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Transaction Publishers
New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.)
Copyright © 2008 by Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conven-
tions. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any
information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing
from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to Transaction Publish-
ers, Rutgers—The State University, 35 Berrue Circle, Piscataway, New Jersey
08854-8042. www.transactionpub.com
This book is printed on acid-free paper that meets the American National
Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials.
P107.S53 2007
401’.9—dc22
2006044497
For Gabriel and Marc,
whose adventures in language
have always moved in me the deepest feeling
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Contents 7
Contents
Preface ix
Introduction 1
1. Two Theories of the Emergence of Language 15
2. Affect, Emotions, and Feeling 29
3. Embodied Language 45
4. Language, Catharsis, and Action 67
5. Symbol, Syntax, and Meaning 93
6. Apprehending Through Gesture 113
7. On the Emotional Origins of Language 135
8. Metaphor 157
9. Narrative and Myth 177
10. Myth and Culture 193
11. Language, Literature, and Culture 207
Conclusion: Language Embodied 221
Bibliography 229
Subject Index 237
Name Index 245
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Preface
This book had its genesis in the 1980s, during the years I spent on the
faculty of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. It was there I
first encountered a divergence of opinion about language that was to lead
me to believe that an area of language study had been ignored during
the heady days of the Cognitive Revolution, when our notions about the
mind were so dramatically transformed.
The essence of the divergence I found among my colleagues at the
Institute lay in their attitudes towards teaching foreign language. One
group—mostly classically trained Europeans—saw culture,1 particularly
in the great works of literature produced by a target culture, as the sine
qua non of their language teaching philosophy. The other group—mostly
younger colleagues trained in the relatively new methods of the then-
expanding discipline of Teaching of English as a Second Language—es-
poused a more systematic approach to curriculum design, one based
on cognitive research into the nature teaching, learning, and language
done since the end of World War II. What was curious—and, for me,
deeply frustrating—about this divergence was an inability on the part
of most of those on either side of the fence dividing the two groups to
see their views as complementary. In most meetings and discussions,
the remarks made and the attitudes expressed were largely adversarial,
sometimes heatedly so.
As fate would have it, the new, more systematic approach to teaching
language was the rising star of the time, and the older, more classically-
oriented approach in its sunset years, guaranteeing that the younger
colleagues would have the greater influence on the development of the
curriculum. But feeling strong allegiance to arguments put forward on
both sides, I felt that either/or attitudes were not only unnecessary, they
ignored the fact that the dialectic between the two views represented a
great opportunity for bringing together two powerful features of language
in the service of the language learner. Moreover, it quickly became appar-
ent to me that, at the time, comparatively little systematic investigation
ix
x Language, Feeling, and the Brain
had been done into the power of culture and literature to invigorate the
language learning experience. While there was a veritable explosion tak-
ing place in research into the cognitive side of language learning, such
things as emotion, if considered at all, were largely consigned either to
generalities about learner motivation or to resistance to language learn-
ing—the “affective filter.” And that imbalance in our knowledge about
language learning led me to realize that the very good work that had been
done in the entire field of language theory since World War II was rather
lopsided. And thus to the fifteen year investigation that has produced this
book, which moves far beyond the questions I was putting to myself in
those early days, but that remains motivated by them all the same.
There are many who contributed to the high learning curve I experi-
enced in those fifteen years, and first among them must come Karl Pri-
bram, whose support for my work during our quarter-century relationship
has been unflagging and always profoundly appreciated. Close behind
ˇ ˇ Juraj Hvorecky, Alessandro Duranti,
come those, like Nenad Miscevic,
Mark Turner, Richard Kern, and Richard Yarborough, who provided
support for this project, sometimes almost on a daily basis.
But thanks must also go to the many who contributed, as colleagues
and friends, to my understanding of language and mind: Peter Shaw,
Paula Moddel, Jane Atkins, and Glenn Fisher at the Institute; Wally
Lambert, Fred Genesee, Tony Clark, Claire Kramsch, Jim Tollefson,
Rafael Ramirez, and Marilyn Garcia—to name only those who cut the
highest profile in helping my understanding evolve. And thanks as well
to others who commented on various parts of the manuscript itself,
John Schumann, Antonio Damasio, and Merlin Donald among them,
and to Pascale Paquet for help in preparing a skeletal version of the
manuscript early on, and to Ond ej Beran, who prepared the index in
the final stages.
I must also acknowledge the help of Project A funds of the Ecole
des hautes etudes commercials for supporting the first stages of my
research, and the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (GACR) ˇ for the
very generous grant (Grant Number 406/04/1307) that allowed me to
pull all the pieces of the puzzle together. Thanks as well go to Irving
Louis Horowitz and Transaction Publishers for having found sufficient
merit in the manuscript to publish it, and to Jan Sokol and Ivan Havel
for having helped provide an intellectual environment in which I could
bring the work to completion. And finally, special thanks to others who,
in more indirect ways, provided their help in the sometimes difficult
Preface xi
Note
1. Whether one should use the word Culture, culture, or “culture” in this context is
the subject of Shanahan (1998).
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Introduction
Suck was a queer word…the sound was ugly…when
[the water] had all gone down…the hole in the
basin had made a sound like that: suck.
1
2 Language, Feeling, and the Brain
The fact that we may respond to words in ways that go beyond their
cognitive functions as carriers of literal meaning is hardly a new one,
nor is it particularly earthshaking. Well before the advent of the written
word, oral wordsmiths used the music of words and the feelings provoked
by that music to give power to their chants, their spells, their poems,
and their oratory, and we have been doing the same ever since. We are
not moved by the information contained in Antony’s repeated, “Brutus
is an honorable man,” but by the feelings evoked by the irony and the
repetitive technique. Nor do we laugh at the information contained in the
commercial narrative of the man who has fulfilled a lifelong ambition of
becoming a poet merely by drinking a name brand soft drink:
Now I rhyme all the time
See what I mean? It comes out keen!
If I don’t stop, I think I’ll pop…
In each of these situations, and countless others like them, the impact
of language on listeners, and on readers as well, goes beyond the cogni-
tive and includes some element of feeling. We know this instinctively
about language. However, the more formal kinds of understanding we
have developed in the last half-century and more largely ignore the fact
that feelings inform language as much as the cognitive features that have
come to dominate our study of it.
In his masterful The Mind’s New Science: A History of the Cogni-
tive Revolution, Howard Gardner (1987) points out that the history of
linguistics in the second half of the twentieth century has been irrevo-
cably bound up with the cognitive revolution that has swept such other
disciplines as psychology, anthropology, and philosophy during the same
period. In no small degree, Gardner says, we have Noam Chomsky and
the revolution in linguistic thinking he helped introduce to thank for that
fact. While such figures as Saussure, Pierce, Jakobson, Sapir, and others
can be ranked as among the earliest truly modern linguists, Chomsky
was responsible for delineating the “paradigm shift” that would set the
agenda for linguistics in the post-World War II period.
As Gardner puts it,
Chomsky took issue with the view that the methodological burden of linguistics is the
elaboration of techniques for discovering and classing linguistic elements, and that
grammars are inventories of these elements and classes. Instead, he saw grammar as a
theory of the sentences of the language; and he saw the major methodological problem
as the construction of a general theory of linguistic structure in which the properties
of grammars…are studied in an abstract way. (194; italics in the original)
Introduction 3
what I and my friends thought the revolution was about back there in the late
1950s…was…an all-out effort to establish meaning as the central concept of psychol-
ogy…to discover and to describe formally the meanings that human beings created
out of their encounters with the world, and then to propose hypotheses about what
meaning-making processes were implicated. (2)
precludes such ill-formed questions as “How is the world organized in the mind of a
Muslim fundamentalist?” or “How does the concept of Self differ in Homeric Greece
and in the postindustrial world?” And it favors questions like “What is the optimum
Introduction 5
strategy for providing control information to an operator to ensure that a vehicle will
be kept in a predetermined orbit?” (5)
This awareness of our own perspective and those of others, Bruner says, will not
lead to an “anything goes” philosophy but “to an unpacking of presuppositions, the
better to explore one’s commitments.” (27)
6 Language, Feeling, and the Brain
Bruner’s critique is a valuable one, and his insistence that culture must
be included in the study of human cognitive experience is entirely valid.
However, the rationale he presents is at least somewhat incomplete. While
one can easily agree that a systematic examination of how “people and
cultures…are governed by shared meanings and values” (20) will get
us beyond the narrow view of what constitutes “meaning,” the question
of subjectivity is a more complex one than can be addressed by mere
comparative study of such things as cultural values. The fact that cultural
“unpacking of presuppositions” allows us to better understand our own
is a comforting—and true—insight into the value of the endeavor Bruner
proposes. However, while it broaches fundamentally important moral
questions about how we see ourselves and others, it makes something of
an end run around more fundamental questions about “the nature of the
beast.” That is to say, if the introduction of cultural aspects of cognition
into the discussion challenge premises upon which the discussion has
been held up until now, we must go beyond merely addressing concerns
about the moral consequences of that challenge and ask whether or not
the premises themselves must be adjusted to fit the expanding picture
we aim to encompass with our investigations.
This returns us to “the de-emphasis on affective factors or emotions”
cited by Gardner above as one of the five hallmarks of study in the cogni-
tive sciences. In fact, Gardner’s remark is probably an understatement
of the true nature of cognitive study. His own very comprehensive and
thorough work is remarkable for the fact that it shows no index entry for
“emotions,” “affect,” or “feelings.” Nor is his book unique. Bruner him-
self includes only one set of substantive remarks about affect, referring
to Bartlett’s study of memory in the thirties and his contention that recall
is “loaded” with affect, which helps to schematize memory.6 Moreover,
Bruner raises Bartlett’s findings only to comment that they must be seen
in an interpersonal or intercultural context; the influence of affect itself
on the structure of cognitive experience is not considered.
Neither Bruner nor Gardner is to be faulted for their “omission.” Ques-
tions of emotion or affect, while they have begun to receive considerably
more attention in the last decade, have not been integrated into the larger
project of “the mind’s new science.” As Gardner’s remarks suggest,
emotion and affect are often only mentioned in passing. More frequently
they are relegated to other domains, if only rhetorically, with the implicit
suggestion that work in this area is the concern of another discipline.7
Unfortunately, the domination of what Bruner calls the “technicalized”
Introduction 7
As things now stand, the amygdala has a greater influence on the cortex than the
cortex has on the amygdala, allowing emotional arousal to dominate and control
thinking…
At the same time, it is apparent that the cortical connections with the
amygdala are far greater in primates than in other mammals. This suggests
the possibility that as these connections continue to expand, the cortex
might gain more and more control over the amygdala, possibly allowing
future humans to be better able to control their emotions. (303)9
Alert himself to the problem of unfair bias against the role of emo-
tion in human experience, LeDoux’s penultimate paragraph suggests
the possibility that evolution may ultimately establish “a harmonious
integration of reason and passion,” but the remark stands largely as a
hopeful afterthought, rather than as a basis upon which we must construct
our view of the relationship between cognition and emotion.
The possibility that cognitive functions and emotional functions may
already exist in some complementary symbiosis is, however, at the core
of one of the more balanced views of the cognitive-emotional relation-
ship in human experience to appear, Antonio Damasio’s Descartes’
Error (1996). Working, like LeDoux, from the neuropsychological
work done on emotions in the last twenty-five years, Damasio argues
not only that emotions play a role in cognitive processing—an asser-
tion made, as LeDoux points out, as long ago as the early 1960s10—but
that the two exist in a tightly-integrated reciprocal relationship that, if
disturbed, causes the breakdown of cognitive processing as we know it.
Reason, Damasio argues, relies heavily on emotional cues in making its
decisions, and detachment from these cues, whether the result of neuro-
logical damage, of inadequate development of the emotions, or of some
other disturbance of the emotions’ link to judgment-making, results in a
diminished ability to function “reasonably.” In other words, Damasio’s
findings strongly suggest that what we have come to call “cognitive
processing” may better termed “cognitive-emotional processing,” or, to
Introduction 9
threshold from sign to symbol in her famous encounter with the “living
word” at the well?13
Of course, in bringing up the question of the power of language to
move us, one immediately encounters two formidable objections: the
conviction that such “power” lies outside the realm of cognition, espe-
cially within the limits Gardner describes; and the even deeper underlying
suspicion—going back at least as far as Plato’s insistence that poetry be
barred from his ideal society—of the ubiquitous power of language
to sway us subjectively. But if we maintain our focus on the true
basis for language, the symbolic mode, we detect the grounds upon
which one may reevaluate the presumption that we must detach the
“persuasive” features of symbols from their cognitive features. While
it may be desirable, for the sake of clarity and precision, to distin-
guish between a “symbol” on a keyboard that is used by a chimp in
primate language studies and the scarlet letter that appears on Hester
Prynne’s cloak (not to mention Arthur Dimmesdale’s chest and in
the night sky) in Hawthorne’s romance, two things are clear: 1) Both
types of symbols represent the “higher order” generalizing functions of
which Deacon and others speak; and 2) language and symbol-making
are much more likely to have emerged in an environment similar to the
steamy atmosphere of Hawthorne’s novel than the clinical atmosphere
of a primate lab.
In short, just as it is incomplete to see the study of the human mind
as limited to the “rational”—or better, rationalizable—faculties of that
mind, so too is it incomplete to deal with language only from the perspec-
tive of its structural, cognitive features. This is not to say that the cognitive
approach is “wrong.” On the contrary, it has produced much of irreplace-
able value in our understanding of ourselves and our understanding of
the act of understanding. However, in order to produce these insights it
adopted, perhaps unavoidably, a limited perspective that excludes a whole
domain of human experience and understanding from view. Moreover,
this exclusivity seems now not to have been merely componential: that
is to say, we are not merely faced with adding a piece of the puzzle that
had previously been withheld. The reevaluation of emotions currently
underway suggests that there is an integral, reciprocal relationship be-
tween the emotional and the rational; each informs the other, interacts
with the other, and relies on the other in order to function. While divid-
ing things into two domains may have had value for understanding one
or the other, a true reevaluation must discard the polarity between the
Introduction 11
two that has come to dominate our view of each and recognize that they
exist in intimate symbiosis with one another.
So too with language. To see the emotional as simply an “overlay” at
the level of rhetoric, prosody, or metaphor is to fail to understand that
language is, like all cognitive faculties, steeped in the emotional features
of the human experience; at the deepest level, there is the same inter-
action, influence, and reliance between the emotional and the rational
aspects of language that we are beginning to recognize in other faculties
of the mind. Language is, at bottom, as much a product of humankind’s
emotional faculties as it is a product of its rational faculties, and the
discussion that follows attempts to set out some of the parameters for
extending the reconsideration of the role of the emotions in the nature
of language itself.
A final word on the philosophical implications of cognitive studies.
Gardner suggests that philosophy has always been given the role of
agenda-setting for scientific study, and that this has been no less the case
for the cognitive revolution:
2. See Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge: MIT Press,
1965.
3. See The Input Hypothesis, London: Longman, 1985.
4. In addition to Gardner’s capable account, Steven Pinker provides a valuable list
of sources in The Language Instinct, New York: Penguin Books, 1994; p. 431, n.
23.
5. See the work of Joan Bresnan, cited in Gardner, p. 217.
6. Bruner’s discussion of Bartlett’s remarks on affect and memory takes place on pp.
57-9.
7. One colleague has suggested that the research upon which this mansucript draws
gives the lie to the notion that the study of emotion has been neglected. My con-
tention is that the new attention paid to emotion represents a significant departure
from previous practice, but that its fruits are still far from having been integrated
into our overall understanding of the psyche.
8. Virtually any discussion of emotions in psychology today begins with commentary
on the James-Lange theory, which dates from 1884-85. See, for instance, K. T.
Strongman’s The Psychology of Emotion, 4th ed., New York: Wiley & Sons, 1996;
pp. 8-10.
9. LeDoux is a competent and cautious scholar, and studiously avoids unfair char-
acterization of emotions. However, the popular Emotional Intelligence by Daniel
Goldman (1996), based largely on LeDoux’s work, essentially starts off from the
assumption that the natural order of things is for cognitive functions to bring emo-
tions under control.
10. Ledoux, p. 38.
11. To cite once again the domain of applied linguistics, emotions have been invoked
as obstacles to second language acquisition by Schumann (1997), and, rather ex-
ceptionally, as an important aspect of first language acquisition by Ochs (1988),
but rarely as essential to the nature of the thing that is acquired.
12. In fairness to Deacon’s very fine book, it must be said that he does include passing
references to the role of emotion, among them, “language, as the most sophisticated
symbolic system, prvoides a medium for building complex symbolic representations
of emotions.” (429)
13. See discussion below, chapter 3.
14. The range of citations one might suggest in this area is all but limitless, but such
things as Nietzsche’s Apollinian-Dionysian dialectic, Freud’s Eros and Thanatos,
and the contrast between postwar philosophers like Sartre and Camus are illustra-
tive examples.
15. See Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987.
16. Merlin Donald, whose work is compared to that of Cassirer in chapter 1, is one of
the few cognitive scientists who lists Langer’s magnum opus in his bibliography,
though he cites only the first volume (1967); the two subsequent volumes (1972,
1982) are not mentioned.
1
If one is to establish a basis for the notion that language has inherently
affective features—that is, its emotional base is as essential to its nature
as its cognitive base—there are a myriad of possibilities that present
themselves as areas that might be investigated. One might begin, for
instance, with the rhetorical power of language and its ability to sway
those exposed to it; one might also examine (as we later will) poetic
expression and the emotive power it carries with it. However, clearly
the most firm foundation on which to build a model of how language
reveals affective features would be to examine the origins of language
itself. But several problems present themselves.
First of all, the emergence of language is shrouded in mystery. With
the emergence of writing, one has the advantage of rock carvings that
have survived the weathering of time to provide modern theoreticians with
the hardest of data; with the emergence of language, one is immediately
stymied by a medium even more fluid than the water in which John Keats
feared his name was writ. Some very good work has been done in recent
years using a variety of kinds of evidence to infer what the emergence of
language might be said to have involved,1 but the relatively new nature of
this work and the relative difficulty of testing hypotheses make the eviden-
tiary base quite fragmentary for the moment. For our purposes, perhaps
it is best to consider the question from a slightly different angle, that of
the emergence of the capacity for language, about which there has been
increasing speculation throughout the last three centuries and which has
begun more recently to enjoy an increasing body of evidence drawn from
anthropology, primate studies, and neuropsychology. If some of the early
studies, which were heavily philosophical in content, can be yoked together
with some of the more recent cross-disciplinary findings, that might provide
us with a model well-grounded both in breadth of time and of discipline.
15
16 Language, Feeling, and the Brain
— Hyvästi!
— Hyvästi, herra kauppias… kii-kiitoksia… Junnu oli tahtonut
kiittää monilla sanoilla ja osoittaa, kuinka paljo hän kauppiaasta piti,
vaan hän oli hätäytynyt kuin lapsi eikä osannut muuta kuin kiirehtiä
ulos niin pian kuin kerkisi.
Niin kuin Junnu pahasti aavisti, tuli kohta ilmi hänen pois
joutumisensa kauppias Helisevästä. Poikarakkeja tuli rantaan ja
alkoivat häntä härnätä sillä, että "isäntä" on ajettu pois talostaan.
Junnu ei ensin virkkanut mitään, vaan kun kaikki toiset kantajat ja
kippari kaikkein enin alkoivat ahdistaa häntä, selitti hän viimein, että
hän se lähti, eikä häntä ole ajettu. Mutta sitäkös kukaan uskoi, ohoh!
Isäntä oli ajettu talostaan — sepäs hauskaa vasta oli! Häntä
neuvottiin, että hänen olisi pitänyt isäntänä ajaa muut pois talostaan,
mutta siinä talossa lieneekin akkavalta. J.n.e.
Junnu koetti kärsiä kaikki, vaikka tukalaa se oli. Miksi hänen piti
näin olla kaikkien pilkattavana, kaikkien sysittävänä? eihän hän ollut
mitään pahaa tehnyt. Hänen lapsellisissa silmissään kuvastui syvä
tuska ja kärsimys, mutta se teki hänet toisten silmissä vaan yhä
naurettavammaksi, kaikilla oli sitä suurempi halu häntä kiusata, kuta
enemmän he näkivät hänen tulevan pahalle mielelle.
Eräänä päivänä kun Junnu oli työssä eräällä lotjalla, tuli kaksi
poliisia vaatimaan häntä poliisikamariin.
— Ei tässä nyt itku auta, käy mukaan vaan! sanoivat poliisit. Itke
sitte linnassa, siellä on parempaa aikaa!
Mutta kun hän oli astunut aittaan, ottanut tulitikulla tulen ja hetken
katsellut ympärilleen, muuttui hänen mielensä kummallisesti. Aitta oli
hänelle niin tuttu, nuo katosta riippuvat palvatut liharaajat olivat
ennenkin riippuneet samalla tavalla, hyllyt ja hinkalot olivat kaikki
entisillä paikoillaan ja tavarat niissä niin kuin ennenkin. Hän oli tullut
tänne aikoen tuhota ja hävittää, vaan nyt tuntui se hänestä
rikokselta, jota hän ei voisi tehdä. Hän ei voinut luvattomasti koskea
näihin tavaroihin, joiden vartija hän itse kerran oli ollut.
Hän läksi aitasta pois, vaan jätti tahallaan oven auki ja viskasi
etäälle rakennusten yli tuon tutun, suuren avaimen, jota hän ei
saattanut varastaa. Viekööt nyt varkaat koko aitan, kun sillä enää ei
ole uskollista vartijaa, ei hän enää tarvinnut varjella sitä!
Kummallisten ristiriitaisten tunteitten vallassa siitä, ettei hän voinut
tuosta aitasta mitään ottaa, meni hän äkäpäissään eräälle liiterille,
joka myterässä syksyisessä yössä kuumotti valkealta ja joka näytti
olevan uusi rakennus, tehty hänen talosta lähtönsä jälkeen. Eräs
hänen kädessään oleva avain sopi liiterin lukkoon, ja hän avasi oven
ja meni sisään. Tulitikulla hän raapasi tulen ja katseli ympäriinsä.
Siellä oli kaikellaista rautatavaraa: lapioita, taikkoja y.m. rautakaluja
sekä puhdasta terästä ja rautaa. Tämä tuntui hänestä vieraalta
omaisuudelta, ja hän otti sieltä muutamia teräspalasia ja yhden
lapion. Lähtiessään hän viskasi avainkimpun oven eteen.
Nyt hän oli saanut kostaa! Kunpa vaan oikeat rosvot tulisivat ja
veisivät koko makasiinin sisällyksen!
Hän päätti nyt lähteä koko kaupungista, ja yötä myöten läksi hän
tavaroineen kaupungista ulos vievää maantietä matkaamaan. Hän
kulki niin kauvan kun tuli aamu, poikkesi sitte erääseen
maantienvarsitaloon, jossa hän söi ja kyseli työpaikkoja. Kuultuaan
sepän asuvan kylällä, läksi hän sinne, möi sepälle teräksensä ja
lapionsa ja pääsi hänelle pajamieheksi.
Mutta kerran kauppias itse kadulla pysäytti hänet, vaikka oli ennen
aina karttanut katsoa häneen, ja kutsui käymään luonaan.
— Minä olen tehnyt suuren rikoksen, vaan olen sen kautta päässyt
valkeuteen. Pastori selitti, että Herra useasti antaa ihmisen pahan
hengen valtaan, johdattaakseen hänet koettelemusten kautta
oikealle tielle. Niinpä on minunkin käynyt. Se oli yksi kohta
oikeudessa, josta minä tulin yminärrykseeni; se oli se, kun kauppias
vannoi pyhän valan siitä kadonneesta avaimesta —
Maksettu asia.
— Sanomalehden tilausrahasta.
— Voi, voi tokiinsa, mikä vahinko piti tulla, kun leivät paloivat!
päivitteli hän mustuneita leipiä uunista pöydälle viskoessaan.
Hänelle tuli siitä niin paha mieli, ettei hän voinutkaan heti lähteä
sanomalehden konttooriin, vaan siunuusteli ja vakeroi palaneiden
leipäinsä ääressä. Kaikessa tapauksessa päätti hän nyt odottaa
ensin miestään kotiin ja kertoa hänelle kaikki: Haverisen piti tullakin
kohta päivälliselle.
— Ei, minä en kärsi tätä! Minä lähden sinne ja vien tämän lipun
niiden nenän eteen.