Pragma-Dialectical Analysis and Evaluation of

Problem-Solving Discussion

M. A. VAN REES

Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric

University of Amsterdam
The Netherlands
E-mail: m.a.vanrees@uva.nl

ABSTRACT: In this article, after arguing that present approaches to improving problem-
solving discussions for various reasons are not satisfactory, I turn to the pragma-dialectic
approach to argumentative discourse to derive a normative framework that can serve as a
point of departure to enhance the quality of problem-solving discussions. I then show how
this approach can be used as analytical and evaluative instrument that can help the analyst
to establish whether participants in actual practice act in a fashion that is in accord with the
norms posited. Two real-life problem-solving discussions provide the material for this demon-
stration.

KEY WORDS: conversation analysis, pragma-dialectics, problem-solving discussion

1. INTRODUCTION

In all areas of public and private life people jointly try to find solutions
for real-world problems through discussion.1 The quality of these discus-
sions is a matter of more than marginal consequence, if only because the
interests that are at stake usually are considerable. Unfortunately, this
quality often leaves much to be desired, not just in the eye of the beholder,
but also in the perception of the participants.
In order to be able to enhance the quality of problem-solving discus-
sions, the first thing we need is a normative framework that can serve
as a point of departure for our efforts at improvement. And we need an
analytical instrument in order to be able to establish whether participants
in actual practice act in a fashion that is in accord with the norms posited
by this framework.
Existing research into problem-solving discussions so far has not
produced very satisfactory results with regard to these two requirements.
The reasons for this are twofold.
In the first place, this research, which, from the 1920s onward, for the
largest part has been carried out in the US, has a strong social science bent.
This means that there have been lots of studies of the influence of social-
psychological factors on the development and outcomes of problem-solving
discussions, such as group size, group cohesion, motivation, distribution of

Argumentation 17: 465–479, 2003.

 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
466 M. A. VAN REES

information, leadership styles, task complexity and task familiarity, but very
few of the role of the verbal interaction itself (Frey, 1996). And those few
have been rather disappointing. The main problem is that the research
usually consists in merely cataloguing the types of verbal activity performed
in discussion and the patterns in which these occur (e.g. Bales, 1950; Fisher,
1970, 1980 and Poole, 1981, 1983; Poole and Roth, 1989). The precise way
in which these activities actually are carried out, the content and form of
the verbal contributions to the discussion, are largely ignored. Thus it
remains unclear how the verbal interaction actually shapes the development
and outcomes of the discussion.
In the second place, quality of problem-solving discussions has turned
out to be a rather unmanageable notion (Hirokawa et al., 1996). Several
standards have been proposed, such as: the discussion should have a correct
outcome, participants should feel satisfaction, there should be an even
distribution of participation, and the discussion should follow Dewey’s
reflective thinking procedure (see for instance Gouran, 1988 and Gouran
et al., 1978). Each of these standards is problematic. It is impossible to
know whether the outcome of a decision is correct: the issues at stake are
too complex and there are too many perspectives from which they can
be considered. And a satisfied feeling of the participants or an evenly
distributed participation is not sufficient if we want to ensure that a high-
quality decision is going to be reached. And executing Dewey’s problem-
solving tasks in itself does not guarantee a superior result: what matters is
how these tasks are performed.
If we want to develop instruments for analyzing and evaluating problem-
solving discussions, a fresh perspective is needed. For this, it is useful to
look at the goals of problem-solving discussions. Problem-solving discus-
sions, obviously, have as their over-all goal finding a good solution to a
problem. But in order to do so, participants must do something else, as
well: they have to resolve in a rational fashion the differences of opinion
that rise in the different stages of the problem-solving process. These
differences arise because the problems that are at issue are too complex to
enable the mere application of a simple recipe: after all, that is the very
reason that a discussion is required in which the participants have to decide
on a suitable solution. Alternative analyses of the problem and its causes
and alternative solutions may present themselves and, with that, differences
of opinion arise and the need to deal with them. And these differences of
opinion will have to be resolved in a rational fashion: since the decision
will need to be an effective one, it becomes essential to carefully scruti-
nize the basis for the decision; pushing or selling a particular solution is
not particularly productive here.
Problem-solving discussions, then, can be seen as a form of verbal inter-
action in which participants try to resolve in a rational fashion the differ-
ences of opinion that rise in the various stages of the problem-solving
process.2 This means that a normative ideal of rational resolution of
 PROBLEM-SOLVING DISCUSSION 467

differences of opinion can serve as a standard for judging the quality of

these discussions, and that they can be analyzed and evaluated in the light
of this ideal.
A normative ideal of rational resolution of differences of opinion has
been elaborated in Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (1984, 1992) pragma-
dialectical approach to argumentative discourse. Central to this approach
is the ideal model of critical discussion that specifies the stages through
which rational resolution of a difference of opinion is attained, and the
speech acts that have to be performed in each of these stages. In this paper
I will explore how this model can be applied in the analysis and evalua-
tion of problem-solving discussions.

2. ANALYSIS

The ideal model of a critical discussion serves as a heuristic instrument

that enables the analyst to chart, with an eye toward subsequent evaluation,
the verbal interaction through which the problem-solving process is carried
out. It is a dialogue model, specifying the speech acts of opposing parties
that are relevant for the rational solution of a conflict of opinion. It directs
the analyst to isolate the dialectically relevant elements in the discussion:
the standpoints brought forward by the participants, the way in which these
are defended, and the way in which the difference of opinion is resolved
(Van Eemeren et al., 1993).
In order to trace the development of problem-solving discussions, the
conceptual instrument that pragma-dialectics offers must be applied sequen-
tially and dynamically. The analysis must clarify the temporal development
of the resolution process (in that respect the analysis is sequential). And
in doing so, it must concentrate on the way in which participants from
moment to moment respond to each other’s contributions (in that respect
the analysis is dynamic). The analysis traces which moves are accepted by
the other participants, which not, and in the latter case, what happens next,
which issues remain unresolved, which are resolved and with what result.
All the way through, the verbal behavior of the participants is expressly
taken into account: the analysis systematically refers to the details of the
way in which participants phrase their contributions. In order to do this,
the analyst must make use of insights into the way in which every-day
verbal interaction is carried on, including the various goals that participants
pursue in every-day talk. The result is an analysis that not only closely
follows the way in which the discussion develops, but also pinpoints the
way in which the verbal behavior of the participants contributes to this
development.
I will give a short demonstration of how this is done by analyzing some
fragments of an actual problem-solving discussion. In this discussion, the
management of a hospital tries to determine a strategy for negotiations
468 M. A. VAN REES

about future collaboration with a neighboring hospital. The discussion

revolves around a standpoint brought forward by B:
18 B: but what what you were saying Frits, (.) I thought you well
that we would get to that, the risk (.) that they er that maybe
20 they deliberately, by er now once again well just as we were
saying dragging their heels in the sand and slowing things down
and  er not doing
A and  yes
B: anything (.) that i-if you found yourself in the situation that
25 even at the ministry you had to say that you still hadn’t really
got anywhere at all with the collaboration, huh, with filling
in the details of the collaboration, and still had no more
than what er whatsisname er (.) Boom called that sherry er
 agreement
30 A:  yes yes, that’s what I told them again this afternoon. yes
B: that at some stage a sort of er (.) unease or uneasiness or or er
irritation will set in for people who actually do have something
to say about the collaboration,
A: yes
35 B: and they say okay, cut the cackle, this is getting no-one
anywhere, you people want (.) to set up a form of collaboration
that no-one’s  got any experience of at
A: that no-one’s  that’s not going to earn anything
B: all, er er that’s much too complicated, and and you clearly
40 haven’t got anything down on paper, er it’s not going to work,
one party is working in quite a different direction from the other,
(.)  cut the cackle,  amalgamation
A: (.)  (yes but)  yes yes but
B: hey, at least we know that model
B claims that there is a risk that the negotiators on the other side are delib-
erately trying to delay the collaboration, so that the Ministry will gain the
impression that ‘the whole thing is too complicated’ and accordingly
impose amalgamation. The word risk that B uses, is an indication of
the fact that a problem is being raised (see Jordan, 1984). Amalgamation
evidently is regarded by the conversationalists as an undesirable option.
During B’s statement of this problem, A several times throws in a ‘yes’,
and twice provides a supportive elaboration.
Now, how should we reconstruct A’s contributions? As an expression
of agreement? There are several reasons not to do so. For a start, A’s utter-
ances are in accord with what the general principles of turn-taking in con-
versation require: A’s behavior is the conventional way of showing
listenership, that is, displaying an understanding of the interlocutor taking
an extended turn and a willingness to let him do so (see Sacks et al., 1974;
Schegloff, 1982; Bublitzl, 1988). But also, with these utterances A is doing
 PROBLEM-SOLVING DISCUSSION 469

interpersonal work: he is trying to raise his status (Cheepen, 1988) by

demonstrating his being in the know and in control. In line 30, for example,
A observes that he himself has referred to the fact which B mentions; in
line 38, A supplements the information B is trying to provide at that
moment. All in all there is good reason not to reconstruct A’s contribu-
tions as an expression of agreement, but to consider them as relevant to
other goals than that of resolving the conflict of opinion.
Once A takes over the floor (after a couple of interruptions by C), we
can clearly see that indeed in actual fact he defends an opposing stand-
point. He argues that the problem that B raises does not exist:
52 A: but don’t worry, if I can just if I can just talk about him
C: yes
A: Egberts has tackled that point very well. he was clearly looking
55 strictly for simplification, of the formula. for the collaboration.
and to start with it wouldn’t work out the way we wanted but
later it did, and you’ll see it will end up a véry simple, clear,
lucid, binding formula. and the rest of it is all verse eighty-three,
and that formula will go there and then their lordships will be
60 satisfied.
Contrary to B’s allegation, A claims that the Ministry will not think things
are too complicated. To support this contention he advances the argument
that Egberts will present to the Ministry a simple formula for collabora-
tion that is in agreement with the wishes of ‘our’ side.
Clearly, a lot of reconstruction work is required in order to represent
A’s contribution in this way. We have to reconstruct ‘but don’t worry’ as
the standpoint ‘there is no such problem’, and ‘their lordships will be
satisfied’ as the argument ‘the Ministry will not think things are too com-
plicated’. One very obvious justification for doing so is that we may assume
A is trying to make his contribution be relevant to the ongoing course of
the talk – in accordance with Grice’s Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1975).
B has just put forward the standpoint that there is a risk that the Ministry,
as a result of the other side’s obstruction, will think things are too com-
plicated, and a relevant sequel would be to either agree or disagree with
this standpoint. And the wording in ‘has tackled’ and ‘simplification’
implies that the problem B introduced no longer exists because a successful
solution has been achieved for it. But we can add to this justification by
pointing out that the fact that A formulates his contribution in this partic-
ular way can be accounted for in terms of interpersonal work. ‘Don’t worry’
is an instantiation of the status-gaining strategy that Cheepen calls other-
attentiveness that the other person is not in a position to reciprocate; in
other words, A is patronizing. With ‘their lordships will be satisfied’, as
well, A is taking a superior stance, in this case, towards the Ministry. This
same stance is manifested in the way in which he phrases the argument
as a whole, which is one big display of control and superior knowledge:
470 M. A. VAN REES

evaluating Egberts’s behavior, detailing the development of the negotia-

tions, giving assurances, and, finally, evaluating the future proceedings. All
these are status-raising techniques, not immediately relevant to the reso-
lution of the conflict of opinion as such. In the reconstruction, then, A’s
contribution would be stripped of these authoritative overtones, and pared
down to the core of his standpoint and the arguments that he puts forward
in support of it. Incidentally, with a view towards evaluation, it is note-
worthy that A addresses only part of B’s standpoint: he does not attend to
B’s expressed fear for the obstruction of the other party.
B’s reaction to this opposition of A against his standpoint, as well, stands
in need of reconstruction. His contribution runs like this:
61 (---)
B: ye-es, that is of course  I think it is vèry important
A: ye-es, that is of course  yes
B: that that  Egberts should stay on our sìde
65 A: that that  and that part that’s exactly his line and we agree to
that and Bob’s your uncle. yeah you have to ram it down their
throat that’s all I can say about it
When we look at B’s reaction, at first sight, we might think we have to do
with an expression of agreement. But there are several reasons for not
reconstructing it so. B’s initial reaction to A’s argument that the problem
is non-existent is silence (line 61). He then embarks on a reply with a con-
cession (‘ye-es, that is of course’), which refers to part of A’s argument,
namely that Egberts is taking the same line as ‘us’. He says nothing about
whether Egberts’s support offers a solution for the problem he has signaled.
Silence, concessive start and the absence of explicit, direct agreement all
are in accordance with a general conversational strategy for expressing dis-
agreement in such a way as to minimize the threat to the social face of the
interlocutor which is inherent in a dispreferred second pair-part such as this
(see Pomerantz, 1984). So, there is a justification for reconstructing B’s
utterance as disagreement with A’s argument that the problem no longer
exists. Unfortunately for the analyst, B is interrupted by A and unable to
finish his contribution. But then, the interruption itself lends support to
the above reconstruction, because A certainly appears to interpret B’s con-
tribution as an expression of disagreement: he advances support for his
assertion regarding Egberts’s position (‘that’s exactly his line’), and sub-
sequently unilaterally closes the subject. Again, this merits note as a fact
that is relevant for the evaluation.

3. EVALUATION

After the analysis, we need to establish whether the discussion proceeds

in a fashion that is conducive to the goal of rational resolution, and if this
 PROBLEM-SOLVING DISCUSSION 471

turns out not to be the case, what is amiss, and why. Here, again, the model
of critical discussion turns out to be helpful. I will examine another real-
life problem-solving discussion and use the pragma-dialectical framework
to demonstrate this.
The discussion took place during the staff meeting of an organization
that initiates and manages co-counseling groups. The topic of the discus-
sion is the organization of additional training for group leaders, after the
one year of basic training that they receive. A has opened the discussion
with the question who should organize this.
As a first step, I will briefly relate what points of view are brought
forward in the discussion and how the linear process of trying to resolve
the differences of opinion evolves. I will present, in other words, the
result of an analysis that was carried out along the lines sketched in the
above.
After A’s introduction of the question, B briefly sketches the past
situation and then argues for the view that the organization of additional
training belongs to the domain of the training program committee: a stand-
point that A, later in the discussion, also will advance. B’s arguments elicit
no reaction; instead, D argues for his own point of view: he questions the
need for additional training. A and B attack one of the two arguments which
D adduces, but the one which he himself declares most important – the
group leaders have never asked for additional training – remains undis-
cussed. C then brings up another point: who is supposed to pay for the
training. During the ensuing discussion of this point, D repeatedly ques-
tions the need for additional training, but his questions receive no answer.
C replies with practical proposals for finding out what possible topics
for training might be and for integrating additional and basic training.
The discussion ends in general banter about the financial state of the
organization.
After this intermezzo B once again brings up for discussion the stand-
point that the program committee should organize the training. D objects
by pointing out that nobody on the committee can take on additional work.
When B rejects this line of argument as merely practical, D brings in
another argument: others may do the job just as well; he then once again
poses the question what need there really is for additional training. B says
she would like to discuss this question at another occasion, but C ‘answers’
it by bringing forward a standpoint of her own: before anything else, an
inventory of the topics on which training is required must be taken; that is
the only sensible basis for any policy at all. A counters that a committee
charged with organizing the training could do this; C maintains that it
should be done before appointing a committee, repeating her policy
argument. A then changes tack. He points out that an agreement has already
been made to organize additional training and that it is high time some-
thing were done about it. D denies the binding force of this agreement and
claims that it is not at all clear what urgency there is for such training. C
472 M. A. VAN REES

brings forward doubts of her own against the status of the agreement. The
discussion bogs down in an exchange of reproaches.
A manages to soothe the parties and re-initiates the discussion about
the question who should organize additional training. C responds by listing
sources for the inventory that she once again proposes. A doesn’t react to
this, but argues for his own proposal to charge the program committee with
the organization. C asks for a response to her proposal. A then repeats his
own proposal and says it amounts to the same thing. B supports A’s
proposal. C once more repeats her proposal. Asked for his opinion, D says
he agrees, but only because it will show there is no need for additional
training. When B reacts to this with the statement that additional training
always is necessary, C reiterates that an inventory of the topics on which
training is needed must be taken first, A repeats his proposal to charge a
committee with this task, and C repeats that first there needs to be an inven-
tory. The discussion closes with both C and A lamenting the fact that the
discussion is moving in circles, after which C unilaterally puts an end to
the impasse by implementing her own proposal through distributing the
tasks for taking an inventory among those present.
C and A’s lament seems justified: the discussion has got stuck in a
repetition of standpoints without any progress being made. C forces a break-
through, but none of the differences of opinion have been resolved. In
fact, the various standpoints have hardly been discussed at all.
A and B’s standpoint, that the organization of additional training belongs
to the domain of the training program committee, receives direct discus-
sion at only one point, when D argues against it by saying that it is not
feasible and that there are other people who can be charged with the task.
The first of these counterarguments is rejected as merely practical, the
second receives no response at all. For the rest, C and D’s reactions concern
the standpoint only indirectly; they address presuppositions of the question
to which it is presented as an answer.
D’s standpoint, that there is no need for additional training, is only
responded to with regard to a subordinate issue; his main point remains
undiscussed. D’s questions regarding this need receive from C merely prac-
tical proposals for conducting an inventory and for integrating initial and
additional training. A and B, implicitly or explicitly, declare these ques-
tions out of order.
C’s standpoint, that an inventory of the topics on which additional
training is required must be taken first, is not discussed at all; A, who is
C’s main opponent, does not respond to her arguments, but invariably
counters her proposal with his own one.
By investigating how the successive stages of critical discussion have
been executed in this particular discussion, I think we can reach a diag-
nosis of how this unfortunate course of events could develop. I will deal
with the stages in their order.
 PROBLEM-SOLVING DISCUSSION 473

3.1. The confrontation stage

In the confrontation stage of a critical discussion, the differences of opinion
that the discussion addresses are externalized. Our discussion pertains to
a multiple mixed difference of opinion: involved are three main standpoints
and three contra-standpoints against these, and all of these standpoints
meet with doubt. The three main standpoints are: additional training belongs
to the domain of the program committee (A and B); it is unclear if
there is a need for additional training (D); before anything else, an inven-
tory of the topics on which additional training is required must be taken
(C).
The three main standpoints are expressed, but this is not the case for
the doubt against them, the contra-standpoints, and the doubt against these.
That this doubt exists and that these contra-standpoints are being main-
tained can only be inferred from the fact that the participants repeatedly
respond to the expressed standpoints by bringing forward a different stand-
point of their own.
In itself, the fact that doubt and contra-standpoints are not expressed
explicitly is not unusual, nor does it necessarily form an impediment to a
proper execution of the procedure for resolution of a difference of opinion.
But the fact that the various positions which the participants take have not
been clarified, almost undoubtedly is one of the causes for the defective
execution of the subsequent stages which we shall encounter shortly. If
doubt is not expressed, it is not so clear that, in the end, the question must
arise whether or not this doubt ought to be retracted; if a contra-stand-
point is not expressed, it is not so clear that it stands in need of defense
and that, in the end, its tenability in the light of this defense must be
assessed.
At another level, a more serious defect can be observed. Behind the
differences of opinion that the participants set out to resolve in the dis-
cussion, the existence of another difference of opinion may be divined; this
one, however, is not made into a topic for discussion.
As A makes clear when he refers to the earlier agreement (in lines
850–880), the issue of additional training has been around for quite some
time, without anything being done about it. A mentions that he even had
to account for this to the board of directors:
A: That’s sort of the way it is the expectations of uh
D: yes
A: the board
D: yes [but]
A: yes [and and that]’s e- because of because I’ve, yes, because I’m
involved because of course I’ve mentioned that the other time
I said well hh uh (.), the additional training, that was on the staff
agenda, that was last time then we didn’t get to it ((. . .)), well,
474 M. A. VAN REES

then there was a big hullabaloo right away, gee what a shame
((. . .)) you see, so that’s the expectation there
Later, A attributes this failure to execute the agreement to the training
program committee (of which C and D are members!):
A: I’m also to blame for this myself I think, but I think, like, the
program committee as well as far as that is con- if there would
have been time for that so to speak, huh, or space at least that
is my estimation, I don’t know whether that is the case, then
that could’ve been worked out (.) or faster. right? but now
Unfortunately, this grudge of A’s doesn’t surface until almost three-quarters
of the discussion has gone by and it is at no point made into an issue for
discussion. Earlier in the discussion, it manifests itself only indirectly in
the content of A and B’s standpoints: the organization of additional training
is the province of the program committee.
D, in turn, feels that he cannot be expected to have taken this task upon
himself in the context of the part-time job that he holds. That the size of
his job is an issue for D, comes out most clearly in the part of the discus-
sion in which the participants engage in reciprocal reproaches:
B: yes well I think you as a member of the program committee,
that it’s up to you to fill in the details on that. how is a board
supposed to know, hh
D: make it into a full-time job then, then I’ll do it
Again, this matter is not made into an issue for discussion. It only indi-
rectly surfaces in the fact that, whenever A and B try to assign the com-
mittee of which he is a member the task of organizing added training, D
puts the need for this training into question.
This second difference of opinion most likely is what is at the root of
the difference of opinion ‘up front’, and it appears to influence the dis-
cussion about the latter to a considerable extent. But because it is itself
not put up for discussion, it cannot be resolved.

3.2. The opening stage

In the opening stage the roles of protagonist and antagonist are distributed
and the shared starting points for the discussion established. In our dis-
cussion, neither of these tasks gets performed properly.
All participants have the role of protagonist for their own standpoints.
In addition, they all have the role of antagonist against the other two stand-
points and that of protagonist for the contra-standpoints against the same.
In the discussion, however, the latter two roles do not get performed ade-
quately. The participants hardly address each other’s arguments and points
of view. They argue almost exclusively in favor of their own standpoints.
They thus simply replace one standpoint by another, without subjecting the
 PROBLEM-SOLVING DISCUSSION 475

replaced standpoints to any criticism. The result is that, in the end, it can
not become clear whether or not the three main standpoints can survive
criticism.
As to the shared starting points: one of these is certainly that at some
point and by someone an inventory must be made of the topics on which
additional training is required. This idea is a presupposition of a number
of contributions of various participants, and it is not challenged by anyone.
But the fact that it is a common starting point is not established by any one.
In itself, that is not strange – common starting points typically remain
implicit –, nor is it particularly wrong, but the discussion could have been
simplified considerably if it had been. The discussion could then have been
reduced to the questions of when and by whom the inventory should be
taken.
More serious is the fact that on other issues there exists a profound but
unacknowledged difference of opinion as to what belongs to the common
ground. On the one hand, according to D, before the question of where
additional training belongs can be discussed, there must be agreement about
the need for such training, and according to C, data must be available about
the topics for which this training is required. Neither agreement nor data
exist. So, with neither whether nor what established, A and B demand an
answer to who. A and B, on the other hand, take it for granted that there
exists a long-standing agreement to organize additional training, and that
it is merely a question of who is going to do it. Whether and what are no
longer relevant issues, according to them.
The result of this implicit difference of opinion as to what does and does
not belong to the common ground, is that the discussion cannot progress.
Every time A and B pose the question who, D and C return to the ques-
tions whether and what. And those questions cannot be answered in the
discussion because A and B consider them no longer relevant.

3.3. The argumentation stage

In the argumentation stage, the protagonist brings forward argumentation
for his standpoint, to which the antagonist critically responds. In our dis-
cussion, the execution of this stage is flawed in several respects. Partly,
this is the direct result of the inadequate division of dialectical roles men-
tioned above: the participants hardly react to the standpoints and arguments
of the other party. A crass example of this is A, who does not at all respond
to C’s proposal, but instead bluntly presents one of his own, and when B
and C protest and demand a reaction, simply repeats his own proposal and
claims it boils down to the same thing.
But in other respects as well, the connection between the various
contributions is rather loose. This applies, for one thing, to the local rele-
vance of these contributions. Many of them relate only superficially to the
preceding utterances of the co-participants. An example can be found in
476 M. A. VAN REES

the following passage. C has voiced the opinion that students should not
have to pay for additional training. A points out that they do pay for basic
training. C objects that that is quite something else, and that the compar-
ison can only stand if the additional training would be integrated into the
basic training. But, she contends, an argument against such an integration
would be that it is only after the basic training, in the course of doing the
actual work, that the need for additional training arises. B agrees:
C: but here the hitch is, (.) that only when you do the actual work
you experience what you run up against and only then additional
training, (.)
B: exactly
C: becomes a need
B: and an added point is wh- what to me always is a er (.) yeah it
almost is a hobby horse, but I feel that people who work with
people ((. . .)) well, everyone who works with people should
themselves regularly (.) ehm (.) get to hear (.) all over again
from someone else and learn, like how do you actually go about
that, and, what do you run up against.
Ostensibly, B’s argument connects to that of C. But in actual fact, the link
is quite tenuous. Although B presents her contribution as a second argument
for C’s thesis that additional training can not be integrated with basic
training (‘exactly, and an added point is’), all she does is bring up an
argument for the need of additional training.
Other examples are the two passages where D questions the need for
additional training, and C replies with practical proposals, first, for col-
lecting possible topics for training, and then, for integrating additional and
basic training.
Overall relevance, as well, is less than ideal. The participants hardly
seem aware of the main thread of the dispute. Digressions abound. As a
result, the discussion takes a meandering course. A topic or proposal will
get discussed for a shorter or longer while, but every time, before the
discussion is brought to a close, another topic emerges, which in turn is
not dealt with decisively, after which earlier topics once again come into
focus, are again not dealt with decisively, etcetera, without, and that is the
point, any progress being made.

3.4. The closing stage

In the closing stage, the results of the defense of the standpoints, which
has been undertaken in the argumentation stage, are determined. If a stand-
point has been defended successfully, the antagonist must withdraw his
doubt; if the standpoint has not been defended successfully, the protago-
nist must withdraw it. In our discussion, this stage, too, is only partially
performed.
 PROBLEM-SOLVING DISCUSSION 477

Apparently, since everyone in the end cooperates in implementing C’s

proposal, that is the proposal which all participants accept. In itself, that
is not surprising, since no one has objected to the idea of taking an inven-
tory. But the other proposals have not been refuted, nor have they been
retracted. A keeps on defending his proposal to the very last, even when
B voices agreement with C’s. D, too, maintains his own standpoint; he
combines it with C’s. In addition, the ‘acceptance’ of C’s standpoint is not
the result of a weighing of the different standpoints. Such an assessment
simply has not taken place. In pragma-dialectical terms, then, the differ-
ence of opinion has been settled, not resolved.
In large part, the inadequate execution of the closing stage can be traced
back to the deficiencies in the preceding stages that I have pointed out.
Because the different positions of the participants with regard to each
other’s standpoints have not been clearly explicated, establishing the
outcome becomes more difficult. Because the participants mainly take on
the role of protagonist for their own standpoints, other standpoints and argu-
ments have not been scrutinized critically and therefore cannot be rejected
or accepted on the basis of a critical assessment. And, finally, such assess-
ment is hindered by the fact that the participants hardly seem to have any
awareness of the main thread of the dispute: they lack an overview of what
has been adduced pro and contra the different standpoints.

4. CONCLUSION

In this article, I have shown how the model of critical discussion can be
applied in the analysis and evaluation of problem-solving discussions. To
be sure, I did only do part of the work. For a full evaluation the substance
of the moves that were made must be considered: whether contradictions
and inconsistencies were present, whether any fallacies were committed,
what the quality of the arguments was, and whether the assessment of these
arguments was appropriate.
The process-oriented diagnostic use of the model of a critical discussion
that I have demonstrated has several advantages. First of all, the model
helps the analyst to get into clear focus the very facts that need to be
observed, that is, the facts that are relevant for the resolution process. In
the second place, the model provides a normative framework that enables
the analyst to work out the implications of the facts that have been
observed. It goes beyond saying that also a ‘naive’ interpreter could observe
– for example – that discussants do not address each other’s arguments, but
without the normative framework of the model of a critical discussion it
would be impossible to point out why this is problematic. Only within this
framework we can point out what the consequences of the observed fact
are for the resolution of the difference of opinion which is at stake in the
discussion.
478 M. A. VAN REES

Additionally, because the analysis focuses on the interactional processes

between participants, it opens up a view on some of the deeper, social
causes of the derailment of discussions. The model in itself already is
dialogic: it specifies the verbal acts that the participants have to perform
collaboratively and in interaction with each other. In addition, the model
is used specifically to trace the interactional development of the discus-
sion. The interactional features of the discussion that are uncovered in this
way, can point to underlying social processes. In the second discussion,
for instance, it transpires that there is a conflict of interests, connected with
the different institutional positions of the participants, which hinders the
progression of the discussion. A and B, who try to obtain a decision as to
where the organization of additional training should be placed, are policy-
making staff members who regularly meet with the board of directors of
the organization. C and D, who launch concrete questions and objections
regarding the need for and the content of additional training, stand, as vol-
unteer group leader and group coordinator, respectively, and as members
of the training program committee, with both feet in the arena of practical
action. They are the ones who have to put the proposals of the policy-
makers into effect. Obviously, the interests and responsibilities of these two
parties differ. This difference is at the root of the different positions that
they take in the discussion and of their persistence in maintaining these
positions.
Pointing out a conflict of interests like this can provide a deeper expla-
nation for the observed flaws in the verbal interaction of a discussion.
However, even though a conflict of interests may be at the root of what
makes a discussion go wrong, for improving the qualiy of these discus-
sions, more is required than just pointing this out. Conflicts of interests
are an unavoidable fact of every-day life. What is at stake, is, given the
existence of these clashing interests, how to resolve in a rational fashion
the conflicts of opinion that are at issue. And in fact, that is what the par-
ticipants themselves evidently seem to want: they do not simply walk out
on each other or shout each other down; they try to resolve their differ-
ences of opinion through an exchange of arguments and criticism. That is
why it is relevant to analyze and evaluate the way in which their verbal
behavior in the discussion facilitates the rational resolution of their con-
flicts of opinion.

NOTES

1
This paper was prepared for the occasion of the Austin conference. It is an amalgam of
papers that have been published elsewhere.
2
These differences of opinion can relate to all stages of the problem-solving process: the
participants may disagree on whether a problem exists at all, what it is, what the potential
solutions might be, by what criteria these solutions ought to be judged, and what the final
judgment ought to be.
 PROBLEM-SOLVING DISCUSSION 479

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