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Instrumental Autonomy Political
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Case Study of Korean Minority
Citizenship Identity Bilingual Education
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Governance and Citizenship in Asia
Mengyan (Yolanda) Yu
Instrumental
Autonomy, Political
Socialization, and
Citizenship Identity
A Case Study of Korean Minority
Citizenship Identity, Bilingual Education
and Modern Media Life in the Post-
Communism Transitioning China
Series editors
Kerry J. Kennedy, Centre for Governance and Citizenship,
The Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Yan Wing Leung, Centre for Governance and Citizenship,
Sonny Shiu Hing Lo, Centre for Governance and Citizenship,
Aims and Scope
This series explores how citizenship is shaped by social, political, cultural and
historical contexts and how it may be moulded to serve the nation state in the age of
globalization. In these publications we see how governance relates to all aspects of
civic life, including politics, public policy, administration, civil society and the
economy, as well as the core values of society.
Titles cover themes including public trust and trust building, the role of civil society,
citizens’ rights and obligations, citizenship identities including those related to
gender, class and ethnicities. Authors explore how young people are shaped by
democratic and traditional value systems and the importance of citizenship
challenges in the Asia Pacific region.
Research collaborations in this interdisciplinary series probe questions such as:
What are the links between ‘good governance’ and new forms of citizenship? What
is the role of citizenship education as a tool in state formation and the development
of active citizenship cultures? How do we explain the distinctive features of
governance and citizenship in Asian societies?
Through these publications we see that citizenship is an integral part of ‘good
governance’ and that such governance ultimately enriches citizenship. Scholarly
investigation and academic dialogue in this series describe the interdependence and
mutuality of governance and citizenship.
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11911

Instrumental Autonomy,
Political Socialization,
and Citizenship Identity
A Case Study of Korean Minority Citizenship
Identity, Bilingual Education and Modern
Media Life in the Post-Communism
Transitioning China
123
Department of Public Policy
City University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
ISSN 2365-6255 ISSN 2365-6263 (electronic)

ISBN 978-981-10-2692-8 ISBN 978-981-10-2694-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2694-2
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016953649
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

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Preface
This book has been a major part of my Ph.D. research findings, which attribute to
multiple field trips to Northeast China and the Korean Peninsula from 2007 to 2012.
I have grown up in an environment that has easy access to the Korean minority
culture, and later I have been blessed with a number of precious academic
opportunities to further research about multicultural and multilingual development
in Northeast Asia. On the other hand, working and research experience at both
international organizations and tertiary institutions in different parts of the world
have also inspired to me to ponder the relationship between civil society and
nation-state in terms of citizenship identity socialization. The case of Korean
minority is a perfect case to observe both multiculturalism and state–civil society
relationship in socializing citizens’ identity. Hence with the encouragement from
both experts in the field and friends from the two cultures, I have decided to turn
what I have observed and analyzed into this book. It is expected that this book
could bring a more updated understanding about Korean minority’s identity
development in China, as well as contribute to the existing theories of citizenship
identity and minority studies about China. Readers are expected to renew their
evaluation on China’s Minority Regional Autonomy policy, and further deepen
their understandings of multicultural development in China.
During the writing process of the whole book, I have struggled to minimize my
personal feelings by presenting research outputs in close relation with the concepts
of instrumental autonomy, political socialization, and citizenship identity.
Approaching the end of the writing, I have also improved my understanding of my
own research interests and developed many skills to explore answers from theory as
well as data. The biggest challenge in life has been my limited time to invest in this
book, with other ongoing life commitments during the day, I ended up staying late
many nights in the past year to think and write. I have to thank my lovely and
healthy daughter Nolia, all the family members, and my private mentor for being
who they are and their great company during this whole period, they make the
process challenging but meaningful, and I feel very lucky for having so many
unforgettable and special moments with them.
v
vi Preface
It took me a whole year full of nonstop thinking, writing, and editing to finally
complete this immature book. Instead of being an end or an answer, this book is
more as a start and a stepping-stone. I wish it could contribute to our understanding
of relevant issues and encourage many different opinions. Lastly, I would like to
dedicate this book to my beloved parents, for whose love and with whose love I
would forever carry on my academic research adventure.
Hong Kong Mengyan (Yolanda) Yu

July 2016
Contents
1 Introduction: A Third Trial of National Identity

and Minority’s Citizenship Identity in Contemporary China. . . . . . . 1
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Nation-state, Citizenship Identity, Minority Autonomy:
Orchestrating Civil Religion and Ideology Through Political
Socialization Process in a Post-communism Asian State . . . . . . . .... 9
Citizenship Identity, Origins, and Way Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 9
Ideology of Communism and Civil Religion of Confucianism:
Discretionary Power Over Civil Society for Chinese Citizenship
Identity Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 14
Historical Evolvement of Chinese Nationalism as a Construction
of Civil Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 20
Culturally Nurtured Human Rights Perspectives, Territorialization,
and Instrumental Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 24
Political Socialization and Identity Habitus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 30
Recreation of Public Discourse Space, Bilingual Education
and Media as Medium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 35
Minority Governance Evolvement in People’s Republic of China . . .... 40
International Discourse and Chinese Minority Governance . . . . . .... 40
A Need for Reform? Placing China’s Minority Governance
Within Its Contemporary Political Reform Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . .... 48
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 52
3 Background of Korean Minority, and Its Development
in People’s Republic of China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 57
China as a Multi-ethnic State, Korean as a Cross-State
Homogenous Ethnic Diasporas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 57
Coming to China: The First Generation of Korean Migration
in China, Ancestry and Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 59
The Second Immigration Stage Under the Emerging Japanese
Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 63
vii
viii Contents
The Third Stage: The Combined Influences of Manchurian

Warlords and Japan, and Their Impediment of Communist
Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
The Fourth Stage: The Manchukuo Era and the Japanese’s
Arbitrary Control Over the Regional Education Development . . . . . . . . . 67
The Fifth Stage: The Emergence of Communism and Korean
People’s Anti-Japanese Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
The Sixth Stage: The Chinese Civil War, Settling Down in China . . . . . 81
Conflicts and Confrontation in the History of Korean Minority Area . . . 86
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4 A Methodological Framework to Access Citizenship Identity
Development and Journey in the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Why Korean Minority? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Rationale of Social Context and Field Research Site Selection . . . . . . . . 90
Field Research Experience: A Personal Journey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5 Evidence from the Field: How Does Korean Minority
Students Territorialize Their Identity Habitus in Their
Bilingual Education and Media Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 105
Accelerated Global Capital Flow: A Reborn Yanbian Region
and a Re-exploration of New Space for Minority Governance . . . . .... 105
Bilingual Education Development History of Korean Minority
in Yanbian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 108
Current Citizenship Training Through Bilingual Education
in Yanbian University and Yanbian No. 1 Middle School . . . . . . . .... 117
Communism, Confucianism, a Hanized Development of Korean
Minority Right Discourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 131
Collective Memory, Propaganda, and Modern Media Life
in Yanbian Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 141
Evidence of Korean Minority Students’ Media Socialization
from the Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 145
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 158
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 163
Identity Habitus, Disempowerment, or Enhanced Opportunity
for Korean Minority’s Independent Citizenship Development? . . . . .... 163
Political Socialization, Becomes a “Fusion Engine”
for New Hybrid Identity? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 164
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 165
Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Chapter 1
Introduction: A Third Trial of National
Identity and Minority’s Citizenship
Identity in Contemporary China
Globalization seriously challenges the traditional authority of state as the flow of

ideas and capital accelerates, yet it does not fundamentally deprive state of its
decisive power in distributing governing resources to monitor citizens’ physical and
mental activities. What is commonly acknowledged is that traditional geopolitical
boundaries have become more elastic as state has to monitor its citizens’ devel-
opment by respecting universally worshiped value standards while balancing it with
its own domestic politics. Western-oriented recognition of democratic politics once
dominated the ideological preferences in the Global South, where history and
culture have witnessed the rise of diverse types of authoritarian regimes with
illiberal democratic politics. The dialogue between state and its citizens in the
political context of the Global South, thus represents more complicated dynamic
and diversity due to different historical, political contexts and ethnic, cultural
backgrounds. New possibilities of multi-ethnic and multicultural politics have been
widely explored and observed in expectation to look for a solution in mediating and
diversifying the relationship between state and multicultural civil society, which in
this research’s case is represented by Korean minority students’ bilingual education
and modern media life at school and their outbound socioeconomic exposure both
abroad and at home. European Union’s establishment has definitely inspired and
encouraged people who long for a new possibility in their multicultural society in
many regions, even though it has survived its way out of many concrete challenges.
While in East Asian political context, progressive and developmental states instead
of politically legitimate regional networks still play a central role in socializing
citizens’ political and social identity despite of their own cultural and ethnic
diversity. Originally conceptualized as a natural process that takes place within a
certain society and shapes citizens’ behavior as well as identity, political social-
ization is highly if not dominantly influenced by political ideology and is constantly
reinvented as a governmental instrument by nation-states in East Asian political
contexts. The intermingled relationship among global capital, nation-state and civil
society represents a dynamic negotiating process which constantly territorializes a
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017 1

M. (Yolanda) Yu, Instrumental Autonomy, Political Socialization,
and Citizenship Identity, Governance and Citizenship in Asia,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2694-2_1
2 1 Introduction: A Third Trial of National Identity …
geographical terrain and an identity habitus for citizens to develop and realize their
achievable “autonomy.”
Due to the cultural and historical complexity, minority governance has been an
intricate challenge that People’s Republic of China inherited from the past.
Minority autonomous regions annex around 64 % of China’s entire territory along
its official national border, they were defined and legitimatized by the political
authority mainly according to the minority population density within certain geo-
graphical area when the Minority Regional Autonomy (MRA) policy was initially
adopted in the newly founded People’s Republic of China. Even though the total
minority population only takes 9.44 % (Zhang 2013) of the entire Chinese popu-
lation, with an average poor literacy rate around 85 % compared to the national
literacy rate of 99.4 %, all the minority autonomous areas in China bear immense
strategic significance as they usually have rich natural resources, frequent
transnational communication, and diverse cultural heritage. Hence politically
socializing minority people has been on top of the political agenda as an important
task ever since the People’s Republic of China was founded. Minority population’s
positive and strong identification with the state’s political authority and legitimacy
is not only important to the state but also of high relevance to their own identity
development. Even though the minority population is small in a numeric sense, the
cultural diversity and vitality have provided inspiring data for the observation of
state’s political socialization strategy and its impact on minority identity develop-
ment. What political socialization processes could provide minority with is access
to knowledge building, language training, as well as other assets and skills that are
expected to eventually equip them with increasing social, human, and financial
capital. Previous studies have argued for a negative relationship between the pro-
portion of the minority population and relevant regions’ economic growth as well as
social harmony in China (Zhang 2013). It is also true that the wealth gap between
minority and majority, also in general between rich and poor, enlarges drastically
since the Opening and Reform policy was implemented. The per capita GDP in
Chinese minority autonomous regions is 722.58 USD in 2000 and 901.03 USD in
2005, compared to the national average of 856 USD in 2000 and 1703 USD in 2005
(Zhang 2013). One dominant traditional view is that minority population does not
propel a better statehood development and social integrity in China; it is more a
burden and a challenge for the state to control and monitor despite its natural
resources and symbolic cultural representativeness. The citizenship identity
development of Chinese minority citizens is both heterogeneous and homogeneous
as a process, as the state has to reinvent ideological guidelines and policy instru-
ments to homogenize cultural identity differences brought along by ethnic diversity
toward a unanimous identification with the political authority, while encouraging a
possible cultural diversity based upon social equality despite the economic and
cultural disparity between different minorities and the Han majority.
CCP has a class-based and developmental phase-oriented view over social
political development including minority governance. From the very start of CCP’s
reign in China, Mao Zedong had set a clear stance for the Party to emphasize
minority regions’ natural resources’ advantage and indispensable strategic
1 Introduction: A Third Trial of National Identity … 3
significance. In his On the Major Ten Relationships, Mao claims that China has
“huge population on vast land with abundant natural resources” (Dida Wubo,
Renkou Zhongduo), he further clarifies that the “huge population” refers to the Han
majority and “abundant natural resources” refers to minority regions, both being
China’s unique advantages (Mao 1999, p. 41). The premise of the unity, stability,
and prosperity of China has a long tradition of relating itself to secured territorial
integrity, thus the attachment and identification to land as a citizen and society
member serves as a natural instrument for the state to conduct governance. CCP’s
victory against KMT during Chinese Civil War (1945–1950) is based on the
guerrilla wars backed by the support of “citadels” (genjudi) in rural areas, CCP has
since been relying on the solid foundation of rural population’s identification with
its political legitimacy yet also conscious of its vulnerable and young relationship
with its citizens especially in urban areas of China. The worshiping of minorities’
cultural diversity, massive territory, and rich natural resources has not necessarily
invited a more authentic appreciation of their cultural diversity and emancipated
identity development, especially compared to the Party’s strategy to develop the
Han majority’s economy and culture. Minority population in fact stays in a
marginalized position, its comparatively weak education foundation and limited
social resources become a convenient excuse for the Party authority to fully preside
over the politicized governance process in its autonomous regions. The state invests
various resources to enhance the socialization process of minority, such as imple-
menting citizenship education curriculum at school and propaganda campaign
programs through media, which are expected to serve as instruments in nurturing
pro-regime minority citizenship identity.
China can be considered to have experienced two trials of its national collective
identity development in modern history. During the first half of the twentieth
century, the spread of Communist ideology has earned CCP the popularity and
eventually the political legitimacy among Chinese people, especially in rural areas.
Freeing the large amount of rural population from the control of KMT and foreign
colonization has planted seeds for common Chinese people’ recognition and
identification with the political authority of CCP. Yet soon it was proved that
enforcing rigid loyalty to communism ideology and radical application of relevant
theories on a massive piece of land have brought more furnaces than joy to the
majority population in China. The Anti-Rightist Movement and Cultural
Revolution from 1960s to 1970s catastrophically held the country up for decades
from healthy development and made it miss one after another epoch-making eco-
nomic development opportunity. The collective identification with communism had
to be superior and suppressive to any other belief in China at all times, the political
and ideological perspective become the only legitimate and valid one to evaluate
Chinese society’s self-identification as a nation, since worshiping ancient and
foreign cultural virtues is either banned or isolated within Chinese society.
The second trial for a collective identity development of Chinese people took
place after the Opening and Reform in 1978, when China took the historic step
under Deng Xiaoping’s courageous leadership to switch from the non-admittance-
of-doubt ideological worship of Maoism and communism to focus on economic
development and ideological emancipation for integration with the outside world.
Not only China started repositioning itself closer to the socialism developmental
model and market-oriented economy, it also seriously started changing its rela-
tionship with the rest of the world. As commented by Deng himself, if China does
not change, it will lose its global citizenship. As the country’s economy opened to
the outside world with a much more flexible ideology orientation, the collective
identity and belief of common Chinese people also started transforming as tides of
capital and relevant ideas from outside surge into the country more frequently.
However, the fading of communism ideology faces a new danger of a collective
belief vacuum, how to bring certain cultural value and practices back while
maintaining parts of communism ideology as a central tenet to support the regime’s
political legitimacy thus became the major task.
After decades of rapid economic growth, China is now the second largest eco-
nomic entity after the United States, a pivotal player in the world economy. It starts
sending out signals of catching up ideologically to integrate further into the global
mainstream, such as launching Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and proposing
the One Belt One Road agenda. The national rejuvenation in the post-semi-colonial
China has been looking for ancient cultural inspiration and modern ideological
motive at the same time to market the idea of Chinese Dream, evidence indicates
that both political authority and civil society are increasingly getting ready to
involve into the process of the third round national identity development at the
post-communism stage. Chinese people have passed the stage of resisting foreign
invasion and getting political independence, they have also passed the stage of
mapping out an economy development path and integrating itself into the world
economy. Now with much less material development challenges imposed to the
state, both the state and civil society start pondering on its citizens’ ideological
belief. Chinese people have no excuse but to reflect upon the original questions
everyone would ask themselves in order to look for happiness, “who am I, and what
I’m supposed to do next?” Unfortunately yet obviously, the answers seem to be
complicated and far from being reached for the moment. Suggested solutions
include the restoration of Confucianism values, which were considered as an
essential component of Chinese culture; the adherence to Communism ideology,
which is the cornerstone of the PRC’s founding legitimacy; or the gradual transition
toward Western liberal democracy, which is considered as a radical solution but
would have more global resonance. Striving for a comforting prominent collective
national identity for all its citizens is important for China as its ambition does not
stay merely on expanding global economic impact, to export its value system and
influence the way the world thinks has always been part of the Chinese dream.
Through exploring the model minority’s citizenship identity development and
the current political context of China, this research tries to answer the major
question of how does the state participate in certain political socialization processes
to shape Chinese minority’s citizenship identity. Among all the Chinese minorities,
Korean minority stands out and has earned itself the honorific title of “model
minority” out of its long history within Chinese culture even before the founding of
modern P. R. China. As a minority represents almost zero confrontation with the
state during the past 50 years, “Koreans in China have been popularly portrayed by
the press/media as a model minority primarily with academic success” (Gao 2008,
p. 55). The Korean minority, different from other minorities who have been “saved”
by the CCP back in the 1930s, was itself an active participant in the local com-
munism movements alongside with Han Chinese and contributed to the shaping of
geopolitics in Manchuria with other local ethnicities. Many of them, after the land
reform and cancelation of dual-nationality policy implemented by the CCP in the
1940s, chose to stay in China and became Chinese citizen, and most of those who
did not choose to stay within People’s Republic of China ended up living in another
communism regime of North Korea. Ideologically and culturally they have inher-
ited abundant asset from their ancestors in the past, which allow them to easily
identify with the CCP’s contemporary governance philosophy. At that certain time
of history, many measures taken by the CCP was indeed out of non-antagonistic
political intention but of disastrous outcome, Korean minority had stayed to form a
concrete political alliance with the CCP, which was stable until the break of Korean
War and Cultural Revolution, after which resumed to an ameliorated momentum
again in recent decades. Though the above argument does not necessarily suggest
that Korean minority is merely a group of passive and obedient citizens. As a
minority with Confucian cultural traditions, Korean minority has selected a civi-
lized path to territorialize its identity habitus as a floating population over the years
of coexistence with their Han counterpart. In general, its surviving philosophy is
pragmatic which manages a stable balance of power relations between Han and
Korean Chinese in the region.
The hypothesis of this book contemplates the nature of autonomy mechanism
that Korean minority lives under in China, how has the autonomy policy, which
was framed upon geopolitical boundary, served as an instrument to politically
socialize Korean minority students’ experience, and eventually forged their identity
habitus as a governmental terrain for the Party-led state to govern minority citizens?
It is expected that this research would explore the above major hypothesis with field
research evidence. Over the two political socialization stages of high school and
university, Korean minority students are exposed to public political cultural space
territorialized by historical cultural development, ideological evolvement and
contemporary political socialization under the state’s hegemony. Through exploring
both qualitative and quantitative data collected from multiple field trips, how does
Korean minority’s citizenship identity take shape out of the convenience of insti-
tutional benefits, as well as socioeconomic and geopolitical development in
Northeast China would be explained, the central hypothesis assumes that the
pragmatic pursuit of socioeconomic upward mobility and cultural pride through an
emancipated politicized citizenship status, and the power dynamic between state
and both domestic, transnational civil society shaped by the instrumental autonomy,
serves as the ultimate answer to rationalize the shaping of Korean minority stu-
dents’ citizenship identity. However, between the political maneuver of state and
transnational socioeconomic activities in civil society, which side overtakes the
other in terms of impacting citizenship identity is yet to be explored and explained.
As China politically and economically further opens up, socioeconomic inequality
and cultural prejudice minority groups encounter both overseas and domestically
are better balanced and compensated by the citizenship pride that institutions strive
to provide and guarantee. This entails both cause and consequence of Korean
minority’s citizenship territorialization processes, that the state’s hegemonic power
and strong willingness to dominate and politicize its citizens’ identification with
themselves and the political authority, serves as a cause because it fundamentally
decides the political cultural background for minority citizenship development, also
serves as a consequence as it becomes a preferred hub which Korean minority
citizens consider as their identity habitus to empower themselves with a sense of
peace and security. The central argument is that, instrumental autonomy, as a highly
politicized and instrumentalized liberal policy mechanism which is consistently
implemented within a certain geographical area, serves as the foundation to shape
Korean minority’s identity habitus, their autonomous life is politicized as an
instrument to define geopolitical and governmental boundary and also provides
resources beyond the boundary in shaping their identity. The accumulated
socioeconomic and cultural assets inherited from the past, the contemporary
political context and the future perspective of their development dynamically
construct an identity habitus that decisively matter much more than the superficial
resources provided by the instrumental autonomy in eventually shaping Korean
minority’s citizenship identity during the post-communism transiting age in China.
Like the three trials of Chinese national identity presented in this chapter, China has
been exploring new possibilities of its own citizenship identity while carrying on its
ideological mission. Post-communism, as a stage during which China tries to
emancipate ideological control over various realms within the society, becomes
valuable for researchers to observe the policy adaptation trickled from state level
through political socialization process.
China has been undergoing a long and profound transiting stage ever since the
late 1970s, reflection and readjustment on its political ideological paths a core issue
throughout the process even though the superficial reform appears more economic
and social as far as until now. Economically, since it started opening up its econ-
omy in 1978, political moves have been providing accompany to better facilitate the
implementation of economic policies, relevant to the Korean minority case, it first
liberalized its political environment by establishing a series of diplomatic rela-
tionships with capitalism countries. After joining the WTO for more than a decade,
China made further efforts to not only integrate into but also lead the regional
economic development. Yet the dilemma is that the political reform has emanci-
pated the political state machine and civil society to look up to a more universal
value but also invited authentic and irreversible challenges to the regime’s legiti-
macy. The post-communism China is having a difficult time in reforming and
locating itself politically between the roles of leader and follower, as communism
steps out of the CCP’s central tenets in governing its citizens, the state has to
reexplore a number of historical, cultural assets to socialize its citizens in a less
politicized sense but still keep them under the Party’s absolute political
leadership. Korean minority, bearing both the cultural root of Confucianism,
communism and the foreign exposure to the democratic South Korea, turns itself
into a perfect case to interpret the equilibrium of ideological emancipation and

politicization regarding its own socialization. The rising state-centered nationalism,
the pursuit of Chinese Nation (Zhonghua Minzu)’s rejuvenation, and Chinese
Dream are prominent examples to prove the state’s efforts in looking for a
replacement of communism as a cohesive collective belief for its citizens. Instead of
replacing the policies with new ones, preferential policies such as autonomy are
continuously implemented yet become more instrumentalized and politicized to
guarantee the ultimate interests of the political Party. Minority citizen, as a sig-
nificant component of Chinese citizen, represent more cultural complexity and
socioeconomic challenges, the regional autonomy it enjoys naturally poses chal-
lenges to the state’s ambition in shaping a unanimous collective belief at national
level. And minority’s regional autonomy exactly explains the state’s governance
philosophy, which is about adopting policies with instrumental nature but seem-
ingly liberal autonomous style to secure the consistency and sustainability of
minority citizens’ political belief. By diffusing a still dominant and hegemonic
political belief from state level, what changes at times is the strategy that applied to
civil society’s development, which becomes more flexible and diverse in form and
in essence.
In line with the neo-Marxism perspective, this book attempts to understand the
citizenship identity of Chinese-Korean minority in the post-communism era. The
conclusion reaches to the state’s dominant and leading role over other historical and
globalization impacts in terms of orchestrating the historical legacy, cultural and
political resources to politically territorialize minority’s identity habitus. It brings
attention to the instrumental nature of MRA policy, as territorializing the identity
habitus is expected to happen from top-down, no matter whether the relevant ethnic
culture is authentic or not, rather than naturally surging from bottom-up. Although
China is smart enough to realize what is the global expectation and adapts what
happens domestically in according ways, the strong determination to nourish a
pragmatic and politically loyal citizen identity in order to secure its own political
legitimacy and authority still primarily stays as the central policy and dominates as
the governmental philosophy of the Party. The first half of the conclusion might not
be completely new, yet how is this dynamic applied to the case of Korean minority,
the so-called model minority, could shed new light on our understanding about how
does the Chinese state maneuver politics to govern its multi-ethnic citizens, and to
preserve multi-ethnic cultures authentically (Banks 2004; Kennedy 2010; Law 2011).
References
Banks JA (2004) Democratic citizenship education in multicultural societies. Jossey-Bass, San

Francisco
Gao F (2008) What it means to be a ‘model minority’: Voices of ethnic Koreans in Northeast
China. Asian Ethn 9(1):55–67
Kennedy KJ (2010) Neo-statism and post-globalisation as Contexts for New Times. In: Reid A,
Gill J, Sears A (eds) Globalization the nation-state and the citizen: dilemmas and directions for
civics and citizenship education. Routledge, London, pp 223–229
Law WW (2011) Citizenship and citizenship education in a global age: politics, policies, and
practices in China. P. Lang, New York
Mao ZD (1999) On the major ten relationships. In: Collected works of Mao Zedong VII. Renmin
Press, Beijing
Zhang JP (2013) An analysis of Chinese Minorities’ contribution to the GDP. Chinese Science and
Technology Thesis Online. http://wenku.baidu.com/view/c95dacde5022aaea998f0fea.html.
Accessed 15 Oct 2015
Chapter 2
Nation-state, Citizenship Identity,
Minority Autonomy: Orchestrating
Civil Religion and Ideology Through
Political Socialization Process
in a Post-communism Asian State
In this chapter, different sections of concepts will be discussed to present how could
the power dynamic be possibly formulated between state and civil society under
communism ideology and authoritarian political governance. How could the
politicized and instrumentalized policy such as autonomy achieve an “appease-
ment” between state’s political interest and civil society’s pursuit of emancipation
in shaping minority citizens’ identity.
Citizenship Identity, Origins, and Way Ahead
Although many scholars had anticipated in the early twentieth century that “pri-
mordial phenomena” like nationalism would decline in importance and eventually
vanish in the modern and postmodern history (Weber 1980; Fukuyama 1992),
history has proved the opposite. Culture and value differences originated from
ethnic diversity and various political cultures remain as a major source of conflicts
and unrests in many parts of the world. In a big nation with diverse ethnicities, it is
often challenging for minorities to tailor their own ethnic identity out of the national
identity, especially if the state strives to maintain a strong political authority riding
above subnational differences and interests. “A nationalist holds the view that
political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries” (Eriksen
1993, p. 6), this belief has to invite a supreme authority from the state to territo-
rialize a national culture above local and minority cultures, during which process
political socialization serves as an important instrument to facilitate knowledge
input into citizens’ minds and filter information exposed to them. Nation, thus
different from the concepts of state and country, is a politicized cultural concept that
could hold up to several or even more different ethnic groups within certain political
boundary. Taking the Korean Diasporas for example, people of the Korean eth-
nicity mainly live in three different political regimes on the contemporary Korean
Peninsula, although sharing the same original ethnic culture, they now live under
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017 9
M. (Yolanda) Yu, Instrumental Autonomy, Political Socialization,
and Citizenship Identity, Governance and Citizenship in Asia,
DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-2694-2_2
10 2 Nation-state, Citizenship Identity …
three political ideologies of socialism (China), communism (North Korea), and

democracy (South Korea). The North Korea and South Korea both still carry a
strong willingness to reunite with each other and rejuvenate a politically unified
Korean nation as a whole, while Korean population in other Asian countries is
considered as overseas compatriots migrated outside of the Peninsula at different
generations. Members of the Chinese-Korean minority, as Chinese citizens, have
been considerably socialized by their state and tend to consider themselves more
culturally rather than politically connected to the Korean Diasporas.
Colin Mackerras has discussed the conceptualization of minority by studying the
translation of the term “nation” and “minority” in Chinese, which are Minzu and
Shaoshu Minzu separately. The character “min” and “zu” refer to “citizen” and
“ethnicity”, respectively (Mackerras 1994, p. 3), which is more political than
anthropological compared to its original English term as it emphasizes “min” before
“zu”; and “shaoshu” means the minority’s weakness in a numeric sense compared
to the majority “duoshu” for the word of majority. Yet as “shaoshu” appears before
both “min” and “zu”, so different from the English word, it interestingly refers to
minority’ weaker stance as both “citizen” and “ethnicity” compared to majority in
Chinese. This perspective also indicates that in China everyone is considered as a
citizen of the regime primarily before they fit in as ethnic member or other social
cultural roles, thus a marginalized number as an ethnic group further extends to
impact how they are treated as citizens. With both inborn and postnatal factors
included, ethnic identity is shaped out of minority’s citizen and ethnic experience in
China, under the political supervision formulated and implemented from the top of
the political machine. Abner Cohen emphasizes the important relationship between
ethnicity identity and political power, he reminds us that “ethnicity is a matter of
degree”, which indicates how dependent the development of ethnic minority is on
its political circumstances. Sometimes ethnic identity confusion and conflict show
up in unthreatening forms, but some other time it might lead to serious violence and
bloodshed, as power interaction and its derived form in presentation between the
ethnicities and political authority varies. The Korean minority has been crowned the
“model minority” in China, yet the absence of superficial contention does not
represent the complete success of political socialization, nor there is no depression
or grudge accumulated at all. In other words, from peace to riots, there is neither
clear boundary drawn nor clear tipping point locked as the contributing factors that
lead to identity formation are accumulated over history and contemporary political
development instead of taking place overnight. Most importantly, this dynamic of
fluidity and mobility exists all the time so it is not up to a fixed status for good, it
evolves with history. The potential failure to secure self-esteem and happiness has a
latent effect on the superficially harmonious coexistence when we explore deeper
into the specific development of certain minorities’ ethnic identity. One typical
nonviolent reaction would be the counter-political-socialization process during
which people embed their social and cultural relationships from other dimensions as
a demonstration to the unsatisfying and hegemonic political socialization process
enforced by the state. To various degrees minority groups absolutely long for an
opportunity to change at least their economic and cultural status in those illiberal
Citizenship Identity, Origins, and Way Ahead 11
democratic or authoritarian states, the cultural habitus of ethnic groups become the
universes of their nonpolitical pursuits, though more than often these actions are
still considered in politicized terms by politically conservative state (Cohen 1996).
Identity politics is “broadly defined as political action oriented on the needs,
values, and interests of particular collective groups possessing a shared identity”
(Thiel and Coate 2010, p. 1), the shaping process of collective identity takes place
in both vertical and horizontal directions alongside the development of various
nation-state politics. The first wave of identity politics study rise along with the civil
rights movement in the 1960s, power and how it shapes various groups of people’s
identification has since become the central focus of identity politics research in the
United States. Entering the twenty-first century, the “globalization certainly aug-
mented competitive pressures” for identity politics among different cultures and
regimes, it also enforces the international identity political dialogue to become more
transparent by a more commonly acknowledged universal standard.
As a number of international organizations as well as numerous NGOs and civil
groups are surging around the globe, identity development and relevant discussion
involve more participants at multilevels of governance and invite more ferocious
discussion on the traditional hegemonic role of nation-state. The global ideology
flow from the technologically and economically advantageous Global North has
further consolidated its leading status and secures its existing advantage in setting
an international standard, if there could be any, for citizenship development
everywhere. For the Global South, looking up to the Global North for its com-
paratively more successful experience obviously does not answer all the questions
derived from its own postcolonial or post-communism/authoritarianism experience
sufficiently. The historical experience about power has proved that domestic cul-
tural background and political development is a primary and prior determinant
factor of domestic groups’ identity politics dynamic, identity politics thus remains
strongly attached to territory and sovereignty, though it is not doubted that the
self-actualization of any specific group should be encouraged in a multivalue and
free society, as a universal human right (Thiel and Coate 2010; Turner 1990, 1993).
In liberal democratic countries, relevant legislative practices and government
policies serve as powerful instruments to unite and regulate citizens from different
ethnic and social backgrounds, which guarantees minority groups with institutional
support that they do not feel left out or marginalized in the political and socioe-
conomic development process. However, to authoritarian regimes, the reconcilia-
tion with cultural pluralism increasingly rises as a challenge in the new century
(Young 1976; Henders 2004), as reaching unanimous political and cultural
agreements among groups with various ethnic backgrounds inevitably and con-
stantly involves conflicts over resource distribution and power competition. In the
context of East Asia, what has been argued by the plural society critics is that the
use of force is less uncommon due to the existence of “deeply divided multiethnic
societies” and the traditional appreciation of strong political leadership, which are
“wielded by a colonial or other authoritarian government, or a dominating ethnic
group” (Henders 2004, p. 3). In China, the post-communism state and a strong
Party in political leadership spend persistent efforts to reshape a superficial ethnic
cultural diversity from top-down in order to create and maintain harmony among
minorities. In other words, cultural and ethnic diversity is more an artificial deco-
ration for the regime’s political legitimacy rather than an authentic pursuit as a
belief of the regime. Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore is a positive and exceptional
example to illustrate this perspective and prove that how a nation-state can
implement minority policy under its reign on ethnic cultural fusion and guide it
toward an authentic social harmony. In a similar vein, China is trying to implement
a minority governance policy to guarantee a united interethnic relationship and a
unified citizenship identity through maintaining their diverse languages’ and cul-
tures’ coexistence. Through institutional school education, through daily informal
media exposure, the governmental strategy of the state tries to reach as many
citizens as possible with extra efforts labeling minority members as Chinese citi-
zens, promoting their support for the Party, and maintaining their harmonious
relationship with the Han majority.
Multiple scholars’ works focus on the power and impact of state’s ideology,
which is believed to be able to weigh on people’s identity formation. Through
examining human society’s development in different historical stages, it is not
doubted that collective identity formation and development is a natural accompa-
nying product of institutional and informal socioeconomic, political development
(Gellner 1983, 1994, 1997; Anderson 1991; Arendt 1973, 1978, 1998; Gramsci
1971; Forgacs 1988; Jessop 2005). When the state came into existence and
struggled to survive there arrives the collective identification of citizens to them-
selves and to the political institution they develop within, and this collective identity
develops on the foundation of accumulated cultural and political heritage invented
or obtained by the state. During this process, “high culture” is invented by the state
and dominated by its ideology to homogenize citizens’ identity throughout the
modernization process. Transforming or reforming the state politics successfully
and acceptably can grant a regime more authority and legitimacy, more resources
and accountability to further govern its people without rebellion. Policies serve for
this purpose thus essentially serve as instruments for the implementation of state’s
ideology rather than value-free policy frameworks. Meanwhile, the by-product of
these political, socioeconomic developments and reforms, such as a growing sup-
portive middle class, better foreign exposure, higher religious freedom, or more
pragmatic cooperation from the political opponents, are expected to facilitate to
harmonize politics among different ethnic and socioeconomic groups rather than
taking place for granted (Chang 2004; Mackerras 1994, 1995).
From the 1970s to the 1980s, the Great Debate on nationalism already has
focused intensively on how has nation-state come into existence and has been
maintained, the discussion on its development yet has not become out-of-date at all
as new challenges emerge confronting the traditional role of state as our world
globalizes. At the start, the argument was about the order of nation-state’s
becoming and citizenship identity’s birth between modernists and perennialists;
while nowadays, either being ethnic-rooted or citizenship-significant, citizenship
identity is discussed to observe how it serves as an outcome of intermingled cultural
and sociopolitical developments. It is argued in this book that the state, especially a
Citizenship Identity, Origins, and Way Ahead 13
less democratic one, could not only invent or “imagine” nation to a decisive degree,
but also learns to maneuverably deploy strategies that do not explicitly indicate the
governmental ideology behind to influence minorities’ identification, by territori-
alizing a governmental space either coincides with their geographical autonomous
terrain or not, with the state. By implementing these instrumental policies in the
regional autonomy mechanism, especially through political socialization campaigns
at school and via media in China, minority citizens’ citizenship identity develop-
ment is nurtured by the historical, cultural heritage and contemporary political
dynamic, it possesses real power in facilitating to maintain the political discourse
and even enforce the political authority to adapt its strategies.
Believing that human freedom is the ultimate purpose for which the history is
becoming, quite a number of philosophers’ arguments on the role that state plays
are also reexplored in terms of identity politics research. From communitarianism,
totalitarianism, to cultural hegemony and metagovernance, cliché and niche con-
cepts are reinterpreted within the globalizing context to understand how
illiberal/nondemocratic state is reinventing instruments to realize its governing
ideologies and to facilitate its citizens to reach their equilibrium between being
autonomous and being governed (Hegel and Miller 1998; Plant 1984; Arendt 1978;
Habermas 1994; Hoig 1988; Gramsci 1971; Jessop 2006). Inheriting the philo-
sophical arguments from the masters, later researches propose how the formation of
citizenship identity notably happens through state’s supervision of education,
propaganda, and other relevant political socialization channels (Bourdieu et al.
1993; DiMaggio 1979; Habermas 1994; O’Mahony 2010). Various terms about the
territorialization process of this (Elden 2005, 2006, 2009, 2013; Crampton and
Elden 2007; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Bourdieu 1993; Habermas 1994,
Verstraeten 1996), such as habitus, public sphere, terrain, are raised to illuminate
the process of citizenship identity formation and maintenance within the cultural
boundary of nation and the political boundary of state. The autonomy practiced
within state hence could expand beyond geographic boundary as the possibility of a
new mobile public space arises, more importantly it serves or is originally expected
to serve as an instrument of governmental ideology for nation-state (Crampton and
Elden 2007; Lears 1985; Barry et al. 1996; Larner 2000; Lemke 2002). State as a
source of coercion, and instrumental policies as real practices, manage to mediate
global capital expansion’s impact on domestic political power maintenance by
paying attention to citizens’ collective identity (Castres 2007; Deleuze and Guattari
1987). The citizens within a nation-state can obviously be ethnically and culturally
diverse, when their citizenship identity socialized through state’s policy is expected
to be developing at a unanimous pace, common ideological and cultural collective
memory become catalyst to accelerate the process of identity socialization, such
as cultural customs, civil, religious, and political believes. One fundamental dif-
ferent perspective neo-Marxism offers differently from neoliberalism in terms of
citizenship identity formation is that how state could consciously and deliberately
monitor this process with instrumental policies (Fukuyama 1992; Dimitrova-Grajzl
et al. 2010; Turner 1990, 1993, 2004). State, still as a force of coercion through
much less rigid and overt policy implementation different from the past, is more
capable and aware to manage to recruit stateless people and to consolidate

minorities’ identification under the reign of its governmental instruments in the new
era (Scott 2009).
Ideology of Communism and Civil Religion

of Confucianism: Discretionary Power Over Civil
Society for Chinese Citizenship Identity Development
Continue from the discussion above, ethnic cultural diversity underpins the flexibility
of citizens’ identity formation while cultural hegemony constrains it throughout
political socialization process. Political ideology or ideology-like way of thinking
from the superstructure level has the dominant impact on economic and social life of
citizens, while with the degree varies from the most politically and economically
liberal societies to the illiberal ones, it tends to be realized through both social cultural
and political measures without explicit distinction. Not entirely divergent from the
Marxist tradition, it does embrace an emancipation from political manipulation of
resources by recognizing that the sustainable maintenance of its own political dis-
course cannot stay away from being a conjuncture of social, cultural, and economic
history. However, difference and diversity are not particularly well preferred on the
traditional Left. A communism state tends to rationalize its policy making and
governance by claiming its representation of the common good and justice for its
citizens, which overpasses the significance of a variety of rights and demands from
the citizens. Facing political diversity, the Marxism tradition reveals its impoverished
condition as the monologist concept of class struggle stays as the sole foundation,
thus plurality is not considered but antagonism is welcomed (Derrida 1993; Borradori
2003). Identity, instead of being a transparent accomplished fact, should be con-
ceived as a product of infinite historical fluidity representing civil society’s rela-
tionship with state. The more constrained or even nonexisting a civil society is, the
more dominant cultural hegemony will be from the state (Turner 1986, 2001;
Marshall 1981). Especially in a society with both political and cultural traditions of
worshiping the belief of becoming oneness and making all citizens “equal”, there
would be less struggle and resistance from the civil society in response to the
enforced governmental or even political strategies from the state. Diasporas culture
also has an indispensable impact on an ethnic or cultural group’s identity formation in
terms of oneness and shared culture, which both profoundly impact the identity
politics in the postcolonial and postmodern world as it provides another dimension
with transnational geopolitical and governmental boundaries. A collective “one true
self” is a delicate equilibrium reached via balancing the many superficial or artifi-
cially imposed “selves” by multilevel authorities along these boundaries, constructed
by a shared history, collective memory, or one common ancestry, one fatherland
(Schopflin 2000; McCarthy 2009).
Ideology of Communism and Civil Religion of Confucianism … 15
In some societies, just as why we are discussing the post-communism ideo-

logical legacy, the secularization effort of either religions or civil cultural believes
cannot be complete, because civil culture is an complicated composition of cultural,
religious, and ideological elements inherited from different stages of history and
development. Communism, as one of the most powerful ideologies existing in our
world, has “kept societies in a cocoon of ignorance about the rest of the world and
thereby deprived them of acquiring the cognitive equipment for dealing with rapid
change” (Schopflin 2000, p. 107; McCarthy 2009), which makes the post-
communism ideological transition a rather long and volatile experimental process.
Problems arise as communism fades into history, because actions have already been
taken to destroy the old moral criteria without establishing new ones and getting the
according universal acceptance, it is thus still challenging to enhance state’s
legitimacy to end the questioning and threats it faces. The assumed political aliens,
the ideological others at this time function as the buffering zone toward where
political resentment could be directed, they could be a common historical enemy
like Japan, or a local ethnic minority who is politically uncompetitive. Usually
ideological thinking, like many other collective believes, is regarded as incom-
patible of their counterparts within one society. By antagonizing its competitors,
conservative ideological thinking functions in a destructive spiral rather than a
constructive pattern. Even within one Diasporas ethnic culture, there cannot be one
homogeneous belief due to political and economic development divergences.
Cultures, especially Diasporas cultures, always contain elements that could serve as
either advantage or disadvantage for identity development within a certain political
discourse. If the cultural elements reaffirm the ideological value advocated by the
state, political identity is re-enhanced; if the cultural elements clash with the
mainstream political value, then the political identity would face more challenges
and uncertainties rather than blesses.
In the post-Cold-War era, the pervasive Western discourse convinces us to
follow and think in the so-called “global” power layout and experience ourselves as
either insiders or outsiders against the Global North (Said 1978; Crampton and
Elden 2007; Barry et al. 1996; Larner 2000; Lemke 2002). No matter in Eastern or
Western political cultures, the representation of citizens in politics explains how
people distribute power and compromise to resources distribution mechanisms,
knowledge is transferred and consensus is consolidated through the multidimen-
sional power interactions. The transfer of knowledge greatly impacts people’s
identity formation, which is in a more internalized way even though indirectly
guided by external powers. Positioning a subject or a group of people as one of
“others” then govern it in a politically hegemonic discourse which is different from
subjecting them to a type of “knowledge”, as the latter focuses on the inner com-
pulsion of power and subjects’ voluntary willingness to compromise and convert
their identity. Even though traditionally communism does not prefer this soft
socialization strategy, adapted version of this ideology or derived forms of this
collective belief bear impressive potentiality to the political authority as a channel
to generate more inner compulsion within citizens to strengthen their identification
with state’s legitimacy.
Ideological development process, being significant in terms of shaping people’s

collective identity, is defined to be both the cause and re-enhanced outcome of “the
impact of inherited patterns of cognition, the types of reasoning, and the structure of
expectations and self-definitions” within a society (Arendt 1978, 1998; Schopflin
2000, p. 99). The common belief and self-identification with a transcendental law is
the beginning of accepting an ideology, in this sense civil religions accumulated
through cultural and historical experience have always in fact prepared citizens for
their later ideology digestion and selection. Ideological thinking therefore is a
power game of logically reinventing the preexisting cultural and ideological codes
in one society while decoding the other ideological signals introduced from other
resources (Arendt 1973). As for ethnic minorities with Diasporas connection,
hybridity is one constant feature under the combined influence of globalization and
state politics, the dynamic of which also offers state an opportunity to approach
various resources to reproduce themselves anew. An emancipation from the dom-
inance of communism ideology has make the impact from Diasporas more sig-
nificant, when people have the capacity of re-innovating these diverse ideologies for
their own development, the moment would become free instead of constraining for
the minority (Miller 1995), the occurrence of many social and political conflicts
could be explained by this observation and interpreted differently with less judg-
ment based on cynicism. Culture by nature is not homogeneous, through the
reinvention of it could work in a manner to facilitate cooperation and compromise
for identification unity to secure political legitimacy of nation-state (Schopflin
2000). Even within a homogeneous culture, it might still be slow and difficult to
transform the ideology belief and people’s identification with it, its specific com-
bination with culture would turn itself and the world surrounding it into its unique
version of world-making, either as a faulty or authentic cognitive process. The
group of people in power of leading the ideology shaping, such as cultural elite
groups, political governing authority, or ethnic majorities, often selectively utilizes
the part of history or reality in its preference, converts it into a normative propo-
sition before imposing it on the people collectively. Whoever in charge of dis-
tributing the relevant resources is in great power to manipulate the governmentality
process and other relevant governance instruments. In an imbalanced political
power pattern, how ideological context is shaped often becomes risky, just like the
situation in many communism, authoritarian, and illiberal democratic countries.
“No community comes innocent into the world” (Demick 2010), when certain
ideology embeds itself within certain culture, power distribution and relevant
application could decide the derived collective thinking and generate immense
power in shaping people’s collective social behavior. In a society with a strong
political state leadership such as communism, it provides ground rules with the
support of state political apparatus and thus could afford to care less about the
authenticity of policy efficacy, such as through prison, police, and media
censorship. Currently, many states emphasize the development of ethnic national-
ism as they realize how much power they can still extract from this traditional idea.
Through market reform and ideological depoliticization, the obverse of discre-
tionary power has left behind societies with a hazy idea of what can and cannot be
achieved through politics, which explains why in many post-communism political

cultures there is either belief vacuum or belief chaos. Religion, or any pervasive
collective belief, plays a similar role like culture in “the conservation of ideological
thinking, though not in the most obvious way” (Schopflin 2000, p. 104). The
populist discourse or relevant ones become popular as it tends to explain the
regime’s own political govern failure by referring to an antagonized “enemy”, as a
weak way to demonstrate who “we” are.
As pursuing a neo-nationalism civil collective belief offers new hope, we have to
come back to what we have already briefly discussed in the introduction,
Confucianism. Confucian cultural tradition is another path explored by reflecting on
political ideological development in the post-communism China. More than a
century ago when intellectual predecessors like Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao
were blueprinting China’s civil religion development before communism was
introduced and bloomed in China, both argued that a renewed China under tradi-
tional Confucian ideology would entitle the Chinese with “both the ability and
responsibility to subjugate the ‘white race’ and rule the world” (Chang and Turner
2012). “Confucian universalism” could work with and coexist with Han chauvinism
well in terms of stabilizing social harmony (Gries 1999, p. 64). China has been
ruling its “barbarians” living by its ancient kingdoms’ border for thousands of years
within the ancient tribute system, it has also gone through a rough modernization
path by fighting against different foreign colonization powers on the international
political stage. There is an opaque boundary between the positive and negative
interpretation of this cultural legacy as China’s expected and becoming role in
current international politics stays unclear. It both wants to get rid of the image
shaped by its humiliating modern history and restore its ancient “central kingdom”
glory, yet has to be careful as its rise still often is read as the rise of the last
communism that works. Homogenous and hegemonic root of ideology evolvement
in China goes back earlier before the import of communism ideology, as Kang
Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Sun Yat-sen, the most famous masters as China’s last
great Confucians, all argue for the importance of a renewal of “yellow race” against
“white race”. The great ethnic unity thus is not only about ethnic harmony within
China, it is also about unifying diverse ethnicities as “one Chinese” to confront the
“Western other”, which is almost identical with what communism claims during the
Cold-War era. The longing for a great rejuvenation of Chinese Nation could thus be
interpreted as reviving another version of the ancient tribute system of Chinese
Han-centered orders by combining with its modern political experience of semi-
colonization and communism. Since its very ancient history, the strong belief in the
universal availability of its own value leaves China as a rough partner who could
“harden boundaries when barbarians do not accept Chinese values” (Gries 1999,
p. 64), which is also not new and unique to its communism experience alone. Thus
as long as the identification with its sole political authority is not challenged, the
Communist Party concurs the adoption of Confucianism in reinstalling a prosperous
nationalism, many core values of Confucianism advocates are about loyalty to the
existing political, gender, and familial authority, which helps the authority to
socialize its Han and minority citizens to maintain as certain social order. Neither
Confucianism nor communism would necessarily thin out nationalism, all together
they could contribute to a racism-sponsored and ideology-supported nationalism.
As communism pursues ideological dominance and Confucianism culturally seeks
to become the common moral foundation for civil religion, they naturally become
armament tools for an unconditional defense of Han-superior culture, China-
centered and state-dominant political worldview. This kind of national aspirations
or patriotism complex serves as a kind of seemingly dilution yet actual enhance-
ment of political ideology, as they could be more flexible and less didactic to
approach legitimacy for the political authority’s governmentality process. However,
the communism state’s role is viewed as the society’s exploiter, and its central focus
has often been regarded as “an enormous concentration of power and a homoge-
nization of society” (Schopflin 2000, p. 171). As an ironic consequence, the more
difficult the state finds about rooting out nationalism and other relevant traditional
cultural elements, the more likely it ends up in aligning with it or arms itself up with
this instrument. Partially because how limited the communism state trusts civil
society and the culture nurtured within it, also partially because how dependent it
has to be on civil society in order to maintain its legitimacy in the long run. The
communism state usually ends up in constructing or maintaining easy, visible but
mostly unauthentic cultural legacies, thus modernization and industrialization
cannot be a complete and organized process due to a lack of authentic cultural
foundation and ideological emancipation, which in long term would threaten the
legitimacy and accountability of nation-state.
“Just”, “mutual obligation”, and “civil contract (minyue)” are emphasized values
by Confucianism, which accepts that the governing is in power and the governed is
passive. How citizens and civil society view and accept this power pattern exactly
explains why the Western sample of democracy has not rooted in Chinese society
(Chang and Turner 2012). Conflicts and solving them through social contract is not
considered to be real success, a regime within which the ruler cares for the spiritual
and material development of the subjects it rules with the latter understanding and
trusting the former with their welfare and well-being is more commonly considered
as the ideal type of governance in Confucianism. Thus deriving a common
understanding from common ideological belief, be it Confucianism or communism,
and further configuring out common interests then obeying a certain social order to
purse the goal, is a potential formula for political harmony within Chinese society.
Both the contemporary China and other East Asian countries once heavily influ-
enced by its ancient cultural ideology have revealed how conservative they can be
when the issue of individual autonomy or sovereign individual rises, because this
kind of term is totally new to the Confucian cultural tradition.
When communism revolution came to China, it embeds and interweaves its
ideological components within the established cultural context rather than being
able to root the old pattern out. In other East Asian countries, even when Western
democracy has been introduced and adapted to develop impressively, ethnic
homogeneity and loyalty to traditional Confucianism culture can still keep brewing
the belief in collectivism but not individualism. China, being ethnically diverse,
replaced it with a politically homogeneous belief of communism to guarantee
collective loyalty to the political authority. It reckons less rising challenges at the
start because it connects itself up to the Comintern as universal standard and down
to the proletariat as universal care for the grassroots interests, yet it has to look for
new directions as ideological confrontation and absolute state authority fade into
history. Among the communism pioneers, Lenin from former Soviet Union for-
mulates the policy of “national in form, socialist in content”, which aims to unite
people from different ethnic backgrounds but eventually implement communism
ideology. In communists’ view, the class struggle and the proletarian mission of
overthrowing the capitalism, usually represented by the USA, enjoys the primary
priority. Hence the social, cultural, and ethnic development of minority is the
governing mediation rather than goal, and relevant autonomous policy serves as
instrument rather than the purpose. This belief is widely adopted in most com-
munism countries, as the ideology itself never aims to mediate interethnic cultural
differences, the hermeneutical high-land communism claims have allowed political
authority to store criticism up as long as it constructs the discourse of ultimate class
struggle (McCarthy 2009). This belief has naturally granted supreme power to the
communism state, which monitors the development of multiculture and languages
from an ideologically conservative stance. Communism believes that by setting out
to destroy the old cohesions within a society, which blindly believes that unity and
harmony would be easily achieved because other “superficial” measures do not
solve concrete social conflicts anyway. Like many other religions or civil religions
like Christianity and Confucianism, becoming one within the society is the ultimate
goal, even though the path leading to becoming one and how to define the one in
specific format could differ tremendously. Further danger lies in the understanding
and reinterpretation of subgroup differences such as local ethnic histories and rel-
evant legitimacy of political regimes. Communism holds a static perspective over
the political evolvement, as it obviously foresees “an ultimate classless society” as
the goal. Thus it does not favor diversity and dynamic essentially, neither trusts
nonzero-sum political game because battles among classes are necessary and only
one class should win out. It barely has constructed any mechanism in monitoring
the potential political and cultural transformation, the sense of obligation and
mission to establish an ultimate happy society has explained the arrogance of
communism party in being ineffective to find a more convincing alternative to
replace the coercive and discretionary manner of governance.
In terms of minority political life, communist party usually consider itself as the
savior of minorities from their previous original and disadvantaged political
development stages, which further waives the possibility of negotiating to define
real autonomous right in minorities’ favor since it is already considered as a gift.
Class is the dominant form of social group categorizing criteria, and class remains
as the only criteria that need to be worked on until it “disappears”. This mentality
explains phenomenon beyond communism period in China, in the post-Cultural
Revolution China especially since the Opening and Reform in 1978, the economic
development has benefited not only the Han majority but also the minorities, among
whom especially the growing middle class have highly recognized the legitimacy
and authority of political leadership for endowing them with economic prosperity.
Yet the economic development itself has not concretely answered the political
identity confusion at all, though it temporarily creates a false consciousness of
harmony, the foundation for its sustainable development could not be consolidated
as long as the political disparity exists. As the political and social discourse still
works in majority’s advantage, minorities cannot secure their economic and cultural
achievement facing the overwhelming competition with the majority, they are
doomed to end up suffering a double disadvantage as being marginalized citizen
and economic development victim in the long run. Cultural Revolution has rep-
resented this situation in its apex, since ethnic identity and its development are
regarded as an outcome of class inequality rather than a culturally divergent ethnic
diversity, minority’s development is considered as the class conflict and a lower
stage minority “thing”. The formal political minority representation in cultural,
social, and political institutions thus becomes more symbolic decoration of the
political slogans instead of being authentic and meaningful. Since communism
emphasizes the singular discourse of class difference, social and cultural diversity is
antagonized totally in order to “block the potential for the evolution of cross-
cutting, multilayered identities” (Schopflin 2000, p. 246). As a way to waive out
political risk for the political regime, a state machine under the leadership of
communism party, or even a post-communism one, thus would only experiment to
develop without an emancipated civil society, where responding to citizens’ diverse
identity demands does not have to be considered as a necessity like in a Western
democratic civil society.
Historical Evolvement of Chinese Nationalism

as a Construction of Civil Religion
Liang Qichao (1873–1929) is one of the earliest intellectuals who started ques-
tioning the relationship between individuals and political system within Chinese
cultural and political contexts when the Qing Dynasty began to collapse in early
twentieth century. He put “an important emphasis on the idea of the citizen as a new
creation with a moral purpose” (Chang and Turner 2012, p. 28) and suggested to
renew and recreate these terms from top-down by reestablishing Confucianism as
the national civil religion, even though it did not happen but somehow was
achieved by another “political religion” of communism. The ancient Tributary
System, Sinocentrism (Huayi Order), and Confucianism as the national civil reli-
gion have greatly impacted scholars’ thinking about ethnic politics and minority
governance in China. In the modern history of China, Sun Yat-sen is another most
influential predecessor advocating and promoting the idea of Chinese nationalism.
His early perception of this issue is expressed somehow in racial terms by arguing
that Chinese is a single pure yellow race. He promoted this idea by claiming the
illegitimacy of Manchu ruling Qing Dynasty (AD 1636–1912) and Mongolian
ruling Yuan Dynasty (AD 1271–1368) in Chinese history, as Han is the only
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He was going now, holding his patient horse by the bridle, but Margery
stopped him.
"There's Jacob—don't bolt, else he'll think you've seen him and want to
avoid him," she said.
The man stopped, therefore, till Bullstone's trap was beside them. Jacob
smiled genially and Auna asked her mother to ascend and be driven home.
A few words passed. Margery told how her brother was shining as huckster,
and Adam hoped that Jeremy had now settled down at last and was on the
way to prosperity. Jacob smiled again and hoped so too, and then Margery
climbed into the trap.
She spoke of Adam when they had left him, but her husband paid no
heed to this matter. He was anxious to know if two letters had reached Red
House.
Then he told Auna how good the dogs had been, and she, hardened to
these partings, was glad they had gone bravely.
Jacob appeared to be as usual and the contents of his letters served to

put him in a good temper; yet Margery was sharply conscious of the hidden
watcher that night and, after some hesitation, she decided upon returning to
the subject of Adam Winter.
When they were alone she did so, though in doubt to the last moment
whether it was expedient. The thing she designed to say might merely serve
to remind Jacob of a trifling incident he had already forgotten; but she knew
the contrary was far more likely to be the case. The significance of the
matter would possibly be lessened by a few words concerning it. She was
heartily sorry that the thing had happened; and yet felt it hard and absurd
that such a trifle should cause her sorrow. Thus she was in an uncertain
mood when she did address him—a mood not indifferent or scornful of the
incident, otherwise she had not returned to it at all; but a mood a little
regretful for herself, and in no sense tinctured with that repentance, which
alone would have made it really desirable to speak.
She waited for some time to see if Jacob himself would allude to it—a
fact that showed how little she really grasped the inner nature of the man;
for past experience might well have taught her that his silence was assured.
He did not mention Winter at all, but spoke placidly of his children and
declared that now the holidays were done and the boys back at school, he
missed Peter in the kennels. He then proceeded to tell her that he was glad
he had decided to keep Barton Gill in his old, responsible position a little
longer. These things drifted past Margery's ear, and then, just before Jacob
finished his glass of spirits and rose to lock up, she spoke.
"I'm sorry you saw me push Adam this afternoon. It was a silly thing;
but he was poking fun at me, and you know how I'll respond to a challenge.
Just an impulse, because I couldn't think of a sharp answer."
"Are you sorry you did it, or only sorry I saw you do it?" he asked, but
did not wait for a reply. "No matter—you needn't answer. You keep so
young for your age, though you always say you're old for it."
"I'm sorry. I grant it was foolish. But Winter's an old friend, and I feel as
if we might almost be brother and sister sometimes. He's good to the
children too."
"We'll go to bed," he said.
"Not till you've forgiven me."
"If you know you did a vulgar thing, that's to the good."
She flushed.
"I wish somebody had saved your life," she said, "then you'd find that
you never can feel to that person same as you feel to other people."
"Christ's blood!" he swore, but hissed it and did not raise his voice to be
heard beyond the room. "When are we going to hear the end of that?"
She was alarmed, and echoes of a similar incident, now some years old,
came to her memory. She stared at him, then banished her fear, put her arms
round his shoulders and kissed him.
"I'm so sorry, dear. I seem to get so clumsy."
He, too, was sorry, though for something other than he now declared.
He apologised and blamed himself for being a fool; while in his heart he
felt that his folly lay, not in his anger, but the display of it. The watcher had
lifted a corner and peered from its concealment; the banked fires had
broken into a visible flame. He had been betrayed by the accident of her
apology, and shown her something he had no desire to show her.
Her next word accentuated his error.
"I hoped you would have mentioned it and given me a talking to. I
deserved it."
"Seeing that I've never chidden you for anything on God's earth in my
life, it wasn't very likely I should begin to-night, was it?"
"I might be happier if you did chide me. I dare say I do many things you
hate; if you told me so, I wouldn't do them again."
"You may be right; but it's contrary to my nature to play schoolmaster.

Where I don't like a thing and can change it myself, I do; but where others
are concerned, if it's not my place to order, I don't order."
"I know; but if you'd order oftener, or express an opinion as you have
to-night, we might all be quicker to do your will."
"Women like tyrants, it's said," he replied. "But I'm not built that way,
and if wit and love can't see to please without being ordered—so much the
worse. Forget it; forget it."
"No," she answered. "I'll take very good care not to forget it, Jacob."
"So you think; but true memory comes from the heart, not the head."
He was unusually silent for many days, as she knew he would be. Then
he grew cheerful again and spoke of Shipley and the Winters in his
customary, indifferent fashion.
CHAPTER V
THE CHILDREN
On a winter's morning the Red House children were playing in a great

ruin which stood near their home. Clay works had brought a busy company
to Shipley vale in past times; but now only the walls of the drying houses
and the stack of the furnace still stood, while above them, on the hill, large
pits, whither had flowed the liquid clay from its bed on the high moor, were
now filled with herbage, foxgloves, blackberries and sapling trees.
This famous playground found a small company of children and dogs

assembled, and among them, as cheerful as any, was an ancient man. Old
Billy Marydrew delighted in young people, and they found him more
understanding than the middle-aged.
Children and red dogs romped over ground sparkling with frost, and
Billy sat on a stone and enjoyed the entertainment. Auna fetched and
carried; Avis issued orders, John Henry with some condescension, took his
part. And then he quarrelled with his brother about a terrier that he was
trying to teach a trick.
"He shall do it; I'll larn him," vowed John Henry hotly.
"He can't do it—no Irish terrier could do it," answered Peter.
They argued over the ability of the bewildered bitch, and Peter appealed
to Billy; whereupon Mr. Marydrew agreed that John Henry was demanding
impossibilities.
"When I was as young as you, John Henry," he said, "my father gave me
some silkworms for a present, and I was a determined nipper and thought
I'd train 'em up in the way they should go. And I gave 'em some very fine
poplar leaves, which other worms be fond of. But my father warned me and
said they must have lettuce. 'No, father,' I told him. 'They shall eat the
poplar, because I will it. I won't have no caterpillars setting up their wills
against mine.'"
"Did you make 'em, Mr. Marydrew?" asked Auna.
"I did not, my pretty. Instead, I found out that, though a small boy can
put a worm on a leaf, the whole round world won't make the worm eat it—
not if it isn't his food."
"And nobody won't make 'Nixie' stand on her head," vowed Peter,
"because it's contrary to her nature to do such foolishness. They French
poodles will larn any silly thing; but not an English dog."
John argued to the contrary; Avis and Auna tried to teach the puppies to
slide on a frozen pond and John Henry, quite unconvinced, turned to pursue
'Nixie's' studies. But that wise dog had bolted home.
Then came along Jacob Bullstone, and hearing his children's voices, he
turned off the road and entered the ruin. He joined the games for a few
minutes; then Avis and Peter, who were in charge of the dogs, went
homeward, and John Henry followed with Auna, while their father
proceeded to the road beside old William.
"I've been to Owley," he said. "My brother-in-law's weakening. Doesn't

like this cold weather."
The ancient laughed.
"He'll stand to it a bit longer yet. The pinch be going to come when the
babby does. Then he'll have to work for the pair of 'em, and go to market
instead of his wife."
"What's the matter with the man?"

"Nothing. A very ordinary sort of man, and if he'd been a lord, or a
landed proprietor, or any sort of chap called to spend money instead of earn
it, he'd have been a great success. Don't we know scores of the upper people
like him? But he wants a thick-set hedge of money between him and real
life. Even as it is, he has had a good bit of yours, not to say his father's.
Afore Jeremy Huxam can shine, he must have the mercy and good-will of
his neighbours. Their good-will he's got, and their mercy he'll surely want,
if there ever comes a time when he's got to stand alone. But a charming
chap I'm sure, and not an enemy. Same as your wife, without her pluck and
sense, Jacob. Your boys are more like their grandmother than her own son
be."
"So I've heard, and don't want to hear it again," answered Bullstone.
"Judith Huxam's no great heroine of mine, Billy, as you know. I see myself
in my sons, and who more likely to be in them?"
"They're a very fine pair of dear boys, and their fortunes are on their
foreheads," said Mr. Marydrew. "Born to command is John Henry. Peter's
most like you in my judgment—got your painstaking care for details. He's
larning all there is to know about the dogs."
"From me."
"Who else? And why for don't you see all the way with Judith Huxam?
My late daughter thought the world of her."
"Too much hell-fire," answered Jacob. "She's narrow and self-righteous,

and I don't want any child of mine to grow up either one, or the other."
"A pinch of hell-fire doctrine don't hurt the young," declared Billy. "'Tis
true that you and me know the fire's cold; but a lively sense of the dangers
of wrong-doing be a good tonic for the girls and boys. I keep in touch with
the rising generation, because they believe in me in a way I can't expect you
middle-aged folks to do. And I see what they want—discipline. That ain't
your strong suit, nor yet your wife's. You go in for example; but that's not
enough. You know what's good for a puppy, though I wouldn't say you
know so well what's good for a little human."
Jacob laughed.
"You're a wise old bird—to call you 'old.' But how do you keep so
young in your mind, William? Is it just character, or do you try for it?"
"I try for it," answered Billy. "Yes, I try for it. You can't keep young-
minded at my age without an effort. And this I do. I never look back, Jacob.
I don't drag the past after me, and I'm lucky, maybe, because I haven't got
much in my past to drag. What is it—what is most of the past—but a
garment that makes you discomfortable, a boot that galls? Let the past bury
the past and always look forward."
Jacob considered and struck his gaitered leg with his walking-stick.
"The mind no doubt works healthiest when it's working forward," he

admitted. "I know that much. Even the best of the past makes you turn to
sadness rather than happiness. Because the good time has gone, I suppose,
and never can come back no more."
"That's why business be such a blessing to some minds. Business

always means looking forward—so your father used to say."
"He looked forward sure enough, and I've got to thank him for no little
that he did," replied Bullstone. "A rare man of business, and nobody ever
cut a loss and put it behind him quicker and cleaner than he did. All for
land, and pretty well the last thing he said in my ear was, 'Buy in Brent.' He
knew Brent to be on the up grade in his time, and he'd always buy when he
could. Some nice parcels I've got for building, Billy; but most of them are
not up to my selling price yet."
They talked of Brent and then Jacob looked at his watch.
"Toddle up the valley and have dinner with us."
"Not to-day. I've promised your missis to come Sunday," said William.
CHAPTER VI
HUNTINGDON WARREN
That winter passed without event and life at Red House offered no
incident of apparent significance whence to date—no upraised point from
which the past might be measured, or the future explored. The days
repeated themselves until spring, returning, accelerated all pulses and
unconsciously increased vitality and will to live and enjoy.
Bullstone's lads neared the end of their studies, and when summer came
again, John Henry, in sight of seventeen, prepared for apprenticeship to the
business of his choice.
To-day he was riding over the Moor, with his father and a farmer, to see
sheep, while Margery and the others made pilgrimage for Huntingdon
Warren. They carried their lunch and baskets for the whortleberrries, now
growing ripe again; while more than their own food they took, for there had
come a baby at Huntingdon and Margery conveyed certain delicacies for
the wife of Benny Veale. Old Frederick Veale was dead; but Benny still
worked the warrens; though rumour announced that he had nearly done
with them and, at his wife's entreaty, intended soon to desert the waste and
return into civilisation.
Peter and Auna ran this way and that as they climbed slowly aloft. They
met the goats browsing together presently and played with them a while,
then hastened after the retreating figures of their mother and sister. And
then they played a new game, at the inspiration of Auna, and dyed their
faces and hands with whortleberry juice. They were now Indians and,
sticking a few feathers from a dead carrion crow into their hair, and
brandishing spears, represented by Peter's fishing-rod, they rushed
screaming upon Margery and Avis and demanded food at the point of their
weapons.
Presently they returned to the river beyond Zeal Plains, where Auna and
her brother washed the berry juice from their faces. Then Peter fished and
caught some small trout with a worm. An hour later they tramped forward
to Huntingdon Cross, ate their pasties and cake beside it and so proceeded
to the Warren House.
Red Benny saw them from afar and came to meet Margery. He was now
a stalwart man of forty, and claimed to get more out of the rabbits than any
warrener before him; but that, he vowed, was because he worked harder
than his predecessors. He was lean and immensely strong, and his wife
seemed cut in his own pattern. The unexpected arrival of visitors excited
them, for few ever called at their home. Tourists saw it afar, like a white eye
under the tumulus on the hill behind it; but it seldom happened that
anything but the wild Scotch cattle, or a moorman on a pony, came near the
spot.
Sally Veale's second child was six weeks old, and Sally was by no
means an invalid. She laughed at the nice things Margery had brought and
displayed her baby.
"Red—red," she said. "The daps of Benny."
While Auna and Avis gazed fearfully upon the remains of a dead horse,
and Peter played with Mr. Veale's lean lurchers, despising them in secret,
Sally prattled to her visitor and declared her hatred of the Warren.
"No place for a woman and two babies," she declared; "and my
husband's of my mind. He's pretty well fed up. I want to go to the in-
country and for Benny to be a gamekeeper; and Mr. Blake, to Beggar's
Bush, would take him on next fall, when his head man stops; but Benny's
all for foreign parts and more trapping. He says that in the far north of
Canada, a man like him could face the winters and catch creatures whose
fur be worth their weight in gold. But if he does that, it will be out of the
frying-pan into the fire for me I reckon."
"Work on him to go to Beggar's Bush," advised Margery. "Then you'll

come down to Brent and have your neighbours about you. It's cruel and
unnatural for us women to be shut off from the world."
"That's what I say. But he's all for the wilds again."
Margery talked of the past. Huntingdon had been a spot on her great
holiday pilgrimage with Jacob, before they were wed, and every feature of
that long day's ramble her mind held precious still. The old radiance of the
image was long departed, yet force of a habit, that had extended through
years, still woke an afterglow of interest in certain scenes when she came
among them.
She talked of Benny's father, whom Sally had not known.
Tea was prepared and, while they were eating it, Bullstone and his son
arrived on horseback. They joined the meal and presently, when the young
people were off again, Benny repeated his determination to depart.
Jacob heard the alternative courses and advised him to stop in England,
for the sake of his family. Then he said a thing that surprised Margery.
"So like as not I'll lease the warrens when you go—if ever you really do
go. I'm very much set on Huntingdon. It's the sort of lonely spot that does
me good. If I were to take it, I'd employ a couple of men to live here and
keep a room for myself—for sake of health and peace."
"Easier to say you'll employ men than to do it," answered Benny, "Took
me a month of Sundays to find a boy. The warrens are very near played out
in my opinion. There's not the head of rabbits used to run in my father's
time. Nobody will ever lease 'em again if you don't."
Jacob discoursed of Benny's two boys and asked their names. Then
Margery was shocked.
"Haven't got names yet," confessed Benny. "We can't come to no

agreement. Missis wants a grand sort of name, like 'Fortescue' or
'Champernowne,' and I say 'Fred' after father, or 'Thomas' or 'Richard.' No
good giving children silly names."
"I lived along with the Champernownes as under housemaid," explained

Sally; "and 'tis a valiant name."
"It doesn't go with Veale, however," confessed Jacob.
"But if they're not named, they're not baptized!" exclaimed Margery.
"They are not," admitted their father, "and none the worse so far as I
know."
"They're not Christians then—oh, Benny!"
"No more ain't I," answered the warrener. "It's no good pretending
nothing. No man can breathe a word against me, but I've not got religion
and never felt the want of it. More haven't Sally."
His wife contradicted him, declaring that she had always gone to church
in her maiden days; and Margery was too troubled to speak.
"Duty's duty and I do it; and if ever I've got time, I'll go into religion
also," explained Benny; "but so far time's lacked."
"You must have them baptized whatever you believe, or don't believe,"
declared Jacob. "You can't let your sons be nameless and outside the pale.
That's wrong, Veale, and I hope you'll mend it."
"Don't think I've got anything against religion," replied the other. "It
shall be done, if you reckon it ought, Mr. Bullstone. And I'll name one, and
my wife shall have her way with the other."
"Haven't you heard about original sin?" asked Margery.
"No, never," replied Benny. "But there's no pride in me and my wife.

We'll hunt up some gossips and put the thing in train."
"I'll be one, and I'll buy a christening cake, and you shall come into Red
House on the way home and eat it," said Margery. Even the prospect of this
modest entertainment pleased her.
The parents were much gratified, and still more so when Jacob also
agreed to be a godfather.
"Duty's all right, Benny; but we must have law and order also," he
explained. "This is a Christian land, and though Christians differ a lot and
some take their religion sadly, and some cheerfully, and some so lightly that
it doesn't amount to anything at all, yet we must bow to custom and it won't
do you much good with any master to say you're no Christian; because the
Christian habit is to distrust any who don't subscribe."
It was arranged that when Mrs. Bullstone returned from her holiday to
Plymouth, the children should be received into the Church.
Sally declared great gratification and Benny promised Jacob not to

declare himself a pagan—if merely as a measure of worldly wisdom.
"And I hope you'll go one better presently," added Bullstone, "and find
you can honestly call yourself a member."
"I always keep an open mind," answered the warrener. "I don't quarrel
with nobody's opinions if their practice stands for 'em."
"It's all summed up in that," admitted Jacob. "But, because we fall short
in practice, you godless men mustn't quarrel with our principles. The
principles are loftier than our powers to reach—to make us aim high,
Benny. I don't hold with a lot I hear and see; but then I allow for the poverty
of human nature, finding it in myself. And when you know how poor you
are yourself, you make allowance for others."
Benny listened and so did the women.
"All true as Gospel I'm sure," murmured Sally.
"Yes," said Margery, who had been astonished at Jacob, "and you two
had best set about finding how true the Gospel is."
Somewhat cast down, the warrener and his wife presently witnessed the
departure of the Bullstone family.
Jacob decided to walk back and, to his satisfaction, Peter was allowed to
mount his father's horse and proceed with his brother. The boys were soon
out of sight and Margery, well pleased, walked beside her husband.
The evening was full of gracious light and the west threw a roseal
warmth of colour into the bosom of the Moor. The hour was reflected in
Margery's mood and she found herself happy, weary, content. Jacob, too,
discoursed amiably and praised his eldest son. Sometimes they came thus
closer in spirit and wondered secretly why it was not always so. Yet, even
as the sun sank and they entered the deep gorges of the river, where it
wended toward their home, something of the twilight entered Margery's
mind also, by reason of a thing said.
They had dwelt on the past to their mutual satisfaction and he, she
found, remembered their lovers' walk of old, which had brought them home
again by the same path that now they trod. Their minds were at peace and
no dark thought, for the moment, thrust in upon Jacob; no doubt or dread of
the watcher saddened his wife. Then she asked a question and, though it
was inspired by concern for him alone, there arose out of his answer a spirit
of helplessness in her that was swift to awaken the familiar gloom in him.
Thus the tramp that had begun with both in good heart, drifted them finally
upon silence before they were home again.
"What did you mean about Huntingdon being good for health and
peace, Jacob?" she asked. "I didn't like to say anything before those people.
But you don't mean you feel your health frets you? You're all right?"
"Right enough. We breathe the same air in the valley as they do on the
hill. I didn't mean health of body. I'm so hearty that I don't know my luck in
that respect, or guess what it would mean to be otherwise. Health of mind is
what I meant. A man's mind often gets sick."
"Not yours I'm sure."
"Don't say that, because you're not sure. Who should know that my
mind often falls sick better than you do? And I've found one healing thing,
and that's solitude."
"Surely to God you're solitary enough?"

"You don't know the meaning of solitude," he answered, "because
you've never tried it."
"'Never tried it!' What's my life?"
"You imagine your life's lonely and even such loneliness as ours—so to
call it—casts you down and makes you miserable. Solitude is no physic for
you, and I dare say, if we lived in a town, you'd be a happier woman."
"I'm not lonely really—I know that. Life's a bustling thing—even

mine."
"Company is your food and my poison," he answered. "That's how it is.

Loneliness—what I call loneliness—is as much beyond my power to get, as
company—what you call company—is beyond your power. We've made
our bed together and must lie upon it."
"You ought to have thought of that sooner, if you wanted to be a hermit,

for ever out of sight of your fellow-creatures."
"We've made our bed," he answered, "and what we've got to do is to

keep our eyes on the bright side. Nobody's life pans out perfect. My idea of
a good time would be a month at Huntingdon all alone."
"That wasn't your idea of a good time when you married me; and if you
say that, it only means I've changed you and made you hunger for what you
never wanted before you married."
"You needn't argue it so, Margery. I might as well say that you were
happy with me at Red House long ago, and didn't want anybody else but
me. Life changes our tastes and appetites; life laughs at us, while it makes
us cry sometimes. I want Huntingdon for contrast, because home often
comes between me and my best thoughts—because home often fouls my
thoughts, if you must know. And you—home makes you hunger for change
—change—new ideas—new voices—new faces. Why not? I don't blame
you. We are both smitten and must bend to the rod."
"If you see it so bitter clear, perhaps you could alter it," she said.
"No, no. We can't alter it. I can't be different; you can't be different. It
would only be pretending to alter, and pretence could bring no content to
either of us. But time—time may make us different. We'll grow numb as we
grow old."
Margery was indignant. She restrained tears with difficulty.
"I've prayed for a lot of things," she said. "I never thought to pray to
grow old."
"Changes are coming," he replied. "The children will go out into the
world."
"Then perhaps you'll have a little of the peace you thirst for."
"I'm too selfish ever to get peace," he replied. "That's the crux and curse
of loving a woman as I've loved you. Love and peace can't walk together.
You don't understand that. No matter. It only means that if half of you is
getting what it wants, then the other half cannot. The knot is there. We can't
be happy together, and it's still more certain I can't be happy apart. But you
could. That's the difference."
"And you think I might be happy, knowing you weren't? Why d'you say
that? What have I done to sink below you in love?"
"I don't know—I wish I did," he answered.
"And you spend your whole life trying to find out," she retorted. "And
so you waste your life, because there's nothing to find out."
Occasionally, in moments of indignation, she had accused him thus

before; and now that happened which had previously happened on such
challenges. He said not another word.
At the kennels he stopped and turned away, while she followed her
children to the house.
CHAPTER VII
SUNDAY
John Henry, Avis and their mother had come on a Sunday, to drink tea
with Margery's parents and go to chapel afterwards.
There was trouble in the air; indeed Mr. Huxam, who happened to be
ailing, declared that he never remembered so many problems demanding
solution at one time. When he was indisposed, he always dwelt on the
blessings of retirement and declared that the 'villa residence' he designed to
build for his declining years should now be erected.
"I feel it borne in upon me very much of late that we ought to begin," he
told Margery, and she agreed with him.
"Jacob's always saying you should start. Not a week ago he was telling
me that his bit of land on the north side of the railway ought to suit you
down to the ground."
"I've let the chance slip," declared Barlow, coughing and patting his
chest. "If I'd been awake, I should have purchased a site ten years ago; but
what with one thing and another—chiefly Jeremy—I never seemed to have
the necessary dollop of money."
"It wasn't that," argued Mrs. Huxam. "Jeremy, though he hasn't found
the exact work yet, can't be said to have cost much in money, if he has in
thought. I always warned against looking too far ahead touching the villa
residence. But now I do think the time has come."
"'Peace with honour' is what you and me have a right to," answered
Barlow, "and if Jacob, among his possessions down this way, has got an
acre or thereabout, to please your mother, Margery, so much the better. I
want to see the house started."
"Jeremy's really going," Margery told them; but it was no news. Indeed
his mother knew more than she.
"I won't speak about the past," she began, "though I haven't heard
anybody say that Jeremy failed as huckster, or Jane to market. But now,
with a family on the way, the circumstances are changed. So like as not
Jeremy will come into Brent and take over Michael Catts' little business—
the green-grocer's."
"Leave Owley Cot?"
"Yes. It hasn't suited him too well and he's a good bit cut off from
religion up there."
"What changes!" murmured Margery. "Jacob says that Joe Elvin is

going down hill rather quick. His health's giving out. In fact Jacob's
beginning to look round already for a new tenant, if it must be. Just now
we've got distemper in the kennels and he's lost some valuable young dogs."
"I hope he's taking it in a Christian spirit then," answered Judith. "He's
had an amazing deal of good fortune in his time, by the will of God, and
such men are often a great disappointment under affliction."
"He's vexed, of course, but he doesn't whine about it. You'll never see
him cry out if he's hurt."
"His steady luck has not hurt Jacob, as luck is apt to do," said Barlow.
"He keeps an even front."
"But he's not sound and commits himself to a very doubtful thought
sometimes," replied Mrs. Huxam. "A jealous God reads every heart,
Margery, and won't suffer no looseness in matters of doctrine."
"He does nothing but good—a very honourable and upright man, and
more than that," said Margery. "You must be all right if you make the world
happier than you find it."
"It is your place to stand up for him," returned Judith, "and, in reason, a
wife ought to say the best she knows of her husband; but actions may spring
from all sorts of motives. Good actions may arise from bad motives, owing
to the ignorance and also the devious cunning of men and women. All
we've got to cling to is the Light, and if a man shows the Light doubtfully,
then, however he may seem to shine, we can't be sure of him."
Margery had concealed from her parents the gap that existed in
understanding between Jacob and herself. Her father cordially approved of
him; her mother had ever expressed herself as uncertain. Now her daughter
declared surprise at this fact.
"I've always got to champion Jacob against you," she said. "But I should
have thought you'd have been the first to see his qualities. He's like you in a
way—don't care for pleasure, or company, and keeps a guard over his lips,
and works morning, noon and night. If Jeremy had been like that——"
Mrs. Huxam was not annoyed.
"You can't see all round the human character as I can, Margery," she
answered, "and I don't blame you, because such a bird's-eye view only
comes with years, and between husband and wife it often never comes at
all. What the deep eye looks to is the foundations. In Jeremy's case I laid the
foundation, being my work as his mother. And in your case I laid the
foundation also. Jeremy has a character that you might call weak, and
without religion he would very likely have brought our grey hairs with
sorrow to the grave—if I was that sort of woman, which I am not. But the
foundation is there, and as for the building, though it ain't very grand to the
eye yet, that's the Lord's business. Jacob puts up a finer show, being a man
with money-making gifts and experience; but where the foundations are
doubtful, who can say what may happen if a shock comes?"
"I wouldn't call his foundations doubtful," answered Margery. "I should
say his foundations were the strongest part about him. Not that I've ever
seen them. Nobody has. Jeremy, for all his weakness and instinct for
change, gets more out of life than Jacob. Jacob misses a lot by his nature."
"If he misses anything that he'd be the better for having, be sure there's a
reason," asserted Judith. "Haven't I seen it thousands of times? Don't ninety-
nine men and women out of a hundred miss a lot, just because the one thing
needful—the absolute trust and certainty that all is for the best—be denied
them?"
"He doesn't grant that all's for the best, because he doesn't think or feel
so," answered Margery.
"There you are then! That's weak faith. That's what I'm telling you. The
man who pits his opinions against God and doubts of the righteous fate of
the world is next door to a lost man himself."
"He's talked of these things," answered Jacob's wife, "for I've

challenged him sometimes and said how I believe, with you, that nothing
happens that's not ordained to happen. But he won't grant that. He holds
much evil happens that we might escape, if men were wiser and more
patient and reasonable. He's great on reason."
"I'm sorry to hear it," replied Judith. "Reason is well known for a very
faulty shift and the play-ground of the devil. Reason don't save no souls, but
it damns a parlous number, and I wish I could feel a lot surer than I do
where Jacob will spend his eternity."
Margery was not moved at this dreadful suspicion.
"Goodness is goodness and can't be badness," she said, "and goodness is

rewarded. Jacob says religion can't alter your instincts, or your nature; and
if you're the fidgety, anxious sort, belief in the Almighty won't make you
less so. You may know perfectly well that you ought to trust, like a lamb
trusts its mother; but Jacob says you can't always keep your mind fixed on
God, when it's full to bursting with a wife and children. I know what he
means well enough."
"Do you? Then I'm cruel sorry to hear it," answered Judith, who was
much perturbed. "What's religion for but to alter your instincts and your
wretched nature? If I thought that man was weakening your faith by a hair's

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Instrumental Autonomy Political

Socialization and Citizenship Identity A

Education Citizenship and Cuban Identity 1st Edition

The Citizen in Teaching and Education: Student Identity

Science Communication: Culture, Identity and

Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education

What s Left of the World Education Identity and the

The Korean Diaspora in Post War Japan Geopolitics

Bilingual Education and Minority Language Maintenance

Money, Autonomy and Citizenship: The Experience of the

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11911

ISSN 2365-6255 ISSN 2365-6263 (electronic)

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature

Hong Kong Mengyan (Yolanda) Yu

1 Introduction: A Third Trial of National Identity

The Third Stage: The Combined Inﬂuences of Manchurian

Globalization seriously challenges the traditional authority of state as the flow of

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017 1

into a perfect case to interpret the equilibrium of ideological emancipation and

Banks JA (2004) Democratic citizenship education in multicultural societies. Jossey-Bass, San

Citizenship Identity, Origins, and Way Ahead

three political ideologies of socialism (China), communism (North Korea), and

capable and aware to manage to recruit stateless people and to consolidate

Ideology of Communism and Civil Religion

In some societies, just as why we are discussing the post-communism ideo-

Ideological development process, being signiﬁcant in terms of shaping people’s

achieved through politics, which explains why in many post-communism political

Historical Evolvement of Chinese Nationalism

Jacob appeared to be as usual and the contents of his letters served to

"We'll go to bed," he said.

"Not till you've forgiven me."

"I'm so sorry, dear. I seem to get so clumsy."

Her next word accentuated his error.

"You may be right; but it's contrary to my nature to play schoolmaster.

On a winter's morning the Red House children were playing in a great

This famous playground found a small company of children and dogs

"He can't do it—no Irish terrier could do it," answered Peter.

"Did you make 'em, Mr. Marydrew?" asked Auna.

"I've been to Owley," he said. "My brother-in-law's weakening. Doesn't

The ancient laughed.

"What's the matter with the man?"

"Too much hell-fire," answered Jacob. "She's narrow and self-righteous,

"The mind no doubt works healthiest when it's working forward," he

"That's why business be such a blessing to some minds. Business

They talked of Brent and then Jacob looked at his watch.

"Toddle up the valley and have dinner with us."

"Red—red," she said. "The daps of Benny."

"Work on him to go to Beggar's Bush," advised Margery. "Then you'll

She talked of Benny's father, whom Sally had not known.

"Haven't got names yet," confessed Benny. "We can't come to no

"I lived along with the Champernownes as under housemaid," explained

"But if they're not named, they're not baptized!" exclaimed Margery.

"They're not Christians then—oh, Benny!"

"Haven't you heard about original sin?" asked Margery.

"No, never," replied Benny. "But there's no pride in me and my wife.

Sally declared great gratification and Benny promised Jacob not to

Benny listened and so did the women.

"All true as Gospel I'm sure," murmured Sally.

"Not yours I'm sure."

"Surely to God you're solitary enough?"

"'Never tried it!' What's my life?"

"I'm not lonely really—I know that. Life's a bustling thing—even