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Journal of
Managerial Dysfunctionality in
Psychology
14,7/8
``citizenship'' behaviour in
decentralized organizations
526
A research note
Nada Korac-Kakabadse and Andrew Korac-Kakabadse
Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield, UK, and
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Alexander Kouzmin
University of Western Sydney-Nepean, Kingswood, New South Wales,
Australia
Keywords Individual behaviour, Leadership, Corporate culture, Interaction,
Self-managing teams
Abstract Emerging in the literature on organizational design is the question of the efficacy of
self-managed work groups. From task-forces and matrix prescriptions of the 1970s, imperatives
towards de-centralization, networked capabilities and self-managed teams seem to be part of the
IT-driven prescriptions emanating from contemporary re-structuring and social re-engineering of
workplaces. This article explores some interesting dysfunctionality dynamics of corporate
``citizenship'' behaviour in de-centralized contexts and suggests the necessity to study, in some
further depth, the unquestioned virtues of self-regulated and de-centralized teams. As the article
implies, cultural engineering, leadership dynamics and complex motivation/citizenship behaviour
within such organized settings also require critical re-examination.
Introduction
Work life involves more than just doing one's job. Employees bring to the
workplace aspirations and visions as to what their futures hold; providing the
basis for career interests that may be independent of the job being performed.
They also bring personalities; attitudes; values; preferences and beliefs and sets
of commitment from outside work, allowing these external interests to shape
the way they act in relation to the job, career and the organization (Organ,
1990). The tensions existing between different interests one wishes to pursue
makes the individual relationship to work inherently ``political'' (Morgan, 1986,
p. 150), even before one takes into account the existence and actions of other
organizational members.
The orientation of different people towards these tensions varies from
context to context, producing great variety in styles of behaviour. While some
individuals are committed to doing their job as an end in itself, others are more
careerist, and yet others spend their energy attempting to make work life less
onerous or as comfortable and consistent with their personal preferences as
possible. Many individuals manage to achieve their aims and aspirations,
shaping their mission in a way that allows them to achieve their aims at once,
Journal of Managerial Psychology,
Vol. 14 No. 7/8, 1999, pp. 526-544.
while others have to content themselves with compromising positions (Organ,
# MCB University Press, 0268-3946 1990). Motivating factors that underpin the varied styles of extra role
behaviours of careerism; gamesmanship; task commitment; rigidity; ``turf Dysfunctionality
protection''; zealousness; detachment and free wheeling lend the politics of in ``citizenship''
organizational life its detailed character (Morgan, 1986, p. 151). behaviour
Employees' extra role behaviour may be perceived as ingratiation or as
organizational ``citizenship'' behaviour, depending on motive, others' perception
of their behaviour or both (Schanke, 1991; Eastman, 1994). Ingratiation is
usually defined as a political tactic employees use to further their personal 527
interest, often at the expense of their employing organizations (Wortman and
Linsenmeier, 1977). Organizational citizenship behaviour is defined as
``individual behaviour that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized
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by the formal reward system which, in the aggregate, promotes the effective
functioning of the organization'' (Organ, 1988, p. 4).
Fandt and Ferris (1990) postulated that some self-interested behaviours on
the part of employees may be beneficial to organizations and that some pro-
social behaviours may also benefit individuals. Thus, without knowing the
motive of an employee, it is difficult to differentiate between ingratiation and
citizenship behaviour, provided that political tactics used are settled (Schanke,
1991). Eastman (1994, p. 1390) found that group leaders respond positively to
extra role behaviour when employees' motives are perceived as good
citizenship and negatively when perceived as ingratiation. This implies that
some employees, with strong influencing tactics, may behave covertly and
project their motive on others as citizenship behaviour.
However, individuals' and groups' behaviour and standards of right and
wrong are not the sole determinant of their decisions (Trevino, 1986). Instead,
beliefs interact with other individual characteristics, such as locus of control,
and contextual factors, such as an organization's rewards, punishment and
culture. Perceived organizational support, ``a general perception concerning the
extent to which the organization values employees'' (Eisenberger et al., 1990,
p. 51), is also a mediating factor in citizenship behaviour. Trevino (1986)
explicates how individuals can choose to engage in acts they consider unethical
when the culture of an organization and its prevailing reward structure
overwhelm personal belief systems.
The presence or absence of ethical behaviour in organizational members'
actions both is influenced by prevailing culture (ethical climate) and, in turn,
partially determines the culture's view of ethical issues. Eisenberger et al.
(1990) argue that an employee's perception of how an organization values him/
her may be vital for determining whether any attitudes or behaviours
benefiting the organization emerge from the social exchange relationship.
Organizational culture may promote assumptions of responsibility for factors
taken by individuals and groups, thereby increasing the probability that both
will behave in an ethical manner (Wayne et al., 1997). Alternatively, culture
may diffuse responsibility for the consequences of unethical behaviour, thereby
making such behaviour more likely.
In addition, there is the increased potential for ``group-think'' (Janis, 1972) ± a
mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in
Journal of cohesive in-groups; when members striving for unanimity over-ride their
Managerial motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action (Janis, 1972,
Psychology p. 46). Group-think, even ``cult-like'' behaviour, can occur in almost any
organization (Sims, 1992). Alternatively, individuals can seize control of
14,7/8 organizational cultures, through spanning leadership and social leadership
tactics, and single-handedly rule the group in an ethical or unethical manner,
528 but almost always at a cost to group members.
(Kouzmin, 1980a; 1980b; 1983) and organized life; the basic tension being that in
subordinating action to the managerialized will of the organization, actors
surrender some autonomy in organizational participation (Barnard, 1938,
p. 17). The ability of culture to control has to do with the social structure of the
organization concerned, represented as a combination of the degree of formal
structuring of the organization and the degree of social pressure to conform ±
itself a product of social bonding and a sense of community. The anthropologist
Douglas (1973, p. 77) described these dimensions, psychologically, in terms of a
society's ``grid'' and ``group''.
Two cases are briefly outlined to explore the dynamics of enhanced cultural
control. In the case of the multinational management consultancy corporation,
with its informal structure, sense of professional community and social
pressure to conform, one of the groups experienced concerted control in a ``cult-
like'' fashion. In the case of a large telecommunication corporation, with its
bureaucratic culture and in the process of change to a flatter structure, a
division experienced cultural and coercive control by a manipulative individual
who took control of the culture.
Politically, the first example corresponds to a post-bureaucratic organization
or organization with a flatter hierarchy and peer management; exemplified by
self-managed or self-directing teams in which control emerges not from rational
rules and hierarchy but from the concertive, value-based actions (Satow, 1975)
of organizational members (Soeters, 1986; Ogilvy, 1990; Parker, 1992) ± an
organizational culture that has much greater prospects for innovation and
entrepreneurial ventures but much less prospect for central control. However,
concertive structure often results in a form of control more powerful, less
apparent and more difficult to resist than that of the former ``bureaucracy''
(Tompkins and Cheney, 1985; Barker, 1993), ``technological control'' (Davis and
Lawrence, 1977; Galbraith, 1973; 1977) or ``simple control'' (Edwards, 1981).
Tompkins and Cheney (1985) argue that the numerous variations of the de-
bureaucratized organization (matrix, ad hoc, self-managed teams) represent a
new type of control: ``concertive'' control where the locus of control shifts from
management by authority and rules to the value-based system where
employees negotiate consensus on how to shape behaviour according to a set of
core values (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). In the concertive organization, the locus of
authority (Whitley, 1977) transfers from the bureaucratic system and its
rational-legal constitutive rules to the value consensus of the members and its Dysfunctionality
socially-created generative rules system. Employees in a concertive in ``citizenship''
organization create the meanings that, in turn, structure the system of their behaviour
own control. Rule generation moves from the traditional manager-subordinate
relationship to the actors' negotiated consensus about values. Concertive
control works by blurring substantive and formal rationality into a
``communal-rationality'' system (Barker, 1993). Concertive employees create a 529
communal values system that eventually controls their action through rules.
Thus, team members are socially constructed by the system they have created
(Mumby and Sthol, 1991).
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Concertive control does not free employees from Weber's (1978, pp. 180-81)
``iron cage'' or rational rules, as culturalist and practitioner-oriented writers on
contemporary organizations often argue (Drucker, 1988; Peters, 1988; Kanter,
1989). Instead, an ironic paradox occurs: the ``iron cage'' becomes stronger. Peer
management increases the total amount of control in a concertive system
through two important dynamics. First, concertive employees have created this
system through their own shared value consensus, enforced on each other.
Second, the reason for the increased power of concertive control is that the way
it becomes manifested is less apparent than bureaucratic control (Barker, 1993,
pp. 433-4). The powerful influence of ``peer pressure and rational rules in the
concertive systems creates a new `iron cage' whose bars are almost invisible to
the employees it incarcerates'' (Barker, 1993, p. 435). Concertive employees
must invest a part of themselves in the team. They must identify strongly with
their team's values and goals, its norms and rules. If they want to resist their
team's control, they must be willing to risk their human dignity, being made to
feel unworthy as a ``team-mate'' (Barker, 1993, p. 436). Entrapment in the ``iron
cage'' is the cost of concertive control (Barker, 1993, p. 435). In Weber's (1978,
pp. 987-8) words, the individual in a modern organization ``cannot squirm out of
the apparatus into which he has been harnessed''.
Perhaps the concertive control experienced by the multinational
management consultancy corporation exemplifies two theoretical predictions
about the future of organizational activity. First, it asserts that organizational
life will become increasingly rationalized and controlled (Foucault, 1976, 1980;
Weber, 1978) and, second, that organizational control will become less apparent
and more powerful (Tannenbaum, 1968; Edwards, 1981; Tompkins and
Cheney, 1985). On the other hand, the telecommunication corporation example
reflects adversely on traditional bureaucratic use of cultural champions in
effecting organizational change.
organization and grows and moves gradually towards the core. This is the
process of natural, organic change that proceeds through the development of a
shared vision of how the group should operate; grows through the
reinforcement of successful experience and spreads through imitation by other
units. It is slow to mature and is unpredictable in its consequences. There is a
question as to whether that is what the organization is seeking in the pursuit of
development and cultural change (Hendry and Hope, 1994).
The influence of the manipulative individual at the grass-roots cultural
exchange level can be quite forming. In the case of the multinational
management consultancy corporation, an ``ex-cult'' member and external
consultant, hired regularly over the years, seized the opportunity provided by
the context of grass-roots cultural change and self-directed teams to grow a
successful operation, in a cult-like manner, over a period of 15 years. In 1981,
the leader of the personal development group recruited the training services of
the external consultant, Maundy, on a contractual basis, for self-development
programmes specializing in ``personal development skills''. Although she did
not have a traditional education in psychology and psychotherapy, she had a
general degree and her personal strengths and ``influencing skills'' got her the
job. As the programme was expanding, there was a need for additional trainers
and Maundy's husband at the time, Jonathan, joined the group as a consultant
trainer.
Shortly after, Victoria, one of the group's tenured consultant members,
approached the group leader, an established psychotherapist, with a complaint
that Maundy was un-cooperative and difficult to work with and, furthermore,
that Maundy ``ran the show her own way''. The group leader listened
sympathetically and promised to talk to Maundy, but with no visible outcomes.
Months later, when Maundy accused Victoria publicly of stealing her work and
undermining her programme, Victoria found the situation at first embarrassing
and then unbearable. She gracefully made a lateral move to a different group.
Within a year, the group's other tenured consultant made a similar lateral move
with the excuse that she wanted to develop different skills. This consultant
later made it known that she could not work in a group where the senior
partner, and a designated group leader, served merely as a figure-head, whilst
the external consultant, Maundy, led the group without any consultation with
other group members.
In the meantime, Maundy re-married and business had been growing. New Dysfunctionality
positions were filled on a regular basis by two new external consultants ± in ``citizenship''
Maundy's new husband and ex-husband's new wife. With time, the programme behaviour
expanded, creating room for new staff. These positions were filled, over time,
by Maundy's personal live-in friends ± a husband and wife who also shared the
same household with Maundy and her second husband. Maundy also brought
to the group her two friends and proteÂgeÂs who had been ``trained'' by her as 531
``self-development trainers''. Of course, during this time, a number of other
consultants applied to join the group. However, they seldom passed Maundy's
scrutiny. The few outsiders who managed to pass Maundy's initial scrutiny left
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the group after a brief stay of four weeks while others had their contracts
terminated by the group leader after an initial contract period of one year.
In 1993, the multinational management consultancy corporation assessed
individual group performance and recommended, amongst other things, that
due to growing programme expansion in the Management Development Group,
there was a need for additional staff. Considering that June, the designated
group leader, was the only tenured consultant in the group, it was
recommended that help of at least one tenured consultant was needed to help
run ``self-development'' programmes. This solution was also seen to be more
economical than paying for services of external consultants. Unable to delay
the hiring process any longer, in 1994, June recruited John, whose role, besides
delivering training programmes, was to re-vitalize existing programmes and
develop new ones according to market demand. John, a qualified and
experienced psychotherapist and a highly sensitive person, attempted to
integrate into the group but, at the same time, sought to establish work-plans
and timetables for each consulting trainer. When, after months, he failed to
obtain relevant information regarding tasks and responsibilities of individual
members within the group, he realized that Maundy was in charge of the group
and June was leader in name only.
The second thing John observed was that Maundy and all the female
trainers in the group had one thing in common: little heart-shaped gold
earrings. For months, John tried very hard to lobby June to take control of the
group, only to realize that June had little emotional robustness to confront her
personal friend and professional guru, Maundy, who was also her inner
strength and guide in a rather unhappy personal life. Although Maundy's
extra-role behaviour operated in a ``modal'' or ``exchangeable'' (Burns, 1978)
way with June, her motivation was based on the need to control the group and
gain rewards of additional honorary and other special benefits. June received
higher order, non-concrete rewards such as moral support and guidance for her
unhappy personal life. John tolerated Maundy's favourite accusation that he
was trying to ``undermine'' her programme. When Maundy tried to come
between John and his wife, Victoria, by projecting him as ``bad guy'' and
Victoria as ``good guy'', John recognized the cult tactics at work. With little
investigation he found that Maundy and her first husband, Jonathan, had spent
ten years in a cult commune led by Nadine Scott, an American who, in the late
Journal of 1970s, started the group known as the ``family'' in a small village of Stoke
Managerial Hammond in the UK and, later, moved, with her mostly British and Dutch
Psychology followers, to the hilltop village of Areia in Portugal (Hooper and Bunting, 1997).
During the ten years spent in the family, Maundy and Jonathan learned ``self-
14,7/8 development skills'' from charismatic Nadine who, according to a British judge
in 1984, had scant and meagre schooling and a total lack of substantial
532 qualifications but had managed to latch on to the vogue concept of group
therapy in the 1960s (Hooper and Bunting, 1997; Nash, 1997). What particularly
concerned the judge was that Nadine had ``not been subjected to any of the
disciplines required by any professional training . . . allowing her to assess the
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risks and limits of therapy or group pressure or its effect on weaker group
members, their marriage and family'' (Hooper and Bunting, 1997, p. 2).
Although Maundy and Jonathan officially left Nadine's ``family'' when she
moved to Portugal, they established their own cult group in the middle of the
large multinational management consultancy corporation with operations in
five continents. Like Nadine, Maundy did not possess formal psychotherapy
qualifications, was training other members of her group and provided services
to numerous clients who were unaware of these issues.
John recognized that Maundy's eloquence, command of facts, passionate
commitment and sheer tenacity and endurance could win the day, adding to her
personal power to inflict decisions with which she was involved (Morgan,
1986). Realizing that he could not make any progress, John approached the
executive director with a request for a lateral move to another group, giving
reasons for the request. Talking to other colleagues, John discovered that a
majority of his colleagues had knowledge that the group operated in an
unorthodox way, that June was a group leader in name only and that no
tenured consultant member could integrate into the group. However, as the
group operated successfully and profitably, and no formal complaint had ever
been lodged, management never got involved.
Individuals in cult or ``group-think'' cultures use a variety of ``collective
patterns of defensive avoidance'' (Janis and Mann, 1977, p. 129). The symptoms
of this behaviour are high esprit de corps and amiability among members (often
leading members to believe that those who question their approach or
intentions are acting irrationally); over-commitment; excessive or blind loyalty
to the group; a strong desire of members to continue as group members; an
arrogance and over-confidence; insulation from ethical opinion and control; and
leader's promotion of unethical decisions (Janis and Man, 1977; Cosier and
Schwenk, 1990; Sims, 1992).
In the case of the multinational management consultancy corporation, a
number of those symptoms were operational ± the strong esprit de corps in the
group and amiability among the members (couples living together in the same
household); excessive or blind loyalty to the group by members ± such as
sharing the same symbols of heart-shaped earrings; consuming certain types of
food before executing training courses; a strong desire of members to continue
as a group; arrogance and over-confidence ± exemplified by Maundy's
arrogance in running the programme her way; insulation from ethical control ± Dysfunctionality
such as using unethical tactics to eliminate opponents and interfering in in ``citizenship''
personal likes; and the leader's promotion of unethical decisions ± as exhibited behaviour
by June's support of Maundy's actions in order to secure group wins.
introduce humour into the division and the organization as a whole in the
manner that Henry Kissinger introduced humour to diplomacy. Thus, besides a
standard team-building exercise incorporated in the ``happy working''
programme, Ken introduced a weekly coming together ± ``bonding'' time. These
times consisted of extended lunches, afternoons together through entertainment
activities of game playing, and eating or outings together. However, during this
bonding time, Ken also offered open feedback to individual members in front of
the group. Furthermore, feedback was given in what Ken called a humourous
manner, but recipients perceived this feedback as being very crude and
involving unacceptable language in the workplace. During bonding time Ken
would call many people by derogative names, such as ``you're a lazy so and so'',
stating that if he were his or her boss he would fire them. Those comments were
always delivered with laughter. Ken also encouraged others to talk through
humour frankly and openly to others, regardless of their position in the
workplace. He would urge them to identify what they did, and did not, like about
them. He proclaimed that he wanted to establish a sort of ``time-out'' where
anyone was free to say anything, an arena where it was possible to ridicule
existing rituals, practices and values. However, he also ridiculed members
without ``safe distance'' (Srivastava et al., 1988) and, thus, with great offence.
Knowing that Ken was on a one-year contract and a personal friend of the
departmental director, section managers complained to each other about Ken's
behaviour and methods, but decided to give him some time to settle in before
doing anything. Some had tried to resist the new culture in which Ken
encouraged everyone to be brutally honest with each other during bonding
time. However, those were made to feel traitors of the group. A kind of
``concertive control'' (Tompkins and Cheney, 1985) grew out of a substantial
consensus about group values ± a concertive structure that resulted in a form of
control more powerful, less apparent and more difficult to resist than that of the
formal bureaucracy. The irony of the change in the department was that
instead of building a ``happy working'' climate, by loosening the ``iron cage'' of
rule-based, rational control (Weber, 1978, p. 180), control actually became
tighter, by the group and by Ken.
Those who resisted acceptance of the new culture contemplated by-passing
the director and approaching the company president for help. Unfortunately, at
the same time, the president had become ill and was absent from work for most
of the time. Others pretended acceptance of Ken's new culture but, underneath, Dysfunctionality
turned to friends and therapists for help. Responding to the question as to why in ``citizenship''
nobody reported dissatisfaction to the president, one section manager replied,
``No one likes to be the skunk at the garden party. One does not make friends
behaviour
and influence people in the boardroom or elsewhere by raising unpopular
issues that create embarrassment or discomfort for top management''. Other
section managers replied that they had hoped that the year would end soon and 535
that ``there was no need to rock the boat''. At year's end, members of the design
department realized that their hardship was far from being over as Allen had
renewed Ken's contract for an additional year.
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Now, panic set in as everyone in the department realized that this process
might continue for years to come. Desperate for help, many section managers
started to look for help elsewhere ± outside the organization. A number of
section managers hired local consultants to help them with coping strategies
for combating Ken's behaviour and the institutionalization of his values and his
culture. In some cases, these consultants provided moral support and survival
skills for what many saw as an uncomfortably difficult situation. In total, seven
consultants were hired to help combat the power of the single change
consultant. The action taken by section managers was in line with theories of
action that stress a free and informal choice of limits; a choice of negative-
feedback ``noxiants'' one wishes to avoid rather than just a choice of ends with
minimally defensive interpersonal relations (Argyris and Schon, 1982; Morgan,
1986; Schott, 1991) ± a strategy which could be encouraged by ``bottom-up''
innovation or defence processes that question the limits placed on innovation
(Morgan, 1986). However, expenditure on consultants (Ken and others) was
difficult to justify.
The theory of transitional phenomena suggests that in situations of
voluntary change, the person doing the changing must be in control of the
process (Winnicott, 1958), for change ultimately hinges on questions of identity
which, in this case, had been threatened (Vheney, 1991). In order to create an
innovative situation, a change agent must help create an environment where
actors can explore their situation and options they face with minimal threat.
Being a large and structured organization and, as such, subject to a number of
changes in a top-down or ``molar'' fashion, members of the department were
inexperienced with, and unskilled for, coping with change at the grass-roots
level ± especially controlled by one individual.
Promoting honesty
In discussing quality and breadth, there is need for openness but also for
honesty. A good litmus test for a decision's openness is the scrutiny of public
opinion. A variation of this is the ``sunshine test''; that is, to imagine how one
would feel if one's ideas were to be seen on the front page of the press. With
hierarchies collapsing (Abrahamsson, 1977) and less power derived from
formal rank (Mechanic, 1962; Laurent, 1978), there will be added emphasis on
negotiation and persuasion. Team members will increasingly have to elicit the
co-operation of employees over whom they have no formal authority and will
increasingly need to utilize persuasion skills (Bass, 1975). The issue of honesty
will become of paramount importance as well as citizen motivation in extra-role
behaviour.
Journal of Rotation and training
Managerial Periodically, it is necessary to rotate new members into groups and old
Psychology members out (Cosier and Schwenk, 1990). Groups can become prisons of set
ways of doing things and set patterns of seeing the outside world, of gathering
14,7/8 information, of defending customers and markets. What were once core
competencies, if cultivated too long and too tightly, are liable to become core
538 rigidities likely to breed incompetence in responding to new circumstances.
Self-managed teams are formal and ``permanent'' organizational units that
typically consist of five to 20 members working together on an ongoing, day-to-
day basis. Because members have responsibility for their former supervisors,
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Cultural audits
Periodically, it is also necessary to conduct cultural audits (Korac-Kakabadse
and Kouzmin, 1997). The purpose of cultural audit is to determine whether
changes are needed in the organizational climate, codes and the enforcement of Dysfunctionality
cultural and ethics policies. Such audits require careful analysis of the existing in ``citizenship''
practices in the organization, including the validation of current practices, behaviour
determining questionable external issues (relations with clients) and internal
issues (whether the organization's own reward system hinders the performance
of certain quality procedures). Furthermore, implementing a new cultural
policy requires support in the form of change and ethics training programmes 539
for all employees. These programmes need to interpret the underlying cultural,
ethical and legal principles and present practical aspects of carrying out
procedural guidelines (Drake and Drake, 1988; Korac-Kakabadse and Knyght,
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1996).
Most actors develop heuristics for dealing with organizational issues and
dilemmas (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985). Newstorm and Ruch (1975, p. 32) found
top executives to be a ``key reference group in providing an important source of
managers' behavioural standards''. A survey, by Weaver and Ferrell (1977), of
marketing practitioners reached a similar conclusion, finding that the existence
of an enforceable corporate behaviour policy influences beliefs towards various
ethical behaviours. A cross-cultural study of Irish, UK and US managers
(Alderson and Kakabadse, 1994, p. 439) highlights that the impact of top
management influence on the behaviour and attitudes of personnel lower down
the organization varies according to national culture and identity.
The study emphasized that UK and Irish top management need to behave
according to the ethical standards they have set. The whole of the executive
team needs to constantly display a behaviour pattern that accentuates
commitment to the organization's code of behaviour (Alderson and Kakabadse,
1994). The study concluded that codes of ethical behaviour, in whatever form
(lengthy documents to a brief section in the mission statement), require the
clear communication of organizational values which are being espoused and
that this ``responsibility falls inexorably on top management'' (Selznick, 1957;
Alderson and Kakabadse, 1994, p. 439). Thus, although socialization and
cultural differences shape one's ethical beliefs (Preble and Miesing, 1984),
learning and re-inforcement processes are instrumental in re-learning and
substituting newly desired behaviour for existing, inappropriate ones
(Mathews, 1988). Managers apparently need courage, as well as an ethical
infrastructure, to lead de-centralizing networked organizations forward.
Conclusion
Self-managed work groups have been a relatively ignored phenomenon in
managerialist circles for some time. It is now conventional wisdom that
decentralization, networks and IT-driven re-structuring of organizations have
axiomatic connotations with dimensions of self-management teams/self-
regulating work groups. This paper has sought, via two cameo cases, to
highlight the ``dark side'' of enhanced control, brought about by cultural
manipulation and an overly optimistic faith in the efficacy of self-regulating
groups. In the professional arena, self-regulated work groups have been, in the
Journal of limited literature identified in this paper, presented positively (Satow, 1975;
Managerial Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). Whether the positive virtues of such self-managed
Psychology capacity can be extended to wider employment situations, especially driven by
so-called IT imperatives, is certainly problematic and requires more detailed
14,7/8 investigation. As this paper has implied, cultural engineering, leadership
dynamics and complex motivation/citizenship behaviour (Giacalone and
540 Greenberg, 1997) within such organized settings also require critical re-
examination.
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Extra pagination
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and fully-searchable by keywords.
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