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H U M A N I T Y I N G O D’ S IM A G E
Humanity in
God’s Image
An Interdisciplinary Exploration

C L A U D I A WE L Z

1
 3
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© Claudia Welz 2016
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First Edition published in 2016
Impression: 1
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 Preface with Acknowledgments

This book has been underway for a long time, and I owe a debt of gratitude to
many people and institutions. The book originates in a postdoctoral project
that I started at the Danish National Research Foundation’s Center for
Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen. The project followed up
on my doctoral dissertation, which was submitted to the Institute for Her-
meneutics and Philosophy of Religion at the University of Zurich in 2006 and
published under the title Love’s Transcendence and the Problem of Theodicy
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008). While in my doctoral dissertation I devel-
oped theology as a ‘semiotic phenomenology of the Invisible,’ in my postdoc-
toral project I wanted to explore the complexities of human existence in the
tension between visibility and invisibility.
In 2009, the Carlsberg Foundation approved my application for a three-year
research grant for the project “Samvittighed og menneskets u-synlighed.” One
part of the project focused on the notion of conscience and processes of both
self-disclosure and self-deception through memory and moral emotions such
as guilt and shame, while the other part concentrated on the conception of the
human being, which surfaces in the biblical imago Dei motif: How are we to
understand the idea that the human being is created in the image of an
invisible God? The following year, I took up a professorship at the Faculty
of Theology, University of Copenhagen, which meant that I could use only
eleven months of the research grant before many new tasks demanded my
time and attention. This is why the completion of this book has been post-
poned again and again.
As a steering-group member of the interdisciplinary research project “In-
visibilis: Visibility and Transcendence in Religion, Art, and Ethics” (2010–13),
which was funded by the Danish Council for Independent Research, I could at
least now and then give lectures, write articles, and organize a conference on
the theme of my part of the collective project, which was entitled “Imago Dei
and Human Dignity.” The local In-visibilis research group—including Anna
Vind, Sven Rune Havsteen, Kirsten Busch Nielsen, Iben Damgaard, Martin
Wangsgaard Jürgensen, Karina Juhl Kande, and Therese Bering Solten—
provided an inspiring forum for discussion.
In 2013, I was awarded the Elite Research Prize by the Danish Ministry of
Science, Innovation and Higher Education, which fortunately allowed me to
return to my unfinished research endeavors. With the help of this research prize
I founded CJMC: Center for the Study of Jewish Thought in Modern Culture,
which was launched in 2014. Owing to the ensuing extra administrative and
organizational work, the completion of my book project was, once more,
vi Preface with Acknowledgments
delayed for three years. I owe cordial thanks to Paul Mendes-Flohr, Melissa
Raphael, and Elliot R. Wolfson, who have not only followed and promoted the
development of CJMC as Advisory Board members, conference speakers, and
partners in conversation, but who have also encouraged me to pursue my own
research—in particular this book project.
The book at hand has its origins in lectures, articles, and essays that were
written in different languages between 2007 and 2015. Since being included in
the composition of the present book, all texts have undergone significant meta-
morphoses. The texts have been thoroughly revised and rewritten, so none of the
book chapters has already been published in its current form. However, I have
included and modified materials from the following publications:
• An earlier, shorter version of Chapter 1 (“Deictic References to the
Invisible: The Imago Dei as a Complex Sign Pointing beyond Itself ”)
was published as “Imago Dei—References to the Invisible,” Studia Theo-
logica, 65/1 (2011), 74–91, and is in parts reproduced by kind permission
of Taylor & Francis Ltd <http://www.tandfonline.com> on behalf of
Studia Theologica. I wish to thank the participants at the Theology
Research Seminar, University of Glasgow, where I first presented these
considerations on October 26, 2010, for their feedback—in particular
Werner Jeanrond and Julie Clague. A variation of the lecture was pre-
sented at the University of Zurich on November 1, 2010, and published
under the title “Imago Dei—Bild des Unsichtbaren,” Theologische Litera-
turzeitung, 136/5 (2011), 479–90. The introductory section in Chapter 1
on epistemological problems posed by the invisible is based on “Un-
sichtbar,” Hermeneutische Blätter, 1/2 (2007), 13–23.
• Chapter 2 (“Subjectivity of Seeing: The Imago Dei as Self-Interpreting
Image”) originates in the lecture “Imago Dei—a Self-Concealing Image”
delivered at the conference “Visibility and Transcendence in Religion, Art
and Ethics,” which took place at the Faculty of Theology, University of
Copenhagen, on October 3–6, 2012. The lecture was then revised to be
published in the anthology Anna Vind et al. (eds), (In)Visibility: Reflec-
tions upon Visibility and Transcendence in Theology, Philosophy and the
Arts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, forthcoming). I wish to thank
Morten Sørensen Thaning and Iben Damgaard for commenting on a
previous version of this chapter.
• An earlier version of Chapter 3 (“Resonating and Reflecting the Divine:
The Imago Dei as God-Revealing Humanity in Jewish Theology, Philoso-
phy, and Poetry”) was published as “Resonating and Reflecting the
Divine: The Notion of Revelation in Jewish Theology, Philosophy, and
Poetry,” in Ingolf U. Dalferth and Michael Ch. Rodgers (eds), Revelation:
Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion—Conference 2012
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 141–83, and material from this chapter
 Preface with Acknowledgments vii

is reproduced by kind permission of Mohr Siebeck. The English text

builds on my German contribution, “Wo Gott Gesicht und Stimme
wird: Zum Offenbarungsbegriff in der jüdischen Tradition,” to the vol-
ume Florian Bruckmann and René Dausner (eds), Im Angesicht der
Anderen: Gespräche zwischen christlicher Theologie und jüdischem Den-
ken (Festschrift für Josef Wohlmuth zum 75. Geburtstag) (Paderborn et al.:
Ferdinand Schöningh, 2013), 91–122.
• Chapter 4 (“Divine–Human (Dis-)Similarity: Freedom, Sin, and Relational
Ontology in Reformation Theology”) has been partly published in Danish
under the title “Gudbilledlighed, synd og relationel ontologi: Kierkegaard og
Luther,” in Niels Henrik Gregersen (ed.), Lutherbilleder i dansk teologi
1800–2000 (Copenhagen: Anis, 2012), 105–21. A translated and modified
version is reproduced by kind permission of Anis. It draws on a lecture that
was delivered at the Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen, on
March 7, 2012, and a paper entitled “Imago Dei—an Image Lost or Distort-
ed?” that was presented at the 12th International Congress for Luther
Research at the University of Helsinki on August 8, 2012.
• The bulk of Chapter 5 (“Likeness to God in Love and Suffering: Imagin-
ation, Identification, and Religious Reorientation”) was written in 2012,
originally published as “Imitatio Christi as Self-Transfiguration: Imagin-
ation, Identification, and Religious Reorientation,” in Svein Aage Chris-
toffersen, Martin Wangsgaard Jürgensen, and Nils Holger Petersen (eds),
Transfiguration: Nordic Journal of Religion and the Arts 2012/2013
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2014), 29–55, and reproduced
by kind permission of Museum Tusculanum Press.
• Chapter 6 (“Glory from Elsewhere: The Human Being as Embodied
Image of God”) has its origins in my text “Menneskets u-synlighed:
Krop, gudbilledlighed og kristomorfi,” in Kirsten Busch Nielsen and
Johanne Stubbe Teglbjærg (eds), Kroppens teologi—teologiens krop
(Copenhagen: Anis, 2011), 95–117. A translated and modified version is
reproduced by kind permission of Anis. The section “Mindsight and
metaphor: Blumenberg, Wittgenstein, McGinn” contains new material.
The section “Limits and horizons of embodied vision—from Plato’s
cavedweller to modern self-mirroring” is based on “Un-sichtbar,”
Hermeneutische Blätter, 1/2 (2007), 13–23.
• An earlier version of Chapter 7 (“Imago Dei and Crimes against Human-
ity: Biblical and Post-Holocaust Perspectives on an Ethics of In-
Visibility”) was published under the title “Imago Dei and Crimes against
Humanity: Jewish Perspectives on an Ethics of In-Visibility,” in Claudia
Welz (ed.), Ethics of In-Visibility: Imago Dei, Memory, and Human
Dignity in Jewish and Christian Thought (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
2015), 247–73, and material from this chapter is reproduced by kind
viii Preface with Acknowledgments

permission of Mohr Siebeck. It draws on two presentations given at the

University of Copenhagen—namely, “Billedforbud, gudbilledlighed og
kristologi” (September 21, 2011) and “Billedforbud og gudbilledlighed:
Jødiske og kristne tilgange til en u-synlighedens etik” (November 9,
2011), as well as on a paper presented at the University of Leuven on
September 18, 2014, in the context of the 17th Biennal Conference of the
International Society for Religion, Literature and Culture (ISRLC) about
the topic “Re-Imagining Human.”
• Chapter 8 (“Imago Dei and Human Dignity: Reciprocal Regard and an
Unfulfilled Demand”) is a translated, revised, and extended version of a
lecture delivered at the Institut für Vergleichende Ethik, Freie Universität
Berlin, on January 26, 2011. I wish to express my thanks to the hosts
(Michael Bongardt and Hilge Landweer) and the audience, for their ques-
tions and comments. A shorter version of the text was published in German
as “Menschenwürde, Blickwechsel und Schamgefühl: Ethische Implikatio-
nen menschlicher Un-Sichtbarkeit,” Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik, 58/1
(2014), 21–39 © 2014 Gütersloher Verlagshaus in der Verlagsgruppe Ran-
dom House GmbH. An English version was presented at a research seminar
of the Danish Network for Holocaust and Genocide Researchers, which
took place at the University of Copenhagen on September 3, 2013.
Quotations from the Bible are cited from the NIV (International Bible
Society) edition, either Holy Bible: New International Version (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1984), or the online version <http://biblehub.com/niv/> (© 1973,
1978, 1984, 2011 by Biblica, Inc.™). Quotations from other works in foreign
languages are translated by myself, if no other translation or translator is
mentioned. Elazar Benyoëtz’s aphorisms are translated by Martina Sitling.
At the completion of this project I would like to thank all those who have
been involved in it at some stage. In the first place, I would like to express my
gratitude to those who have read the whole manuscript. The insightful com-
ments and suggestions of two reviewers for Oxford University Press, who have
done a wonderful job and provoked new revisions of the manuscript in
summer 2015, are gratefully acknowledged. Thanks to Casper Løwenstein,
for his invaluable assistance with the toilsome tasks of proofreading, format-
ting, and establishing the index, and to Nicole Osborne and Elin Simonson for
their thorough English-language corrections.
I am also grateful to Martina Sitling for carefully translating the texts that
were originally written in German (that is, parts of the Introduction and parts
of Chapters 1, 3, 6, and 8); to Thomas Derek Robinson for helping me to
translate parts of Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 from Danish into English; to Jan
Masorsky for his diligent work finding English translations of the sources
quoted in the two latter chapters and for research in image rights regarding the
paintings discussed in Chapter 2; and to Nete Helene Enggaard for copy-editing
 Preface with Acknowledgments ix

Chapters 1–6 and 8 while she was In-visibilis research assistant. Warmest
thanks to the artist Andrea Heinz, my longtime friend, who in April 2014
created the acrylic print Jesus zeichnet (Joh 8,6) that graces the cover of
this book.
The book has benefited not only from the intellectual challenges presented
by literature on similar themes, but also from discussions with colleagues in
Denmark and abroad, above all with Arne Grøn, who since the early 1990s has
performed pioneering work on the ethical dimensions of the visual, on religion
and (in)humanity, recognition, and the dialectics of in-visibility. It has been a
privilege to have the opportunity to try out thoughts in dialogue with him and
to see whether they pass the test of his critical sense. I am also indebted to
Philipp Stoellger, who in 2007 founded the Institute for Iconicity at the
University of Rostock and participated in several conferences and research
seminars with the In-visibilis research group in Copenhagen. The group has
profited immensely from his sharp-witted and ingenious contributions. I also
wish to thank the students who were enrolled in the Master course “Mennes-
ket som imago Dei,” which I taught at the Faculty of Theology, University of
Copenhagen, in the spring term of 2011. Their questions and reflections
provoked me to reread and reconsider the texts we studied together. Judith
Winther was, in 2014, the first reader of selected chapters of the revised
manuscript. She encouraged me to simplify some passages and to state others
more precisely. I would like to express my thanks for her interest in this
project, which has helped to sustain its progress. Moreover, a heartfelt thank
you goes to René Rosfort for his feedback on a draft of the Conclusion.
At Oxford University Press, I would like to thank Karen Raith and Lisa
Eaton for priceless support throughout the process of publication, and Hilary
Walford for her conscientious and efficient work as copy-editor of this book.
Claudia Welz
Copenhagen,
December 2015
 Contents

List of Figures xv
Abbreviations xvi

Introduction: Imago Dei and the Dialectics of In-Visibility 1

Theme and aim 1
Scope and methodological approach 6
The state of the art and distinctive features of the present study 7
Outline of the argument and structure of the book 14

PART I: CREATION AND CREATIVITY

1. Deictic References to the Invisible: The Imago Dei as a Complex
Sign Pointing beyond Itself 23
Introduction: Epistemological problems posed by the invisible 23
The functional model emphasizing representation: Genesis 1:26–7 27
The mimetic model emphasizing resemblance: Augustine, Luther,
Bonhoeffer 30
The relational model emphasizing encounter: Thielicke, Barth,
Ebeling, Benjamin, Buber 32
The dynamic model emphasizing (con)formation: Pico della
Mirandola, Meister Eckhart, Kierkegaard 38
Preliminary conclusion: A new approach in the intersection
of semiotics and visual studies 41

2. Subjectivity of Seeing: The Imago Dei as Self-Interpreting Image 46

Introduction: The image of God as object and subject
of interpretation 46
The glance 48
Mimesis? 64
In God’s non-representable presence 69
Preliminary conclusion concerning an incomplete image 72

PART II: REVEALMENT AND CONCEALMENT

3. Resonating and Reflecting the Divine: The Imago Dei as God-
Revealing Humanity in Jewish Theology, Philosophy, and Poetry 79
Introduction: Songs of suffering and the search for God 79
xii Contents

Illumination, evidence, or enlightenment? On the rationality

of revealment through concealment 85
Language-based synesthesia: the (super)sensible aspects
of revelation 91
Nearness despite remoteness: Revelation as encounter and event 97
God’s word and name: Revelation as (meta)historical source
of orientation 100
Tradition, interpretation, and translation: On the (dis)continuity
of revelation 102
The voice of the inspired witness: Heteronomy and autonomy,
exteriority and interiority 105
Ethics as a way of seeing God in one’s fellow man: Witnessing
the infinite in the finite 108
Preliminary conclusion with a troubling question: Where are you? 112

4. Divine–Human (Dis-)Similarity: Freedom, Sin, and Relational

Ontology in Reformation Theology 120
Introduction: Luther and Kierkegaard on self-enslaving freedom 120
Likeness to god: imago versus similitudo Dei—or hendiadys? 123
The image of God at creation 124
The image of God after the Fall 126
The recovery of the image of God 130
Preliminary conclusion concerning relational ontology 135

PART III: REORIENTATION AND REDEMPTION

5. Likeness to God in Love and Suffering: Imagination,
Identification, and Religious Reorientation 143
Introduction: Connecting imago Dei and imitatio Christi 143
The ambiguity of imagination 144
Imitation through identification 153
Religious reorientation 161
Preliminary conclusion concerning human mimesis
and divine kenosis 165

6. Glory from Elsewhere: The Human Being as Embodied Image

of God 167
Introduction: The human being as homo in-visibilis 167
The body’s soul and the soul’s body: Aristotle, Merleau-Ponty, Nancy 169
God’s image and the human body: Augustine, Luther, Raphael 174
Signs and symbols referring to the invisible: Peirce,
Cassirer, Herder 179
 Contents xiii

Christomorphism: God’s radiance and the transfiguration

of the body—from Paul to Grundtvig 182
Mindsight and metaphor: Blumenberg, Wittgenstein, McGinn 187
Limits and horizons of embodied vision—from Plato’s cave-dweller
to modern self-mirroring 191
Preliminary conclusion concerning the image of God: Mirror,
metaphor, or trace? 195

PART IV: ETHICS WITH AN ESCHATOLOGICAL PROVISO

7. Imago Dei and Crimes against Humanity: Biblical and Post-
Holocaust Perspectives on an Ethics of In-Visibility 201
Introduction: Pagis’s “Testimony” 201
The anti-mimetic point of the biblical prohibition of images 204
Mimesis and transcendence: Levinas on ‘icon’ versus ‘trace’ 208
Recovering the imago Dei? Arendt’s notion of natality 212
Wiping off the filth from de-faced faces: Raphael’s feminist
theology of the Holocaust 216
Recognizing God’s image? Benjamin’s notion of a
dialectical Denkbild 219
Margalit on the paradox of humiliation—and the dialectics
of recognition 223
Preliminary conclusion and an open question concerning
human dignity and ethical orientation 225

8. Imago Dei and Human Dignity: Reciprocal Regard and an

Unfulfilled Demand 230
Introduction: Phenomenological, legal, and theological dimensions
of human dignity 230
Human dignity as a constitutional principle between normativity
and factuality 233
The in-visibility of human dignity 236
Regard versus disregard: On the moral epistemology of ‘recognition’ 239
Kierkegaard’s ethics of the loving gaze 241
Sartre on the objectifying look experienced in shame 243
Shame tied to love and/or respect: The guardian of human dignity? 246
Human dignity—beyond death? 249
Preliminary conclusion concerning a ‘vision’ of the invisible 252

Conclusion: Vision and Speech 255

Seeing the invisible with the help of verbal, visual, and mental images 255
Theological, ethical, and eschatological ‘visions’ of the invisible 258
xiv Contents

Human likeness to God as an incomplete image unified in linguistic

communion 264
Rethinking humanity in God’s image: New research trajectories 268

Bibliography 276
Index of Names 296
Index of Subjects 300
 List of Figures

1. Rembrandt: Self-Portrait, Wide-Eyed (1630) 50

2. Rembrandt: Self-Portrait with Angry Expression (1630) 50
3. Rembrandt: Self-Portrait (1634) 52
4. Rembrandt: Self-Portrait with Beret and Turned-Up Collar (1659) 53
 Abbreviations

Barth, Karl
KD III/1 Die Kirchliche Dogmatik: Die Lehre von der Schöpfung. Das Werk der
Schöpfung, vol. 13, Studienausgabe (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich,
1993)

Benjamin, Walter
GS I/3 Abhandlungen, vol. I, part 3, Walter Benjamin: Gesammelte Schriften, ed.
Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991)
GS V/1 Das Passagen-Werk, vol. V, part 1, Walter Benjamin: Gesammelte
Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991)

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich
DBW1 4 Discipleship, vol. 4, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, ed. Geffrey B. Kelly and
John D. Godsey, trans. Barbara Green and Reinhard Krauss
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001)
DBW2 4 Nachfolge, 2nd edn, vol. 4, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke, ed. Martin Kuske
and Ilse Tödt (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1994)
DBW3 3 Schöpfung und Fall, 3rd edn, vol. 3, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke, ed. Martin
Rüter and Ilse Tödt (Gütersloh and Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag and
Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007)

Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD)

BSLK Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche
herausgegeben im Gedenkjahr der Augsburgischen Konfession 1930
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998)

Kierkegaard, Søren
JP Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, vols 1–7, ed. and trans. Howard
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by G. Malantschuk (Bloomington
and London: Indiana University Press, 1967–78)
 Abbreviations xvii
KW V Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, vol. 5, Kierkegaard’s Writings, ed. and
trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990)
KW VIII The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation
on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin, vol. 8, Kierkegaard’s Writings, ed.
and trans. Reidar Thomte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980)
KW XII Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, vol. 12.1,
Kierkegaard’s Writings, ed. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992)
KW XV Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, vol. 15, Kierkegaard’s Writings,
ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993)
KW XVI Works of Love: Some Christian Deliberations in the Form of Discourses,
vol. 16, Kierkegaard’s Writings, ed. and trans. Howard V. and Edna
H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995)
KW XVII Christian Discourses, vol. 17, Kierkegaard’s Writings, ed. and trans.
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1997)
KW XIX The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for
Upbuilding and Awakening, vol. 19, Kierkegaard’s Writings, ed. and trans.
Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980)
KW XX Practice in Christianity, vol. 20, Kierkegaard’s Writings, ed. and trans.
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1991)
Pap. Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vols 1–25, ed. Niels Thulstrup (Copenhagen:
Gyldendal, 1968–78)
SKS 3 Enten—Eller. Anden del, vol. 3, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren
Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 1997)
SKS 4 Gjentagelsen. Frygt og Bæven. Philosophiske Smuler. Begrebet Angest.
Forord, vol. 4, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren Kierkegaard
Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 1998)
SKS 5 Opbyggelige Taler 1843. Opbyggelige Taler 1844. Tre Taler ved tænkte
Leiligheder, vol. 5, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren Kierkegaard
Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 1998)
SKS 7 Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift, vol. 7, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter,
ed. Søren Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag,
2002)
SKS 8 En literair Anmeldelse. Opbyggelige Taler i forskjellig Aand, vol. 8, Søren
Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret
(Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2004)
SKS 9 Kjerlighedens Gjerninger, vol. 9, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren
Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2004)
xviii Abbreviations
SKS 10 Christelige Taler, vol. 10, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren
Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2004)
SKS 11 Lilien paa Marken og Fuglen under Himlen. Tvende ethisk-religieuse
Smaa-Afhandlinger. Sygdommen til Døden.
“Ypperstepræsten”—“Tolderen”—“Synderinden”, vol. 11, Søren
Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret
(Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2006)
SKS 12 Indøvelse i Christendom. En opbyggelig Tale. To Taler ved Altergangen om
Fredagen, vol. 12, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren Kierkegaard
Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2008)
SKS 17 Journalerne AA, BB, CC, DD, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vol. 17, ed.
Søren Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2000)
SKS 19 Notesbøgerne 1–15, vol. 19, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren
Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2001)
SKS 20 Journalerne NB–NB5, vol. 20, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren
Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2003)
SKS 21 Journalerne NB6–NB10, vol. 21, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren
Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2003)
SKS 22 Journalerne NB11–NB14, vol. 22, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren
Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 1997)
SKS 23 Journalerne NB15–NB20, vol. 23, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren
Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2007)
SKS 24 Journalerne NB21–NB25, vol. 24, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren
Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2007)
SKS 26 Journalerne NB31–NB36, vol. 26, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, ed. Søren
Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2009)

Levinas, Emmanuel
AT Alterity and Transcendence, trans. Michael B. Smith (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1999)
BPW Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley,
and Robert Bernasconi, trans. Alphonso Lingis and Richard A. Cohen
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996)
BV Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, trans. Gary D. Mole
(London and New York: Continuum, 2007)
DE En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (3rd edn; Paris:
J. Vrin, 2001)
DF Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Seán Hand (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1990)
DL Difficile liberté: Essais sur le judaïsme (Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, -1976)
 Abbreviations xix
GDT God, Death and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2000)
LR The Levinas Reader, ed. Seán Hand (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009)
LV L’au-delà du verset (Paris: Editions du Minuit, 1982)
OB Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1981)
TaI Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969)
TeI Totalité et infini: Essai sur l’exteriorité (Paris: Kluwer Academics (livre de
poche), 1992)
TN In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith (London and New
York: Continuum, 2007)

Luther, Martin
LW 1 Lectures on Genesis (1535/38): Chapters 1–5, vol. 1, Luther’s Works, ed.
Jaroslav Pelikan (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958)
LW 26 Lectures on Galatians (1535): Chapters 1–4, vol. 26, Luther’s Works, ed.
Jaroslav Pelikan (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1963)
LW 27 Lectures on Galatians (1535): Chapters 5–6, vol. 27, Luther’s Works, ed.
Jaroslav Pelikan (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1964)
WA 1 D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe),
vol. 1, ed. Joachim Karl Friedrich Knaake (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau
und Nachfolger, [1883] 1966)
WA 2 D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe),
vol. 2, ed. Joachim Karl Friedrich Knaake (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau
und Nachfolger, [1884] 1966)
WA 3 Dictata super Psalterium (1513–16). D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische
Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe), vol. 3, ed. Gustav Kawerau
(Weimar: Hermann Böhlau und Nachfolger, [1885] 1966)
WA 5 Operationes in Psalmos (1519–21). D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische
Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe), vol. 5, ed. Paul Dietsch (Weimar:
Hermann Böhlau und Nachfolger, [1892] 1966)
WA 7 D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe),
vol. 7, ed. Paul Dietsch (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau und Nachfolger,
[1897] 1966)
WA 18 D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe),
vol. 18, ed. Karl Drescher (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau und Nachfolger,
[1908] 1964)
WA 20 Vorlesung über den Prediger Salomo (1526). Predigten des Jahres 1526.
Vorlesung über den 1. Johannesbrief (1527). D. Martin Luthers Werke:
xx Abbreviations
Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe), vol. 20, ed. Paul Dietsch
(Weimar: Hermann Böhlau und Nachfolger, [1904] 1964)
WA 24 In Genesin Declamationes—Über das erste Buch Mose. Predigten (1527).
D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe),
vol. 24, ed. Paul Dietsch (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau und Nachfolger,
[1900] 1964)
WA 37 Predigten des Jahres 1533. Predigten des Jahres 1534. D. Martin
Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe), vol. 37,
ed. Karl Drescher (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau und Nachfolger, [1909]
1964)
WA 38 D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe),
vol. 38, ed. Karl Drescher (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau und Nachfolger,
[1912] 1964)
WA 39/I D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe),
vol. 39/I, ed. Karl Drescher (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau und Nachfolger,
[1926] 1964)
WA 40/I In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius (1535). D. Martin
Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe), vol. 40/I,
ed. Karl Drescher (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau und Nachfolger, [1911]
1970)
WA 40/III D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe),
vol. 40/III, ed. Gustav Bebermeyer (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau und
Nachfolger, [1930] 1969)
WA 42 Genesisvorlesung (1535/38). D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische
Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe), vol. 42, ed. Karl Drescher (Weimar:
Hermann Böhlau und Nachfolger, [1911] 1964)
WA 56 Der Brief an die Römer. D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische
Gesamtausgabe (Weimarer Ausgabe), vol. 56, ed. Gustav Bebermeyer
(Weimar: Hermann Böhlau und Nachfolger, [1938] 1970)

Rosenzweig, Franz
GB Die “Gritli”–Briefe: Briefe an Margrit Rosenstock–Huessy, ed. Inken Rühle
and Reinhold Mayer (Tübingen: Bilam, 2002)
GS I/1 Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I/1: Briefe und Tagebücher 1900–1918, ed.
Rachel Rosenzweig, Edith Rosenzweig-Scheinmann, and Bernhard
Casper (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979)
KS Kleinere Schriften (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, Jüdischer Buchverlag, 1937)
NT Franz Rosenzweig’s “The New Thinking,” ed. and trans. Alan Udoff and
Barbara E. Galli (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999)
PTW Philosophical and Theological Writings, ed. and trans. Paul W. Franks and
Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000)
 Abbreviations xxi
SE Der Stern der Erlösung (5th edn; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag,
1996)
SR1 The Star of Redemption, trans. William W. Hallo (Notre Dame: Notre
Dame Press, 1985)
SR2 The Star of Redemption, trans. Barbara E. Galli (Madison, WI: University
of Wisconsin Press, 2005)
 Introduction
Imago Dei and the Dialectics of In-Visibility

T H E M E AN D A I M

What does it mean to say that the human being has been created in the image
of (an invisible) God, as is written in the Hebrew Bible (cf. Genesis 1:26–7;
5:1–3; 9:6)? This is the guiding question of the present study. It offers a
systematic discussion of the age-old idea of ‘humanity in God’s image.’
Humanity in the image of God, or the human being as imago Dei that is at
once visible (embodied) and referring to its invisible (transcendent) creator,
cannot be conceptualized without imagination, transforming the invisible into
something visible, accessible, determinate. Yet, if the imago Dei becomes
‘visible’ precisely as an image of the ‘invisible,’ it must also be conceived as
an image that preserves its indeterminacy. It cannot be accessed directly, as if
it were a picture on a wall, which can easily be perceived by everyone looking
at it. As the reception of the imago Dei motif in different traditions of thought,
literary genres, and research disciplines shows, it remains controversial what it
connotes and implies for human self-understanding in relation to God, the
world, and other creatures.
The aim of the book at hand is threefold: (1) to clarify the meaning of the
biblical notion of the imago Dei, which in the New Testament is linked to the
imago Christi, while focusing on the question of what the idea of ‘humanity in
God’s image’ signifies in modern times; (2) to trace different interpretations of
‘humanity in God’s image’ through the centuries and reformulate the imago
Dei motif in the context of contemporary debates on the epistemological status
of images, signs, and metaphorical language visualizing the invisible; and
(3) to discuss theological and ethical questions in regard to human dignity—
which has traditionally been grounded in the thought that all human beings
have been created in God’s image—in a post-Holocaust context.
Of course, different views on human existence ‘between’ visibility and
invisibility imply different conceptualizations of the invisible God in whose
2 Introduction

image we have been created. Therefore the rationale of this project is to

co-investigate human and divine in-visibility. The hyphen in the word ‘in-
visibility’ indicates an ‘either/or’ of visibility versus invisibility, which none-
theless involves a ‘both/and’—a play of contrasts where extremes can meet.
The verb ‘to see’ is equivocal. Taken in a narrow sense, the visible is that which
can be seen with our eyes. Taken in a broader sense, ‘visibility’ synesthetically
unites the experience of all our senses. It might even include intuition and
intellectual insight. As a result, ‘seeing’ can in some cases be equivalent to
‘understanding,’ and ‘seeing something as something’ can amount to ‘grasping
or interpreting something in a certain way.’ Thus, in its broadest sense, the
relation between the visible and the invisible corresponds to the relation
between that which enters and that which escapes consciousness.
This relation is dialectical in that no one can see what is completely invisible
and no one can totally see through that which comes into view. The visible
hides something else, which remains invisible, while the invisible can become
known only on the basis of its nexus with the visible.1 The dialectics of in-
visibility will in this book be illuminated by exploring what it means to
understand the homo in-visibilis, the visible (‘outer’) and at once invisible
(‘inner’) human being, as imago Dei. What is it that can be ‘seen’ when God
and human beings are envisioned in their relatedness, as primordially belong-
ing together and yet still distinct from one another?
Theological anthropology involves ethical considerations too, because what
is at stake in the dialectical interrelatedness of visibility and invisibility is not
just human self-understanding vis-à-vis God, but also inter-human under-
standing or misunderstanding, which influences human action and social
coexistence. Insofar as the imago Dei is invisible, the image of God that
someone is, represents, or embodies might be at variance with the image
someone else perceives, which poses the challenge of seeing more than one
can see optically. Similar problems arise with regard to how human dignity
can be protected where it is unapparent, neither demonstratable nor recog-
nizable. As the love commandment (cf. Leviticus 19:18; Mark 12:31), in my
view, includes both the duty to love the people one can see, with their strengths
and weaknesses, and a release from every image that determines once and for
all how someone is seen, I shall propose an extension of the proscription of
idols (cf. Exodus 20:4) as applying not only to God, but also to human beings
who are created in the image of the living God—a God who may surprise us
and provoke us to revise our beliefs about Him.

1
More on this issue can be found in my “Introduction: Dialectics of In-Visibility in Religion,
Art, and Ethics,” in Claudia Welz (ed.), Ethics of In-Visibility: Imago Dei, Memory, and Human
Dignity in Jewish and Christian Thought (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 1–18. See also
Chapters 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in the present book.
 Introduction 3

In this context, we need to scrutinize our own language use. How can we
tackle the problem that language, too, can be idolatrous? Metaphors employ
visual imagery for the invisible. For instance, divine presence, attention, and
caring might be expressed with reference to ‘God’s countenance.’ The point of
contact or tertium comparationis between the visible and the invisible is here
the experience of another person’s face-to-face presence. If this inter-human
experience is transferred to the God-relationship, we end up with anthropo-
morphism; if, conversely, we assume that human beings are akin to God so
that they need to be described in correspondence to their creator, we end up
with theomorphism. In both cases, the question is whether it is correct to
conjecture that humanity and divinity are related mimetically to each other.
What sort of image is the imago Dei, and how can the relation between the
image carrier and image content be described? Moreover, what exactly is the
difference between pictorial representation, mental images, and verbal images—
and how is the imago Dei to be classified, compared to these?
Insofar as the invisible, which is ‘seen’ as invisible, appears relative to those
who understand it in this way, it is no longer absolutely invisible. If the
invisible itself eludes any experience, it also eludes our thinking and must
remain as invisible as it is unthinkable. Hence, if we want to talk about the
imago Dei as an image of the invisible God at all, we must stick to the relatively
invisible, which can only indirectly come into ‘view’—not as an object of
vision, but by distinguishing itself from all other objects of vision. We cannot
view the invisible itself, but it can change our view on everything else. When
our viewpoint is changed, we ourselves have been ‘moved’ and are changed as
well and understand ourselves differently.
If we fail to see that there is an irreducible rest that remains invisible in and
despite our seeing—‘something’ that is neither a thing nor nothing, but rather
‘no-thing’—we fail to see that our own vision is limited. In that case, the ‘blind
spot’ is a spot not only on the retina, but in our entire way of seeing, experien-
cing, and understanding. Thus the limits of human understanding need to be
taken into account when trying to understand ‘humanity in God’s image.’
As for God-language, I will consistently use the male pronoun for God,
which is in keeping with the language usage in the Hebrew Bible and the New
Testament. In the context of this tradition, ‘God-She’ would be conceptually
confusing. However, this does, of course, not exclude the attribution of
‘feminine’ characteristics, such as compassion, to God,2 whose “fullness as a

2
In his book Biblical Affirmations of Woman (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1979),
Leonard Swidler has investigated feminine imagery of God in the Bible, e.g. of God as a
comforting mother (Isaiah 66:12–13), divine Lady Wisdom (Proverbs 9:13; Job 28) and feminine
Spirit (e.g. Genesis 1:1–2; Job 33:4; Psalm 51:11; 139:7; 143:10). With reference to Jeremiah 31:10,
Swidler writes: “In Hebrew, rechem means womb. The plural form, rachamim, extends this
concrete meaning to signify compassion, love, mercy” (Biblical Affirmations of Woman, 31).
4 Introduction

divine personality” is “revealed in both female and masculine modes,” as

Melissa Raphael has put it, reminding us that Hebrew lacks a gender-neutral
form.3 Both in the Jewish and the Christian tradition, feminine and masculine
divine personifications are co-identified or even conflated—for instance,
“Hokhmah-Sophia and Logos” denoting God’s Wisdom and Word.4 If one
views God as heavenly Mother and Father, both male and female, one can
apply inclusive language to divinity.5
However, does God not transcend sexuality and gender, and should we
therefore not use sex-transcendent imagery for divinity? Admitting that to
speak of God is among the most difficult and audacious things that humans
do, and that to address God is even more difficult, Rita Gross clarifies that
statements about God cannot be taken literally, but are analogous and meta-
phorical: “Every statement contains a bracketed ‘as if ’ or ‘as it were.’”6 Since
God is neither “really male” nor “really female,” we can talk only about
“images of God, not God.”7 Thus, God-talk “does not really tell us about
God, but it does tell us a considerable amount about those who use the God
language.”8 In the worst case, our manner of speaking shows that we subscribe
to an androcentric model of humanity, with its eclipsing of women. In this
line, Judith Plaskow brings up the “great scandal” that “the God who sup-
posedly transcends sexuality, who is presumably one and whole, is known to
us through language that is highly selective and partial.”9 For this reason,
feminist theologians have called attention to the connection between male
God-language and a society that reserves power and authority to men: “If God
is male, and we are in God’s image, how can maleness not be the norm of
Jewish humanity?”10 This rhetorical question applies equally to Christian or
Muslim humanity as linked up with corresponding concepts of divinity.

3
Melissa Raphael, The Female Face of God in Auschwitz: A Jewish Feminist Theology of the
Holocaust (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 11, 167 n. 5. Referring mainly to “the
immanent God as Shekhinah (the traditionally female image of the indwelling presence of God)”
(p. 5), Raphael mentions “She-Who-Dwells-Among-Us” (p. 6) and accompanies us in mourning,
exile, and terror.
4
Swidler, Biblical Affirmations of Woman, 72.
5
Cf. Susanne Scholz, Introducing the Women’s Hebrew Bible (London and New York: T&T
Clark International, 2007), 17, referring to Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The Women’s Bible (Boston:
Northwestern University Press, 1993).
6
Rita M. Gross, “Female God Language in a Jewish Context,” in Carol P. Christ and Judith
Plaskow (eds), Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion (New York et al.: Harper &
Row, 1979), 167–73, here p. 169.
7
Gross, “Female God Language in a Jewish Context,” 168.
8
Gross, “Female God Language in a Jewish Context,” 170.
9
Judith Plaskow, “The Right Question Is Theological,” in Susannah Heschel (ed.), On Being
a Jewish Feminist: A Reader (New York: Schocken Books, 1983), 223–33, here p. 227.
10
Plaskow, “The Right Question Is Theological,” 228. See also Mary Daly, who argues that
“the Judaic–Christian tradition has served to legitimate sexually imbalanced patriarchal society”
(“After the Death of God the Father: Women’s Liberation and the Transformation of Christian
Consciousness,” in Christ and Plaskow (eds), Womanspirit Rising, 53–62, here p. 54). Similarly,
 Introduction 5

Even though I do not want to go as far as to speak of the ‘Goddess’ and of

‘thealogy,’ which would bring us to the other extreme (namely, that women
instead of men are named as norms of humanity), I acknowledge that a
personal God cannot be imagined completely gender-free and that the notion
of a personal God is indispensable to prayer and liturgy. Since non-personal
images are not themselves sufficient to evoke a loving God, we cannot do
without anthropomorphic images, but they must be supplemented by images
evoking God’s creative and sustaining power—for example, images of God as
fountain, source, wellspring, or ground of life.11 For the time being, the tension
between personal and trans-personal aspects of the concept of God cannot be
dissolved, but it is possible to show why this tension is theologically fruitful.12
Theology as critical reflection on the speech of, to, and about God must take
into account the limitations of religious language: how do we imagine the
unimaginable? Provided that God is present in all aspects of life, inside and
outside us, the worship of a single verbal image of God, which in its fixedness
can be idolatrous, needs to be rejected in favor of a multiplicity of images.13 If
we want to promote a holistic notion of the imago Dei, the aim can be neither
sameness nor a hierarchy of gender, but mutual recognition, affirming differ-
ences within an egalitarian framework.14 At the same time we need to concede

Elaine H. Pagels criticizes that, while theologians “are quick to point out that God is not to be
considered in sexual terms at all,” “the actual language they use daily in worship and prayer
conveys a different message and gives the distinct impression that God is thought of in
exclusively masculine terms” (“What Became of God the Mother? Conflicting Images of God
in Early Christianity,” in Christ and Plaskow (eds), Womanspirit Rising, 107–19, here p. 107).
11
Herein I agree with Judith Plaskow, “God: Reimagining the Unimaginable,” in Standing
Again at Sinai: Judaism from a Feminist Perspective (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 121–69,
here pp. 160, 164–5. Plaskow presents a feminist critique of Jewish God-language by criticizing
received images of God as a dominating Other who is portrayed as male. She advocates using a
plurality of images for God, embracing also “the experience of those who have hitherto been
excluded from the process of naming the sacred” (p. 154).
12
See my argumentation in Claudia Welz, “Difficulties in Defining the Concept of God—
Kierkegaard in Dialogue with Levinas, Buber, and Rosenzweig,” International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion (December 24, 2015) <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11153-
015-9544-z> (accessed December 24, 2015).
13
Cf. Judith Plaskow, “Jewish Theology in Feminist Perspective” in Feminist Perspectives on
Jewish Studies, ed. Lynn Davidman and Shelly Tenenbaum (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1994), pp. 62–84, here p. 76. Commenting on an attempt to compile a prayer-
book for women, Plaskow diagnoses “a certain naïveté in the assumption that the insertion of
female pronouns or images into traditional prayers provides a solution to women’s invisibility”
(ibid., p. 75).
14
Rosemary Radford Ruether rightly points out that we “must reach for a continually
expanding definition of the inclusive humanity: inclusive of both genders, inclusive of all social
groups and races” (“Feminist Interpretation: A Method of Correlation,” in Letty M. Russell (ed.),
Feminist Interpretation of the Bible (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 111–24, here
p. 116). Correspondingly, an international, interdisciplinary, and interdenominational collection
of articles explores “the gradual inclusion of women in fully human God-likeness, as realized by
interpretation of Scripture through Christian tradition” with the help of the idea of imago Dei as
“primary example of interaction between the concept of God and the definition of humanity”
6 Introduction

that God surpasses anything that human beings can say about God, which
cannot but remain inadequate.

SCOPE AN D METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

In discussing these epistemological issues, which concern the dialectical inter-

play of visibility and invisibility in human existence, and through which
I intend to unearth the meaning, actuality, and lasting significance of the
biblical imago Dei motif, I resort to a variety of sources, including poets,
novelists, and aphorists (e.g. Dan Pagis, Abraham Sutzkever, Max Frisch,
Edmond Jabès, and Elazar Benyoëtz), Protestant theologians (from Martin
Luther, through Søren Kierkegaard and Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig,
to Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Helmut Thielicke, and Gerhard Ebeling),
Jewish philosophers and theologians (for example, Franz Rosenzweig, Walter
Benjamin, Martin Buber, Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt, Emmanuel
Levinas, and Abraham Joshua Heschel), representatives of existential and
hermeneutic phenomenology (for example, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul
Ricoeur, Jean-Luc Marion, and Jean-Luc Nancy), the philosophy of language
and semiotics (for example, Ernst Cassirer, Charles Sanders Peirce, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, and Jacques Derrida), and philosophical anthropology (for
example, Helmuth Plessner and Hans Blumenberg).
Moreover, when explaining the difference between God’s all-seeing gaze
and the human glance, I draw not only on textual sources, but also on
paintings—namely, self-portraits by Rembrandt van Rijn and Frida Kahlo.
Although the scope of this book is limited largely to the modern period, with a
special focus on the twentieth century, I shall also refer back to classical,
medieval, and Renaissance texts (for example, by Aristotle, Augustine, Meister
Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola). When choos-
ing my partners of conversation, my primary selection criterion has been their
contribution ad rem and its potential to solve (or at least elucidate) particular
problems. I raise no claim to completeness or full coverage of the works by
anyone mentioned in the book. It includes influential accounts, but also offers
some relatively unfamiliar perspectives that I, personally, have found inspiring.
My study is systematic—that is, it is structured according to thematic focal
points within certain subject areas, and offers a critical comparative analysis of
the material investigated. As the subtitle of the book suggests, the biblical

(Kari Elisabeth Børresen, “Introduction: Imago Dei as Inculturated Doctrine,” in Kari Elisabeth
Børresen (ed.), The Image of God: Gender Models in Judeo-Christian Tradition (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1995), 1–4, here p. 1).
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Title: Tantalus
Or, the future of Man

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 TANTALUS
OR
THE FUTURE OF MAN
 TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW
SERIES

DAEDALUS, or Science and the Future

By J. B. S. Haldane
ICARUS, or The Future of Science
By Bertrand Russell, F. R. S.
THE MONGOL IN OUR MIDST
By F. G. Crookshank, M.D.
WIRELESS POSSIBILITIES
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NARCISSUS, or The Anatomy of Clothes
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TANTALUS, or The Future of Man
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In Preparation
THE PASSING OF THE PHANTOMS
By Professor Patten
WOMAN AND THE FUTURE
By Anthony M. Ludovici

E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY

 TANTALUS
OR
The Future of Man
BY
F. C. S. SCHILLER
M.A., D.Sc.; Fellow and Tutor of
Corpus Christi College, Oxford

Man never is, but always to be, blest

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 PREFACE
I rather anticipate that superficial critics who do not like the argument
of this essay will accuse it of pessimism, a charge which perhaps
means little more than that they do not like it. Nevertheless, it may
be worth while to point out, (1) that pessimism is not a logical
objection to a contention of which the truth cannot otherwise be
questioned, and (2) that though the argument of Tantalus may be
said generally to corroborate that of Daedalus and Icarus, yet its
conclusion is much less pessimistic than theirs, because (3) it makes
it very plain that the evils which threaten the future of mankind are in
no case unavoidable. If it is called ‘pessimism’ to point out the
methods by which men may escape destruction, because men do
not care to adopt them, I suppose it must be ‘optimism’ to rush
violently and open-eyed down a precipice, and to expect to be saved
by a miracle. Certainly such would appear to be the belief upon
which human affairs are at present conducted.
F.C.S.S.
TANTALUS
 TANTALUS

PROLOGUE: THE ORACLE

OF THE DEAD
When I read in Mr Haldane’s Daedalus the wonderful things that
Science was going to do for us, and in Mr Russell’s Icarus how
easily both we and it might come to grief in consequence, it at once
became plain to me that of all the heroes of antiquity Tantalus would
be the one best fitted to prognosticate the probable future of Man.
For, if we interpret the history of Daedalus as meaning the collapse
of Minoan civilization under the strain imposed on its moral fibre by
material progress, and the fate of Icarus as meaning man’s inability
to use the powers of the air without crashing, one could gauge the
probability that history would repeat itself still further, and that man
would once more allow his vices to cheat him of the happiness that
seemed so clearly within his reach.
I determined, however, to confirm this intelligent forecast by
consulting Tantalus himself. To consult the oracle of a dead hero, it
was, I knew, only necessary to undergo the process of ‘incubation,’ a
sort of camping out on his tomb, in the skin of a sacrificial beast; and
fortunately the tomb of Tantalus had just been discovered in Phrygia
by the archæologists of the British School at Athens.
I set out, therefore, with great promptitude, and in due course,
arrived at the ruins of the tomb of Tantalus. They did not much
resemble a first-class hotel, and, of course, my idea of an
‘incubation’ was well laughed at, but I managed to find a pretty level
corner, more or less sheltered from the wind. Here I wrapped myself
up in my excellent rug, having decided to dispense with the more
correct method of ensconcing myself in the gory hide of a sacrificial
ox. The night was fine, though cold, and fortunately there were no
mosquitoes, nor any of the other insects one would inevitably have
encountered in the dwellings of the living. But the ground was very,
very, hard, and I tossed about for hours, regretting my classical
education and the psychical researcher’s rashness in trying foolish
experiments.
At last I fell asleep, at least I suppose so. I also fell a great deal
further. I seemed to go right through my rocky bed, and to fall down,
down, down, interminably, through a sort of elastic space. When at
last the not wholly unpleasant motion stopped, I found myself in a
vast, grey, sandy plain, illuminated by a cold grey light as though of
dawn. The only thing to catch the eye was a small round hummock,
not very far from me. On it grew a mighty tree, with dark green
pointed leaves and drooping branches, surrounded by a gleaming
white fence or paling. I naturally walked towards it.
As I got near, I noticed that the white paling, which completely
enclosed the hummock, was composed of bones, or rather of every
imaginable sort of spine, tooth and sting, garnished with the saws
and swords of sawfish and swordfish, and all knit together into an
impenetrable cheval de frise that prevented approach to the foot of
the tree. The soil all round this strange hedge had apparently been
trodden into deep mud by some creature that had walked round and
round the tree, and the water required for its manufacture was
supplied by a small spring which rose within the enclosure and
flowed out through its interstices.
As I walked round the tree to the further side of the hummock, I
came upon an extraordinary sight. I beheld a naked man trying to
reach some of the fruit that dangled down from the outer branches of
the tree but appeared to be just out of his reach, and so intent upon
his design that he did not notice my approach. He seemed a tall
man, and the upper part of his body was well formed. His features
were good and regular, though somewhat hard, and not intellectual;
his resolute jaw bespoke the man of action, accustomed to
command and to be obeyed. So far, his appearance would have
done credit to any modern captain of industry. But the lower half of
his body appeared to be misshapen. His thighs were so curved that
he could not walk upright, but had to stoop and lean forward as he
slowly shambled along. Still more monstrous seemed the feet, with
which he churned up the mud around the fence; they were enormous
and hardly seemed human in their shape, though they were too
deeply plunged in the mud to permit one to see what exactly was
wrong with them.
This strange being, whom the bold intuition of the dream-
consciousness at once identified with Tantalus, was evidently trying
to grasp the fruit that hung from the lower branches of the tree. For a
while his efforts were vain, but then a gust of wind brought within his
reach a large conical shining red fruit he had long coveted. It was
one of the strange features of the tree that it was covered with fruit,
and higher up also with flowers, of the most various sizes, shapes,
and colours. He seized it triumphantly; but the effect was surprising.
For he had hardly touched it when it exploded, and covered him from
head to foot with its blood-red juice. He at once sank senseless to
the ground. But, after a while, he slowly recovered, and
recommenced his old game. This time, he attacked a large round
yellowish fruit; but when he succeeded in seizing it, it too exploded,
and poured out upon him volumes of a heavy yellow-green vapour.
Again he collapsed, and this time his stupor lasted longer.
By the time he began to stir again I had, I thought, grasped the
situation, and determined to intervene. So I drew near, and
addressed him: “Can I be mistaken in thinking that I see before me
the far-famed hero, Tantalus, boon companion of the gods?” “And
their victim.” “And what tree is this, I pray you, about which you busy
yourself?” “The Tree of Knowledge.” “And the water, which you have
trampled into mud, is what?” “The Elixir of Life.” “Then you seem to
have all the materials for a happy life. Why don’t you eat of the fruits
of the tree, and drink of the elixir?” “You have seen the results of my
efforts.” “I cannot but think you have been unfortunate in your choice
of the fruits: there are many that look much better higher up.” “And
how am I to get at them?” “Well, of course, you must break through
all these debris of former animal life, which bar your access to the
trunk of the tree, and prevent you from drinking of the water of life;
after that, you can climb up the tree, and pick the best of the fruits.”
“And how am I to break through the barrier of bones?” “Even though
you appear to have no instruments, you can surely find a stone?”
“Where shall I find a stone in the Plain of Forgetfulness? And
besides, how should I climb the tree with these ... feet?” And he lifted
up one of his monstrous limbs. “Certainly you seem to be pretty
badly earth-bound,” said I, “but I will try to find you some stones.”
So off I set. I had not got far when a fierce blast struck me and
peppered me with sand. I struggled stoutly against it, but was nearly
choked. And then, suddenly, I awoke to find that day was dawning
and that the wind had gone round to the north, and was blowing in
my face. But I was well satisfied with my experiment. The
interpretation of the response I had obtained from Tantalus was too
plain to need the aid of a psycho-analyst.
 I
Our best prophets are growing very anxious about our future. They
are afraid we are getting to know too much, and are likely to use our
knowledge to commit suicide, or rather, mutual murder, after the
fashion of the Kilkenny cats.
To these dismal forecasts it is reasonable to reply that there is
nothing novel in the present situation. The human race has always
known enough to wreck itself, and its abounding folly has always
inspired its wise men with the gravest apprehension for its future.
Yet, either by chance or providence, it has always known also how to
avoid destruction. It has never known enough to make itself happy;
nor does it know enough to do so now. Its future has always been
precarious, because it has always been uncertain whether it would
use its knowledge well or ill, to improve or to ruin itself. It has always
had a choice between alternative policies, and it has so now.
What sense then is there in making such a fuss about the present
crisis? It is a particularly plain case of the perennial choice of
Hercules. What is needed is just a little clear thinking and plain
speaking to a society more than usually debauched by a long regime
of flattery, propaganda, and subterfuge. Mankind can make a fool of
itself, as it always could; if it does, its blood will be on its own head.
For it has knowledge enough to avoid the dangers that threaten it, if
it will use its knowledge properly.
 II
The first fact to be enunciated plainly, and faced, until it grows
familiar, and its import is appreciated, is that, biologically speaking,
Man has ceased to be a progressive species long ago. The
evolutionary impetus which carried our ancestors from the level of
the ape or even of the lemur, through such subhuman types as
Pithecanthropus, and the Heidelberg and Neanderthal men, to
‘modern’ man, seems to have spent itself by the middle of the
palæolithic period, i.e. say, thirty thousand years ago. At any rate,
the Cro-Magnon people of the Aurignacian age, who then appeared
upon the scene, were in no wise inferior to any subsequent race of
men, either in stature or in brain capacity. They average six feet
three inches in height, with one-sixth more brains than the modern
European. So far indeed as their physical remains can indicate, they
seem to have been very definitely the finest race of human beings
that has ever existed. If we have improved on them, it has probably
been only in such minor matters as resistance to the microbes of the
many diseases which flourish among dense populations under slum
conditions. Against that probability have to be set such certainties as
that our toes and many of our muscles are being atrophied and that
we are getting more liable to caries and baldness.
This remarkable fact of the arrest of his biological development is
certainly the greatest mystery in the history of Man. It at once raises
two further questions: In the first place, how did it happen, and what
caused it? And, secondly, what has enabled man, nevertheless, to
progress in other respects, in knowledge, in power, and in culture?
To answer the first question we cannot do better than argue back
from what is now the most salient feature about man’s biological
position, namely that his survival is determined far more by his
relations to the social group to which he belongs than by personal
efficiency: hence he can draw on the collective resources of his tribe,
and, to a growing extent, gets emancipated from the control of
natural selection. Thus social selection and the survival of societies
profoundly modify (and often defeat), the working of natural
selection. The advantages are obvious; it is no longer essential for a
member of a society that collectively controls the conditions of
existence to develop any high degree of personal capacity, in order
to survive. A single wise and provident minister, like Joseph, is
enough to keep alive millions of Pharaoh’s subjects through the lean
years of famine. But the inferior and incompetent survive with the
rest.
Now, if we suppose that by mid-palæolithic times man had
established his ascendency over nature and perfected his social
organization sufficiently to render these services to his fellows, we
have suggested a possible cause of the cessation of biological
progress. For social influences are as likely as not to be ‘contra-
selective,’ that is, to tend to preserve by preference the stocks which
are less viable from a merely biological point of view. They are
markedly so at present, and it would be asking too much to expect
the tribal chiefs of early men to have been wise and provident
enough to see to it that their social institutions were eugenical in their
effects. We cannot even now find such a pitch of wisdom and
providence in the controllers of our destinies.
 III
The answer to the second question is much easier. The human race
has continued to progress in its culture, in its knowledge, in its power
over nature, because it has devised institutions which have created
for it a continuous social memory that defies death. Now, as ever, the
wisest and the best must die, while their place is taken by babies
born as ignorant and void of knowledge as in the beginning. Only
there has been invented apparatus which relieves the civilized baby
of his hereditary ignorance, and renders him potentially the heir to all
the wisdom of the ages.
In the first place, Language not only extends enormously the
possibilities of co-operation and common action, but also renders
possible the consolidation of customs and their preservation by oral
tradition. In the next place, Writing enables a society to record all
that it considers worth remembering. Upon these two inventions may
be reared vast intricate structures, religious, political, social, and
scientific, which knit together and dominate human societies from
generation to generation, and create the conditions for an almost
mechanical accumulation of knowledge.
Man has thereby become an educable creature and fallen a victim to
the arts of the examiner. Provided the mechanisms of education do
not get out of gear, it is hard to set limits to the amounts of
knowledge with which he can be crammed; but it is clear that they
are far greater than he could ever have acquired in a lifetime for
himself. And as education (of sorts) has now become world wide, it
might seem that the future of knowledge was now assured, and no
longer liable to setbacks such as those due to the famous burning of
the library of Alexandria at the command of the Caliph Omar, or the
extinction of the only Greek scientists who seriously concerned
themselves with the applications of science to life, of Archimedes
and his School, in the sack of Syracuse. At any rate, it seemed clear
that progress in knowledge could continue indefinitely, even in an
otherwise stationary or decadent society.
Whoever argued thus would fail to make sufficient allowance for the
perversity of human nature. Human institutions, like the human body,
are ever tending to get clogged with the waste products of their own
working. Hence, so far from performing the functions for which they
were intended, they are constantly becoming the most formidable
instruments for their frustration. Experience shows how easily
Churches become the most effective deadeners of religious zeal,
how often Law becomes the negation of justice, how deadly is the
School to the inborn craving for knowledge which seemed to
Aristotle so characteristic of man’s nature.
Accordingly, no one familiar with the actual working of academic
institutions is likely to fall into the error of pinning his faith to them.
They are, of course, designed for the purpose of preserving and
promoting the highest and most advanced knowledge hitherto
attained: but do they anywhere fulfil this purpose? Its execution must
of necessity be left to professors not exempt from human frailty,
always selected by more or less defective methods, whose interests
by no means coincide with those of their subjects. The interest of the
subject is to become more widely understood and so more
influential. The interest of the professor is to become more
unassailable, and so more authoritative. He achieves this by
becoming more technical. For the more technical he gets, the fewer
can comprehend him; the fewer are competent to criticize him, the
more of an oracle he becomes; if, therefore, he wishes for an easy
life of undisturbed academic leisure, the more he will indulge his
natural tendency to grow more technical as his knowledge grows,
the more he will turn away from those aspects of his subject which
have any direct practical or human interest. He will wrap himself in
mysteries of technical jargon, and become as nearly as possible
unintelligible. Truly, as William James once exclaimed to me,
apropos of the policy of certain philosophers, “the natural enemy of
any subject is the professor thereof!” It is clear that if these
tendencies are allowed to prevail, every subject must in course of
time become unteachable, and not worth learning.