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
Gracia Kahasha, African Development Bank
Johnson Kakeu, University of Prince Edward Island
Cilas Kemedjio, University of Rochester
Guy Albert Kenkouo, Bank of Central African States (BEAC)
Octave Keutiben, University of Moncton
Jean-Marc M. Kilolo, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
Ambroise Kom, College of the Holy Cross
Jacques Landry Bikai, Bank of Central African States (BEAC)
Ebenezer Lemven Wirba, University of Bamenda
Constant Lonkeng, International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Marie Christelle Mabeu, Stanford University

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Yselle Malah Kuete, University of Yaoundé 2
Jean-Luc N. Mastaki, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
Andrea Mata, World Bank
Ahmadou Aly Mbaye, Cheikh Anta Diop University
Moustapha Mbohou Mama, International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Andreas Mehler, University of Freiburg
Francis Menjo Baye, University of Yaoundé 2
Célestin Monga, Harvard University
John Mukum Mbaku, Weber State University
José-María Muñoz, University of Edinburgh
Roger B. Myerson, University of Chicago
John Nana Francois, World Bank
Pierre Nguimkeu, Georgia State University
Fabien Nkot, University of Yaoundé 2
Issidor Noumba, University of Yaoundé 2
Paul Noumba Um, World Bank
Augustin Ntembe, Bowie State University
Christian Oldiges, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Viviane Ondoua Biwolé, University of Yaoundé 2
Antonio Pedro, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
Roland Pongou, University of Ottawa
Maciel M. Queiroz, Paulista University—UNIP
Stephanie Robins, University of Québec
Drissa Sia, University of Québec
Isidore Sieleunou, Research for Development International
Simon Alain Song-Ntamack, University of Yaoundé 2
Zakaria Sorgho, FERDI and University of Laval
Didier Tatoutchoup, University of Moncton
Regina Tawah, Bowie State University
Fulbert Tchana Tchana, World Bank
Eric Tchouaket Nguemeleu, University of Québec
Guy Tchuente, University of Kent
Michel Tenikue, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research
Samuel Fosso Wamba, Toulouse Business School
Nadege D. Yameogo, World Bank
Christian Zamo-Akono, University of Yaoundé 2

9
 INTRODUCTION
The Economics and Poetics of Sorrow

CÉLESTIN MONGA

Cameroon? Rumor has it that the word “Cameroon” is valid only when the national football team, the
famed Indomitable Lions, bursts into a stadium, makes the turf tremble, and sends the stands into
apoplectic fits by the mere force of their arrogance. “Cameroon” would then exist only occasionally, when
eleven men in green jerseys, red shorts and yellow stockings run like fools after a round ball, go wild in
sliding tackles, chest traps, scissors moves, outside foot controls, curling inside foot shots, or downward
headers into the penalty area. “Cameroon” would thus have—provisional—meaning only when these crazy
athletes bustle about and get out of breath under the—often alcoholic—yells of the crowd and the
voyeuristic lenses of the cameras.
A variant of the same argument, expressed with the necessary philosophical emphasis to give it some
semblance of elegance, stresses particularly the random character of the historical accident that this
country was—like almost all African States for that matter. This other argument mentions the fortuitous
nature of the genesis of this geographic triangle with long uncertain borders that are still questioned today
by certain anglophone citizens who feel suppressed in the corset of a tropicalized French-speaking world.
In short, for some people, since “Cameroon” is recognized on the large map of nations only by its football
team or its bad reputation of being another of the last vestiges of Franco–British colonial fantasies, it
should be systematically surrounded by quotation marks, or simply amalgamated into this single,
indivisible Africa that serves as an ideological junk cupboard for some, and a political business for others.
However negative it may be, there is a legitimate side to this rumor. After all, like most of the present
African States, “Cameroon” was hastily drawn up by French and English colonists, probably after a night
of negotiations and orgies, this in the framework of a political theatre known as the Conference of Berlin
(1884–1885). An entity so arbitrarily drawn up and carved out would thus merit only the furtive episodes
of recognition offered by the fleeting excitement of sports competitions.
The contributors to this Handbook have not let themselves be intimidated by the strength of this rumor
or the weight of these prejudices. With admirable abandon that does not, however, contain the slightest bit
of naïveté, they sovereignly decided to present economic knowledge and images of their “Cameroon.” In
so doing, they ignored the quotation marks that some would like to inflict upon this country which always
proclaims its desire to be a nation. In a varied thematic register, the authors of this work cast light on the
context, the contours and mechanisms of the Cameroonian economy, the processes of socialization of the
economic agent in this country and the emergence of new rituals of thought, action, and deviance. Finally,
they offer elements of a response to the well-known problem of historical causality and obliquely outline a
grammar of sorrow and melancholy.

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 I.1 CAMEROON WITHOUT QUOTATION MARKS

The matter of the validity of the territory studied remains, however. What is the legitimacy of an economic
work on Cameroon in this Africa that officially consists of fifty-five States arbitrarily drawn by the
colonizers? Must we accept the very idea of this “Cameroon” bequeathed to us by yesterday’s oppressors?
Must we be satisfied with the geographical and above all psychological borders that the European colonists
bequeathed to us and that we interiorize like infallible prescriptions? Should we, on the contrary, begin by
questioning the legitimacy of the term “Cameroon” and its validity, especially in the context of the great
number of identity and political frustrations that feed demands of all sorts? Should we redefine the concept
of the nation-State in Africa, reinvent the territory it refers to, and satisfy, for example, the broken dreams
of Kwame Nkrumah? Or rather deplore the nativist risk hiding behind the vision of a world of
nation-States presented implicitly as sealed-off entities developing in isolation and whose communities and
socioeconomic groups sometimes live side by side in an atmosphere of rancor and suspicion?
These questions do not arise only in Africa. In a January 1995 speech to the European Parliament that
has remained famous, the former head of the French State François Mitterrand received a standing ovation
when he cried out: “Nationalism is war!” Admittedly, Europe was at the time moaning under the battering
of the ethnic wars that had torn ex-Yugoslavia apart. It was easy in such a context to refer to the skeptical
sally of the metaphysically Stateless Emil Cioran for whom “the homeland is a camp in the desert.” Yes, of
course, nationalism is at times the breeding ground of nativism because, in some forms, it constantly needs
an enemy to validate itself; this despite the arbitrariness of the delineation, the forms of organization, the
cultural sediments that found the nation, and the fact that it is always the product of the fortuity of the
historical adventure.
Today, under the cover of a certain legalism, international law provides a normative approach inspired
by the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, positing “objective” criteria to fulfill in order to be considered
a nation: territory, sovereignty of a State, language, religion, culture, history, etc. The promoters of this
mechanical and superficial legalism omit mentioning that their model nations would themselves never
have passed that test: the borders of France in 1789 were not at all natural, no more than those of the
United States in 1776 or of Belgium in 1830. As for the supposed sociological or cultural homogeneity of
current America, it would provoke smiles if it were compared to that of Rwanda, Mali, or Cameroon. Italy
is populated by Gauls, Etruscans, Greeks, and many other peoples. Great Britain is Celtic and Germanic,
among other things. France too is Celtic, Germanic, Iberian, Arab, Jewish, and even Sahelian … These
unstable mixtures do not prevent those countries from proclaiming that they are nations—a label that it is
handy to refuse to Cameroon or Guinea.
It is advisable to take seriously Ernest Renan’s observation, according to which “the essence of a nation
is that all of its individual members have a great deal in common, and also that they have all forgotten
many things.” The contributors to this Handbook implicitly accept this “subjective” and modest approach
to the nation. They have no need to put into quotation marks the idea of the Cameroon that is concerned in
the present work because the nation is here considered in its most immaterial sense. “A nation is a soul, a
spiritual principle,” said Renan (1992). “The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of
efforts, sacrifices and devotions.” This is the stoical and generous conception adopted by the authors of
this book. Thus Cameroon appears here as the result of a fermentation process that led to the acceptance of
a common destiny. Neither exclusive nor arrogant, that Cameroon is the sum of the common memories of
the peoples who compose it, the symbol of the mutual consents, the reflection of the desire to live together
and to take on a rich intellectual and spiritual heritage for which entire generations of men and women
from all regions of the country sacrificed themselves. This collection is therefore, above all, the epic and
analytic chronicle of a long journey and an invitation to the knowledge and discovery of a Cameroonian
imaginary whose texture is constantly changing.

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 I.2 CAMEROON’S ECONOMIC EXPERIENCE: MEANING AND RELEVANCE

Cameroon was the first of the African territories under French colonial rule to regain independence in
1960. Yet, its history as a sovereign nation has been so far one of economic underperformance. It is also
one of paradoxes, missed opportunities, erroneous strategies and policies, but ultimately, resilience.
Cameroon’s economic experience sheds light on broader issues of Africa’s economic narrative and
provides valuable development economics knowledge. It deserves scrutiny.
Cameroon is classified as a lower-middle-income country by the World Bank. Located along the
Atlantic Ocean, it shares its borders with Chad, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
and Nigeria. Two of its border regions with Nigeria (northwest and southwest) are Anglophone, while the
remaining eight are Francophone. Cameroon is endowed with talented people, rich natural resources,
including oil and gas, minerals, high-value species of timber, and agricultural products, such as coffee,
cotton, cocoa, maize, and cassava. While Cameroon’s informal economy is quite diverse and resilient, and
rooted in old business traditions, its formal economy has exhibited low productivity and employment
growth over much of the past 60 years.
Cameroon’s growth rates climbed in the two decades following independence, as public policies initially
focused on expansion of educational facilities, diversification of farm production, industrialization, and
rural development. Yet that growth was largely fueled by export of raw materials to the production centers
of Europe. The commodity price boom supported Africa’s rapid growth. In the 1970s and 1980s, oil made
a significant contribution, as did higher prices for metals and agricultural products. But domestic
manufacturing, which has been central to those countries which earlier achieved sustainable growth,
lagged as a contributor of growth.
In the mid-1980s, economic mismanagement, coupled with the drop in price of important export
commodities—particularly cocoa, coffee, and oil—forced Cameroon into a lengthy recession.
Unsustainable budget deficits compelled the authorities to resort to external borrowing and to seek support
from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in the form of various forms of macroeconomic
stabilization and structural adjustment programs.
Cameroon’s economy continues to depend heavily on the sale of its commodities on the world market,
and fluctuations in the global prices of its primary goods—petroleum and cocoa—have led to a decline in
terms of trade and have made its economic situation fragile; with a currency pegged to a strong French
franc and subsequently a strong euro within a French–African monetary union (the Franc Zone), the
Cameroonian economy experienced appreciation of its real exchange rate and lost external
competitiveness; with fewer profitable investment opportunities, the country also experienced capital flight
and high unemployment and underemployment. Corruption, a persistent problem, also hampered economic
development. In much of the past three decades, more reliance on private enterprise and free trade became
the dominant trends but has yielded disappointing results—especially in the context of rapid demographic
growth.
While Cameroon has many of the inputs and markets that would support the rise of a large
manufacturing sector, the country has a small industrial footprint and arguably saw a degree of
deindustrialization in the commodity boom of the mid-2000s—a continuation of deindustrialization trends
that have been in place since the structural adjustment programs. The basic structure of the economy, as
measured by sectoral contributions to GDP, has changed little in the past 60 years. The main question is
whether Cameroon’s growth model will yield enough decent employment to meet the needs of its young
and educated workforce.
For several years, Cameroon was ranked on perception surveys (most notably by Transparency
International) as the most corrupt country in the world. Poor governance has indeed stifled the country’s
economic development—though it is important to define governance in much broader terms than
corruption, State capture, and even dishonest practices by government officials: honest economic policy
mistakes can be even costlier than narrowly defined corruption and State capture. This is particularly the
case in countries like Cameroon where the economic costs of political sclerosis have been high (the same
political party and two individuals have been in power for six decades). The country’s history has also

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 been marked by sustained social unrest (since 1990), separatist armed rebellion and military conflicts in
the two English-speaking regions (since 2016), and insecurity due to jihadist terrorism in the northern
regions (since 2009).
The absence of structural transformation is especially evident in the labor market. Economic growth in
recent years has taken place in capital- and skills-intensive sectors, creating few jobs. Traditional
agriculture still employs most of the workforce. Only 5% of new entrants to the labor market work in the
formal and modern sectors. Formal employment has grown too slowly to absorb the influx of young and
educated workers, particularly in urban areas. The household enterprise sector is Cameroon’s fastest
growing employment source. Cameroon’s growth pattern needs to be more pro-poor, with consumption
growing faster for lower income segments of the population.
Manufacturing matters, and especially so because Cameroon, like all African countries, must create a
large number of new jobs to meet the needs of its young people and the growing pressures of urbanization.
And it has to create higher quality jobs that can raise incomes on a large scale—especially in the regions
currently marred by violent conflicts. Manufacturing is central to any sustainable job creation effort. It
creates jobs directly, and of generally good quality employment. It generates more jobs in supplier
industries, from mineral processing to services. And its labor force supports still more jobs in agriculture,
retail, production of consumer goods, and infrastructure. Manufacturing generally has a positive impact on
foreign exchange earnings and the balance of payments, both increasing export earnings and reducing the
import bill.
Recent economic history has shown that it is still possible for countries at low-income levels, such as
Cameroon, to achieve substantial growth in manufacturing, despite the rise of automation. Many of the
success stories occurred in Asia, from Japan’s early lead to Korea’s development as an industrial economy,
and today with the rise of China as the factory of the world. But successes can also be found on a smaller
scale for specific industries on the African continent, in countries as diverse as Mauritius, Ethiopia,
Morocco, South Africa, or Tunisia. What these examples point to is the return of industrial policy as a
valid focus of public policy. But modern industrial policy is not just concerned with expanding the
traditional industrial sector. It includes a wide range of activities, from sustainable transformation in
agriculture to tradable services.
Modern economic growth is a process of continuous technological innovation, industrial upgrading, and
economic diversification. No country in the world has been able to move from low- to middle- and
high-income status without undergoing the process of industrialization. Structural transformation is always
taking place because of changes in technology, in comparative advantage, and in the global economy.
There is a need for some guiding principles on how “best” Cameroon and other developing nations should
move human, capital, and financial resources from low- to high-productivity sectors. For the process to be
efficient, coordination and externality issues must be addressed. Markets typically do not manage such
structural transformations well on their own.
Moreover, most increases in per capita income arise from advances in technology—about 70% of
growth comes from sources other than factor accumulation. In developing countries, a substantial part of
growth arises from closing the technology (or knowledge) gap between themselves and those at the
frontier. And within any country (especially one like Cameroon), there is enormous scope for productivity
improvement simply by closing the gap between best practices and average practices. If improvements in
standards of living mainly come from a diffusion of knowledge, learning strategies must be at the heart of
the development strategies.
These elements of an emerging intellectual consensus provide further justification for studying how
economics should apply in developing country contexts such as Cameroon’s—well beyond the traditional
theoretical discussion of market failures based on coordination and conventional externalities. This new
theoretical perspective focuses on the reasons why markets, by themselves, are not likely to produce
sufficient growth enhancing investments, such as those associated with learning, knowledge accumulation,
and research.
However, the issues of diffusion of learning throughout society to equip and empower all private agents
have received little attention, in marked contrast to those of resource allocation. Indeed, much of the focus
has been on narrow conceptions of industrial policy and its suspicious connotation of “picking winners”
and generating private rents without social rewards. Externalities in learning and discovery support an

13
 infant economy argument for government intervention that is far more robust than the conventional infant
industry argument.
The consensus among economists and policymakers has grown wider on the need for governments to
focus on promoting learning, infant industries and economies, exports, and the private sector, not only in
manufacturing but also agriculture and services such as, health, information technology, or finance.
Industrial policy is therefore not just about manufacturing. Tackling all these questions in the context of
Cameroon provides useful knowledge and—hopefully—sparks new research on the fundamental dynamics
of economic development.
This Handbook examines the reasons for Cameroon’s unsatisfactory economic performance and draws
lessons from successful development experience to help tackle these issues. Through Cameroon’s
economic story, the Handbook discusses the evolving conceptions of economic policy, takes stock of
intellectual progress, documents the challenges of implementation, and outlines the remaining intellectual
and policy agenda. The Handbook also provides a critical assessment of the history, patterns, and strategies
of economic development in Cameroon, and outlines new approaches to economic inquiry for prosperity
and social change. It is therefore intended to be a contribution in the body of ongoing analytical work that
focuses on and Africa’s economic development strategies in the global economy.

I.3 UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMY OF CAMEROON—AND

CONTRIBUTING TO KNOWLEDGE

Various strands of growth research since World War II have yielded some insights on the type of strategies
and policies that a country like Cameroon should implement in its quest for economic prosperity: on the
theoretical front, the analysis of endogenous technical innovation and increasing returns to scale has led to
a general framework for capturing the broad picture and the mechanics of economic growth; on the
empirical side, cross-country regressions highlight systematic differences between high-growth and
low-growth countries with regard to initial conditions (such as productivity levels, human capital,
demographic features, infrastructure, financial development, and inequality), institutional variables (such
as rule of law, protection of property rights, and governance indicators), and policy variables (such as
macroeconomic stability, financial regulation, or trade openness).
Yet, it has proven much harder for developing countries to achieve convergence with high-income
countries. Even the often-celebrated success stories of Asia only represent a handful of economies that
have moved from low- to high-income status during the past decades. As noted by Lin (2012), “between
1950 and 2008, only 28 economies in the world—and only 12 non-Western economies—were able to
narrow their per capita income gap with the United States by 10 percentage points or more. Meanwhile,
more than 150 countries have been trapped in low- or middle-income status. Narrowing the gap with
industrialized high-income countries continues to be the world’s main development challenge.”
Some unavoidable questions arise: what is the economic power of history? How does the political
economy of memory play out in country contexts with multiple colonial legacies and randomly set
boundaries? Such questions have not been studied systematically and empirically in the economic
literature on Cameroon. Most studies of African economies explain the continent’s poor growth and
development performance as resulting from markets or national government interventions.
Part I on the“Context, Legacies, and Mindsets” of the Handbook reexamines such claims and revisits
the arguments that the organization of pre-colonial States affects long-run prosperity. As a territory
subjugated by Germany, France, and Great Britain, Cameroon is a good laboratory for exploring and
testing some of these theories: the intellectual benefits of studying the long-term impacts of Cameroon’s
colonial history and its interplay with postcolonial institutions go well beyond a handbook on Cameroon.
Mbaku’s opening chapter 1 on “The Cameroon Economy: A Historical Overview” surveys Cameroon’s
modern history, its institutional and cultural landscape, and sets the stage for such analyses. His chronicle
of the changing economic priorities during colonial times helps understand the economic dynamics
observed in Cameroon for more than a century. It starts with European colonialism—German, British, and
French—which brought various ethnolinguistic groups together to form what is now Cameroon, and
introduced the people to Western forms of capitalism and their associated institutions (e.g., private

14
 ownership of the means of production). Second, Christianity and Christian missions, which significantly
affected the people’s worldview, forced a restructuring of family relations, and paved the way for more
intergroup interaction and cooperation, are explored.
Mehler’s chapter 2 on “Cameroon as Part of Central Africa’s Political Economy” outlines a short history
of political developments in Cameroon since independence from a subregional perspective. Cameroon’s
violent history had an impact on its neighbors just as those neighbors had a, generally overlooked, impact
on Cameroon. Contagion via transnational networks and their dynamics is highly relevant. This
contribution also looks into the subregional status of dysfunctional institutions and the absence of checks
and balances in overly presidential, personalized, and undemocratic political systems. Autocratic regimes
and coup-makers clearly learned from each other. In fact, the wave of democratization of the 1990s all
over the continent did not produce tangible results in Central Africa, despite intense (but short-lived) street
mobilization to achieve political rights and civil liberties. Both the impact of a former colonizer (France)
and the relative dysfunctionality of subregional organizations (above all, the Economic Community of
Central African States (CEMAC)) were additional factors slowing down necessary political and economic
reforms: Ordinary Cameroonian citizens (just as citizens of the entire subregion) saw their objective
interests relegated behind the selfish interests of ruling families.
In their chapter 3, “The Interplay Between Colonial History and Postcolonial Institutions: Evidence
from Cameroon,” Mabeu and Pongou exploit both the arbitrary division of the German Colony of
Kamerun between France and Britain after World War I and the 1961 reunification of British Southern
Cameroons and the French-speaking République du Cameroun. Comparing individuals from the same
ethnic homeland, but living on either side of the British–French border within Cameroon, they find that
individuals on the British side had higher educational attainment before the reunification. However, that
this initial advantage was partially erased by post-reunification governance. Despite achieving higher
educational attainment overall, individuals on the British side have worse employment outcomes and
roughly similar infant mortality rates. Mabeu and Pongou provide further evidence of the interaction
between colonial origins and postcolonial institutions by analyzing how the outcomes of individuals in the
former Southern Cameroons differ from their hypothetical outcomes, had they instead opted to join Nigeria
in the 1961 plebiscite. They find that the people of Southern Cameroons have lower educational
attainment, higher infant mortality rates, and worse employment outcomes relative to their “co-ethnics”
living on the Nigerian side of the border between the former Southern Cameroons and Nigeria.
Picking up from where Mbaku and Mabeu-Pondou left off, Monga’s chapter 4 on “The Political
Economy of Ethnicity” examines the question of ethnicity and the economy of belonging. It deconstructs
the ethnic categorizations in Cameroon and emphasizes their contradictions and their arbitrary character. It
also discusses the empirical challenges for measuring ethnic inequities.
Lonkeng’s chapter 5 on “The Political Economy of Reform Consensus (or Lack Thereof) in Cameroon”
proposes a rationale for the apparent lack of economic reform consensus in Cameroon. Drawing on the
political economy literature, he provides model-based evidence that the quasi status quo may have resulted
from a systematic strategy by the rent-seeking elite to buy off groups to counter reform proposals by any
reform-minded team. The chapter focuses on the interaction between different interest groups and not on
specific reforms, many of which are explored throughout the Handbook.
Kom’s chapter 6 on “The Homo Economicus in Cameroon: A View from Below” proposes a reading of
the Cameroonian economy based on an economic agent’s view from below. Its intent is to cast
complementary light on the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical analyses constituting most of this work.
It is therefore written from the point of view of the citizen who interacts daily with the institutions
designing and implementing public policies, and small and medium-sized businesses that make up the
economic fabric. The perspective adopted here is also long-term, briefly covering the economic and social
approaches of the precolonial era as well as those of the colonial and post-independence eras. Kom’s
sobering analysis emphasizes the richness and the paradoxes of the Cameroonian economy, of its ruling
elites, its private sector, and economic agents of various levels.
Nkot’s contribution titled “Untold Perspectives About Cameroon’s Economy” (chapter 7) is both an
epistemological and empirical challenge to economists working on Cameroon. Examining a large sample
of works by well-known authors, Nkot argues that the analyses have often been limited to the formal
economy whose size and significance are nevertheless limited. He discusses the problems posed by an

15
 exclusive focus on the formal sector of a national economy and suggests that analyses directed toward the
less formal aspects of this economy would more appropriately state its truths.
Part II on “Economic Structure and Structural Transformation” analyzes the fundamental elements for
structural change in Cameroon. Economic studies of structural transformation have evolved over the
decades to cover both macro and micro issues, and to hold different meanings (Lin and Monga, 2014). The
first wave of researchers working on low-income countries, which emerged in the 1940s, conceived
development to be an interrelated set of long-run processes. Their focus was therefore on structural change
in production structure and on economy-wide phenomena such as agricultural transformation,
industrialization, urbanization, and “modernization.” Kuznets (1966) who studied the genesis and patterns
of the evolution of modern economic growth in high-income countries approached structural analysis
mainly through the lenses of sectoral changes—that is, the evolution over time of the relative contributions
of agriculture, industry, and services to gross domestic product (Syrquin, 1988).
In the second wave of development thinking that dominated policymaking in low-income countries in
the 1980s and 1990s, structural analysis was carried out indirectly. Like Mr. Jourdain in Molière’s play,
economists approached structural change almost inadvertently through broad analysis of the general
functioning of economies, their markets, institutions, mechanisms for allocating resources, regulatory and
incentives systems, etc. The designers of the “structural” adjustment programs implemented in many
developing countries viewed the restoration of external and internal balances as an essential precondition
for launching the process of economic transformation and change.
A third and more recent wave of the development literature has sought to refine structural analysis and
bring back to the agenda some of the specific issues of the process of economic transformation: the
strategic selection of competitive industries according to the comparative advantage of developing
countries; the determinants of the dynamics of sectoral contributions to growth; the evolution of the capital
intensity of sectors over time—within and across countries; the factors that help or hinder the reallocation
of resources from low- to high-productivity sectors and the policy environment that facilitates such
changes; the processes that allow economies to move up the value chain; the various ways of organizing
and fostering the adaptation and adoption of new technologies in poor countries; the determinants of a
country’s ability to create good jobs; the respective roles of the government and the private sector; and the
institutional arrangements that are necessary to support structural transformation, especially in the context
of low-income countries where infrastructure, skills, and long-term financing are scarce.
In this Handbook, the concept of “economic structure” is used in its broadest meaning, referring to “the
composition of production activities, the associated patterns of specialization in international trade, the
technological capabilities of the economy, including the educational level of the labor force, the structure
of ownership of factors of production, the nature and development of basic State institutions, and the
degree of development and constraints under which certain markets operate (the absence of certain
segments of the financial market or the presence of a large underemployed labor force, for example)” (
Ocampo et al., 2009, p. 7).
Cameroon has recorded positive economic growth in the new millennium, while poverty reduction has
been limited and inequality has worsened. In their chapter 8, “Monetary and Multidimensional Poverty in
Cameroon: Measurements, Determinants and Policy Implications,” Andrianarison, Housseini, and Oldiges
investigate the different facets of poverty in Cameroon, the factors affecting them, and policy options to
tackle poverty and achieve inclusive and sustainable development. They apply two prominent poverty
measurement methods (Alkire–Foster and Foster–Greer–Thorbecke) to a series of household consumption
and living standards surveys, as well as demographic and health surveys, and perform various empirical
analyses to elucidate poverty dynamics and features. Their results show that both monetary and
multidimensional poverty have decreased in Cameroon during the two decades prior to the COVID-19
pandemic, albeit slowly and to varying degrees across the different demographic, socioeconomic, and
spatial groups of the population. They also find that the proportion of multidimensional poor people is
always higher than the proportion of the monetary poor. At the same time, multidimensional poverty has
reduced much faster than monetary poverty at the national level. Lastly, they find that higher levels of
poverty in Cameroon are strongly associated with rural livelihoods, large family size, less education, and
employment in agriculture and the northern regions of the country. The microeconomic analysis is
complemented with a review of structural factors affecting poverty at the macro level. They point out the

16
 need to accelerate the structural transformation of the Cameroonian economy, to reduce inequalities across
the different regions and subgroups of the population, and expand economic opportunities for the youth of
the country to achieve the demographic dividend.
Tchana Tchana’s chapter 9 on “Cameroon’s Economic Assets and Production: Documenting and
Analyzing a Mismatch” documents and analyzes the mismatch between Cameroon’s perceived wealth and
its economic production. It shows that, although not as wealthy as some analysts perceive, Cameroon’s
natural resources are underused as it is not transformed at its full potential to economic production (GDP).
The inadequate level of produced capital relative to the country’s total wealth mainly explains this
shortcoming. The country should focus on increasing public and private investments in infrastructure while
ensuring greater efficiency and building its human capital to fix the mismatch.
In their chapter 10, “The Economics of Infrastructure in Cameroon: State, Challenges, and Policy
Reforms,” Bougna and Noumba Um provide a critical assessment of infrastructure development and its
role in enabling business and growth in Cameroon. They explore the current state of Cameroon
infrastructure and the main challenges it faces. They use a simple econometric framework to link
Cameroon GDP growth with the stock of different infrastructure assets. They reveal an infrastructure-led
growth potential gap in Cameroon because the country’s infrastructure stock is not at the level of the
average African country. Also, the marginal productivity of its highways infrastructure is higher compared
to other transport infrastructures in Cameroon. In addition, there are potential efficiency gains and
economic benefits of investing conjointly in different infrastructure subsectors, especially in highways,
electricity, railways, and ports. Bougna and Noumba Um highlight the institutional failures and
deficiencies in Cameroon’s infrastructure, which constrain the implementation of structural infrastructure
projects.
Tapping into domestic and regional savings, improving the business environment, implementing
public–private partnerships effectively, and attracting private equity investors to support infrastructure
development are necessary conditions for putting infrastructure at the heart of Cameroon’s economic
transformation.
Avom and Malah Kuete’s chapter 11 on “Structural Transformation and Productivity Growth in
Cameroon” evaluates the contribution of structural transformation to labor productivity growth in
Cameroon over a 40-year period. Using the McMillan–Rodrik decomposition approach, they show that
structural transformation, viewed as a progressive reallocation of the workforce from sectors with low
productivity to those with high productivity, has contributed little to the increase in labor productivity
growth. It is actually the so-called “within component” that explains most of the productivity gains, while
the “between component” has been rather weak. Even more, the dynamic share of this structural
transformation was negative throughout the period covered by the study.
This is not surprising. As explained in the chapter 12 by Kilolo, Cameron, Pedro, and Mastaki on
“Economic Diversification in Cameroon: A Trade–DSM Analysis,” despite its rich endowments of natural
resources, the Cameroonian economy remains undiversified and vulnerable to exogenous shocks as an
exporter of unprocessed primary products. With the ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA) in 2021, the Cameroonian authorities intend to follow an export-led industrialization strategy.
They expect the country to become the “factory of the new industrial Africa” through its Plan Directeur
d’Industrialisation (PDI; industrial masterplan). The chapter examines such ambitions using the
Trade–DSM approach and finds that Cameroon has the largest export potential for food-related products
and other products not prioritized in the PDI, unfortunately.
Sorgho’s chapter 13 on “Cameroon: Trade Costs, Trade Facilitation, and Regional Integration” studies
the challenges related to governance and trade costs, which hinder its development and ability to attract
investment and promote trade. It focuses on trade-related issues, in particular trade facilitation and Central
Africa’s regional integration. The empirical analysis shows that Cameroon can substantially reduce its
trade costs by reducing time-waiting for customs procedures at its borders and playing a stronger
leadership role in Central Africa.
Structural transformation also depends critically on the stock, quality, and use of human
“infrastructure.” As a theory of earnings, human capital theory has provided the rationale for policies to
combat poverty around the world. It aims to explain people’s decisions to invest in education and training
and the pattern of their lifetime earnings. Individuals’ different levels of investment in education and

17
 training are then explained in terms of their expected returns from the investment. Investments in
education and training entail costs in both the form of direct expenses and foregone earnings during the
investment period, so only those individuals who will be compensated by sufficiently higher lifetime
earnings will choose to invest. It follows that, people who expect to work less in the labor market and have
fewer labor market opportunities, such as women or minorities, are less likely to invest in human capital,
and more likely to remain in poverty.
The standard neoclassical theory of human capital is to view it as the set of marketable skills of the labor
force. It is the stock of knowledge or characteristics the worker has (either innate or acquired) that
determines his or her “productivity” and marketability. Such knowledge is a form of capital in which
workers make a variety of investments in order to remain attractive to firms throughout their career. The
fundamental argument is that investing in education leads to economic growth through increased
productivity, social stability, and healthier lifestyles.
The remaining chapters of this section of the Handbook highlight the rigidity, the limitations, and the
failures of the policy frameworks derived from traditional human capital theory. There are so many market
failures and nonmarket dynamics in education and training that the assumptions underlying human capital
theory make it a shaky basis for policy. Various structural factors (from demography to financing and
social norms) and fundamental distortions invalidate the basic dynamics of supply and demand. Most of
the individuals and social groups often excluded from the human capital market do not have the
opportunity and freedom to make such a choice. Besides, for most women and minorities around the
world, investing in their human capital yields low returns in lifetime earnings.
“The Political Economy of Contemporary Youth in Cameroon,” chapter 14 by Eloundou, Giroux, and
Tenikue, is once a case study of Cameroon’s political economy, a substantive hypothesis, and a
methodological tool for forecasting the future of African societies in a context of educational expansion,
demographic transition, and economic divergence. Its central thesis is that Cameroon has a real
opportunity to turn its current generation of youth into its greatest. Seizing this potential depends on
strategic efforts to cultivate and empower this generation along economic, demographic, social, and
political spheres. To put it differently, this entails a holistic development of youth and their human capital
along four concentric circles that include inner personal growth, family life, cognitive and labor market
skills, and civic life. A genuine policy commitment to such holistic development is a non-negotiable
prerequisite for harnessing a sizable dividend for the country and averting the specter of social crises that
would befall the country in the absence of deep and timely investments in youth.
Housseini and Boudarbat’s chapter 15 on “Cameroon’s Labor Market Dynamics and Prospects”
provides a comprehensive assessment of Cameroon’s labor market, with a focus on the dynamics and
patterns of key labor market indicators and factors affecting performance in the labor market. Their
analysis uses both macro- and microeconomic approaches and combines country-level times-series data
from the World Bank World Development Indicators and household survey data produced by Cameroon’s
National Institute of Statistics. They observe an overall limited increase in the capacity of the Cameroonian
economy to absorb its labor force, with a fluctuating pattern over time. Second, Housseini and Boudarbat
show that the positive dynamics observed in labor force participation, employment, and unemployment
actually hide the precarity of jobs and poor working conditions prevailing in the country. Third, their
results reveal that significant gaps persist across different groups of the population in terms of labor market
outcomes, and women, youth, low-educated people, and the population of northern regions of the country
are the most affected groups by the scarcity of formal and decent jobs. This analysis also corroborates
previous findings of the literature showing that gender, education, area of residence, and economic sector
of employment are key drivers of labor market outcomes in Cameroon. To mitigate the growing
demographic pressure in Cameroon’s labor market and convert it into a demographic dividend, there is a
need to accelerate the structural transformation of the Cameroonian economy, invest more in education and
human capital, and therefore set up conditions for extensive job creation in more formal and more
productive sectors. Additionally, targeted economic policies aiming to formalize the labor market and
expand social protection programs, especially for women and youth, would help in improving employment
and earning prospects for the growing and young Cameroonian population.
In Chapter 16, Wirba, Akem, and Baye analyze the other side of the coin, that is “Cameroon’s Informal
Labor Market.” It largely harbors female workers, engaged mainly in low-productivity and low-paying

18
 jobs. They investigate the sticky-floor—a wider earnings gap at the top end of the earnings distribution,
and the glass-ceiling phenomena—a wider earnings gap at the bottom in the informal labor market as a
whole and across its segments. Using labor market survey results and a framework to account for
selectivity bias and resolve the index number problem of the standard decomposition, Wirba, Akem, and
Baye examine earnings differentials across the unconditional earnings distribution. They find compelling
evidence of a sticky-floor phenomenon in the informal labor market, manifested essentially among wage
earners. Returns to experience mitigate the gender earnings gap at the mean, and 10th and 50th percentiles
of the unconditional earnings distribution. Female workers have an unambiguous human-capital-based
advantage over their male counterparts at the mean, lower tail, and median of the distribution.
Zamo-Akono and Song-Ntamack’s chapter 17 on “Drivers of Earnings Inequality in Urban Cameroon”
analyzes the dynamics and extent of earnings inequality in urban areas in Cameroon. Using data from the
National Institute of Statistics, covering nearly two decades, they show that earnings inequality fell sharply
between 2001 and 2010, and rose between 2010 and 2014, with persistent inequality at the upper tail of the
distribution. They use the Recentered Influence Function regression to examine the impact of supply and
demand factors on wage distribution and inequality indicators. Their results indicate that while secondary
education is likely to reduce earnings inequality, higher education, job informality, and self-employment
appear to be factors that increase inequality.
There is strong consensus among economists on the social and private benefits of education, which
increases people’s productivity and creativity, enhances innovation and the use of advanced technologies,
and promotes economic and social progress. But while some argue that investment in education has a
positive effect, such as profitability,others contend that the effect of investment on education can be small
or even negative. Some others even claim the existence of a Laffer curve on returns to education. Dia
Kamgnia’s and Kamdem’s chapter 18, “Education: The Hypothesis of Negative Returns,” uses household
survey results, in which only 9% of the individuals worked in the formal sector under a contract, to study
the issue. They find positive and significant returns to education, as high as 80% for women. But they
highlight the predominance of the informal sector, which has become the only viable option for making a
modest living, even for those with secondary, vocational, and tertiary education.
Decentralization is a centerpiece in Cameroonian’s government institutions’ design. Tchuente’s chapter
19 on “Early Human Capital Accumulation and Decentralization” takes the study of human capital
accumulation at the local level. He elaborates a simple hierarchy model for the analysis of the effects of
power devolution. The model predicts overall positive effects of decentralization with larger effects when
the local authority processes useful information on how to better allocate the resources. The estimation of
the effects of 2010’s power devolution to municipalities in Cameroon suggests a positive impact of
decentralization on early human capital accumulation. The value added by decentralization is the same for
Anglophone and Francophone municipalities; the effects of decentralization are larger for advanced levels
of primary school.
Myerson has long promoted the benefits of decentralized democracy (2015). In his chapter 20,
“Comments on Decentralization in Cameroon,” he argues that decentralization can be a driving force for
development, democracy, and better government in Cameroon; but the recent decentralization reform
seems unlikely to achieve its promise without some further reforms. It is suggested that the system for the
popular election of municipal councils should be changed to an open-list proportional representation
system. Where higher officials of municipal and regional governments are indirectly elected by municipal
councilors, the municipal councilors should also have the power to recall and replace these officials. The
powers of the centrally appointed prefects and governors should be limited to monitoring and advising
their municipal and regional councils.
In his chapter 21, “Determinants of the Performance of the Education System: The Role of Institutions,”
Noumba investigates the effect of institutions on primary and secondary school enrollment, controlling for
other key variables. His empirical analysis, based on a standard education production function, which is
specified and estimated using the SURE method (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations), finds some
heterogeneity in the effect of institutions on the performance of the education system. Institutional factors
seem to have had a positive and significant effect on primary school enrollment but no effect on secondary
school enrollment. Heterogeneity is also observed in the effect of public spending on education as a share
of GDP, which appears to be positive and significant on primary school enrollment and not on secondary

19
 school enrollment. He concludes that a high level of GDP growth rate would not be a necessary and
sufficient condition for improving the Cameroonian education system performance. Therefore, to boost
educational performance, the Government should implement reforms beyond the education sector and
adopt measures to reduce political instability and improve good governance. An effective health policy
would also help to achieve the same goal.
Good health is an essential component of human capital. In advanced economies, healthcare systems
matter for the macroeconomy because of their large size in outputs, employment, and research. They also
have major implications for the long-term sustainability of public finance, while healthcare spending can
have substantial multiplier effects in the short term. In developing countries such as Cameroon, good
health can influence productivity and labor force participation. Spending levels on healthcare are often
determined by income levels, population age structures, epidemiological profiles, and other factors.
Ntembe’s chapter 22 on “Health Outcomes and Health Care Financing in Cameroon” discusses trends in
health outcomes and health expenditures. It develops a fully modified Ordinary Least Squares estimator for
cointegrating regressions that include deterministic variables as regressors and allows an integration
process so that the stationary errors can be serially correlated and the regressors to be independent of each
other. His empirical analysis shows that public expenditure, immunization, and per capita income have a
significant long-run relationship with infant and under-5 mortality in Cameroon. These results suggest that
more public resources could improve health outcomes.
The chapter 23 by Tchouaket Nguemeleu, Robins, Belanger, Sia, and Sieleunou on “Economic
Evaluations of Health Financing Programs” examines Cameroon’s healthcare system, which has faced
many challenges. Health outcomes are poor and the country’s medical infrastructure and available human
resources fail to meet the demand for care. The chapter stresses the need for the continuous monitoring and
evaluation of Cameroon’s healthcare sector financing, both in the current COVID-19 pandemic as well as
in the post-pandemic period. Such critical appraisal of current health financing programs is necessary to
achieve optimal, effective, efficient, and sustainable investment that can promote healthcare for the
Cameroonian population over the long term.
Last, Fregene and Kahasha’s chapter 24 on “Agriculture Transformation” focuses on another critical
element of Cameroon’s economic transformation. The chapter examines the main challenges of the
country’s agriculture sector. It presents the Government’s strategy to transform agriculture, and lessons
from successful approaches that are relevant to Cameroon’s objectives.
Part III on “Macroeconomic Policies and Institutional Practices” focuses on what is usually considered
the fundamental requirements for effective economic transformation.
Sound macroeconomic policies and effective institutions are universally considered prerequisites for
sustained growth and economic development. But what exactly constitutes “sound macroeconomic”
policies and “effective institutions” in a particular country context and time? Perhaps more than any other
external economic shock in recent times, the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the fragility and
inadequateness of the conventional macroeconomic framework, long promoted by international financial
institutions for developing countries such as Cameroon.
The generic macroeconomic objectives of simultaneously achieving and maintaining internal balance
(the situation where the economy is in full employment and the level of activity consistent with a very low
and stable rate of inflation) and external balance (the situation where the economy has a balance of
payments on current and capital accounts combined, which is sustainable, at least in the medium run) at all
costs have been endorsed by Cameroon and other African countries since the early 1990s. After several
decades of IMF and World Bank programs, the country has “successfully” designed and implemented
macroeconomic adjustment programs and policy measures to achieve these twin goals.
Numerous positive IMF Article IV reports, which are broadly consistent in their analysis with the World
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, indicate that the quality of macroeconomic
management has improved, or remained broadly stable, in Cameroon over a decade despite the severe
negative shocks recorded (most notably the 2014 slump in commodity prices). Yet, like most African
countries, Cameroon experienced very low growth in recent decades. In 1990, its GDP per capita measured
PPP (purchasing power parity) (constant 2017 international dollars), was $3,200.1 In 2020, it was
$3,600—an almost insignificant increase for a country of about 30 million inhabitants in 2022, and one
well-endowed with natural wealth, decent levels of physical capital, and enormous human talents.

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 Cameroon’s economic performance is even weaker when observed through the lens of GDP per capita
(measured in constant local currency): in 2020, after six decades of independence, it was CFAF 640,000,
compared to CFAF 786,000 in 1986 (a decline of 18.6% in 34 years). This decline was not due to the
pandemic: in 2019, prior to the COVID-19 shock, Cameroon’s GDP per capita (measured in constant local
currency) was CFAF 652,000—that is, a decline of 17% compared to the 1986 peak. Clearly, the evidence
of improved economic wellbeing due to macroeconomic policies geared toward internal and external
imbalances is flawed. There is something profoundly inadequate in Cameroon’s macroeconomic
framework and policies, which the proforma focus on internal and external balance does not capture.
Analytical and policy justification for rigid adherence to the objectives of internal and external balance,
narrowly defined, is quantified arbitrarily and measured with indicators reminiscent of the European
Union’s Growth and Stability Pact for economic convergence (inflation rate of less than 2% inflation,
annual government deficit not to exceed 3% of GDP, government debt not to reach 60% of GDP, current
account balance in equilibrium with a limited deficit and to be fully financed by concessional funds, etc.).
Cameroon’s macroeconomic prescription could not have yielded the expected benefits. Its objective of
strictly achieving internal balance was misguided and unrealistic. Internal balance is a situation in which
consumption in an economy roughly equals production—which is not necessarily desirable for a low- or
lower-middle-income economy such as Cameroon’s. Moreover, treating full employment and price
stability under the same single umbrella of “internal balance” has been justified by the belief or the
assumption that if one maintained a level of effective demand, which preserved full employment, one
would also find that the money price level was reasonably stable. As noted by Meade, “The reason for
making this tacit or open assumption was, of course, due to a tacit or open assumption that the money
wage rate was normally either constant or at least very sluggish in its movements … This may have been a
very sensible assumption to make in the 1930s. It is more doubtful whether it was a sensible assumption to
make in the immediate post-war years” (1978, pp. 424–425). Meade’s commentary was meant for
advanced economies. It is even more relevant for developing economies such as Cameroon’s, which can be
viewed as being in “post-war”-type situations given their enormous savings and investment challenges,
and their urgent needs for some type of (re)construction.
Likewise, the external balance objective was defined too rigidly and unrealistically for Cameroon.
External balance occurs, roughly speaking, when the value of production in the economy and the value of
spending are never too far from being even. This happens theoretically when the revenues a country brings
in from exports is roughly equal to the money it spends on imports. That is, external balance occurs when
the current account is neither “excessively” positive nor “excessively” negative. In other words, external
balance is a current account position “that can be sustained by capital flows on terms compatible with the
growth prospects of the economy without resort to restrictions on trade and payments, so that the level of
international reserves is adequate and relatively stable” (Wong, 2002, p. 11).
The chapters in this section of the Handbook show that such a rigid macroeconomic view was idealistic
at best in Cameroon, and certainly impractical and improbable. Francois and Mata’s chapter 25 on “Fiscal
Policy Effectiveness Through the Lenses of Useful Government Consumption” lays out, in a pedagogical
manner, the logic of useful public consumption in the context of Edgeworth
substitutability/complementarity between public and private consumption and why it matters for fiscal
policy effectiveness in Cameroon. Government consumption is useful when it is directly internalized by
households in their utility such that it generates positive or negative externalities that alter households’
utility. The chapter presents some empirical evidence of Edgeworth substitutability of government
consumption based on a permanent income theory of consumption. This naturally leads to the examination
of the implication of this empirical evidence of useful government consumption and its relevance to fiscal
policy design and effectiveness in Cameroon. Francois and Mata conclude with a brief discussion on why
workhorse general equilibrium models need to explicitly incorporate useful government consumption
when evaluating the impact of fiscal policy involving changes in government consumption in Cameroon.
Bougna and Nguimkeu’s chapter 26 on “Fiscal Decentralization, Entrepreneurship, and Firm
Productivity in Cameroon” examines the country’s macroeconomic framework from an institutional
perspective. They investigate the impact of fiscal decentralization on entrepreneurship and firm
productivity. They simulate counterfactual changes in taxation policy on the regional distribution of firm
outcomes. Their results show the potential of optimal and adapted tax reforms in fostering business

21
 creation, increased formalization, and aggregate income gains across and within regions in Cameroon.
These findings suggest that a well-targeted regionally decentralized taxation policy has the potential to
improve the overall socioeconomic ecosystem by attracting an optimal size of entrepreneurship in each
region and hence favoring a more efficient cross-regional distribution of income.
Monga’s chapter 27 “Public Debt: Beyond Accounting” addresses fears and facts about the Cameroon
government’s indebtedness and the country’s financing framework. Public debt (deficits) should be
decomposed to reveal its origins: change between macro factors, public investment, or politically
motivated measures and other misbehavior. This is essential for assessing both whether or not the increase
in debt was justified, and whether debt is sustainable. Monga argues that public debt is an indispensable
financing instrument for developing countries. By definition, they are low- or middle-income countries
often with great needs in public services, which they cannot finance with tax revenue alone. Like others,
Cameroon has large infrastructure needs, that, despite an increase in saving, it cannot finance internally. To
the extent that debt finance is used to fund useful and productive public infrastructure, increases in public
debt are justified. The chapter argues that under plausible assumptions, infrastructure improvements can,
both directly and through their effect on foreign direct investment (FDI), increase growth sufficiently to
eventually decrease the debt–GDP ratio. The effects of specific infrastructure dimensions on FDI, and in
turn of FDI on growth, should be the focus of more research. Rather than setting arbitrary limits on
debt–GDP ratio, the focus of international development institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or
the African Development Bank should be on making sure that increases in debt, if they take place, are
indeed used for the right purposes, including and especially public infrastructure. The focus should be on
governance and surveillance structures aimed at allowing a good use of debt, thus reassuring investors and
decreasing spreads.
The chapter 28 by Muñoz on “Withholding Trust: Business Taxpayers and the Value-Added Tax in
Cameroon” provides a micro analysis of fiscal policy and tackles a serious hindrance to economic activity
in the country. Looking at a feature of the tax system known as the value-added tax (VAT) withholding,
Muñoz shows that commercial might and managerial standards are equated and couched in terms of civic
morality. The result is a deeply discriminatory tax system that treats all but a small minority of businesses
as untrustworthy.
Amin’s chapter 29 on “The CFA Franc Zone: The Financial Sector and Economic Growth in CEMAC”
examines Cameroon’s macroeconomic policies from the perspective of monetary and financial policies.
The CFA franc zone is one of the world’s oldest currency arrangements. Amin assesses the financial sector
of the zone and analyzes the role of the financial sector on the growth of the private sector and economic
expansion. He concludes that the weak financial system of the CFA franc zone, which results from the
monetary union, has hindered the economic expansion because of limited private sector financing.
The chapter 30 by Bikai, Kenkouo, Essiane, and Mbohou Mama, “The Monetary and Financial Sector in
Cameroon: Structure, Performance, and Vulnerabilities,” also assesses the performance of Cameroon’s
financial system and outlines its main vulnerabilities and the challenges facing the conduct of monetary
policy. It confirms that in Cameroon, as well as in CEMAC in general, the financial sector remains
shallow, poorly developed, and with little involvement in the creation of added value in member
economies.
Tawah’s chapter 31 on “Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Cameroon” also addresses
macroeconomic policies from a microeconomic angle. It examines bank financing to small and
medium-sized enterprises. It carries out empirical analyses to determine the effect of the characteristics of
the firm on small and medium-sized enterprises’ access to working capital from banks. It shows that the
size of the firm, its legal status, and some foreign activities could improve access to bank finance for
SMEs. Because access to funding is significantly related to the size of the firm, medium to large firms
have a clear advantage relative to smaller firms in obtaining bank financing for both working capital and
investment.
The chapter 32 by Mbaye, Gueye, and Benjamin on “Female Entrepreneurship in Africa: Characteristics
and Determinants in Cameroon” echoes some of the findings of the Tawah chapter. They examine data on
formal and informal firms in Cameroon and explore the links between female direction of firms and the
obstacles known to keep firms from reaching their full potential. The strong presence of women in the
informal sector can be explained by several factors, including the size of their business activities, their

22
 poor access to education and training as well as to financing, and institutional and sociocultural constraints.
Using a survey of formal and informal enterprises in Yaoundé and Douala (Cameroon’s two largest cities),
they show women to be more exposed to symptoms of informality and precariousness than men. The types
of activities most associated with female entrepreneurship are very small businesses, which are more
excluded from most public infrastructure services including water, electricity, telephone, and Internet
infrastructure services than are male-directed firms.
A very strong case has been made by economists to put institutions—defined as “the rules of the game”
by North (1990)—at the top of the list of economic performance. They have done so by challenging the
standard economic explanation for the failure of countries like Cameroon to improve their GDP per capita
despite their natural resources and endowments.
In his Lionel Robbins Lectures, Acemoglu lists and refutes the traditional economic explanation of
underdevelopment: “Physical capital differences (poor countries don’t save enough); Human capital
differences (poor countries don’t invest enough in education and skills); ‘Technology’ differences (poor
countries don’t invest enough in R&D and technology adoption, and don’t organize their production
efficiently)” (Acemoglu, 2004). He then suggests that institutions, defined more precisely as “the formal
and informal rules governing economic and political interactions, are the major determinant of the
cross-country differences in economic performance. Understanding the effect of institutions on economic
outcomes and why institutions vary across countries must be a first step in any attempt to improve the
long-run performance of less-developed nations in the world.”
Even African countries such as Cameroon, ranked low on the “effectiveness” of their political
institutions and labeled “not democratic,” still must have a very strong and effective institutional security
apparatus to maintain an authoritarian regime for many decades. Could it be the case then that political
leaders in some countries deliberately pick and choose the type of institutions that they truly want to build
and make highly performing (State security for instance), while deliberately neglecting and even actively
weakening other institutions whose role is not viewed as essential for their purposes and goals? This would
explain the mystery of “poor governance” in low- or lower-middle-income countries where political
settlements have not been well negotiated among the most powerful groups (Khan, 2018 and 2012).
Viviane Ondoua Biwolé’s chapter 33 on “Models of Governance in Cameroon’s PublicAdministration”
concludes this section of the Handbook. While it does not directly discuss these theoretical debates over
institutional design, it provides insights into ways of building a prosperous economy in a fragile, even
inoperative administrative environment. She questions the pertinence of the governance model of
Cameroon’s public administration, where free-market levers do not necessarily correspond to the values
that Cameroonian society identifies with; hence the necessity to re-think another governance model that
would promote an endogenous social imaginary.
Finally, Christelle Amina Djouldé’s chapter 34, “The Economy of Corruption in Cameroon’s Cartoons”
analyzes editorial cartoons with a view to decoding paradigms of corruption in Cameroon, a major obstacle
to the country’s economic progress. In the light of the “pictorial turn,” it examines how satiric images are
material that make it possible to understand the complexity of corruption. Her contribution combines the
comparison of various sources to show how the editorial cartoon offers a painting of corruption. It also
discusses the relationship between “the tyranny of corruption” and the persistence of Cameroon’s
underdevelopment.
A last set of studies grouped in Part IV, “Looking Forward” suggests the way forward for the
Cameroonian economy, focusing on natural resource management, the comparative analysis of
nonrenewable resource stocks and capital goods, electricity supply for manufacturing (which should be the
main engine of growth for Cameroon to reach its medium- and long-term economic goals), employment
generation strategies, the challenges and opportunities of artificial intelligence and big data analytics, the
economics of migration, the economy of reliance in humanitarianism as a development finance tool, and a
rethinking of Cameroon’s role as a potential driving engine of the economies of the central African region
and beyond.
The section starts with three chapters co-authored by Bahel, Keutiben, and Tatoutchoup. In chapter 35,
“The Analytics of Natural Resource Management,” they present the theoretical framework of how society
allocates scarce natural resources. They distinguish between the cases of nonrenewable resources and
renewable resources. Nonrenewable resources differ from renewable resources because they have a fixed

23
 stock of reserves that, once removed, cannot be replaced. Extracting a unit of resource today means that a
lower resource stock will be available for future extraction. For both renewable and nonrenewable
resources, the economic analysis aims to determine the flow of production over time and whether and
when the resource stock will be depleted. In the case of nonrenewable resources, they present Hotelling’s
theory of the mine as well as its extensions. In the case of renewable resources, they examine the
derivation of Faustmann’s optimal rotation for even-aged forests.
These building blocks are used in the next chapter to test the dynamic efficiency of Cameroon’s
resource management. In the second chapter 36, “Testing the Dynamic Efficiency of Extraction of
Nonrenewable Resources,” Tatoutchoup, Keutiben, and Bahel examine whether nonrenewable resources
are extracted and managed efficiently in Cameroon. The analysis is performed by empirically evaluating
the consistency between the theoretical extraction path dictated by the Hotelling model and its various
extensions and the actual extraction path. They test the dynamic efficiency of the theoretical path of the
main nonrenewable resources produced in Cameroon and conclude that the Hotelling model cannot explain
the evolution of the observed price path of these resources.
In their third chapter 37 on “Oil Revenue Management: Cameroon’s Experience,” Keutiben,
Tatoutchoup, and Bahel start with the observation that Cameroon’s growth performance and development
outcomes have not reached the level expected from the country’s oil wealth and abundant resources
endowments. They review the theory and practice of oil revenue management in the context of developing
countries and highlight many political economy factors to explain why Cameroon has not harnessed its
natural resources (especially oil) for sustained growth and shared prosperity. The chapter underscores that
if Cameroon has ever suffered, or is suffering, from any “curse,” it should be referred to as an “institutional
curse.” Keutiben, Tatoutchoup, and Bahel conclude that accountability to the people of Cameroon, not to
donors, is essential for transparency and good governance.
Kakeu’s chapter 38 on “Comparing Nonrenewable Resources Stocks and Capital Goods” uses shadow
pricing for comparing nonrenewable natural resource stocks and capital goods. It shows that, from a social
welfare perspective, there are situations where the social worth of nonrenewable natural resource stocks is
greater than the social worth of capital goods. Numerical examples on shadow pricing are provided for
illustration. The shadow pricing metric and the market pricing metric do not lead to the same conclusion
when it comes to comparing natural resource stocks and capital goods. The chapter emphasizes the
importance of incorporating information on natural resource stocks in optimally managing a country’s
public wealth. Public policy recommendations relating to the optimal management of natural resource
stocks in Cameroon are discussed.
Electricity shortages are a serious threat to manufacturing exports—trade will be the driving engine to
Cameroon’s economy for the foreseeable future. Amadu and Ngah’s chapter 39 on “Electricity Supply and
Manufacturing Exports” estimates the impact of power deficits on manufacturing exports. Using a vector
error correction model, they show that a percentage decrease in electricity supply causes a reduction in the
exports of manufactured products by 1 percentage point in the short term and 6 percentage points in the
long term. Other covariates suggest that a 1% increase in manufacturing causes the labor force to increase
by 7% in the short term with the long-term value not being significant. They conclude that increasing
electricity supply and making it more affordable and accessible to manufacturing industries should be at
the core of Cameroon’s industrial policy, economic development programs, and the national development
strategy.
Few issues have done more damage to the credibility of economics as a “scientific” discipline and to the
reputation of economists than unemployment and underemployment. This is not surprising: As noted by
Solow, “the labor market connects quickly with everything else in the economy and its performance
matters more directly for most people than that of any other market” (1980, p. 2). Despite major advances
in contemporary macroeconomic theory, policymakers and citizens in most countries have been
particularly frustrated by the inability of economists to provide reliable general blueprints and actionable
policy frameworks to cure pervasive and persistent joblessness, which is perhaps the worst of economic
and social ills.
Monga’s chapter 40 on “A Blueprint for Employment Creation” observes that the policy prescriptions
derived from traditional, dominant models have aimed at making labor markets work better. Their results
have been often disappointing, especially in Africa and in countries like Cameroon, where the labor

24
markets should be analyzed mainly in disequilibrium, because transactions take place there at
non-market-clearing wages, or where the markets are missing. There is evidence of involuntary
unemployment and massive underemployment, which suggests that the wage structure cannot receive, or
respond to, the typical policy signals. The chapter discusses the challenges to employment creation in
developing country contexts—especially through industrialization—and the fears generated by the Fourth
Industrial Revolution, and offers a policy framework for creating employment.
Yameogo’s chapter 41 on “The Economics of Migration and Remittances: New Opportunities” analyzes
Cameroon’s international emigration patterns, which turned from an elite education-type of migration to a
more adventurous type following the 1980s economic crises. More young Cameroonians aspired to escape
economic hardships and find employment especially in developed countries. Migration is more a family’s
decision where the family invests in the costs of migration and in return, expects the migrant to send
remittances. Remittance inflows spiked over the past few decades and have replaced foreign direct
investments. With a strong and educated diaspora abroad, especially in the OECD, Cameroon has a great
opportunity to tap into their human, financial, and social capital to boost its economic transformation and
create decent employment for those left behind.
The chapter 42 by Fosso Wamba and Queiroz on “Artificial Intelligence and Big Data Analytics in
Cameroon: Challenges, Benefits, and Potential Applications” explores the dynamics and behavior of a
representative lower-middle-income country, namely Cameroon, toward the digital transformation,
specifically regarding Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data Analytics (BDA) as the key cutting-edge
technologies for the economy’s digitalization. Despite Cameroon’s poor performance in different
international rankings, mainly related to infrastructure and information and communications technology
(ICT) adoption, the country is an attractive market for digital transformation projects. This chapter
discusses the drivers and enablers of Cameroon’s digitalization supported by AI and BDA and a
framework for action by the government, universities, practitioners, industries, international organizations,
scholars, and other interested stakeholders.
The book ends with two reflective contributions: Kemedjio’s chapter 43 “The Economy of
Humanitarianism” analyzes the contradictions of humanitarianism as a benevolent approach to
nation-building in Cameroon and beyond. It then addresses the shame associated with foreign aid, through
the works of several thinkers, including Mongo Beti and Imbole Mbue, two major literary figures from
Cameroon. It also examines the shame associated with humanitarian aid and concludes with thoughts on
the fictional nature of a humanitarian State.
The final contribution to this Handbook, chapter 44 by Etounga-Manguelle, is more optimistic with
caution. Endowed by its history and geography with considerable assets for its development, the country
initially called Kamerun, which was a German protectorate from 1884 to 1918, before being placed under
a mandate of French and English trusteeship from 1918 to 1960, is today at a crossroads. For since 2016
(with the eruption of an armed rebellion in the country’s English-speaking regions), it has been subjected
to a sociopolitical crisis that endangers its State institutions and threatens its national integrity and its
survival as a flagship nation with a rich and diverse history. Etounga-Manguelle’s chapter sums up the
challenges of the new sociopolitical situation of the country, whose economy shows a great deal of
resilience, despite the gravity of the ills that weigh it down. These ills are due essentially to poor
governance and the lack of leadership. But the current daunting challenges facing Cameroon do not in any
way mortgage its future when the country, reconciled with itself, will awaken and shine with all its
radiance.

25
 I.4 ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, INSOCIALIZATION, AND THE WEIGHT OF
HISTORY

The requirement to adhere to academic standards in this Handbook does not, however, forbid either
nostalgia, or at times even anger. But transcending these emotions, the texts assembled in this volume
above all throw light upon the modes of economic interactions, actors’ decisions, management of
households, businesses, and public institutions, socialization, even re-socialization very particular to
Cameroonians. Traditional sociology claims that the genesis of the self, which is the first stage of
socialization, is an automatic process essentially driven by institutions like the family, the school, and the
social groups to which one belongs. This linear view of the modes of fashioning social textures does not
really suit the environment described here. The sites where socialization occurs—those often-informal
spaces where a Cameroonian becomes aware of being either “fully part” of the economic and social action
or a piece of social rubbish “fully apart”—are very different from the sugary reality described in sociology
books. And with reason: over in Douala or Yaoundé the family and the educational system often have very
different roles from what can be seen in Brasilia or Helsinki. Their aims of socialization are generally the
same as those of traditional sociology—teach the fundamentals of life in society, transmit ways of living,
inculcate values like a taste for effort, and work toward aims that society considers important.
However, in a Cameroon where the political leadership and the elites often have shown neither vision
nor ethical concern, the socialization of the economic agent in households, businesses, and administrations
is a chaotic and unstable process of legitimizing the philosophies of oppression, exchanging survival
techniques, appropriating instruments of power, and validating the symbolics of self-hatred—that is, of
others. The short and insightful commentaries of Ambroise Kom and Fabien Nkot are, in this respect,
particularly revealing. It is difficult to read them without catching a glimpse of the many dimensions of
what could be called insocialization—Cameroonian society’s extraordinary capacity for exhibiting and
deploying its stock of inhumanity and thus refusing to integrate into itself the citizens it produces, as if
inadvertently.
A panorama of existences marked out on one hand by, at times rigid, public policies and economic
systems derived from colonial certainties and on the other by the ingenuity and indocility of economic
agents whose creativity and energy know no law, rule, or constraint, the texts of this volume also shed light
on original modes of knowledge and practices.
This Handbook also approaches obliquely, almost surreptitiously, a few epistemological questions like
the problem of historical causality. This could, in fact, not be avoided, for the different contributions
essentially are expressed as freeze frame shots of a country caught in the act of self-questioning, at a
particularly interesting moment of its historical trajectory. What are the cause-and-effect relationships
between the phenomena that form the narrative framework of this work? Is the failure of the elite the cause
or simply the reflection of a mass resignation of social groups? Does the chicken precede the egg or the
reverse?
The answers to these questions are neither one-directional nor one-dimensional. They integrate what is
in econometrics called multi-collinearity, that is, the fact that explanatory variables identified as having an
impact on a dependent variable already influence each other. Therefore, before studying the causality
relationship between explanatory variables on one hand and dependent variables on the other, one should
examine the interaction existing between the explanatory variables themselves. The sociology of
Cameroon that is reflected in this book illustrates this problem and the fact that the country’s history
mingles several orders of causality: there are the material or “objective” data that one sets out in advance
to try to explain the changes and the phenomena of rupture; there are the data of fortuity, those incidents, at
times superficial but that play the role of the dissipative structures described by Ilya Prigogine (those
particles as trivial as they are unexpected that, by themselves, completely disrupt and upset an equilibrium
that was thought to be forever stable); and there are the final causes, as Paul Veyne would call them, those
obvious events on which the news tends to focus and to which the contributors of this book give priority.
The authors of this Handbook well know that the history of contemporary Cameroon is, however,
neither a simple superposition of these three types of histories nor a “multi-story construction” with a

26
material and economic basement, a sociocultural ground floor, all of it capped by a superstructure
consisting of events of current politics. They know that this history expresses itself in mixtures,
non-scientific amalgams, and the introduction of plots. Thus, the historical explanation consists in
clarifying the depth of a plot, in showing its progression, even if through a narrative schema that highlights
little causes. This is the approach followed by many authors of this collection: they tell touching and
delightful stories with a subjectivism not at all shameful—even when they are sad. According to their
preferences, they pick off the torments of a country to which they are all very attached, freely analyzing
the causes of the phenomena they describe and unapologetically expressing the reasons for their
certainties.
In such an approach, the imagination plays a crucial role in the selection of historical facts, the search
for the causes, and the modes of understanding and interpreting the real. It is the well-known problem of
causal imputation in the social sciences: as soon as one differentiates oneself from the quantitative methods
privileged by economists or statisticians to identify not only the significant variables but also the important
coefficients assigned to them and the meanings of the causalities, one exposes oneself to the risk of a
counter-narration able to support reverse theses with the same arguments. One must then transfer
explanatory schemes tested at that moment to situations observed in the past, or even to those to come. The
imagination gives life to the material that one observes and identifies. The memory and reminiscence then
take on a capital importance, with the risks of excess which that implies. That is no problem: several
chapters of theoretical economics in this Handbook ask us to be satisfied with suppositions of the
sociologist, anthropologist, or historian and with the novelist’s and poet’s dreams. The reader will
therefore be neither surprised nor disappointed to find in some contributions a strong dose of pessimism or
nostalgia.

I.5 POETICS OF SORROW AND THE GRAMMAR OF HAPPINESS

This Handbook also poses the uncomfortable questions: why such a disappointment? Why such a waste of
resources, competences, talents, and imagination? How can some citizens of this territory, which proudly
proclaims itself a Republic, put up with that? As of 2022, Douala, Cameroon’s largest city and economic
capital, has neither a museum, nor a library, nor a bookstore, nor a theater, nor a cinema or performance
hall worthy of the name. Even football, which everyone is mad about and which brings together social
classes and generations, is often played in pitifully sad stadiums. Only neighborhood bars, as noisy as they
are run-down, and a few nightclubs where each person reveals the social identity to which he aspires, seem
to constitute places of leisure. How in the world, wonders the New Yorker or Chilean passing through, do
they manage to overcome such stifling tedium? What justifies these big smiles, these bursts of laughter in
the torrid, humid heat, this contagious delight in life in places and at a time that seem cursed? How can one
decipher the grammar of happiness in this Cameroon that intrigues as much as it beguiles?
The secret of this informal art of living resides in the ability of Cameroonians to experience
micro-sensations. They assume their existences with a great deal of appetite, magnifying events that others
would find ordinary, celebrating without qualms the tiny rhythm intervals of days and nights, insisting on
the value of the slightest punctuation, picking off time like a melody played out in diatonic half steps. The
most amazing thing is that there is nothing artificial in their enthusiasm, and nothing self-conscious in the
solemnity with which they are able to show themselves happy. “Wise is the man who monotonizes his
existence, for then each minor incident seems a marvel” recommends Fernando Pessoa … “Monotonizing
existence, so that it won’t be monotonous. Making daily life anodyne, so that the littlest thing will amuse.”
Having become experts in the daily management of melancholy and tedium, the Cameroonians didn’t have
to read Pessoa in order to appropriate this exhortation.
Esthetics of disenchantment at the same time as poetics of the sorrow of existing, the collection
proposed here is also a chronicle of nostalgia. Nostalgia not of a mythical past reinvented to make one feel
good, but nostalgia of a dreamed future, a future that could have been if the collective imaginary had not
for so long been held hostage by a band of usurpers disguised as the country’s political elite.

27
 At a workshop to discuss the draft chapters of this Handbook and hosted by Harvard’s Kennedy School of
Government (April 2–3, 2021), Joseph Stiglitz, Roger Myerson, Dani Rodrik, and Richard Joseph, whose
works have inspired research on Africa in general and Cameroon in particular for decades, provided
thoughtful and challenging reflections on the state of the world economy, the limits of export-led growth
strategies in the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and trade wars, and the fragilities of global and
domestic governance systems. They also offered a rich set of ideas on the possible paths forward for
African economies. I would like to thank them for their guidance, generosity, and support. I am glad to
report that the contributors to this Handbook took up their challenges and did their best to outline credible
strategies for growth and more effective governance in Cameroon.
Without claiming absolute comprehensiveness, this Handbook aims to offer a broad survey of
knowledge, debates, and current thinking and research on the economics of Cameroon. It examines the
macroeconomic, microeconomic, and institutional issues faced by Cameroon using several approaches that
combine discussions of historical events and their hysteresis effects, theoretical arguments, results from
empirical studies, and relevant policy experiences. It includes technical and methodological contributions
on governance, growth, and transformation, but also think pieces on mindsets, behavior, and social norms.
It brings together a wide range of well-established economists and researchers who address issues from
various perspectives. The contributors tried to strike a balance between academic literature and policy
issues, between economic theory and practice, and between past knowledge and the unexplored ideas for
future research. I am grateful to their commitment to this intellectual venture and to their hard work.
I would like to acknowledge the enormous debt owed to Madeleine Velguth and Mankan Mohammed
Koné who translated several chapters in this volume from French; Bouba Housseini and Ambroise Kom
who helped me identify some great contributors and evaluate some of the early drafts; Nyemb Popoli who
graciously provided cartoons for the chapter on the economy of corruption; my colleague Kevin Drumm
who helped me to organize the work and managed the logistics of this project; and my students at
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government who always raised the big questions that allowed me to identify
the most relevant issues to be covered. This Handbook would not be nearly the one that it is without the
strong support and careful attention to detail of all these colleagues. Last but not least, I would like to
thank Cameroonian visual artist Samuel Dallé for granting us the use of his artwork on the cover of this
handbook. The painting, entitled The Lighthouse, depicts the aesthetics of suffering, the brilliant agony of
some unrepentant characters, and also the resilience of ordinary people and the celebration of life and its
possibilities—all themes that seems appropriate to convey some of the messages of this Handbook.

NOTE
1. The data in this section is from the World Bank. See GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international
$)—Cameroon | Data (worldbank.org).

REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D. (2004), Understanding Institutions, Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures. London: London School of
Economics and Political Science, February 23–25.
Khan, M. (2012), “Governance During Social Transformations: Challenges for Africa,” New Political Economy, 17(5):
667–675.
Khan, M. (2018), “Political Settlements and the Analysis of Institutions,” African Affairs, 117(469): 636–655.
Kuznets, S. (1966), Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lin, J. Y. (2012), “Development 3.0,” Project Syndicate, June 14.
Lin, J. Y. and C. Monga (2014), “The Evolving Paradigms of Structural Change,” in B. Currie-Adler, R. Kanbur, D.
M. Malone, and R. Medhora (eds.), International Development: Ideas, Experience, and Prospects. New York:
Oxford University Press, pp. 277–294.
Meade, J. (1978), “The Meaning of ‘Internal Balance,”’ The Economic Journal, 88(351, September): 423–435.
Myerson, R. (2015), “Democratic Decentralization and Economic Development,” in C. Monga and J. Y. Lin (eds.),
Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 756–769.
North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University
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Ocampo, J. A., Codrina Rada, and Lance Taylor (2009), Growth and Policy in Developing Countries: A Structuralist
Approach. New York: Columbia University Press.
Renan, E. (1992). “What is a Nation?” Text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882, in Ernest
Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation? Translated by Ethan Rundell. Paris: Presses-Pocket.
Solow, R. M. (1980), “On Theories of Unemployment,” The American Economic Review, 70(1): 1–11.
Syrquin, M. (1988), “Patterns of Structural Change,” in H. Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan (eds.), Handbook of
Development Economics, Vol. 1. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishers, pp. 203–273.
Wong, Chorng-Huey (2002), “Adjustment and Internal-External Balance,” in M. S. Khan, S. M. Nsouli, and C.-H.
Wong (eds.), Macroeconomic Management: Programs and Policies. Washington DC: IMF, pp. 10–37.

29
Another random document with
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be brought from a vessel which had recently reached the coast. A
great event was the arrival of three vessels with two hundred
Spaniards, eighty horses, and a full complement of arms,
ammunition, and other effects, partly bought and partly enlisted by
the agents whom Cortés had despatched to the Islands during the
previous autumn. Among the new-comers were Julian de Alderete of
Tordesillas, appointed royal treasurer for New Spain, and the
Franciscan Pedro Melgarejo de Urrea of Seville, bearing a supply of
papal indulgences for the men who had been engaged in the
crusade. That the soldiers were conscious of frequent transgressions
may be judged from the suggestive and not wholly reverential
observation of Bernal Diaz, that “after patching their defects the friar
returned to Spain within a few months, a rich man.”[1075]
Cortés was cheered by offers of submission and alliance, owing
partly to the good offices of Tezcucans and other allies. Some came
from places quite distant, such as Nautla and Tuzapan, on the coast
north of Villa Rica, laden as usual with presents.[1076] Another
pleasing evidence of still more devoted loyalty came not long after
from the south, from the country of the valiant Chinantecs, of the
long pikes. During the great uprising, when Spaniards in small or
straggling parties had everywhere been slaughtered, this people
faithfully protected the two soldiers who happened to be with them,
and were in return aided by their prowess and advice to achieve
victories over adjoining tribes. One of these men, Captain Hernando
de Barrientos, sent two natives in April with a letter to his
countrymen imparting the assurance that Chinantla and its six sub-
towns were loyal.[1077]
The recent successes and the arrival of the two hundred men
induced Cortés once more to propose peace to Quauhtemotzin. To
this end, during passion week, he bade some of the captured nobles
proceed to Mexico with a letter as a symbol of their commission, and
impress upon their master the superiority in arms and skill of the
Spanish forces, their constant and large reinforcements, and their
unvarying success in the field. They must point out the generous and
humane treatment of the provinces which had submitted, and assure
the Aztec leaders that equal forgiveness would be accorded them.
Refusal to return to their allegiance would lead to the destruction of
themselves and their city. Only two of the captives ventured to
accept the commission, for according to Aztec articles of war any
noble who returned to his country after having been captured by an
enemy was doomed to decapitation unless he had performed some
extraordinary deed.[1078]
No answer came from Mexico, and it was afterward learned that
the messengers had suffered death. The Aztec ruler had not even
given a thought to peace. He was watching his opponents, prepared
to take advantage of any neglect or relaxation in their effort. No
sooner had Sandoval been induced by peaceful appearances to
retire from Chalco than Aztec forces again prepared to invade the
province. The Chalcans had due warning, and close upon the heels
of Sandoval came two messengers lamenting louder than ever, and
exhibiting a painting wherein were named the many towns whose
forces were coming upon them, fully fifty thousand strong. These
constant menaces and movements were exasperating, and Cortés
resolved personally to inflict a lesson which might be lasting. At the
same time he proposed to complete his reconnoissance of the lake
region and encourage his troops with spoils from hostile localities
whereon the Aztecs yet relied for support.[1079]
Cortés selected thirty horse, three hundred infantry, a number of
Tlascaltecs, and over twenty thousand Tezcucans, under Prince
Ixtlilxochitl, to which twice that number of other allies were added on
the way. A large proportion of archers and aquebusiers were taken,
together with Alvarado, Olid, Alderete, Melgarejo, and others, while
Sandoval was left in charge of Tezcuco, with instructions to watch
and promote the completion of the brigantines against which several
incendiary attempts had been made.
The expedition left Friday, the 5th of April, and passed through
Chalco, Tlalmanalco, and Chimalhuacan,[1080] and crossing in a
south-westerly direction into the Totolapan province, they entered the
hills which form the southern border of the Mexican valley. By this
time the forces had assumed proportions hardly inferior to those of
the Iztocan campaign, when over one hundred thousand moved
against the foe. Highly picturesque was the spectacle of this army, its
naked hordes of warriors relieved by plumage and glittering iztli
points which rose above the broad line of gaudy shields; its white
adventurers in mail of cotton and metal, surmounted by bright
helmets, and armed knights on proudly stepping steeds: picturesque
in particular as it wound in almost endless line along the rounded
slopes of the cliffs, or climbed in clearly defined file across the hill-
tops, only to descend again into gulches gloomy as their own sinister
purpose.
Alarmed by the invasion, the inhabitants had abandoned their
valley homes, and had sought refuge on the summits, whence they
hurled missiles at the passing lines. Little attention was paid these
irregular bands, composed as they were to a great extent of women
and children. On entering the Tlayacapan Valley, however, and
observing on the craggy sides of an almost perpendicular isolated
rock, perched there like an eagle’s nest, a place of refuge peopled
with more pretentious opposers, in a fit of insensate folly Cortés
ordered the place to be assailed. He seemed to think the honor of
the army demanded it, and was ready to stake the lives of valuable
men on its destruction.
Orders were given to attack from three several sides, the
steepest being assigned to Alférez Corral, a brave and spirited
leader. Verdugo and Villafuerte were given another side, and Ircio
and Monjaraz the third. Each party consisted of about threescore
men, and included archers and arquebusiers. At a given signal all
rushed forward to the ascent. Soon they were on hands and knees,
crawling over projections and pulling themselves up by means of
shrubs. All the while stones and darts rattled on helmet and
breastplate; and huge rocks came rolling down upon them. In vain
they sought shelter in crevices and under crags; they must face the
storm. Bernal Diaz followed Corral, and after receiving many a hard
knock they gained what was called two turns of the rock. There they
paused and looked around, wondering at their success thus far.
Supporting himself against a small tree, his face bathed in blood, his
banner rent, Corral said, “Señor Diaz, it is useless to advance
farther; not a man will survive.” Then they shouted a warning to
Pedro Barba, at the head of his archers, not to climb farther. “The
order is to advance!” was the reply. The next moment Barba was
wounded by a stone, and a soldier at his side was killed. Cortés then
sounded the recall, but not until eight brave men had laid down their
lives, victims of their commander’s puerility, and of the rest most of
them returned wounded.[1081]
The recall was likewise prompted by the approach of a
considerable force in the valley. This the cavalry charged and quickly
routed, following in close pursuit, though the broken ground soon
enabled the fugitives to gain shelter. During this ride some of the
horsemen came, a league beyond, to another hill fortress, strong in
its natural features, and held by a large force. Near by were some
springs. The need of water was pressing, which afforded a plausible
excuse for abandoning the scaling of Tlayacapan, and the whole
force was moved to the springs. Early next morning Cortés
examined the approaches to the new stronghold. It extended over
three hills, the central one exceedingly steep and held by the largest
force; the others easier of ascent, though higher, and occupied by
smaller numbers. In reconnoitring, Cortés advanced toward the
centre. This movement led the occupants of the other hills to infer an
attack on the central height, and they began to abandon their
positions with a view to reënforce the threatened point. Observing
this, Cortés ordered Barba to occupy the most commanding
elevation with some fifty arquebusiers and archers, while he himself
continued to scale the centre as a feint, for there was little hope of
capturing a point so steep and strongly held. The stones and darts
rained here as previously, and man after man was struck down,
some bleeding freely from the wounds sustained.[1082]
Meanwhile Barba’s sharp-shooters had made so effective a use
of their weapons that within half an hour the volleys from the fortress
ceased, and the women began to wave their robes in token of truce,
shouting their submission. Cortés graciously met the advances, and
extended full pardon. He also prevailed on the chiefs to induce the
Tlayacapans to submit. On the extensive surface of the rock were
collected all the inhabitants of the neighborhood, with their effects,
which Cortés ordered not to be touched.[1083]
The army remained encamped for two days to refresh
themselves after their arduous march, and after sending the
wounded to Tezcuco, Cortés proceeded to Huastepec. The report of
the clemency extended to preceding settlements had a reassuring
effect on this town, whose cacique came forth to welcome them, and
tender his palace for their entertainment. This was situated in a
garden, celebrated throughout New Spain for its beauty and extent,
and the immense variety of its plants, collected partly for scientific
purposes. A river with tributary canals flowed through its grounds,
which extended over a circuit of nearly two leagues, murmuring its
melody in unison with winged songsters hidden in arbors or playing
between bush and hedge, mingling their bright color with the green
expanse. Adjacent were steep rocks, on whose smooth surface were
sculptured the portraits of noted warriors, statesmen, and orators,
with hieroglyphic inscriptions of their fame. It was a paradise formed
equally for student and idler, and to the weary soldiers no spot could
perhaps have proven so grateful. Cortés certainly grows ecstatic in
describing it, declaring it “the largest, most beautiful, and freshest
garden ever seen.”[1084] Tempting as was the retreat, Cortés tore
himself from it the following day, and proceeded in a south-westerly
direction to Yauhtepec. Although many warriors were gathered there,
they fled on the approach of the Spaniards, and were chased, with
some slaughter, for about two leagues, into the town of Xiuhtepec.
[1085] The women and effects there found were appropriated as
spoils, and rendered agreeable the two days’ stay. The ruler failing to
appear, the place was fired, and terrified by this warning the lord of
Yauhtepec hastened to proffer submission.
After a day’s hard march the army came in sight of
Quauhnahuac,[1086] capital of the Tlahuicas. They were one of the
Nahuatlaca tribes, which according to tradition had entered the
Anáhuac country to supplant the Toltecs. Coming rather late, they
found their brethren already in possession of the lake region, and so
they crossed the range to seek a home on the headwaters of the
Zacatula, where soon a number of settlements rose round
Quauhnahuac. They afterward fell under the sway of the
Chichimecs, and finally the Aztecs took advantage of internal discord
to establish sovereignty,[1087] maintaining it by a garrison in the
capital. This was a natural stronghold, situated on a tongue of land
between two steep ravines over forty feet in depth, and through
which ran a little stream during the rainy season. It was further
protected by strong walls, particularly on the side where a strongly
guarded gate opened to a fine stretch of country. Two other
entrances faced the ravines, sometimes spanned by bridges, which
were now removed.
Situated at the gateway to the tropical southern valleys, between
which and the colder lake region interposed a range of mountains,
the spot stood as a new Eden in its manifold beauties. A sight even
of the pine-fringed mountains that rolled off toward the north, with
their green slopes shaded by oak and birch, and bathed in soft
though bracing airs, was refreshing to the indolent inhabitants of the
burning plain beyond. On the other hand the sturdy toilers of the
northern plateaux might in this sunny south seek relaxation in the
varied charms of a softer air balmy with the incense of a more
lustrous vegetation.[1088]
It was an opulent community that of Quauhnahuac, surrounded
as it was by endless resources and advantages, and the people
were in no mood tamely to yield their wealth to invaders. And in this
determination they were sustained by their lord, Yohuatzin,[1089] who
was not only a vassal but a relative of Quauhtemotzin. Confident in
the impregnable position of his city, in which supplies were ample, he
replied with volleys to the demands of the Spanish forces as they
appeared on the other side of the ravines. It seemed almost
impossible to effect a crossing and climb the steep wall of the ravine
to the city; nevertheless Cortés selected a position and began to
open fire so as to occupy the attention of the garrison and cover the
scaling parties.
While they were thus busied a brave Tlascaltec reconnoitred and
came to a point half a league beyond, where the ravine was steepest
and narrowed to an abyss. On the two sides grew two large trees,
which inclined toward each other, with branches intertwined, forming
a sort of natural bridge, though by no means secure. He called the
attention of his party to this and led the way across, followed by
several Spaniards. The natives, who were more accustomed to this
kind of tactics, found comparatively little difficulty in swinging
themselves across; but to the soldiers it was far from easy, and three
of them, overcome by dizziness or weight of armor, slipped and fell.
[1090]
 The attention of the inhabitants being attracted elsewhere, a
number of the invaders had gained a secure foothold within the city
before they were observed. Even now a few resolute men might
have driven them back, but such were wanting, and the sudden
appearance of the dreaded white men, as if indeed they had
dropped into the stronghold from some cloud made radiant by the
sun whose reputed children they were, struck terror to the hearts of
the poor natives. All impotent and nerveless, they permitted the
daring strangers to lower the drawbridge, and turned to spread the
panic. Meanwhile the reports of a formidable army advancing from
the rear so wrought on the fears of the garrison that, when the
handful who had crossed on the bushy bridge fell on them, they
offered no resistance. This also allowed the scaling forces to pour in,
so that within a short time the siege was turned into a rout, wherein
the cavalry played a prominent part. The zeal of the allies was
already indicated by smoky columns in different parts of the city, and
the foot-soldiers hastened to share in the rich plunder and intercept
the women.
Most of the fugitives had gathered on an adjacent height, and
though no attempt was made that day to molest them, yet they
began to fear that men who could so readily capture one of the
strongest fortresses in the country, would find no difficulty in reaching
them anywhere; therefore, after listening to the advice of
messengers sent by Cortés, Yohuatzin concluded to surrender, and
presented himself on the following day with a large retinue and rich
presents. The Mexicans were as usual blamed for the opposition
offered. He would have submitted before, but thought it best to
expiate the fault of resistance by allowing the Spaniards to pursue,
so that after spending their fury they might be more ready to forgive.
[1091]

There was no time at present to extend the reconnoissance

farther in this direction, and after a brief rest Cortés turned northward
to the lakes. The route over the mountains proved far more difficult
than before, and after issuing from the pine forest the army entered a
desert country terminating in a three-league pass through the Ajuzco
Mountains. Here thirst became so intense that several natives
succumbed.[1092] This suffering was relieved in a hamlet not far from
the pass.
On the following day they passed through a fine and cultivated
country toward Xochilmilco, that is to say, Field of Flowers, aptly
named, for round almost every house, particularly on the outskirts,
was a flower-garden enclosed by canals. Many of them were of the
chinampa class, or floating gardens,[1093] the outgrowth of early
Aztec weakness, now forming a picturesque border to the lake
towns. Altogether the aspect was most pleasing, while the buildings
of the central parts were artistic and striking. Besides the strength
added by canals and moats, pile buildings were frequent, and
intrenchments had been thrown up and drawbridges raised to defend
the approach against any enemy of the Aztecs, for its loyalty to the
queen city was fully as great as that of Iztapalapan. It was the most
important place on the thickly settled fresh-water lake. Bishop
Garcés relates that angels were heard to sing praises in the Mexican
tongue when it was converted.[1094] The usual summons was issued
by the Spaniards, and no heed being given, they attacked in three
divisions by different approaches. The enemy fell back behind the
raised bridges and intrenchments, whence they kept up a steady
volley. The archers and arquebusiers replied briskly, and covered the
van as it plunged into not very deep water and waded across to
capture the fortifications. This effected, the foe was driven from one
retreat to another. Seeing how affairs went, they sought to parley, but
the pursuers paid no heed, regarding it as a trick to gain time for the
removal of their families and property. Within half an hour the greater
part of the city was won, and soldiers and allies were sacking as they
advanced. The foe rallied now and then to cover their retreat, and in
one instance managed to despatch two soldiers who had allowed
avarice to overcome prudence.
Not long after, a body of some ten thousand warriors, reënforced
by fugitives from the city, was seen advancing from the rear as if to
cut off retreat. They were already close at hand when first observed,
and without losing a moment Cortés charged them at the head of a
body of cavalry.[1095]
At first they boldly faced the animals, and fought so well as to
severely wound four, besides several riders; but the mounted body
kept breaking through their ranks and then turned to fall on the rear.
This movement proved decisive, and the enemy dispersed in flight,
the horsemen scattering in pursuit. Already weakened by the severe
march across the mountains, the horse of Cortés became quite
exhausted, and while its rider was striking right and left into a large
body of fugitives, it fell. No other horseman being near, the enemy
gathered courage and rushed upon the general, who had risen to his
feet and stood with sword in hand to defend himself. It was a critical
moment, and had not a brave Tlascaltec warrior come to his rescue
thus opportunely, the career of the Estremaduran would have ended
there; for he had already received a severe blow on the head and
was about to be dragged away when thus rescued. The general’s
body-guard then came up and cut in pieces his late stupid assailants
—stupid because they might so easily have killed him, and did not.
[1096]
The pursuit was not long maintained, tired as the horses were,
and remounting his steed Cortés led the way back to camp in the
square.
Late as it was he superintended the filling of all the channels
which broke the causeways, and the erection of defences, and
ordered the soldiers to put in order their arms and prepare arrows.
The forces were distributed at three points, and extra guards were
posted for the night, together with bodies of troops at probable
landing-points. These precautions were prompted chiefly by the
evident effort of the last body of the enemy to shut up the army
within the city, a movement which boded other attempts, as Cortés
rightly supposed.
When Quauhtemotzin heard that the Spaniards had marched
against Xochimilco he called a council to consider the course to
adopt, and the result was the despatch of reënforcements. Finding
that the city had so easily fallen, he became furious. The gods were
indignant at the outrages of the strangers. Arms must be employed
more manfully, and, these failing, the loyal ones must let their nails
grow, as the last means of protection. The first step should be the
recovery of Xochimilco. That very night two thousand canoes were
sent with some twelve thousand warriors, and a similar force by land,
all approaching stealthily, without music.[1097]
The rumor of a probable night attack kept the Spanish camp on
the alert, and advised of this, the enemy made no attack. At dawn
their canoes were already swarming round the city, the inmates
rending the air with loud and repeated shouts, and brandishing their
weapons, those of the chiefs being captured Spanish swords. “With
your own arms you shall be killed, and we will eat you!” they cried.
“We fear you not, for Montezuma is dead!” At the same time the land
forces were seen approaching, evidently to assist the fleet in
besieging the Spaniards within the city, which would give the
Mexicans greater advantage, as they had well learned during the
siege of Mexico. Cortés understood the manœuvre, and leaving the
greater part of the infantry and allies to guard the city, he sallied with
most of the horse, in three parties, a few of the infantry and several
hundred Tlascaltecs, breaking through the enemy’s ranks and
gaining the foot of a hill in their rear, the Tepechpan.
While the enemy were rallying, Cortés led the horse round to
their denser flank, and gave orders to the infantry to allure the
Mexicans by climbing the steepest part of the hill and pretending to
escape. This succeeded, and the next moment they were attacked in
several directions with such effect as to cause a panic and drive
them in flight toward a quarter where one division of horse had taken
a stand. Five hundred Mexicans covered the field and five leaders
were among the captured, while the Spanish loss was only one
soldier and a few allies, including three Tlascaltec chiefs, although a
number were wounded. During the pursuit the foremost division of
horse came upon a further Mexican reënforcement, estimated at ten
thousand, which rallied the fugitives and caused the pursuers to halt.
Soon, however, the remaining force came up, the charge was
continued, and the Mexicans routed.[1098]
Too tired for long pursuit, the Spaniards returned by ten o’clock
in the morning to Xochimilco, where their garrison had repulsed the
lake force. The fight had been fierce, and the soldiers had exhausted
all their ammunition, capturing in return two Spanish swords. These
victories brought little satisfaction, however, for the captives gave
information that the forces so far sent were but detachments of the
armies destined for Xochimilco, which must be recovered, and the
Spaniards driven forth, if it cost the lives of all the men in Mexico.
The Spaniards might defeat force after force, but even victory must
so weaken them that the Mexicans would finally triumph. This
seemed to be confirmed by the movements of the fleet, which,
though repulsed, was still hovering thereabout.
Cortés now gave orders to burn the city, as a warning to the
wilful inhabitants and preparatory to its evacuation. The soldiers,
who had been interrupted in their plundering the day before, obeyed
with alacrity. Xochimilco was a wealthy city, and not a Spaniard or
ally but obtained an abundance of robes, feathers, and other effects,
and even some gold, which helped to cheer those whom ordinary
merchandise and slaves did not satisfy. The enemy had been
watchful, however, and in their canoes they flitted round the city to
cut off stragglers. At one point quite a charge was made, wherein
several Spaniards were wounded and four carried off alive. This
event did more to cast a gloom over the army than many defeats, for
all knew the fate of prisoners.[1099]
After a stay of three days, all fraught with hard fighting, the army
filed out from Xochimilco, presenting the appearance of a dilapidated
caravan rather than of a reconnoitring and fighting expedition, so
much so that Cortés thought it necessary to remonstrate, but in vain.
The enemy hovered about like vultures, to harass them in what they
regarded as a retreat. The march was made in regular fighting order,
with cavalry distributed in three sections, in van, rear, and on flank.
In order to complete the reconnoissance, a north-westerly route was
taken to Coyuhuacan, the centre of a series of inner towns which lay
clustered within a radius of a league and a half, along the shores or
upon islands in the lake, all picturesque in their pyramidal temples
and their white walls, which gleamed amidst blooming orchards and
shady groves. Coyuhuacan itself was a beautiful town, and Cortés
felt so captivated with it that he afterward made it for some time his
favorite residence.[1100] It had been evacuated, but toward and
beyond Mexico the lake teemed with canoes, while in every direction
spread one continuous extent of farms and hamlets, connected by
causeways and roads with busy traffic. To Alderete and friar
Melgarejo this was a novel scene, and they could not refrain from
expressing their admiration at the enterprise and prowess of Cortés
and his followers in undertaking so vast a conquest. God’s aid alone
could have enabled them to succeed as they had done.[1101]
The army remained here over the following day, chiefly to
examine the place as intended head-quarters of a besieging force. It
was found satisfactory; and while arrows were prepared and the
wounded tended, the general advanced along the causeway leading
to Mexico and expended his remaining ammunition in the useless
capture of the temple fortress of Xoloc,[1102] during which a number
of soldiers were wounded, though the enemy suffered considerably.
After offering to heaven the fiery sacrifice of pagan temple, the army
proceeded through Tlacopan without halting, for they had no
ammunition, and this place had been examined on the previous
expedition. This unexpected haste encouraged the Mexicans to
come forth in great numbers and attack the baggage train and rear.
Owing to the level nature of the ground the cavalry found no difficulty
in repelling them, yet they caused more trouble, and succeeded
even in carrying off two of the favorite equerries[1103] of Cortés. He
was deeply grieved at the loss, and partly with a view to avenge
them, partly to inflict a lesson which should save the army from such
annoyance, he formed an ambuscade beside the road with twenty
horse. Seeing the other ten horses engaged as formerly in covering
the rear, the Mexicans continued their pursuit. At a favorable
moment the hidden horsemen appeared, and soon over a hundred
of the flower of the Mexicans lay dead upon the ground,[1104] their
rich panoplies, dresses, and arms offering a pleasing addition to the
already heavy plunder. Freed from further molestation, the army
proceeded through Azcapuzalco and Tenayocan to Quauhtitlan, all
deserted. Here the army clustered round camp fires of green wood,
wet from a recent shower and supperless. Next morning they
followed the route already pursued during the flight from Mexico,
round Zumpango Lake through Citlaltepec, and thence through
Acolman to Tezcuco.[1105]
A mass of booty and slaves being now at hand, a general
distribution was ordered, the second in Tezcuco. Again, says Bernal
Diaz, Cortés disregarded his promises and secured not only for
himself the objectionable fifth, but allowed his favorites to carry off
the prettiest women before they were brought forward at auction.
Many who remembered the former tricks hid their women and said
they had escaped, or they declared them free servants from allied
tribes; while a few managed to obtain a private branding, paying the
fifth required. A large proportion of the soldiers were so heavily in
debt for stores and fifths that their booty left them no surplus.[1106]
While the reconnoitring expeditions had on the whole been
fraught with pecuniary benefit and glory, they had nevertheless
served to open the eyes of many to the difficulty of the great
purpose, the capture of Mexico. This was particularly the case with
the Velazquez party, whose adhesion before the Tepeaca campaign
had been compulsory, and after it mercenary in its motives. Every
obstacle to them appeared terrible, magnified through constant fear
of the dreaded stone of sacrifice, on which so many comrades had
already been laid. And this they were encountering for what? the
advancement of an envied usurper and a pecuniary reward far
beneath their expectations. The failure at Iztapalapan, the repeated
inroads of the Mexicans, unabashed by constant repulses, and the
hardships of the campaigns, particularly the last, all tended to
support their arguments against Cortés’ plans as chimerical,
involving long delays, constant toil, and waste of life, and with poor
recompense save for Cortés and his favorites.
Presently the affair assumed the color of conspiracy, headed by
Antonio de Villafañe, a common soldier from Zamora, who is claimed
by Herrera to have had the active or passive sympathy of some
three hundred malcontents, nearly one third of the army. The
professed object was to secure a pliable leader who would consult
the wishes of the soldiers, even those desirous of returning. Such a
man, and withal of great influence and valor, was Verdugo, the
brother-in-law of the all-powerful patron Velazquez, and him the
conspirators chose as the new captain-general, unknown to himself,
since he might prove too honorable to engage in plots against the
commander. As a reward for his own efforts Villafañe claimed the
position of alguacil mayor, while other friends and influential men of
Narvaez were assured of the remaining offices, from alcalde mayor
and maestre de campo downward, now held by the retainers of
Cortés, as well as a share in the arms and other effects of the
doomed number.[1107] It was arranged that when Cortés was seated
at table with his intimate friends, as Alvarado, Sandoval, Olid, and
Tápia, a letter was to be handed him, as if coming from his father,
and while he was reading, the conspirators should fall on and stab
him and his supporters, since all must be removed who might prove
troublesome. The new officers were thereupon to be proclaimed,
together with the liberal plan agreed on, by which it was hoped to
allure even the friends of Cortés.
There were too many in the secret, however, and Cortés was a
man of magnetic influence. At the eleventh hour, two days after the
return from Xochimilco, says Diaz, an accomplice, struck with
compunction, rushed distractedly to the feet of Cortés and implored
pardon for having even dared to listen to the vile machinations. He
thereupon revealed the plot and stated that Villafañe carried the
names and details on a list in his breast-pocket. Cortés quietly
summoned his captains. He represented the need for a “remedy,
since, besides the scandal, it was evident that all the Spaniards must
perish if once they turned one against the other; and to this end not
only declared foes but allies would join.”[1108]
Attended by Sandoval and others, Cortés hastened to the house
of the accused and found several persons assembled. Some were
secured as they sought escape. Villafañe found time to take a paper
from his breast and tear it in pieces, but Cortés gathered and
arranged them,[1109] and was grieved to read the names of quite a
number of promising persons whom he had honored and regarded
as friends. Villafañe confessed the details of the plot, which had
been forming since the Tepeaca campaign. A court-martial was held,
presided over by Cortés himself, and there being no doubt of his
guilt, the accused was condemned to death and promptly hanged
from the window of his dwelling.[1110]
Cortés had probably no doubt regarding the guilt of the persons
named on the list, but the prosecution of so many notable men might
not be prudent, and would only widen the breach between himself
and the malcontents and gain them sympathy. The day following the
execution the general called a meeting. Many were the consciences
that pricked their possessors to trembling on that occasion. But the
sage Cortés preferred the traitors should risk their necks in winning
for him Mexico, rather than himself to break them with a rope.
Napoleon, who in national warfare could open with his sword the
veins of the people until there poured forth torrents of blood, shrank
in horror from blood shed in civil broils. It was policy with Cortés,
however. So, after finishing his narration of the conspiracy, he coolly
informed them that Villafañe had refused to reveal his accomplices,
and he could not therefore name the guilty. There were no doubt
men amongst them with real or fancied grievances which may have
induced them to harbor resentment; but let them frankly state their
wrongs and he would seek to right them. If he had erred, let the error
be named. The conclusion of the affair created general satisfaction.
Thankful for their escape, the guilty sought both by words and deeds
to prove their devotion, and although Cortés kept his eye upon them,
there was no indication that he suspected any. He rather sought to
win them back with favors.[1111] So impressed were his intimate
followers by the risk to which so valuable a life had been exposed
that they insisted on his accepting a body-guard of twelve select
men, under the command of Antonio de Quiñones, an hidalgo of
Zamora,[1112] who watched over him day and night.

FOOTNOTES
[1062] This is according to Cortés; others differ slightly, and Ixtlilxochitl increases
the Tezcucan force to 60,000. Hor. Crueldades, 13.

[1063] From tocatl and xal, spider and sand. Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., ii. 29. The
lake in which it lies is divided about the centre by an artificial causeway about one
league long, running from east to west, the southern water being now known as
San Cristóbal Ecatepec, from the town of that name, and the northern water as
Xaltocan or Tomanitla, San Cristóbal being also the general term for both waters.

[1064] See Native Races, ii. v.

[1065] Bachiller Alonso Perez, afterward fiscal of Mexico. Bernal Diaz, Hist.
Verdad., 135.

[1066] This incident was commemorated by some poetic follower in a ballad which
became a favorite with the conquerors:

En Tacuba está Cortés,

Con su esquadron esforçado,
Triste estaua, y muy penoso,
Triste, y con gran cuidado,
La vna mano en la mexilla,
Y la otra en el costado.

Which may be translated literally:

In Tacuba stands Cortés,

With his troopers strong and brave:
Sad he was and deeply grave;
Sad, and heavily oppressed.
With one hand his cheek he pressed;
Against his side, the other.

[1067] So runs Bernal Diaz’ account, which appears a little exaggerated, for
recently Cortés had shown the greatest caution, and would hardly have allowed
himself to be so readily trapped on so memorable a spot. Hist. Verdad., 126.
Cortés states that not a Spaniard was lost, though several Mexicans fell. Cartas,
187.

[1068] Herrera, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. vii.

[1069] They begged permission to return home, says Chimalpain, Hist. Conq., i.
31. Herrera relates that the efforts of Ojeda, by Cortés’ order, to take from the
Tlascaltecs the gold part of their booty so offended them that they began to desert.
The extortion was accordingly stopped, dec. iii. lib. i. cap. vii. Clavigero doubts the
story. Prescott regards the departure of the allies as distasteful to Cortés; but we
have seen that he did not care at present to encumber himself with too many
unruly auxiliaries to prey upon the peaceful provinces. The Tlascaltecs would
willingly have remained to share in raiding expeditions.

[1070] Including 8000 Tezcucans under Chichinquatzin. Ixtlilxochitl, Hor.

Crueldades, 15. On March 12th, says Vetancurt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 154.

[1071] Also known as Chimalhuacan-Chalco, to distinguish it from Chimalhuacan

on Tezcuco Lake.

[1072] Lorenzana inspected the position in later times. Cortés, Hist. N. Esp., 214.

[1073] ‘Que todos los que allí se hallaron afirman.’ Cortés, Cartas, 190. The
general lauds the achievement with rare fervor for him. Bernal Diaz sneers at the
river of blood story; but then he was not present to share the glory. The Roman
Mario was less dainty than these Spaniards under a similar circumstance,
commemorated by Plutarch; or as Floro more prosaically puts it: ‘Ut victor
Romanus de cruento flumine non plus aquæ biberit quam sanguinis barbarorum.’
Epitome, lib. iii. cap. iii.

[1074] Fifteen, says Bernal Diaz. Chimalpain, the Chalcan narrator, states that his
tribe lost 350 men, but killed 1500 foes, capturing the captain-general,
Chimalpopocatzin, a relative of the emperor, who now became a captain among
the Tezcucans, and was killed during the siege. Hist. Conq., ii. 34. Some of these
facts are evidently not very reliable. He also assumes that Sandoval lost eight
soldiers on again returning to Tezcuco.

[1075] The ‘comissario’ or clerk in charge of the bulls was Gerónimo Lopez,
afterward secretary at Mexico. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 129. This author names
several of the arrivals, some of whom became captains of vessels. A number also
arrived during the following week, he adds, notably in Juan de Búrgos’ vessel,
which brought much material.

[1076] Gomara mentions also Maxcaltzinco as a distant place. Hist. Mex., 186.

[1077] The chiefs were awaiting orders to appear before Cortés. The general told
them to wait till tranquillity was more fully restored. The name of the other soldier
was Nicolás. Cortés, Cartas, 203-5. Herrera assumes that Barrientos arrived in
camp during the late Tepeaca campaign, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xvii.
[1078] Of the rank and file none suffered penalty on returning, for captivity was
regarded as disgraceful only to a noble. Native Races, ii. 419.

[1079] Bernal Diaz states that the soldiers were tired of these repeated calls, many
being also on the sick-list, but Cortés had now a large fresh force only too eager
for a fray attended with spoliation.

[1080] According to a native painting the army entered here April 5th, which is a
day or two too early, and received a reënforcement of 20,000. See copy in
Carbajal Espinosa, Hist. Mex., ii. 523.

[1081] So says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 130, who names four. Cortés allows
only two killed and twenty wounded; how many fatally so, he carefully omits to
mention. Cartas, 194.

[1082] Twenty fell, says Bernal Diaz. He speaks of two futile attempts on the
previous evening to scale the central hill. It seems unlikely for soldiers, tired by
repulse and march, to undertake so difficult a feat, and that at the least assailable
point.

[1083] Yet Bernal Diaz relates a story to show that the order was a mere pretence.

[1084] Cartas, 196; Torquemada, i. 536.

[1085] Some write Xilotepec. Bernal Diaz mentions Tepoxtlan, which may have
been visited by a detachment.

[1086] Place of the Eagle. Corrupted into the present Cuernavaca, which
singularly enough means cow’s horn.

[1087] See Native Races, v.

[1088] Cortés was so captivated by the alluring clime and scenery that he made
the town his favorite residence in later years. It was included in the domains
granted to him, and descended to his heirs. Madame Calderon speaks of his
ruined palace and church. Life in Mexico, ii. 50.

[1089] Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 311. Brasseur de Bourbourg calls him Yaomahuitl.

[1090] ‘El vno se quebró la pierna ... y se me desvanecia la cabeça, y todavia

pasè yo, y otros veinte, ô trienta soldados.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 132. Solis
misinterprets the passage, and gives this author credit for leading the party. Hist.
Mex., ii. 362. Vetancurt calls the district toward this spot Amanalco. Teatro Mex.,
pt. iii. 155.