Digital Authoritarianism and its

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Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan,
and India Ihsan Yilmaz
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Digital Authoritarianism
and its Religious
Legitimization
The Cases of Turkey, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and India
Edited by
Ihsan Yilmaz
Digital Authoritarianism and its Religious
Legitimization
 Ihsan Yilmaz
Editor

Digital
Authoritarianism
and its Religious
Legitimization
The Cases of Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan,
and India
Editor
Ihsan Yilmaz
Alfred Deakin Institute
Deakin University
Burwood, VIC, Australia

ISBN 978-981-99-3599-4 ISBN 978-981-99-3600-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3600-7

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023

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 Acknowledgements

This book contains revised versions of previously published Open Access

material in the following articles:
Chapter 4: Shukri, Syaza. 2023. “Digital Authoritarianism: Protecting
Islam in Multireligious Malaysia.” Religions, 14(1), 87. https://doi.org/
10.3390/rel14010087.

v
 Contents

1 Digital Authoritarianism and Religion in Democratic

Polities of the Global South 1
Ihsan Yilmaz
Introduction 1
Key Questions 9
Significance of the Book 11
Chapter Descriptions 13
References 17
2 Digital Authoritarianism and Religious Populism
in Turkey 21
Ihsan Yilmaz and Fan Yang
Introduction 21
AKP’s Authoritarianism 24
Erdoğanism and Religious Populism 26
The Power of the Digital Space and AKP’s Fears 29
Full Network Level Governance 30
Sub-Network or Website Level Governance 33
Proxy or Corporation Level Governance 34
Network-Node or Individual Level Governance 38
Conclusion 42
References 44

vii
viii CONTENTS

3 Digital Authoritarianism and Religion in Indonesia 53

Ihsan Yilmaz, Idznursham Ismail, Syaza Shukri,
and Hasnan Bachtiar
Introduction 53
Religion and Authoritarianism in Indonesia’s Post-Suharto
Era 55
Internet Governance Institutions 63
Full Network Level Governance 65
Sub-network or Website Level Governance 67
Proxy or Corporation Level Governance 67
Network-Node or Individual Level Governance 68
Complexities of Digital Authoritarianism, Religion,
and Democratization 71
Conclusion 73
References 76
4 Digital Authoritarianism and Religion in Malaysia 81
Syaza Shukri
Introduction 81
Religious Institutionalization and Islamization of Society 84
Internet Governance Institutions 88
Full Network Level Governance 90
Sub-network or Website Level Governance 91
Proxy or Corporation Level Governance 92
Network-Node or Individual Level Governance 95
Digital Authoritarianism and the Rise of Right-Wing
Populism 98
Conclusion 100
References 102
5 Digital Governance and Religious Populism in Pakistan 109
Ihsan Yilmaz and Raja M. Ali Saleem
Introduction 109
History of Pakistan’s Path to a Religious Populist
Authoritarianism 111
Digital Authoritarianism and the Governance Architecture 114
Full Network Level Governance 118
Sub-Network or Website Level Governance 119
Proxy or Corporation Level Governance 121
 CONTENTS ix

Network-Node or Individual Level Governance 123

Conclusion 125
References 126
6 Hindu Nationalism and Digital Surveillance in India 131
Ihsan Yilmaz and Raja M. Ali Saleem
Introduction 131
Religion and BJP 133
Full Network Level 135
Sub-network Level Governance 136
Proxy or Corporation Level Governance 137
Network-Node or Individual Level Governance 140
Conclusion 144
References 145
7 Digital Authoritarianism, Religion and Future
of Democracy 151
Ihsan Yilmaz and Fan Yang
References 165

Index 167
 Notes on Contributors

Hasnan Bachtiar is a lecturer in the Faculty of Islamic Studies, Univer-

sity of Muhammadiyah Malang (UMM), Indonesia. He is also a Ph.D.
student in the Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University,
Burwood, Australia. Currently, he has worked as a casual research assistant
to Prof Ihsan Yilmaz at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and
Globalisation. Since 2020, he has been appointed as a research director
at the RBC Institute Abdul Malik Fadjar and a research assistant to Prof
Pradana Boy on the project Radicalisation, Secularism and the Gover-
nance of Religion: Bringing Together European and Asian Perspectives
(GREASE) in Indonesia, coordinated by European University Institute
(EUI), Florence, Italy. He holds LL.B. majoring in Islamic law from
UMM and Advanced Master’s from the Centre for Arab and Islamic
Studies (CAIS) at the Australian National University (ANU).
Idznursham Ismail is the director of Strat.O.Sphere Consulting Pte Ltd
and the editor of stratsea.com, a publishing arm of the company. With
a background in Biological Sciences, he specializes in threats involving
chemical, biological and radioactive agents. He has also conducted field
studies in Indonesia focusing on the psychological drivers of violent
extremism. His rounded perspectives are shaped by his previous engage-
ments at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism
Research, the Ministry of Education (Singapore) and in reputable orga-
nizations such as Wahid Foundation and PAKAR.

xi
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Raja M. Ali Saleem is currently working with the Asian Development

Bank (ADB) as a consultant. He has graduated from the University
of Manchester, the University of Calgary and George Mason Univer-
sity. Previously, he was an Associate Professor (Public Policy) at Forman
Christian College University, Pakistan. He is a former civil servant and
has more than 25 years of diverse experience in government, consulting
and academia. He has consulted and worked on projects funded by
World Bank, ADB, United Nations, CIDA, GiZ, USAID, FCDO, etc.
His research focuses on religious nationalism, populism, the relationship
between church and state in India, Pakistan, Turkey, Israel, local govern-
ments, public financial management and democratic consolidation. In
2020, Dr. Saleem was a Fellow of Wolfson College, University of Oxford.
He is also a Non-resident Senior Research Fellow of the European Center
for Populism Studies, Brussels. His first book, State, Nationalism, and
Islamization: Historical Analysis of Turkey and Pakistan, was published
by Palgrave-Macmillan in 2017.
Syaza Shukri is an associate professor at the AbdulHamid AbuSulayman
Kuliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, Inter-
national Islamic University Malaysia. She continues to do research in
comparative politics, especially on democratization and identity politics
in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. She has published numerous
works on her research interests in various forms. Syaza is also a regular
commentator on local politics in Malaysian media.
Fan Yang is a postdoctoral research associate at Alfred Deakin Insti-
tute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University. She studies
the effects of large-scale international digital technological infrastruc-
ture in terms of cross-jurisdictional tensions and expectations, and their
cross-border effects on political activity and identity.
Ihsan Yilmaz is research professor of political science and interna-
tional relations at Deakin University’s ADI. He is also a Non-Resident
Senior Fellow at Oxford University’s Regent College and Brussels-based
think tank, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Previ-
ously, he worked at the Universities of Oxford and London and has a
strong track record of leading multi-site international research projects
to successful completion. At Deakin, his projects have been funded by
the Australian Research Council (ARC), Department of Veteran Affairs,
Victorian Government and Gerda Henkel Foundation. He has recently
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xiii

been working on authoritarianism, digital authoritarianism, populism,

transnationalism, religion and politics, soft power and sharp power, with
special emphasis on Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan. He is currently
leading two ARC Discovery projects: “Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital
Technologies and Social Cohesion: The Case of Turkish & Indian Dias-
poras in Australia” and “Religious Populism, Emotions and Political
Mobilisation: Civilisationism in Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan.” He is
also co-leading a Gerda Henkel Foundation (Germany) project: “Smart
Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.”
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 Internet freedom in Turkey from 2016 to 2022 22

Table 4.1 Malaysia’s score on internet freedom 2016–2022 84
Table 5.1 Internet freedom in Pakistan 115

xv
 CHAPTER 1

Digital Authoritarianism and Religion

in Democratic Polities of the Global South

Ihsan Yilmaz

Introduction
The purpose of this book is to understand how digital authoritarianism
operates within democratic nation states and how religion can be used to
legitimize digital authoritarianism. In examining the relationship between
digital authoritarianism, democracy, and religion, the book analyzes 5
examples of democratic nation states of the Global South with different
socio-religious dynamics. By investigating the close relationship between
government and religion the book attempts to bring a new understanding
that digital authoritarianism is not merely about parliamentary aspects

At various stages of this book project, I have immensely benefited from the
insights, feedback, input, research assistance, and revisions of Raja M. Ali
Saleem, Nicholas Morieson, Mahmoud Pargoo, Fan Yang, Kainat Shakil, and
Nadeen Madkour. I am very grateful to them.

I. Yilmaz (B)
Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia
e-mail: ihsan.yilmaz@deakin.edu.au

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
I. Yilmaz (ed.), Digital Authoritarianism and its Religious
Legitimization, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3600-7_1
2 I. YILMAZ

and that religiosity, among other factors, legitimizes and shapes digital
authoritarianism.
The advent of the world wide web was widely assumed, in the 1990s,
to herald a new age of freedom, in which ordinary people would have
unprecedented access to information. This new age would see, because of
the increased sharing of information across national boundaries, the fall
of authoritarian regimes, which could not survive—it was assumed—in an
environment in which citizens were empowered by truth and possessed
an increased ability to organize. The internet, world wide web, and later
social media were often assumed to be tools which could bring down
dictatorships and replace them with democratic governments. The Arab
Spring provided the first test of this argument, and showed that, indeed,
digital technology in the form of social media could play a vital role
in organizing protests that ultimately led to revolution and the down-
fall of brutal dictatorships. That the Arab Spring, outside perhaps of the
successful revolution in Tunisia, largely failed was led to a number of civil
conflicts and ultimately to the return of dictatorship in Egypt, does not
itself disprove the notion that digital technology—like the printing press
before it—possesses the ability to create revolutions.
The exponential growth of the internet in the 1990s has generated
a new world of hitherto unknown information exchange and dissemi-
nation across national borders. The prominence of digital space can be
contextualized by the percentage of worldwide internet users that has
increased from 14% in 2005 to 60% in 2014 and the number tends to
increase with national and international endeavors of bridging the digital
divide. However, this overall increase has been accompanied by concerns
regarding the misuse and manipulation of digital tools in the political
space, specifically after incidents such as the Cambridge Analytica Scandal
2018. On the one hand, for cyberlibertarians, the internet provides a
space of freedom and liberty and in the meantime, eliminates the power
of authorities upon their citizens. Arab Spring in 2011 is demonstrated
as an example to indicate the power of social media in enabling polit-
ical activism in an authoritarian regime—on Facebook, citizens, who
were otherwise rather segregated, were networked and connected to
discuss their shared grievances, organize protests and rebellions, and ulti-
mately oblige authoritarian regimes to meet their undoing (Smith 2017).
Seemingly, transnational platforms perform as an overwhelming force
combatting the power of authoritarian regimes.
 1 DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND RELIGION … 3

Yet, the then common belief that the internet was an almost entirely
positive development is, in hindsight, contentious. Social media has now
been co-opted by governments and this has compromised their libertarian
potential. Dystopian literature had long portrayed technological develop-
ment as potentially dangerous if harnessed by authoritarian regimes. For
example, in Orwell’s classic novel 1984—much taught in schools in the
English-speaking world—the Party uses telescreens and hidden recording
devices to both police the thoughts of citizens, but also to shape their
worldview and control their knowledge of the world. Yet these dystopian
possibilities were not readily admitted to in the 1990s when, perhaps due
to the conclusion of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union,
it no longer appeared likely that technology would be weaponized by
oppressive regimes. However, before the start of the 2010s, the libertarian
promise of the internet had fizzled in light of China’s Great Firewall that
blocks platforms and websites from the West.
Today, the effects of the internet and social media are often described
in dystopian terms. The open nature of social media becomes a double-
edged sword that expands the distribution of both information and
misinformation and amplifies the voices of people on both sides of the
political spectrum. Social media is often accused of spreading extremist
ideas, shortening attention spans, and destroying the mental health of
young people. Perhaps worse than this, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube,
and TikTok, among other social media companies, are popularly blamed
for rising polarization, and the spread of misinformation and disinfor-
mation, in a variety of democratic states, and even for the election of
Donald Trump as President of the United States in 2016. Indeed, the
rise of digital media has had a profound impact on people’s lives around
the world—they have changed the way people communicate, organize
protests, and engage in political debate and activism (Brown et al. 2012).
The spread of misinformation via social media is perhaps not the most
disappointing aspect of the digital age. The internet has been facing
a destabilized currency and the future. The simultaneous crushing of
internet freedom in a variety of nations, including in Russia, China,
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey, and the increasing ability of these
regimes to use technologies to increase their control over their respective
societies, is undoubtedly the most disturbing and problematic aspect of
our digital age. In September 2022, with the US and Russia competing
for the leadership at the UN’s International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), uncertainties have surfaced in terms of which kind of internet
4 I. YILMAZ

future the public is facing—the one with more freedom or the one with
more control (McCabe 2022). The election results demonstrated that
more nations expected a more libertarian future of the internet. Scholarly
attention has been paid to digital authoritarianism, or the way digital tech-
nology can be used to empower authoritarian regimes and increase their
ability to control societies over the past decade as authoritarian nations
have been increasingly seeking control over the domestic internet and
social media and the digital platforms outside their own regimes.
In 2019, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey among 979
technology experts addressing technological impacts on citizens, civil
society groups, and governments with regard to social democracy and
democratic representation. Among the respondents, 49% said that the use
of technology will mostly weaken core aspects of democracy, along with
voicing concerns about the misuse of digital technology to manipulate
and weaponize facts destabilizing people’s trust in institutions and each
other, further affecting their views about whether democratic processes
and institutions designed to empower citizens are working (Anderson
and Rainie 2020). Along with an erosion of trust in political processes,
the spread of misinformation and hate speech on social media along with
the use of political ads during elections allows for the scalable manip-
ulation of public opinion in a direction that is desired by authoritarian
regimes. According to Freedom of the Net 2018: The Rise of Digital
Authoritarianism by the Freedom House, 26 of the 65 countries assessed
experienced a deterioration in internet freedom, where reductions in half
of these countries was related to a rise in disinformation, censorship,
online attacks, surveillance and harassment of protestors, and arrests of
government critics in the lead-up to elections. Governments in 18 coun-
tries have increased state surveillance since June 2017—the COVID-19
pandemic only legitimizes and normalizes governments’ access to citizens’
biodata while intensifying control (Yang et al. 2021). Governments, at
the national and state levels, eschew independent oversight and weaken
encryption in order to gain unfettered access to data, as well as blocking
at least one social media or communication platform.
This is not to suggest the transformative role of platforms. However,
this book highlights the co-optation of technological power by govern-
ments. Whether a platform is good, bad, or ugly is more likely to be
determined by who controls the platform and the ethical, political, and
economic factors.
 1 DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND RELIGION … 5

Government’s manipulation of the public sphere online is not just

an activity limited to authoritarian regimes. Many of these technologies
have long been used by liberal, democratic regimes to target people of
color, political activists, migrants, and refugees, and many of the basic
technologies used to surveil and censor and manipulate come from Amer-
ican technology companies. However, what’s more unique about the
authoritarian regimes’ use of emerging technology to monitor and stifle
opposition is its intensity, density, and scalability (Feldstein 2021). Of
course, the internet is a space where degrees of censorship or content
moderation should be required to eliminate harm and disadvantages
directed toward one’s gender, age, region, race and ethnicity, religion,
or mental or physical capacities. For example, child pornography and
other types of illicit content are typically blocked in most societies. South
Korea screens web content to keep out propaganda that supports the
North Korean government. In addition, the celebration of Nazism is
illegal in many European nations (such as Germany and France), and even
internet gambling is prohibited in the United States. However, legisla-
tive bans (even if implemented ex-territorially) (Scott 2008) are more
common than access-restricting technology filters. When it comes to the
top-down restriction of the internet via national jurisdiction, the openness
and neutrality can be compromised—the ideological and political interest
of the state or the dominant party can be embedded within the legisla-
tion. Political censorship and a desire for a monopoly on power are the
most frequently cited justifications. In order to protect the status quo and
single-party or family regimes, Vietnam, China, and some Persian Gulf
countries (Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, to name a
few) implement censorship by restricting unacceptable content at home
and abroad. The degree of acceptability is subject to the definition of the
national government. Tunisia’s and Egypt’s previous governments serve
as cautionary tales. The offense of criticizing or insulting the head of
state is known as lèse majesté. Because of objectionable content about
the nation’s founding father Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkish courts have
blocked access to YouTube in the country. Another country that has
seen a YouTube ban similar to this one is Thailand, where an arrest was
made after a slanderous text message about the King was sent between
only two private individuals (Feldstein 2021). A complaint was allegedly
sparked when another image was placed above the King’s photograph
on a website (Nepstad 2015). There is also much religious censorship,
particularly in the Muslim world, which targets behaviors like viewing or
6 I. YILMAZ

making pornography and gambling. A ban on Facebook was imposed in

Pakistan by the Telecom Authority of Pakistan (TAP) in May 2010 due to
“increasing sacrilegious content,” and since the highly publicized Danish
Prophet Muhammad caricatures in 2006, censorship has increased.
A significant portion of the extant literature on digital authoritar-
ianism discusses the Chinese Communist Party’s use of digital tech-
nology to prolong and even deepen their rule (Polyakova and Meserole
2019; Dragu and Lupu 2021; Ming-Tak Chew and Wang 2021; Lilkov
2020; Erixon and Lee-Makiyama 2011; Cebul and Pinckney 2021). The
Chinese model of technological advancement has been found among
other governments along China’s Belt and Road that use similar systems
of control on their own populations (Polyakova and Meserole 2019;
Dragu and Lupu 2021; Khalil 2020; Sherman 2021).
Like the Chinese people, publics in Russia too are victims of their
government’s digital authoritarianism. Russia, however, has a rather
different model of digital authoritarianism that is more characterized
by internet censorship, the spread of disinformation, and the mobiliza-
tion of trolls and automated bots among American social media. The
different strategies of Russia’s digital authoritarianism are largely due
to the limited popularity of Russia’s self-developed digital platforms in
the world. Like China, the Russian regime has attempted to close its
internet to the West in an effort to restrict the Russian people’s knowl-
edge of the outside world and to prevent Western ideas and liberalism
from entering their societies. Yet the Russians have not enjoyed the same
success in creating social media platforms and apps, but instead forced
Russians onto somewhat non-user-friendly platforms which are heavily
monitored and policed. According to the result of Russian Science and
Technology Foresight (Jankowski 2021), in light of the lack of national
and commercial resources invested in tech and science and the structural
constraints that limit Russia’s supply chain domestically, tech and science
development in Russia lags behind the US and China. Without external
resources, in a domestic setting, Vladimir Putin, however, believes that
the internet is a CIA project designed to promote American interests and
values (Morgus 2018, 86; MacAskill 2014), and therefore consistently
attempts to “subvert existing architecture and governance structures”
(Morgus 2018, 86). Russia under Putin’s rule is not able to filter internet
content as efficiently as the Chinese regime, and instead relies more on
legal threats to prosecute dissidents intended to create an atmosphere of
self-censorship, all “underpinned by robust technical surveillance system
 1 DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND RELIGION … 7

on all internet traffic, known colloquially as SORM – the System for

Operative Investigative Activities” (Morgus 2018, 87).
The Russian regime attempts to spread its digital authoritarianism
throughout the world through cybersecurity treaties, designed to help
states establish control over the internet within their respective borders,
and in doing so legitimize censorship and mass surveillance (Morgus
2018, 86–87). Joining forces with other authoritarian states, including
China and its Belt and Road alliances, Russia has sought to encourage
other nations to re-establish internet sovereignty (by which they mean
state control over the internet) (Morgus 2018). China and Russia there-
fore work to spread their digital authoritarianisms across the world. And
they have found a receptive audience, at times, in nations as varied
as Turkey, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Unlike China and
Russia, these states are democracies, or at worst hybrid regimes with
democratic elements. Yet they too seek to use digital technology to main-
tain and at times increase their power. These nations also have in common
highly religious populations, and their governments have at times used
religion to legitimize their rule and indeed authoritarian and oppressive
actions. Indeed, it appears that in each of these five nations religion is
used by secular authorities to legitimize digital authoritarianism.
The growth of digital authoritarianism is not limited to authoritarian
regimes and has now been operated by quasi-democratic and hybrid
regimes. It should be noted that while the chosen countries vary in their
regime types, a common thread of civilizational populism runs through
them. This political ideology places a significant emphasis on the cultural
and historical accomplishments of a specific civilization. Civilizationalism
often includes a sense of cultural and religious exceptionalism (Yilmaz
and Morieson, 2023). Populism is a political strategy that emphasizes
the interests of the “common people” and opposes a perceived corrupt
or disconnected elite. Religion plays an important role in civilizational
populist regimes as religious traditions are seen as integral to the identity
of a civilization (Yilmaz and Morieson 2023). Populists often draw on
the language of cultural and national identity and may appeal to religious
or traditional values to galvanize support for limiting civic freedoms such
as the case with digital authoritarianism examined in this book. When
combined with civilizationalism, populism can be a potent political force,
as it appeals to a sense of religious-cultural identity and grievance against
perceived external threat. This ideology or mode of governance can be
exclusionary and divisive, as it tends to emphasize a narrow understanding
8 I. YILMAZ

of what it means to be part of a particular civilization or religious tradi-

tion. When authoritarian tendencies are added to the mix, as in the case
of Turkey, India, and Pakistan, dissent can be suppressed, and minority
groups marginalized. Thus, in many ways religion acts as a central element
in consolidating and strengthening civilizational populist regimes and
legitimizing their authoritarian policies.
This book was expanded and updated from Yilmaz et al.’s report Reli-
gious Populism, Cyberspace and Digital Authoritarianism in Asia: India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey (2022). It examines the digital
authoritarianism practiced by governments in India, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Pakistan, and Turkey. Internet governance has become a crucial tool
for civilizational populist regimes such as Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Pakistan, and India. Here, digital authoritarianism is defined as the legit-
imized exercise of control over internet infrastructure across four levels:
full network, sub-network, proxy, and node or individual. Interestingly,
this legitimacy comes from religious figures, sources, and institutions
which support and consolidate the architecture of digital authoritarianism
across these five polities. This, what the book argues, is what differentiates
the digital authoritarianism practiced by China and Russia from the one
in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey.
The enmeshment of religion with digital authoritarianism allows the
ruling parties to legitimize their control of the internet (Yilmaz, 2023).
This book delves into how internet governance takes on digitally auto-
cratic qualities with religious legitimization, becoming a tool for civi-
lizational populist countries to prolong or solidify their rule. Thus, in
these cases governments do not merely censor the internet but use digital
technology to generate public support for their policies, key political
figures, and at times their worldview or ideology. For example, in India,
the Hindu nationalist and populist Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) led by
Narendra Modi (Saleem et al. 2022) has effectively leveraged digital
technology to increase their influence over Indian society, censor their
political opponents, and legitimize punishments. The BJP has also sought
to control social media, Bollywood, and the news industry using tech-
nology to appeal to a broader voter base while enforcing its underlying
Hindu nationalist philosophy, Hindutva. Similarly, in Turkey, the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) has embraced authoritarianism in their
governance of the internet. As they became more paranoid and fearful, the
AKP turned away from the democratic and pluralistic “Muslim” politics
that characterized their early years in power. Consequently, Turkish social
 1 DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND RELIGION … 9

and political life became less diverse and open, and the regime intensified
efforts to eliminate dissent and control both online and offline political
and religious narratives.
The use of religion in enabling civilizational populist leadership and
legitimizing autocratic practices extends to the governance of the internet,
as seen in the cases of the AKP in Turkey and the BJP in India. In
Turkey, the AKP has found an ally in the Directorate of Religious Affairs
(Diyanet), which issues religious opinions that legitimize censorship and
the regime’s persecution of online dissidents (Yilmaz and Albayrak 2022).
Diyanet has helped the AKP assert control over social media by portraying
the regime’s securitization of opponents (Yilmaz et al. 2023) as enemies
of Islam and corrupters of Muslim morals. Similarly, in India, the BJP
has employed a vast network of people to promote Hindu nationalism
online. Both the AKP and BJP have used religion as a weapon to control
the internet and legitimize their autocratic practices, which highlights
the alarming trend of digital authoritarianism in civilizational populist
regimes.

Key Questions
The advent of the internet has made it increasingly difficult to determine
the boundaries of sovereignty and control. While digital technology has
the potential to promote freedom of expression and empower individuals
to uncover and share information that governments may want to keep
hidden, it has also enabled authoritarian regimes to strengthen their grip
on power and perpetrate human rights abuses. In addition, the transna-
tional nature of the digital age means that these regimes can use trolls and
bots to spread propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation across
borders and beyond their own control. The impact of these practices is felt
differently by various groups, with diasporic communities and dissidents
being particularly vulnerable due to their less stable immigration status
and their families living under the governance of authoritarian regimes.
The purpose of this book is to provide answers to the following
questions: How does digital authoritarianism operate within the iden-
tified polity? How do governments practice digital authoritarianism in
the following technological levels: whole network level, sub-network
level, proxy level, and user level? Why do governments seek to control
cyberspace and social media? How do they justify their digital authoritar-
ianism? What role does religion play in its justification? These questions
10 I. YILMAZ

are designed to encourage a diverse range of readers to understand both

the technical and social aspects of digital authoritarianism in Turkey,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and India. Thus, the book examines how
the governments use digital technology to spy on, censor, and spread
propaganda, but also how governments justify these actions, and the
ultimate reasons behind their desire to control cyberspace.
To carry out the analysis, a four-layered approach to digital authori-
tarianism was utilized. This is drawn upon the framework developed by
Howard et al. (2011) in their article The Dictators’ Digital Dilemma.
The authors outline a multi-layered approach employed by authoritarian
regimes to control digital communication, which includes four levels of
control: full networks, sub-networks, network-nodes, and by proxy. Full
network refers to the government control over the entire Internet infras-
tructure by shutting down the internet as a way to exercise control over
online activities. In Turkey, this was observed by the AKP government
during the 2016 coup. Sub-network refers to a smaller part of the infras-
tructure such as websites or social media platforms that are censored
or blocked by the ruling government to limit access to certain infor-
mation or dissenting views. In India, the government has been known
to block access to specific websites and social media platforms such as
Twitter during times of political unrest. A common theme across the five
polities is that the blocking of social media platforms and websites has
disproportionately targeted minorities, and the use of website blocking
was done to prevent rioting against government authorities. At the proxy
level, governance is carried out with the use of intermediaries to restrict
access to the specific content or expression. According to Twitter’s Trans-
parency Report (2020), the Malaysian authority filed 275 legal demands
from 2012 to 2020 to remove or withhold content perceived unaccept-
able on the platform. Finally, network-node or individual-level governance
refers to the targeting of individual users, activists, or content creators
for their views or online activities. In Pakistan and Indonesia, journal-
ists and activists face the bulk of the individual level of governance.
This four-layered approach provides a comprehensive understanding of
the tactics employed by hybrid regimes to control digital communication
and allowed for a nuanced analysis of the data. Using this disaggregated
framework enables the researchers to interrogate the severity of internet
governance across the five polities and demystify the role of religion in
justifying and legitimizing this interference.
 1 DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND RELIGION … 11

Significance of the Book

This is most probably the first book to investigate the legitimiza-
tion of digital authoritarianism by religion, and the first to focus on
digital authoritarianism in democratic regimes in India, Pakistan, Turkey,
Malaysia, and Indonesia. Digital authoritarianism is evident across these
five disparate polities, though in different ways and to differing degrees.
Yet there is a dearth of studies examining and describing how these
governments use digital technology to both censor their opponents and
spread pro-state propaganda. Indeed, the primary focus of studies on
digital authoritarianism is China, and secondarily Russia. While this is
understandable, by limiting studies of digital authoritarianism to these
two states scholars fail to show how it is not merely authoritarian
non-democratic states, but also democracies and hybrid regimes, which
attempt to control the internet.
This book therefore increases the scope of studies on digital authoritar-
ianism, and encompasses five emerging economies with large populations
and an increasing influence on global politics. India is home to over one
billion people, and is the only Hindu majority nation. It is likely to play
a highly important role in international affairs in the future. Equally,
the governing philosophy of the BJP—Hindutva—is frequently used to
justify censorship online, and indeed is spread by the BJP through its
large network of paid social media content creators. Therefore, it is vital
that scholars and policymakers comprehend how the Indian government
approaches issues of online censorship and how it uses digital technology
in order to advance its political and religious agendas.
Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous nation and is home
to more Muslims than any other nation. Like India, its large popula-
tion means it will play a larger role in international politics and in the
global economy in the future. As the largest Muslim majority nation,
it plays an important role—despite being located far from the Middle
East—in global Muslim affairs. Understanding how religion is used to
justify online censorship, the persecution of minorities, and how the state
itself uses digital technology to spread propaganda, is vitally important
insofar as Indonesia is only increasing in political significance, and will
continue to play a role in shaping South-East Asian politics. Malaysia,
too, is an increasingly important South-East Asian and Muslim majority
nation. Understanding how the Malay authorities commandeer digital
12 I. YILMAZ

technology and the means by which they justify censorship is rarely exam-
ined, and therefore it is important that scholars investigate how a nominal
democracy with a multi-ethnic, multi-religious population.
Pakistan, a nuclear armed country with a population of over 200
million people, has for several decades suffered from internal instability
and the persistent threat of war with neighboring India. Pakistan’s impor-
tance in international affairs can be seen in its courting by the United
States and China. Its internal instability, complex international relations,
and the growing menace Islamism poses to the nation’s religious minori-
ties (including non-Sunni Muslims), make Pakistan uniquely important.
Therefore, it is vital that scholars more deeply examine the state’s use
of digital media to censor, intimidate, or indeed spread pro-state propa-
ganda, how they do these things, and the means by which they justify
these actions.
Turkey is a NATO member and one-time aspiring European Union
member. Under AKP rule, Turkey has, after a period of Muslim democ-
racy, returned to authoritarian rule. However, the AKP has incorporated
Islamism and populism into its authoritarian governance, and in doing so
created a system by which the closing of the public sphere and oppression
of minorities is justified by appeals to both religion and the democratic
will of the majority population of ethnic Turk Muslims. There is much
scholarship on the populist and authoritarian turn in Turkey, however,
less is known about how the AKP use digital media to both censor their
opponents, and spread pro-AKP propaganda, the means by which they
do this, and the way religion and religious authorities are used to justify
their control over digital technology.
This book marks an attempt to increase scholarly and public knowledge
of digital authoritarianism in the democratic world, and particularly in a
group of democratic nations of the Global South with growing economies
and internal tensions. The comparative analysis finds that digital authori-
tarianism is evident across these five disparate polities, though in different
ways and to differing degrees. Yet there is a dearth of studies exam-
ining and describing how these governments use digital technology to
both censor their opponents and spread pro-state propaganda. Indeed,
the primary focus of studies on digital authoritarianism is China, and
secondarily Russia. While this is understandable, by limiting studies of
digital authoritarianism to these two states scholars fail to show how it
is not merely authoritarian non-democratic states, but also democracies
and hybrid regimes, which attempt to mobilize their existing resources to
 1 DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND RELIGION … 13

control the internet. Equally, by comparing the forms of digital author-

itarianism in Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia, this book
expands knowledge of digital authoritarianism. In other words, the book
discusses in detail how the state can take control of domestic cyberspace
and transnational social media through legislative and technical methods.
What makes these chapters distinct from the ongoing debates about the
tension between the nation-state and transnational social media is the reli-
gious complexity in the governance of translational platforms and the
internet that each chapter delineates. It is intriguing to observe how
different religions can be used for this purpose, but also how both reli-
gious figures and authorities and secular governments have come together
to justify and implement internet censorship, and the spread of pro-state
propaganda. This aspect of digital authoritarianism is little touched upon
by scholars, and yet throughout all the countries studied in this book
religion plays a major role in justifying digital authoritarianism, and reli-
gious authorities sometimes play an active role in supporting state efforts
to suppress dissidents, particularly if they come from religious minority
communities. This book therefore increases the scope of studies on digital
authoritarianism, and encompasses five emerging economies, complicated
by their religious diversities, with large populations and an increasing
influence on global politics.

Chapter Descriptions
Chapter 2 of the book examines digital authoritarianism in Turkey,
which is becoming increasingly authoritarian under the rule of a populist-
Islamist government. The chapter discusses the 2017 Constitutional
Referendum that gave President Erdogan and his AKP party colleagues
greater power, which they have used to encourage fear and suspicion of
non-Muslims and other nations to legitimize their controversial changes.
The chapter also discusses how the AKP has eliminated internet freedom
in Turkey by using the Turkish Penal Code to criminalize illegal access
to/disruption of data or IT systems. The AKP has established bodies that
are permitted to surveil internet users and govern access to the internet
through ISPs and has used this power to brand many of its enemies as
terrorists and ban their websites. The AKP has also expanded its power
over cyberspace, allowing it to shut down the internet in Turkey when
the nation is allegedly threatened. The chapter found that websites that
are frequently blocked include those with pro-Kurdish content, religious
14 I. YILMAZ

extremism, pornography, and LGBT content. The chapter demonstrates

how the Turkish government sought to prevent further protests by
cutting internet access and even preventing Turkish people from accessing
Twitter and YouTube during and after the Gezi Park protests. At each
of the levels, the chapter examines the role of religion, specifically the
state body Diyanet, in justifying and legitimizing digital authoritarianism
in Turkey. Overall, the chapter illustrates how the Turkish government
has descended into digital authoritarianism and established control over
the full network, sub-network, network, and proxy levels of internet
infrastructure in the country.
Chapter 3 discusses digital authoritarianism in Indonesia, highlighting
the reduced tolerance for criticism and religious minorities’ public expres-
sion online. The chapter begins by describing the socio-political atmo-
sphere of the country during the 2010s, in which the rise of Jokowi,
a popular figure who became the president in 2014, had instilled hope
in many Indonesians. However, this hope was not translated into a
significant increase in media freedom, which is illustrated by Indonesia’s
stagnating scores in media freedom indexes. Although Indonesia’s consti-
tution guarantees freedom of speech and the press, the government has
been using laws such as the ITE Law and the UU Pornografi to silence
critics and dissenters, both online and offline. The government’s focus
on economic development and social harmony at the expense of basic
freedoms, including internet freedoms, is noted. Internet censorship in
Indonesia, including website blocking and total internet shutdowns, is
analyzed using the four-level framework. The chapter explores how digital
authoritarianism intersects with Islam in Indonesia. The government has
been using Islam as a tool to legitimize its actions and gain public support.
For example, the government has been using the concept of “pribumi,”
a term that refers to native Indonesians, to promote Islamic values and
restrict the influence of non-Muslims. This has led to the suppression of
religious minorities, including Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists, who
are often targeted for expressing their beliefs online. The chapter argues
that digital authoritarianism in Indonesia is a growing concern, as the
government continues to use laws and technology to suppress dissent and
limit free expression. While the government has been partnering with
tech companies to regulate online content, this raises concerns about
government censorship and abuse of power. The intersection of digital
authoritarianism and Islam in Indonesia also raises concerns about the
 1 DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND RELIGION … 15

suppression of religious minorities and the use of Islamic morality as a

basis for censorship.
Chapter 4 of this book delves into the topic of digital authoritarianism
in Malaysia, focusing on the government’s control over the internet and
its impact on civil liberties and dissent. The chapter begins by describing
the political and social atmosphere in Malaysia in the 2010s, noting the
deterioration of media freedoms within the country since the Covid-19
pandemic. According to Freedom House (2021), the public health crisis
has given the government an excuse to crack down on opponents in the
media. The chapter argues that different media outlets in Malaysia are
often politically affiliated, and the government has been tightening its
control over the internet. Despite this, the chapter observes that internet
freedoms have not seen a similar decline, and if anything, they have
increased since 2015. However, the Malaysian government has demon-
strated its capacity to indirectly censor or block websites and prosecute
users who violate Malaysian law by sharing or creating content that is
“indecent, obscene, false, menacing, or offensive in character with intent
to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person.” The problem with this
legislation is that the ambivalent use of terminologies such as “offensive”
and “annoy” can leave the interpretation open, subject to government
abuse. The chapter then discusses the founding of the Malaysian National
Cyber Security Agency (NACSA) in 2017. While the agency’s stated
aim is to protect Malaysia’s cybersecurity, the chapter observes how
the widened definition of cybersecurity in Malaysia threatens civil liber-
ties and the ability of citizens to dissent. Similarly, the Anti-Fake News
Act, while intended to prevent misinformation and disinformation, can
be easily abused and used to silence dissidents who may be accused of
spreading information not accepted by the authority. While the govern-
ment has never authorized a full-network interference by shutting down
the internet, it has been accused of shutting down mobile phone networks
to quell violence and rioting. The chapter finds that the government is
most active at the network-node and proxy levels and uses the law and its
rather ambiguous definitions of offensive, annoying, or harassing material
to block websites, and prosecute dissidents and certain minorities. Like
the other case studies, the Malaysian government has effectively used reli-
gious justification to “protect Islam” for its actions, making it difficult for
opponents to challenge its policies and decisions.
Chapter 5 delves into the issue of digital authoritarianism in Pakistan,
despite the country being a democracy and its citizens having access to
16 I. YILMAZ

high-speed broadband. The chapter examines how Pakistan’s internet

governance institutions have been abused by the government and how
laws such as the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) and the
Fair Trial Act have legalized and intensified state surveillance programs.
The chapter investigates the technical aspects of digital authoritarianism,
including the full-network governance of the internet in Pakistan. It also
highlights the role of religion, particularly Sunni Islam, in justifying and
legitimizing digital authoritarianism in the country. Appeals to Islamic
morals and religious authority have helped generate support for content
blocking, banning of users, and even social media platform bans, which
have allowed for restrictive government legislation that curtails citizens’
right to free expression, information, and privacy.
The final case study chapter of the book focuses on digital authoritari-
anism in India. It begins by providing the political and religious context in
which digital authoritarianism emerged in the country. The chapter high-
lights the historical problems India has faced since gaining independence,
including religious intolerance, authoritarian governance, and widespread
poverty. Despite these challenges, there has been a long-standing tradi-
tion of argument and disputation in India that has been carried over
into the digital age. The chapter finds that the election of the Modi-
led BJP government in 2014 marked a significant shift from previous
governments. During their campaign for high office, Modi and the BJP
effectively used digital technology to promote themselves and generate
support for their populist and Hindu nationalist form of politics. The
chapter argues that Modi and the BJP’s success in gaining power can be
attributed to their ability to instrumentalize digital media. They created a
vast army of social media users, some paid and others volunteering their
time, who trolled opponents of the BJP and spread consistent pro-BJP,
pro-Hindutva messages across social media. Yet contradictingly, Modi’s
ascend is paralleled with a notable deterioration of democracy and internet
freedoms. The BJP government has now embraced digital authoritari-
anism, not merely keeping its paid and volunteer social media army, but
increasingly using technology to censor and surveil its opponents online.
The chapter describes the Hindu Nationalism of the BJP and its leader
Narendra Modi, and the impact Hindutva has had upon Indian politics
and society since Modi became Prime Minister. It shows how Hindutva
is used to justify online censorship and how the BJP uses digital media to
spread Hindutva’s core message that India is a Hindu nation wounded by
Muslims and the British and requires reviving.
 1 DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND RELIGION … 17

The concluding chapter answers key questions by comparing and estab-

lishing contrasts to the five different countries studied in the book. It also
sums up the key points that emerge from the data and shows how author-
itarian governments in these five democratic polities (or hybrid regimes)
use technologies as a way to render their rules less likely to be chal-
lengeable, spread pro-state propaganda domestically and internationally,
and undermine human rights and diminish open society. The methods
that are used by the five selected countries contextualize what we call
“digital authoritarianism.” The book is concluded with the four key find-
ings. First, that digital authoritarianism is present in India, Indonesia,
Pakistan, and Turkey, and to a lesser extent in Malaysia; therefore, it
is not a phenomenon endemic to non-democracies such as China and
Russia, but a phenomenon affecting both democratic societies and hybrid
regimes. Second, the book shows that digital authoritarianism operates
in four dimensions—in government legislation, the combination of both
censorship and the disciplining of citizens who break the strict censor-
ship laws, and an embracing of digital technology itself by government,
which uses it to spread pro-government propaganda. Third, the book
finds that digital authoritarianism, at least in the five nations surveyed
in this book, is the product of both government fear of losing power,
and of a recognition that digital media provides the state with the ability
to undermine its enemies and spread—through various means including
the funding of large numbers of social media commenters or “buzzers”—
pro-government propaganda. Finally, the concluding chapter finds that
religion plays a key role in legitimizing digital authoritarianism in each of
the polities examined in this book.

References
Anderson, J., and L. Rainie. (2020, August 28). Many Tech Experts Say Digital
Disruption Will Hurt Democracy. Pew Research Center: Internet, Science &
Tech. Retrieved October 17, 2021, from https://www.pewresearch.org/int
ernet/2020/02/21/many-tech-experts-say-digital-disruption-will-hurt-dem
ocracy/.
Brown, H., E. Guskin, and A. Mitchell. (2012). The Role of Social Media in the
Arab Uprisings. Pew Research Center, 28.
Cebul, Matthew, and Jonathan C. Pinckney. (2021). Digital Authoritarianism
and Nonviolent Action: Challenging the Digital Counterrevolution. United
States Institute of Peace.
Another random document with
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 After taking off his hat, and making a low bow,
Nibbles said:

“I think I have found your lordship’s ring, which

you lost. I have it around my neck.”

The Prince lifted Nibbles up, and looked at the

ring.

“That is most surely my Lucky Ring,” said he.

“Where did you find it?”

“In the sand at the bottom of the river,” answered

Nibbles, and he told the Prince how nearly drowned
he had been, and about Mr. Scratchetty-Claw.

“My old friend, the Alligator,” laughed the Prince.

“Oh, I know him well, the lazy scamp, for he eats up
all my best trout.”

Then he took the ring carefully from Nibbles’s

neck, and put it on his own finger.

“You have given me back what I prize most in the

world,” he said, “and your reward shall be in
proportion. Every year, as long as you live, you shall
receive a bag of gold.”

Nibbles was almost too happy to speak, but he

thanked the Prince and kissed his hand. A page was
sent to bring the gold, and a few minutes later,
Nibbles and Teenie Weenie, carrying the precious
bag between them, were hurrying back to the raft.

They found Mr. Scratchetty-Claw fast asleep, but

Nibbles, dancing with joy, woke him up to hear the
great news.

“Good enough!” said the Alligator. “It’s a lucky

thing for you that I tipped you into the river.”

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mother will never have to work any more. Let us
hurry home to her as fast as we can, Teenie Weenie.”

“I’ll take you part of the way,” yawned Mr.

Scratchetty-Claw, “although I am fearfully sleepy.”
 Chapter VIII

Nibbles’ Return

Away they sailed towards home, as happy as two

little mice could be.

Mr. Scratchetty-Claw towed them for a long way,

until he became so sleepy that he had to stop and
take a nap. He shed tears when he said good-bye to
Nibbles and Teenie Weenie, but he soon settled
himself comfortably on a mud bank in a shady spot,
and in two minutes was snoring so loudly that you
could have heard him half a mile away.

Nibbles and Teenie hoisted their sail, and, as they

floated along, Teenie Weenie sang this song:

“Two little mice sailed down the stream

 One lovely summer day.
The sky was blue, the banks were green,
The birds in the tree tops sang unseen,
As they merrily sailed away.

“Their silken flag was red and white,

Their sail a butterfly’s wing;
With a firefly their pilot light,
They went to seek their fortune bright,
And found it in a ring.

“Deep buried in the golden sand,

Beneath the water blue,
Far away in a distant land
The little mice went hand in hand,
And sought the token true.”

For more than a week they sailed up the pretty

river, but at last, one afternoon at sunset, they
reached home. Quietly they stole up to the cottage
and peeped in at the window.
 There was Mrs. Poppelty-Poppett cooking supper,
while Sniffy and Snuffy were peeling potatoes, and
Gobble was eating an apple behind the door.
 Nibbles tapped gently on the window-pane, and
Mrs. Poppelty-Poppett turned quickly around. With a
squeak of perfect delight, she cried: “Oh, here is
Nibbles!” and ran to the door, upsetting the soup-
kettle right into the fire in her haste. Of course, Sniffy
and Snuffy, Gobble and the baby, all ran out, too, and
then they all talked together so fast that no one knew
what any one else was saying. Pretty soon they
quieted down, and Nibbles told them of his wonderful
adventures, and of the finding of the Lucky Ring.
When he gave his mother the bag of gold, poor little
Mrs. Poppelty-Poppett did not know whether to laugh
or cry with happiness, so she did both. She had
worked hard for her children, and now there would be
comfort and plenty for the rest of her life.

After a little while she dried her eyes, and thought

of supper. It was all in the fire and burned up!
 “Never mind,” said Nibbles. “Teenie Weenie and I
would far rather have some of your nice corn cake
and toasted cheese than soup.”

“Indeed we would,” said Teenie Weenie.

So they all helped, and in a few minutes

everything was ready; and how good the supper
tasted!
 When at last they went to bed, they all dreamed of
bags of Lucky Rings, and rivers of gold, guarded by
Alligators, who ate nothing but toasted cheese and
corn bread.
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