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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN THE FUTURE
OF HUMANITY AND ITS SUCCESSORS

Are Cyborgs Persons?

An Account of Futurist Ethics
Aleksandra Łukaszewicz Alcaraz
Palgrave Studies in the Future of Humanity
and its Successors

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 Aleksandra Łukaszewicz Alcaraz

Are Cyborgs Persons?

An Account of Futurist Ethics
Aleksandra Łukaszewicz Alcaraz
Academy of Art in Szczecin
Szczecin, Poland

Palgrave Studies in the Future of Humanity and its Successors

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 Foreword

Cyborg Persons: Humanity Played in a Different Key

Although much has been written about cyborgs for the past forty years,
especially in light of Donna Haraway’s 1985 Socialist Review piece, ‘A
Manifesto for Cyborgs,’ Aleksandra Lukaszewicz Alcaraz’s Are Cyborg
Persons? is arguably the first book to consider cyborgs understood as a lit-
eral reality from a broad philosophical standpoint. It is often forgotten
that when Haraway invoked ‘cyborgs’ in her famous manifesto, she meant
it as an extended metaphor for her vision of feminists reappropriating sci-
ence and technology for their own emancipatory purposes. The power of
her rhetoric was felt at the time because many feminists had seen science
and technology as the ultimate enemy to their cause. Yet most of Haraway’s
references to cyborgs were from science fiction, not science fact. Moreover,
as the years have passed, Haraway has distanced herself increasingly from
any literal reading of cyborgs, which she believes could result in a stealth
‘re-masculinization,’ as in the case of (so she says) contemporary transhu-
manism. Nowadays one needs to turn to Katherine Hayles for sustained
interpretations of the cyborg as an emergent cultural phenomenon.
Lukaszewicz Alcaraz’s distinctive contribution is a systematic investigation
into the ontological location of the cyborg. Her discussions of Charles
Sanders Peirce’s semiotics and Joseph Margolis’ historicist understanding
of personhood provide strong clues in that direction, which are greatly
enhanced by something not normally found in a philosophical work,
namely interviews with several high-profile people who have become

v
vi FOREWORD

cyborgs in the name of art, science, and politics. In what follows, I focus
especially on Neil Harbisson as part of general framing of how the cyborg
might be seen as the ‘hopeful monster’ capable of thinking about what it
means to be human altogether.
It is now well-known that ‘cyborg’ is a contraction of ‘cybernetic organ-
ism.’ The vision behind the word was that of cybernetics founder, the
mathematician Norbert Wiener, who believed that the classic metaphysical
dichotomy of ‘natural’ versus ‘artificial’—or its modern version, ‘organ-
ism’ versus ‘machine’—can be regarded as alternative realizations of a
common set of mathematical equations. Those equations specify the con-
ditions under which an entity remains in equilibrium with its environ-
ment—or ‘retains its autonomy,’ metaphysically speaking. Here
‘equilibrium’ should be understood in dynamic terms, relative to how the
entity adjusts the pursuit of its ends in light of a changing environment.
Stated so simply, cybernetics was open to the reductio ad absurdum that
organisms, including humans, are basically glorified thermostats.
(Nevertheless, the late analytic philosopher Fred Dretske designed an
entire theory of knowledge around that idea.) The rise of ‘second-order
cybernetics,’ popularly known as ‘autopoiesis,’ is meant to respond to that
objection. Here we are to imagine cybernetic systems that manage to
immunize themselves from extinction by developing a capacity to shift
fundamentally their rules of engagement with the environment without
losing a sense of identity with their previous incarnations.
This last point is worth bearing in mind when thinking about whether
cyborgs are simply enhanced humans or something other than human. In
the balance hangs the difference between, respectively, the transhuman
and the posthuman. How the matter is decided depends on whether the
relevant ‘sense of identity’ is maintained as one undergoes some sort of
‘cyborganization.’ But before proceeding further, it is worth recalling that
this is not how Wiener’s original audience thought about the matter. They
were more focused on his main example: the behavioral synchronization
of Cold War military aircraft and its human pilot, courtesy of a properly
designed interface, or ‘dashboard,’ that enabled their integration into a
single operating unit. In the late 1940s, this unified perspective of human
and machine started a radical shift from the image of, say, Charles
Lindbergh, whose heroic solo transatlantic air crossing only twenty years
earlier was widely portrayed as demonstrating mastery of both an uncer-
tain technology and an uncertain nature. Wiener’s neologism of ‘cyber-
netics’ makes sense in this context. It etymologically recalls the human
 FOREWORD vii

pilot’s relationship to a ‘ship’—in this case, an air rather than a sea vessel.
So, in what sense can a cyborg be understood as possessing ‘person-
hood’—perhaps even as in the case of Wiener’s synchronized aircraft,
inheriting the personhood of its human pilot?
At the outset, it is useless to think in terms of cyborgs as either the next
stage of human evolution or a stage of evolution that goes beyond the
human, which is how transhumanists and posthumanists, respectively,
tend to understand cyborgs. There is a genuinely open question about
what it will mean to be ‘human’ in the future, and the existence of cyborgs
provides a genuinely open space for considering the matter. At a strictly
biological level, neither Lamarckians nor Darwinians hold that Homo
Sapiens—or any other species—evolves. Only life itself evolves, and species
are simply the conventional names we give to space-time slices of that
evolutionary process. Even at the genetic level, there is no clear cut-off
point between the ‘human’ and the ‘non-human.’ In this respect, modern
evolutionary theory is indifferent to the trans/posthuman interpretations
of ‘cyborg.’ Indeed, ‘human evolution’ is itself a social scientific turn of
phrase that owes more to Enlightenment doctrines of progress than any-
thing specifically from biology. However, it does not follow that the quest
for the relevant ‘sense of identity’ is mysterious or even very futuristic. In
fact, it is no more than a revamped statement of John Locke’s 300+-year-­
old definition of personal identity in chapter twenty-seven of the Essay
Concerning Human Understanding.
Locke discussed personal identity in terms of the backward extension of
consciousness. He is nowadays read as meaning an individual remember-
ing his or her past, which in turn informs how s/he experiences the world
now. Philosophers routinely call Locke’s approach ‘psychological,’ but he
was really talking about something much more abstract, which he himself
called a ‘rational being.’ Indeed, Locke went so far as to call personhood
as a ‘forensic’ quality, namely one related to accountability, which has both
a private and public character. I can feel accountable by identifying with
some past event or action, and others can hold me accountable by getting
me to agree to such a self-identification. Personal identity is formally
established when the two judgments coincide. This typically happens in a
court room during a trial, say, when one is made to admit to a crime. But
at a deeper level, it is related to the etymology of persona, the masks worn
in Greek drama to indicate an actor’s character. In this respect, what hap-
pens on stage is simply much more prescribed than in a trial.
viii FOREWORD

Here it is worth recalling that Plato’s main objection to drama was that
the use of masks licensed an alternative version of reality, just as some
people today object to the use of ‘avatars’ in the online world as absolving
them of moral responsibility. Locke’s orthogonal view is that the mask—
that is, the person—always needs to be constructed in situ: One doesn’t
begin by presuming a distinction between a ‘real’ and a ‘fake’ self. This
provides the key to what Locke really meant when he described the mind
as a tabula rasa (‘blank slate’). He was drawing attention to the ongoing
situated nature of the mind’s constitution, even at its most fundamental
level. In this context, his seemingly paradoxical appeal to ‘innate ideas’ is
best understood in today’s terms as simply referring to the ‘platform’ on
which many different programs might be executed.
Locke’s original audience would have been struck by the novel idea of
personhood as something that is not legally prescribed but rather is the
outcome of a struggle over attribution between an embodied individual
and a larger context of action in which the individual is embedded. Before
Locke, personhood had been seen as primarily an attribute not of physical
individuals as such, but of their role in, so to speak, society’s ‘meta-drama.’
One’s legal identity had been largely defined by membership in a collective
or corporate entity. You were a lord/peasant or citizen/priest, depending
on whether you entered by birth or by examination, respectively. (Keep in
mind that most ‘citizens’ in Locke’s day were residents of city-states, many
of whom were what we would now call ‘highly qualified immigrants.’)
Under those circumstances, it was still common in Locke’s day for the
wrong individual to be convicted for a crime simply because the evidence
pointed to someone of that person’s class as having committed the crime.
The great modern legal innovation that is the doctrine of habeas corpus
was its requirement that a specific individual is tied to a specific crime
before that individual is formally charged.
It is also worth recalling that ‘consciousness’ had been coined only a
few years prior to Locke’s discussion by the Cambridge Platonist philoso-
pher Ralph Cudworth, who defined it as the aspect of our humanity that
interfaces with God, which is experienced as a capacity to observe oneself
from the outside, an idea closely associated with ‘conscience,’ still the
French word for consciousness. Consciousness is thus the ‘internal court-
room’ in which the struggle over personal identity is conducted. The para-
digm case of this conception of consciousness was Martin Luther’s
electrifying 1521 self-presentation at the Diet of Worms. Sociologists fol-
lowing George Herbert Mead would later speak in secular terms of
 FOREWORD ix

justifying yourself in the context of seeing yourself as others see you. The
difference between Cudworth and Mead is, so to speak, a 90-degree axial
rotation of what it means to ‘stand outside’ yourself: instead of standing
above (Cudworth), you stand alongside (Mead), as befits a secular democ-
racy in which you are judged by your peers rather than by an overseeing
deity. And of course, from the cybernetic standpoint, one might think of a
pilot’s encounter with his or her airplane’s dashboard as the site of ‘con-
sciousness’ in the cyborg world.
Locke’s redefinition of personal identity had many profound implica-
tions that over the next two centuries slowly reshaped our understanding
of human psychology. Pierre Janet and Sigmund Freud could turn ‘false
memory syndrome’ (what Ian Hacking provocatively calls ‘false conscious-
ness’ in Rewriting the Soul) into a topic of investigation at the end of the
nineteenth century because at that point Locke’s ‘liberal’ sense of person-
hood had been fully realized in social, economic, and legal institutions.
‘False memory syndrome’ would not matter if the memories in question
were ones that someone in the individual’s position would likely to have
had, regardless of whether the specific person on trial actually had them.
To be sure, even today, under a variety of circumstances, including legal
settings, people are allowed to justify themselves by appealing to what
other real or imagined others in their position would have or have not
done. Indeed, the great sociologist Emile Durkheim’s nephew, Marcel
Mauss, argued that the relative indifference to the truth or falsehood of
memories has been the default norm across most cultures, providing the
psychosocial basis of myth-making.
Mauss’ observation reveals the truly revolutionary import of Locke’s
proposal that one’s sense of identity is neither an inherited status nor even
a prerogative of office, but a different sort of social achievement, one
ascribed to a specific individual. The very idea of ‘cyborg persons’ revisits
this proposal with a vengeance. Psychologists today easily grant that our
sense of personal identity depends on the sort of story we are allowed to
tell about ourselves, since we cannot ever be sure that a particular memory
corresponds to something that really happened, let alone happened to us
as unique individuals. In the end, it boils down to ‘owning’ the memory.
But this Lockean insight immediately raises the question of jurisdiction of
ownership, or the ‘boundary of the self,’ in metaphysical terms. The late
Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit has done the most in recent times to
register this insight in a new key, especially in his 1984 book, Reasons and
Persons. It inspired the seminal transhumanist theorist Max More’s 1995
x FOREWORD

doctoral thesis, The Diachronic Self, which opened the door to a general-
ized sense of ‘morphological freedom’ with regard to personal identity.
Common to Locke, Parfit, and More is the intuition that consciousness
is, at least in principle, ‘substrate-neutral,’ which is to say, executable on a
variety of platforms. Thus, the same consciousness could be embodied in
multiple forms in temporal sequence, as in the reincarnation of an immor-
tal soul. But equally, there could be simultaneous multiple embodiments,
at least for a brief period—say, if one’s consciousness were downloaded
into a machine, while the biological source of that consciousness remained
intact through the translation process. Of course, the properties of the
specific substrate supporting the consciousness—the mechanical and the
organic—would be expected to bias the two versions of the same con-
sciousness differently as their respective lives proceed, resulting in differ-
ent identities over time. This point is relevant to the distinction between
virtual reality and augmented reality, which is at the core of what might
be called ‘cyborg consciousness.’ I shall return to it shortly, in the context
of Neil Harbisson, a performance artist and prominent cyborg rights activ-
ist, whom Lukaszewicz Alcaraz interviewed.
In a state of morphological freedom, personal identity turns on self-­
identification, understood as an extreme form of autopoiesis. We normally
think of self-identification as involving a relatively stable, continuously
existing physical body that is coextensive with the ‘self.’ But the Lockean
suspends this assumption. Indeed, More radicalizes a tendency implicit in
Parfit’s thought by basing self-identification simply on informational con-
tinuity, which in turn allows for, say, a resurrected dead being to resume
their former life if it agrees to identify with it. However, if the resurrected
entity somehow refuses to identify with their former life, then it becomes
a different person. More’s subsequent work for Alcor, the iconic US cry-
onics firm, suggests that he takes this argument as mainly licensing the
resumption of the same life even after the most radical biological disrup-
tion of all, death. But of course, the same argument can justify the resur-
rected entity deciding to become someone else by revaluing their past so
as to effectively ‘disown’ their old self. Moreover, such ‘disownership’
need not rely on the amnesia-like effects that characterize a ‘dissociative’
personality of the sort that concerned Janet and Freud. Rather, it could
simply involve a radical reinterpretation of one’s previous experience, oth-
erwise perfectly recalled. Indeed, a striking feature of More’s thesis is a
comprehensive critique of the philosophical sense of ‘memory’—that is, as
a relatively passive repository of ideas, images, and sensations that happen
 FOREWORD xi

to come to mind whenever we engage in conscious thought—as the psy-

chological basis for establishing personal identity.
More effectively pushed Locke’s ‘forensic’ conception of personhood
to the limit, rendering self-identification literally a matter of ‘selective
memory’ of what one wants to associate with oneself. This sounds very
Nietzschean—and it is. But it is also familiar from the earliest days of
Christian theology. Origen of Alexandria made a point of linking the
Biblical episodes of Jesus’ Transfiguration (when he first becomes aware of
his divinity) and Resurrection (when he returns in his divinity as ‘Christ’).
The hermeneutical point of this connection was to demonstrate that Jesus’
Crucifixion wasn’t some colossal human error on the part of those who
convicted and sentenced him, but an essential feature of how Jesus became
Christ. It was the ultimate ‘conversion experience,’ a physical rupture so
severe as to enable Jesus to reorganize his life, resulting in a Gestalt shift
in how Jesus subsequently went forward in the world. To be sure, there
was ‘informational continuity,’ in More’s sense, between Jesus’
Transfiguration and Resurrection. But the significance of that continuity
had been radically altered—‘transvalued,’ Nietzsche would say—by the
seriousness of the alteration made to the platform conveying it, namely the
Body of Christ.
Unsurprisingly perhaps, Origen remains a controversial figure in
Christian theology. He has been understood (perhaps rightly) as suggest-
ing that Jesus simply in his human form was capable of becoming Christ,
with God doing little more than allowing it to happen, but which in turn
sets an example for all humans to follow. The main legacy of this line of
thought was the Arian heresy, a red thread that runs from Europe’s early
modern Scientific Revolution to contemporary transhumanism. It has
played out in popular culture as the story of Faust, which has been subject
to several different endings, Goethe’s classic version being among the
more hopeful. Presupposed in this entire trajectory has been the human
need for self-enhancement in order to recover the loss of divinity that
resulted from Original Sin, which following St Augustine was taken to be
a spiritual defect that is genetically transmitted across all human genera-
tions, starting with the fallen Adam and Eve. The late US historian David
Noble took the measure of this development in a book shrewdly entitled
The Religion of Technology, the scope of which extended from the mechan-
ical and disciplinary regimes of medieval monasticism to the pharmaceuti-
cal promises of today’s genomic medicine. An intuitive interpretation of
Noble’s thesis which transcends that sacred/secular divide is that, no
xii FOREWORD

matter how healthy and successful we may appear, we see ourselves as

‘always already’ disabled. It is this self-understanding of humanity that
makes the cyborg an attractive figure.
Neil Harbisson is a pivotal figure in this context. He was born unable
to distinguish colors and became a cyborg once an antenna was surgically
implanted in his skull to enable him to translate light into sound. He
nowadays earns a living by performing a distinctive form of music that
reflects his acquired synesthetic capacity. It would be fair to describe
Harbisson’s access to reality as both virtual and augmented. It is ‘virtual’
in the sense that the antenna allows him to distinguish colors that others
would normally do with their eyes. But Harbisson’s access is also ‘aug-
mented’ in the sense that he is now able to distinguish ‘more colors,’ so to
speak, which has fed into his musical compositions, generating new visual
and auditory experiences for his audiences. Thus, Harbisson’s antenna
straddles between simulating a lost sense to restore its natural function
and extending his sensory capacities into realms of experience not nor-
mally had by others. Moreover, it would be difficult to separate the thera-
peutic and enhancement functions of the antenna unless he was legally
forbidden from producing music—that is, prevented from converting the
virtual into the augmented, and thereby deprived of both his self-­
expression and a unique livelihood. This point confirms Harbisson’s genu-
ine cyborg status.
The duality of the virtual and the augmented in Harbisson’s cyborg
existence epitomizes a schism that has always existed in the histories of
both biology and technology. A convenient way to characterize the transi-
tion from Aristotle to Darwin in the history of biology, which of course
did not happen straightforwardly, is in terms of a shift from thinking about
organisms as purpose-made to thinking about them as works in progress.
In the Aristotelian world-view, one observes how organisms normally
function, which in turn sets the normative standard by which organisms
are judged. This also suited a specific—not necessarily correct but none-
theless very influential—Christian understanding of divine creation in
which God designed each type of creature with its own function as part of
maintaining some common world order. Linnaeus’ coinage of Homo
Sapiens in the mid-eighteenth century still reflected this sensibility. On this
view, a cyborg is understood purely in therapeutic terms. Thus Harbisson’s
antenna is regarded as remedying a disability, with the music he produces
seen as ‘unnatural,’ or perhaps even not really music.
 FOREWORD xiii

Those familiar with natural law theory will recognize this attitude as
influencing judgments in such other ‘artificial’ interventions in the life
process as contraception, abortion, stem cell research, and euthanasia. In
contrast, Darwin effectively treated organisms as raw material with which
nature experiments (or ‘selects’) through a process of elimination (aka
death). Nothing is ever truly complete or adequate from the standpoint of
nature. Rather, the adaptiveness of organisms is always being tested under
new conditions. Although Darwin knew no more about genetics than
Aristotle, his world-view better suited biology’s ‘Newtonian’ moment,
which came when the Augustinian monk Gregor Mendel proposed that
organisms were composed of combinable factors, which suggested a more
experimental, even lottery-like view of how biological inheritance relates
to survival.
To see the connection between biology and technology, consider the
role of ‘mutation’ in this lottery-like conception of life. Once life is under-
stood as occasionally throwing up highly improbable organic forms, there
is a question as to whether they die, adapt, or set a new standard to which
others then either adapt or else die. In 1940 geneticist Richard Goldschmidt
coined the term ‘hopeful monster’ to characterize a mutation that man-
ages to ‘set a new standard’ by occupying an ecological niche previously
inhabited by another species and refashioning it for the purposes of itself
and its future generations. The organism’s distinctive ‘mutant’ features,
which at first put it at a disadvantage turn out to be its long-term strength,
given the vicissitudes of natural selection. To be sure, Goldschmidt’s work
has been largely marginalized by modern evolutionary biology, yet it has
provided inspiration for thinkers ranging from Karl Popper to Donna
Haraway.
However, a problem with Goldschmidt’s reception, especially after
Hiroshima, was that the very idea of mutation—now understood as the
product of nuclear radiation—was subject to a protracted political debate.
Science fiction movies of the period routinely dramatized the stakes. On
the one hand, US Cold War strategist Herman Kahn (Stanley Kubrick’s
model for Dr. Strangelove) claimed optimistically that the range of muta-
tions of Homo Sapiens capable of surviving a nuclear war might finally
serve to eliminate various persistent forms of social discrimination. On the
other hand, most evolutionary biologists cautioned against any easy cele-
bration of mutation, with some following US ecologist-activist Barry
Commoner in calling for a ban on nuclear weapons altogether. We live
with a more subdued version of this debate today, as Kahn and Commoner
xiv FOREWORD

anticipated the terms of reference in today’s the trans/posthuman

debate—at least in terms of their respective attitudes toward risky innova-
tions: Kahn the more ‘proactionary’ (i.e. transhumanist) and Commoner
the more ‘precautionary’ (i.e. posthumanist). Arguably, the nuclear
‘doomsday’ scenario that originally concerned Kahn and Commoner, and
dominated the international relations imaginary from the late 1940s to
the late 1980s, marked the first time that the potential for universal cybor-
ganization was countenanced—albeit as the radiation fallout of a nuclear
confrontation.
Recall that until the mid-nineteenth century, ‘innovation’ was normally
taken to mean ‘monstrosity’ in the pejorative sense of, say, Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein. It was only once industrial innovations started to boost the
Europeanized world to unprecedented levels of productivity and wealth
that the relevant value reversal took place. Indeed, what Marx and
Schumpeter called the ‘creative destruction’ of markets was no longer an
unwelcomed disturbance to traditional ways of life. On the contrary, it
became the driving force of the capitalist economy. Characteristic of these
now positively valued ‘innovations’ was their novel combination and
repurposing of already existing technologies. For example, Henry Ford
managed to replace the horse as the primary form of personal transport in
the early twentieth century by attaching a gasoline engine to a four-­
wheeled bicycle. The legacy of that profound shift in the physical constitu-
tion of the vehicle has been our increased reliance on petroleum, our
increased carbon emissions, and our increased segregation from the envi-
ronment. For better or worse, Ford perhaps did the most to show in con-
crete terms how humans might acquire an independence and mastery of
nature. Such an achievement certainly qualifies as a ‘Faustian Bargain.’
We might think of the combinatorial mentality of Ford—and indeed
that of his first employer Thomas Edison—as akin to Mendel’s original
pea experiments, which involved presuming that an organism’s traits are
the outcome of a trial and error process, the underlying algorithms set the
research agenda of the science we call ‘genetics.’ The word ‘bricoleur’ is
not out of place in this context: Indeed, in a famous 1977 Nature article,
‘Evolution and Tinkering,’ the great French molecular biologist François
Jacob himself adapted the term from the anthropologist Claude Lévi-­
Strauss to describe the workings of natural selection. Thus, it is not unrea-
sonable to regard the cyborg as literally a ‘hopeful monster’ in both the
biological and technological senses: It is a mutation and an innovation.
The best way to think about the implications of this point is through a
 FOREWORD xv

question that is familiar from Lukaszewicz Alcaraz’s home discipline of

aesthetics: Does form follow function, or function follow form? We can think
of the history of Western art as the movement from presuming the former
to the latter answer—from ‘classical’ to ‘modern,’ as exemplified by
Aristotle’s Poetics and Lessing’s Laokoön, respectively. In this respect, the
cyborg epitomizes the modern attitude—very self-consciously, in the case
of Neil Harbisson.
The classical approach to art assumes that one grasps the purpose of
something in nature and the point of art is to reproduce the original, per-
haps with improvements but within the design of the original. On this
view, art is not in the business of converting the natural into the ‘unnatu-
ral.’ Indeed, artifice is generally regarded as something best left hidden
(e.g. not seeing a painting’s brushstrokes, an actor’s makeup), lest it be
regarded as ‘monstrous.’ For the classicist, ‘mastering’ an art amounts to
exploiting a medium—but only within its ‘natural’ expressive limits.
Unsurprisingly, classicists regard aesthetic perception as a refined sense of
pleasure, a domestication of natural sensory experience. The preoccupa-
tion with ‘taste’ in the eighteenth-century writings of Shaftesbury and
Hume was probably classicism’s last and most sophisticated stand—at least
until its recent revival by evolutionary psychology. (But that is a story for
another day.) In any case, that was the attitude interrogated by Lessing,
who concluded that it was silly to think that some media are inherently
better suited than others for expressing certain themes. For him, the point
of art is to realize potentially any theme in the medium’s terms, with the
extent of the artist’s actual achievement resting on the outcome of that
struggle.
Modernists following Lessing increasingly demonized the ‘classical’
attitude as ‘representationalism’ for failing to take advantage of a medi-
um’s full expressive capacity, which in the hands of a genuinely ‘creative’
and ‘original’ artist could result in works that prompt experiences that
would never happen naturally. Such experiences may be described as
‘counter-intuitive,’ ‘shocking,’ or even ‘sublime.’ (Think Picasso, Joyce,
Schoenberg.) If the artist is trying to reproduce anything, it is the sense of
awe associated with one’s experience of God. This was the context in
which the artist as ‘genius’ came to the fore in early nineteenth-century
Romanticism. Put crudely, when function started to follow form in art,
artists became more concerned with how their works looked to them (as
proxies for their audiences) than how the works looked in relation to their
putative objects. Thus, the viewer as a potential creator of the artwork
xvi FOREWORD

became constitutive of the work’s interpretation and value. This shift in

perspective gave unprecedented scope for ‘critics’ who grant the prima
facie validity of the artist’s chosen theme and medium, while possibly con-
cluding that the work fails ‘on its own terms.’ No reference to ‘nature’ is
needed to reach either a positive or a negative critical verdict on the art-
work. On the contrary, artists are judged by the power of their artifice—
that is, whether they exploited their chosen medium to maximum effect.
From this standpoint, Harbisson is the ultimate modernist artist, the
full-bodied exemplification of Locke’s forensic conception of the self. His
cyborg existence is literally a collaborative project, the platform for which
happens to be biological. The nature of the struggle for ‘cyborg rights’
that he has spearheaded with Moon Ribas is itself a work in progress. If
cyborgs come to be legally entitled to rights, will they be as disabled or
enhanced humans? Of course, cyborgs might also achieve rights as a dis-
tinct class of non-human entities, which would be very much in a ‘posthu-
manist’ spirit. But that then invites the prospect of ‘fully abled’ humans
voluntarily migrating to cyborg status. After all, if someone admires the art
that Harbisson has achieved with his antenna, why shouldn’t others try to
emulate it, perhaps by disabling/enhancing other parts of their bodies in
the name of ‘new media’? Under such fluid ontological conditions, will
the cyborg be a ‘strong attractor’ that sets a trend for others to follow, or
will it be seen as the ‘enemy within’ that needs be persecuted and avoided?
This question poses a much more realistic challenge to humanity’s future
normative order than the simplistic ‘them vs. us’ currently portrayed in
dystopic fantasies of superintelligent artificial intelligences. In the end, we
should take the idea of ‘cyborg persons’ seriously because ‘we’ are becom-
ing ‘them.’

Department of SociologySteve Fuller

University of Warwick
Coventry, UK
 Acknowledgments

This book is the product of a four-year research on posthumanism and

technological enhancement of human bodies, in which I offer consider-
ations on how to approach the new world and new persons emerging from
the process of natural-cultural evolution, intentionally guided, but not
univocally subordinated to agents in societies/communities. On my way I
met many amazing and inspiring persons, without whom this book would
not be as it is, and on whom I would like to shed some light, because
although I am an agent responsible for the book you have in hand, there
are many people and circumstances that formed the final effect.
The whole journey started in Oslo, where during a seminar on posthu-
manism I noticed important issues to be addressed in reference to the idea
of posthuman, that is the one-sided notion of ‘human,’ the Cartesian one.
Starting from that moment I followed my scientific appetite, and as a
Fellow of the Kosciuszko Foundation I conducted research in 2016 at
Temple University in Philadelphia, working closely with the wonderful
philosopher Joseph Margolis, who became also a dearest friend. Discussions
on the post-Darwinian approach to evolution helped me to construe
understanding of the place of cyborg persons in the course of evolution.
During my research stay I also had a great opportunity to interview Neil
Harbisson and Moon Ribas, the first cyborg persons in the world, cyborg
activists, and artists, and Eduardo Kac, an artist using bio-engineering in
the creative process and who has the first reported RFID implant inserted
under the skin. These meetings gave me specific empirical content to my
theoretical considerations, and I decided to add full transcriptions of the
interviews at the end of this book.

xvii
xviii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My research in posthumanism in the United States took me also to The

New York Posthuman Research Group, conducted by Francesca Ferrando
at New York University. There, during one of summits, I had one of the
first chances to share my ideas on cyborg persons emerging in the evolu-
tionary continuum from human persons, and I clarified distinctions
between post and transhumanism. In addition to Francesca Ferrando, also
one of the members of the organizing committee of the international con-
ference ‘Beyond Humanism,’ I have been happy to meet on my way other
persons involved in this same endeavor, such as Stefan Lorenz Sorgner,
Jaime Del Val, and Jan Stasienko. In one of the conferences I met Steven
Fuller, who has shown me the legal implications and context of my con-
siderations and has painted a vision for the future of the republic of trans-
humanity (using his own words). There is also an important person in
Poland to whom I owe depth and seriousness of my approach to the tech-
nological world, and this is my friend Michal Ostrowicki, alias Sidey Myoo,
philosopher of technology, aesthetician, metaphysician of the electronic
world, and manager of Academica Electronica in Second Life.
Of course, apart from the strictly scientific direction, the research would
not have progressed without all the support from the Faculty of Painting
and New Media at Academy of Art in Szczecin, and from my family: my
grandmother Charlotte, who has instilled in me passion for knowledge;
my mother Ewa, who has always motivated me on the way; and my sons
Szczepan and Antonio, who inspire me for future. I also wish to thank the
language corrector: Elizabeth Gagnon, who helped me to polish my
English and to clarify expressions of my ideas, due to her understanding of
my thought and our steady professional relationship.
 Contents

1 Introduction  1
1.1 Comments on Methodological Approach  4
Bibliography  7

2 Evolutionary Continuity between Human Person and

Cyborg Person  9
2.1 Change in Human Condition. Who is Human? Who is
Posthuman? Who is Cyborg?  9
2.2 Joseph Margolis’ Redefinition of the Human Self or Person 19
2.3 Evolutionary Transformation from the Human Self to the
Cyborg Self 22
Bibliography 26

3 Semiotic Approach to Person and Cyborg Person 29

3.1 Person within General Theory of Signs: Charles Sanders Peirce  29
3.2 Person in Cultural Realism: Joseph Margolis 34
3.3 Formal Approach to Person in Law 37
3.4 Embodiment Matters 39
Bibliography 45

4 Person in a Social and Technological World 49

4.1 Personal Identity: David Hume and Joseph Margolis 49
4.2 Person in Technical World: Slavoj Žižek and Rob Cover 53

xix
xx Contents

4.3 Person in Community and Environment: Umberto Eco,

G. H. Mead, and Arnold Berleant 57
Bibliography 64

5 New Forms of Embodiment 67

5.1 New Embodiment for a Person 67
5.2 Body Image, Body Schema, and Their Relations with
Perception and Cognition: Shaun Gallagher 69
5.3 Changes in Perception and Cognition Due to Technological
Enhancement of the Senses: Neil Harbisson, Moon Ribas 73
Bibliography 81

6 Cyborg and Material Communication 83

6.1 Language—Image—Neural Impulse 83
6.2 Toward 4.0 Communication: Direct Neural
Communication and Brain-to-Brain Interface Experiments 87
6.3 Material Communication: Poiesis and Hybrids:
Eduardo Kac 90
Bibliography 95

7 Vitalist, Posthuman, and Environmental Ethics 99

7.1 The Question of Agentive Norms, Normativity, and Ethics 99
7.2 Vitalist Posthuman Ethics, Its Transcendentalism, and
Destructive Power: Patricia Mac Cormack102
7.3 Posthuman Agency Without an Agent: Jane Bennett106
7.4 Environmental and Posthuman Ethics in Search for an
Agent: David Roden, Tom Regan110
Bibliography115

8 Possibility of Cyborgean Ethics and Politics117

8.1 Allo-human Persons and Allo-human Normativity: Nelson
Goodman, Joseph Margolis117
8.2 Margolis Darwinizing Kant?123
8.3 Against Flat Darwinism: Silim Berker, Vincent Descombes126
8.4 Toward Cyborg’s Ethics and Politics131
Bibliography136

9 Conclusions for Future139

Bibliography146
 Contents  xxi


Appendix A: Cyborgs’ Perception, Cognition, Society,
Environment, and Ethics147

Appendix B: Toward Material and Interspecies Communication159

Index187
 About the Author

Aleksandra Lukaszewicz Alcaraz holds PhD in Humanities in the field

of Philosophy and is specialist in philosophical aesthetics and theory of
culture and art. She is the vice-chairman of the Polish Society of Aesthetics.
She is the recipient of various prizes and grants; these include a scholarship
from the Kościuszko Foundation for research on art, culture, and aesthet-
ics in the work of Joseph Margolis, and a grant to support the preparation
of her book project on the theory of cyborg persons explained in terms of
the metaphysics of culture. She is the coordinator of two international
research consortiums: ‘Technologies of Imaging in Communication, Art,
and Society’ (TICASS) and ‘Transcultural Perspectives in Art and Art
Education’ (TPAEE) realizing projects founded by the European
Commission within the program Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions—
Research and Innovation Staff Exchange, Horizon 2020 (MSCA-RISE
H2020), dedicated to visual communication and visual literacy, and to art
and art education in transcultural perspective.

xxiii
 List of Figures

Fig. A.1 Neil Harbisson. (Photo by Lars Norgaard) 148

Fig. A.2 Moon Ribas. (Photo by Lars Norgaard) 149
Fig. B.1 ‘Natural History of Enigma,’ 2003–2008. Transgenic flower
with artist’s own DNA expressed in red veins 160
Fig. B.2 ‘GFP Bunny,’ 2000. Transgenic work with the fluorescent
rabbit, Alba 161
Fig. B.3 ‘Time Capsule,’ 1997 162
Fig. B.4 Ornitorrinco, 1989 (with Ed Bennett). Telepresence robot,
2 ft2 × 18 in (plus extendible antennae) 164
Fig. B.5 ‘Rara Avis,’ 1996. Telepresence work with telerobotic parrot,
thirty zebra finches, Internet, VR headset, aviary. View of
exhibition at Atlanta Museum of Contemporary Art 166
Fig. B.6 ‘Uirapuru,’ 1996–1999. Hybrid telepresence/virtual reality
online installation. View of exhibition at the
InterCommunication Center (ICC), Tokyo 1999 167
Fig. B.7 ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding,’ 1994. Interspecies
biotelematic work with canary, Philodendron, telephone,
computers, custom hardware 169
Fig. B.8 Holopoem: ‘Zephyr,’ 1993. Multicolor computer holographic
stereogram (WL transmission). 30 × 40 cm 177
Fig. B.9 ‘Genesis,’ 1999. Transgenic work with artist-created bacteria,
ultraviolet light, internet, video, dimensions variable. View of
exhibition at OK Center for Contemporary Art, Linz 181

xxv
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

It would be natural to begin a book dedicated to ‘cyborg persons’ with

broad references to post and transhumanism. This of course will happen
in the following pages, because it is impossible to discuss issues regard-
ing the redefinition of ‘human person’ without the perspective devel-
oped by these branches of contemporary reflection in humanities,
understood as interdisciplinary field within cultural studies. Yet I do not
consider them as a necessary departing point, because the topic in
question is of greater significance and should also be approached
philosophically.
Technological enhancement—developments in genetic engineering,
artificial intelligence and robotics, and so forth—are processes that are
currently happening changing the environment, urban spaces, modes of
functioning, making choices, and satisfying one’s needs. These processes
are not alien to human nature, as it is stressed by, for example, Pierre Levy,
because technology together with language defines Homo Sapiens indi-
viduals as humans—so that “the human world is technological to its core”
(Levy 1997, pp. 3–4). However, at the same time technology ceases to be
manipulated externally, outside of human body, and starts to permeate it,
operating from the inside connected to the world around. In this way
there appear various DIY bodyhackers technologically extending their
senses, like Neil Harbisson and Moon Ribas, hybrids—like ‘the daughter’
of Educardo Kac and flower Petunia: Edunia—or androids like Sophie,

© The Author(s), under exclusive 1

license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
A. Łukaszewicz Alcaraz, Are Cyborgs Persons?, Palgrave
Studies in the Future of Humanity and its Successors,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60315-1_1
2 A. ŁUKASZEWICZ ALCARAZ

produced by Hanson Robotics Company from Hong Kong, recognized as

an official citizen of Saudi Arabia in 2017.
In such a situation, it should be considered: how should we refer to the
new entities starting to appear among purely biologically humans, and
what is the significance of redefining of our relationship with them? Trying
to approach that subject we encounter philosophical, sociological, and
legal understandings of what it means to be a person—defining what have
never been before needed to be specified—a ‘human person’ in relation to
other persons that might not be human in biological sense. This entails
reconsideration of what does it mean to be human, and what is the basis
of human rights granting people rights and obligations in society due to
their species affiliation, as it is inscribed in the United Nations’ Universal
Declaration from 1948.
Therefore, in order to rethink the notion of a person in such a way that
it may include non-humans—especially cyborg persons, on whom I will
focus my considerations—I propose to turn to Joseph Margolis, a contem-
porary American philosopher, whose extensive work on culture, language,
and human persons offers an interesting post-Darwinian, non-canonical
pragmatist view that allows us to understand the changes in culture and
persons in evolutionary, non-reductionist perspective. Particularly helpful
in this reasoning is his idea of a human person or self as an artefactual
individual emergent from the process of hybrid evolution of intertwined
nature and culture, due to invention and mastery of language, and every-
thing that this entails with developments of culture and technology
(Margolis 2017a, pp. 39–62).
The stripping of a human person from his assumed, probably ‘divine’
(or ‘of divine provenance’) nature or essence, as Margolis does, is bold but
bright—not reducing the human world to mere matter, nor blindly accept-
ing neo-Darwinism, but also not accepting religious or transcendental
demands. The way Margolis presents human persons—as artefactual,
enlanguaged, and hybrid, having no natural environment and therefore no
natural source for any set of norms and rules other than that which is col-
lectively invented, shared, and transformed historically (what he calls sit-
tlich)—opens up for the inclusion of cyborgs into the classification of
persons. It also opens for consideration of the possibilities of different
kinds of ethics, possibly cyborgean ethics too, if cyborgs are to be recog-
nized as socially defined persons, because normativity—as Margolis
explains—is not rooted in any transcendental setting but rather always
contingent and relational. Contemporary discussions on cyborgs and the
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

ethical, social, and political issues that accompany them—currently hap-

pening in various places across the world—could benefit from turning to
Margolis’ philosophy in the process of redefining our ideas of a person,
his/her/its/their autonomy, responsibility, and freedom, as well as for
imagining their possible practical applications in science and politics.
Approaching the subject of new kind of persons emerging in contem-
porary world, I cannot address all kinds of new entities appearing in con-
junction with rapidly developing technology, then I decide to limit myself
predominantly to the idea of the ‘cyborg.’ By cyborg I understand an
individual being embodied in a technologically enhanced human form,
who by means of (often) online technology implemented in the body has
different kinds of perception, cognition, practices, patterns, habits, and/
or methods of communicating in comparison to someone embodied in an
unaltered human form, and who should be recognized as a cyborg person,
analogically to a human person. Cyborgs are not science fiction, neither
they are completely artificial entities as Sophia; they are those on the spec-
trum between humans and robots, having implanted technology operat-
ing from within their body and influencing their way of life.
These are such persons as Neil Harbisson, whose antenna implanted
into his brain allows him to ‘hear’ colors via bone conduction, and Moon
Ribas, whose implanted sensors allow her to ‘feel’ earthquakes over 1.0 on
the Richter scale and movements of the Earth’s moon. There are many
other DIY bodyhackers too—Harbisson and Ribas are not the first ones to
implant themselves with connectivity-enabled technology in order to
change their perception and communication. Eduardo Kac implanted his
leg with digital memory (in radio-frequency identification (RFID)) chip
form) within the art project ‘Time Capsule’ in 1997, and Kevin Warwick
also implanted himself with multiple chips for sensory perception and
online communication. Because these transformations may be taken as not
radical enough, there is no questioning if Harbisson, Ribas, Kac, or
Warwick should be granted the status of persons, although the laws are
being moved, bended with the allowance of passport photo with antenna
that Harbisson has. However it may be helpful to differentiate between
the relatively ‘weak’ cyborg status of Kac and Warwick, and the relatively
‘strong’ status of Harbisson and Ribas (what may have implications also
on a legal level).1 Harbisson’s and Ribas’ synergy of technology and senses

1
The phrasing used ‘relatively weak’ and ‘relatively strong’ cyborg status, I owe to Steve
Fuller, who assisted in naming the differentiation observed in scrutinizing the cases of Kac,
Warwick, Harbisson, and Ribas.
4 A. ŁUKASZEWICZ ALCARAZ

stays for strong cyborg status, because the technology merges with the
organism in the intent to alter regular performance. This is not the case of
Kac and Warwick, in whose cases either the technology does not alter
profoundly forms of perception and/or communication (Kac) or its
engagement is just for them time being of experiments.
Contemplating the changing conditions of personhood nowadays,
there should be taken also a broader outlook on the future of society, in
which we will have to include differently embodied legal persons—tech-
nologically enhanced, genetically engineered, artificially created. An inter-
esting perspective to which I will later refer to more extensively is proposed
by Steve Fuller, a professor of social epistemology and enthusiast of trans-
humanism, and it is ‘Humanity 2.0’ with an ‘Extended Republic of
Humanity or Transhumanity’ which includes all responsible agents regard-
less of their material substratum. Extended Republic of Humanity or
Transhumanity is Fuller’s proposal of the republican society inclusive of all
possible citizens, not just those born as Homo Sapiens. For this to occur, as
he points out, it is necessary to redefine the concept of Human Rights as
declared by the United Nations in 1948, which currently limits the basis
for civil rights legislation to the Homo Sapiens species (Fuller 2015).
Therefore, my research on cyborg persons focuses on philosophical
redefinition of the category of ‘person’ in the reference to Margolis’ grasp
on human persons or selves, in order to make space for the inclusion of
differently embodied, relatively autonomous individuals into our societies
and sketch a vision for our future—indispensably framed by sociopolitics
as envisioned by Fuller. Fuller’s focus on the legal issues, social history, and
history of law, in addition to his grasp on the idea of person (which is
symbolic and social, ‘artificial’), fits neatly with my adoption of Margolis’
philosophy in understanding the right of cyborgs to be recognized as per-
sons, and specifically as legal persons.

1.1   Comments on Methodological Approach

My point of departure is in traditional philosophy. Philosophy is also my
destination, helping me to comprehend contemporary changes in our
bodies and lives, and aiming at practical effect, which is the paradigm shift
in understanding persons in societies. The philosophy suited best to this
task is pragmatism, focusing on a lived experience, an individual and a
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

social one. I do not try to enter here into the discussion on the character
of this experience—if it is a ‘bare’ experience or if it’s theory-laden
(Hildebrand 2015, pp. 37–51). I follow instead Joseph Margolis’ line of
understanding experience, which is culturally and biologically defined, and
from its beginning submerged in an artefactually constructed human
world of culture.
Pragmatist methodology, as settled on by John Dewey, finds a prob-
lematic situation to be a flash point, provoking a search for the possible
solution (Dewey 1938, 1991). The problematic situation provoking many
theorists currently is caused by the power of influence offered by new
technologies which mediate persons’ forms of life: perceptions, work and
leisure, social contacts and communication, forms of our mobility in an
urban environment, even forms of self-identification. I do not refer here
only to visual technologies, or technologies of imaging, which are a very
powerful tool in this aspect, but more generally to all technologies, includ-
ing the medically invasive usage of technologies (such as implants, metal
bones, artificial heart valves, and cosmetic surgery). I also refer to smart-
phones, sensors, and intelligently designed products which have become a
normal part of everyday life—technologies which are already influencing
our forms of doing things; our daily practices; and also our forms of per-
ception, rational thinking, memorizing; our forms of actualization and
expressions of emotional feelings; and our directions of desire. Reflecting
on the technological influence on human persons, it is explicit that some-
thing is radically changing the human condition and the functioning of the
social world. Of course, I do not claim that every individual experiencing
the influence of technologies on his/her life is conscious about that fact,
nor analyzing and interpreting it critically. Still, this influence challenges
philosophical consideration on the condition of the human person and its
modes of functioning as mediated by technologies.
In the second chapter, ‘Evolutionary Continuity between Human
Person and Cyborg Person’ I claim that a cyborg should not be treated
merely as a metaphorical figure, but rather as a person or self, emerging
from within process of hybrid nature-culture evolution in post-Darwinian
perspective of Joseph Margolis. The very idea of the evolutionary continu-
ity between human persons and cyborg persons draws on the prior notions
of the hybrid artefactuality of human persons, the evolutionary continuity
of animals and humans, and the entwinement of biological and cultural
processes. The central puzzle concerns the need to admit that the applica-
tion of evolutionary theory to human persons and cyborg persons requires
Another random document with
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 For the glory of thy rule I have written these lines with
humble heart. O flower of boyhood, according to thy
worthiness I wish thee prosperity.’
71 In the first version, ‘I am myself the worst of sinners, but may
God grant me relief by his Spirit.’
72 Communicated to me by Miss Bateson.
73 It is even the case in one instance (i. 846) that a blank is left in
the line for a word omitted in D which might have been
supplied by reference to any other MS. which contained the
passage. So difficult was communication between Oxford and
London in those days.
74 e.g. i. 209 Regem 219 Qui est ii. 9 sociatus 114 de pondere
266 Pontifice.
75 A few errors may be noted in the poem De Lucis Scrutinio, viz.
l. 15 manifestus 36 oculis 66 similatam 89 Ominis (for O
nimis): also in ‘O deus immense,’ l. 28 se (for te) 104 sub (for
sue).
76 Trifling differences of spelling are as a rule not recorded.
Examples of such variations are the following in C: i. 1 ut 11
uidet 23 choruschat 120 talamum 137 sydera 139 themone
141 &c. sed (for set) 196 &c. amodo 234 prohdolor 311
Immundos 586 Egiptus 1056 Symonis 1219 Ocupat 1295
suppremis 1505 loquturus 1514 Obstetit 1755 opprobrium
1832 littora 1947 litora 2094 patiens ii. Prol. 11 etiam ii. 57
fatie 261 Moise 494 synagoga iii. 291 redditus, &c. Variation in
the use of capital letters or in regard to the separation of ‘que,’
‘ve,’ &c. from the words which they follow is usually not
recorded. The spelling of H and G is almost identical with that
of S.
 EPISTOLA77

Hanc Epistolam subscriptam corde deuoto

misit senex et cecus Iohannes Gower
Reuerendissimo in Cristo Patri ac domino suo
precipuo, domino Thome de Arundell,
Cantuariensi Archiepiscopo, tocius Anglie
Primati et apostolice sedis legato. Cuius statum
ad ecclesie sue regimen dirigat et feliciter
conseruet filius virginis gloriose, dominus
noster Ihesus Cristus, qui cum deo patre et
spiritu sancto viuit et regnat deus per omnia
secula seculorum. Amen.

Successor Thome, Thomas, humilem tibi do me,

Hunc et presentem librum tibi scribo sequentem:
Qu o d tibi presento s c r i p t u m78 retinere
memento,
Vt contempletur super hoc quo m e n s
s t i m u l e t u r.
Curia diuisa que Rome stat modo visa,
Dum se peruertit, in luctum gaudia vertit:
Et quia lex Cristi dolet isto tempore tristi,
Hoc ad p l a n g e n d u m librum tibi mitto
legendum.
Set tu, diuine qui lumen habes
medicine,
Gaudeat vt tristis, confer
10 medicamen in istis:
Dummodo lux cessit, alibique fides
t e n e b r e s c i t,
Tu noster Phebus nostris da lumina rebus,
Et quod splendescas, virtute tuaque calescas,
 Hoc magis ad lumen tibi scriptum dono volumen.
I n s p e c u l o tali de pectore iudiciali
Si videas plane, puto non erit illud inane.
Cecus ego m e r e, nequio licet acta videre,
Te t a m e n in mente m e m o r a b o r corde
vidente.
Corpore defectus, quamuis michi curua s e nectus
To r q u e t , a d h u c m e n t e m s t u d i o s i n i t
20 e s s e m a n e n t e m,
Et sic cum Cristo persto studiosus in isto,
Quo mundi gesta tibi scribam iam manifesta.
Hinc, pater, exoro, scripturis dumque laboro,
Ad requiem m e n t i s a n i m a m d i s pone
studentis;
Semper speraui, que patrem te semper amaui,
Quo michi finalis tua gracia sit
specialis.
Nunc quia diuisus meus est a
corpore visus,
Lux tua que lucet anime vestigia
ducet,
Corpus et egrotum, vetus et
miserabile totum,
N e c o n t u r b e t u r, t e d e f e n s o r e
30 iuuetur;
Et sic viuentem custos simul et
morientem
Suscipe me cecum tua per
suffragia tecum.
Lux tua morosa de stirpe micans
generosa
Condita sub cinere non debet in
orbe latere.
Claret Arundella quasi Sol de luce nouella,
Que te produxit, que te prius vbere succit.
Es quia totus Mas vocitaris origine Thomas,
Vnde deo totus sis ab omni labe remotus;
 Et sic prelatus nunc Cristi lege sacratus
40 Legem conseruas, qua te sine labe reseruas.
Stat modo secura tua l u x, sine crimine pura,
Claraque lucescit, quod eam nil
turpe repressit:
Anglia letetur, l u m e n q u i a t a l e m e r e t u r,
Quo bene viuentes tua sint exempla sequentes.
Per te succedet amor omnis, et ira recedet,
Subque tua cura sunt prospera cuncta futura:
Et quia sic creuit tua lux, terramque repleuit,
Det deus vt talis tibi lux sit perpetualis.
Hec Gower querit, qui tuus est et erit.

FOOTNOTES:
77 This Epistle is found in the All Souls MS. only.
78 Words written over erasure in the MS. are printed in spaced
type.
 VOX CLAMANTIS79
In huius opusculi principio intendit compositor describere qualiter
seruiles rustici impetuose contra ingenuos et nobiles regni
insurrexerunt. Et quia res huiusmodi velut80 monstrum detestabilis
fuit et horribilis, fingit81 se per sompnium vidisse diuersas vulgi
turmas in diuersas s p e c i e s b e s t i a r u m domesticarum
transmutatas: dicit tamen quod ille bestie domestice, a sua
deuiantes natura, crudelitates ferarum sibi presumpserunt. De causis
vero, ex quibus inter homines talia contingunt enormia, tractat
vlterius secundum distincciones libelli istius, qui in septem diuiditur
partes, prout inferius locis suis euidencius apparebit.
Sequitur prologus.

Capitula libri Primi.

Capm. i. Hic declarat in primis sub cuius Regis imperio, in quibus
eciam82 mense et anno, ista sibi accidencia, cuius tenor
subsequitur, contingebat. Commendat insuper, secundum
illud quod esse solebat, fertilitatem terre illius vbi ipse tunc
fuerat, in qua, vt dicit, omnium quasi rerum delicie pariter
conveniunt, et loquitur vlterius de amenitate temporis,
necnon et de diei serenitate, que tunc tamen83 sompnium
nimis horribile precedebant.
Capm. ii. Hic incipit sompnium, vbi quodam die Martis dicit se varias
vulgi turmas vidisse, quarum primam in similitudinem
asinorum mutari subito speculabatur.
Capm. iii. Hic dicit se per sompnium quandam vulgi turmam in boues
vidisse mutatam.
Capm. iiii. Hic dicit se per sompnium quandam vulgi turmam in
porcos vidisse mutatam.
Capm. v. Hic dicit se per sompnium quandam vulgi turmam in canes
vidisse mutatam.
Capm. vi. Hic dicit se per sompnium quandam vulgi turmam in
murelegos et vulpes vidisse mutatam: dicit murelegos vt
seruos domesticos; dicit vulpes, quia fures ruptis vbique
Gaiolis liberi tunc eos comitabantur.84
Capm. vii. Hic dicit se per sompnium quandam vulgi turmam in aues
domesticas vidisse mutatam, quibus dicit q u o d bubones
quasi predones commixti associebantur.85
Capm. viii. Hic dicit se per sompnium quandam vulgi turmam in
muscas et ranas vidisse mutatam.
Capm. ix. Hic dicit se per sompnium vidisse quod, quando omnes
predicte furie in vnum extiterant congregate, quidam
Graculus auis, Anglice Gay,86 qui vulgariter vocatur Watte,
presumpsit sibi statum regiminis aliorum, et in rei veritate
ille Watte fuit dux eorum.
Capm. x. Hic dicit se per sompnium vidisse progenies Chaym
maledictas vna cum multitudine seruorum nuper Regis
Vluxis, quos Circes in bestias mutauit, furiis supradictis
associari.
Capm. xi. Hic dicit secundum visionem sompnii qualiter audiuit
nomina et eorum voces diuersas et horribiles. Dicit eciam
de Iohanne Balle presbitero, qui eos ad omne scelus
instigabat, et quasi propheta inter eos reputabatur.
Capm. xii. Hic dicit secundum visionem sompnii qualiter furie
supradicte precones sibi et tribunos constituebant, et
quomodo senes et iuuenes eorum fuerunt armati.
Capm. xiii. Hic dicit secundum visionem sompnii qualiter et quando
dicte furie, instigante diabolo, Nouam Troiam, id est
 ciuitatem Londoniarum, ingresse sunt: nam sicut Troia
nuper desolata extitit, ita ista Ciuitas protunc quasi omni
consolatione destituta pre dolore penitus ignominiosa
permansit.
Capm. xiiii. Hic tractat secundum visionem sompnii quasi per figuram
de morte Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi.
Capm. xv. Hic tractat vlterius secundum visionem sompnii de diuersa
persecucione et occisione, quas in dicta Ciuitate
quodammodo absque vlla pro tunc defensione furie
supradicte, prodolor! faciebant, et qualiter huiusmodi fama
vicinas perterruit ciuitates.
Capm. xvi. Hic plangit secundum visionem sompnii quasi in propria
persona dolores eorum, qui in siluis et speluncis pre timore
temporis illius latitando se munierunt.
Capm. xvii. Hic eciam secundum visionem sompnii describit quasi in
persona propria angustias varias que contingebant hiis qui
tunc pro securitate optinenda in Turrim Londoniarum se
miserunt, et de ruptura eiusdem turris; figurat enim dictam
turrim similem esse naui prope voraginem Cille periclitanti.
Capm. xviii. Hic dicit secundum visionem sompnii qualiter tanta
superhabundauit tempestas quod de certo remedio absque
manu diuina omnes in dicta naui hesitarunt, et deum super
hoc precipue quilibet sexus ingenui deuocius exorabat.
Capm. xix. Hic dicit secundum visionem sompnii de quadam voce
diuina in excelsis clamante, et quomodo deus placatus
tandem precibus tempestates sedauit, et quomodo quasi in
holocaustum pro delicto occisus fuit ille Graculus, id est
Walterus, furiarum dictarum Capitaneus.
Capm. xx. Hic loquitur adhuc de naui visa in sompnis, id est de
mente sua adhuc turbata, vt si ipse mentaliter sompniando,
quasi per nauem variis ventis sine gubernaculo agitatam,
omnes mundi partes pro pace mentis scrutanda
inuestigasset, et tandem in partes Britannie Maioris, vbi
 raro pax est, dicit se applicuisse. Dicit eciam qualiter vox in
sompnis sibi iniunxit quod ipse omnino scriberet ea que de
mundo in illo scrutinio vidisset et audisset; et ita terminatur
sompnium.
Capm. xxi. Hic reddit vigilans gracias deo, qui eum in sompnis a
pelago liberauit.
Expliciunt Capitula libri primi.

Incipiunt Capitula libri Secundi.

Prologus. Hic dicit quod ipse iam vigilans, secundum vocem quam in
sompnis acceperat, intendit scribere ea que de mundo vidit
et audiuit, et vocat libellum istum Vox Clamantis, quia de
voce et clamore quasi omnium conceptus est; vnde in huius
operis auxilium spiritum sanctum inuocat.
Capm. i. Hic dicit, secundum quod de clamore communi audiuit,
qualiter status et ordo mundi precipue in partibus istis
multipliciter in peius variatur, et quomodo vnusquisque
super hoc fortunam accusat.
Capm. ii. Hic corripit fortunam et sui euentus inconstanciam
deplangit.
Capm. iii. Hic describit fortunam secundum aliquos, qui sortem
fortune dicunt esse et87 casum.
Capm. iiii.88 Hic tractat vlterius de mutacione fortune secundum quod
dicunt: concludit tamen in fine, quod neque sorte aut casu,
set ex meritis vel demeritis, sunt ea que hominibus
contingunt.
Capm. v.89 Hic dicit secundum scripturas et allegat, qualiter omnes
creature homini iusto seruientes obediunt.
Capm. vi. Hic tractat secundum scripturas et allegat, qualiter omnes
creature homini peccatori aduersantes inobediunt.
Capm. vii. Hic loquitur de deo summo Creatore, qui est trinus et
vnus, in cuius scientia et disposicione omnia creata
reguntur.
Capm. viii. Hic loquitur de filio dei incarnato domino nostro Ihesu
Cristo, per quem de malo in bonum reformamur.
Capm. ix. Hic dicit quod quilibet debet firmiter credere, nec vltra
quam decet argumenta fidei inuestigare.
Capm. x. Hic tractat quod in re sculptili vel conflatili non est
confidendum, nec eciam talia adorari debent, set quod ex
illis in ecclesia visis mens remorsa ad solum deum
contemplandum cicius commoueatur.
Capm. xi. Hic dicit quod exquo solus deus omnia creauit, solus est a
creaturis adorandus, et est eciam magne racionis vt ipse
omnia gubernet, et secundum merita et demerita hominum
solus in sua voluntate iudicet.
Expliciunt Capitula libri secundi.

Incipiunt Capitula libri Tercii.

Prologus. Hic dicit quod, exquo non a fortuna set meritis et demeritis
ea que nos in mundo prospera et aduersa vocamus digno
dei iudicio hominibus contingunt, intendit consequenter
scribere de statu hominum, qualiter se ad presens habent,
secundum hoc quod per sompnium superius dictum vidit et
audiuit.
Capm. i. Hic tractat qualiter status et ordo mundi in tribus consistit
gradibus: sunt enim, vt dicit, Clerus, Milicies, et
Agricultores, de quorum errore mundi infortunia nobis
contingunt. Vnde pre aliis videndum est de errore Cleri,
precipue in ordine prelatorum, qui potenciores aliis existunt;
et primo dicet de illis qui Cristi scolam dogmatizant et eius
contrarium operantur.
Capm. ii. Hic loquitur de prelatis illis, qui carnalia appetentes vltra
modum delicate viuunt.
Capm. iii. Hic loquitur de prelatis illis, qui lucris terrenis inhiant,
honore prelacie gaudent, et non vt prosint sed vt presint
episcopatum desiderant.
Capm. iiii. Hic loquitur de legibus eorum positiuis, que quamuis ad
cultum anime necessarie non sunt, infinitas tamen
constituciones quasi cotidie ad eorum lucrum nobis grauiter
imponunt.90
Capm. v. Hic loquitur de prelatis illis,91 qui bona mundi temporalia
possidentes spiritualia omittunt.
Capm. vi. Hic loquitur92 qualiter Cristus pacem suis discipulis dedit et
reliquit: dicit93 tamen quod modo propter bona terrena
guerras saltem contra Cristianos prelati legibus suis
positiuis instituunt et prosequntur.
Capm. vii. Hic loquitur94 qualiter clerus in amore dei et proximi
deberet pius et paciens existere, et non bellicosus.
Capm. viii. Hic tractat eciam95 qualiter non decet prelatos ex
impaciencia contra populum Cristianum aliqualiter96 bella
mouere; set tantum ex precibus absque impetu ire omnem
deo adiuuante mundi deuincant maliciam.
Capm. ix. Hic tractat quod, sicut non decet dominos temporales
usurpare sibi regimen in spiritualibus, ita nec decet cleri
prelatos attemptare sibi guerras et huiusmodi temporalia,
que mundi superbia et auaricia inducunt.
Capm. x. Hic querit quod, exquo prelati scribunt et docent ea que
sunt pacis, quomodo in contrarium ea que sunt belli
procurant et operantur. Ad quam tamen questionem ipse
subsequenter respondet.
Capm. xi. Hic loquitur de prelatis illis, qui nomen sanctum sibi
presumunt, apropriant tamen sibi terrena, nec aliis inde
 participando ex caritate subueniunt.
Capm. xii. Hic loquitur de Simonia prelatorum, et qualiter hii delicati,
dicentes se esse ecclesiam, aliis grauiora imponunt, et
multociens de censura horribili laicos pro modico impetuose
torquent et infestant.
Capm. xiii. Hic loquitur qualiter prelatus non solum doctrina set etiam
bonis actibus populo sibi commisso lucere deberet.
Capm. xiiii. Hic loquitur qualiter signa Anticristi in Curia Romana
precipue ex auaricia secundum quosdam apparuerunt.
Capm. xv. Hic loquitur secundum commune dictum, qualiter97
honores et non onera prelacie plures affectant, quo magis
in ecclesia cessant virtutes, et vicia multipliciter accrescunt.
Capm. xvi. Postquam dictum est de illis qui errant in statu prelacie,
dicendum est de errore curatorum, qui sub prelatis
constituti, parochiarum curas sub animarum suarum
periculo admittentes, negligenter omittunt: et primo intendit
dicere de curatis illis qui suas curas omittentes ad
seruiendum magnatum curiis adherent.
Capm. xvii. Hic loquitur de rectoribus illis, qui ab episcopo licentiati se
fingunt ire scolas, vt sub nomine virtutis vicia corporalia
frequentent.
Capm. xviii. Hic loquitur de rectoribus illis, qui in curis residentes,
curas tamen negligentes, venacionibus precipue et
voluptatibus penitus intendunt.
Capm. xix. Hic loquitur de rectoribus in curis residentibus, qui tamen
curas animarum omittentes, quasi seculi mercatores
singula de die in diem temporalia ementes et vendentes,
mundi huius diuicias adquirunt.
Capm. xx. Postquam dictum est de errore illorum qui in ecclesia
beneficiati existunt, iam dicendum est de presbiteris
stipendiariis; de talibus saltem, qui non propter mundiciam
et ordinis honestatem, set propter mundi ocia gradum
 presbiteratus appetunt et assumunt. Et primo dicit de illis
qui pro diuinis celebrandis excessiue se vendunt.
Capm. xxi. Hic loquitur de consueta presbiterorum voluptate, et
qualiter hii stipendia plebis ex conuencione sumentes,
indeuote pro mortuis orando non se debite ad suffragia
mortuorum exonerant.
Capm. xxii. Hic tractat causam, quare accidit quod laici, quasi iuris
amici, luxurie 98presbiterorum consuetudinem abhorrentes,
eam multociens castigantes grauiter affligunt.
Capm. xxiii. Hic scribit contra hoc quod aliqui presbiteri dicunt,
qualiter ipsi in carnis luxuriam committendo non grauius
hominibus laicis deum offendunt.
Capm. xxiiii. Hic describit qualiter omnia et singula que sacerdocii
concernunt officium magne virtutis misteria designant. Et
primo dicet de vestibus sacerdotalibus ex vtraque lege ob
diuinam reuerenciam competenter dispositis.
Capm. xxv. Hic loquitur qualiter sacrificia de veteri lege altari debita
fuerunt in figura ad exemplum nunc noue legis
presbiterorum: dicit v l t e r i u s qualiter e c i a m e x vtraque
lege sacrificantes altari debent esse sine macula.
Capm. xxvi. Hic loquitur quod etas sufficiens, priusquam gradum
sacerdocii sibi assumat, in homine requiritur: loquitur eciam
de suorum rasura pilorum, et dicit quod talia in signum
mundicie et sanctitatis specialiter presbiteris conveniunt.
Dicit vlterius quod presbiteri a bonis non debent esse
operibus ociosi.
Capm. xxvii.99 Hic loquitur de presbiterorum dignitate spirituali, et
qualiter hii, si bene agant sua officia, plus aliis proficiunt;
sinautem, de suis malis exemplis delinquendi magis
ministrant occasiones.
Capm. xxviii. Postquam dixit de errore illorum qui inter seculares
sacerdocii ministerium sibi assumpserunt, intendit dicere
secundum tempus nunc de errore scolarium, qui ecclesie
plantule dicuntur.
Capm. xxix. Hic querit causam, que scolarium animos ad ordinem
presbiteratus suscipiendum inducit: tres enim causas
precipue allegat; tractat eciam de quarta causa, que raro ad
presens contingit.
Expliciunt Capitula libri tercii.

Incipiunt Capitula libri Quarti.

Capm. i. Exquo tractauit de errore Cleri, ad quem precipue nostrarum
spectat regimen animarum, iam intendit tractare de errore
virorum Religiosorum. Et primo dicet de Monachis et aliis
bonorum temporalium possessionem optinentibus: ordinis
vero illorum sanctitatem commendans, illos precipue qui
contraria faciunt opera redarguit.
Capm. ii. Hic loquitur de Monachis illis, qui contra primi ordinis statuta
abstinencie virtutem linquentes delicacias sibi corporales
multipliciter assumunt.
Capm. iii. Hic loquitur qualiter modus100 et regula, qui a fundatoribus
ordinis primitus fuerant constituti, iam nouiter a viciorum
consuetudine in quampluribus s u b u e r t u n t u r.
Capm. iiii. Hic loquitur de Monachis illis, qui contra primitiua ordinis
sui statuta mundi diuicias ad vsus malos, suo nesciente
preposito, apropriare sibi clanculo presumunt.
Capm. v. Hic loquitur qualiter monachi extra claustrum vagare non
debent.
Capm. vi. Hic loquitur de monachis illis, qui non pro diuino seruicio,
sel magis pro huius mundi honore et voluptate, habitum sibi
religionis assumunt.
Capm. vii. Hic loquitur qualiter paciencia vna cum ceteris virtutibus a
quibusdam claustris, viciis supervenientibus, se
transtulerunt.
Capm. viii. Hic loquitur quod sicut monachi ita et errantes canonici a
suis sunt excessibus culpandi.
Capm. ix. Hic loquitur qualiter religiosi male viuentes omnibus aliis
infelicissimi existunt.
Capm. x. Hic loquitur qualiter vnusquisque qui religionis ingredi
voluerit professionem, cuncta mundi vicia penitus abnegare
et anime virtutes adquirere et obseruare tenetur.
Capm. xi. Hic loquitur qualiter religiosi consorcia mulierum specialiter
euitare debent.
Capm. xii. Hic tractat quasi sub compendio super hiis que in religionis
professione secundum fundatorum sancciones districcius
obseruanda finaliter existunt.
Capm. xiii. Hic loquitur vlterius de mulieribus illis, que in habitu
Moniali sub sacre religionis velo professionem suscipientes
ordinis sui continenciam non obseruant.
Capm. xiiii. Hic loquitur qualiter ordinarii ex sua visitacione, qua
mulieres religione velatas se dicunt corrigere, ipsas
multociens efficiunt deteriores.
Capm. xv.101 Hic loquitur de castitatis commendacione, que maxime
in religione mulieribus convenit professis.

Capm. xvi. Postquam tractauit de illis qui in religione possessoria sui

ordinis professionem offendunt, dicendum est iam de illis
qui errant in ordine fratrum mendicancium; et primo dicet de
hiis qui sub ficte paupertatis vmbra terrena lucra
conspirantes quasi tocius mundi dominium subiugarunt.
Capm. xvii. Hic loquitur de fratribus illis, qui per ypocrisim predicando
populi peccata publice redarguentes, blandiciis tamen et
 voluptatibus clanculo deseruiunt.
Capm. xviii. Hic loquitur de fratribus illis, qui propter huius mundi
famam, et quod ipsi eciam, quasi ab ordinis sui iugo
exempti, ad confessiones audiendas digniores efficiantur,
summas in studio scole cathedras affectant.
Capm. xix. Hic loquitur qualiter isti fratres inordinate viuentes ad
ecclesie Cristi regimen non sunt aliqualiter necessarii.
Capm. xx. Hic loquitur qualiter isti fratres inordinate viuentes102 ad
commune bonum vtiles aliqualiter103 non existunt.
Capm. xxi. Hic loquitur de fratribus illis, qui incautos pueros etatis
discrecionem non habentes in sui ordinis professionem
attractando colloquiis blandis multipliciter illaqueant.
Capm. xxii. Hic loquitur de Apostazia fratrum ordinis mendicancium,
precipue de his qui sub ficta ypocrisis simplicitate quasi
vniuersorum Curias magnatum subuertunt, et inestimabiles
suis ficticiis sepissime causant errores.
Capm. xxiii. Hic loquitur qualiter isti fratres mendicantes mundum
circuiendo104 amplioresque querendo delicias de loco in
locum cum ocio se transferunt. Loquitur eciam de superfluis
eorum edificiis, que quasi ab huius seculi potencioribus
vltra modum delicate construuntur.
Capm. xxiiii. Hic loquitur qualiter, non solum in ordine fratrum
mendicancium set eciam in singulis cleri gradibus, ea que
virtutis esse solebant a viciis quasi generaliter subuertuntur.
Dicit tamen quod secundum quasdam Burnelli
constituciones istis precipue diebus modus et regula
specialius obseruantur.
Expliciunt Capitula libri quarti.

Incipiunt Capitula libri Quinti.

Capm. i. Postquam dictum est de illis qui in statu Cleri regere
spiritualia deberent, dicendum est iam de hiis qui in statu
Milicie temporalia defendere et supportare tenentur. Et
primo distinguit causas, ex quibus ordo Militaris cepit
originem.
Capm. ii. Hic loquitur qualiter miles, qui in mulieris amorem
exardescens ex concupiscencia armorum se implicat
exercicio, vere laudis honorem ob hoc nullatenus meretur.
Describit eciam infirmitates amoris illius, cuius passiones
variis adinuicem motibus maxime contrariantur.
Capm. iii. Hic describit formam mulieris speciose, ex cuius
concupiscencia illaqueata militum corda racionis iudicio
sepissime destituuntur.
Capm. iiii. Hic loquitur quod, vbi in milite mulierum dominatur amoris
voluptas, omnem in eo vere probitatis miliciam extinguit.
Capm. v. Hic loquitur de militibus illis, quorum vnus propter mulieris
amorem, alter propter inanem mundi famam, armorum
labores exercet; finis tamen vtriusque absque diuine laudis
merito vacuus pertransit.
Capm. vi. Hic loquitur interim de commendacione mulieris bone,
cuius condicionis virtus approbata omnes mundi delicias
transcendit: loquitur eciam de muliere mala, cuius cautelis
vix sapiens resistit.
Capm. vii. Hic loquitur qualiter milicia bene disposita omnibus aliis
gradibus quibuscumque commune securitatis prestat
emolumentum.
Capm. viii. 105Hic loquitur qualiter milicie improbitas alios gradus
quoscumque sua ledit importunitate et offendit.
Capm. ix. Postquam dictum est de illis qui in statu militari rem
publicam106 seruare debent illesam, dicendum est iam de
istis qui ad cibos et potus pro generis humani sustentacione
perquirendos agriculture labores subire tenentur.
Capm. x.107 Hic loquitur vlterius de diuersis vulgi laborariis, qui sub
aliorum regimine conducti, variis debent pro bono communi
operibus subiugari.

Capm. xi. Quia varias rerum proprietates vsui humano necessarias

nulla de se prouincia sola parturit vniuersas, inter alios
mundi coadiutores Ciuium Mercatores instituuntur, per quos
singularum bona regionum alternatim communicantur, de
quorum iam actibus scribere consequenter intendit. Et
primo dicit quod in mutuo conciuium amore policia magis
gaudet, quam omnium malorum radix auaricia ad presens,
prodolor! extirpare presumpsit.
Capm. xii. Hic loquitur de duabus auaricie filiabus, scilicet vsura et
fraude, que in ciuitate orientes ad ciuium negociaciones
secretum prestant obsequium. Set primo dicet de
condicione vsure, que vrbis potencioribus sua iura
specialius ministrat.
Capm. xiii. Postquam dixit de potencia vsure, iam de fraudis
subtilitate dicere intendit, que de communi consilio quasi
omnibus et singulis in emendo et vendendo ea que sunt
agenda procurat et subtiliter disponit.
Capm. xiiii. Hic loquitur vlterius quomodo fraus singula artificia
necnon et vrbis victualia vbicumque sua subtili diposicione
gubernat.
Capm. xv. Hic loquitur de Ciue illo maliuolo et impetuoso, qui Maioris
ministerium sibi adoptans in conciues suam accendit
maliciam, quo magis sanum ciuitatis regimen sua
importunitate perturbat et extinguit.
Capm. xvi. Hic loquitur eciam de ciue illo, qui linguosus et Susurro
inter conciues seminator discordiarum existit. Loquitur de
variis eciam periculis occasione male lingue contingentibus.
Expliciunt Capitula libri quinti.
 Incipiunt Capitula libri Sexti.
Capm. i. Exquo de errore in singulis temporalium gradibus existente
tractatum est, iam quia vnumquemque sub legis iusticia
gubernari oportet, tractare vlterius intendit de illis qui iuris
ministri dicuntur, quamuis tamen ipsi omnem suis cautelis
iusticiam confundunt, et propter mundi lucrum multipliciter
eneruant.108 Set primo dicet de illis qui magis practicam
cum fallaciis in iuris confusionem exercent.
Capm. ii. Hic loquitur de causidicis et aduocatis illis, qui vicinum
populum depredantes, ex bonisque alienis ditati,
largissimas sibi possessiones adquirunt: de quibus tamen,
vt dicitur, vix gaudet tercius heres.
Capm. iii. Hic loquitur de causidicis et Aduocatis illis, qui quanto
plures sunt in numero, tanto magis lucra sicientes patriam
deuorant, et iuris colore109 subtilia plectentes, suis cautelis
innocentem populum formidantem illaqueant.
Capm. iiii. Hic loquitur qualiter isti causidici et iuris Aduocati in sua
gradatim ascendentes facultate, Iudicisque aspirantes
officium, iudicialis solii tandem cacumen attingunt; vbi quasi
in Cathedra pestelencie sedentes, maioris auaricie cecitate
percussi, peioris quam antea condicionis existunt.
Capm. v. Hic loquitur quasi per epistolam Iudicibus illis directam, qui
in caduca suarum diuiciarum multitudine sperantes deum
adiutorem suum ponere nullatenus dignantur.
Capm. vi. Hic loquitur de errore Vicecomitum, Balliuorum, necnon et
in assisis iuratorum, qui singuli auro conducti diuitum
causas iniustas supportantes, pauperes absque iusticia
calumpniantur et opprimunt.
Capm. vii.110 Hic loquitur quod sicut homines esse super terram
necessario expedit, ita leges ad eorum regimen institui
oportet, dummodo tamen legis custodes verum a falso
discernentes vnicuique quod suum est equo pondere
distribuant. De erroribus tamen et iniuriis modo
 contingentibus innocenciam Regis nostri, minoris etatis
causa, quantum ad presens excusat.111
Capm. viii. Hic loquitur quod, exquo omnes quicumque mundi status
sub regie maiestatis iusticia moderantur, intendit ad
presens excellentissimo iam Regi nostro quandam
epistolam in eius honore112 editam scribere consequenter,
ex qua ille rex noster, qui modo in sua puerili constituitur
etate, cum vberiores postea sumpserit annos, gracia
mediante diuina, in suis regalibus exercendis euidencius
instruatur. Et primo dicit quod, quamuis regalis potencia
quodammodo supra leges extollatur, regiam tamen decet
clemenciam, quod ipse bonis moribus inherendo, quasi
liber sub iusticie legibus se et suos in aspectu Regis
altissimi assidue gubernet.
Capm. ix. Hic loquitur qualiter rex sibi male consulentes caucius
euitare, proditoresque regni sui penitus extinguere, suorum
eciam condiciones ministrorum diligencius inuestigare, et
quos extra iusticiam errantes inuenerit, debita pena
corrigere debet et districcius castigare.
Capm. x. Hic dicit quod rex sano consilio adhereat, ecclesie iura
supportet et erigat, equs in iudiciis et pietosus existat,
suamque famam cunctis mundi opibus preponat.
Capm. xi. Hic loquitur qualiter regiam libertatem in viciorum
nullatenus decet incidere seruitutem, set sicut coram
populo alios excellit potencia, ita coram deo pre ceteris
ampliori virtutum clarescat habundancia.
Capm. xii. Hic loquitur qualiter rex a sue carnis voluptate illicebra113
specialiter se debet abstinere, et sub sacre legis
constitucione propter diuinam offensam sue coniugis
tantum licito fruatur consorcio.
Capm. xiii. Hic loquitur et ponit magnifico iam Regi nostro Iuueni
nuper serenissimi Principis patris sui exempla, dicens quod,
vbi et quando necessitatis illud exigit facultas, rex contra
 suos hostes armorum probitates audacter exerceat, et quod
ille nulla aduersitate sui vultus constanciam videntibus aliis
amittat.
Capm. xiiii. Hic loquitur quod absque iusticie experta causa rex
bellare non debet. Dicit insuper quod regie congruit
dignitati, discreto tamen prouiso regimine, magis amore
quam austeritatis rigore suos subditos tractare.
Capm. xv. Hic loquitur secundum Salomonis experienciam, quod
ceteris virtutibus ad regni gubernaculum preualet sapiencia,
que deo et hominibus regem magis reddit acceptabilem.
Capm. xvi. Hic loquitur qualiter celi deus, qui est rex regum et
dominus dominancium, a regibus terre pura mente precipue
colendus est et super omnia metuendus.
Capm. xvii. Hic loquitur qualiter rex in caritate dei et proximi viuens,
contra superuenientem mortem, que nullo parcit regi, omni
se debet diligencia prouidere.
Capm. xviii. Hic loquitur in fine istius epistole, vbi pro statu regis
deuocius exorat, vt deus ipsius etatem iam floridam in omni
prosperitate conseruet, et ad laudem dei suique et sibi
commisse plebis vtilitatem feliciter perducat in euum.
Capm. xix. Hic recapitulat quodammodo sub figuris et exemplis tam
veteris quam noui testamenti, in quibus pretendit quod
eorum loco qui in omni sanctitate legem dei et fidem Cristi
primitus augmentantes ecclesiam colebant, et a diu114
mortui sunt, iam resurgunt alii precipue de clero, qui illam
omnium viciorum multitudine suffocantes corrumpunt.
Capm. xx. Hic tractat vlterius quod, sicut virtuosis nuper in ecclesia
existentibus succedunt viciosi, sic et mundi proceribus
omnis milicie nuper de probitate famosis succedunt modo
alii, qui neque diuine neque humane laudis digni efficiuntur.
Capm. xxi. Hic loquitur adhuc vlterius super eodem, qualiter loco
eorum qui nuper casti fuerunt et constantes, surrexerunt