Seneca on Death

Author(s): Russell Noyes Jr.

Source: Journal of Religion and Health , Jul., 1973, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Jul., 1973), pp. 223-
240
Published by: Springer

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27505179

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Seneca on Death 223

Seneca on Death

RUSSELL NOYES, Jr.

Lucius Annaeus Seneca, the foremost exponent of Roman Stoic philoso

phy, dwelt extensively upon the subject of death in his writings. The key
to the ethics he espoused lay in conquering the fear of death; he urged
premeditation throughout life in preparation for its final and climactic
hour. Indeed, Seneca saw learning to die as preparation for life; hence he
made it a goal of his practical philosophy. He raised the human will to
lofty heights by his call for men to seize power over tyrannical fortune
and, if necessary, to end their lives to maintain supremacy. In contrast to
the Christians of the following era, he was uncertain of existence after
death and did not regard this life as a preparation for the next one. Con
sequently, he did not consider the manner of dying to be an important
determinant of an afterlife as did the Christians. Like them, however, he
recognized the importance of this last stage of life and viewed it as a
long-awaited moment when a man's beliefs were put to their severest
test. If he died well, a man died bravely and gladly. Since dying held con
tinuity with the life of the Stoic, early contemplation of the event influ
enced his moral development. Seneca's teachings stand in sharp contrast
I am indebted to Roger A. Hornsby, Ph.D., Professor and Chairman of the Department
of Classics, University of Iowa, for his review and criticism of this manuscript.

Russell Noyes, Jr., m.d., is an Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the University of

Iowa College of Medicine, Iowa City, Iowa.

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224 Journal of Religion and Health

to our own and deserve re-examination during a time when attitudes to

ward death are undergoing change.

Life and works

Seneca was born in Corduba, Spain, in 4 B.C. of wealthy and cultured

parents.1 He was of delicate constitution and suffered serious illness dur
ing his childhood. In Rome, he studied rhetoric and philosophy and, in
early adult life, rose to wealth and prominence as a pleader of causes. He
became a senator under Caligula, but the latter, envious of his talents,
marked him for destruction. The emperor was restrained from killing
him only because he believed that Seneca's ill health would soon result
in death. Under Claudius, Seneca rapidly rose to eminence. Accused,
probably falsely, of adultery by Claudius' wife, Messalina, he was ban
ished to Corsica, where he remained for eight years. A succeeding wife,
Agrippina, brought about his return and entrusted him with the educa
tion of her son, Nero. When, in 54 A.D., Nero became emperor, Seneca
served as his prime minister. The restraint that his counsel imposed up
on the emperor, however, led to strained relations between them, and in
59 A.D. the philosopher retired to his estates. Becoming implicated in an
abortive conspiracy in 65 A.D., he was bidden to take his own life. He
did so in the company of his wife, who had insisted upon sharing his
death.
Seneca's death was a truly noble one, becoming to a Stoic if not to Sen
eca himself. According to Tacitus, when Nero's message reached him,
"undismayed he asked for tablets upon which to make his will. When
this was refused by the centurion, he turned to his friends and said that
since he was prevented from rewarding their service, he would leave to
them one thing, and yet the best thing, that he had to leave?the pattern
of life. ... At the same time he reminded his weeping friends of their
duty to be strong, now by his conversation, now by sterner rebuke, ask
ing them what had become of the precepts of wisdom and of the philoso
phy which through so many years they had studied in the face of im
pending evils. . . . Then he embraced his wife and, with a tenderness

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Seneca on Death 225

somewhat in contrast to his fortitude, entreated her to moderate her grief

and not nurse it forever, but in the contemplation of a well-spent life to
find honorable consolation for the loss of her husband."2
A popular writer in his own day, Seneca was both poet and philoso
pher. He left, in addition to his philosophical works, nine tragedies that
had an important influence upon Elizabethan drama. His seven books of
natural history reveal his humanistic approach to the study of a subject
he regarded as important to followers of Stoic philosophy. Seneca's mor
al treatises were his supreme achievement. In them he put forth practical
principles for insuring the wise conduct of life. They contain little ab
stract speculation, being based upon a thorough knowledge of human
nature. Few writers, ancient or modern, have equaled his understanding
of the pathology of the mind. Within his writings may be found an in
cisiveness of style, a vividness of illustration, a richness of experience,
and at times a tolerant understanding of human weakness. Seneca wrote
in "pointed" silver Latin, an elaborate and rhetorical style that served to
highlight Roman vigor and pride. It is of interest that his religious and
moral maxims approximated those of Christianity so closely that the ear
ly fathers of the church incorrectly believed that he had adopted their
faith. Basically a Stoic, he regarded himself as an eclectic philosopher
and seeker after the truth, both human and divine.

Stoic philosophy

Stoicism met the magnified needs of the Roman individual in the first
century.3 The political revolution begun by Alexander had stripped the
average man of the security of the city-state and had exposed him to an
increasingly cosmopolitan Roman Empire. Within the expanding em
pire, large government and paid armies further reduced the common
man's sense of importance. Widened horizons brought narrowed con
sciousness, and without the former spirit of nationalism, communal in
terest, and participation in government, a need for a new meaning for
life arose. This need led to a growth of individualism.
Even prior to the time of Socrates, who was accused of inculcating dis

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226 Journal of Religion and Health

belief in the Athenian gods, an increasing religious skepticism had de

veloped. Philosophy had been offered as a substitute for religion, and
early philosophers had attempted rational explanations of the universe
to replace superstitution. However, a need for a basis on which to de
termine their conduct to replace the guiding needs and laws of the city
state arose among citizens. A philosophy of behavior consequently be
came important and began to replace metaphysics. Ethics was the
philosophy of greatest importance in Rome and, in the first century,
Stoicism was the orthodox Roman morality.
Stoic ethics were based upon Stoic physics, according to which the
universe was governed by an organizing principle that operated on the
basis of strict causality.4 This principle or force, which Seneca called for
tune, was identified with the divine and was inherent in nature. As a re
sult of its operation, every event had its cause and occurred of necessity
in the unending chain of events. Man, since he belonged to nature, was
governed by this principle along with the rest of natural creation. His
reason, however, set him apart from the natural world and provided him
with a means of understanding the causal connections to be found every
where about and within him. Though regarded as incapable of perfect
knowledge, a man's reason was seen as his divine potential that, through
philosophical search for truth, should be developed toward perfection.
The Stoics saw reason guiding men toward the ultimate goal of virtue
or moral perfection. Because they regarded events as having no super
natural significance, they viewed virtue as an end in itself and the su
preme good. Only through the exercise of free choice toward the attain
ment of virtue did the Stoic achieve an existence or identity apart from
nature. For him, this was life itself. In order that his will remain free, the
Stoic called for harsh mastery of his egocentric and unruly passions. He
did not deny their existence, but regarded them as determined by fortune.
The Roman Stoic strove to become a sage or one who achieved perfec
tion of reason and virtue. This ideal, while unattainable, was, neverthe
less, worthy of life-long pursuit.
The humanistic ethical principles developed by the Stoics were based

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 Seneca on Death 227

upon their understanding of the world. The basic unity of the universe
led them to a recognition of the essential brotherhood of mankind,
which called for the practice of love and justice in all human relation
ships. The highest ideal of the Stoic way of life became the fulfillment of
social obligations. Taking precedence over individual duties, these prin
ciples forced a man to undertake an altruistic conversion of his basic na
ture. As a part of his social obligations, each man was assigned a neces
sary role and, whether emperor or slave, all were equally important.
The Stoics exhorted each man to play his role to the best of his ability,
while remaining obedient to the state and to the divine with which he
identified himself. Through his reason, man was admitted to commu
nion with the gods from whom he believed that he differed only by being
mortal. He also believed in the communion of all men's souls. Unity
applied to the divine as well as to the material world.

Fear of death
The fear of death was a central concern for Seneca. This fundamental
and powerful passion might dominate the human will and rob it of its
freedom. He noted that it sprang from man's unique recognition of the
fact that he is mortal. He saw it as a natural fear and an agonizing ac
companiment of man's divine gift of reason. Observing that neither chil
dren nor madmen fear death, he felt that it would, indeed, be paradoxical
if reason were unable to furnish the same security that innocence made
available. It was, for Seneca, the ultimate fear and the one that rendered
all thoughts of the future uneasy. Its strength may have stemmed in part
from the uncertainty of life in Seneca's day. He expressed this idea in
typically dramatic fashion when he said, ". . . nothing is so deceptive as
human life, nothing is so treacherous. Heaven knows! not one of us
would have accepted it as a gift were it not given to us without our
knowledge." (Ad Marc, XXII. 3)5 The source of it lay in the love of self,
the desire for unending existence, a dread of the process of dying, and
ignorance of the future. Apprehension of an afterlife made its contribu

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228 Journal of Religion and Health

tion to this multifaceted fear or, depending upon a man's beliefs, was
equaled by a fear of annihilation. Despite fear of the afterlife, Seneca em
phasized that it was the manner of dying, rather than death itself, that
aroused men's fears.
For Seneca, the fear of death seemed inescapable. He felt that the fre
quent and untimely deaths occurring wherever one looked served to re
mind his fellow-men that death might surprise them at any moment.
And surprise them it might, because, as he observed, using a metaphor of
the sea, "The number of men that will plan a voyage without thinking
of storms is very great." (De Tranq. An., XI.7) The philosopher himself
suffered from asthma, which served to keep the thought of death before
him. He described attacks as a sort of continued "last gasp," comment
ing that physicians of his day referred to the affliction as "practicing how
to die."
Seneca regarded the fear of death, though ubiquitous, as displaced in
certain instances. One of them was the apprehension associated with dis
ease. Three elements were responsible for the distress of disease, namely:
fear of death, pain, and interruption of pleasures. But, in his essay, "On
the healing power of the mind," he claimed that the fear of death did not
belong among them. In one penetrating passage he stated:

"... this fear is not a fear of disease, but a fear of nature. Disease has often
postponed death, and a vision of dying has been many a man's salvation. You
will die, not because you are ill, but because you are alive; even when you have
been cured, the same end awaits you; when you have recovered, it will not be
death, but ill-health, that you have escaped." (LXXVII.6)6

So powerful was this fear that it could rob a man of the very life he
feared to lose. "He who fears death will never do anything worthy of a
man who is alive." (De Tranq. An., XI.6) It could force an individual to
surrender his will to the dictates of fortune and accept slavery; the man
who surrendered not only displayed despicable lack of courage but sac
rificed a life of tranquility he might otherwise have attained. Therefore,
it was supremely important for a man to rid himself of this fear and es
sential if he were to attain the goal recommended by this Stoic philoso

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 Seneca on Death 229

pher. In a startling but meaningful aphorism he stated, "We must make

ready for death before we make ready for life." (LXI.4)

Preparation
Preparation for death was, for Seneca, preparation for life. The two were
inseparable. First he called for premeditation. Men were advised to lose
no opportunity to premeditate upon death in order to render the thought
familiar and death itself a matter of indifference. "If an evil has been
pondered beforehand, the blow is gentle when it comes. (LXXXVI.34)
Rehearse the thought of death every day, that you may be able to depart
from life contentedly; for many men clutch and cling to life, even as
those who are carried down a rushing stream clutch and cling to briars
and sharp rocks." (IV.5) By means of courage and philosophical detach
ment, an individual might surround himself with a protective armor and
make himself impervious to death. To endure the awareness, of ap
proaching death required long practice. Seneca praised this accomplish
ment and expressed the view that brave endurance of death was among
the greatest achievements of the human mind.
Essential to overcoming the fear of death, Seneca felt, was submission
to nature. Servitude was avoided when a man, instead of rebelling
against the laws of the universe, made their dictates his will. It was of
some consolation that the gods and man alike were subject to nature's
law; there were no exceptions. The man who attained virtue ". . . never
cursed his luck, and never received the results of chance with dejection;
he believed that he was a citizen and soldier of the universe, accepting his
tasks as if they were his orders." (CXX.12) Contemplation of death was
an aid to moral and spiritual growth. For example, as it led men to dis
cover their oneness with nature, it provided a guiding principle for life.
To the extent to which they identified themselves with this principle,
men realized an opportunity to become the ideal that they placed before
themselves.
If not overwhelming, of course, the fear of death provided an oppor
tunity for a man to test and strengthen his character and, kept in the

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230 Journal of Religion and Health

forefront of his thoughts, it remained a continuous spur to moderate and

thoughtful living. The man who passed through life without experienc
ing adversity could never have known his potentiality or have gained
self-knowledge. Seneca pitied the man who might have been so unfortu
nate. Pointing to the early arrival of death, he exhorted men to temper
their anger and practice humanity toward one another. "Nothing," he
said, "will give you so much help toward moderation as the frequent
thought that life is short and uncertain here below; whatever you are
doing, have regard for death." (De Ira XII)
As a result of Seneca's contemplation of the fear of death, he cautioned
against excessive reliance upon the future and urged zestful living in the
present. Noting the link between hope and fear, he observed that ". . .
passions that look forward and are very solicitous for the future arouse
fear. Fear and craving for the future eat away at the mind. There is noth
ing more wretched then worry over the outcome of future events." (CI.8)
Seneca saw the man who was anxious about the future as one for whom
the present was unprofitable. Living for hope only produced fear of
death and was to be avoided. He urged men instead to live fully in the
present. "Let us postpone nothing. Let us balance life's account every
day. . . . One who daily puts the finishing touches to his life is never in
want of time." (CI.8)
In his essay "On the Shortness of Life," Seneca noted the enslaving
potentiality of a preoccupation with the future. Born of insecurity, this
approach to life could only render its author increasingly fearful by plac
ing him in the hands of fortune. Seneca wrote a vivid description of this
type of person and his plight. He said:

They keep themselves busily engaged in order that they may be able to live bet
ter; they spend life in making ready to live! They form their purposes with a
view to the distant future; yet postponement is the greatest waste of life; it de
prives them of each day as it comes, it snatches from them the present by prom
ising something hereafter. The greatest hindrance to living is expectancy, which
depends upon the morrow and wastes today. (De Brev. Vit., IX. 1)

In addition to this one, a variety of other worldly preoccupations, such

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 Seneca on Death 231

as the crowd, desire for wealth, and ambition, distracted men from the
recommended philosopher's life. All tended to remove death from view
and focus attention upon remote hopes.
Aging, which brought life's end ever closer, altered Seneca's perspec
tive on death and led him to realize that this natural process aided men
to prepare for death. He emphasized that, rather than simply arriving at
the end of life, death was a condition that had shaped the whole of it. In
harmony with nature's law, of birth and decline and life and death, a life
progressed toward its end from its very beginning. He observed that:

. . . every day a little of our life is taken from us; even when we are growing, our
life is on the wane. We lose our childhood, then our boyhood, and then our
youth. Counting even yesterday, all past time is lost time; the very day which we
are now spending is shared between ourselves and death. (XXIV.20)

He pointed out that the final hour does not bring death, but merely com
pletes a process long underway: ". . . it is the last but not the only
death!" (XXIV.22) Since a man's life was granted with the reservation
that one day he must die and since he had always lived according to this
agreement, he should have no complaint. He concluded simply that the
man ". . . who does not wish to die cannot have wished to live."
(XXX.10)
Old age was regarded by Seneca as a mixed blessing. It was accompa
nied by weariness, but it was also a time well suited for the attainment of
wisdom. Complete and victorious virtue combined with unwavering
judgment of the supreme good could only be the fruits of a long life
steadfastly devoted to their accomplishment. He said that no ". . . time
of life is more fitted to the attainment of a sound mind than that which
has gained the victory over itself by many trials and by long and oft-re
peated regret for past mistakes, and, its passions assuaged, has reached
a state of health." (LXVIII.14) Thus, relieved in large measure of the
burden of his desires, the aging Seneca described in himself a peaceful
spirit and an increasing acceptance of death. He felt that this acceptance

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232 Journal of Religion and Health

usually developed just at that moment when a man achieved his highest
potential. Here, then, was another resource in the preparation for death.
In his essay "On the Proper Time to Slip the Cable," Seneca dwelt fur
ther upon old age and its relation to death. He emphasized the impor
tance of the quality as opposed to the length of life and advised men to
end their lives, if necessary, to escape the enslavement of pain or senility.
His view was extreme: "... the foulest death is preferable to the cleanest
slavery." (LXX.21) About the death that arrived in old age, he expressed
varied feelings. "No ending," he said, ". . . is more painless; but there is
none more^lingering." (XXX.4) Yet with the boon bestowed by philoso
phy, men might be joyful at the sight of it for:

... if it falls to the lot of any man to be set gently adrift by old age, not suddenly
torn from life, but withdrawn bit by bit, oh, verily he should thank the gods,
one and all, because after he has had his fill he is removed to a rest which is
ordained for mankind, a rest that is welcome to the weary. (XXX. 12)
Seneca himself, in a letter to his friend Lucilius, claimed that he awaited
death cheerfully. He said simply, "I have lived . . . long enough. I have
had my fill; I await death." (LXI.4)

Dying
The hour ?f death upon which the Stoic had long meditated placed be
fore him the supreme test of his soul. For this reason, dying well became
a matter of extreme importance. Dying represented neither good nor evil,
according to Seneca, but might become either, depending upon the at
titude a man took toward it. Like most things regarded as ill, it could be
converted to good if a man succeeded in rising above it. First of all, Sen
eca said that dying well meant dying gladly. The freedom of the human
will depended upon its submission to necessity. If a man died by his own
choosing instead of rebelling against this universal necessity, he achieved
a final victory over fortune. "He who has learned to die has unlearned
slavery; he is above any external power, or, at any rate, he is beyond it."
(XXVI. 10) Fortune unleashed a powerful assault upon the soul at the

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Seneca on Death 233

moment of death, threatening it with loss of bodily pleasures, earthly

companions, and worldly goods and placing before it an uncertain fu
ture. With ". . . what terror do they die," said Seneca, picturing the
plight of those defeated at the hands of fortune, "feeling that they are
being dragged out of life, and not merely leaving it." (De Brev. Vit. XI. 1)
Secondly, dying called for bravery. ". . . an end that is near at hand,
and is bound to come, calls for tenacious courage of soul; this is a rarer
thing, and none but the wise man can manifest it." (XXX.8) Dying
posed the ultimate challenge to virtue and presented the soul with an
opportunity to achieve an otherwise unattainable height of courage. The
greater the danger and resultant fear, the greater the courage required to
overcome it. Consequently, dying, because it was an extreme threat, pro
vided an opportunity to display unusual strength of character. It was an
occasion to prove one's resolution and test one's knowledge of himself.
Seneca wrote, "If I am tortured but bear it bravely, all is well; if I die, but
die bravely, it is also well." (LXVII.15) To behave in an effeminate fash
ion in the course of an act so austere demonstrated lack of virtue and
corruption of soul. The man who died bravely might, by so doing, teach
others to endure similar hardships. The good man was, after all, born to
serve as a model for other men.
Dying not only represented a trial of a man's soul but also a final judg
ment of its strength. A variety of deceits or masks might well have borne
false witness before, but death stripped them away and provided an op
portunity for the soul to look into its very depths:
The showing which we have made up to the present time, in word or deed,
counts for nothing. All this is but a trifling and deceitful pledge of our spirit,
and is wrapped in much charlatanism. I shall leave it to Death to determine
what progress I have made. Therefore with no faint heart I am making ready for
the day when, putting aside all stage artifice and actor's rouge, I am to pass
judgment upon myself. . . (XXXVI.6)
Thus Seneca saw death placing a last judgment before a dying man sim
ply by removing encumbrances to a truthful view of himself and his now
completed life. He would discover whether the brave sentiments he had

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234 Journal of Religion and Health

expressed in the course of his life held true once philosophical studies,
learned discussions, and worldly opinion were set aside. At this point,
bereft of a certain future, a man would be thrown back upon and review
his past. This process held danger for one whose life had been misspent.
Perceptively, Seneca observed that:

No one willingly turns his thought back to the past, unless all his acts have
been submitted to the censorship of his conscience, which is never deceived; he
who has ambitiously coveted, proudly scorned, recklessly conquered, treach
erously betrayed, greedily seized, or lavishly squandered, must needs fear his
own memory. (De Brev. Vit. X.4)

This represented a waste of an otherwise precious possession; for the past

was always readily at hand, unchangeable, and out of reach of disease,
vexation, or any force fortune could unleash upon it.
Not only was a man free to choose the attitude he would adopt toward
death, but he was free to choose the time of it as well. It mattered little
whether he were to cause his death or merely to accept it; and it mattered
just a little whether he died early or late. The important thing was that a
certain quality of life be preserved. According to Seneca, a man should
not cling to life regardless of the circumstances, "For mere living is not a
good, but living well. Accordingly, the wise man will live as long as he
ought, not as long as he can." (LXX.5) Dying well he saw as an escape
from the danger of living ill. Consequently, in the face of the wretched
ness of incurable disease or the cruelty of men, an individual might seek
deliverance. Such deliverance was readily at hand. Seneca felt that if a
man were prepared to open his veins, he carried with him at all times the
means by which he might escape slavery. The responsibility for the value
of life was placed squarely upon the individual and, according to the
philosopher, left little room for complaint. He said, "Humanity is well
situated, because no man is unhappy except by his own fault. Live, if
you desire; if not, you may return to the place whence you came."
(LXX.16)
The human will received its most exalted expression in the suicide
proposed by Seneca. It remained unconquerable as long as its faithful

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Seneca on Death 235

ally, death, was at hand. "Slavery loses its bitterness when by a step I
can pass to liberty. Amidst the miseries of life, I have the refuge of
death." (De Consol. Marc.) While the way out of life lay open, fortune,
which otherwise held enormous power over individuals, became an ob
ject of scorn. And having readied himself to choose death, the Stoic de
veloped supreme mastery over dying. Said Seneca, "Just as I shall select
my ship when I am about to go on a voyage, or my house when I pro
pose to take a residence, so I shall choose my death when I am about to
depart from life." (LXX.12) In his decision to die by his own hand, Sen
eca proved true to his teachings. His willing death was a model of for
titude and a testimonial to the noble achievements of Stoic philosophy.
For Seneca, death chosen for oneself was not a panacea, however. He
regarded suicide prompted by a fear of death as cowardly, and one
prompted by boredom with life he considered a testimonial to the futility
of a man's beliefs. He noted that the good man should not simply live as
long as it pleased him, but as long as it was his duty. He recalled that,
when vexed by illness himself, he had desired to end his life but had been
restrained by the realization that his death would cause his father great
suffering. Obligation to loved ones that called for restraint might some
times call for an even more extraordinary display of strength on the part
of the human will. Seneca said, ". . . sometimes, even in spite of weighty
reasons, the breath of life must be called back and kept at our very lips
even at the price of great suffering, for the sake of those whom we hold
dear." (CIV.3) Again and again, as in this example, he called for his fol
lowers to demonstrate in their daily lives the kind of fortitude usually
confined to the battlefield. His words go beyond exhortation to reflect a
belief in a godlike capacity of the human will and reason.
Seneca cited the death of Canus as an example of one befitting a true
and noble philosopher. Condemned to death by Caligula, Canus was
playing chess when the centurion summoned him to join a column of
doomed men.

Having been called, he counted the pawns and said to his partner: "See that
after my death you do not claim falsely that you won;" then nodding to the cen

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236 Journal of Religion and Health

turion, he said: "You will bear witness that I am one pawn ahead." . . . His
friends were sad at the thought of losing such a man; but "Why," said he, "are
you sorrowful? You are wondering whether our souls are immortal; but I shall
soon know ..." His own teacher of philosophy was accompanying him, and
when they were not far from the low hill on which daily sacrifice to Caesar, our
god, was made, said: "What are you thinking of now, Canus, or what state of
mind are you in?" And Canus said, "I have determined to watch whether the
spirit will be conscious that it is leaving the body when that fleetest of moments
comes," and he promised that if he discovered anything, he would make the
round of his friends, and reveal to them what the state of the soul really is. (De
Tranq. An. XIV.8-9)
Seneca commented that this great man not only displayed a disdain for
death, but carried the philosopher's search for truth to the very last. By
such a death he achieved a form of immortality.

Seneca's message

The reawakened interest in the subject of death during the past decade
appears to be one manifestation of a reassertion of humanistic values in
reaction to the stifling domination of science. In medicine, this force for
change has shown itself in a renewed interest in the dying man and his
human experience apart from his terminal disease. It is most appropriate
that a re-examination of values focus upon man's awareness of death; it
is death that ultimately provokes his search for life's meaning. Seneca's
message today is both timely and provocative. Stoicism filled a need
among the citizens of the Roman Empire similar to one we now find un
met. The Stoic sought a sense of belonging and significance for the in
dividual man amidst the distant and immutable forces of his time. Today
we seek to establish the worth of the individual within an increasingly
impersonal technological society, declining nationalism, and a threat of
environmental destruction resulting from scientific advances. We appear
to have entered upon a second Renaissance in which science has replaced
the church. Like the humanists of that earlier period, we may learn from
study of the ancient philosophers.

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Seneca on Death 237

Consistent with an illusion of mastery over death achieved by the ad

vance of medical science, we have set death aside. We have, through at
taching a stigma, urged men not to think of it; and we have, to a certain
extent, robbed it of its impact by coaxing it into old age. We have not
dealt with it, but have simply removed it from view. Seneca urged quite
the opposite, because he recognized the enslaving character of the fear of
death. He recommended that men brace themselves against the on
slaughts of this ubiquitous and natural fear. What the common man of
today considers morbid opened the way for the Stoic to develop his
unique potential and achieve for himself the ultimate goals of wisdom
and virtue. As he daily contemplated his mortal nature, Seneca contin
uously confronted himself with the meaning of his existence. Meaning
was made to loom large, and in the process men rose above suffering and
death. In the process they gained a sense of their uniqueness and place in
the universe. Such contemplation was a potent prod to the recognition
and adoption of transcendent humanistic values. Having deprived our
selves of this prod to emotional and spiritual development, we have, ac
cording to Frankl,7 experienced a sense of meaninglessness that he has
called existential escapism, the neurosis of our time.
Seneca's works provide a refreshing reminder in our time of man's
uniquely human characteristics; namely, his free will and his reason. He
seems to point up a failure on the part of so many to appreciate the con
trol they have over their destiny. A recurrent theme presented by emo
tionally disturbed individuals, and one that psychotherapy attempts to
correct, is the attitude or feeling that forces outside of the person are in
control of his life and are responsible for what becomes of him. Seneca
allows us to see that as a man chooses a cause?which for him was virtue,
or moral perfection?he becomes that cause. In choosing the good over
evil, he becomes the good, and in the process transcends his being. Sen
eca pointed clearly to the value of examining human suffering in order
not only to rise above it and find tranquility but, more importantly, to
find there the meaning for an individual's existence. This opportunity
should be seized by psychotherapists even if it goes no further than an

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238 Journal of Religion and Health

exploration of the meaning of the illness for which a patient has sought
assistance. This aspect of psychotherapy is a neglected one. Too often
such treatment fails to deal with the whole man. It fails to emphasize the
significance of a patient's system of beliefs and leads him to see himself
as controlled by forces outside his awareness rather than as one capable
of free choice and mastery over those forces clearly visible to him.
Seneca made note of the intimate relation between the experience of
time and the fear of death. The more a man lived for the future, and con
sequently the less for the present, the greater his fear of death. Such liv
ing, requiring constant planning, striving, and delay of gratification,
prevents or limits the uniquely human and enriching inner experiences
of the moment. We observe this mode of functioning in extreme form in
the compulsive personality. It is noteworthy that fear of death is a fre
quent complaint among these patients. If differing attitudes toward the
future lead to differences in this fear, Seneca tells us that the converse is
also true. Recognition of death influences personality development. Sen
eca, in his recommendation for the abandonment of hope as a source of
the fear of death, seems to overestimate human capabilities. In his call
for a balanced approach to living, one not wholly oriented toward the
future, he seems most prudent.
Today old age is largely looked upon as a period of decline in health
and prestige. While retirement may provide long-deserved leisure, it ap
pears barren and wasteful to many who approach it. Seneca emphasized
the value of old age. He saw it as a time for the attainment of wisdom.
Erikson,8 in his "Eight Stages of Man," describes a final one bearing a
resemblance to the wisdom of Seneca. He points to several constituents
of a state of mind he calls "ego integrity." It is assurance of order and
meaning; it is a love of self that conveys a world order and a spiritual
sense; it is an acceptance of one's uniqueness and a comradeship with
humanity and with past ages. Lack or loss of ego integrity leads, accord
ing to Erikson, to despair that is signified by fear of death. The valuable
potential of old age should be given emphasis and the waning years of

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Seneca on Death 239

life recognized as harboring potential. We should see the value of psy

chotherapy for aging and dying persons mindful of the goals of those
stages of life. We should shift our orientation from its emphasis on
youth.
Continuity between dying and the life preceding that final stage,
which seems to be missing in our time, is abundantly evident in Seneca's
writings. We tend to view dying persons as unaware or incapable of ap
preciating their circumstances. The situation is consequently a meaning
less one for them and a desperate one for their families, who appreciate
what is happening but can see no way of dealing with it. The Stoic's
unconquerable will saw its most exalted expression in its dying hour;
consequently the moment was a climactic one. If a man died gladly it
was proof that his will had been free and in accord with the order of the
universe. Beyond this, Seneca pointed to the unique vantage point upon
life and, consequently, the unique value?also the danger?of the dying
stage. An individual was exposed to a truthful view of himself and a re
view of his past. Thus he might look upon his life from a new and per
haps distant perspective and might also, just as he achieved the height of
wisdom, view his life with fresh humility and understanding. The final
stage of life, because it harbors great potential, should be more thor
oughly studied and understood so that dying persons might be aided by
their physicians and ministers to realize that potential.9
Suicide opened the door to freedom for Seneca, and it was ultimately
the exit he chose for himself. This course of action, because of societies'
condemnation of it, is not open to men of today.10 Even the sometimes
mistaken interpretation of suicide as a manifestation of mental illness
leads to avoidance of the act. Most societies have condemned suicide be
cause they view this supremely independent act as destructive of its uni
fying forces. Even Seneca was restrained from killing himself by a sense
of obligation to his family and his fellow-men. For the average man,
even under unusual circumstances, suicide represents an extreme and un
justified action. Most men will, nevertheless, recognize its possibility

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240 Journal of Religion and Health

and, on occasion, give thought to it as a solution to problems in living.

From their reflection they may conclude, as Seneca did, that men live and
die by their own choice.
Seneca brings us a shocking reminder of the extent to which we have
attempted to escape the inescapable. He forces us to see that we have set
aside an important stimulus to zestful living and a potent prod to the
discovery of the meaning of our lives. Further, he reminds us of our
uniquely human reason and will, the strength of which has been under
mined by the forces of our time. His message reflects the pride and nobil
ity of the Roman Stoic. If at times it seems extreme, we should not ig
nore it, but rather hope that the almost divine strength of will that
Seneca demanded will not be required of men by future circumstances.
Let us also hope that men may discover, as Seneca did, the brotherhood
of mankind and learn thereby to live in harmony.

References
1. Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed., Hammond, N. G. L., and Scullard, H. H., eds.
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970.
2. The Complete Works of Tacitus, trans, by Moses Hadas. New York, Modern Li
brary, 1942.
3. Mendell, C. W., Our Seneca. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941.
4. Edelstein, L., The Meaning of Stoicism. Martin Classical Lectures, vol. 21. Cam
bridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966.
5. Seneca Moral Essays, trans, by J. W. Basore. The Loeb Classical Library, 3 vols.
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1928. Passages from Seneca's moral
essays, identified by abbreviated tide, are taken from this translation.
6. Seneca Ad Lucilum Epistulae Morales, trans, by R. M. Cummere, the Loeb Classical
Library, 3 vols., New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1917. Passages from Seneca's
epistles, identified by roman numerals, are taken from this translation.
7. Frankl, V. E., Psychotherapy and Existentialism: Selected Papers on Logotherapy.
New York, Washington Square Press, 1967.
8. Erikson, E. H., Childhood and Society. New York, W. W. Norton, 1950.
9. Noyes, R., "Care and Management of Dying," Arch. Int. Med., 1971,128, 299-303.
10. -, "The Taboo of Suicide," Psychiatry, 1968,37, 173-183.

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