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Xiaoli Lu

Managing
Uncertainty
in Crisis
Exploring the Impact of Institutionalization
on Organizational Sensemaking
Managing Uncertainty in Crisis

“Why do some crisis managers rely on routines, whereas others make things happen on the fly?
Xiaoli Lu combines classic insights of Philip Selznick and Karl Weick in a highly innovative way
to answer this question. This book bridges the gap between institutional thinking and crisis
management theorizing. A major step forward in the world of crisis management studies!”
—Professor Arjen Boin, Leiden University, the Netherlands

“In this carefully crafted book, Prof. Xiaoli Lu examines the institutional level of sensemaking in
crisis situations. Building on the seminal work of Karl Weick and other theorists who focus on
sensemaking in individual decision-making processes, Prof. Lu extends this concept to the
organizational level to examine how large, complex organizations develop different strategies of
coping with uncertainty in crisis situations. He uses the analytical technique of process tracing to
identify decisions made in four large U.S. organizations confronting high uncertainty to illustrate
the critical transition from individual to organizational sensemaking, and the consequences that
follow when this transition is missed. In a world of increasingly complex, sociotechnical systems
interacting in risk environments, Prof. Lu’s analysis of how organizations manage uncertainty is
both timely and profound.”
—Professor Louise K. Comfort, Director, Center for Disaster Management,
University of Pittsburgh, USA

“In his new book, Managing Uncertainty in Crisis, Prof. Xiaoli Lu thoughtfully grapples with a
fundamental problem of crisis response: comprehending rapidly changing conditions amidst
confusing, incomplete, often conflicting bits of information and misinformation. These have to be
put together, assessed, and interpreted in order to achieve situational awareness and frame
appropriate response actions. How do organizations with different degrees of internal and external
institutionalization manage the profound uncertainties of crisis conditions? Professor Lu proposes
a contextually sensitive model of organizational sensemaking and then uses this model to analyze
four case studies. Acutely integrating theory and empirical evidence from his four cases studies,
Prof. Lu greatly enhances our understanding of how organizations cope with uncertainty and make
sense of their challenges under the pressures of catastrophe.”
—Dr. Arnold M. Howitt, Faculty Co-Director, Program on Crisis Leadership,
Harvard Kennedy School, USA

“The concept of sensemaking has become increasingly important in crisis and disaster
management. Managing Uncertainty in Crisis is an important contribution to sensemaking which
has become not only a theory in crisis management but also a key concept around which research
and practice are conducted. This book is an essential reading for those who new to the field of
crisis management and sensemaking as well as experienced researchers and practitioners with
leadership responsibilities.”
—Professor Naim Kapucu, Director of School of Public Administration,
University of Central Florida, USA

“This manuscript compares the dynamics of organizational sensemaking in four major crises in the
USA. The analysis results in a generic institutional sensemaking model for analyzing and
managing hazards, disasters, and crisis worldwide. An important and inspiring contribution to the
theory and practice of crisis management.”
—Professor Joop Koppenjan, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands
“This book has done an excellent job in opening the black box of how organizations make sense
of the crisis situation they face and develop strategies to respond. The nuanced analysis of the four
major crises is fascinating, and the theory of institutional sensemaking built on this analysis is
illuminating and pathbreaking. It is a major contribution to the field of crisis management and
should be read by all of us who wish for a peaceful and safe world.”
—Professor Lan Xue, Dean of School of Public Policy and Management,
Tsinghua University, China
Xiaoli Lu

Managing Uncertainty
in Crisis
Exploring the Impact of Institutionalization
on Organizational Sensemaking

123
Xiaoli Lu
Center for Crisis Management Research,
School of Public Policy and Management
Tsinghua University
Beijing
China

ISSN 2363-6866 ISSN 2363-6874 (electronic)

ISBN 978-981-10-3989-8 ISBN 978-981-10-3990-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3990-4

Jointly published with Social Sciences Academic Press

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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
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To my parents, my wife, and my son
Preface

I became interested in studying uncertainties in crisis during my master study,

because I personally experienced a crisis in China, the Songhua River pollution
crisis. In 2005, an explosion of a chemical factory in Jilin Province caused a spill of
poisonous materials into the Songhua River, which led to a shutdown of the water
pipe system in Harbin city, Heilongjiang Province (where I studied), with a pop-
ulation of 10 million. The water pollution evolved into an international crisis when
the Russian city downstream of the river began to protest against this pollution to
their quality of life. The uncertainties regarding the impacts of the pollution and the
social panic caused by uncertainties of the crisis in Harbin shocked me and inspired
me to explore this topic.
In 2007, I decided to continue pursuing my research interests at Leiden
University. I learned about the reputation of the Crisis Research Center
(CRC) which had produced high-quality publications in the field. Then, CRC
Director Dr. Arjen Boin accepted me as a Ph.D. researcher. Starting from a student
with background in engineering and management, I am grateful to Dr. Boin for his
guidance in the new world of social science research. During the six and a half
years’ study, Dr. Boin provided constructive advice and encouragement with
consistent patience and encouragement. When Dr. Boin stayed in the USA for the
first year of my Ph.D. study, Dr. Sanneke Kuipers and Prof. David Lowery helped
me complete the research proposal and grasp the knowledge foundation of crisis
management and public administration.
This book has been written at offices in four universities and a company; the
assistance and advice by colleagues in these five organizations have been extremely
helpful. At Leiden University’s Institute of Public Administration (formerly
Department of Public Administration), I owe so much to Toon, who helped me in
adapting to life in the Netherlands. At Louisiana State University’s Stephen
Disaster Management Institute, Ping discussed with me about crisis research and
introduced new friends to me in Baton Rouge. Special thanks to Warren, a former
colleague at LSU (now at WVU), who commented on two chapters of this book. At
Crisisplan, I would like to express thanks to Werner. At Tsinghua University, I owe
thanks to Dean Xue Lan, Associate Dean and Center for Crisis Management

vii
viii Preface

Research director Peng Zhongchao, and other colleagues have been helpful in
shaping my perspectives on crisis management, institutionalization, public orga-
nizations, and general research methodology. I particularly mention Frank, Dimiter,
Moosa, Sevgi, Brendan, Anne, Ling, Kaibin, Haibo, Peng, Bing, Xinchuan, Baoxia,
Long, and Xuran.
I also kindly acknowledge comments by participants of the various conferences,
workshops, and summer schools that I attended during my Ph.D. research, i.e.,
NIG, BNU summer School, ISCRAM summer school, LSE-CARR, ICPPM, and
GFCSPA. Special thanks to Tianyl for providing the final proof reading assistance.
I am particularly thankful to friends at the Leiden China Discussion Group,
Matthias, Bo, Lijing, Xiang, Chang, Changjuan, and Yiwen, who provided inspi-
ration for my own research during the discussions. Emily helped me by offering
opportunities to contribute a series of articles about emergency management in
China in her Crisis Response Journal and reading two chapters.
Thanks to my colleagues of the China Crisis Management Website (www.
crisis119.org), Peigen, Yang, Lin, Yihong, Qian, Xi, Xin, Ni, and YinXuan, who
share similar interests in crisis management and a willingness to contribute to the
website.
I am grateful to friends in Leiden and Baton Rouge for making my overseas life
more colorful. I only mention a few of them, Jiongwei, Xiaolei, Xiaomeng, Hao,
Shengfa, Wen, Xiaodong, Zheng, and Luke. I especially thank Mary for helping me
settle down in Baton Rouge and Leiden and providing good dinners for me after
discussions with Arjen. I owe thanks to my host family Mr. & Mrs. Joseph who
helped me gain a better understanding of Baton Rouge and the southern culture.
Finally, many thanks go to my wife Dan for always standing right beside me for
more than thirteen years. This book is dedicated to my parents, who taught me
about life and encouraged me always in the six-year-long Ph.D. study.

Beijing, China Xiaoli Lu

November 2016
Acknowledgements

This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation of
China (91224009, 71642005), Beijing Social Science Fund (15JDJGB047), and
Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program (20151080360).

ix
Contents

1 Managing Uncertainty in Crisis Sensemaking: A Core Challenge

for Public Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction: Exploring the Black Box of Dealing
with Uncertainty in Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Uncertainty in Crises as a Challenge to Crisis Managers . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 Challenges for Crisis Managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Research Puzzle: Explaining the Variation of Strategies
for Coping with Uncertainties in Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Research Strategy: Towards an Institutional
Sensemaking Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.1 Comparative Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.5 Research Aims and Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5.1 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2 Coping with Uncertainty: Towards an Institutional Sensemaking
Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Causes of Diversity in Strategy Selection: Different Types
of Uncertainties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Causes of Diversity in Strategy Selection:
Psychological Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.1 Coping with Uncertainty: Individual
Cognition Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.2 Coping with Uncertainty: Prior Experience Matters . . . . . . 20

xi
xii Contents

2.4 Causes of Diversity in Strategy Selection: Organizational

Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 21
2.4.1 Coping with Uncertainties: Information
Processing Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 22
2.4.2 Coping with Uncertainty as a Sensemaking/
Organizing Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 23
2.4.3 Coping with Uncertainties: Institutions Matter I . . . . . .... 27
2.5 Causes of Diversity in Strategy Selection: The Macro
Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.1 Coping with Uncertainties: Institutions Matter II. . . . . . . . . 28
2.6 Towards an Institutional Sensemaking Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3 Exploring the Influence of Institutionalization on Sensemaking
in Crises: A Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Defining and Operationalizing Key Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.1 Defining Uncertainty in a Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.2 The Dependent Variable: Strategy Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.3 Mapping Out the Dimensions of Institutionalization
as Independent Variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 39
3.2.4 A New Typology of Organizations
Based on Institutionalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 43
3.3 Towards an Empirical Exploration of Institutional
Sensemaking: Integrating Comparative-Case
Study and Within-Case Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 45
3.3.1 Case Selection and Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 45
3.3.2 Data Analysis: Process Tracing and Theory
Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 48
4 The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency and the 2005
Great New Orleans Flood: A Deinstitutionalized Response
Organization Facing Unknown Unknowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 The Big Easy: A Vulnerable City Hit by a Predictable
Top 10 Catastrophic Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3 The Deinstitutionalization of FEMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.3.1 Federal Emergency Management Policy
in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.3.2 A Shining Star Among Federal Agencies:
FEMA Before 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3.3 FEMA’s Deinstitutionalization After 9/11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Contents xiii

4.4 FEMA and the Great New Orleans Flood: Identifying

Uncertainties and Coping Actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 69
4.4.1 Preparing for Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 70
4.4.2 FEMA’s Actions to Cope with Uncertainties
During the Response to the New Orleans Flooding . . .... 71
4.5 Analysis: A Deductive Sensemaking Model in a
Deinstitutionalized Response Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 80
5 NASA and the Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster: An Institution
Coping with “Unknown Unknowns” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.2 NASA: An American Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2.1 NASA in the Apollo Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2.2 NASA in the Post-Apollo Era: Doing
More with Less . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3 NASA and the Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster: Identifying
Uncertainties and Coping Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.4 Analysis: The Collapse of Collective Sensemaking
in an Institutionalized Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6 BP and the 2010 Gulf Coast Oil Spill Disaster: An Arrogant
Organization Coping with a “Known Unknown” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.2 The 2010 Gulf Coast Oil Spill Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.3 BP as an “Arrogant Organization” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.3.1 BP’s Early Years as a State-Owned Company
(Before 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.3.2 BP’s Institutionalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.3.3 The Internal Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.3.4 The External Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.3.5 BP After the Merger Wave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.4 BP and the 2010 Gulf Oil Spill Disaster: Identifying
Uncertainties and Coping Actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 130
6.4.1 Uncertainties and Coping Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 131
6.5 Analysis: An Arrogant Organization Playing with Discretion . .... 140
7 The Los Angeles Police Department and the 1992 LA Riots:
A Mythical Organization Coping with Known Unknowns . . . . . . . . . 147
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.2 An Overview of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.3 LAPD as a Mythical Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
7.3.1 LAPD and South Central Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
7.3.2 Parker’s “Thin Blue Line” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7.3.3 The Post-Parker Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.3.4 After the 1991 King Incident: Escalating
Deinstitutionalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 162
xiv Contents

7.4 In Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 164

7.5 LAPD and the 1992 LA Riots: Identifying Uncertainties
and Coping Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 165
7.5.1 Los Angeles’ Emergency Preparedness
Before the Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 166
7.5.2 Coping with Uncertainties During the Response
to the 1992 Riots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 168
7.6 Analysis: A Deinstitutionalizing Organization Caught Short . . .... 176
8 Towards a Theory of Institutional Sensemaking:
Building on a Comparison of Four Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8.2 Comparing the Influence of Institutionalization on Sensemaking
Strategies: Towards a Dynamic Model of Institutional
Sensemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
8.2.1 Organizational Sensemaking Starts with Rule-Based
Strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
8.2.2 Rule-Based Sensemaking, Discontinuities,
and Institutionalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
8.2.3 Specific-Based Sensemaking in Crises: Mission
Impossible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
8.2.4 Sensemaking After Intervention by Authorities . . . . . . . . . . 193
8.3 Implications for Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
8.3.1 An Expansion of Sensemaking Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
8.3.2 Contributions to Institutional Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
8.3.3 Contributions to Crisis Management Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
8.4 Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
8.4.1 Organizing Sensemaking Feedback Loops . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
8.4.2 Overcoming Organizational Routines That Do Not
Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
8.4.3 Build a Unique Organizational Capacity: Instant/
Emergent Institutionalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
8.5 Reflections on Sensemaking and Crisis Management
in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
8.5.1 Limited Availability of Data Is a Barrier to Studying
Crises in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
8.5.2 Testing Western Theories in the Chinese Context
and Adapting Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
8.6 Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Future
Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Contents xv

Appendix A: A List of Web Sources Relevant to This Research . . . . . . 207

Appendix B: Figures and Tables Indicating the Flooding Areas
in New Orleans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
About the Author

Xiaoli Lu was born on September 16, 1982, in Penglai, China. He studied civil
engineering management at Harbin Institute of Technology in Heilongjiang
Province, China. He completed his bachelor and master in 2005 and 2007,
respectively. From 2007 to 2011, Xiaoli was a Ph.D. researcher at Leiden
University’s Institute of Public Administration. During the studies, he was a visiting
scholar at Louisiana State University’s Stephenson Disaster Management Institute
from 2008 to 2009. In the fall of 2011, he continued his Ph.D. research at Utrecht
School of Governance, Utrecht University. After receiving his Ph.D. degree from
Utrecht, he has been working at Tsinghua University’s School of Public Policy and
Management in Beijing, China, as an assistant professor and served as the associate
director at the Center for Crisis Management Research.
Xiaoli published in international journals (i.e., Public Administration, Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management, Disasters, Natural Hazards, International
Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, and Crisis Response Journal),
Chinese journals (i.e., Journal of Public Management, Chinese Public
Administration, Emergency management in China, and Journal of Gansu Institute
of Public Administration) and chapters in various books. In 2009, he was awarded
the 1st Place Winner in the Annual Hazards and Disaster Student Paper
Competition for an article on typhoon evacuation in Wenzhou in the 34th Annual
Natural Hazards Research and Application Workshop (the first winner from the
non-US university). In 2015, he was short-listed in the Van Poelje prize 2014 for
the Best Public Administration Dissertation in the Netherlands and Belgium. In the
same year, he was sponsored by the Beijing Youth Talent Program. Since 2017, he
is the Tsinghua University’s Tang Scholar.
In 2009, Xiaoli initiated the China Crisis Management Website (www.crisis119.
org) as the founding coordinator with 22 other members and volunteers from
institutions in six countries. Xiaoli and his colleagues update news, research
information, experts’ information, conference information, and crisis wiki world-
wide on a daily basis for the Chinese audience.

xvii
List of Figures

Figure 1.1 A decision tree model of hurricane evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2

Figure 2.1 An inventory of different theories reviewed
in this chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14
Figure 2.2 R.A.W.F.S. heuristic for coping with uncertainty . . . . . . . . . .. 15
Figure 2.3 Organizational strategies for dealing with uncertainties:
information processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22
Figure 2.4 Weick’s view of the relationship among enactment,
organizing and sensemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 24
Figure 2.5 An institutional model of sensemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 30
Figure 3.1 A typology of organizations based on
institutionalization levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 44
Figure 3.2 Case selections under the typology of institutionalization . . . .. 46
Figure 4.1 Tone of major newspapers editorials’ coverage of FEMA
(1982–2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 62
Figure 4.2 FEMA’s evolution in terms of its
institutionalization status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 68
Figure 5.1 NASA’s budget as a percentage of the Federal Budget
(1958–2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 88
Figure 5.2 The historical evolution of NASA’s centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 89
Figure 5.3 Downsizing of NASA’s overall workforce and technical
workforce (1993–2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Figure 5.4 NASA’s evolution of institutionalization status . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Figure 5.5 Image request flow chart in STS-107 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Figure 6.1 BP’s evolution in terms of its institutionalization . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Figure 7.1 LAPD’s evolution in terms of its institutionalization
status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Figure 7.2 Los Angeles City’s emergency management framework . . . . . . 167

xix
xx List of Figures

Figure 8.1 An institutional sensemaking process model in crises . . . . . . . . 185

Figure 8.2 Weick’s sensemaking theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Figure B.1 A revising version of screenshot of flooding area
in New Orleans during hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Figure B.2 The landfall point of Hurricane Katina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Figure B.3 The flooding situation of St. Tammany Parish . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
List of Tables

Table 1.1 A list of uncertainties and coping strategies generated

from crises cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6
Table 2.1 Thompson’s (1967) categorization for the process
of decision making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17
Table 2.2 A process demonstration of the sensemaking model . . . . . . . .. 25
Table 3.1 Operationalization of uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 37
Table 3.2 Operationalization of strategies to cope with uncertain
situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 38
Table 3.3 Operationalization of the internal dimension
of institutionalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 41
Table 3.4 Operationalization of the external dimension
of institutionalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 43
Table 4.1 Comparison of emergency support functions under the old
federal response plan and the new national response plan . . . .. 65
Table 4.2 Reductions to FEMA budget base (FY 2003–2005) . . . . . . . . .. 67
Table 4.3 A summary of uncertainties, coping actions and strategies
in the 2005 New Orleans flooding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 81
Table 5.1 A summary of uncertainties and actions taken by NASA
in the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Table 6.1 A summary of uncertainties, coping actions and strategies
in the 2010 Gulf Coast oil spill disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Table 7.1 A summary of uncertainties, coping actions and strategies
in the 1992 Los Angeles Riots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Table B.1 A summarized table of the flooding process
in New Orleans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

xxi
Summary

This book studies the variety in organizational strategy selection when coping with
critical uncertainties during a crisis. Dealing with uncertainty is an essential part of
any crisis response and poses enormous challenges to crisis managers and response
organizations. In dealing with uncertainties, some organizations rely on organiza-
tional routines developed over time, while some others analyze uncertainty in an ad
hoc way to provide a workable interpretation of that uncertainty. The research
question of this book, therefore, is why some organizations select a rule-based
strategy to cope with uncertainties whereas others follow a more ad hoc-based
strategy.
To answer this question, this study formulated and applied an institutional
sensemaking model to explain the selection of strategies to cope with uncertainties
during a crisis. The institutional sensemaking model integrates sensemaking theory
and institutional theory. Weick’s sensemaking theory provides a general explana-
tion of organizational processes of coping with uncertainties, identifying two basic
strategies of dealing with uncertainties: a rule-based strategy and a specific-based
strategy (Weick 1979, 1995). This study builds on the insight that organizational
sensemaking might vary in different organizational contexts, which are defined by
different levels of institutionalization (Jepperson 1991, Tolbert and Zucker 1996).
This research aims to explore how different levels of institutionalization influence
the selection of organizational sensemaking strategies during a crisis, thus
explaining the selection of different strategies to cope with uncertainty in crises.
The empirical chapters describe four major crises in the USA and the major
response organizations in these four major crises. The organizations are selected
based on the level of institutionalization. A distinction is made between the internal
and external dimensions of institutionalization. This leads to a typology: the
Organization (with a low level of institutionalization on both the internal and
external dimensions), the Institution (with a high level of institutionalization on both
the internal and external dimensions), the Mythical Organization (with a high level
of external institutionalization but its internal institutionalization remaining low),
and the Arrogant Organization (with a high degree of internal institutionalization
and a low level of external institutionalization). The Organization type is filled by

xxiii
xxiv Summary

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the 2005 New Orleans
Flood; the Institution, Mythical Organization, and Arrogant Organization are filled
by the National Aeronautic Space Administration (NASA) in the 2003 Space Shuttle
Columbia Disaster; the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in the 1992 Los
Angeles riots; and BP in the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in 2010, respectively.
The four case studies concentrated on uncertainties that the organizations
encountered during their response to the crisis and on sensemaking actions to cope
with these uncertainties. Based on the collected data, the influence of institution-
alization on organizational sensemaking strategies during the response to a crisis
was analyzed. After synthesizing findings from four case studies and making a
comparison among them, the results show that the influence of institutionalization
on organizational actions does not follow institutional logic which would suggest
that highly institutionalized organizations rely on routines to cope with problems at
hand while organizations with low levels of institutionalization resort to ad hoc
analysis to make sense of uncertainty in times of crisis. Instead, this book formu-
lates an institutional sensemaking process model. The model can be translated into
the following concrete insights:
Firstly, it was demonstrated that the level of institutionalization does not make a
difference for strategy selection in the initial phase of responding to crises.
Organizations in the midst of deinstitutionalization still engaged in rule-based
actions based on long-sliding procedures.
Secondly, the empirical results show three rigidity effects in the selection of
sensemaking strategies after organizations had faced the failure of their selected
strategies.
• Organizations with low levels of institutionalization stick to rule-based sense-
making after failing to interpret uncertainties based on existing frames.
Although experiencing failures, these organizations with low levels of institu-
tionalization attribute the failure of rule-based sensemaking to weak external
support instead of the ineffectiveness of existing frames.
• Highly institutionalized organizations persist in their selected strategies after
experiencing the failure of specific-based sensemaking. These organizations rely
on their unique organizational capacities to exclude the possibility of external
intervention, and insist on a trial-and-error way of working to interpret
uncertainties.
• Highly institutionalized organizations make contradictory interpretations of an
uncertainty, creating intra-organizational tensions between different subgroups.
These subgroups stick to their selected strategies, and this finding confirms that
the effect of the invulnerable mindsets in a highly institutionalized organization
makes it hard to tolerate deviation from institutional procedures (Wicks 2001).
Even if the deviating subgroup (institutional challenger) resists the routine
procedures, the subgroup fails to oppose the institutional procedures publicly.
Instead, the subgroup turns to non-institutional channels to prove the inappro-
priateness of existing rules and procedures.
Summary xxv

Thirdly, this study describes how the discontinuities in the feedback loop of
sensemaking trigger a switch of sensemaking strategies. The discontinuities do not
necessarily cause the switch of sensemaking strategies, but interact with institu-
tionalization to contribute to the switch of sensemaking strategies.
• This study identifies a condition that reflects Moynihan’s (2012) findings in his
recent study on organizational cultural switch in crisis response, and adds
another condition contributing to the switch from a rule-based strategy to a
specific-based strategy. Moynihan (2012: 864) suggested that “culture switching
is likely to occur if a dominant cultural assumption limits the ability of the
organization to respond to challenges.” This study finds that the switch from a
rule-based strategy to a specific-based strategy occur when the failure of
rule-based sensemaking shocks the organization and helps the organization to
recognize the failure of existing frames to interpret the uncertainty. The dis-
continuity provided by failures of existing frames results from existing cultural
assumptions limiting organizational response according to Moynihan.
Moreover, this study identifies another condition conducive to a switch in
sensemaking strategy: an autonomous status resulting from its unique organi-
zational capacities. The autonomous status may prevent intervention from
stakeholders, which enables an organizational switch in sensemaking strategies.
This would be impossible if the organizational response were taken over by the
authorities.
• Besides an active switch in sensemaking strategies, a second type of switch in
sensemaking strategies can be discerned. This occurs after external intervention
due to the organizational failure to cope with the crisis. The external intervention
signifies the failure of the organizational response to the crisis (at least in the
eyes of stakeholders) and reflects a loss of legitimacy among stakeholders, after
which organizations have to interpret uncertainties within boundaries imposed
by intervening stakeholders.
Fourthly, this study shows that several institutional elements are salient in
determining whether organizations act according to institutional procedures.
• A unique organizational capacity helps organizations maintain their autonomy,
even if the crisis has already caused the erosion of external legitimacy.
• In an organization in deinstitutionalization, the way of working imposed by the
organizational environment is no longer adequate when a crisis breaks out, and
the organization tends to return to its way of working before deinstitutional-
ization. The organization shows rigidity in its adherence to the way of working
before deinstitutionalization.
Fifthly, the vulnerability to intervention by stakeholders depends on the level of
institutionalization. During a crisis, organizations are vulnerable to criticism by
stakeholders, and continuous failures easily trigger intervention by the authorities.
Organizations with a high degree of external institutionalization can maintain
xxvi Summary

operations without external intervention longer than organizations with a low level
of external institutionalization. However, continuous failures make intervention by
authorities inevitable.
Finally, this study—at least partially—confirms the improvisation paradox
proposed by Boin, ’t Hart et al. (2005: 56): “when employees realize that a crisis
demands the services of their organization, the accompanying uncertainty nurtures a
reliance on institutionalized response modes. However, these modes were never
designed or tested with the crisis at hand in mind.” All four cases show that
organizations start with institutionalized response modes to cope with uncertainties.
However, they also show that organizations with different degrees of institution-
alization perform differently in terms of enabling or constraining improvisation in
such a highly volatile condition. The empirical findings show that two types of
institutional conditions trigger the paradox of improvisation, thus constraining the
improvisation:
• In a highly institutionalized organization, leaders tend to rely on routine pro-
cedures in crisis response, even if operators demand improvisation to cope with
an emerging uncertainty. These leaders show low tolerance for improvisation to
cope with an emerging uncertainty, and rely on their institutionalized response
mode.
• Although the routine way of working has resulted in failure, leaders in orga-
nizations with a low level of institutionalization still try to maintain the insti-
tutionalized response mode. The operators might improvise; however, these
improvisations are likely to fail in the end due to a lack of support by stake-
holders or weak organizational capacities.
The empirical research identifies an institutional condition enabling improvisa-
tion when responding to a crisis. A unique organizational capacity that others do not
have can help an organization with a high level of internal institutionalization to
keep its autonomy in responding to the crisis; meanwhile, the organization has to
realize that its plans may have become “fantasy documents.”
This book provides implications for crisis managers in coping with uncertainties
during crises. Firstly, crisis managers should realize that an organization is unlikely
to adopt the right strategy to cope with crisis uncertainties straight away, and
failures and discontinuities occurring in the feedback loops are normal parts of the
sensemaking process in crises. Therefore, organizing information received in the
feedback loops of sensemaking is an essential task for crisis managers. Secondly,
crisis managers should realize that organizations naturally maintain a low sensi-
tivity to emerging uncertainties, which can easily nurture blind spots in sense-
making. Acknowledging the organizational tendency toward certainty and
reinforcing of existing institutional routines, crisis managers should actively enrich
the source of advice and encourage continuous learning through exploring the
deficiency of existing routines. Thirdly, crisis managers should realize that it is
impossible to prepare for each and every unknown situation and mitigate the dis-
ruption to organizational operations. Acknowledging the inevitable occurrence of
Summary xxvii

disruptions, a temporary organization or temporary institutional arrangement to

cope with the unknown situation becomes extremely important for crisis managers.
Instant/emergent institutionalizations require a temporary and quick mobilization of
knowledge and resources from various subgroups in the organization and even
stakeholders.
Chapter 1
Managing Uncertainty in Crisis
Sensemaking: A Core Challenge
for Public Leadership

The basic raw materials on which organizations operate are

informational inputs that are ambiguous, uncertain, equivocal.
… Organizing serves to narrow the range of possibilities, to
reduce the number of ‘might occur’. The activities of organizing
are directed toward the establishment of a workable level of
certainty.
—Weick (1969: 40)

1.1 Introduction: Exploring the Black Box of Dealing

with Uncertainty in Crises

When a hurricane or tropical storm threatens coastal cities, the weather service
usually issues a list of potential landfall areas on the coastline. The forecasts are
based on a blend of specialists’ expertise and various scientific models.
Meteorological experts usually phrase their forecast in terms of a “cone of uncer-
tainty”.1 The storm has only a 60–70% chance of staying within the cone during
that period. Without accurate predictions, crisis managers2 have to determine
whether or not to evacuate threatened communities. In this situation, crisis man-
agers face a critical dilemma in evacuation decision making as demonstrated in the
decision tree model in Fig. 1.1. Among the four outcomes of the decision tree,
outcome A and D are the right choices, while one cannot exclude the errors of
outcome B and C in an uncertain situation caused by a hurricane forecast. To be
specific, deciding to evacuate will lead to a loss of governmental credibility and will
incur unnecessary economic costs of evacuation if the hurricane does not strike as

1
See http://www.iserp.columbia.edu/news/articles/cone.html (accessed on June 10, 2009). The
“cone of uncertainty” represents the forecasted track of the center of a tropical storm or hurricane
and the likely error in the forecast track.
2
In this book, crisis managers refer to leaders at the strategic level responsible for crisis man-
agement. Sometimes, when an analysis of leaders at the strategic level could not understand the
whole picture of crisis management, leaders at the operational level are taken into consideration as
well.

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. and Social Sciences Academic Press 2017 1
X. Lu, Managing Uncertainty in Crisis, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-3990-4_1
2 1 Managing Uncertainty in Crisis Sensemaking …

Strike Outcome A: no lives or credibility lost, economic costs incurred

Evacuate

No Strike
Outcome B: nolives lost, credibility lost and economic costs incurred

Strike Outcome C: lives lost, credibility lost, economic costs incurred

not Evacuate

No Strike
Outcome D: no lives lost or credibility lost, no economic costs incurred

Fig. 1.1 A decision tree model of hurricane evacuation. Source Raiffa (1968), Clemen (1996)

predicted (outcome B)—a Type I error.3 Deciding not to evacuate will cost lives
and expose many other citizens to severe and acute danger if the hurricane does
strike (outcome C)—a Type II error. The media, the public and political opponents
will blame the government.
The above example illustrates a classic issue in crisis management: coping with
uncertainty. Whether the crisis is the result of a natural disaster, technical system
failure or human conflict, dealing with uncertainty is always an indispensable task
for crisis managers. Uncertainty challenges crisis managers because they must make
urgent decisions under difficult circumstances. Crises are characterized by incom-
plete information, the absence of a rational risk model which can provide an
accurate assessment of the situation, and no way of weighing the pros and cons of
alternatives and their consequences. Yet somehow crisis managers must make sense
of the situation before making these decisions. The goal of this research is to open
the black box regarding how crisis managers deal with uncertainty in such a difficult
situation. This will be done by exploring the institutional context in which they
make sense of a crisis.
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the research question that guides the study
presented in this book. The chapter starts with a discussion of the role of uncertainty
in a crisis and the challenges it poses to crisis managers (Sect. 1.2). Section 1.3
enumerates various strategies adopted by crisis managers to cope with uncertainties
in crises and introduces the central research question. Section 1.4 provides a pre-
view of the theoretical perspectives that will help generate tentative answers to the
research question and presents the theoretical framework and research method
adopted in this book. Finally, Sect. 1.5 addresses the theoretical and practical rel-
evance and outlines the composition of this book.

3
Type I error (also called “false positive” or “a error”) and type II error (also called “false
negative” or “b error”) are originally used to describe errors made in a statistical decision making
process by Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson in 1928. Type I error means error of rejecting the null
hypothesis given that it is actually true; type II error means the error of failing to reject a null
hypothesis given that the alternative hypothesis is actually true.
1.2 Uncertainty in Crises as a Challenge to Crisis Managers 3

1.2 Uncertainty in Crises as a Challenge to Crisis

Managers

This section introduces the role uncertainty plays in a crisis. In a general sense,
uncertainty, threat and urgency have been identified as the three fundamental
characteristic of a crisis4:
A crisis is “…a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms
of a social system, which-under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances-ne-
cessitates making critical decisions”. (Emphasis added by the author)
—Rosenthal et al. (1989: 10)

By definition, each crisis induces a sense of severe threat, originating from the
potential tragedies caused by an emerging adverse development or incident.5
Disaster experiences, stories heard from others, or threats portrayed by scientists
may all contribute to this sense of threat (Rosenthal et al. 1989). In a crisis, threats
are accompanied by time pressure. Within hours or minutes, crisis managers have to
make critical decisions. Urgency is rarely objectively imposed by a crisis, but
perceived as such by other involved actors or the public demanding visible and
drastic response measures (Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993).
Uncertainty comes in different guises in almost every crisis, such as unknown
causes and nature of a crisis (what and why), unknown involvement of stakeholders
(who), unknown scope (where) and duration (when) of crisis impacts. Crisis
managers cannot acquire all intelligence about the causes or current states of a
crisis. One can never predict who will be involved in a crisis, because every crisis
requires a different response network formed by governmental organizations,
non-governmental organizations and other interest groups. It is also hard to predict
the boundary and scope of a crisis, given the fact that many crises cross geo-
graphical and functional boundaries (Boin et al. 2006; Lezaun and Groenleer 2006;
Quarantelli et al. 2007; Beck 2008; Boin and Rhinard 2008; Bostrom and Cirkovic

4
Uncertainty is identified as an element not just in Rosenthal et al.’s (1989) definition of crisis, but
also in the definition in the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary as “a time of great dis-
agreement, uncertainty or suffering”. Read http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=
18339&dict=CALD (accessed on June 10, 2010).
5
In a general sense, crises can be understood as threats posed by a wide variety of new risks and
age-old calamities, from extreme weather catastrophes to desertification, from epidemics to food
security crises, from social unrest to cyber terrorism, from chemical explosions to coal mine
collapses, from the collapse of a bridge to major blackouts of a city, from international conflicts to
financial crises, from volcanic eruptions to global warming, or even nuclear wars.
4 1 Managing Uncertainty in Crisis Sensemaking …

2008; Ansell et al. 2010).6 The time frames of crises are also unpredictable, because
they do not follow a linear process or simple causal relationships (Hart and Boin
2001).
A few words from the Mayor of Gretna, Louisiana State in the United States,
Ronnie Harris, help us to better understand the dynamics of uncertainty in the crisis
response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005: “We were going to protect the lives of our
residents. It’s impossible to know what happened unless you were here. At the time,
you don’t know what to believe, but you don’t want to be in a place to find out if
what you heard is true” (Select Bipartisan Committee 2006: 171). In short,
uncertainty is a fundamental characteristic of a crisis, which is worth studying
because previous research has shed insufficient light on this issue.

1.2.1 Challenges for Crisis Managers

Uncertainties pose challenges for crisis managers (Nutt 1989) in every phase of a
crisis (Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993; Cioffi-Revilla 1998). Before a crisis, crisis
managers find it hard to grasp the evolution dynamics of uncertainties, which makes
it difficult for them to intervene before a crisis unfolds (Turner 1978). The 1972
Rapid City flood in South Dakota in the US is a case in point. Crisis managers
detected the threats to local communities caused by the rising water, but failed to
prevent the dam from breaking (Mileti and Beck 1975).
The quality of critical decision making in crisis response is often impaired by
insufficient intelligence regarding the causality, the severity, and the impact and
scale of the crisis (Dutton 1986; Quarantelli 1988). For instance, during the
response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, fire commanders in the lobbies of the two
towers of the World Trade Center lacked intelligence on what was happening
outside the towers, and what the consequences of the plane crashes would be for the
stability of the towers (Kettl 2003). The decision to send fire fighters to the towers
led to more deaths.
Coordination between organizations is an indispensable part of a crisis response
and is often accompanied by unexpected involvement of other organizations.
Organizations that rarely work together in normal times may have to break with
their professional rules of operation and standard routines in order to work together
effectively, which creates new uncertainties (Wilson 1989). Organizations

6
What Quarantelli, Lagadec, and Boin refer to Trans-system Social Ruptures (TSSRs), means
crises “jump across different societal boundaries, disrupting the fabric of different systems”. Beck
defines this new feature as “cosmopolitanism” which means the erosion of clear borders for
separating markets, states, civilizations, cultures, life-worlds of common people and its conse-
quences. Syracuse University’s Moynihan Institute set up a research project on transboundary
crisis management with a focus on how problems of governance are exacerbated when they cross
jurisdictional borders. The transboundary crisis increases the possibility that some types of crises,
such as pandemics disease, spread to different regions of the world.
1.2 Uncertainty in Crises as a Challenge to Crisis Managers 5

responding to a crisis for the first time may not perform as expected, suffering from
the “new organization syndrome”7 (Stern 1997). For instance, during the response
to the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) was instructed by the White House to coordinate the response under the
guidance of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS initiated a new
response framework, forcing FEMA to drop its long existing professional rules for
emergency management. The incompatibility between FEMA and DHS created
uncertainty that led to chaos.
A lack of knowledge about future outcomes and possible consequences of an
intervention also challenges crisis managers in their efforts to set a response strategy
(Dutton 1986; Quarantelli 1988). In 2002, when the first SARS patient was sent to
the hospital in Guangdong, China, doctors could not diagnose the strange disease
(which was later named the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome). This made it hard
to determine the response strategy. If the disease would not be a deadly flu, taking
precautions to isolate all who had been in contact with the patient might cause
social panic and unnecessary costs (Zeng 2003). However, if it would prove to be a
deadly flu, taking the risk to do nothing might allow the flu to spread to different
corners of the world (as shown in the SARS crisis).
During the crisis response, stakeholders compete to give meaning to the ongoing
crisis and the response (framing); this framing process increases uncertainty about
the social construction of a crisis. It is not always clear from the start which frame
will eventually define the situation in media reports, political debates, and public
opinion. This impedes a crisis manager’s ability to predict the public’s response to
his or her efforts. Political opponents may seize this opportunity to disclose the
inadequacy or failure of preparation and response efforts. Journalists may point at
human errors and institutional flaws. Internet users may use different peer to peer
web 2.0 tools (e.g. instant messengers, BBS, Twitter, Facebook, individual blogs)
to discuss the response to the crisis. Malpractices in government may lead to intense
public attention and criticism in the social construction process, which quickly
erodes the legitimacy and credibility of organizations involved in the response and
which may finally result in an institutional crisis or political crisis.

1.3 Research Puzzle: Explaining the Variation

of Strategies for Coping with Uncertainties in Crises

Given that uncertainty is an inherent part of a crisis, dealing with uncertainty is an

indispensable task for crisis managers. Although the example at the beginning of this
chapter describes a critical situation forcing crisis managers to make sense of
uncertainty, the way crisis managers cope with uncertainties is not limited to this

7
“New organization syndrome” means that members fail to act due to a lack of understanding on
the organizational role, status and accountability in a new organization (Stern 1997).
6 1 Managing Uncertainty in Crisis Sensemaking …

Table 1.1 A list of uncertainties and coping strategies generated from crises cases
Cases Uncertainties Coping strategies
The Chinese Health minister Zhang Impacts of an unknown Denial/playing
Wenkang in the SARS crisis in 2003 disease down
Galveston (US) Mayor E. Gus Manuel in Impacts of a potential
responding to Hurricane Alicia in 1983 Hurricane
NASA in the Space Shuttle Columbia Consequences of the “foam Normalization
disaster in 2003 strike”
Local officials in Wenzhou, China in coping Uncertainties about the Reliance on rules
with a coming typhoon typhoon track in the and procedures
weather forecast
BP in the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill Unknown effectiveness of Analogy
disaster the oil containment method
UK government and EU in the BSE crisis in Uncertainty whether BSE Reliance on
1996 caused human deaths experts
The Texas state government in the 1964 Unknown hurricane track Delegation
Hurricane Carla

example. This section will demonstrate various strategies developed by crisis man-
agers to cope with uncertainties in crises, which have been extracted from different
cases (a list of these uncertainties, coping strategies and crisis cases has been sum-
marized in Table 1.1). These strategies represent various ways of dealing with
uncertainties during a crisis (the strategies are not limited these types).8 Each type of
coping strategy listed in Table 1.1 will be described in the following sections.
In the unfolding phase of a crisis, routine accidents or risks that may lead to a
crisis or disaster emerge from the normal rhythm of the organizational operations.
Crisis managers may simply deny the possibility of a catastrophic consequence.
Crisis managers might mask these deficiencies of operations or block the infor-
mation from being released to the public or their superiors, hoping that they can
control the situation (Peng 2008). When many patients with unknown fever
symptoms appeared in different regions in China in 2003, nobody knew what the
disease named SARS actually was and how such an unknown disease could be
controlled. Yet, the Chinese Minister of Health Zhang Wenkang simply played
down the uncertainty with a declaration to the media that SARS was under control
in China (Xinhua Reporter 2003). In response to the unknown impact of the coming
Hurricane Alicia, Galveston’s Mayor E. Gus Manuel simply dismissed the warning
by Texas Governor Mark White in 1983. Alicia caused 21 deaths in Galveston
(Isaacson et al. 1983; Committee on Natural Disaster 1984).
Crisis managers may have become accustomed to existing uncertainties in the
system that never caused any damage or problems before and they may refuse to
take further measures to deal with them because of other pressing problems at hand

8
Please be aware that these strategies are not mutually exclusive in a single crisis. Crisis managers
can select multiple strategies in coping with an uncertainty in a crisis.
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from early experience be prepared, should the cause arise, to fulfil a
noble destiny, even as he himself, having from his tenth year borne
arms under his father Hamilcar and brother-in-law Hasdrubal, had
been prepared for the mighty role which, with the siege of Saguntum,
he was now commencing to fill in the world’s history.
For the Greek city of Saguntum, on the eastern coast of Spain,
was strictly allied with Rome, and the fact of Hannibal’s attacking it
was, he well knew, equivalent to a commencement of a new war with
mighty Rome herself.
Upon Hannibal’s departure for the siege of Saguntum some eight
months previous, he had taken all the generals and captains in
whom he could put trust and the greater part of the army with him.
Although not styled a king, his power was at that time more than
regal in all the parts of Spain south of the Ebro, and his authority as
regards the care of the City of New Carthage itself he had, on his
departure, delegated under his sign manual and seal absolutely to
his daughter Elissa.
It is, then, no cause for wonder, if her female companions looked
with some degree of awe and respect upon this sixteen-years-old girl
who sat there so pensively dabbling her hands and feet in the marble
basin, while raising her head occasionally to cast a glance through
the embrasures on the battlemented walls surrounding the garden,
upon the gulf below and the blue sea stretching out far beyond.
Elissa had far sight, and it seemed to her once or twice as though
she could make out, shining in the evening sun, far away upon the
horizon, the white sails of ships. But they were no larger than
specks, and soon disappeared altogether; therefore the maiden,
thinking that she had been misled by some sea birds, soon gave up
watching the sea, and returned to the apparent contemplation of the
fishes, but really to the continuation of the reverie upon which she
was engaged.
Meanwhile the ladies under the trees were chatting away merrily.
“Oh! dear me, how hot it is,” exclaimed the rotund little Princess
Cœcilia, fanning herself vigorously with a palm leaf fan. “I am sure
when my poor husband, Hasdrubal, built this city of New Carthage,
he must have selected it purposely as being the warmest site in all
Spain, just to remind him of his native country which he was so fond
of. Or else,” she continued, “it was to try and keep down my
inclination to fat. Oh! dear me!” and she fanned away at herself more
vigorously than ever.
“Don’t call it fat,” interposed Cleandra, a very handsome fair young
woman of about twenty, who was herself by no means inclined to be
thin—“say rather adipose deposit, it is a far more elegant way of
putting it.”
“Or plumpness, Cleandra, that is nicer still,” struck in Melania, a
dark young beauty with vivacious black eyes, who was a year
younger. “I wish I could call myself plump like thee, I am sure I
should not mind the heat,” she added, “instead of being the
scarecrow that I am,” and rising she surveyed with mock ruefulness
her really very graceful figure. She was the tallest of all the young
women there, and was perfectly well aware of the fact that her
comparative slenderness was most becoming to her willowy and
lissome figure.
“A scarecrow, thou a scarecrow,” almost screamed the little
Cœcilia. “Oh! just listen to the conceited thing; why, thou hast a
lovely figure and thou knowest it; there is none in all New Carthage,
save Elissa yonder, who can compare to thee. But then, of course,
no one can compare with her in any way. But what a girl she is! how
can she sit out there in the afternoon sun like that? the worst kind of
sun, my dears, for the complexion, I can assure you. I am sure if I
were to remain like that for only five minutes I should lose my
complexion entirely, yes, become perfectly covered with freckles I
am certain, in even less than five minutes. Now what are you
giggling at, you naughty girls? I declare you are too wicked, both of
you; I shall have to report you to our Queen Regent yonder and ask
her to put you both in the dungeon if you make fun of an old lady like
me. Alas! thirty years of age, don’t you call that old?”
For with a sly glance at each other the two girls had mutually
looked at the lively little princess’s manifestly artificial complexion
which was trickling away in little runnels down her cheeks.
“I wonder what she is thinking about?” she interposed hastily, to
turn away the merry girls’ attention from herself, and glancing across
towards the lady Elissa.
“Who?” said Cleandra.
 “Why, Elissa, of course,” replied that lady’s aunt. “Canst thou not
see that she hath been in a brown study for ever so long? She is no
more thinking of the fish than I am; her thoughts are miles and miles
away. But just notice how pretty the ruddy tints are in her dark hair,
lighted up like that by the afternoon sun.”
“Perhaps she is thinking of affairs of State,” answered Cleandra,
“and whether she is to put us in that black hole or no.”
“Or, perhaps,” said Melania with a grain of malice, “and far more
likely, she is thinking of the siege of Saguntum and whether a certain
young officer of cavalry called Maharbal will ever come back from
the war again to do what we girls cannot hope to do, that is cheer
her in her solitude. I really should like to go and disturb her, she
reminds me so of her namesake Dido—Elissa is Hebrew for Dido,
thou knowest, Lady Cœcilia—mourning on the heights of Carthage
for her lost Æneas.”
“I wonder what she sees in that Maharbal,” continued Melania, in a
tone of pique; “a great big mountain of a hobbledehoy, that’s what I
call him, and merely a prefect of the Numidian cavalry, too. Such
assurance on his part to be always making love to her! I wonder that
Hannibal allows it—a mere nobody!”
“A mere nobody! a hobbledehoy! nonsense!” said the princess,
“thou’rt jealous, Melania, because he never looks at thee. Why, he is
own nephew to Syphax, King of Massaesyllia, and cousin to the
powerful Massinissa, King of Massyllia, both great Libyan princes.”
“Mere vassals of Carthage! and the last named not very
trustworthy,” replied the other interrupting.
“Well then,” gabbled on the princess, “look at his strength, a
hobbledehoy indeed; Maharbal is a regular Hercules, and hath a
beautiful face just like the celebrated Hermes of Praxiteles. I think
Elissa will be a very lucky girl if she weds a magnificent fellow like
that; she will be the mother of a race of giants.”
“Shsh! Shsh!” cried both the girls, smiling in spite of themselves.
“Elissa is listening to all we are saying—just look at her.”
“Yes, yes, you wicked people, and she hath been listening for the
last quarter of an hour,” cried Elissa, springing to her feet as red as a
rose. “But really, my aunt is too bad, she maketh me ashamed; say,
what shall we do with her for punishment? put her in the fish pond I
think.” Bounding across the open space, she playfully seized upon
the merry little woman, and aided by the two others, dragged her in
spite of her cries, screams, and vigorous resistance to the very brink
of the marble basin. She struggled violently, and but with difficulty
escaped her fate.
“Oh, dear me! think of my complexion—cold water in the afternoon
is bad for it. Oh! I did not mean a word, dear Elissa. Oh, dear me, I
shall die,” and with a vigorous final effort for freedom, as she was
really a very strong young woman, suddenly she pushed both Elissa
and Melania together over the brink so that they fell with a splash
into the shallow pond. Then being left alone with the plump
Cleandra, who had no strength whatever, she speedily overcame
her, and threw her in after the others, remaining with torn garments
and dishevelled hair, shrieking with laughter, and panting for breath
on the bank.
“Now there is naught for us but to have a bathe,” cried Elissa gaily;
and first drenching the princess with a shower of spray, and then
springing up the marble steps, the three girls quickly threw off their
thin, wet, clinging garments.
Standing there together in a pretty group for a brief minute or two,
poised on the top of the marble steps, with arms raised in graceful
curves while loosening the fillets of silver from the hair that fell in
masses to the hips, they seemed in all their youthful beauty like the
three graces personified.
At that very moment, from behind the trees, the sound was heard
of a horse’s hoofs galloping on the turf, and in a second an armed
warrior, mounted on a black charger covered with foam and utterly
exhausted, appeared upon the scene. At the same time, a great
sound of shouting was heard in the town without the garden walls,
which shouting was taken up again and again, till the clamour
seemed literally to fill the air. The shouting sounded like the cheers
for victory.
The princess was the first to recover her composure.
“Why, it’s Maharbal,” she cried; “jump into the water, girls, instantly.
Fancy his coming like that!” Then, rushing in front of the warrior, she
wildly waved her hands at the horse, shouting, “Go back! Maharbal,
go away, thou wicked man, go back. Dost not see that the girls are
bathing?”
At that moment they all plunged into the water once more like
frightened swans.
“In the name of Hannibal!” cried the young warrior, “let me pass. I
must speak to Elissa, and instantly, or my head will fall,” and he held
up Hannibal’s signet ring before the dripping princess’s astonished
gaze.
“Oh!” screamed the princess, falling back affrighted. “Hannibal’s
ring! Yes, of course, Hannibal’s orders are law.”
Maharbal advanced to the edge of the shallow pond. In this the
maidens were now crouching and partially concealing themselves
under some flags, but in spite of all, their heads and shoulders
remained uncovered. Elissa and Cleandra faced Maharbal and
strived to look dignified. Melania, on the other hand, had turned her
back upon him.
Curiosity and anger combined caused her to turn her head, and
she was the first to speak, as Maharbal, his charger beside him,
stood upon the steps. Both she and Cleandra, of noble Iberian
families by birth, were, although treated as of the family, but slave
girls in Hannibal’s household, therefore she had no right to speak in
the tone she now used, except the right of outraged modesty that
every woman possesses.
“Begone! Maharbal, thou insolent wretch, begone instantly, or the
Lady Elissa will have thee scourged and beheaded for thine
impertinence. How darst thou insult us, thou ruffian? I wish that thou
wert dead.”
At this instant, Maharbal’s war-horse, with a mournful kind of half
scream, half sigh, fell upon the ground at the edge of the pond, and
with a quiver of all its limbs expired. The warrior turned to watch it for
a second, then looking back, remarked sadly: “My best charger, and
alas! the third I have killed since yesterday morning. But there is no
time for talk. Lady Elissa, my business is with thee alone, and it
brooks absolutely not a moment’s delay. Wilt thou kindly direct thy
slaves,” and he looked hard at Melania, “to leave the water at once. I
must speak with thee alone. I obey the General’s strict orders.
 “Pray be quick,” he added, “for I feel my strength rapidly failing me,
and if I have not fulfilled my duty before, like my horse yonder, I die, I
shall have failed in my vows to my General and to my country.”
He removed his helmet as he spoke, and all the three maidens
noticed not only that the young man was turning deadly pale, but that
a wound on the side of the head, which had been covered with
coagulated blood, had broken out, and was bleeding violently afresh.
But he had yet strength to hand a garment, the first he found to
hand, to Elissa, who, while attiring herself in the water, turned
sharply to her attendants, and addressed them authoritatively.
“Leave the water, maidens, and let no false shame delay ye for a
moment, for I see this is a matter of life or death. Begone at once,
and thou, mine aunt,” she cried.
Like startled deer, the two girls, having recovered some of the
scattered raiment, fled from the pond, and rushed within the palace,
followed by the dishevelled Princess Cœcilia. But whether from
being reminded thus forcibly that she was but a slave, or from a
combination of feelings, no sooner had Melania reached her
apartment than she burst into a flood of violent weeping. The
princess was wringing her hands as she went, and talking aloud.
“Oh, dear me! this is very odd and very dreadful, and most
improper! But poor Maharbal’s horse is dead, and he looks at
death’s door himself. Oh! what hath happened? I hope Hannibal is
not dead as well, or a prisoner, or anything awful. But nay! he hath
sent his seal. But I must prepare a room for poor Maharbal to die in;
where shall I get a bed big enough? what a long body he will be.”
And so chattering to herself, for want of anyone else to talk to, she
left Maharbal, the handsome young warrior, alone with the beautiful
child of sixteen, the Lady Elissa.
 CHAPTER II.
MAHARBAL.

The young warrior had sunk down upon the grass, and was leaning
wearily upon his elbow by the time that, having partially robed
herself, Elissa was able to issue from the pond and fly to his side. He
seemed dying. Oblivious of all but the presence of the man whom in
her heart she loved with all the spontaneity of a youthful, ardent
nature, she not only thought of nothing but him, but she shewed it
clearly by the look in her eyes and by her actions.
“Oh, Maharbal! Maharbal! look not thus. Dost thou not know that I
love thee?”
She stooped over, seized his hand and pressed it to her lips, then,
with part of her raiment which was lying at hand, she repeatedly
bathed his brows with the cool water from the pond. But his eyes
closed as though he were in a faint; whereupon she leant over, and
in an agony of fear kissed him madly on the lips, muttering the while
some incoherent loving words, and cooing in his ear. They were the
first kisses that ever she had given to man, the virgin kisses of her
beautiful lips. Her embraces brought him to himself. Despite the
delight that shone in his eyes and the gratitude he felt at the
unlooked-for favour, the wounded warrior had not by any means
forgotten his duty. With returning consciousness he stretched out his
hand and gently pushed her back.
“This is no time for kisses, Elissa; there is other work to be done.
The State, thy father’s life, and thine own are to be considered; help
me to sit up and to rest against my poor dead charger. There, that
will do; now I feel better.”
For with all the might of her weak arms she had managed to drag
rather than help him into a sitting posture, and place him with his
back against the dead horse.
“Now sit by me and listen, and read what I have brought thee.
First, take this seal from my finger; it is a duplicate of Hannibal’s
signet ring. Here within my doublet I have a letter; canst thou get it? I
have no strength left.”
Elissa felt for some time beneath the doublet with trembling
fingers, but could not find the letter.
“Hold my hand and guide it,” he said, smiling faintly. Thus aided,
he produced a sealed letter from under his leather jerkin. “Take my
dagger and cut it open,” he said authoritatively.
She obeyed, trembling like the child she really was.
“Now read aloud, that I may know thou hast the meaning. But stay;
first bathe my face once more, for I must keep my senses about me.”
Once more she plunged her garment into the cool water, and for a
few minutes bathed his head and face. The young colossus gave a
sigh, then seemed restored: the colour partly came back to his
cheek.
“Now read!” he said; “read.”
But Elissa’s eyes were filled with tears, so that she could not read
the triangular Punic characters.
“Read it to me thyself, Maharbal,” she answered at length, “for I
cannot. There! I will hold it for thee; will that do?”
So he began:

“In the name of the Great God Melcareth, the Invisible God,
the God of Tyre, of Sidon, the God of Carthage, Greeting.
From Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, Commander-in-Chief of
the Carthaginian troops and Governor-General of Iberia, to his
daughter Elissa, Regent and Governor of New Carthage.
“My daughter, these words are written by the hand of my
scribe and friend, Silenus, but they will be sealed with my
signet, which thou knowest, and thou canst verify the seal if
so be they arrive in thy hands.
“They are sent by the hand of Maharbal, whose fidelity to
me is assured. He also hath some liking for thee if I be not
mistaken. Maharbal was wounded in yesterday’s action, but
he is young, of great strength, and of a great courage; he may
succeed in accomplishing the journey. No other but Maharbal
in mine army could ride 2,000 stades without rest. Should he
not succeed, the gods will not have willed it.
 “Yesterday, oh, my daughter, after a siege of over eight
months’ duration, we stormed and took the town and suburbs
of Saguntum. The enemy fought to the last with the greatest
courage, and our losses are very great.
“Several of my generals, including Hanno, who was the
Commander of the Numidian Cavalry—he was killed in the
pursuit of the fugitives—are dead. Most of the tribunes are
dead or disabled, and, in short, there is scarce an officer of
either cavalry or infantry who is not either dead or wounded. I
myself am seriously wounded, but not dangerously. Maharbal
was, by the favour of Melcareth, the means of preserving my
life. He will now succeed Hanno as Commander of the
Numidian Cavalry.
“Every male Greek in the city of Saguntum, no matter of
what age, we have put to the sword. All the older women, that
is all women over thirty, I have ordered to be sent out into the
country to be an incumbrance to the tribes of their Iberian
allies. All young matrons up to about the age of thirty, and all
girls under that age, I have handed over to my troops to do
with as they will. They will probably soon wish to sell them as
slaves for the Carthaginian market. This refers to the Greek
and also Roman women of all classes, from the wives and
daughters of the generals and rich citizens down to the
women of the lowest orders. For all are captives, and all are
slaves in the hands of my officers and men. Every Iberian
woman hath been allowed to go free. Every Iberian man hath
likewise been granted his liberty. This clemency on my part
will gain us many allies among the Celtiberians north of the
river Iberus, whence most of these people came.
“Our spoils of war are enormous, although the citizens
foolishly attempted to burn themselves with their goods in the
marketplace, which folly was prevented by our rapid advance
when the breaches were stormed. In saying burn themselves,
I intended to convey that the male inhabitants, being Greeks,
tried to burn their women and save themselves; this is the
usual Greek custom. But the women were saved, and are
now being consoled by my army. It is the men who sought to
burn them by fire because they could not carry them away
with them who are dead. This is all the news.
“Now, my daughter, I cease to write to thee as thy father,
but as thy General I command thee. It is the Commander-in-
chief writing to the Regent and Governor of New Carthage.
“Maharbal is charged to deliver unto thee this letter if he be
alive, and if thou be alive. He is to find thee, and not to quit
thee until thou readest this letter in his presence. Should he
fail in this duty of his own fault, he will lose his head.
Shouldest thou cause him to fail by thine own neglect of duty,
thine own life will be at stake. For as Regent and Governor of
New Carthage thou hast many lives in thine hands, and thou
art answerable for all to me, thy commanding officer, and
through me to the State.
“Now, know this, I have learned only this very day from
some Roman emissaries captured by me, and since
executed, that there is a plot against me in Carthage. Upon
learning that I had attacked the city of Saguntum, contrary, it
must be owned, to the treaty signed, from sheer inability to
resist, after my father Hamilcar’s death, by my brother-in-law,
thy late uncle Hasdrubal, the Roman Senate decided to send
an embassy to Carthage to demand my surrender to Rome.
That embassy departed quite recently, comparatively
speaking, but found the party of Hanno, the late Suffete of
Carthage, who was, in his lifetime, the enemy of Hamilcar, in
the ascendant. Adherbal, the deceased Hanno’s eldest son, is
now the head of that party. He entertained the Roman envoys
handsomely, and, without any authority from the State, but
merely in his private capacity as a citizen, promised them,
when drunk, both the loss of my head, and the loss of thy
virtue. He is a mere boaster, as was his father, who sought to
have me sacrificed at the age of nine years to Moloch, and
who, but for my own childish words, which saved him, would
himself have been sacrificed instead. Yet, nevertheless,
boasters sometimes succeed. For having boasted, they seek
to make good their words, and the greatest success is often to
those who attempt much. I am not, remember, writing now,
oh! Elissa, as a father, but as thy Commander-in-chief,
therefore hearken unto my words.
“Should the sacrifice of my head benefit my country, the
enemy or the country are welcome to my head.
“Again! Should the sacrifice of thy virtue benefit thy country,
the enemy or the country must be welcome to thy virtue. But
here there is no sacrifice necessary. I therefore do not intend
to lose my head, nor do I suggest unto thee that thou shouldst
sacrifice thy virtue. Yet there is a deep-laid plot, and Melcareth
alone, the great, the invisible God, knoweth whether Maharbal
will reach thee in time to stay it.
“Being a man of war myself, and accustomed to open
warfare from my very earliest youth, I love not the torture. Yet
for once I praise the rack, since by it I have gained the secrets
of this plot.
“Know then this. Without waiting for the decision in council
of the Hundred, the party of Hanno are about to send, or have
already despatched Adherbal, with a fleet strongly armed with
rowers and many marines who are desperate, mere
mercenaries drawn from the disbanded armies in Greece and
Sicily, all ruffians of the very worst description. His intention is
to obtain by fraud or force both possession of New Carthage
and of thine own person, knowing me to be away at
Saguntum. After that, through thee, he hopes to obtain
possession of me also. I cannot tell if these words will reach
thee in time or no, but thou art now, if they do reach thee in
time, forewarned. Pay no attention to the false letters that
Adherbal may bring thee; they are but a snare; he and all his
accursed faction are but scheming against the State. In no
case let him in mine absence, thou living, obtain possession
of New Carthage or of thyself.
“As for Hannibal, thy father and thy commander, fear not for
him. Do but thy duty in this crisis, oh, my daughter and my
delegate!
“(Sealed) Hannibal.”
 As Maharbal read the last lines of this letter, he pushed it back
towards Elissa, who held it.
“Go!” he said, “go at once, heed not me. I saw the sails of
Adherbal’s fleet as I rode up. Leave me instantly.”
“I saw them too!” cried the girl, “but I knew not what they were. Oh,
beloved Maharbal! what if thou shouldst not survive? How can I
leave thee thus?”
“Go! go at once,” replied Maharbal feebly, “send someone to me if
thou choosest, but it is immaterial; go thou at once, do thy duty. Art
thou not Regent and Governor of Carthage? Stay, kiss me once, an’
thou wilt, for indeed ’tis sweet, Elissa, my beloved, thus for once to
feel thy kiss. Ah! now I can die in peace, but go, go! thine own
honour, thy country, and the safety of Hannibal are all at stake.”
Leaving the imprint of her fervent kisses on his lips, she hastily
departed.
The instant she had left him, Maharbal, the self-reliant young
giant, who had hitherto kept himself up by mere force of will, went off
into a dead swoon. For the blood had been continually oozing from
the wound above his temple while he had been reading Hannibal’s
letter, and moreover, he had not been out of the saddle or tasted
food for forty-eight hours.
Thus it came to pass that when, shortly after, the lively little
princess came out again, accompanied by Melania, they found the
beautiful young man lying all alone, quite inert and apparently dead,
by the side of his horse. And under his head was a large pool of
blood. They had brought wine with them, and sought to force it
between his lips, but the attempt was useless. They then strove to
move him from where he was lying, but in vain. No assistance could
be obtained from any of the men, for Elissa had issued orders to
double all the guards, and placed every available man on duty on the
ramparts or the quays. And so poor Maharbal lay bleeding and
unconscious.
Meanwhile two bodies of men had been hastily employed in
placing booms across the entrances to the harbour; other armed
forces were drawn up in detachments upon the island and wharves,
and on all sides of the entrances to the harbour, and a large fleet of
vessels, flying the Carthaginian flag of a white horse on a purple
ground, and consisting of fifty-two stately quinquiremes and twenty-
two splendid hexiremes, all crowded with armed marines, in addition
to the full crews averaging three hundred rowers apiece, being
disappointed at finding the entrance to the harbour closed, was just
heaving to, and casting its anchors in the open sea.
 CHAPTER III.
FOREWARNED.

The City of New Carthage, built by Hasdrubal, the son-in-law of

Hamilcar, with whose second wife and now disconsolate widow we
have just made acquaintance, was most excellently situated,
whether from an æsthetic or a strategic point of view.
It was built upon a hilly promontory jutting out into a gulf which lay
towards the south-west. The two entrances to this gulf, which were
separated by an island, were at a distance of about two thousand
yards from the walls of the town, and were narrow enough to be
easily commanded by a small body of defenders. The whole of the
interior of the gulf formed a magnificent harbour.
At the back of the city, on the north-western or land side, there
was situated a long lagoon. This had formerly been separated from
the sea by a narrow isthmus, but Hasdrubal, who had, before his
assassination, been aiming at royal power, had determined to make
New Carthage his royal city, and in consequence as nearly
impregnable as possible.
He had therefore cut a channel through this narrow isthmus, thus
allowing the sea and the lagoon to join. And then he had bridged the
channel with a wide and excellent bridge. This bridge was a short
way from the gates of the city, and was the sole means of land
communication with the rest of Spain. The gates were strongly
fortified, and inside and near the walls were erected commodious
barracks for the troops; a little beyond these barracks rose, on an
eminence, a well-designed and formidable-looking citadel, above
which proudly floated the Carthaginian ensign.
The town, as has been said, was hilly, and its designer had taken
advantage of the natural features by making it as beautiful as
possible. On every hill top stood a magnificent marble temple. On
the most commanding hill of all, that which was due east, was reared
the glorious temple to Æsculapius, while those to Moloch and Tanais
or Tanith occupied other prominent sites. In every square and at
every street corner were placed the most exquisite and costly
statues, some of the purest of Parian marbles, and others of solid
silver. Some of the richest silver mines in the then-known world lay
close to Carthagena. The supply of the metal was apparently
inexhaustible and unbounded. For there were not only no such
sailors, but no such skilful miners in those days as the Phœnicians,
who had, like the Greeks, formed peaceful settlements in Spain long
before the first of the Punic wars.
By means of pipes coming under the lagoon from various high hills
on the mainland, the supply of water in the town was abundant, and
tinkling fountains, shaded by splendid plane trees, formed on every
side picturesque rendezvous for the gossips of the town. In addition
there were many excellent wells on the island itself which never ran
dry.
For the situation of his own palace and court, in whose gardens
we made the acquaintance of Hannibal’s daughter Elissa,
Hasdrubal, who was eminently a man of genius, had selected the
most advantageous site on the island, by taking in the whole of a
flat-topped hill on the western side which overlooked the sea and
country and all the city, except the temple to Æsculapius. Here he
had reared the most beautiful and luxuriously-furnished edifice of
which the architects of those days were capable; and from what
Carthage was, and what Syracuse was, we know that their abilities
were great. Graceful colonnades, wonderful mosaic-paved corridors
and walls were everywhere; gorgeous saloons, filled with pictures
and statues, formed banqueting halls or audience chambers; while
the richly-furnished sleeping apartments had been designed with a
view to comfort and æstheticism combined.
In one of these, in front of an open window facing south, the
carved lattice fretwork of which was made of the sweet-scented
cedar of Lebanon, and out of which she cast many anxious glances,
stood Elissa, attiring herself as gorgeously as possible with the
assistance of Cleandra, an old white-headed warrior in armour being
also in attendance. The door of the apartment was closed and
barred, and in addition heavy curtains were drawn across it, so that
there could be no chance of a word that was said within the room
being heard outside.
 “And so, my good Gisco,” said Elissa, while putting on a
magnificent chain of gold and emeralds, “thou dost estimate the
numbers of the fighting men, leaving the rowers on one side, at
about eight thousand, dost thou not? I should have thought there
had been more. Why, just see how their spears glisten in the sun
where they are crowded together on the decks.”
“I did not say they had only eight thousand men, Lady Elissa,”
answered the old Prefect Gisco, a faithful and rugged old retainer of
Hamilcar and Hannibal, who had risen from the ranks and was now
the captain of the garrison of Carthagena. “They must, calculating a
hundred and twenty-five marines to each ship, have at least
considerably over nine thousand fighting men with them; but, as they
would leave at least a thousand on board as a guard to the ships,
they would, if they strove to make a landing, disembark, say, about
eight thousand. But they will not seek to land this evening by force
without a parley first, and even if they should do so, we could defend
the two entrances to the harbour to the last. They could never get in
to-night without fighting at a disadvantage. We have, after all, got six
hundred well seasoned soldiers, who will take a lot of killing; and
then we have three hundred more of the wounded and
convalescents, who came down two months ago from Saguntum.
They can bear a hand, and a very useful one too, as many of them
are Balearic slingers, who will prove most deadly to men in boats.”
“And what about to-morrow, oh, most sapient Gisco, when all our
men are dead?” asked Elissa, smiling the while, and examining her
pearly teeth in the mirror of polished and burnished gold, which
Cleandra was holding up before her. “But I agree with thee; I do not
think this Adherbal will dare to attack Carthaginians without a parley.
He will first try to obtain possession of myself and New Carthage in
some other way. No,” she continued, “we must have no fighting. We
can do better than that, I think, and yet save the situation both for
Hannibal and for the country’s welfare. It will be far better than
Carthaginians fighting against Carthaginians. I have, too, other and
better use to which to place those mercenaries in the ships with
Adherbal.”
The old soldier looked at the young Regent with a puzzled
expression, and waited for an explanation. Elissa smiled
enigmatically.
“Listen carefully now, oh! Gisco,” she added, while putting up each
of her little feet in turn upon an ivory and ebony stool for Cleandra to
fasten her jewelled sandals. “Listen, and I will disclose to thee the
details of my plot, by which I believe that we shall avoid any fighting,
for I think by this time to-morrow it will be a case of the biter bit. But
before I tell thee my plans, inform me, my good Gisco, how much
time we have before it will be possible for Adherbal to land?”
Gisco looked out of the window over the gulf to the sea.
“The current that sets this evening out of the lagoon and the gulf is
just now flowing out to sea with its greatest force, the ships are
anchored at a considerable distance from the shore, and the breeze
is blowing strong off the land. Even if he were to attempt to row
ashore now, Adherbal could not reach the booms under an hour. He
is evidently aware of that fact, and is waiting for the slack tide, for I
see a large galley, with a flag in the stern, lying alongside the largest
of the ships.”
“Then we have plenty of time,” said Elissa, and rapidly she
disclosed her plans to Gisco. Then she sent him off to convey the
necessary instructions to the officers, who were waiting for him
outside, bidding him return instantly and have a herald waiting for
her with a State barge and a crew of swift rowers at the steps below
the palace.
Meanwhile, she dictated a letter to Cleandra, which she sealed
with Hannibal’s signet-ring, given to her by Maharbal. Another letter
she wrote herself, and signed with her own seal of office as Regent
and Governor of New Carthage.
By the time these two letters were ready, old Gisco had returned to
inform her that the State galley was waiting at the steps.
“And further,” he added with a smile, “all the preparations for the
fulfilment of thy clever plans are ready, oh! Lady Elissa. Ah, me! to
think of the cunning contained in that little woman’s head of thine!”
And he looked admiringly at her, while the young girl flushed with
pleasure at the compliment.
“Come, Cleandra,” she called, “we must go. But first let us see
what they have done for poor Maharbal.”
 Maharbal had been carried in by Gisco’s orders, and was now
lying on a couch in a comfortable apartment, attended by Melania
and the Princess Cœcilia. A learned leech was feeling his pulse, but
they saw that he was still quite unconscious.
Elissa heaved a sigh, then beckoning to her aunt to follow, left the
room.
“My aunt,” she said, changing from the soft Punic tongue, in which
she had been conversing with the old Prefect Gisco, to the Iberian or
Spanish dialect, which the ladies of the household, being all either
half or wholly Iberians, used habitually among themselves; “my aunt,
grave tidings are to hand, or, rather, both grave and good tidings.
Saguntum has fallen, and Hannibal is wounded. The shouting we
heard in the town, as we were surprised by Maharbal, was doubtless
caused by his informing the guards as he passed the city gates of
the fall of that city. It is uncertain”—here she was purposely
deceiving her aunt, whose tongue she feared—“exactly how long it is
since the town of Saguntum fell; but about a week more or less, so I
judge from a letter I have received from my father Hannibal. Further,
we may expect to see some of his advanced guard of returning
troops almost at once; perchance indeed this very day some of them
may arrive. But that is not the grave part of my news—a large fleet
hath arrived from Carthage, and is now lying anchored without the
Gulf. It is under the command of Adherbal, the son of Hanno, one of
a family that never bore good will to my father or my uncle, thy
husband’s house. I fear they come with no good design.
Nevertheless, we must make a show of entertaining the General
Adherbal and his principal followers as well; and I am about to invite
them to come here and to pass the night. Therefore, while I am
away, I pray thee make suitable preparations for a becoming repast,
and see ye that chambers are prepared. As the evenings are now
long, and it is, moreover, fresher without than within, I pray thee also
to be kind enough to have the repast spread upon the western
balcony beneath the colonnade.”
The foolish little princess, in a flutter of excitement, was about to
ask a thousand questions; but Elissa, giving her no time to talk,
merely waved her hand and departed, accompanied by Cleandra
and the Prefect Gisco.
 Passing through a postern gate in the wall of the palace, they
descended by a wide flight of marble stairs to a landing-stage at the
foot, where was lying moored a magnificent, gilded barge, the prow
of which was shaped like the head and wings of a swan. By the side
of this a gorgeously-clad herald awaited them. He bowed low as the
party approached, and the youthful Regent and Governor of New
Carthage beckoned him to join them, out of earshot of the sailors
who formed the crew.
“Sir Herald,” she said, delivering to him the two letters, “thou wilt
accompany us to the steps at the mouth of the harbour where we
shall land. Thou wilt then proceed to the ship of the Admiral of the
fleet which is lying without the harbour, and deliver to him these two
letters with my greetings. In reply to all questions make only one
answer, namely, that tidings have come that the city of Saguntum fell
over a week ago—fell more than a week ago, dost understand? With
reference to everything else, plead ignorance.”
Entering the barge, followed by Cleandra and Gisco, who gave a
short word of command to the crew, they were, a moment later,
being borne swiftly down the waters of the gulf, and very soon
arrived at the disembarking steps on the south side of the entrance
to the harbour, where a large body of spearmen, who had been
standing about on the quay, fell into rank as they saw the State
barge approaching. As the young girl disembarked, they received
her with the same salute as they would have given to their
Commander-in-Chief Hannibal himself.
The young girl acknowledged the salute by a bow, and never,
perhaps, had she looked so noble and dignified. Her dress was
calculated to enhance her beauty and dignity. She was attired in a
chiton of purple silk, with a broad hem at the bottom, which, as well
as a band at the edge of the loose-hanging sleeves, was of white
silk, trimmed with rich, golden braid. On her dark tresses was now
poised a small diadem of gold, inlaid with rubies and pearls. Two
large drops of single pearls were in her ears, while on her arms, both
above and below the elbow, were clasped costly bands of purest
gold. On her slender fingers she wore many beautiful rings, while
round her neck hung the long chain of emeralds, which has been
already mentioned. Cleandra also was upon this occasion very richly
attired in white and silver, which suited well her fair complexion. Her
jewels and ornaments were likewise costly and becoming; for
although by the fortune of war she had become a slave, she was
ever allowed by Elissa, who loved her, to dress in a style befitting the
princely Iberian family from which she had sprung.
After acknowledging the salute, Elissa walked along the ranks of
the soldiers, addressing a word here and there, complimenting one
upon his soldierly appearance, and another on the brilliancy of his
arms and accoutrements. By this tact, and the gentle ways which
she had always displayed in her dealings with the soldiery left under
her command, she had long ago won the heart of every man among
the troops, and there was not that day an officer or man present who
would not have willingly fought for her to the death.
When she had concluded her inspection, she caused Gisco to
form up the troops close round her in a circle. Owing to their
numbers, this circle was many files in depth; but the young Regent
wished all to hear what she had to say.
A bundle of merchandise which was lying on the quay she caused
to be placed in the middle of the circle of warriors, and, mounting
thereon, she addressed the men:
“Soldiers of Carthage, I have glorious news to announce to you.
Maharbal, the Prefect of the Numidian Horse, hath ridden through
with tidings from our General and Commander-in-chief, my father
Hannibal, that he hath captured Saguntum; and not only hath he put
all the garrison to the sword, but seized an enormous booty in
treasures and slaves, of which booty, no doubt, you, my faithful
garrison, will receive your portion. The number of female Greek
slaves captured is, so Hannibal writes, almost unlimited.”
Upon hearing these words, the assembled troops broke into such
a burst of cheering that the crews on the ships lying out in the roads
wondered exceedingly at the cause. But Elissa had purposely
appealed to the baser feelings of her audience. Having allowed a
few minutes for the natural ebullition of feeling, the fair young orator
raised her hand as a sign, and instantly silence was restored.
“I grieve,” she continued, “to say that our losses have been heavy,
and that Hannibal is sorely, although not dangerously, wounded. But,
soldiers of Carthage, a worse danger threatens Hannibal; a worse