Talking International Law: Legal

Argumentation Outside the Courtroom

Ian Johnstone (Editor)
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Talking International Law
Talking International Law
Legal Argumentation Outside the Courtroom

Edited by
IA N J O H N S T O N E A N D S T EV E N R AT N E R

1
 3
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Names: Johnstone, Ian, 1960– editor. | Ratner, Steven, editor.
Title: Talking international law : legal argumentation outside the courtroom /
edited by Ian Johnstone and Steven Ratner.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, 2021. | Includes index.
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ISBN 9780197588437 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197588451 (epub) |
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DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197588437.001.0001

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 To
Gabriela
and
Nancy, Ben, and Isabel
 Contents

Acknowledgments ix
List of Contributors xi

PA RT I
1. International Legal Argumentation: Practice in Need of a Theory 3
Ian Johnstone and Steven Ratner

2. Why Use the Language of the Law in Global Politics? On the

Legitimacy Effects of Claiming to Act Legally 25
Ingo Venzke

PA RT I I
3. Arguing about the Jus ad Bellum 45
Monica Hakimi

4. Argumentation in the UN Security Council:

International Law as Process 62
Scott P. Sheeran

5. Protesting the Preamble: Normative Pronouncements and

Feminist Jurisprudence in the Security Council 86
Gina Heathcote

6. Persuasion About/​Without International Law: The Case of

Cybersecurity Norms 104
Steven Ratner

7. Nuclear Non-​Proliferation Law: Why Argue and to What Effect? 129

Ian Johnstone

PA RT I I I
8. Mass Atrocity Crimes and Human Rights Discourse at the UN
Security Council: Three Case Studies 157
Bruno Stagno-​Ugarte

9. Non-​State Armed Actors and International Legal Argumentation:

Patterns, Processes, and Putative Effects 181
Hyeran Jo
viii Contents

10. Argumentation through Law: An Analysis of Decisions of

the African Union 203
Wouter Werner
11. The Sanctions Regime of the African Union in Response to
Unconstitutional Changes of Government 218
Namira Negm

PA RT I V
12. Legal Argumentation in the Evolving Climate Regime 239
Jutta Brunnée
13. Law and Science in Environmental Governance: The Effects of
Legal and Scientific Argumentation in the International Whaling
Commission 263
Lisbeth Zimmermann
14. International Legal Argumentation on Intellectual Property: Two
Snaphots from the World Intellectual Property Organization 282
Edward Kwakwa
15. Arguing about Trade Law Beyond the Courtroom 298
Kathleen Claussen
16. The Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 316
Stephen Mathias and Nicolas Perez

PA RT V
17. Toward a Theory of Legal Argumentation 339
Ian Johnstone and Steven Ratner

Index 357
 Acknowledgments

This genesis of this book probably began several decades ago as each of us made the
trek from practicing international lawyer (for the UN and US government) to aca-
demic international lawyer. We had each participated in, witnessed, and been fas-
cinated by the practice of international legal argumentation in political and other
non-​judicial settings and written separately about it. In 2018, we started talking about
a new book on this topic, and we were fortunate to find both practitioners and scholars
from around the world who shared our goal to provide greater understanding of this
phenomenon across a range of issues. We thank all of them for taking the plunge
with us.
We gathered with our contributors over two days in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in
November 2019 to share insights and personal experiences across disciplines, subject
areas, and institutions. We greatly appreciate generous support for that transformative
workshop from the University of Michigan Law School, as well as superlative admin-
istrative assistance from Marielle Toonen-​van Rooij. The editors also appreciate the
excellent work of Irina Langenegger of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at
Tufts University and Emma MacFarlane of the University of Michigan Law School in
assisting us with the preparation of the index to this book.
In addition, our authors wish to thank the following individuals for research and
other assistance with their chapters: Mackenzie Garrity, Philip Stekol, and Isabelle
Janssen (Kathleen Claussen); Pegah Eftekhari and Anna Ver Beek (Monica Hakimi);
Tsion Demissie Bergano (Namira Negm); Ellen Aldin (Steven Ratner); and Tabea
Zimmermann and Franziska Scheppach (Lisbeth Zimmermann).
Finally, we greatly appreciate the support of our editors at Oxford University
Press: Merel Alstein, Charlotte Holloway, and Emma Collison.
 List of Contributors

Jutta Brunnée is the Dean & James M. Tory Professor of Law and University Professor at the
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. She was elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada
in 2013, and Associate of the Institut de Droit International in 2017. In 2019, she taught at the
Hague Academy of International Law.

Kathleen Claussen is Associate Professor at the University of Miami School of Law. Her re-
search focuses on trade, investment, foreign relations and national security, and international
dispute settlement, among other topics. She is a graduate of the Yale Law School, Queen’s
University Belfast, and Indiana University.

Monica Hakimi is the James V. Campbell Professor of Law at the University of Michigan
Law School. Her work ties together the theory and practice of international law, particularly
on issues relating to human and national security. She is a member of the Board of Editors of
the American Journal of International Law.

Gina Heathcote is Professor of Gender Studies and International Law, School of Law,
SOAS, University of London. She is the author of Feminist Dialogues on International
Law: Successes, Tensions, Futures (2019) and The International Law on the Use of Force: A
Feminist Analysis (2013). She co-​authored The Law of War and Peace: A Gender Analysis (Vol.
1) (2021).

Hyeran Jo is Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. She is the author
of Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law (2015). Her research has been sup-
ported by the US National Science Foundation, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and
the Howard G. Buffett Foundation.

Ian Johnstone is Professor of International Law at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University. From 2018 to 2019, he served as Dean ad interim. Prior to joining Fletcher,
Johnstone worked in the United Nations’ Executive Office of the Secretary-​General. His books
include The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations (2016).

Edward Kwakwa is Assistant Director General, World Intellectual Property Organization

(WIPO), Geneva. Before joining WIPO, he worked as Associate at the law firm O’Melveny and
Myers. He has also held senior legal positions with the Commission on Global Governance,
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the World Trade
Organization.

Stephen Mathias is the Assistant Secretary-​General for Legal Affairs of the United Nations. Prior
to taking up that position, he worked in various roles for the Office of the Legal Adviser at the
US State Department.

Namira Negm is the African Union Legal Counsel. She was Ambassador of Egypt to Rwanda
and Legal Adviser in New York and The Hague. She earned a PhD in International Law from the
University of London and an LLM from King’s College London.
xii List of Contributors

Nicolas Perez is a Legal Officer in the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations. He also held
similar positions for the United Nations in Kosovo and Afghanistan and, prior to joining the
United Nations, was a legal adviser in the French Ministry of Defense.

Steven Ratner is the Bruno Simma Collegiate Professor of Law at the University of Michigan
Law School. His recent wok addresses international law’s linkages with political and moral phi-
losophy, as well as business and human rights. He served on expert panels of the UN Secretary-​
General on accountability for human rights violations in Cambodia and Sri Lanka.
Scott P. Sheeran has worked in government, diplomacy, the military, and academia. He was a
Senior Legal Counsel in the UN Security Council for 2015–​2016, and previously a Vice Chair
of the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the UN General Assembly. He has published primarily on the
United Nations, international human rights and humanitarian law, and peacekeeping.

Bruno Stagno-​Ugarte is Chief Advocacy Officer at Human Rights Watch and Affiliate Professor
at Sciences Po. He was formerly Foreign Minister of Costa Rica, Ambassador to the United
Nations, and President of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court.
He is a graduate of Georgetown University, the Sorbonne, and Princeton University.

Ingo Venzke is Professor for International Law and Social Justice at the University of
Amsterdam and Director of the Amsterdam Center for International Law. His monographs
include How Interpretation Makes International Law (2012), which won the book award of the
European Society of International Law.

Wouter G. Werner is Professor of International Law at the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, and
Extraordinary Professor of International Law at the University of Curacao. His main research
interests are in the field of international law and film, and the sources of international law. He is
author of Repetition and International Law (2021).

Lisbeth Zimmermann holds the Chair of International Relations at Zeppelin University,

Friedrichshafen. Her main research interests are norms and contestation in international re-
lations, international organizations, dynamics of expertise, as well as peacebuilding. Her book
Global Norms with a Local Face: Rule of Law Promotion and Norm Translation was published by
Cambridge University Press in 2017.
PART I
 1
International Legal Argumentation
Practice in Need of a Theory
Ian Johnstone and Steven Ratner

I. Introduction

In a decentralized global system that lacks the formal trappings of domestic gov-
ernance systems, most disputes between and among states and non-​state actors
never reach either a domestic or an international courtroom for authoritative res-
olution. This state of affairs continues, even with the creation of new international
tribunals in recent decades. Despite, indeed because of, the relative scarcity of ju-
dicial settlement of disputes, international legal argumentation remains pervasive,
but notably in a range of nonjudicial settings. States, corporations, nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), and even guerrilla groups make claims in interna-
tional legal terms in political bodies like the United Nations’ organs or domestic
parliaments, private diplomatic discussions, and public statements in formal and
informal settings.
What purpose does such argumentation serve? What are its effects, intended and
unintended? Who is engaging in the argumentation? Who is the audience? What, for
that matter, counts as a legal argument and how is it different from other kinds of ar-
gument? These questions are not all new, but they have never been addressed system-
atically in one volume. Answering them is critical to a central goal for scholars and
practitioners of international law and relations—​to understand how international law
actually operates in international affairs.
This book probes these and other questions related to the place of international
legal arguments from a multi-​perspectival lens. It brings together a group of scholars
and practitioners from around the world who have either written about or engaged
in international legal argumentation outside of courtrooms. We draw on various the-
oretical traditions that address the phenomenon of argumentation in international
affairs, either as an element of legal theory or of international relations theory. Yet our
approach is largely inductive, looking at the actual practice of legal argumentation in
a variety of settings and issue areas. From the cases, we seek to identify patterns and
common themes in why, where, how, and to what effect the language of law is used
outside of courts. This fills a significant gap in scholarship on international law and
international relations by exploring the microprocess of communication using inter-
national law.

Ian Johnstone and Steven Ratner, International Legal Argumentation In: Talking International Law. Edited by: Ian Johnstone
and Steven Ratner, Oxford University Press. © Ian Johnstone and Steven Ratner 2021.
DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197588437.003.0001
4 Part I

In this introduction, we will first describe existing theories that address argumentation
in international affairs. These are not theories of argumentation per se, but rather areas of
legal and international relations theory in which the phenomena of communications and
argumentation are central. We then set out the questions our contributors were asked to
consider in their essays. The introduction concludes with an overview of each chapter.

II. Argumentation: Theoretical Orientations and Gaps

Law is the language of international society. This proposition, though perhaps an

overstatement (states communicate in ways other than through legal argumentation),
captures an important feature of how states interact with each other, and increasingly
with non-​state actors. At least six bodies of scholarly literature address, directly or
indirectly, argumentation in international affairs. Three are rooted in international
law: compliance theory, interpretation theory, and critical legal theory. Three have
found their way into international relations theory, although the first two have roots
in other disciplines: communicative action, practice theory, and norm contestation.
As the academic fields of international law and international relations have become
intertwined, these schools have begun to borrow from each other. Yet they do not
add up to a coherent theory. What is missing is a systematic focus on the invocation
of legal norms during the conversation about compliance and other matters. This
volume is designed to bring us a step closer to a full-​blown theory of international
legal argumentation.

A. Theories from International Law

1. Compliance Theory
Much of international legal theory focuses on compliance, precisely because co-
ercive enforcement is rare in a decentralized international system. If not out of fear
of sanctions, why do states comply with international law? Ever since H.L.A. Hart
posited his internal acceptance theory of law, argumentation has been a prominent
feature in theories of compliance. For a legal system to exist, sanctions are not nec-
essary; the principal explanation for compliance is an internalized sense of obliga-
tion. Several prominent schools of legal thought have built on that insight. The New
Haven School or policy-​oriented approach associated with Myres McDougal and
Harold Lasswell defines law as a “process of authoritative decision-​making” char-
acterized by communication between states,1 often in response to international

1 The methodology employed by McDougal and Lasswell is well captured in the following passage: “[t]‌he

communications which constitute an international agreement, like all other communications, are func-
tions of a larger context, and the realistic identification of the content of these communications must re-
quire a systematic, comprehensive examination of all the relevant features of that context, with conscious
and deliberate appraisal of their significance.” Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell, and James Miller, The
Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1967), 11.
 International Legal Argumentation 5

incidents.2 Incidents in particular provoke reactions of decision makers and legal au-
thorities in the form of statements as well as deeds, resulting in back-​and-​forth ar-
gumentation about the legality of actions taken. Transnational Legal Process posits
that international law acquires a certain “stickiness” through a process of interaction,
interpretation, and internalization.3 Legal argumentation permeates all three elem-
ents as governments engage with each other and with domestic actors in articulating
what the law means and what compliance requires. And the management model of
compliance sees international law as operating through a process of justificatory dis-
course: “the interpretation, elaboration, application and ultimately enforcement of in-
ternational rules is accomplished through a process of (mostly verbal) interchange
among interested parties.”4 States feel compelled to give reasons and justifications for
their conduct; these justifications are reviewed and critiqued in various settings, par-
ticularly international institutions. The felt need to have those justifications accepted
pushes states in the direction of compliance because, being bound up in an interde-
pendent international system, they want to remain members in good standing in that
system.
All three of these schools (New Haven, Transnational Legal Process, and the man-
agement model) have elements of both instrumentalism and constructivism in their
theories of compliance. The instrumental account is that states obtain tangible bene-
fits from participating in the system. Rules exert an impact on state behavior because
states have an interest in reciprocal compliance by other states and in preserving a rep-
utation for playing by the rules so other states will cooperate with them in the future
or on other issues. The constructivist account is that membership in the international
legal system generates a sense of obligation to comply with its rules and the felt need to
be seen as complying. Engaging in legal argumentation to justify one’s actions is a way
of remaining a member in good standing.
None of these theories, it should be noted, depends on the interlocutors being truly
persuaded of the merits of a rule. As Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have argued,
state behavior can change through acculturation, the pressure to conform to the be-
liefs and norms of the surrounding culture.5 The audience need not agree with or
even assess the merits of the norm; what matters is the degree of identification it feels
(or wants to feel) with some reference group.6 In the geopolitical sphere, the referent
group could be other great powers, regional neighbors, democratic countries, or the
Global South.7 Acculturation of this sort may lead to internal acceptance of the norm,
but the behavior can change before or without that ever happening.

2 W. Michael Reisman and Andrew R. Willard, eds., International Incidents: The Law that Counts in World

Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

3 Harold Hongju Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,” Yale Law Journal 106 (1997): 2599

(book review).
4 Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory

Agreements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 118.

5 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human

Rights Law,” Duke Law Journal 54 (2004): 621, 638–​645.

6 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” International

Studies Quarterly 45 (2001): 487.

7 Courtney Fung, China and Intervention in the UN Security Council (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2019).
6 Part I

For other legal scholars, true persuasion is central. Tom Franck’s “fairness dis-
course” involves reasoning and communication on the basis of principles that com-
bine procedural legitimacy and distributive justice.8 Through this discourse, a sense of
obligation is fully internalized by the targets of the communication: not only behavior
but minds are actually changed. Steven Ratner goes furthest in developing a theory of
persuasion by identifying four dimensions of a communications strategy: publicity
(how public to be in the argumentation); density (how much law to invoke); direct-
ness (whether to appeal for compliance simply because it is the law, or because the law
serves some higher purpose); and tone (how confrontational and accusatory to be).9
Ratner does not claim that all persuasion aims to get a target to internalize a norm, but
his model suggests what factors will make that more likely.10

2. Interpretation Theory
A growing body of literature considers argumentation through the lens of legal
interpretation. All law, according to Ronald Dworkin, is fundamentally an exercise
in interpretation.11 In a domestic legal system, judges are the primary (though not
sole) interpreters of the law. In the decentralized international legal order, interpreta-
tion occurs in a more diffuse process that includes adjudication, but also through the
argumentation that occurs in quasi-​judicial settings, the political organs of intergov-
ernmental organizations, diplomatic conversation between states, government policy
documents and statements, and the writings of practitioners, scholars, and engaged
citizens in academic journals, blogs, and media outlets.
Many of those who proffer interpretations of the law in these settings are self-​
interested actors, such as the legal advisers to governments. This presents a conun-
drum. If “auto-​interpretation” by self-​interested actors is the norm, who decides what
is the best interpretation of the law? Iain Scobbie draws on rhetorical theory to pos-
tulate that a set of ground rules for persuasive argumentation exists in the process of
interpreting international law.12 But he does not explain how those ground rules are
administered in a horizontal legal system where there is no court to render author-
itative decisions. Ian Johnstone does seek to explain that through the concept of an
“interpretive community,” an idea borrowed from literary theory that he applies to the

8 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1998), at 7, 14.
9 Steven R. Ratner, “Persuading to Comply: On the Deployment and Avoidance of Legal Argumentation,”

in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: the State of the Art, edited
by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 577. See also
Steven Ratner, c­ hapter 6, in this volume.
10 For an earlier analysis of what makes arguments persuasive, see Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

11 Ronald Dworkin, “Law as Interpretation,” Texas Law Review 60 (1982): 27; Owen Fiss, “Objectivity and

Interpretation,” Stanford Law Review 34 (1984): 1325; Cass Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict
(1996), 167; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Meaning of Legal ‘Meaning’ and Its Implications for Theories of
Legal Interpretation,” University of Chicago Law Review 82 (2015): 1235, 1238–​1239.
12 Iain Scobbie, “Rhetoric, Persuasion and Interpretation in International Law,” in Interpretation

in International Law, edited by Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat, and Matthew Windsor (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015), 61. His summary of the ground rules is “start from a topic which is an object of
agreement, pay attention to the audience’s pre-​conceptions, including its understanding of legitimate or
proper argumentative methods, adapt the argument to the audience,” at 62.
 International Legal Argumentation 7

practice of international law.13 The interpretive community is an amorphous constel-

lation of actors that provides the assumptions, categories of understanding, and con-
ventions of argumentation that make reasoned exchange about the meaning of a text
possible. There are widely shared understandings and expectations about the relevant
sources, processes, and argumentative techniques that characterize the international
legal enterprise. One may question whether Article 38(1) of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) Statute fully exhausts all the so-​called sources of international law, or
whether Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
provide adequate guidance on how to interpret treaties. But it is hard to claim that
they are not central components of international legal practice. A competent lawyer
would ignore these instruments at his or her peril.
Yet the interpretive community does more than simply set the parameters of dis-
course. It passes judgment on what constitutes the correct (or at least) best interpre-
tation of the law. “Correctness” is not based on objective criteria, but rather is the
outcome of an intersubjective, discursive process driven by the assumptions and
categories of understanding that are embedded in the international legal discipline.
What is a right or wrong interpretation can only be answered by other participants
in the interpretive community.14 More concretely, the impact of international law is
felt through the weight of international legal opinion; that opinion is both shaped and
measured through argumentation.
The participants in the legal discourse include officials and judges who are directly
involved in the making, interpretation, and implementation of a particular legal
norm. But it extends beyond them to all officials, legislators, judges, lawyers, scholars,
and other nongovernmental actors who participate in some way in the field of interna-
tional law or practice in which the interpretive dispute arises; as well as an amorphous
constellation of stakeholders—​what can be called transnational civil society—​who
listen to and critique the discourse that goes on within the inner circles.15 As René
Provost points out, non-​state actors of various stripes—​starting with the most “highly
qualified publicists” (enshrined in Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute) and including
NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and even non-​
state armed groups—​engage in the process of interpretation.16

13 Ian Johnstone, “Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Communities,” Michigan Journal

of International Law 12 (1991): 371. The term “interpretive community” was coined by literary theorist
Stanley Fish. See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). For a review of literature on legal interpretive commu-
nities, see Ian Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation: International Law, Political and Organizations
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 33–​41. For later writing on the concept, see various chapters in
Interpretation in International Law, supra note 12.
14 Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012),

366; Jean d’Aspremont, “The Multidimensional Process of Interpretation: Content-​Determination and

Law-​Ascertainment Distinguished,” in Interpretation in International Law, supra note 12, at 111, 114.
15 Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation, supra note 13. See also Andraz Zidar, “Interpretation and the

Legal Profession: Between Duty and Aspiration,” in Interpretation in International Law, supra note 12, at
135; Jean d’Aspremont, “Wording in International Law,” Leiden Journal of International Law 25 (2012): 575.
See contra Gleider Hernandez, “Interpretative Authority and the International Judiciary,” in Interpretation
in International Law, supra note 12, at 166.
16 René Provost, “Interpretation in International Law as a Transcultural Project,” in Interpretation in

International Law, supra note 12, at 300.

8 Part I

Much of the argumentation about interpretation is aimed at compliance, but the line
between compliance with existing law and creating new law is blurry. Interpretation
often involves refining, elaborating, or stretching the meaning of a legal term. At a
minimum, it gives content to and thereby “hardens” inchoate norms. At a maximum,
it is “constitutive of international law.”17 Moreover, even when the argumentation fails
to produce clarity on the weight of international legal opinion, interpretative debates
can provide structure and a modicum of stability to the international system. Legal
argumentation is inherently confrontational, but not necessarily coercive. From one
perspective, legal discourse is a battleground; from another, it is a bridge.18 From
the first, disputes over interpretation are an “argumentative battle for semantic au-
thority.”19 The battle cannot be mitigated let alone resolved through legal language,
because it is about whose language is the true language of international law.20 From
the second perspective, argumentation about interpretation is a vehicle for managing
the conflicts that are inherent in any pluralistic society. Because it requires the offering
up of arguments that fit within a wider context of intersubjective understandings
about the rules of international life, it is a bridge if not to consensus and cooperation at
least to peaceful coexistence.

3. Critical Legal Theory

Yet, as critical legal theorists remind us, not all participants in legal argumentation are
equal: powerful actors dominate. Antonio Gramsci defined hegemony as domination
not through brute force but through ideas—​by developing an ideology that serves the
interests of the powerful at the expense of the less powerful, but which the less pow-
erful come to accept. Dominant actors do not impose order; they construct an order
founded on values and ideas that work to their advantage, and then seek to legiti-
mize that order through legal discourse that purports to be apolitical and universal.21
Critical theorists stress that the structure of the international system is not fixed or
immutable; it is a product of historical circumstances. It may be so enduring that it
comes to be seen as natural, but it is not.
From this perspective, the distribution of power in the international system has a
determining impact on the formulation, interpretation, and application of interna-
tional law. The more powerful actors are better able to dictate the terms of legal de-
bates, to win those debates, and to bear the reputational and other costs if they lose.
More insidiously, legal argumentation does not constrain self-​serving interpretations

17 d’Aspremont, supra note 14, at 113. Duncan Hollis makes a related point when he speaks of “existential

interpretation,” which validates the existence of a rule by deciding whether it even counts as law. Duncan
Hollis, “The Existential Function of Interpretation in International Law,” in Interpretation in International
Law, supra note 12, at 79.
18 Venzke, supra note 14, at 356–​360.
19 d’Aspremont, supra note 14, at 113.
20 Venzke, relying on Davidson, supra note 14, at 369.
21 As Robert Cox put it, “Hegemony derives from the ways of doing and thinking of the dominant social

strata of the dominant state or states insofar as these ways of doing and thinking have inspired emula-
tion or acquired the acquiescence of the dominant social strata of other states. These social practices and
the ideologies that explain and legitimize them constitute the foundation of the hegemonic order.” Robert
W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 517.
 International Legal Argumentation 9

of the law by powerful actors, but rather legitimizes those interpretations by making
them seem like a reflection of universally applicable community standards. Invoking
the language of the law hides from view the fact that contestable political choices
are being made.22 To give an example, the UN Charter and many General Assembly
resolutions enshrine two fundamental principles—​“self-​determination” and “terri-
torial integrity”—​which are often in conflict. Yet international law says little about
how to resolve the conflict—​about which people are entitled to assert the right to
self-​determination against states that claim territorial integrity. The principles are in
fundamental contradiction, and there is nothing within the law to resolve the con-
tradiction. International law is an elaborate argumentative structure that pretends
to resolve these sorts of conflicts, but in the end it comes down to a matter of po-
litical choice. Moreover, critical legal theorists claim the argumentative structure is
fundamentally incoherent as it vacillates perpetually between asserting that the law
operates separate from the realities of power politics and asserting that it functions
precisely because it is rooted in the political realities of state practice.23 The project of
critical legal studies in a nutshell is to examine the structure of legal argument to re-
veal that pattern, to reveal the inherent contradictions and hidden ideologies that run
through all international law.24
A related critique concerns the power of experts. The critical literature spans both
subject matter experts and legal experts. So, for example, economists in the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) are criticized for constructing struc-
tural adjustment policies that adhere to conventional economic wisdom with little
regard for the distributional impacts. “Liberal peacebuilders” are accused of crafting
programs and institutions that reflect Western conceptions of good governance and
the rule of law without considering local perceptions of political legitimacy. In the
field of international law, the claim is that legal discourse occurs among a closed circle
of lawyers—​the “self-​appointed visionaries and arbiters of humanity’s needs”25—​who
shut out perspectives that are beyond the mainstream through technical, formalistic,
and ultimately obfuscating legal language. The invocation of legal expertise gets in the
way of inclusive decision-​making even when important value and political choices are
being made.

4. The Missing Elements

Although all three of these theoretical orientations inform our understanding of why
states make legal arguments and the effects thereof, none of them zeroes in on the
actual microprocess of communication. The choices that international actors make
between legal and nonlegal arguments (and the diversity of views about where to
draw the line between them); the variety of motivations for and consequences of those

22 Martti Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law,” European Journal of International Law 1

(2000): 1.
23 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

24 David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987).
25 Paul B. Stephan, “Comparative International Law, Foreign Relations Law and Fragmentation: Can

the Center Hold?,” in Comparative International Law, edited by Anthea Roberts, Paul B. Stephan, Pierre-​
Hugues Verdier, and Mila Versteeg (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 66.
10 Part I

choices; the relevance of the particular speaker, audience, and venue; the role of the
thinness or thickness of the existing legal landscape in argumentation; and the im-
plications for the direct targets of an argument as well as others who might hear it are
among the critical issues that these theories leave out. Nor, generally, do they consider
how and why non-​state actors make legal arguments. To address these issues requires
unpacking particular argumentative strategies in discrete settings, a task we set out
to do in this book through our case studies offered from both scholarly and firsthand
perspectives.

B. Theories from International Relations

1. Communicative Action
In indirect response to the critical theorists, Jürgen Habermas posits an ideal of legal
argumentation that is not insular: “Legal discourse cannot operate self-​sufficiently in-
side a hermetically sealed universe of existing norms but must rather remain open
to arguments from other sources.”26 Though a philosopher and not an international
relations theorist, Habermas has applied his theory of communicative action to the
European Union.27 His theory holds that there are at least three kinds of commu-
nicative behavior: bargaining based on fixed preferences; strategic argumentation,
in which arguments are used to justify positions and induce others to change their
minds; and “true reasoning,” in which actors seek a reasoned consensus on the basis
of shared understandings, where each actor not only tries to persuade but is also open
to persuasion.28 The last is Habermas’s ideal of communicative action. It is not meant
to describe an actual state of affairs, but its basic principles are presupposed in any
linguistic communication.29 It may be impossible to distinguish “true reasoning”
from strategic argumentation, but even the latter can have beneficial effects. Jon Elster
posits the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”: even hypocritical arguments (seemingly
impartial arguments that are really designed to hide one’s self-​serving motivations)
often lead to principled and more equitable outcomes.30 If the rhetoric changes with
every shift in short-​term interests, then it will be dismissed as “cheap talk,” and the

26 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 230.
27 Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
28 Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization

54 (2000): 1, 7–​9. This is Risse’s summary of Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2
(New York: Beacon Publishing Group, 1985).
29 Habermas argues that the ideal speech situation is embedded in the very nature of the discourse.

“Insofar as participants understand themselves to be engaged in a cooperative search for common ground
solely on the basis of good reasons, then they must—​as a condition of the intelligibility of their activity—​
assume that the conditions of the ideal speech situation are satisfied.” See Lars Lose, “Communicative
Action and the World of Diplomacy,” in Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, edited
by Karen Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (London: Routledge, 2001), 179. See also Frank Cunningham,
Theories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2002), 176.
30 Jon Elster, “The Strategic Uses of Argument,” in Barriers to Conflict Resolution, edited by Kenneth

Arrow, Robert Mnookin, Lee Ross, Amos Tversky, and Robert Wilson (New York: Norton and Norton,
1995), 249. See also Diego Gambetta, “Claro!: An Essay on Discursive Machismo,” in Deliberative
Democracy, edited by Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 19, 23.
 International Legal Argumentation 11

entire purpose of making impartial arguments is lost.31 Presumably those who engage
in the argumentation believe it serves a purpose (or else why bother) and therefore
will feel some pressure to match deeds with words in order not to appear blatantly
hypocritical.32
In a similar vein, deliberative democrats hold that in a well-​functioning democ-
racy, public policy should be decided not only through voting but also through the
exchange of reasons that all those who are subject to them can accept.33 This ex-
change of reasons will not always lead to agreement (that is why legislatures vote)
but makes it easier to live with disagreement. If the matter is put to a vote, those who
lose can at least feel all the relevant issues were aired and the interests of all stake-
holders were considered.34 Friederich Kratochwil, Thomas Risse, Michael Zurn, and
others have sought to extend this line of thinking to international affairs.35 They posit
a logic of arguing, separate from but related to the logics of consequences and appro-
priateness.36 According to the third logic, which is tied to the second, arguing helps
to construct norms that reflect “appropriate” behavior and to determine whether the
norms apply in a particular situation. Some deliberative democrats speak of multiple
public spheres in which a range of opinions is developed and exchanged on matters
of common concern: “a highly complex network that branches out into a multitude
of overlapping international, national, regional, local and sub-​cultural arenas.”37
International organizations are settings where a good deal of transnational delibera-
tion occurs. Because international law is a concrete manifestation of shared (intersub-
jective) understandings about what constitutes acceptable behavior among states, the
reasoned exchange that occurs there often has a legal character, although deliberative
democrats tend not to acknowledge that point.

2. Practice Theory
Stretching from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, to Pierre Bourdieu’s so-
ciology, to Étienne Wenger’s organization theory, to Emanuel Adler’s communitarian

31 Cf. Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, “Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational

Choice Perspective,” Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2002): 115; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The
Limits of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 167.
32 Thomas Risse’s notion of argumentative self-​ entrapment makes the same point. Risse, supra note
28. See also Frank Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
33 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap

Press, 1996).
34 Id.
35 Risse, supra note 28; Michael Zürn, “Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-​State: The EU and

Other International Institutions,” European Journal of International Relations 6 (2000): 183; Friedrich
Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
36 On the logics of consequences and appropriateness, see James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering

Institutions (New York: Free Press, 1989).

37 Habermas quoted in Philip Schlesinger and Deirdre Kevin, “Can the European Union become

a Sphere of Publics?,” in Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation?, edited by
Erik Oddvar Eriksen and Erik Fossum (London: Routledge, 2000), 211. See also Seyla Benhabib, ed.,
“Towards a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the
Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 74; John Dryzek, Deliberative
Global Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); James Bohman, “International Regimes and Democratic
Governance: Political Equality and Influence in Global Institutions,” International Affairs 73 (1999): 499, 506.
12 Part I

international relations, the concept of a community of practice has deep roots. It has
found its way into the international law literature via Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth,
Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, Jens Meierhenrich, and Anthea Roberts.38
To understand the relationship between legal argumentation and communi-
ties of practice, four elements of the concept are especially important. The first is
“background knowledge,” a term originally coined by John Searle.39 This is similar
to Wittgenstein’s idea of “tacit knowledge” and to Habermas’s notion of a “common
lifeworld”—​the background of shared assumptions, understandings, and practices
that make meaningful communication possible. Searle put this in terms of interpre-
tation. No rule is self-​interpreting: a person must have contextual understanding to
arrive at the correct meaning, and that contextual understanding draws on a cultural
awareness, habits of mind, and presuppositions that those engaged in communication
must share.
The second is the meaning of “practices.” Adler and Pouliot define them as “socially
meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently,
simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and dis-
course in and on the material world.”40 A practice is not the same as either action or
behavior:

The concept of behavior evokes the material dimension of doing, as a deed per-
formed in or on the world; then the notion of action adds an ideational layer, em-
phasizing the meaningfulness of the deed at both the subjective and intersubjective
levels; and, finally, the term “practice” tacks another layer on the edifice or, better put,
makes it hang together as one coherent structure, by pointing out the patterned na-
ture of deeds in socially organized contexts.41

In the international law realm, Meierhenrich explains that practices are habitual, rou-
tinized behavior that facilitates a particular understanding of the world: “work activ-
ities . . . that are performed in a regularized fashion and which have bearing, whether
large or small, on a social phenomenon, in our case, on the operation of international
law.”42
The third is the notion of shared discourse. Those who engage in a social practice
share a common discourse, a way of speaking about the activities in which they are en-
gaged that reflects a certain perspective on the world.43 Law is a disciplined and spe-
cialized form of discourse. There are widely shared understandings and expectations

38 For an excellent review of the philosophical and sociological roots of practice theory, see Jens

Meierhenrich, “The Practice of International Law: A Theoretical Analysis,” Law and Contemporary
Problems 76 (2013): 1.
39 John Searle, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1979).

40 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, eds., International Practices (New York: Cambridge University

Press, 2011), 1, 4.
41 Id. 5.
42 Meierhenrich, supra note 38, at 19.
43 Étienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning Meaning and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1998), 125–​126.

 International Legal Argumentation 13

about the relevant sources, processes, and argumentative techniques that characterize
the international legal enterprise.
Fourth, being competent in the field is to possess “know-​how”—​a kind of know-
ledge that can only be acquired through practice.44 Drawing on Wittgenstein’s lan-
guage theory and pragmatist philosophy, the idea is that knowledge and competence
come from usage. We know the meaning of a word from how it is used. We under-
stand the functioning of a professional discipline from how it is practiced.
Combining these four ideas and applying them to law, international law is an argu-
mentative practice, competence in which depends on possessing a reservoir of back-
ground knowledge. One learns the law in part by studying it, but also by engaging in
the practice. In so doing, one does not simply (or even primarily) learn black letter
rules, but rather acquires tacit legal knowledge—​the techniques of argumentation and
interpretation that are embedded in the discipline. One internalizes a “certain per-
spective on the world,” as well as a certain set of methods for reading texts and making
claims based on those texts and the contexts in which they are encountered.

3. Norm Contestation
Finally, argument is a central feature of the burgeoning literature on “norm contes-
tation.” This literature stems from the work on norm diffusion pioneered by Martha
Finnemore, Katherine Sikkink, and other constructivist international relations
scholars.45 While that work addresses how norms spread and become internalized,
it does not focus on argumentation per se. Later research on norm contestation
does. Antje Wiener defines contestation as “the range of social practices [that] dis-
cursively expresses disapproval of norms.”46 She starts from the assumption that, in
democratic societies, the norms, rules, and principles of governance ought to be con-
testable at any given time by those governed by them (drawing on Habermas, among
others). Contestation, while inherently confrontational, can generate legitimacy if
it is regular and inclusive of all stakeholders.47 Others take a similarly positive view
of norm contestation as a way of generating shared understandings, echoing the de-
liberative democrats.48 Even when the norms originate from a particular culture,
such as liberal democracies, contestation can result in the extension of those norms

44 Vincent Pouliot, “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities,”

International Organization 62 (2008): 255, 269.

45 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,”

International Organization 52 (1998): 887; Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of
International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: An Introduction,” in The Power of Human
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn
Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1; Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists
Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
46 Antje Wiener, Theory of Contestation (New York: Springer, 2014), 1.
47 Id. 10. See also Antje Wiener, “Contested Compliance: Interventions on the Normative Structure of

World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations 10 (2004): 189.

48 Wayne Sandholtz, “Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules Against Wartime Plunder,”

European Journal of International Relations 14 (2008): 101. Adam Bower, “Arguing with Law: Strategic
Legal Argumentation, US Diplomacy, and Debates over the International Criminal Court,” Review of
International Studies 41 (2015): 337.
14 Part I

to other societies.49 Although she does not use the term norm contestation, Monica
Hakimi claims that communities are constructed as much by conflict as they are by
agreement.50
Charlotte Epstein takes a less optimistic view of contestation. Echoing critical
legal studies, she claims debates over norms are “generative structures that are always
charged with relations of domination” and hence not a check on power but a reflection
and perpetuation of it.51 Another critical line of thinking sees norm contestation as
a never-​ending exercise—​meaning is contested “all the way down.” Holger Niemann
and Henrik Schilinger question the very foundations of research on norms defined as
shared understandings of appropriate behavior:

[T]‌he almost mundane insight that norms have different meanings according to
time, space, or social context leads to a fundamental conceptual problem in norm
research. A contested norm, from this perspective, represents almost a contradiction
in terms, as it is difficult to imagine that norms can be both contested and shared at
the same time.52

They seek to turn norm research on its head by starting not with the established
view of norms as “shared understandings” and norm contestation as the anomaly,
but rather with contestation as the normal state of affairs and settling on an under-
standing is the anomaly.
Recent work on norm contestation focuses on outcomes. Nicole Deitelhoff and
Lisbeth Zimmermann claim that contestation can either strengthen or weaken a
norm, depending on the form of the contestation and context.53 If the argumentation
is about the application rather than the meaning of norm, then the consequences may
not be severe, even if it does not produce agreement. If the contestation is about basic
meaning, it will lead to decay. In a similar vein, Anette Stimmer questions the ten-
dency to treat norm contestation and norm acceptance as binary categories. By dis-
tinguishing norm frames (justifications) from norm claims (to action), she identifies
four possible outcomes from norm contestation: clarification of the norm, when there
is agreement on the frame and claim; recognition of the norm, when there is agree-
ment on the frame but not the claim; neglect, when there is agreement on the claim
but not the frame; and impasse, when there is disagreement on both.54

49 Amitav Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional

Change in Asian Regionalism,” International Organization 58 (2004): 239; Lisbeth Zimmermann, “More
for Less: The Interactive Translation of Global Norms in Post-​Conflict Guatemala,” International Studies
Quarterly 61 (2017): 774.
50 Monica Hakimi, “Constructing an International Community,” American Journal of International Law

111 (2017): 317, 325. She quotes Bernard Yack for the proposition that if a practice of justice “structures
nothing more than the way we engage in conflict with each other, it still reinforces the sense that we partici-
pate with others in a community.”
51 Charlotte Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an Anti-​Whaling Discourse

(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008).

52 Holger Niemann and Henrik Schilinger, “Contestation ‘All the Way Down’: The Grammar of

Contestation in Norm Research,” Review of International Studies 43 (2017): 29, 30.

53 Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann, “Things We Lost in the Fire: How Different Types of

Contestation Affect the Robustness of International Norms,” International Studies Review 22 (2020): 51.
54 Anette Stimmer, “Beyond Internalization: Alternative Endings of the Norm Life Cycle,” International

Studies Quarterly 63 (2019): 270, 270–​271.

 International Legal Argumentation 15

4. The Missing Elements

International relations theories have offered important and influential insights on
argumentation in international affairs. They complement the legal theories by ad-
dressing the microprocess of communication more directly. But despite decades
of work on the issue, they have not tended to focus on the central concern of this
book: the salience of legality to an argument. Norms are defined as standards of ap-
propriate behavior for actors with a given identity. With some exceptions, whether
the norms take a legal form is not of particular concern to most international relations
(IR) theorists.55 Moreover, they tend to elide the distinction between “soft” norms and
“hard” norms. For legal theory, the distinction between soft law and hard law is im-
portant, in part because there is a debate over whether the first even exists and in part
because there is a debate over whether the distinction has any bearing on compliance.
For our purposes, the distinction is important because the type of norm may have an
impact on the purpose, nature, and effects of the argumentation. It is our view, one
that later chapters develop further, that international legal argumentation is different
from other forms of normative argumentation, whether in its motivations or its ef-
fects. So we hope to fill in this important gap with this volume.

C. Theoretical Silences

Finally, we note that some theories or methods of international law and relations re-
main mostly silent about argumentation, legal or otherwise. Among the former, strict
positivism stresses law’s origin in and validity through certain discrete and formal
“sources.” The task of the lawyer is to identify the legal rules and then interpret them
according to accepted modes of interpretation provided by the law (notably the
VCLT). Argumentation, discourse, and persuasion are simply not seen as relevant to
the inquiry—​even though, of course, as a practical matter, the lawyer will be making
her views about to the law to someone through an argument. Among the latter, realism
and certain iterations of institutionalism both neglect the role of argumentation, and
especially legal argumentation, in international affairs. For realists, structural forces
about state power determine the outcomes of disputes between states, with interna-
tional law playing a negligible role. Arguments about international law are just cheap
talk. Even among institutionalists, those steeped in a rational choice model will accept
the advantages of legalization as a way to reduce the costs of cooperation and increase
the credibility of commitments, but the actual process by which those actors dispute
what the norms mean is not particularly important.
These theories all share what might best be termed a static approach to interna-
tional law. Law is something out there, to be found and applied by the positivists, and
that may affect the behavior of global actors (or may not, according to the realists).
While they accept that law changes over time, these approaches are static in that what

55 A notable exception is Deitelhoff and Zimmermann’s recent work that begins to explore how the legal

character of norms affects the discourse about them. Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann, “Norms
Under Challenge: Unpacking the Dynamics of Norm Robustness,” Journal of Global Security Studies 41
(2019): 2.
16 Part I

matters is the snapshot—​not the underlying process that led to it, or the process that
will follow from the law’s invocation. It is our view, and indeed, that of the other the-
ories we have discussed, that these static views are profoundly impoverished. They
both oversell international law’s relevance (by making its identification and applica-
tion the only task for the lawyer) and undersell it (by seeing it strictly in terms of cost
avoidance).

III. What This Book Adds

To fill in some of these gaps in the theoretical literature, we identify the central ques-
tion as follows: How and why does international legal argumentation operate outside
of courts? To answer that question we ask a number of subsidiary questions: What is a
legal argument? Who engages in the legal argumentation? Why do they engage in it?
Who is the audience? Where does it occur? And what is the effect? The existing litera-
ture, both theoretical and empirical, suggests some tentative answers.
What is a legal argument? This question is surprisingly difficult to answer. A min-
imal definition is an argument that explicitly invokes traditional sources of law and
employs the standard techniques of interpretation. A maximalist definition would de-
fine it as an argument that in any way bears on law. The authors of this volume were
not asked to adopt any particular definition, but to be explicit about the definition
they use. We also asked the authors to compare legal to other forms of argumentation
when helpful to illuminate what is distinctive about the former. These include policy-​
oriented, scientific, moral, religious, emotional, economic, and expedient arguments.
Some found it useful to focus on the style of argument, for example, drawing on prec-
edent or making analogies. Others considered explicit versus implicit argumentation.
The latter can occur when a particular policy, decision, or act assumes a legal position,
even if the legal claim is not articulated as such.
Who engages in legal argumentation? The principal “arguers” are representatives
of states. Theory suggests we might observe a difference between powerful and weak
states. The latter may be more inclined to make specific claims, insisting that the law
is clear in order to tie down the powerful; the former may prefer vagueness, leaving
them with the discretion to interpret and reinterpret the law in a manner that serves
their preferences. Other important protagonists in legal argumentation include do-
mestic actors: legislators, advocacy groups, civil society, academics, lawyers in pri-
vate practice, and journalists. Prominent non-​state actors at the international level are
officials of intergovernmental organizations, representatives of international NGOs,
multinational corporations, and armed groups.
Why do actors engage in legal argumentation? What motivates them, what purpose
is the argumentation intended to serve? Here extant theory offers a range of possible
answers. For some, it may be a genuine effort to persuade the interlocutor or other
audiences of the merits of a legal claim. For others, the goal may be more strategic—​
to change behavior without caring whether the audience has been persuaded on the
merits of the claim. For others still, it may be to build or preserve a reputation for law-​
abidingness, even if they do not expect to change anyone’s mind or behavior. Legal
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The doctor took a small bottle out of his pocket, saying, "I must, I
suppose. I would rather have waited for Dr. Haddon."

He mixed a few drops with water, and gave the glass to Mrs. Eyre.

"Flo, you must drink this," Mrs. Eyre said softly. And Flo, having
learned long ago to obey that gentle voice, checked her wild outcry
and swallowed the medicine at once.

"Oh, mamma! is that you?"

"Yes, darling. Lie still; I want you to go to sleep."

"But—the big black dog."

"There is no dog here. Close your eyes, Flo; try to sleep."

Flo obeyed, and slept uneasily for about half an hour. During this
sleep, Mrs. Eyre whispered to the nurse, "Mrs. Dooner, I must just
run down and see what has become of the other children."

Mrs. Dooner did not know that they had gone away, and the doctor
did not hear what was said. Mrs. Eyre left the room.

Poor Hetty, half stupefied with grief and terror, heard her step, and
knew it. The child had ceased to cry. What had happened? She
could not face her kind mistress. She could not bear to hear her say
"Go," as her master had done. She could not bear to hear that the
child was dead. She started up, crept out of the room, and ran out of
the house.

She went to the railway station, and was told that there would not be
another train until seven o'clock—a slow train, the ticket clerk told
her, but she could not understand him, she was so dazed. There was
a seat close by, and she crawled over to it, and sat there until the
train ran in. Then she took her ticket, and got into a third-class
carriage.
The door was opened just as the train was starting, and a woman
got in. At the same moment something white made its appearance.
Zelica sprang into Hetty's lap.

"Is the cat yours?" inquired the porter.

"Oh, Zelica, Zelica!" cried Hetty. "You don't know what we've done."

The man looked at the woman who had just got in, and said, "I hope
the girl's in her right mind."

The woman half rose, but sat down again, saying, "I'm only going to
the next station, and she's but a slip of a girl." And as Hetty sat quite
quiet, she was soon satisfied that there was no danger.

It was a long, weary journey. The train stopped at every station, and
sometimes where there was no station at all. Hetty felt as if she was
dreaming, and could not wake. She did not even cry, and whether
the noise she heard were the whistle of the engine or Flo's screams,
she did not know. But at last they reached B—, and she left the train.
She had a long way to walk, but she did not think of that; she went
slowly along with the cat in her arms. At last she reached the
straggling street of Little Hayes, and then she found herself at her
mother's door.

It was shut, of course, for it was nearly midnight. Hetty tapped with
her hand, and when no notice was taken of this, she tried to call out,
and could not. Then she picked up a little stone and hammered at
the door. She heard the door of the inner room open and her
mother's voice, crying, "Dan! Ned! Get up and come down. The
house must be on fire, the police are knocking at the door."

Dan, however, was so sound asleep that he never heard her, and
Ned only said, "Yes, ma'am, directly," and relapsed into sleep.

Mrs. Hardy and Matty, in their night-gowns, opened the door; and
instead of the policeman they expected to see, there stood Hetty.
The light from Mrs. Hardy's candle fell upon her white face as she
stumbled in, letting the cat fall. Zelica walked over to the fireplace
with an air of dignity, and selected the warmest spot to lie down in.

"Oh, you unfortunate child what's wrong with you now?" said Mrs.
Hardy.

"I have killed Miss Flo!" Hetty answered, in a hoarse whisper. "She's
dead, or dying; the master told me to go home, for he couldn't bear
the sight of me. Mother," holding out her trembling hands, "don't you
hate me, for oh, I'm just dead myself."

Mrs. Hardy made no answer in words. She just took the poor girl in
her arms and kissed her. Hetty clung to her, but neither cried nor
tried to explain; and Mrs. Hardy was very much frightened.

"Matty, get a chair; help me to put her in it. There. Now tell me, Hetty,
my poor child, tell me what happened. I'm very sure you never hurt
Miss Flo a'purpose. Maybe things aren't as bad as you think."

"Yes, I'll tell you all. Where shall I begin? Oh, it was a girl gave me
some shrimps—that was the beginning."

"Well?—go on. Did you give the child the shrimps to eat?"

"No—oh, no! It was—Zelica. She—mother, I can't remember. I'm

worn out. Matty, don't look at me like that—you've no call to be afraid
of me. I'll go away if you like, but take care of Zelica—Miss Flo's pet."

"The girl isn't herself," said Mrs. Hardy. "Help me to get her to bed,
Matty; maybe she'll come to when she has slept."

They made her a cup of tea, and then got her to bed. She fell asleep
at once; and in the morning her mind was somewhat clearer. But she
was not a bit like Hetty. She told her story, but she never once cried
over it. If she had wept and bemoaned herself as usual, her mother
would have had plenty to say to her, but this trembling, silent girl
frightened the good woman out of her wits.
It was on Friday night that Hetty came home, and on Saturday she
was too ill to get up; but Mrs. Hardy made inquiries, and found out
that the child was certainly alive. On Sunday Hetty dressed herself,
and said, "I'll go up to Adelaide Terrace. Maybe Mrs. Goodenough
may know something."

"I'll go with you," said Matty. "I'll be back in time for church, mother."

The two sisters walked together, almost in silence. The door was
opened by Mrs. Goodenough. This worthy creature had questioned
Lina, and had a general idea as to what had happened.

"Well!" said she, "I think, in your place, Hetty Hardy, I'd have had the
decency to stay away."

"Have you heard how Miss Flo is?"

"Just alive—that's all. There's that boy crying again! Master John, if
you don't stop, I'll spank you! The master brought the three home,
and said I must stay here and take care of them."

"Troublesome they are, too—but of course I couldn't refuse."

"They're all crying," said Hetty miserably. "Mrs. Goodenough, let me

come in and mind them."

"Let you come in! The master says to me, says he, 'Mrs.
Goodenough, I look to you—I've turned Hetty Hardy out for bad
conduct, and if she comes here, send her about her business;
character she'll get none,' says he, 'and I'll send a policeman after
her if the child dies, for it's manslaughter, if not murder!' So good-
bye, Hetty; don't be coming here any more. It's my turn to shut the
door with you on the wrong side of it now."

She shut the door accordingly.

"Hetty dear, the half of that is not true. Mr. Eyre never spoke like that.
You never meant to hurt the child, and—"
"No, I did not. But it's all my fault. Nothing's too bad for me!" And she
turned wearily to walk home again.

On the way they met Fred Smith, who you may remember was
employed in the Little Hayes post office.

"Why, Hetty!" he cried. "Whatever ails you?"

Hetty shook her head and walked on, but Matty lingered to tell Fred
what was wrong.

"Poor Hetty!" he said; "and she is so fond of the child! I'll tell you
what, Matty: I'll go this very moment, and find out about the trains,
and I'll go to R—, and bring Hetty word how the child is."

"But, Fred, it is Sunday!"

"Yes, and my Sunday out, or I could not go. Oh, never you mind,
Matty; I'm sure I am not doing wrong in trying to comfort poor Hetty
when she's in such trouble. I owe her a good turn, for she made me
downright ashamed of myself once."

It was late in the evening when he came to the Hardy's.

"Is that you, Fred Smith?" Mrs. Hardy said. "Dan's out."

"I've brought Hetty good news, ma'am. The little girl is much better,
they think. Mr. Eyre is coming home to-morrow, but Mrs. Eyre is to
stay till the child can be moved."

"Oh, Fred, thank you!" said Hetty. "It's very kind of you to come and
tell me."

"He did more than that for you," Matty said. "He went to R— to
inquire."

"Oh, I like to get a sight of the sea," Fred remarked hurriedly. "Good-
night, ma'am. I must get home."
"It was very kind, all the same," said Hetty again. "Oh, if Miss Flo
gets well, what a load will be off my heart! They can never forgive
me, I know; but I do love Miss Flo."

CHAPTER X.
FORGIVEN.

IT was a very, very sad time for Hetty. She did not know, when she
used to cry and bewail herself over her misfortunes, that she could
be as unhappy as she was now. She longed for news of little Flo,
and many a time did she steal up to Adelaide Terrace to question
Mrs. Goodenough, at times when she knew that Mr. Eyre was out.

Worthy Mrs. Goodenough gave her scant information, and less

comfort. If she might be believed, Mr. Eyre spent a good deal of his
scanty leisure in telling her that he thought Hetty very little better
than a murderer, and that she should never so much as see Miss Flo
again.

Hetty was so dejected that she believed all this, and even thought
that Mr. Eyre did not say a word too much; but Matty stoutly declared
that Mrs. Goodenough invented these speeches for Hetty's benefit.

Mrs. Hardy had no reason to complain of Hetty now, for she worked
hard all day, and never cared to go out, except for her melancholy
pilgrimage to Adelaide Terrace, or to go to church.
Meantime, little Flo was really very ill, and suffering greatly both in
mind and body. Her terror about the big black dog was such that the
doctor said that no questions must be asked about her part in the
day's misadventures, nor must she be in any way reminded of them.

Mrs. Eyre, however, did not forget poor Hetty, and she took some
trouble to find out that the story she had told her master was the true
one. The shrimp-girl, and a lad who had met the poor girl in the lane,
and put her into the right road, confirmed Hetty's story. Not many
women, with little Flo before their eyes, would have taken so much
trouble about poor, heedless Hetty, who certainly was fortunate in
her mistress.

After about a month Flo got better. The pain decreased, and she
became calmer and more like her little self. Of course, Mrs. Eyre was
anxious to get home, for the three children there were both unhappy
and troublesome under Mrs. Goodenough's care. So as soon as it
was at all safe Mr. Eyre came to R—, and Flo was carefully
conveyed home.

Up to this time the child had not spoken of Hetty since her mother
had silenced her constant cry for her. But as she grew stronger, and
returned to her familiar home and her familiar habits, Mrs. Eyre
became aware that there was something weighing on little Flo's
heart,—some question that was often on her lips, though she
seemed afraid to ask it. A little questioning soon made the child
speak out.

"Mamma, you bid me speak no more of Hetty. I know the big dog
must have killed Zelica, but did he kill my dear Hetty too?"

"Oh no, my dear child. Hetty is quite well, and safe in her mother's
house."

"Then why might I not speak of her?"

"You misunderstood me, dear; you kept calling, calling, and I only
meant to quiet you."
"But if Hetty was not hurt, why did she not stay with me and nurse
me, mamma?"

"Well; dear, Hetty was to blame about that day—she had left the hut
while you were asleep, to search for Zelica, I believe; but, indeed, I
do not know exactly what happened. Papa sent Hetty away."

Flo was too well taught to question papa's doings; but that very
evening she began begging him to bring Hetty back.

"I want her so much. I do love Hetty. Just tell her that 'Miss Flo'
wants her, and I know she will come at once. She loves me so."

"My dear, I sent her away because it was through her carelessness
that this accident happened to you. When mamma has time, she will
look about for a nice, kind girl to carry you; and now we'll say no
more about Hetty."

To this hint Flo declined to attend. She was very weak, and mamma
had others to attend to now, and could not devote herself to Flo as
she did while at R—, and Flo cried for Hetty far too often for her own
good, and began to look as bad as ever.

Hetty, no longer daring to come to the house, used now to waylay

Mrs. Goodenough on her way home, to ask about Miss Flo. One day
the old woman did not appear at her usual time; it was quite evening
before she came, but Hetty waited all the time.

"Well, Hetty, here you are, to bother me about that child, that's the
worrit of the whole house! The crossest, complainingest little worry
that ever I did see! Morning, noon, and night, the cry is—"

Here Mrs. Goodenough paused. She had very nearly said the word
"'Hetty,'" but that, she thought, would rejoice the poor girl, so she
substituted "'Zelica.'"

"'Zelica! I want Zelica!' That's always on her lips; little peevish brat! I
wonder how her mother keeps her hands off her!"
"I declare," cried Hetty, "I never thought of that. I suppose they think
Zelica is lost."

"Lost she surely is, and a good thing too. But that redic'lous child
thinks some dog ate her! She was in such a state this morning,
declaring I hurt her lifting her up, that we could get nothing done.
That's why I'm late. Mrs. Eyre's going to get a girl in your place,
otherwise I'd have to quit; but I suppose I shan't be turned out this
time, as you're not there to carry tales."

All this did Mrs. Goodenough say, with the amiable wish to make
Hetty miserable; but this time she failed, for Hetty did not know what
she was saying. She was thinking about Zelica, and Zelica's little
mistress, and now with a hasty "good-evening" she turned away and
went quickly home. Mrs. Goodenough immediately made a kind of
general proclamation that "Hetty Hardy was getting to be a greater
fool every day."

Hetty went home, and procured a sheet of notepaper and Matty's

pen and ink. She then sat down to write. It took her a long time, but
at last, with a deep sigh, she folded up her paper, caught up Zelica
from her comfortable nook by the fire, and ran out into the now
almost dark evening.

The Eyres were at supper, or tea, as they called it. Flo was on her
sofa, looking smaller than ever; presently Lina and Edgar ran off to
play, and Mr. Eyre drew a chair over and sat down near Flo.

"Come, my little girl, you haven't eaten any of the nice bread and jam
I cut for you. Try to eat a little bit, Flo. Why are you crying? You make
poor mamma and me very sad."

"I can't help it, papa. I am so sorry for poor dear Hetty. I do want
Hetty—I love her."

"What is that?" cried Mrs. Eyre, as a slight noise was heard.

"It was the window. I suppose the sash has closed a bit. I must see
to it to-morrow, or it may catch somebody's fingers."

But the sash had not closed—quite the contrary. Some one outside
had pushed it up a tiny bit more, and behold!—in walked, fat, snow-
white, and beautiful as ever, Mrs. Zelica! Purring loudly, she marched
over to the sofa, sprang up, curled herself up in her own particular
place, and looked at the astonished assembly with a condescending
and self-satisfied air. What a fuss a little dog would have been in!
What waggings of the tail, and ecstatic wriggles, mingled with small
strangled squeals of joy at seeing his dear mistress again! But
Zelica, being but a cat, just blinked at them all, and felt important.

"Why! Oh, my Zelica! Is this you? Then he didn't eat you? Where
have you been? Who brought you? Oh, mamma! 'Twas Hetty—my
dear, dear Hetty! Oh, run, call her to me! I do love Hetty!"

Mr. Eyre sprang up and went to the door; but Hetty was gone.

Flo did not know how to make enough of Zelica. But the loving little
heart was not satisfied. Mrs. Eyre, who had gone to the window
when her husband ran to the door, had found poor Hetty's letter, but
she slipped it into her pocket, and said nothing about it until the
children were in bed. Then she said,—

"John, there was a letter left on the window-sill. I have it here. I did
not want to excite poor Flo. Here it is, dear; read it to me."

For she had baby in her arms.

"'My dear mistress,'" began John, in a stern tone of voice, which,

however, softened as he read on,—

"'I hope I may be forgiven for writing to you. Mrs.

Goodenough told me to-night that Miss Flo still cries
after Zelica. I did not know that she was well enough to
care for her yet. I found her at the station that day; she
 must have followed me there.'"

"'Dear mistress, try to forgive me. I am too sorry to

know how to say it. I do not feel as if I could ever be
happy any more. After all your kindness, and the
master's, such a return to make and, loving Miss Flo
with all my heart, to be so wicked about her. I know
master was right to send me off, and he never could
trust me any more. I am glad Miss Flo has forgotten
me. I pray continually that she may grow strong and
well, and I hope your new girl will be fond of her, and
patient with her.'"

"'If you could say you forgive me, maybe I could be

more at rest. Sometimes I get stupid, thinking of Miss
Flo; for indeed, ma'am, though you may well not
believe it, I do love both of you, and I think I shall never
forget what I felt when I got back to the hut, and could
not find her.'"

"'I remain, ma'am,'"

"'Your poor, bad servant,'"

"'HESTER
HARDY.'"

"Poor girl," said John Eyre to himself, as he folded up the letter.

"That old Goodenough! Why, Flo thought Zelica was dead; and as to
forgetting Hetty, I wish she had!"

"It would be very ungrateful of her if she had, for Hetty was very
good to her."

"Poor girl!" said the master again.

"John, dear, I must have a girl; and, to be frank with you, I would
rather have Hetty than a stranger. She is so gentle and patient, and
so perfectly truthful. She is a really good girl, and it is not so easy to
find a really good girl. Besides, Flo is too ill to be reasonable, and
she will not like any stranger, because she is longing for Hetty."

"Well, dear, I know I told the girl never to let me see her face again,
but—I suppose we had better make our poor little Flora as happy as
we can while we have her with us. But I tell you fairly, I think we
ought never to lose sight of the girl when she has the cart of Flo. She
is so terribly heedless, though, as you say, a good girl for all that."

"Then I may see her to-morrow?"

"Yes; but don't tell Flo till you are sure of her."

So it came about that once again Mrs. Eyre tapped on the half-
closed door of Mrs. Hardy's house, and was told to "come in."

"Why, if it isn't Mrs. Eyre!" cried Matty joyfully.

"Mrs. Eyre! Matty, you're a—But it is, for all that. Ma'am, I'm nearly
ashamed to face you."

"You have no cause to be, Mrs. Hardy. Hetty is a good girl, and, if
she was heedless, we must remember that she is very young. It was
a great misfortune; but, you know, if the dog had not awakened my
poor little girl, no harm would have been done. Where is Hetty?"

"I sent her into town for some things we wanted, but she must soon
be home. A dog, did you say? I've heard nothing of a dog. Indeed,
Hetty does not rightly know yet what happened to Miss Flora."

"Well, Hetty went, as you, I am sure, know, to look for the little cat.
Zelica led her a regular chase, and when she got back the child was
gone."
"Yes," said Matty, "and the shawls on the path, and the cat's basket
all torn, and some shrimps a girl gave her all mashed up. Oh,
ma'am! she dreams of it often—you never saw the like."

"What had really happened was this. Flo woke up to find the dog—a
big, rough-haired creature-tearing at the cat's basket; and, I confess,
I think it was well for Zelica that she was not in it; but the dog would
not have hurt Flo on any account; in fact, he did not touch her. She
screamed for Hetty, the dog got at the shrimps and tried to eat them,
and while he was at that work my poor little girl got up and tried to
run away. She actually dragged herself some way down the steep
path, when the dog came after her, and she fell. Mr. Eyre thinks that
the creature saved her from falling over the edge, for he was sitting
between her and it, in great distress. He belongs to the
stationmaster, and is a most good-natured dog, very fond of
children."

Matty had seen her sister come in, but Mrs. Eyre did not, her back
being turned to the door. Hetty stood, listening and trembling, and
now seemed about to steal out again; but Matty stopped her.

"Now, Hetty," said she, "you know what really happened."

Mrs. Eyre turned round, and Hetty covered her face with her hands.
Mrs. Eyre fully expected a burst of tears, and "Oh, I'm so sorry,
ma'am!" but there were neither tears nor words.

"My poor girl! My poor Hetty! Have you never a word to say to me?"

"No, not one." Mrs. Hardy spoke for her. "There's something come to
the girl, ma'am, for dear knows her tears and her tongue used to be
ready enough. I used to be tired hearing, 'Oh I'm so sorry, mother!'"

"Oh, I used to say that," said Hetty; "but I was only sorry because
things were broken, or because you were angry. I was not sorry for
my own fault, because I did not think it a fault—only a misfortune.
Though Matty warned me, and made me promise to pray against it, I
never did—I forgot. I thought how unlucky I was to be so
thoughtless; but since I've been at home I've been thinking, and I
see now that it's a sin. Oh, ma'am, if you could only forgive me, I'd
take heart and try to do better. I'll take Matty's way now, for I'm sure
it's the right one."

"You are quite right, Hetty. We are all of us more given to one fault
than to others, and only God can cure us of them. He gives us time,
and grace, and many lessons; some, sad ones. This has been a sad
one to you, but you see it has opened your eyes to your sin. As to
forgiving you, I do indeed, Hetty, and so does Mr. Eyre."

"And Miss Flo? Oh! Does she forget me altogether?"

"Forget you? No, indeed—she is never done crying for you. And she
is so ill and so weak that you must come back to her, Hetty."

Hetty opened both mouth and eyes as wide as ever she could, and
uttered the most extraordinary shout; the poor girl really did not know
what she was doing.

"Hetty! Behave, do! To yell like that in a lady's very ears! Eh! Here
come the tears! I've got my poor Hetty back again. I didn't know that
one with a silent tongue and dry eyes. You're a lucky girl, Hetty, to
have such people to do with as your master and mistress; and
indeed, ma'am, the girl's been breaking her heart after you."

Matty took her sister away into the other room, where she kissed her,
and coaxed her, and cried with her, and altogether contrived to quiet
her so that she was in a fit state to set out at once with her mistress.

"Dan shall bring your things up in the evening, Hetty," said her
mother. "And now, my dearie dear, remember this time as long as
you live, and don't fall back into idle ways. Remember what Matty
said to you: you'll find it's true. These thoughtless doings are real
sins, and it's only God can change your heart. God bless you, Hetty!
I'm glad for you, child."
On the way to Adelaide Terrace Hetty asked many questions about
Flo's state.

"I don't see how you can bear the sight of me, ma'am, nor Miss Flo
either."

"You'll soon know what she thinks about it, Hetty. And you know, if
you had got back and found her still asleep, so that no harm was
done, your fault would have been exactly the same, yet you would
have expected me to forgive you. It seems to me, therefore, that we
ought to forgive you now. You must learn not to measure a fault by
its consequences; you were wrong to leave the child, and it would
have been just as wrong if poor Black Rover had not visited the hut
while you were absent. Do you understand, Hetty?"

"I think I do, ma'am. Oh, I must try very hard."

"Ah! Hetty, trying hard won't do, not by itself. I will talk to you about
this some day soon. But now, here we are at home," Mrs. Eyre said,
as she knocked at the door.

Mrs. Goodenough opened it; her face was really worth seeing when
she recognised Hetty.

"You see, Mrs. Goodenough, I've brought Hetty Hardy back, and you
will be pleased, I hope, to hear that it is partly your doing. She wrote
to me after hearing from you that Miss Flo was still fretting after the
cat. Stay here for a moment, Hetty; I will just say a word to the child
and then call you."

But it was Flo's weak little voice that called—

"Hetty! Oh Hetty! My own good Hetty! Come to me quick!"

It was not for a few days that Mrs. Eyre found time for the talk with
Hetty which she had promised her. But one morning, Flo being
asleep, and the others out, Mrs. Eyre said: "Hetty, you know you and
I were to have a serious talk; for I did not say what I wished to say to
you that evening."

"I remember, ma'am. You were saying that trying hard won't do, by
itself. Ma'am, if you'll believe me, Matty told me that when I was
coming here, that first time, and I never minded. I didn't really
understand. But I do now. I see plain enough that it is not in my own
strength that I can cure my heedlessness. And I know now that it is a
sin, and not just a misfortune, as I used to call it. But indeed, ma'am,
I do not think I could ever forget this lesson."

"Perhaps not. But, Hetty, try to think of what I am going to say to you.
You are an affectionate girl, and so, to please those you love, you
would do nearly anything. When you ran off to search for Zelica, I
know well it was because the loss of the little cat would have grieved
Miss Flo so much. But you see what came of it, and you know now
that you did wrong. Now, had you asked yourself, not what would
please Miss Flo, but what it was your duty to do—then you would
have stayed at your post, and the child would have been safe."

"So it always is, Hetty. The moment our motive is less than the
highest; the moment we act to please this person or that, without
remembering that we have to please God, that moment we go
wrong. I want you to pray, as Matty said to you; but, dear Hetty, pray
that God will give you such a love for Him, your Father, who sent His
Son to save you from your sins, that to please him may become the
first thought of your heart. Will you do this, Hetty? Do you
understand me?"

"I do, ma'am. You've said the like to me before, and so has Matty, but
I didn't heed; I seemed not to understand. But all the time I was so
unhappy about Miss Flo, those thoughts seemed to come back to
me. And I will pray, as you tell me, ma'am. Indeed, I do love Him
even now, though not as I ought; for He has been very merciful to
me. Oh, ma'am!—when I think that she might have been killed! How
could I have borne it, when it was my doing?"

"Indeed, Hetty, we all have much to be thankful for."

Well, if Hetty was not entirely cured of her heedlessness, she was
certainly cured of treating it as a mere misfortune, for which she was
to be pitied. And the best proof of her improvement was that in no
long time Mr. Eyre quite laid aside his distrust of her, and ceased to
be uneasy if she was left in charge of Flo.

Flo was very ill for a long time, and often they thought that a few
weeks more would see the close of her suffering and her life. But
she at last began to improve; and, to the great joy of all who loved
her, she continued to get steadily better, until at last she could walk
about nearly as well as Lina. She grew a great deal, too, and health
brought back her pretty pink colour, and the unchildlike gravity
vanished from her face.

Indeed, if the truth must be told, Miss Flora was rather a troublesome
lassie for a time; for it seemed as if all the fun and frolic she had
missed had to be got through somehow. But she sobered down
again, and is a very good girl, and a great comfort to her parents.
Lina is married, and Flo is the home daughter, helping her mother,
and caring for the younger children.

As to Hetty, after ten years of faithful service, she left her dear
mistress, and still dearer Miss Flo, to become the wife of Fred Smith,
who is now postmaster in the very office where she was once too
late for the London post, thanks to the attractions of Punch and Judy.
And as Fred is a good, steady, God-fearing man, we may hope that
she will be as happy as she deserves to be, I think; even though she
once earned the name of Heedless Hetty.

Butler & Tanner, The Selwood Printing Works, Frome, and London.
 *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HEEDLESS
HETTY ***

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